Social Development Department Europe and Central Asia Series August 2009 56166 Agricultural Activities, Water, and Gender in Tajikistan's Rural Sector: A Social Assessment of Konibodom, Bobojon Ghafurov, and Yovon THE WORLD BANK | WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROJECT ( FVWRMP ) | GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN FERGHANA VALLEY Agricultural Activities, Water, and Gender in Tajikistan's Rural Sector: A Social Assessment of Konibodom, Bobojon Ghafurov, and Yovon World Bank | Government of the Republic of Tajikistan Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Project (FVWRMP) August 2009 Table of Contents Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................................v Glossary of Terms .................................................................................................................................................................... vi Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................... vii Purpose, Scope, and Impact ....................................................................................................................... vii Summary of Findings .................................................................................................................................. vii 1. Background, Rationale, and Methodology..................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Social Assessment Focus ......................................................................................................................... 2 1.3 Social Assessment Methodology ........................................................................................................... 2 1.4 Previous Studies on Tajikistan's Rural/Agricultural Sector .............................................................. 3 1.5 Organization of the Report ..................................................................................................................... 4 2. Socioeconomic Conditions, Access to Land, and Agricultural Activities ......................................................... 5 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 Demographic Profile................................................................................................................................. 5 2.3 Migration.................................................................................................................................................... 6 2.4 Employment .............................................................................................................................................. 7 2.5 Income and Subsistence ........................................................................................................................... 7 2.6 Access to Land ........................................................................................................................................... 8 2.7 Farming Practices and Possession of Livestock .................................................................................. 11 2.8 Gender and Agricultural Activities ...................................................................................................... 12 2.9 Summary of Main Findings .................................................................................................................. 14 3. Access to Water and Structure of Water Provisions ................................................................................................... 15 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 15 3.2 Background ............................................................................................................................................. 15 3.3 Institutional Setting ................................................................................................................................ 16 3.4 Access to Water and Water Shortages.................................................................................................. 18 3.5 Consequences of Water-Related Difficulties ...................................................................................... 21 3.6 Water Conflicts ....................................................................................................................................... 23 3.7 Summary of Main Findings .................................................................................................................. 24 4. Water Users Associations ................................................................................................................................................. 26 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 26 4.2 Institutional Background ...................................................................................................................... 26 4.3 WUAs Covered in This Study .............................................................................................................. 27 4.4 Demonstrated Benefits of WUAs ......................................................................................................... 28 4.5 Challenges to the Operation of WUAs ................................................................................................ 29 4.6 Summary of Main Findings .................................................................................................................. 32 i 5. Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 33 5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 33 5.2 Agricultural Activities, Water, Gender, and Poverty: A Structural Analysis ................................ 33 5.3 Improving the Water Provision Structure .......................................................................................... 40 Annex A: Supplementary Notes on Methodology ......................................................................................................... 45 A.1 Quantitative Survey Methodology ..................................................................................................... 45 A.2. Qualitative Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 47 A.3 Calculation of Household Income Measure ....................................................................................... 48 Annex B: Supplementary Notes on Methodology.......................................................................................................... 50 B.1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 50 B.2. Water Resources, Distribution Channels, Drainage Networks, and Melioration ............................ 50 B.3 Legal Basis of Water Management and Provision ............................................................................ 52 B.4 Water Resources Management Institutions ....................................................................................... 53 B.5 Current Water Resources Management Difficulties ......................................................................... 56 B.6 Water Users Association ....................................................................................................................... 60 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 66 Annex C: Survey Instruments.............................................................................................................................................. 69 C1. Questionnaire ......................................................................................................................................... 69 SECTION A: Household Information ........................................................................................................ 71 SECTION B: Information on land and agricultural activities ................................................................. 73 SECTION C: ACCESS TO WATER ............................................................................................................ 76 SECTION F: Miscellaneous ......................................................................................................................... 85 C.2. Focus Group Discussion Issues ........................................................................................................... 87 Annex D: Tables ...................................................................................................................................................................... 90 Age and Literacy ........................................................................................................................................... 90 Migration........................................................................................................................................................ 92 Employment .................................................................................................................................................. 94 Income and Borrowining ............................................................................................................................. 96 Land .............................................................................................................................................................. 100 Agricultural Activities ................................................................................................................................ 109 Gender .......................................................................................................................................................... 115 Access to Water ........................................................................................................................................... 116 Water Users Assocaitons............................................................................................................................ 129 ii Tables: Table A.1.1: Sample breakdown in Bobojon Ghafurov................................................................................................... 46 Table A.1.2: Sample breakdown in Konibodom............................................................................................................... 46 Table A.1.2: Sample breakdown in Yovon......................................................................................................................... 47 Table A.2.1: List of interviewees in Konibodom, Ghafurov, and Yovon .................................................................... 48 Table B.4.1: Water resources management institutions staff and salaries by district............................................... 55 Table B.5.1: Bobojon Ghafurov water infrastructure repairs and maintenance operations in 2006 ..................... 57 Table B.5.2: Access to water for free and willingness to pay for water ....................................................................... 58 Table B.5.3: Water Users Debts to Water Suppliers as of May 1, 2007 (in Somoni) ................................................. 58 Table B.5.4: Debts of water suppliers as of April 1, 2007 (in Somoni).......................................................................... 58 Table B.5.5: High ground water level in agricultural enterprises ................................................................................. 59 Table B.5.6: High ground water level on presidential lands.......................................................................................... 59 Table B.5.7: High ground water level in villages (in %) .................................................................................................. 60 Table B.6.1: WUAs established through Farms Privatization Support Project funded by the World Bank ......65 Table B.6.2: WUas established through Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project of the World Bank ............ 66 Table D.1: Age........................................................................................................................................................................... 90 Table D.2: Ability to read and write .................................................................................................................................... 90 Table D.3: Total years of schooling ...................................................................................................................................... 91 Table D.4: School Attendance ............................................................................................................................................... 91 Table D.5: Households with migrants in the last five years........................................................................................... 92 Table D.6: Return of migrants ............................................................................................................................................... 92 Table D.7: Purpose of Migration .......................................................................................................................................... 93 Table D.8: Total value of remittance the household has received in the past year ................................................... 93 Table D.9: Impact of Migration ............................................................................................................................................. 93 Table D.10: First, second (part-time), third, and overall important employment..................................................... 94 Table D.11: First occupation by sex across the three districts ........................................................................................ 95 Table D.12: Borrowing in 2006 .............................................................................................................................................. 96 Table D.13: Main reason for borrowing/obtaining lone(s)............................................................................................ 97 Table D.14: Mean and median household income by district ....................................................................................... 98 Table D.15: Annual income quintiles by district............................................................................................................... 98 Table D.16: Change of family income in the last three years ......................................................................................... 98 Table D.17: Own estimate of family's financial status ..................................................................................................... 99 Table D.18: Size of house garden and presidential land ...............................................................................................100 Table D.19: Percentage of land cultivated ........................................................................................................................100 Table D.20: Reason for not cultivating all house garden ..............................................................................................101 Table D.21: Reason for not cultivating all presidential land ........................................................................................102 Table D.22: Land documentation for house garden is under this person's name ..................................................103 Table D.23: Documentation for presidential land is under this person's name ......................................................103 Table D.24: Sex of document holder for house garden .................................................................................................104 Table D.25: Sex of document holder for presidential land ...........................................................................................104 Table D.26: Experienced land restructuring of the Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large collective farm................104 Table D.27: Possession of individual or multi-family farm..........................................................................................105 Table D.28: Total area of individual or multi family farm in sotiq .............................................................................105 Table D.29: Type of document for individual or multi family farm ..........................................................................105 Table D.30: Sex of person on document for individual/multi-family land .............................................................105 Table D.31: Reason why people in your area did not get shares in big farm ..........................................................106 iii Table D.32: Reason why people in your area did not get house garden ..................................................................107 Table D.33: Reason why people in your area did not get presidential land ............................................................108 Table D.34: Household's agricultural activities...............................................................................................................109 Table D.35: Main difficulties in increasing agricultural production ..........................................................................110 Table D.36: Access to machinery ........................................................................................................................................111 Table D.37: Agricultural activities on house garden......................................................................................................112 Table D.38: Agricultural activity on presidential land ..................................................................................................113 Table D.39: Livestock assets.................................................................................................................................................114 Table D.40: Division of labor on household plot/presidential land ..........................................................................114 Table D.41: Division of labor on Khojagii Dihqonii Kollektivi, JSC, Kolkhoz/sovkhoz, or other joint farms .115 Table D.42: Women's wages lower than that of males..................................................................................................115 Table D.43: Do you think in the last ten years women have become poorer as compared to men in your village? .....................................................................................................................................................................................115 Table D.44: Do you think women are often coerced to do very low paying work (such as picking cotton) on the farms? .......................................................................................................................................................................................116 Table D.45: Access to or use of various sources of water for house garden and home use ................................116 Table D.46: Main uses of various sources of water for house garden and home use ............................................117 Table D.47: Frequency of access to water for house garden and home use .............................................................118 Table D.48: Satisfaction with quality of water for house garden and home use .....................................................119 Table D.49: Satisfaction with amount and reliability of water used for house garden and home use ..............120 Table D.50: Who provides the water for house garden/home use............................................................................121 Table D.51: Reasons for use of this source of water for house garden/home use..................................................122 Table D.52: Storing water at home .....................................................................................................................................123 Table D.53: Access to water for presidential land, individual farm or multi-family small farm ........................124 Table D.54: Cost of water for presidential land, individual farm or multi-family small farm from canal/streams/river..............................................................................................................................................................124 Table D.55: Satisfaction with water quality for presidential land, individual farm ...............................................125 or multi-family small farm...................................................................................................................................................125 Table D.56: Availability/frequency of water from canals, streams or rivers...........................................................125 for presidential land, individual farm or multi-family small farm ............................................................................125 Table D.57: Provider of water for presidential land, individual farm or multi-family..........................................126 small farm from canal, steams, or rivers...........................................................................................................................126 Table D.58: Outcome of water going through a neighboring farm............................................................................127 Table D.59: Is there any water conflict in the village and if there is how is it solved? ...........................................128 Table D.60: Do you think in your village some people have more/less access to water? ....................................128 Table D.61: Has the high level of water table caused illness in your village?..........................................................129 Table 62: Impact of WUA.....................................................................................................................................................129 Table D.63: Willingness to establish WUA ......................................................................................................................130 Table D.64: Representing family in WUA or member of WUA .................................................................................130 iv Acknowledgements This Social Assessment (SA) was prepared by a team of consultants supervised by Helen Shahriari (ECSSD). Funding for the SA was provided by Bank-Netherlands Water Partnership Program (BNWPP). Pooya Alaedini (consultant and faculty member of the University of Tehran) was lead consultant and prepared the final report. Firouzeh Afsharnia (consultant) was in charge of the focus group discussions and interviews and contributed to the report. Anne Kuriakose (BNWPP consultant) participated in one field visit, organized some of the focus group discussions, and provided comments on the report. Local consultants Saidali Vohidov and Latif Hadiazoda assisted with field work on the qualitative and institutional parts of the SA. Agency Nau in Khujand carried out the field work for the quantitative survey. Peer reviewers were Nora Dudwick (PRMPR) and Wendy Wakeman (MNSSD). The report benefited from the assistance of Beulah Nobel (ECSSD). The team is grateful to Usaid El-Hanbali (project TTL during the SA preparation) and management and staff of the Fergana Valley Water Resources Management Project (FVWRMP) in Tajikistan. The team also wishes to thank the World Bank staff in Dushanbe for assistance during repeated visits to Tajikistan, especially Bobojon Yatimov, Janna Yusupjanova, and Takhmina Mukhamedova. v Glossary of Terms Dihqon farm General term for larger collectives and farms belonging to one or more families Dirams Equal to 1/100 of a somoni Hashar Collective help Hawz Small cistern Hukumat General term for government, usually local types Jamoat Self-governing village-level unit Khojagi General term ambiguously used to both denote a household and a farming unit Kolkhoz Soviet collective farm organized as a cooperative Mahalla Neighborhood or settlement Mirob Water-monitoring technician Nohiya District Oblast Previous name for viloyat, referring to a province Rais Head Raion Previous name for nohiya Raivodkhoz Water authority at the nohiya (raion) level Somoni Tajik currency equal to around 0.3 US$ at the time of the survey Sotiq 100 square meters Sovkhoz State collective farm under the Soviet system Viloyat Province Vodkhoz Water authority vi Executive Summary PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND IMPACT This social assessment (SA) was conducted under the Fergana [Farghona] Valley Water Resources Management Project (FVWRMP), which is providing assistance to the Government of Tajikistan to address irrigation and drainage deficiencies in eastern Sughd. The main SA objectives were to understand how prevailing structures of water provision, land reforms, and gender relations impact rural livelihoods; to analyze experiences in establishing inclusive Water Users Associations (WUAs); and to provide recommendations to FVWRMP with the aim of enhancing its programs. The SA targeted nine jamoats divided equally among Bobojon Ghafurov, Konibodom, and Yovon districts. The two northern districts were covered by FVWRMP and the Farm Privatization Support Program (FPSP) operated in the southern district (Yovon). Yovon's jamoats were selected specifically to analyze their WUAs formed in conjunction with farm privatization carried out under FPSP. Due to the limited number of community-based water management initiatives in the above-mentioned target areas, other WUAs were included in this study. A survey questionnaire was administered to 1275 households. Fifteen focus groups (mostly-female) and 38 in-depth interviews (with officials from districts hukumats, jamoats, State Water Resources Departments, agricultural enterprises, WUAs, and NGOs) were also conducted. The SA results raise stakeholder awareness of the main water-related issues faced in the target areas as well as the major factors influencing WUA operations. While some of the study's recommendations are beyond the scope of FVWRMP and must be dealt with through other initiatives, as a response to the SA findings, the project is now aiming to continue its work on the rehabilitation of irrigation networks, drainage systems, and reservoir dykes and to emphasize institutional development through establishing water users associations and issuing land use certificates. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Socioeconomic Conditions, Access to Land, and Agricultural Activities Demographic profile In the study area, traditional forms of family structure and a very young population are observed. Some 17 percent of households are female-headed. Literacy rates are quite high with no discernable difference between men and women, but a significant percentage of children are not attending school now and it appears that the educational opportunities available to women in earlier times may not be available for the present generation. Migration Seeking work is the main reason for migration. Remittances sent home by migrant workers constitute a significant share of household incomes and are the most important positive outcome of migration. Among the 1275 sample households, on average, less than 1 person per household has migrated in the past five years and around 0.4 person per household has returned. The absence of migrants may have a vii number of negative impacts including loss of technical know-how. Most migrants are male but more than five percent of sample households across the three districts have female migrants. Women are not more empowered when male migrants are absent from the household if there are other males who de facto become household heads. Despite this, migration as a survival strategy is an increasingly attractive option in response to the debilitating matrix of factors at home, including water management system failures that challenge organic and local solutions to earning a livelihood in favor of external strategies. Employment Most male household members are self-employed in non-farm businesses, followed by trade, industry, and transport/services and agricultural wage labor. For female household members, the most important occupations are homemaker, agricultural wage laborer, trade, industry, and services employee, and household plots/presidential lands worker. The most important second and third occupations in the sample comprise work on household plots/presidential lands. Household plots are significant for food security and providing supplementary household income. Typical household livelihood strategies, especially among women, include a mix of formal sector employment and small-scale commercial cultivation. Women's employment opportunities are limited to large farm labor and a few informal sector activities, in addition to their work on household plots and presidential lands. Income and subsistence Slightly more than ten percent of household incomes is earned from wage labor on large farms and less than ten percent is derived from pension or social assistance. The rest of household earnings are divided evenly among non-agricultural activities, work on household plots/presidential lands, and remittance. The mean annual household income is 5,189 somonis and the median is 4,550 somonis. Generally, people in the study area believe that incomes have stagnated or declined in the past few years in purchasing power terms. Opportunities for formal borrowing for productive purposes are scarce or nonexistent; so whatever borrowing takes place is informal. Access to land The state has been reluctant to relinquish control over prime as opposed to marginal farmlands. Breaking up or renaming former kolkhozes and sovkhozes into collective farms has not increased farmer control over land through land shares. About one-third of households in the quantitative survey have members who work on large collective farms. Three-quarters of these households report not having shares and the rest report little control over their shares. In non-cotton-producing areas there is some evidence of more meaningful land reform. Almost all households across the three districts have household plots with a median size of 5 sotiqs. Slightly more than 80 percent of household lands are cultivated and close to 70 percent of households cultivate all of their household plots. Yet, only about 40 percent of households have presidential lands (with a median size of about seven sotiqs). Close to one-third of the total area of these lands is not cultivated due to lack of access to water or other difficulties. Few single- or multi-family dihqon farms exist and most are concentrated in Yovon. Yet, sometimes as an additional incentive to work on cotton farms, a tiny piece of the collective farm is loaned to workers to cultivate as they wish and these arrangements prove beneficial due to the autonomous choice of crop and proximity to water, in spite of the modest plot size. Farming practices and livestock ownership Given the current prices and lack of access to water on personal plots, farmers are reluctant to produce cotton on lands they directly control. Therefore cotton production is sustained only through state quotas viii on large farms and farmers tend to raise grains, fruits, cotton, or livestock, when they have the choice. Most households believe that their recent production has decreased or remained the same and attribute this to difficulties such as limited access to water in some areas, poor soil conditions, a rising water table, high cost of inputs, and lack of machinery. Water scarcity is more significant on presidential lands compared to household plots. Despite the importance of livestock to overall household livelihood strategies, livestock assets are modest and mostly concentrated in Yovon. Gender and agricultural activities Many women are engaged in low-wage, basic cotton work on large farms, where lack of infrastructure and machinery means that most work is performed by hand. Some instances of implicit coercive practices may occur with regard to basic cotton work performed by women on large collective farms but, for the most part, the structure of village economy and lack of alternatives push women to accept hard work for little remuneration on collective farms. Women's wages are generally lower than men's most often due to gender-differentiated tasks on large collective farms. Cash and in-kind wages are below subsistence level. There is no evidence of official gendered land-titling practices. However, household plots and presidential lands are usually registered to the head of household, most often male. Land shares on large collective farms do not exist in any real sense, but men and women have equal chance of exercising some kind of claim to them. Challenges to most important livelihood means Personal farming activities on household plots and presidential lands generate more household income than cotton farm work, but personal farming is affected by land location, soil quality, and water access, and constrained by taking place on the fringes of cotton farming on large farms, which limits resources otherwise utilized to enhance personal food security. Present regulations discourage privatization of irrigated lands while new allocations for household plots are limited. Access to Water and Structure of Water Provision Main water problems Following Tajikistan's independence rural infrastructure has fallen into terrible conditions due to the combined effects of an end to Soviet-era agricultural subsidies, a devastating civil war, years of neglect, and state water authorities' scarce resources. Derelict irrigation and drainage networks and failing lift technology have resulted in considerable water loss and rising water tables. Water-logged soils due to non-functioning melioration infrastructure have rendered large land areas impossible to cultivate. Neglected drainage systems can no longer manage water runoff, leading to floods, erosion, soil salinity, and declining yields. Waterway contamination is widespread due to upstream activity, pesticides, rampant pollution, and little regulation of the agricultural and industrial sectors. Water subsidies under the former state system and more recently by large farms that in sense trade water for labor have created the illusion that water is a free public good. Also, the crisis in the agricultural sector and the collapse of irrigation and drainage systems have constrained user resources and diminished their will to support local water authorities, so that water fee collection rates are only around 50 percent. The water management system is facing serious funding shortages, and reforms to introduce market mechanisms have created ambiguities about responsibilities for secondary and tertiary infrastructure. ix Water is allocated to each collective farm based on the number of hectares devoted to cotton cultivation. Because villagers get their water from canals used to irrigate the cotton fields, they are locked into the existing cotton production arrangements even though they could earn more income from raising fruits and vegetables. Furthermore, since drinking water provision was not explicitly planned for when the irrigation infrastructure was developed, it remains a pressing need for people and livestock, especially during the winter months. Not only do people suffer from the inadequate and degraded state of the networks and widespread infrastructure failures, but also from disparities in access to water due to structural, geographic, and seasonal factors, all of which threaten their livelihoods. Impacts of water problems Due to problems associated with water access and quality, household food security is threatened, nutritional status is declining, and literacy rates are dropping. Due to water-logging in some areas and water shortages in others, large areas of arable land cannot be cultivated, and valuable hours are lost compensating for household water shortages or system maintenance to prevent flooding. In the face of rising poverty and lack of income-earning opportunities, households increasingly rely on personal farms for food security and surpluses to barter or sell as well as raising livestock. But these livelihood strategies are threatened by the persistent emphasis on irrigating large-scale cotton farms, failing infrastructure, and poor water quality. Farmers have recently witnessed stagnation or decline in their agricultural yields and incomes, in no small part related to their water problems. Canals remain the primary source of household water despite high levels of contamination, causing significant human suffering and draining already meager household resources. Women in particular lose an inordinate amount of productive time to procuring and transporting water, and children who are taken out of school often spend hours queuing for water. Meanwhile entire communities devote productive time to cleaning irrigation system drainage overflows and preventing flooding. Water conflicts Household water often arrives through a large farm or a neighboring small farm, which means that individual households have no control over their own water supply. As a result, conflicts related to water access and flow are rampant among households, villages, and regions. Inter-village disputes about water allocation and drainage are directed towards mirobs of the Vodkhoz or sometimes resolved through ad hoc water diversion. Intra-village water disputes may be dealt with through neighborhood mechanisms, or remain unresolved. Water Users Associations Demonstrated benefits of Water User Associations and their minimum requirements The demonstrated benefits of Water User Associations (WUAs) include a more systematic and equitable water monitoring process, higher rates of fee collection, increased yields and incomes, and enhanced food security. However, the state of water infrastructure and the slow pace of land reforms create obstacles to ongoing attempts at local water management since community-based initiatives require a minimum base of operation and water delivery capacity that are lacking in Tajikistan. In general, the traditional top- down pattern and cultural internalization of authority collude to undermine independent community- based initiatives. Thus, official efforts are needed to curb the influence of the local hukumats and increase transparency and accountability in water access and use. x Donor disengagement and financial difficulties WUAs often fail to meet their obligations after donor organizations depart. They may not be able to sustain engagement with their members or maintain an ongoing ownership identity among them. Furthermore, whereas longer-term WUA operations must be financially sustainable, tariff collection rates are often too low to maintain the irrigation system. Lack of front-end development, expertise, technology Community-based maintenance and management initiatives are not successful without some front-end work by state organizations to enhance water infrastructure. WUAs have wide resource and capacity gaps due to water fee collection shortfalls, depleted technical resources, and little infrastructure ownership. Technical expertise is scarce in rural areas due to large-scale migration of skilled technical workers, the breakup of large kolkhozes, and farm debts while funding shortages prevent WUAs from accessing technological inputs. Insufficient inclusion of women Female participation in WUAs is hampered by their traditional role and multiple livelihood strategies. Despite examples of women's participation and lack of formal institutional barriers, evidence suggests that most rural women avoid active involvement in decision making, which hampers their inclusion in WUA structures. Women do not participate in community-based water management initiatives proportionate to their burden of livelihood maintenance, the rising trend of female-headed households, or their direct interest in improving water provision. Summary of Recommendations Land rights In cotton-producing areas, a relatively closed cycle of low wages and low productivity has been established that locks many rural households in lives of poverty. Land tenure inequalities preserve this poverty cycle while the exogenous factor of migrant remittances relieves it. Land reforms are thus needed to equitably distribute control over prime (versus marginal) lands now under the control of collectives to lay farmers and allow them to engage in agricultural activities that increase food security, improve arability of land, enhance production, and mitigate environmental effects. Furthermore, land rights must be augmented with access to credit, infrastructure, technology, and know-how as well as to education and health services. Furthermore, while the recognition of land rights through an overhaul of the structure of collective farms, as well as proper water and drainage management and provision of infrastructure may be hypothesized to strengthen the position of women, these will still not be adequate unless all development programs in the study area target women specifically. Water institutions and fee collection The state should redefine roles and responsibilities for institutions that administer water resource operations, and create new local-level institutions to fill the void created by privatization. Water fee collection must be re- examined and improved through community-based initiatives. Fairness and rate stability may be maintained by developing a clear mechanism for agreement between water suppliers and users. Water for household consumption Comprehensive national guidelines and regulations are required to control, limit, and reverse damages as a result of pollution and runoff from industry and farmlands. Local solutions to address villagers' xi multiple-use water allocation needs through targeted measures should be developed in collaboration with water authorities and community-based water initiatives. Organic village arbitration and monitoring initiatives at access points should also be encouraged toward an equitable water distribution. Requirements for optimal operation of WUAs Optimal WUA functioning can be achieved only by enacting meaningful land reforms and removing distortions in the cotton sector. Furthermore, institutions that support the operation and viability of WUAs must be strengthened, public spending on maintenance and management of infrastructure must be increased, and technical expertise and technology must be provided. To increase success rates among WUAs and sustain community engagement, more resources must be allocated to front-end development. For example, seed money is needed to set up information and data management systems, to provide technology for water gauging and regulating equipment, and to supply logistical support. A re- examination of regulations pertaining to WUA financial and technical solvency are also needed with the aim to grant certain tax exemptions and to provide long term, low cost loans for the provision of expertise or technology. Local empowerment, sensitization, and improving knowledge base Community-based initiatives require using and strengthening local institutions. Mahalla committees provide a good base from which to mobilize bottom-up construction of WUAs and other community- based initiatives. Public awareness must be raised about the livelihood benefits of participatory water management. Dialogue and greater interest in effective WUA participation must be encouraged to enhance community knowledge base. Accountability and trust Since previous organic initiatives were undermined by corruption and mistrust of authority, fostering accountability and trust is crucial. Transparency must be maintained through processes such as democratic elections by secret ballot, an open-book policy for member inspection, public discussion of policies, and full financial disclosure to members. Inclusion Women's participation is challenged by structural factors, despite the lack of significant formal barriers. There is still considerable work to be done to encourage women water users to participate in Water Users Associations. Inclusion strategies for women could build on specific outreach programs and on mahalla village structures. Creating a two-tiered WUA structure WUAs should include two levels--the WUA and legal entities as members at one level and water user groups (WUGs) at the second level as members of WUA. The WUGs could be organized around provision of drinking water, maintaining drainage pumps, among others. Such bottom-up WUG organizing could generate local organizational experience and serve user-identified needs at watercourse and village level (e.g., ensuring that household plots, water storage cisterns, and individual presidential land plots get allocations). Furthermore, a federation of WUAs is required to address the competing interests among various WUAs along the canal and increase their influence in relation to the local water authorities. xii 1. Background, Rationale, and Methodology 1.1 INTRODUCTION Tajikistan is a landlocked mountainous country in Central Asia with a surface area of some 143,000 square kilometers and a population of around 6.7 million.1 The country suffered a long and devastating civil war during the 1990s that left tens of thousands of people dead and displaced several hundred thousand more. Since the war ended and the first democratic elections were held in 1999, Tajikistan has experienced a respectable annual GDP growth rate of around eight percent. 2 Yet, despite recent improvements, poverty headcount ratio ($2 a day, PPP) in Tajikistan stands at 42.8 percent.3 Furthermore, the overall poverty rate for the provinces with the most populations and the highest incidences of poverty, Khatlon and Sughd, stood at 64 and 78 percent respectively in 2005.4 Tajikistan ranked 122nd out of 177 counties in terms of human development index in 2006.5 Tajikistan has rich water resources but scarce arable lands which are concentrated in the Farghona Valley and Khatlon. Most of the country is mountainous; so agricultural development is restricted by land scarcity and the high cost of water delivery to the fields. Nevertheless, agriculture plays an important economic and social role in the life of most Tajiks--three-quarters of the population are in rural areas and most of the labor force is directly engaged in agriculture. Across Tajikistan, most agricultural activity consists of irrigated farming, followed by rain-fed production. Cotton-farming constitutes 11 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and contributes over 20 percent to total export revenues.6 The Farghona Valley is a rich and fertile region that is now shared by the Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan's portion of the valley (named after the ancient but larger region of Sughd or Sogdiana) has the most fertile soil, the most abundant surface- and ground-water sources, and the highest population density of any region in the country. An unfortunate by-product of Tajikistan's profound political and economic changes in the past decade and half has been underinvestment in the water supply system. The irrigation and drainage networks of the Farghona Valley, Khatlon, and elsewhere in the country have fallen into disrepair, creating water shortages, water- logged soils, reduced soil fertility, and decreased crop yields. This has reduced total irrigated land in the Farghona Valley by a significant factor, affecting the lives of around two million local residents. Against this background, the Government of Tajikistan has sought World Bank assistance to implement the Fergana [Farghona] Valley Water Resources Management Project (FVWRMP), which aims to (i) enhance productivity of irrigated agriculture and increase the incomes of about 250,000 people by improving land and water management; and (ii) improving regulation and dam safety of the Kairakkum reservoir and the efficiency of water management at the basin level.7 1 World Bank general data on Tajikistan. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 World Bank, Republic of Tajikistan Poverty Update, 2005. 5 UNDP, Human Development Report, 2006. 6 World Bank, Tajikistan Country Brief, 2005. 7 See World Bank, FVWRM Project Appraisal Document. 1 This social assessment (SA) was conducted to inform the World Bank and the Government of Tajikistan on the interplay of social and institutional aspects of water, agricultural activities, and gender as major issues affecting FVWRMP implementation. The SA target areas were two districts (nohiya) in Sughd covered by FVWRMP, and a district in Khatlon used to compare and complement the information. The overall SA goal was to ensure that FVWRMP responds to the needs of rural people, farmers, and water users. The assessment built on earlier studies on water use, land tenure, and farming practices to see how existing structures of water provision, land reforms, and gender relations affect rural livelihoods. 1.2 SOCIAL ASSESSMENT FOCUS The SA investigated the FVWRMP target areas--Konibodom and Bobojan Ghafurov in the Farghona Valley--in more detail and among a wider range of beneficiaries. It also covered Yovon, a district in the South. Based on the SA results, this report analyzes current agricultural practices and land tenure, drainage and water provision systems, gender relations in agricultural production, and poverty and vulnerability. It focuses on the level of household access to drinking and irrigation water from various sources as well as the impact of the current water situation on target households and on women. Water users associations (WUAs) have been proposed as a mechanism to deal with the institutional void in water provision and some have been established in the SA coverage area. The report analyzes the structure of existing WUAs, their levels of success, and their shortcomings. Finally, the report probes some of the cross-cutting and side issues that are important to understanding the SA's main areas of focus--gender dimensions of land-titling and the impact of labor out-migration on rural households and on women as well as family structures, employment, and incomes. 1.3 SOCIAL ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY In each district covered by the SA, the research team selected three jamoats (sub-districts) to ensure diversity in terms of donor projects, land reforms, agricultural practices, water and drainage conditions, and the existence of water users associations. Two jamoats in each of the three districts were covered by either FVWRMP or Farm Privatization Support Program of the World Bank, as detailed below. Ghafurov: Qataghon and Isfisor (under FVWRMP) and Ovchikalacha (non-project) Konibodom: Lohuti and Sharifov (under FVWRMP); and Ortiqov (non-project) Yovon: Ozodi and Chorgul (under Farm Privatization Support Program); and Obi-Muki (non- project) Yovon`s jamoats were selected specifically to analyze their WUAs formed in conjunction with farm privatization carried out under FPSP. Since the target areas listed above had so few community-based water management initiatives, WUAs from elsewhere were included in the quantitative and qualitative assessments. The quantitative assessment used a survey of 1,275 households randomly selected and equally divided among the districts. The qualitative assessment used 38 key informant interviews (with officials from districts hukumats, jamoats, State Water Resources Departments, agricultural enterprises, WUAs, and NGOs) and 15 focus-group discussions. Participation of females in the focus groups was specifically emphasized to allow for a thorough gender analysis while being congnizant of its implecation 2 for representativeness. An institutional analysis was also conducted through an in-depth literature review as well as through interviews with aforementioned key informants. More information on SA methodology is in Annex A. Survey instruments are in Annex C. 1.4 PREVIOUS STUDIES ON TAJIKISTAN'S RURAL/AGRICULTURAL SECTOR Few government and/or international organization studies are available in Tajikistan regarding agricultural production or rural socioeconomic conditions.8 All highlight the difficulties faced by the rural/agricultural sector since independence, including difficulties related to land, infrastructure, and water with their negative impacts on livelihoods and social and gender relations. These studies report low agricultural productivity and widespread rural poverty, primarily due to deteriorating agricultural infrastructure, inefficient land and water exploitation, sub-optimal state cropping plans, and lack of auxiliary agricultural services or credit. Nevertheless, these studies expect that, under favorable conditions, improvement in land tenure, water provision, and infrastructure will allow the agricultural sector to experience robust growth in productivity and output. Land restructuring has been a major ongoing issue in the agricultural sector and the Tajik government has opted for a gradual process of transforming old-style kolkhozes and sovkhozes into smaller land holdings and other entrepreneurial market-based entities. However, studies on land reform in Tajikistan generally conclude that until now farm restructuring has been more or less cosmetic. There has been a great deal of reluctance to relinquish control over prime farmlands and little shift of land tenure to households. 9 By end-2005, of the 380,000 hectares of land reformed into private farms, only 30,000 hectares were irrigated farmland, of which 18,000 hectares were under World Bank's 10 pilot farm projects.10 Even where land rights were transferred, tenure security remains weak. Furthermore, a recent draft report11 prepared for the World Bank on knowledge, attitudes, and farmer practices regarding land restructuring indicates that less than half of the surveyed farmers believed themselves to have a good knowledge of land reforms; women farmers were considerably less knowledgeable than their male counterparts. Farmers also believed they had no decision making power regarding cultivation of cotton versus other crops, even when some land rights existed. Most gender studies in Tajikistan concur that widespread changes in the country since independence have more negative effects on women than on men. Thus women have become among the most vulnerable groups in the rural sector while male migration trends have resulted in many female-headed households­­this against the background of Tajikistan's traditional, male-dominated society. An 8 See, for example, World Bank, "Republic of Tajikistan Poverty Assessment Update," 2005; World Bank, "Tajikistan Poverty and Social Impact Analysis of Cotton Farmland Privatization," 2004; H. Shahriari, "Social Assessment for Second World Bank Alleviation Project in Tajikistan," Draft report prepared for the World Bank, 2001; SECO/World Bank, "Priorities for Sustainable Growth: A Strategy for Agricultural Sector Development in Tajikistan," 2006; Temelsu Company, "Fergana Valley Water Resources Management Project: Agriculture and Agro-Economic Systems Report," Prepared for FVWRMP, 2005. 9 See for example, World Bank Fergana Valley Water Resources Management Project, "Rapid Social Assessment," Draft Report, 2005. 10 World Bank, "Implementation Completion Report, Farm Privatization Support Project", Report No. 36487, June 2006. 11 World Bank, "Results of a Baseline Survey and Qualitative Analysis of Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices of 1500 Farmers in 15 Tajikistan Raions Concerning Land Use Rights and Farm Restructuring," Draft report, August 2007. 3 estimated 18 percent of households are headed by women and half of them are considered very vulnerable. Many women in the rural areas are active in cotton production with little pay. Furthermore, privatization is believed to have had an overall negative impact on women as men have controlled the process.12 Although Tajikistan has some of the most important global water resources, potable and irrigation water provision has become a central impediment to rural development. Recent water-related problems coupled with difficulties in land tenure are primary factors in rural poverty and its disproportional impact on women. In 2004-05, during project preparation for the FVWRMP and as a precursor to this study, a BNWPP-funded Rapid Social Assessment (RSA)13 was conducted that focused on poverty and social conditions among target area inhabitants, their traditional water use, and effects of recently- established WUAs. The RSA confirmed that better water management improved local people's quality of life and their willingness to pay tariffs, but also that WUAs face serious financial constraints, poorly developed organizational structure, large-scale out-migration of technical staff, and underdeveloped legal and institutional capacity including limited land tenure. The RSA highlighted the slow progress of agricultural reforms and privatization, government's reliance on cotton as a cash crop, and mounting debt to domestic and foreign futures companies as reasons for little improvement in the lives of most farmers, who continue to labor under the persistent but deteriorating old organizational structures. The RSA concluded that better water management would improve the yields of family gardens as well as the drinking water supply, thus enhancing livelihoods and reducing exposure to water-borne diseases. 1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT This report is divided into five main parts and a set of annexes. This first part has discussed the background and methodology of the social assessment. The next part analyzes general socioeconomic conditions of surveyed households (including family structure, employment, income, and migration) on the one hand and their agricultural activities and access to land on the other. The next two parts of the report deal with the structure of water provision and water users associations. Each section draws on results from the quantitative and qualitative assessments. Section five synthesizes all findings and offers a set of recommendations. The annexes provide survey instruments and more information on methodology. Furthermore, to keep the main body of the report short, the institutional analysis of water and quantitative tables are also placed in the annexes. 12 See I. Akimushkin, "Economic Rights and Opportunities of Tajik Women," Draft report prepared for the World Bank, undated; J. Falkingham, "Women and Gender Relations in Tajikistan," Prepared for the Asian Development Bank, 2000; Asian Development Bank, "Women in Tajikistan," 2000; UNDP, "Tajikistan: National Status Report on Women," 1999. 13 Fergana Valley Water Resources Management Project, "Rapid Social Assessment," Draft Report, 2005. 4 2. Socioeconomic Conditions, Access to Land, and Agricultural Activities 2.1 INTRODUCTION This part of the report first summarizes general socioeconomic findings from quantitative and qualitative assessments; topics include general demographic profile, migration, employment, and income. It then examines households' access to land; their agricultural activities on household plots, presidential lands, and single and multi-family dihqon farms; and their land shares and agricultural activities on collective farms. The last section before a summary of main findings discusses the gender aspects of agricultural activities. 2.2 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE The rural populations of Konibodom, Ghafurov, and Yovon were 128,900, 242,500, and 130,900 respectively when the survey were conducted. Total populations of villages in the target jamoats were 69,684 in Konibodom, 64,109 in Ghafurov, and 68,508 in Yovon. Ghafurov (as well as Konibodom) has a significant Uzbek population who are Tajik citizens. Uzbek households comprised more than half of the quantitative sample. Inhabitants of the three investigated districts were quite young, reflecting high birth rates across Tajikistan (see Table 1, Annex D). The average age of sample household members was 26 and their median age was 22. Households included large percentages of extended family members such as sons- and daughters-in-law, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, and uncles--exhibiting the high prevalence of extended family structure in the districts. While the majority of households were male-headed, the proportion of female-headed household, at 17 percent of the total, was significant. Female-headed households were more prevalent in Ghafurov and Konibodom than in Yovon. This observation together with sex ratio figures found through the survey in Ghafurov and Konibodom (uncharacteristically more females than males) could be due to significant male migration in these two districts and perhaps more gender-balanced migration in Yovon (see discussion on migration below). Literacy rates were high in the sample as is well-known in Tajikistan, although some five percent of the sample in the relevant age range could not read and write--four percent of males and six percent of females. Most female and male adults reported an average of nine years of schooling. School non- attendance among children in the relevant age group was relatively high at around 17 percent; non- attendance was higher among females at 18.2 percent than males at 15 percent. Qualitative assessments indicated that younger women may have fewer educational opportunities during this period of economic transition (Tables 2-4, Annex D). 5 2.3 MIGRATION Significance Tajikistan began to experience significant labor out-migration after its independence and the outbreak of civil war through the established ties in former Soviet Republics, especially Russia. Recent migration trends are believed to be based on simple demand and supply factors. Labor demand in Russia has increased due to a decline of the working-age population whereas the Russian economy has expanded. Responding to this demand, the supply of labor from Tajikistan and a number of other former Soviet Republics has increased as a result of a booming population, prevalent unemployment and under- employment, low earning potentials, and general economic hardship back home. The number of Tajik migrants was officially estimated as 421,000 in 2004. Unofficial sources say it was closer to 1.0-1.2 million.14 In the quantitative sample, around 62 percent of all households across the three districts (more in Ghafurov and less in the other two districts) reported at least one migrant worker during the previous five years (some may have returned); in 21 percent of households, that person was the head. For every sample household slightly less than 1 person had migrated in the past five years and around 0.4 person had returned. The cited purpose of migration in the overwhelming majority of cases (more than 98 percent) was to find work (more details in Tables 4-8 in Annex D). Quantitative results highlighted the significance of male migration. Yet, they also showed that more than five percent of all households had female migrants. Focus group discussions and interviews revealed that high migration rates reflected attempts by rural households to mitigate their livelihood hardships due to difficulties in earning a living and with access to land and water (of which more later). For example, key informants indicated that 20,000 people from Konibodom--which is located at the end of the canal--had left for the cities, Russia, or other places due to an increasingly compromised water supply. Impact Some 77 percent of respondents cited remittances as the most important migration outcome while 16 percent said there was no remittance and by extension no positive impact.15 A total of 623 respondents from 793 households reported receiving remittances from migrant household members. The mean value of remittance was 3,841 somonis and the median 3,400 somonis. These observations align with findings elsewhere that suggest migrants earn an average monthly income of around US$275 dollars and remit slightly less than half to Tajikistan.16 Furthermore, later sections reveal that remittance constitutes a large portion of household income in the study area. Apart from the income impact, survey respondents cited negative impacts of migration as the absence of family members and the burden that placed on women. Few respondents thought that the absence of male migrants actually empowered women (see further Tables 7-8, Annex D). Qualitative assessments revealed more nuanced impacts of migration. First, sending a household member to Russia or elsewhere requires significant sacrifice considering the meager resources of the rural 14 World Bank, "Tajikistan Policy Note: Enhancing the Development Impact of Remittances," 2006. 15 Indeed, UNDP estimated the annual flow of remittance to Tajikistan as amounting to 600 million US dollars annually. See UNDP, "Tajikistan: Mobilization of Labor Remittances into Infrastructure Rehabilitation," www.europeandcis.undp.org, 2007. 16 Ibid. 6 population in the survey districts. Focus group participants reported the heavy cost of travel, about $300; people often sell precious assets or borrow to send a member abroad. Second, although most focus group participants indicated that a significant portion of their household income came from remittances, these payments were frequently irregular. Third, when male householders are absent, the burden of agricultural activities falls on women, and sometimes, family controlled land may not be cultivated at all due to the absence of able bodies, particularly presidential lands as discussed below. Focus group participants reported that male migrant returnees often arrived during winter when the agricultural season was over. 2.4 EMPLOYMENT Most adult male household members (except pensioners, handicapped, and unemployed) were self- employed in non-farm business outside home (42.6 percent), employees in trade, services, or industry (17.42 percent), or agricultural wage laborers (11.20 percent). Female household members were homemakers (45.02 percent), agricultural wage laborers (19.1 percent), employees in trade, industry or services (11.43 percent), or engaged in farming and related activities on household plots or presidential lands (3.81 percent). Other occupational categories such as public employee, teacher and home handicraft production were rarely cited. Furthermore, 23.05 percent of male household members and 14.04 percent of female household members were unemployed and looking for jobs, although they might have worked on household plots or presidential lands (Tables 10-11, Annex D). Many household members had more than one occupation. Women in particular often worked in several positions to earn a living, including on household plots and cotton farms. Therefore the relative importance of the above-cited occupations would differ if all employment channels cited for household members were taken together. Indeed, most respondents reported that working household plots and presidential lands was the second or third most important occupation and one of the most important sources of household income. These observations indicate a lack of employment opportunities as well as the significance of household plots and presidential lands in providing food security and perhaps supplementary household incomes. They underscore the importance of access to water to enable rural households to maximize benefits from household plots and presidential lands. 2.5 INCOME AND SUBSISTENCE This study did not aim for a "highly accurate" computation of a welfare index. Since the main goal of the exercise was to probe the issues of water, land, and gender rather than welfare pre say, the study only collected enough data to construct a basic income profile of the sample population. Variables used to calculate the mean and median household incomes and calculation procedures are in Annex A. Household incomes in the sample across the three districts may be disaggregated as slightly more than one-tenth from wage labor on large farms and less than one-tenth from pension/social assistance. The rest is evenly distributed among non-agricultural activities, work on household plots/presidential lands, and remittances. 7 The mean annual income value across the three districts was 5,189 somonis and the corresponding median value was 4,550 somonis (Table 14, Annex D). Mean and median income values were significantly higher in Yovon compared to the other two districts. The lowest mean and median values were recorded in Ghafurov. Yovon is close to Dushanbe and its residents can earn extra incomes through various business interactions with the capital. Land reforms in Yovon have also been deeper than the other two districts.17 Part III of this report further shows that residents of Yovon are more likely to own livestock and have a higher prevalence of individual and multi-family small land holdings. It also that average sizes of land parcels available to households are higher in Yovon in comparison to the other two districts. In contrast, jamoats surveyed in Ghafurov have faced delayed land reforms and significant water and drainage network difficulties. No significant income differences were observed between households with members working on the large farms and those without. Yet, there were indications that households with members who were self- employed in non-farm businesses were better off in comparison to other households. Finally, the mean income of households in the highest income quintile was found to be about three times those in the lowest income quintile, indicating some income inequality in the study area (see Table 15, Annex D). About 22 percent of respondents reported positive changes in their incomes in the last three years while 22 percent reported no changes and 56 percent reported negative changes (Table 16, Annex D). An overwhelming majority of households across the three districts felt that money sufficed only for minimal requirements of clothes and food or stated that money did not suffice even for food purchases (Table 17, Annex D). Thus, most households lived on the verge of poverty and slightest shocks, such as illnesses or livestock losses, could have severe negative consequences for their wellbeing. As explained later, diseases related to poor water quality are widespread and erode livelihoods in terms of real and opportunity costs. Furthermore, the survey revealed little access to formal borrowing for productive purposes; any borrowing took place through informal means (Tables 12-13, Annex D). 2.6 ACCESS TO LAND Household experience with land reforms Households in the study area may have access to several types of land. Household plots are adjacent to homes, while presidential lands have been allocated to some households through presidential decree (most often from erstwhile unused or marginal lands). As a result of land reforms, households may also theoretically possess individual or multi-family separate farms or have shares in large farms formed out of the previous kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Land reform in the study target areas has taken on different forms depending on land values, water availability, and the extent of cotton-farming potential. In prime cotton-growing areas such as Ghafurov, kolkhozes and sovkhozes still exist, although they are smaller and referred to by new names. This demonstrates public sector's reluctance to relinquish control of and divide prime agricultural lands in favor of dealing with many inexperienced small owners. The three jamoats surveyed in Ghafurov had four large collectives between 1,000 and 5,300 hectares, each with over 1,000 farm workers. Around 60 percent of the land was under cotton cultivation. There were several individual and multi-family dihqon 17 Yovon, as mentioned earlier, has been under World Bank's Farm Privatization Support Project (FPSP). 8 farms; however the sizes (averaging 0.54 hectares across a total of 36 farms) and magnitudes of their operations were negligible. In contrast, Lohuti, the very last jamoat in Konibodom relative to the canal water flow had 24 large farms and 443 individual and multi-family dihqon farms at average sizes of 178 and 4.1 hectares respectively. Less than ten percent of the agricultural land in Lohuti was dedicated to cotton at the time of the survey with the rest under fruits, grains, and vegetable cultivation..18 Setting aside the allocation of household plots and presidential lands, the survey found that, for most farmers, nominal changes in land tenure did not constitute real land reform. The quantitative survey revealed that land reforms had no meaningful impact for 60 to 65 percent of households across the three districts. Former collectives continued business as usual under different names and lay farmers worked there at below-subsistence wages with little knowledge of the privatization process. Some focus groups indicated that the few single or multi-family separate farms had gone to the elite (see below). Household plots and presidential lands Households have near total control over household plots and presidential lands. These land holdings are thus a main source of subsistence for a large number of households surveyed.19 Yet, due to sustained emphasis on cotton production as well as the premium placed on irrigated lands, the government in recent years has slowed down the process of new personal land allocations. Whereas household plots are next to homes, presidential lands are typically small plots located elsewhere, far from canals, and difficult to work on. In spite of this, presidential lands are still desired by many rural households who do not have them. Almost all sample households (1250 out of 1275) across the three districts had household plots with a mean size of 6.6 sotiqs20 (averages were 4.9 in Ghafurov, 5.1 in Konibodom, and 9.8 in Yovon). The median size of the household plot for the entire sample is a better measure--5.0 sotiqs. The corresponding median size in Yovon at 8.0 sotiqs was much higher than the 4.0 sotiqs found in the other two districts. Most households reported having titles for household plots, issued in the name of the head of household, regardless of gender, although most titles were issued to men. Ownership of presidential land was far from universal at about 40 percent for the sample. More households in Konibodom held presidential lands than in either Yovon or Ghafurov, although average sizes were larger in Yovon than the other two districts. The mean sizes of presidential lands were 5.9 sotiqs in Ghafurov, 8.0 in Konibodom, and 11.3 in Yovon. The more accurate median sizes in the three districts were recorded as 5, 7, and 7 sotiqs respectively. Households cited land scarcity as the main reason some people received presidential land while others did not. Most respondents reported possessing their presidential land titles, issued primarily under the name of the male heads of households. Yet, their percentage was lower than the case of household plots (Tables 18-19, Annex D). Focus group discussions revealed that tiny parcels of collective farms (0.05 - 0.1 ha) were sometimes available to workers to cultivate as an additional incentive to work on cotton farms. This arrangement was considered common in focus groups in Ovchikalacha Jamoat in Ghafurov, for example. These tiny land 18 Information obtained through interviews. 19 According to a study conducted by Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) in 2003, household plots in Tajikistan accounted for 69% of agricultural output growth both in the crop and livestock sub-sectors (crop production accounting for 40% and livestock 29%). See Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs, Rep. of Tajikistan, "Priorities for sustainable growth: A Strategy for Agriculture Sector Development in Tajikistan," 2003. 20 Sotiq = 100 square meters 9 parcels on which farmers could cultivate their choice of crop were prized for their proximity to water. The rental arrangement was captured in the quantitative assessment as "other types of land" (52 respondents, mainly Ghafurov and Yovon). A significant proportion of households with presidential land reported not doing much with the plot (around 43 percent in Ghafurov and about 20 percent in the other two districts). Across the three districts, on average, close to one third of the presidential lands and slightly more than 80 percent of household plots were cultivated. Furthermore, around 70 percent of households with presidential land and about 68 percent of those with household plot cultivated all of the land holdings (Table 33). The main reasons for non-cultivation of household plots were low land quality, including a high water table, and lack of access to water. Although similar reasons were cited for non-cultivation of presidential lands, lack of access to water was a more significant factor. Further reasons included no one available to work the land, no markets, and unavailable or unaffordable agricultural inputs. Overall, households had little difficulty in accessing water for their household plots, but in the case of the presidential lands, water scarcity was cited as a major problem (Tables 20-21, Annex D). Possession of shares in large farms The study found that dividing up kokhozes and sovkhozes has not resulted in farmer control over land through land shares. Indeed, cotton workers on the new collectives (khojagii dihqonii Kollektivi) have little say in crop cultivation choices (Table 26, Annex D). Many focus group participants were unaware of large farm land shares or land certificates, let alone how to participate in the decision-making process. When women cotton workers in Yovon were asked to explain the concept of "land share", they described it as work-for-hire--payment for work on the fields. None of the workers knew the owner of the dihqon farm she was working on. In Qataghon (Ghafurov), some participants believed that privatization would occur in the future. Those who thought there were actual shares believed the head brigadier was holding on to them. Even when focus group participants had land shares and land certificates, these seldom translated into concrete instruments of wellbeing. In some cases, while individual shares were reported to represent 0.8-1.2 hectares of land, they were said to be attached to US$700 to US$800 of collective farm debt. The above findings were confirmed by the quantitative data in which about one-third of sample households reported household members employed on the large farm but many of them reported not having shares. The evidence was strongest for Ghafurov where close to 73 percent of households lacked shares, and smallest, although still significant, in Yovon where about 43 percent reported that they did not have shares. A partial explanation is that in Ghafurov most holdings are still large collective farms as compared to Yovon. Study data also indicated that many workers/share holders on large farms did not know the location of their land shares. Among workers who reported having shares on the large farms, most indicated their shares yielded no payments, but some 10 percent reported some relatively small payments (Table 31, Annex D). Access to individual and multi-family dihqon farms Only 50 households in the quantitative sample had individual or multi-family dihqon farms, and of these 45 households were from Yovon (almost equally distributed between individual or multi-family dihqon farms). Some focus groups participants believed that individual or multi-family dihqon farms were distributed to citizens through a form of lottery; others suspected malfeasance. So few of these farms are 10 available that selection criteria may be suspected to relate to influence, status, or wealth. For example, one focus group indicated that the former head of the kolkhoz managed to get an individual farm. Nearly all respondents who had individual and multi-family dihqon farms stated that all of their lands were under cultivation and most reported having land titles (Tables 27-29). 2.7 FARMING PRACTICES AND POSSESSION OF LIVESTOCK Farming Practices In the surveyed districts, the main agricultural activities of the households across all land types were production of fruits, vegetables, cotton, and livestock (see further Tables 35-38, Annex D). In Yovon, cotton had less importance while animal husbandry was more significance. In case of household plots and presidential lands, in Ghafurov and Konibodom, the main three agricultural activities were production of fruits, vegetables, and livestock. A similar situation was observed in Yovon, except that production of grains was also an important activity on the household plots in this district. Same use pattern was observed for presidential lands. The situation in Yovon may be partially explained by the larger parcels of land available to households. The main activities on individual and multi-family dihqon farms were production of grains, cotton, and vegetables (note that the majority of these farms were found in Yovon and not in the other two districts). Since Tajikistan's independence, the government has removed most state quotas on agricultural production, liberalized prices, and carried out measures that support small and medium sized enterprises. But the state maintains control of the country's main cash crop--cotton. This is the flip side of the slow pace of land reforms. Survey findings showed that most households were disinclined to grow cotton on lands they controlled. This suggests that cotton production is unprofitable at current prices and only sustained through state quotas that are only possible through state control over agricultural land. Some cotton is produced on individual or multi-family dihqon farms, which may be less due to profitability and more due to the terms agreed to during acquisition of these scarce and highly desirable farms. Overall some 78.8 percent of households reported that agricultural production had declined on lands they directly controlled, including individual or multi-family dihqon farms; 12.9 percent reported that production was stable; 3.5 percent reported increases; and 4.7 percent declined to respond or found the questions inapplicable. Among the most cited difficulties in agricultural production were limited access to water, unavailable or unaffordable agricultural inputs, a rising water table, and poor quality soil. Most agricultural activities on household plots and presidential lands are small-scale. Inputs are made locally and access to machinery is limited. Most respondents across the three districts produced their own seeds for cultivating household plots and presidential lands; a smaller number of households also reported producing their own fertilizers; and livestock feed was both purchased and self-produced. Some farmers accessed machinery by renting from large farms or leasing companies, but most farmers had very little access to machinery. Livestock Assets Livestock are important assets and a sign of the relative economic wellbeing of the households that own them. In the study area, focus groups indicated that the proceeds from selling a single cow might easily exceed proceeds from cotton field labor. Thus, in the environment of almost-universal vulnerability 11 existing in the study areas, livestock owners are most well positioned to face external shocks such as drought, illness, or natural disasters. At the same time, this important asset is also vulnerable to draught and lack of access to quality water. Despite the significance of livestock, results from the quantitative assessment showed that the average, median, and maximum numbers of cattle, sheep and goat, poultry and other domestic animal holdings were rather small across the three districts (Table 39, Annex D). Qualitative findings also indicated that livestock were held only by a minority of households. Initial and running capital involved in this activity and the need for pasture or other means of animal feed provision make it a difficult activity to undertake. This said, in Yovon, a relatively larger number of households (compared to the other two districts) had dairy cows and buffalos. Furthermore, a higher percentage of households in Yovon indicated increases in their numbers of cattle and buffalo as compared to the other two districts (the corresponding figure for the whole sample was around 60 percent, mainly attributed to natural birth). This highlights the importance of the activity in Yovon as an exception. In particular, a main reason for the prevalence of livestock (on one side of the canal) in Yovon was found to be the availability of pasture. About 5 to 10 percent of households in the quantitative sample marketed their produce. 2.8 GENDER AND AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES Gender Division of Labor The study found that many individual women's livelihood strategies included a mix of formal sector employment and small-scale commercial cultivation. For example, a female teacher or a librarian may also cultivate her household plot and work on a large collective farm. The study also found that female employment opportunities outside the home were limited to wage labor at the large farms (except for working on household plots and presidential lands). Also, women were more likely than men to work on large collective farms as their primary occupation. By contrast, many men were able to become self- employed in non-farm businesses. The quantitative assessment and focus group discussions revealed that both women and men performed basic cotton work on the large farms. Respondents believed that men and women were equally likely to do manual work in agricultural activities, but men more often performed specialized tasks such as irrigation, driving tractors, or as work group leaders. 21 The quantitative assessment found that overt unemployment was higher among males, but these findings were at odds with perceptions of male and female unemployment or underemployment in the qualitative assessment (Tables 42-44). Coercion and Discrimination The SA team did not discover any instances of outright coercion or discrimination against women in agricultural activities. Most focus group participants said that no one was forced to work in the cotton fields for so little money. However, widespread poverty and rural socioeconomics offered few alternatives and women suffered most from these conditions. Young girls also appear to be drawn into this low-wage field work, especially during harvest when farm team leaders gather all able bodies to work on the large farms. Under the current structure, women shoulder most of the production burdens but earn very little. Private interviews revealed that older high school and college students risk penalties 21 According to IMF ("Republic of Tajikistan: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper," 2006), women-dominated social groups are the most economically marginalized and continue to be excluded from decision-making processes. The same study indicates that only 6.8 percent of dihqon farms were managed by women in 2004. 12 unless they work in cotton fields for a month or two each year. If this information is accurate, other coercive practices may also be widespread. To quantify this issue, respondents who participated in the quantitative assessment were asked whether they thought women were often coerced into low paying work on large farms. About 55 percent of respondents believed this to be the case in Ghafurov and Konibodom. The corresponding figure in Yovon was around 30 percent. Women's Wages The quantitative assessment did not find any significant differences between the mean incomes of male- and female-headed households. Yet, some wage differentials based on gender were recorded as being due to the different type of activities undertaken by men and women. Focus group sessions revealed a low and/or irregular pay for female (as well as male) labor on large farms, although women cotton workers also cited additional non-wage benefits of access to cotton stalks used as cooking fuel. According to the officials and also stated in some of the group discussions, female farm workers in the collectives were reported to earn a monthly salary of about 15-20 somonis in regular months but to receive about 50-70 somonis during harvest season (11 dirams per kg of harvested cotton, that is, on the average about 6 somonis per day). During weeding and harvesting many members of the farmers' families were drawn to work in order to speed up the process to get the most financial benefit out of the activities. Men were reported to receive higher wages (around 60 somonis pre month) when they performed more specialized tasks. Worse cases were also reported in some of the focus group discussions. Some women reported working for months only to be paid in-kind or the equivalent of a few dollars at the end of the cotton season. The quantitative assessments captured beliefs about gender-based wage differences. Two-thirds of respondents believed that females were paid less than males and the remaining one-third believed that differences were based on task assignments. The quantitative survey also sought opinions on whether women had become poorer as compared to men in the last ten years. Well over half of the respondents thought women had always done worse than men while another one quarter of respondents thought men and women in the same family were at the same level. Another one quarter of the respondents thought that women had become poorer as compared to men because the latter group had more options. Women's Access to Lan/Land Shares Because most document holders for household plots and presidential lands were heads of households, whether men or women, it would be difficult to conclude that women were discriminated against in this regard. Indeed, around 15 percent of title holders were women for both types of land holdings, which reflects the high numbers of female-headed households in the sample. Respondents were also asked about the gender of people in their villages who did not get a household plot, presidential land, or land shares in large farms; based on their opinions, there were no differences between males and females, or at least the survey results yielded no discernable pattern. Also, according to officials and group discussants, every person in farm collectives, regardless of gender, was registered as having shares, although women would still have little say about crop selection on cultivated lands. Women's Access to and Agricultural Inputs/Machinery Research revealed no serious evidence of gender-differentiated access to agricultural machinery or agricultural inputs, which, in the case of the study areas, means that men and women face equal shortages and deteriorating, unreliable infrastructure. However, since women have fewer livelihood options and shoulder many family burdens, the impact of these shortages may be even more severe, especially since 13 obsolete or deteriorating farm machinery means that women perform most of the farm work by hand, and that women and girls must regularly carry heavy loads for several kilometers due to transport shortages. 2.9 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 1. The rural social structure is traditional with a high incidence of extended families and a young population. While educational attainments are high, women's educational opportunities are becoming limited. 2. Migration is quite significant. It has a positive remittance impact but also a set of negative social effects. 3. Household plots play a significant role in livelihoods. While men may find work in non-farm activities, the most important economic activities of women outside home are work in the large farms and cultivation of household plots. 4. Slightly more than one tenth of household incomes is from wage labor on (large) farms and less than one tenth is derived from pension/social assistance. The rest of household earnings are evenly divided among non-agricultural activities, work on household plots/presidential lands, and remittance. 5. Almost all households have household plots whereas only around 40 percent of households have access to presidential lands. The number of single or multi-family dihqon farms is very small. 6. Barriers to increasing agricultural production and cultivating all household land holdings include limited access to water, poor soil conditions, rising water table, unavailable or unaffordable inputs, and lack of machinery. 7. Household livestock assets--mostly found in Yovon which is under more favorable conditions-- are modest. 8. Large collective farm land shares are almost nonexistent, but access to some kind of claim to them is undifferentiated by gender. 9. Women undertake hard manual labor on collective farms for little remuneration due to the structure of village economy and a lack of income-generating alternatives. 14 3. Access to Water and Structure of Water Provisions 3.1 INTRODUCTION This social assessment aimed to analyze the relationship between livelihoods and water in rural Tajikistan. In the previous part of this report, issues such as income and employment, migration and remittance, and agricultural practices and land holdings were explored to set the stage for an analysis of water. This and the next part of the report explore the impacts of water-related issues on people in the study area, particularly women. A detailed description of the target areas' water resources, management institutions, and infrastructure failures are provided in Annex B. The two sections that follow this introduction partly draw on this annex to describe the background and institutional setting of water provision. Another section examines qualitative and quantitative findings on households' access to water, from the point of view of beneficiaries. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of water and drainage shortcomings. The next part of the report focuses on water users associations which have been proposed for rural Tajikistan, and some have already been established to deal with water management difficulties. 3.2 BACKGROUND Sughd and Khatlon, targeted in this study, are Tajikistan's two main irrigated cotton-producing regions situated within the Farghona and the Vakhsh irrigation networks respectively. The Vakhsh tunnel was among the first irrigation projects of the former Soviet Union, undertaken in 1933, to redirect the river and adjacent streams to feed the Yovonsu Valley. In 1939, the Big Farghona Canal was built to harness the waters of Sirdaryo (Jaxartes) and its tributaries to irrigate the large cotton farmlands in the Farghona Valley (spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Among the three districts covered in this study, the major water sources in Konibodom are Kairakkum water reservoir (served by Sirdaryo), the Big Farghona Canal, and Isfarinka River. Ghafurov is served by the Kairakkum water reservoir, Sirdaryo, and to some extent by the Big Farghona Canal and Khojabakirgon River. Baigazi water facility on Vakhsh River serves Yovon through two canals. Despite providing some economic benefits for area residents, the massive water diversion networks have had severe environmental impacts. For example, diverting water to the 270 km Farghona Canal and completing the Kairakkum reservoir in the 1960s contributed to the drying up of the Aral Sea. On a smaller scale, agrochemical-laced runoff from cotton farmlands has polluted the waters, raising the nitrogen and sulfur combinations to several times the maximum allowable levels in many areas and increasing water and soil salinity. Furthermore, much of Tajikistan's water infrastructure and drainage system is in an advanced state of deterioration due to decades of low-quality construction and operation, funding shortages, and institutional deficiencies in the post-Soviet transition period. These conditions have created a livelihood- threatening water paradox--many areas face water shortages for irrigation and personal consumption, but many rural people and agriculture suffer the effects of rising water table and increasing soil salinity. Across the three districts in this study, considerable water loss occurs through the poorly-lined networks 15 because melioration wells and pumps are unable to control severe water-logging in the area, and low irrigation efficiency undermines the productivity of agricultural lands. All these feed into a poverty cycle. Some 30% of agricultural farmland is dependent on lift irrigation that uses underground water resources. The problem of water-logging due to canal seepage has only increased the need for lift technology. Around 86 percent of 300 vertical boreholes in Ghafurov and Konibodom are inoperable as are more than two-thirds of pumping stations in the project territory. In Konibodom, only 14 the existing 108 pumps are still in working condition. 22 The rising water tables and increasing demands on lift technology for household water consumption and irrigation increase household dependence on ever-failing equipment. It has been claimed that cotton yield in the 10 year period after Tajikistan's independence almost decreased from 800,000 to 450,000 tons with 16% of the formerly irrigated lands no longer under production since 1991 (although there has been some improvements in recent years).23 In Konibodom alone, 8,895 hectares or up to 40 percent of irrigated lands are severely water-logged.24 Water-logging damage, high humidity, and mildewed walls are visible in the study area and potentially lead to respiratory problems, bone ailments, and infectious water-borne diseases such as malaria (see below and Annex B). 3.3 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING National and Regional Water Authorities Distribution of water, especially irrigation water, is highly centralized in Tajikistan, organized mainly around cotton farming. The Ministry of Melioration and Water Economy (MMWE) is the institution responsible for the management and oversight of the water sector and maintenance and development of irrigation and drainage networks. Its regional arms, the State Water Resources Departments known as the Vodkhoz are the main bodies responsible for managing water resources at the district level. In the study area, the following institutions have primary responsibility for water provision and drainage management. 1. Konibodom: Konibodom State Water Resources Department (KSWRD); 2. B. Ghafurov: Ghafurov State Water Resources Department (GSWRD); 3. Yovon: Yovon Productive Operational-Melioration Unit (YPOMU). All three of these public organizations face serious funding shortages (notwithstanding the impact of purely technical factors). Chronic budget shortages are responsible for deterioration of more than half of basic irrigation and manifold-drainage systems assets--especially water pumps and vertical drainage wells--and for heightened soil salinity and water-logging. System sustainability requires developing some type of market mechanism in the water sector, in particular collecting fees from water users, which will be discussed later in this report. Supporting Institutions While State Water Resources Departments directly deal with water issues, oblast and district levels of government and village councils managed by jamoats also influence water provision. Moreover, village- 22 Local hukumat data. 23 Asian Development Bank, "Proposed Loan and Technical Assistant Grant Irrigation and Rehabilitation Project," by P. Bozakov, 2004. 24 Local hukumat data. 16 level semi-formal or informal institutions such as mahalla committees may exercise limited water-related decision-making authority. These supporting institutions are explained below. District hukumats, headed by government-appointed raises, are to implement national policy and administer services and regulations. These have a pivotal position in water allocation and a proactive role in agriculture that includes allocating land, appointing heads of farmers associations, imposing cotton quotas, and allocating irrigation water for land under cotton production. Jamoats, according to the Constitution, are village- and settlement-levels self-governance structures. In practice, a jamoat is a small entity headed by a hukumat appointee with no budgeting authority and very little independent responsibility for service delivery, including water. However, since the state does not provide services in many rural areas, jamoats are supposed to organize community-based delivery of some public services. Local mahalla committees are informal institutions, rooted in the Tajik culture, with three to five members democratically elected from among local elders and respected settlement members. Mahalla committees organize community activities such as weddings and funerals, and help elderly or disabled people. They also often serve to resolve local problems and conflicts or to mobilize support for hashar (collective help) to clean the streets after flooding for instance. They may be important actors in collection of fees for a hand pump or in mediating between two neighbors when in conflict over water. Large farms are the main apparatus of control over water distribution to settlements and despite the main institutions of water management described above, the de facto organizing principle for the Tajik irrigation system is to serve the water needs of these farms. Most large farms are now collectives, but some are individual or multi-family dihqon farms. Water Management at the Local Level The breakup of the previous command and control system has created a number of ambiguities with regard to the authority and responsibility for parts of the system. Rural reforms and diminished direct public sector involvement have blurred responsibility for maintaining downstream irrigation systems, manifold-drainage networks, and household water delivery that used to be handled by state-owned enterprises. This issue is of high significance since the newly-formed farms are secondary water users to which the public water management institutions may not feel responsible and for which no funds are available. District water management institutions control and administer the primary canals; they regulate weekly farm water access and scheduling through their mirobs (water monitoring technicians) according to type of crop and farmland area. Traditionally the large farms pay the water fees and large collective farm mirobs allow villagers to access water, often free of charge, in part as a quid pro quo to ensure a regular supply of villager labor, and in part to maintain good community relations. The villagers monitor intra- farm tertiary canals through informal agreements and organic scheduling but the arrangement is far from smooth because responsibility for maintaining downstream canals is unclear, and no oversight mechanism is in place to monitor where the water goes. As a result, household water supply can be completely erratic because water flow is determined by variables such as household geographic location in relation to the farms, mirob control and access, land conditions, and water quality. All this has been 17 reason for the introduction and establishment of water users associations that are discussed in the next part of the report (as well as in Annex B for the national level). Cost Recovery and Fee Collection Against the background of changes in the water provision system, budget shortfalls, and state inclination to introduce market mechanisms in the water sector, fees have been set by the state to be collected from water users in order to cover part but not all water delivery costs (see Annex B on this). Although collection rates have recently improved, they have been quite low for several reasons. First, users do not want to pay for water because it used to be free; second, fees are being demanded as service levels are plummeting due to deteriorating infrastructure; and third, even if water users were willing to pay, existing collection mechanisms are underdeveloped. As a result, significant debts have accrued at all levels, from water users to water delivery organizations (see Annex B for debts and improvements). In the study area, significant numbers of households receive free water for household plots and presidential lands while a smaller number of households must pay for water, which means that fee collection improvements are experienced in relation to the large collective farm system, at least in our study area. Furthermore, even if all fees were collected the amount would be insufficient for system maintenance. Since these revenues are essential to address widespread water delivery problems, fee collection rate and willingness to pay are important issues in maintaining the water provision system. Formally-levied fees do not reflect actual household water costs, which qualitative findings indicate may be significant. Although this cost is for the most part related to water transport, instances were also found where the local community had created some makeshift micro-systems with informal fees for the provision of water. 3.4 ACCESS TO WATER AND WATER SHORTAGES General Sources of Water The primary waterway grid across Sughd and Khatlon is supplied by rivers, their tributaries, and a network of underground streams and waterways, accessed through a vast array of pumping stations. However, in the study area, financial, technical, managerial, and institutional difficulties have led to widespread infrastructure failure that compromises water delivery. As a result, local people have had to develop their own sources of water such as collective and individual wells, captured rainfall, and purchased, transported and stored water for drinking and essential consumption needs. The survey indicated that in some locations households travelled long distances to carry spring water back to their homes, while in others households frequently used canal water for household and livestock consumption. Quantitative details on water access are in Tables 45-57, Annex D. Water Needs of Large Farms Supersede Household Water Needs The main determinant of household access to water is proximity to large cotton farms. Those closest to large farms are likely to have sustainable livelihoods because they can access water for personal irrigation and household needs, whereas more distant households are faced with water shortages and its consequences. Since large-scale cotton monoculture was the primary form of agricultural production, irrigation and drainage systems were constructed for continuous water flow to the large farms. When the snow melts in spring, the reservoirs fill up, electric plants resume full-time operation, the few functioning 18 pumps are set into motion, and canals serve the intensive irrigation demands of the cotton farming industry. Meanwhile, since potable water delivery was not expressly planned, the canals are also the primary source of water for personal consumption. Access to Water for Household Plots and Home Use Across the surveyed districts, 68 to 98 percent of households cited a canal, stream, or river as their primary access to water. Piped water, water from communal or individual wells, and natural springs served personal and household consumption needs. In Yovon, some 58 percent of respondents reported using collected and stored rainwater. Konibodom and Ghafurov respondents reported that large farms supplied their water from canals, stream, and rivers. For most Yovon respondents water came from the large farms, but more than ten percent received their water from WUAs. A few respondents also cited mahalla committees and Vodkhoz as water providers through canals, streams, or rivers. In Yovon, rainwater collection prevailed and the mahalla managed water sources, although ten percent of respondents also cited large farms as a water provider. In Ghafurov and Konibodom, large farms and mahalla committees managed communal wells; Ghafurov respondents also cited Vodkhoz as a provider. Typically, mahalla committees manage spring water provision. Many homes had hawzes (small cisterns or covered ponds) to store purchased and transported water, or rainwater collected from rooftops through downspouts (around 20 percent in Ghafurov; 40 percent in Konibodom; negligible in Yovon). Hawzes provide off-season water storage for months when the canals are not operating, or for villages too far from canals.Most households filled their hawzes two or three times during the winter months. The cost of constructing a new hawz was said to be beyond the means of elderly, disabled villagers, or poor women-headed households. Some households (mostly in Yovon) also saved water in storage tanks or containers, which cost less to build but were smaller and therefore needed to be filled more frequently. Between 20 to 40 percent of the surveyed villagers stored water. Few participants reported paying for water, in part due to the study being conducted during the irrigation season when canals are in full operation. Typically, households that had to pay for water were among the poorest in the settlements, lived furthest from natural sources, and were least likely to afford the modest cost of water and its transport. Access to safe drinking water According to the World Health Organization, the average daily water requirement for individual basic activities is 20 liters. Children under five years of age who use less than this amount are 1.6 times more likely to contract illnesses such as diarrhea.25 In some parts of rural Tajikistan, it is estimated that only between ten and fifty percent of people have access to safe drinking water, since potable water delivery was not explicitly planned when the irrigation infrastructure was built.26 The problems this creates were confirmed by site visits during the qualitative part of the study. Drinking water sources, reliability, and systems maintenance responsibilities varied and included government, participatory actions, NGOs, and self-provisioning. Access to drinking water varied across and within villages and due to and seasonally. 25 World Health Organization, "Highlights on Health in Tajikistan," 2005. 26 For example, based on Asian Development Bank estimates in 2004. 19 In Ghafurov, over half of respondents reported having access to piped water; in Konibodom and Yovon, only a third of people or less had access. However, piped water is available only part of the time and water quality can be below standards, so access to safe drinking water is actually lower than these percentages suggest. Nevertheless, households expressed satisfaction with the quality of piped water, perhaps unsurprising in this context of serious constraints to water access. Scarcity of safe drinking water in Tajikistan is also due to high pollutant levels in water resources, and many alternate water resources available to rural people are either difficult to access or equally polluted, due to poor waste management practices. Access to Water for Presidential Land, Individual Farms or Multi-Family Small Farms Concerning presidential lands as well as individual and multi-family small farms, the main sources of water for the quantitative assessment respondents were canals, streams or rivers in Konibodom and Ghafurov. In Yovon, in addition to these sources, rain water was also found to be important. Some respondents also stated that they had very little access to water for these types of land in Yovon. The cost of water was either zero or small. Satisfaction with the quality of water from stream, river, or canal water was average to low across the three districts. The quantitative assessment showed that in Ghafurov, for the majority of respondents, water form canals, streams and rivers was available at least half of the week. In Yovon, half of the respondents reported irregular access. In Ghafurov and Konibodom, the overwhelming majority of respondents reported the large farm system as the provider of water. WUAs were also cited as a provider in addition to large farms in Yovon. Differential Access to Water The study found differential access to water among locations and even within individual settlements. Differences were primarily linked to distances from the main canals, competition from large farms, and water resource seasonality. Some survey respondents also believed that politically or socially influential people had better access to water. Head and tail-end disparities in water flows that are prevalent in surface water irrigation systems everywhere are also found in Tajikistan. Generally, villages farther away from canals receive less water and are poorer. For example, the village of Jigdelig in Konibodom is the last village on the Farghona Canal, and has a maximum monthly average water flow of only 4-6 days at the height of the cotton season. Consequently, Jigdelik inhabitants must transport almost 100 percent of their water consumption needs which creates significant livelihood burdens. Similarly, the Lohuti dihqon farm is number 11 of 12 outlets on the canal and suffers inadequate water flows. Focus group respondents in Lohuti reported that canals were empty of water from September to March. Differences in the provision of drinking and irrigation water to individual households also have a structural dimension. While on the one side large collective farms often continue to provide water to village residents for free, on the other side, proximity to cotton farms may in the long-run be detrimental to the quality and sustainability of the livelihood of the village population. The cotton monoculture has traditionally been the prime focus of the command and control political economic system based on the capture of scale economies. The irrigation and drainage systems have thus been constructed in such a way as to support a continuous flow of water to large-scale farms. This structure has in turn subjected the 20 livelihoods of the village populations to the needs of the large collective. While irrigation canals operate to support cotton production for the most part, the needs of horticulture and production of crops beneficial to the wellbeing of the households, is not taken into account. Seasonality is another factor that differentiates water access among settlements. Across most of the study area, when the cotton season ends around October or November, electricity plants cease 24-hour operations and supply only a few hours of electricity each night during the winter, which ultimately halts the water flowing through the canals. Local people in some areas admitted in focus group discussions that they continued to use whatever water remains, even drinking stagnant, bacteria- and growth- infested waters. In off-season between November and March, there is no water in the canals unless it rains, and villagers are forced to seek alternatives. During these months, procuring water for drinking, livestock, and household needs takes precedence over all other activities. 3.5 CONSEQUENCES OF WATER-RELATED DIFFICULTIES Direct Impacts on Livelihoods Infrastructure failure and water management shortcomings have led to water shortages, water-logging, water and soil contamination, flooding, soil erosion, and desertification (see Annex B), all of which have depleted arable land quality and householders' livelihoods. Close to one-third of arable lands in the study area are no longer productive due to low water quality, water shortages, or rising water tables. Cultivation of household plots and presidential lands, an important source of household subsistence, has become unviable or more difficult due to limited or lack of water access, rising water tables, or poor soil quality; presidential lands in particular suffer from lack of water. As indicated earlier, 79 percent of survey respondents believed their agricultural production had recently decreased and 56 percent expressed an income decline in the previous three years. This situation was most evident in Konibodom, where household income is one of the lowest in the study area. Efforts to own and increase livestock assets, crucial to the survival of the rural family, are hampered by water shortages and water contamination. The opportunity costs of time spent accessing water are high but people have few alternatives. Villagers must dig trenches and clean overflowing drainage systems by hand when it rains, invest in hand pumps to drains dangerously flooded homes; people spend hours every day fetching water for the household--a task frequently performed by children who have been taken out of school to make the long walk in search of water, or by women who must triage their time among productive activities, caring for their families, and fetching water. Household resources to cope with basic livelihood challenges are shrinking, which forces many women back to large-scale cotton farms to earn below subsistence wages. Meanwhile, organizing irrigation systems around the cotton monoculture has further depleted the resources of distant villages such as those in Chorgul Jamoat, Yovon, that are spread out in three tiers in between two irrigation canals with cotton farms located in the lower two tiers. At one time there were underground streams at the top end of the Jamoat but all of these have been redirected to feed cotton farms and now the upper levels of the Jamoat have dried up. Villagers have lost their access to irrigation sources and now rely mainly on rain-fed farming for limited cultivation of wheat and fodder; they take their livestock down to water in open ditches, exposing them to risks inherent in stagnant waters and contaminated drainages. 21 Severe water-logging and flooding due to drainage inefficiencies are also threatening infrastructure. Buildings, roads, and bridges are in precarious condition due to rising water tables. In 2002, 342 homes in Sharifov Jamoat in Konibodom were deemed uninhabitable due to increased ground water, and the inhabitants were recognized as ecological refugees.27 Many homes are dangerous to live in and schools are crumbling. According to hukumat officials who were interviewed by the study team, 33 of 54 schools in Konibodom were in dire need of repair--their basements flooded and their foundations under threat of collapse. This level of devastation of key infrastructure such as schools undermines the country's future. Water Contamination and Health Problems Intensive development of irrigated farming has increased levels of water contamination via water drainage--primarily from agrochemicals that wash out through drainage systems into streams and rivers and seep underground. Household water discharge is the second largest source of water contamination in streams, rivers, and underground waters. In the Sirdaryo basin the mineral content of upstream water has been measured at 0.3-0.5 g/l while the downstream water is reported as 1.3-1.4 g/l (exceeding 1.7-2.3 g/l in Kazalinsk). Mineral content has risen for magnesium, copper, iron, sulfate, and chloride. Sirdaryo water quality at the inlet to Kairakkum water reservoir in Konibodom and Ghafurov districts has been reported unsatisfactory because the mineral contents exceeds 35-38 percent; so water from Sirdaryo is not 28 potable in many areas, in particular in Sughd. The Farghona Canal and Isfara River make their long trajectories through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan before arriving in Tajikistan, passing through Bobojon Ghafurov, and ending up in Konibodom. Pesticides, agricultural runoff from rice plantations, sewage, and waste pollute the waters along the way, putting villagers towards the end of the canal increasingly at risk. Only abundant rainfall temporarily improves water quality by diluting contamination. Underground reservoirs are polluted by irrigation runoff and pesticides; for example, the underground well near the village of Kuikuzian in the Ortiqov Jamoat in Konibodom has been found to contain 27 percent chemicals.29 The situation is exacerbated by non- or low-functioning melioration wells (only 14-30 percent are in operation) and pumping stations related to Kairakkum water reservoir, land reclamation in neighboring Kyrgyz Republic, and electricity shortages. Similarly in Khatlon, along the banks of 70 km long Yovonsu river that flows from the mountains to the Vakhsh River and onto Omudaryo (Oxus), waste from chemical plants and pesticides from farmlands is deposited in the waters which test up to 47 percent in chemical and 54 percent in bacteriological contaminants. Yovon chemical plant and Vakhsh nitric fertilizer plant poison groundwater.30 According to observers, in many locations contaminants in underground water are ten times the maximum allowable level. Water hardness exceeds allowable levels by a factor of five, and bacterial sources of serious illnesses are present. Many alternate water resources are difficult to access or equally polluted by poor waste management practices and unregulated agricultural toxins (see Table 61, Annex D). 27 World Bank Fergana Valley Water Resources Management Project, "Rapid Social Assessment," 2005. 28 Information supplied by Oblast. 29 Data from Konibodom Hukumat. 30 World Bank data; see also UNEP-GRID-Arendal Norway Website - Research Laboratory for Nature Protection. 22 The combined effects of lack of access to piped water, polluted irrigation canals, water-logging, and blocked and non-functioning drainage have resulted in the spread of hepatitis, malaria, typhoid, and gastrointestinal ailments. Water-borne diseases were a main source of 969 reported illnesses across the nine target jamoats last year.31 Many deaths from these ailments were reported in Konibodom, which has 32 higher levels of contamination due to its location at the end of the Farghona Canal. Many young children died in Bobojon Ghafurov during 2005-06. Indeed, mortality rates for children under five years old, adjusted for under-reporting, is estimated as 118 per 1,000 in Tajikistan, much higher than the figure set by the Millennium Development Goals,33 in part due to lack of access to clean water. Earlier subsidies, estimated at 40 percent of GDP in 1991, have disappeared, exacerbating health problems associated with 34 access to clean water. There are also psychological dimensions to inadequate accessibility of water. In the hot summer months, temperatures can rise up to 40 centigrade and beyond, putting additional physical and psychological strain on those further away from water resources. In a Yovon focus group, perceptions were to the effect that those away from the canals were "more emotional", "less rational" mostly referring to women. Unfortunately, these trends help strengthen stigmas in a traditional culture where discrimination against woman are on the rise following the loss of their socialist rights. Sanitary and healthcare shortcomings also drain already meager household resources that could be used for school fees, clothes, or food. For example, savings toward the cost of school supplies--about 100 somonis--could be wiped out by one serious illness. Survey findings indicate that health problems are among the main reasons for borrowing money. Indeed, the most frequently reported shocks experienced by households were illnesses and injuries, from which only a quarter of households had recovered. These narrow margins between survival and disaster are likely the reason most survey respondents believed that money was sufficient only for absolute minimum needs. 3.6 WATER CONFLICTS Water flow to households is a function of the geographical location of farms vis-ŕ-vis the source on the one hand and control exercised by water authorities and mirobs at various levels on the other. The differences in means and circumstances among regions, villages, and households have led among other things to continuous water conflicts and tensions. At various levels, those who find themselves compromised sometimes resort to desperate, improvised, and sometimes even clandestine efforts to reroute resources for their own benefit (see further Tables 59- 60, Annex D). Water conflicts at the macro-level are represented by disputes between bordering governments, cross- border tensions, and disregard for treaties. Under the Soviet Union, water resources flowed unhampered across what are now separate and sovereign Central Asian nations. Funds for the repair and maintenance of the water system infrastructure were also provided centrally to ensure efficient irrigation management. As a negative side effect of the recent geopolitical changes, water resource management has now fallen 31 Based on local team data. 32 Data from Konibodom District's Health Department, 2007 (in Tajiki). 33 World Health Organization, "Mortality Fact Sheet," 2006. 34 Asian Development Bank, "Women in Tajikistan: Tajikistan in Transition," 2006. 23 prey to competitive struggles across newly-drawn boundaries and emerging regional stakes. These conflicts are further compromising disadvantaged downstream communities. Water conflicts at the local level are best observed between the needs of the bigger and better-connected cotton farms on the one side and the requirements of smaller land holdings. For over 80 percent of the quantitative assessment respondents, access to water for household plots and presidential lands was through a large farm or a neighboring small farm. A large number of households further either stated that they received very little or low-quality water as a result. While only a small minority of respondents chose to cite actual incidents of conflictual relationships through the quantitative assessment, upon further probing in focus groups, recurrent admissions of diversionary tactics and sometimes overt conflict were recorded. Some of the focus group participants reported having to steal water in the middle of the night by breaking the gates, thus risking recurrent confrontations with the mirobs who invariably chose to ignore these operations. There are also conflicts over drinking water. Long waits and overcrowding at points of access lead to tension and at times aggression. In Chorgul Jamoat in Yovon there is only one source of sweet drinking water for 14 villages, an underground access to a well constructed by CARE International. Disputes at this watering point are frequent, once even leading to death, as one impatient neighbor killed another with a shovel while standing in line. In another incident a woman was beaten while trying to take water out of turn after a 15 km walk. Even though the aggressor was arrested, this is an illustration of the level of contention and stress caused within the community due to the scarcity of water. Inter-village disputes regarding water allocation (as well as irrigation and drainage issues such as pump rehabilitation) are generally directed towards the mirob of the Vodkhoz in a vertical manner. Intra-village disputes however are more common and resolutions are attempted organically through neighbors, village elders, and mahalla committees. For most conflicts the primary coping strategy seems to be resignation. Some 60 percent of survey respondents cited "no arbitration" to conflicts, alluding to acceptance of their own limited power relative to that of larger stakeholders. Other respondents cited ad hoc organic conflict resolution methods such as mutual agreements, or mediation through neighbors and village elders. 3.7 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 1. Economic difficulties have resulted in the breakdown of water infrastructure, leading to extensive water shortages, water-logging, and high levels of contamination. 2. Large areas cannot be cultivated due to water-logging and water shortages, which limit the income-generating opportunities of households. 3. Water fee collection rates are low due to widespread poverty, a sense of entitlement to free water, and low-quality water delivery services. 4. Water provision is organized around the needs of the large cotton farms. Households are dependent on these farms for water, which often leads to household members, primarily women, supplying below-market value labor to large farms as a quid pro quo for their household water supply. 5. Drinking water was not specifically planned for and remains a pressing problem. 24 6. Water contamination and water shortages have a severe impact on rural health indicators, and some households never recover financially from family illness due to the medical costs. 7. Against the background of water shortages and households' dependence on large farms, water conflicts and tensions have become prevalent. 25 4. Water Users Associations 4.1 INTRODUCTION The previous part of the report discussed how, since independence, Tajikistan's public institutions have not had the means to maintain and rehabilitate the antiquated irrigation and drainage systems. This has further resulted in potable and irrigation water shortages as well as water-logging and water contamination which have in turn severely impacted agricultural production, rural livelihoods, and health indicators. It was also suggested that water infrastructure continues to function around the needs of large farms which provide water to rural households at least partially in exchange for their cheap labor. While this leaves rural households at the mercy of large farms, a sense of entitlement to free water further prevails in rural areas that obstructs the introduction of fee-for-use system for water that would create partial cost-recovery for water suppliers. The situation has been exacerbated by recent structural changes and shortcomings that have created a void in water management at the local level. This part of the report focuses on water users associations (WUAs) whose establishment is on the agenda of FVWRMP, aiming toward an effective ownership and management of the secondary and tertiary water delivery networks. A number of international and domestic organizations have already been involved in creating WUAs across Tajikistan, and an examination of their experiences can help FVWRMP to set up its WUAs in an effective and sustainable manner. A detailed description of the legal and institutional aspects of WUAs is provided in Annex B and summarized as part of the background in the next section. The sections that follow introduce several WUAs and initiatives to establish WUAs in the near future in Yovon and in Sughd to draw lessons from their experiences. The analysis also benefits from WUA experiences elsewhere. 4.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND The agricultural sector of Tajikistan is undergoing extensive restructuring with the aim of establishing market mechanisms by replacing former state-owned kolkhozes and sovkhozes with smaller farms. In addition to the problems with land reforms discussed earlier, it is unclear where responsibility lies for maintaining the irrigation system, the manifold drainage networks, and water delivery to households served by state-owned enterprises. Tajikistan needs to create a water management structure that prevents over-consumption and ensures equitable distribution. Under the existing situation, households and small farms are secondary water users and water companies feel neither responsible nor accountable to them; nor is there any funding to service them. Experience elsewhere has shown water users associations, with their members drawn among water users, to be effective in managing water provision, consumption, network maintenance, and melioration. Water users associations are supposed to provide for a fair distribution of water, maintain the irrigation and drainage networks, and allow for the voices of their members to be heard at the level of public organizations. Water users associations are also expected to reduce overall expenses, increase investment efficiency, and ultimately lead to increased crop yields and lower negative environmental impacts. 26 In 2006, the President signed a Law on Water Users Associations intended to create a firm legal basis for WUAs and to replace and/or complement the earlier ad hoc legal structures. The Law, which regulates relations between public water authorities and water users, stipulates that WUAs must provide for water users' participation in managing water infrastructure and water delivery. WUAs have the authority to set fees to cover their expenses including irrigation system maintenance costs. Both WUA members and non- members must pay fees for using WUA services in the association service area. WUAs should be registered with a ministry-level office that monitors their activities and provides legal, technical, and financial assistance. Furthermore, three regional WUA Support Units are being organized under Sughd Oblast Water Resources Department, Kurgantube Territorial Water Resources Department, and Kulob Territorial Water Resources Department. WUA Support Units are also being established at the district level (see Annex B for further details). 4.3 WUAS COVERED IN THIS STUDY About one hundred WUAs have been established across Tajikistan under the old and new legal frameworks, primarily with funding from international organizations, including the World Bank under the Rural Infrastructures Rehabilitation Project and the Farm Privatization Support Project (see Annex B). Local hukumats, district water resources departments, dihqon farm associations and local NGOs also have initiatives to establish WUAs. Each funding agency has its own way of establishing a WUA, including differing levels of funding, technical assistance, administration arrangements, equipment, staff, and service areas. Not surprisingly, these different inputs have produced WUAs with different levels of efficiency, influence, and sustainability. Of the nine jamoats covered across the three districts in this study, only Yovon's jamoats have experience with WUAs. In 2002, a WUA called Ten Years of Tajikistan was established in the Ozodi Jamoat (comprising 10 villages with a population of 11,033) as part of the Bank Farm Privatization Support Project, which involved 308 members, eight specialists, 72 dihqon farm members, and 754 hectares of irrigated land. A sibling WUA was also initiated in the Chorgul Jamoat but due to an array of difficulties is now defunct. As expected, quantitative assessment only captured evidence of WUAs in Yovon. Yet, the numbers were still small with about 40 percent of respondents being aware of WUAs and only around 5 percent indicating their Khojagi's (large collective or individual/multifamily small farms) membership in WUAs (see further Tables 62-64, Annex D). Among Konibodom's jamoats covered in this study, only in Lohuti has a WUA been initiated. An NGO helped to register the association and an engineer was initially chosen among dihqon farm directors to head the WUA. Yet this WUA was not found to be functioning in any discernable way by the study. Yet this study concluded that the WUA was not functioning in any discernable way. Preparatory work for establishing WUAs was also reported in Sharifov and Ortiqov, although progress has been slow due to delayed mobilization of human and material resources. Accordingly little evidence of WUAs was captured in the quantitative assessment of Konibodom's targeted jamoats. However, two WUAs have been fully established elsewhere in Konibodom outside the study area. Ravot-1 and Ravot-2 were set up in Puloton Jamoat in 2005 with ACTED financial and technical assistance, and further support from District Hukumat, Raivodkhoz and Puloton Jamoat. Ravot-1 WUA service area includes Ravot and Yangi Ravot villages; its water supply source is Isfarinka River, and its members comprise six dihqon farms with 1100 hectares of irrigated land and 1,273 shareholders. Ravot-2 WUA members are two dihqon 27 farms with 400 hectares of irrigated land and 264 shareholders (including Kyzyl-nur, Patar and Yakkaterak villages) and water for the service area is pumped from the Big Farghona Canal. Additionally, since there was no WUA in Ghafurov (where large farms are still kept in the form of joint stock companies and production cooperatives, and meaningful land restructuring has not yet started), except for early initiatives in Qataghon, an alternative WUA elsewhere in Sughd, that is Jabbor Rasulov, was targeted by this study in order to have adequate evidence on the subject. The Zarafshon WUA in Jabbor Rasulov was established in 2003 in the framework of Integrated Water Resources Management in Farghona Valley. Funding was provided by Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the project was jointly implemented by International Water Resources Management Institution (IWRMI) and Scientific Information Center of Interstate Coordination Water Economy Commission. ACTED has also given this project a small amount of funding while the main financial source to run the WUA is supposed to be water fees. The WUA service area includes 65 farms with a total area of 1050 hectares distributed among 1966 land shareholders living in 5 villages and 1,180 households. In Zarafshon, water authorities transferred the usage of off-farm channels to the WUA but provide funds for it to operate and maintain the system. Below are lessons learned from the study WUAs and a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. These findings are supplemented by citing information from WUA experiences elsewhere in Tajikistan, including those related to the Rural Infrastructures Rehabilitation Project, the Farm Privatization Support Project, Water Users Associations Support Project (WUASP) implemented by Winrock International and funded by USAID, and Asian Development Bank initiatives. 4.4 DEMONSTRATED BENEFITS OF WUAS The success of WUAs is supposed to lead to improvements in the deteriorating water infrastructure through budgetary and investment efficiencies as well as enhancement of the conditions of adjacent farmlands, ultimately resulting in increased yield potentials and improved livelihoods of users. Additionally, responsible water management is supposed to have positive environmental impacts and to further result in improved sanitation and health of rural households. While research into the operation of target WUAs found mixed overall results, it also illustrated a number of benefits associated with WUAs that had experienced some degree of success. In some WUA projects, 10-20 percent increases in water fee collection rates were witnessed. Farm Privatization Support Project WUAs elsewhere are also reported to have increased fee collection by 20 percent while WUAs established under the Rural Infrastructures Rehabilitation Project are said to have enhanced fee collection by 19%. Water provision to dihqon farms under these two sets of projects are also reported to have increased by 3-13 percent. Among target associations, water resources management was reported to have improved somewhat at the local level. Furthermore, crop yields were reported to have increased in the Zarafshon WUA's service area from 1.9 ton/ha to 2.3 ton/ha between 2003 and 2006 and similar increases of around 15 to 20 percent were anecdotally reported as an outcome of the establishment of Ravot-1. Many of these improvements are due to an active users association that collects fees on behalf of all members and deals directly with water authorities, circumventing the challenge of dealing with many different users. The new arrangements have yielded a more systematic and equitable water monitoring process by introducing meters and gauging technology to assess and dispense water according to need, 28 type of crop, and surface area. Before such measures were implemented, water users at the beginning of the canal would open the gates and take more water than needed and water users at the end of the canal would have little or no water. The new arrangements have also enhanced food security, improved maintenance of secondary and tertiary water infrastructure, and helped meliorate adjacent farmlands. These benefits have strengthened community-based involvement by creating ownership and accountability links that have resulted in increased cohesion, trust, and awareness of sanitation and good practices. Additional future benefits may include bridging mechanisms for agricultural marketing and contract farming arrangements. 4.5 CHALLENGES TO THE OPERATION OF WUAS The sustainable operation of WUAs hinges on effective community participation and sustained engagement of the users by way of expertise, resources, and connection to the core issues of the operation and management of the water infrastructure as well as a deep understanding of the concerns of water users. Organizations active in the target area have opted for different approaches with various outcomes. An analysis of these variations demonstrates a number of challenges linked to slow pace of land reforms and inadequate transparency, deteriorating infrastructure and lack of technological inputs, depleted financial resources and insufficient expertise, and failure to engage water users in general and to include women in particular. Slow Pace of Land Reforms The slow pace of meaningful land reforms and prevalent farm policies pose serious obstacles to community-based water management initiatives. Under the current setting, organizations striving to set up WUAs find themselves working on the edges of large cotton farming interests and must deal with the impact of future company monopolies and top-down dictations by local hukumats. In territories where large-scale cotton production dominates, as in Ghafurov, farms continue to exist and operate much as they used to in spite of the official position advertising otherwise. As a consequence, WUA activities in these areas have a limited scope of operation. Deteriorating Infrastructure Across the study area, dilapidated water delivery systems are working at a greatly reduced capacity. Electricity flow is also severely reduced during winter months and impacts the operation of the few functioning pumps. Ongoing challenges are thus posed to the successful establishment and operation of WUAs due to the progressive failure of infrastructure and lack of capacity on behalf of governing institutions to provide a minimum base of operations for irrigation, drinking, and multiple-use needs. Fundamental support gaps creating an erosion of confidence and trust in water delivery management continue to undermine local water management initiatives. For example, having adequate level of equipments, including computers, Zarafshon WUA manages two secondary channels, namely, Ak-kalya (5 km 453 ha) and Bystrotok (5.2 km, 597 ha) from which the water is delivered through 28 derivations to farms and villages (water comes from Gulyakandoz's main canal as well as the main canal of Khojabaqirgon-3). Yet, despite its achievements, it is unable to sustain its water supply, since Khojabaqirgon canal has no regulating water storage (reservoir) and depends solely on the water level of Khajabaqirgonsoy, which faces shortages. Water shortages should have been anticipated and reservoirs constructed to provide continuous water supply during breakdowns, until the pumps could resume operation. Lack of safeguards erodes water user confidence and undermines WUA operations. As a result, 29 local people revert to traditional water user patterns, and subsequent efforts to organize WUAs are met with resistance and lack of trust. Financial Difficulties A major issue in the long-term operation of WUAs is financial sustainability. While funding organizations have covered start-up expenses, it is often expected that in the medium-term water fees satisfy WUAs' financial needs. However, fee-based financial sustainability is not automatic. It is a gradual process, requires careful planning in advance, and may further need other non-cash financial incentives (exemptions, etc.). For example, the WUA in Ozodi Jamoat of Yovon under the Bank Farm Privatization Support Project, had an agreement with Raivodkhoz on water supply and irrigation system maintenance. The WUA was able to pay staff salaries during the 2002-03 implementation, but when the start-up was completed in 2005, WUA finances deteriorated and staff salary payments were so late that five of the eight staff left the project. Even the mirobs were not paid on time, and their work attendance was irregular. Obviously, this deteriorating situation decreased WUA effectiveness and scope of the work and fee collections declined. Most user fees, especially from cotton farms, are now collected directly by Raivodkhoz. As mentioned above, the sibling organization in Chorgul is defunct for the same reasons. Elsewhere, an example from Asian Development Bank (ADB), which established and wholly funded a WUA--providing bicycles for the mirobs, water meters, computers, and salaries for the first year-- expected the association to become self-sustaining. But after the ADB stopped paying salaries, the WUA disintegrated in a web of internal corruption, non-collection of fees, and disillusioned users.35 Similarly, the price of water was reported to be a significant problem for farmers of Ravot-1 and Ravot-2 WUAs. Fee collection levels translate into how much water can be requested by dihqon farms from Raivodkhoz and determines the profitability of farm activities. Dihqon farms started paying Raivodkhoz for water in 1996. Price was set at 0.006 somoni for 1 m3 of water or 60 somonis per 1 ha. In 2003, before additional payments were requested by the WUA, water fees amounted to 13% of all expenses of the dihqon farms, including seeds, fertilizers, fuel etc. Due to various financial difficulties faced by the farms, water users have not been able to pay their fees and have accrued significant water debts to the Raivodkhoz, amounting to approximately 25% of gross annual income from sale of crops. Ravot-1 WUA Board has had to approve additional payments in the amount of 0.001 somoni per 1 m3. In order to pay for electricity and for technical expenses linked to three pumps, Ravot-2 WUA added 0.0024 somoni per 1 m3 (an increase of 40%) resulting in a total figure of 0.0084 somoni per 1 m3 of water. These experiences show that lack of planning for the financial sustainability of WUAs lowers the chances of their survival. Overall, WUAs have not been able to meet all of their obligations due to low rate of fee collection. In particular they are often not able to maintain the irrigation system they are responsible for due to the absence of adequate funds. WUAs do not have the minimum requirements of office, office equipment, and means of transport. More importantly, most WUAs do not have the necessary equipment for melioration and other related work. As of yet, there is no credit available to WUAs for the procurement of equipment and repair work. The WUA support units do not provide any financial support either. The 35 See Asian Development Bank, "Support for Monitoring Policy Reforms and Improving Farm and Water Management Project," No.4472-TAJ, Dushanbe, 2007 (in Russian); and Asian Development Bank, "The Irrigation Rehabilitation Project," No.4143-TAJ, Dushanbe, 2004 (in Russian). 30 status of WUAs as non-commercial organizations also limits their activities to some extent in financial terms. Problems with Human Resources Large-scale migration of technical staff, breakup of large kolkhozes, and farm debts have depleted the rural landscape in terms of technical expertise. Qualification levels of WUA technical personnel remain low. The technical staff active in WUAs today often does not have a full comprehension of its responsibilities. Indeed, WUA's continue to be challenged in terms of competent human resources in the absence of specialists, hydro-engineers, technicians, agronomists, business and financial managers. Institutional arrangements are also absent for improvement of WUA service personnel. To make matters worse, as suggested above, WUAs' financial difficulties related to fee-based operations act as an obstacle to attraction and retention of expert staff. For example, Ravot-1 and Ravot-2 WUAs have an annual agreement with Raivodkhoz for water supply, make annual water distribution plans, and in accordance with their capabilities, maintain irrigation systems in working conditions (having made partial repair of gutters, pipes, small electric pumps, etc). Despite all this, the absence of hydro-engineer as well as specialized equipments is particularly noticeable. Inadequate Transparency and Accountability Anecdotal information gathered through the research shows that hierarchic influence peddling often intervenes in the work of WUAs. In particular, placement of prominent but largely ineffectual favorites in key positions is a detriment to the operation of the associations. It compromises the fundamental strength of WUAs which are supposed to be democratic institutions with transparent procedures and accountable to their members. In the study, the ex-deputy of a Jamoat who had been without employment was simply appointed to the position of the head of a WUA, although demonstrating a clear lack of expertise and inability to cope with developing challenges. Inadequate leadership and lack of sufficient mandate often lead to management breakdowns, erosion of confidence, and subsequent failure of the WUAs. Furthermore, traditional top-down models and cultural internalization of authority in general collude to undermine the independent rise of community-based initiatives. Efforts are thus needed to officially curb the influence exerted by the local hukumats as well as impressing guarantees of freedom of operation on local community institutions. Insufficient Front-End Development Much work is needed for a successful implementation of community-based water initiatives as the case of Yovon WUA illustrated. In particular, the quantitative survey showed that for the most part households in Yovon felt that there was no impact resulting for the WUAs with a sizable number thinking that things had even gotten worse. Without front-end work on behalf of state organizations to enhance the water infrastructure, community-based maintenance and management initiatives are bound to fail. There is some evidence of good although still not adequate front-end efforts in the study area. For example, significant efforts were made to mobilize people in the process of WUA establishment in Ravot-1 and Ravot-2. ACTED arranged seminars on mobilization and organization of WUAs, methods of compiling water use plan, technical evaluation, monitoring, and repair of irrigation networks, , and a few other topics. These seminars were effective in organizing Ravot-1 WUA and Ravot-2 WUA. 31 Disengagement of the Donor Organization and Ownership Challenges Many WUAs in the study area failed after donors disengaged because local people had never really developed a sense of ownership. Sometimes this happened because outsiders were contracted to administer start-up in the interest of speeding up front-end work to establish a WUA but this undermines local capacity building and ownership. Instead, community participation is essential from the inception-- to develop business plans, supervise functions and operate the organization, a process that builds skills and ownership incrementally. In fact, in examples from elsewhere, some donors have even adopted a sliding scale that makes donor grants contingent on levels of user participation. Another element that has weakened WUAs is paying salaries to some WUA members, which has compromised community links and seemed to send a message. Instead, enforcing a modest symbolic payment of even one somoni signals that WUAs are user-owned-and-operated associations, which establishes and strengthens ownership links from the outset. The USAID and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) adopted this approach to sustaining user engagement. Insufficient Inclusion of Women Although widespread male migration has significantly increased the number of female-headed households, women's participation in WUAs in Tajikistan is hampered by a post-Soviet societal return to traditional gender roles and the necessity of women's multiple livelihood strategies. Given women's new responsibilities as heads of households, their economic contributions could suffer as they are not involved in key decisions affecting their livelihoods. The study found no formal institutional barriers to female participation and some examples of women participating in community groups, but most evidence suggests that rural women avoid active involvement in decision making. Some female focus group participants commented, "Women do not travel to government offices," and said that they "...persuade their men to talk on their behalf." Women's involvement in the community-based water management initiatives thus falls considerably short of their disproportionate burden of livelihood, the rising trends in female-headed households, and the direct interest they have in the improvement of water provision. 4.6 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 1. Establishing WUAs has yielded several benefits such as more systematic and equitable water monitoring, higher rates of fee collection, increased crop yields and incomes, and enhanced food security. 2. The challenges to successful WUA operation include the slow pace of land reforms, lack of transparency and accountability, deteriorating infrastructure and lack of technological inputs, depleted financial resources, insufficient expertise, and failure to gain the trust and participation of water users in general and women in particular. 3. Official intervention is needed to curb influence peddling by local hukumats and ensure democratic, transparent, and accountable operations among community institutions. 32 5. Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations 5.1 INTRODUCTION This study was conducted with the aim to inform FVWRMP in two main areas. First, as the central focus of FVWRMP is on water, the social assessment sought to shed light on household's access to water and the structural dimensions of water provision, including the working of recently-established WUAs. Second, since it was hypothesized that rural poverty in the study has a strong gender aspect, the study probed how the (changing) socioeconomic structure of the rural society and the formal and informal institutions of agricultural production, including those related to water and land, affect women. This brought the study to cover, apart from water and gender, demographic situation, incomes and wages, employment, and agricultural activities as well as various aspects of access to land, possession of land shares on large farms, and titles for land holdings and land shares. This part of the report synthesizes study findings and is organized in two main sections. The first section examines the interplay of the main issues covered in the study to discuss in a structural manner various aspects of poverty and vulnerability in general and as they affect women. It also suggests an outline of a framework that may lead to an improved overall situation for the households and for women in the long- run as well as of short-term measures that can have poverty alleviation and gender equity impacts. This acts as a prelude to the second section discussing the water situation whose improvement is among the short- to medium-term measures that can enhance agricultural production and farm earnings. Furthermore, water users associations have been proposed and established in a few instances to improve the structure of water provision, but they have experienced various shortcomings that have hampered their operation on balance. The last portion of the second section thus suggests ways to ensure their growth, sustainability, and satisfactory performance. 5.2 AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES, WATER, GENDER, AND POVERTY: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Rural development entails increased incomes, reduced vulnerability, improved sanitation and health, better access to services, and enhanced human capital. These improvements have further cross-effects. For example, enhanced human capital has a positive impact on incomes. Yet, these improvements will still be inadequate if they are not distributed equitably among households, across various social and ethnic groups, and between men and women. In the area covered by this study and perhaps across Tajikistan, a number of factors act as barriers to development while a set of opportunities also exists. Apart from some self-employment channels for men as well as a few public sector and trades and services occupations, the most important first employment of household members in the study area comprises agricultural activities on the large farms. This is particularly the case for women. Furthermore, the second productive activity of most household members is working on the household plots and presidential lands. These employment channels are also augmented with minor informal sector activities. Indeed, it is not uncommon for livelihood strategies of women and men to include a mix of formal and informal sector employment. Yet, high levels of labor migration (which does translate into significant 33 earnings for the households) suggest unemployment and underemployment, inadequate wages, and low levels of productivity in the study area. Despite reported economic growth in Tajikistan, there is a general feeling of poverty among the population of the study area. The overwhelming majority of the households feel they have only enough money for the absolute minimum of clothes and food, or even less than minimum. Indeed, the roughly- estimated median and mean annual incomes are quite low with remittance constituting about a quarter of the money households receive. Many households have a feeling that their financial situation is stagnant or getting worse (indeed against the background of rising prices). Households are vulnerable to shocks and there is little access to formal borrowing. Working on large farms is a main formal-sector, income-generating channel for many rural household members, in particular women, although it brings in little. Workers continue to labor at the large farms for small amounts of cash, some in-kind wages, and cotton stalks used for fuel. There are few new opportunities available in the industry. Most manufacturing units and workshops that existed in the past were closed down during post-independence economic disruption. There is also a social structure at work made up of households, large farms, and power institutions, acting among other things through the provision of water from large farm networks to individual houses and household plots, which pushes many villagers (in particular women) back to the low wage jobs at the collectives. On this last point, note that village water comes from the canals irrigating the cotton fields, making these settlements wholly dependent on maintaining the existing cotton production set-up (despite the possibility of higher returns from fruits and vegetables the sale of which could also benefit women). Large farms pay low wages mainly as a result of several factors. Labor productivity is low on these farms. Machinery and equipment are obsolete or non-existent and application of scientific know-how is minimal due in part to migration of high-skilled labor and the disruption of the previous knowledge system. The water and drainage networks and electricity shortages exacerbate the situation. The wages are also low since the farms have significant debts to future companies and others (including water debt). Yet, debt has been accrued due to financial mismanagement and possibly malfeasance. Finally and quite importantly, large farms must meet state cotton quotas while they sell their outputs at low prices due to both prevailing international low cotton prices and the monopsony through which cotton is purchased from the farms. This situation is operationalized and exacerbated by a collusive structure that extracts and takes away surplus from lay workers at the large farms, thus precluding both increased rural household consumption and reinvestment in productive activities of the collectives. The fact that few large farm workers have a clear understanding of the land shares they are supposed to have is an indication of this convoluted structure. Indeed, land reforms are meaningless from the point of view of a majority of households. In particular, there has been reluctance to relinquish control over prime as opposed to marginal farmlands. Cotton-growing kolkhozes and sovkhozes have been turned into a few smaller collectives that operate more or less on the old principles and large-scale cotton production still predominates as under the Soviet period (although in non-cotton-producing areas there is some evidence of more meaningful land reform). Thus in cotton-producing areas, a complete and relatively closed low-wage, low-productivity cycle is established that keeps many rural households in poverty with the only exogenous factor affecting it being migrants' remittances. What should be emphasized is that exploitation per se does not hamper poverty 34 reduction or development. The developmental obstacle here is rather the particular exploitation structure whereby surplus is extracted but is not reinvested in the localities. There is no evidence either that the proceeds are invested domestically elsewhere in productive activities that may lead to increased demand for labor. If the surplus was reinvested where it was extracted (or for example in manufacturing units around urban areas), it would be possible for an upward spiral to be established through which gradual improvements in productivity coupled with an expansion of the economy and job opportunities could take the population out of poverty. Every system of exploitation must have its labor reproduction mechanisms. Yet, of necessity, in the above-mentioned low-wage, low-productivity rural exploitation structure, the reproduction mechanism continues to preserve poverty in order to keep the increasingly feminized labor at work in the large farms. Gender relations against the background of removal of previous socialist programs are thus an important part of the reproduction mechanism of the low-wage, low-productivity structure of exploitation and poverty cycle. Despite high levels of educational achievements in the study area (and in fact across Tajikistan's rural regions) among females, formalization of women's work, and high prevalence of female-headed households, traditional forms of family structure remain the norm with their implications for gender relations. Against this background, the feminization of low-wage labor keeps the exploitation and production structure operating. Whereas female labor at the large farms has low bargaining power, male labor is either recruited by the collusive structure or can find income-earning opportunities in some businesses and quite importantly through migration. On this last point, note that the absence of overwhelmingly male migrants does not empower women and weakens the cohesion of the family and by extension the society by depleting it of high-skilled human resources. All these help reproduce the low-wage, low-productivity (female) labor required at the large farms. Furthermore, with such low wages offered at the large farms, household plots and presidential lands are significant in providing food security and supplementary incomes for many households. Yet, households covered in this study believe that their produce on these types of land is stagnant or even decreasing. Notwithstanding the small sizes of these land holdings and their meager potentials, the main reasons behind their low level of output are water shortages in some places and water-logging in others due to deteriorated water and drainage network structure, little possibility to apply scientific know-how, limited access to inputs, migration of able bodies, and low productivity of land or inaccessibility in the case of presidential lands. Also, despite the importance of livestock in the overall livelihood strategies of the households, livestock assets are for the most part modest--a further manifestation of poverty or at least lack of productive opportunities in this area. All these mean that household plots and presidential lands only act to reproduce labor for the large farms, rather than release the households from the poverty trap. Even health problems may be thought of as having a reproduction function. The compound effects of lack of reliable drinking water and polluted irrigation canals, rising water tables and water-logged homesteads, deteriorating water delivery systems, and blocked and non-functioning drainages are the main source of widespread illnesses. The health and wellbeing impacts of the current water management situation are a drain on the inhabitants' already meager resources which are otherwise needed to sustain or enhance livelihoods. With the current economic strife, large-scale migration of the able bodied male population, and collapse of the socialist programs, there are heavier demands on the shrinking means of the rural households to close health and service gaps. The negative health consequences of the deteriorating water infrastructure as well as time and energy spent in procurement of suitable water alternatives lay first claim on the limited resources that would otherwise be used in provision of 35 education or on realizing livelihood potentials. The resultant opportunity costs are decreasing food security and lack of proper nutrition that feed into a cycle of poverty and create a new generation of disadvantaged rural folks. Furthermore, for these people the slightest shock to scant livelihood assets can tilt the balance of the scale and plunge them into a survival crisis. With these unfortunate circumstances, (increasingly feminized) labor is pushed back to work on the large farms. In spite of the vicious cycle of poverty, there are some developmental opportunities in the study area as well. High level of educational achievements enjoyed by both men and women are certainly the first thing that strikes observers in Tajikistan's rural areas. Indeed, excluding Tajikistan's neighbors, it is difficult to find another place at the same level of per capita income that enjoys universal literacy. In fact, the Tajik situation may provide a counter-example to theories of endogenous growth and human development that place education-based human capital at the core of development.36 This need not be the case if we still accept the importance of human capital but attribute underdevelopment in Tajikistan's rural areas to the pervious and existing political economic structure (including that related to the process of physical capital formation). That is, the high level of human capital in Tajikistan's rural areas is a great potential that can be tapped into under the right development circumstances. Related to the above observation are the possibilities that exist with regard to female labor force participation both for women and for Tajikistan's development trajectory. Traditional gender relations have perhaps been reinforced due to the removal of earlier social programs, increasing poverty which affects women more than men, and possibly a resurgence of patriarchal religious beliefs. Yet, not only are women in Tajikistan's rural areas much better educated that their counterparts across the predominantly- Muslim world, but their rate of formal-sector economic participation is quite significant. Indeed, although women's labor in Tajikistan brings in low wages (in low-productivity activities), its formalization has important ramifications. High rates of women's participation in the formal sector can form the basis of future export-oriented industries which have been a main driving force in East Asian development and industrialization. In fact, in Tajikistan, women's labor is the driving force of an export industry--cotton. The problem is that cotton, in terms of its current production structure, is not the right type of export industry that can lead to respectable and sustainable growth in the medium- or long-term. It has all the characteristics of primary goods exports with their historically disappointing performance. Its nature is in contrast to activities such as small-scale farming where barriers to entry and exit are low and productivity may be enhanced over time by incremental application of capital. Such a system allows incomes to increase incrementally, yielding an increasing source of tax revenues for the purpose of infrastructure expansion, and resulting in better income distribution. Under a small-scale farming structure, as much of the income is both retained and distributed where it is earned, a network of villages and towns may emerge that can 36See World Bank, The East Asian Miracle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993; Barro, R. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, October 1990, pp. 103-125; Barro, R. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, May 1991; Romer, P.M. "The Origins of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 8, Winter 1994; Lall, S. "Human Resources Development and Industrialization, with Special reference to Sub-Saharan Africa," in Human Development and International Development Strategy for the 1990s, edited by K. Griffin and J. Knight. London: McMillan, 1990. 36 facilitate local exchange of goods and services via a central town with other regions. Cotton production is also vulnerable to external factors that inhibit local economic activities which could otherwise arise as a result of exports. It may be the case that at least some of the earnings from cotton production, in its current form, are in fact taken out of the country by foreign firms--a process facilitated through their local associates. The situation is further exacerbated since the value-added processing stage of the production chain is located elsewhere. The initial stages of the production thus remain at the mercy of 37 the market with no guarantee that the terms of trade do not further deteriorate. This brings us back to the issue of land and agricultural activities. As an important recent World Bank 38 report asserts, the main issue with regard to rural development is property and land-use rights. For 39 land tenure inequality is believed to stall growth, increase poverty, and degrade the environment. In contrast, land reforms that distribute control over prime (versus marginal) lands and give decision- making authority on agricultural activities to farmers are believed to allow for increased food security, land improvements, enhanced production, and better conservation of the environment. As discussed, households in the study area may cultivate land of their own (household plots or presidential lands) or large collective lands for which they should have land shares. The number of single or multi-family dihqon farms is very small. Almost all households across the three districts have household plots--most of which are cultivated--and face modest difficulties in accessing water (although to increase their production they may face water scarcity). Furthermore, less than half of all households have presidential lands (generally low quality lands and farthest from water sources), a significant percentage of which are not cultivated due to lack of water, inputs, or able bodies, or due to their distance from households' residences. The main reason some households are not in possession of presidential land is for the most part their unavailability. Furthermore, very few households lack household plot or presidential land titles (with little indication of payments involved), the majority of which are issued under the name of the head of household (men for the most part). With households having full access to household plots and reasonable access to presidential lands, perhaps part of the rural reform agenda is fulfilled--at least in terms of providing some food security and income. Yet, household plots are quite small and presidential lands are neither universally available to households nor necessarily arable. The key to rural development then lies with the collectives. Household members working on these farms are supposed to have land shares, that is, the collectives are to act as joint stock cooperatives. However, the establishment of new, smaller collective farms has not meant 37 See Baldwin, R.E. "Patterns of Development in Newly Settled Region," Manchester School of Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 24, 1956, pp. 161-79; Auty, R.M., Resource-Based Industrialization: Sowing the Oil in Eight Developing Countries. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990; Beckford, G.L. Persistent Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972; Furtado, C. Economic Development of Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976; Girvan, N. Foreign Capital and Economic Underdevelopment in Jamaica. London: Allen and Unwin, 1971; Kessel, N. "Financial Aspects of the Mining Industry in Aambia," in The Financing of Economic Development, edited by W.T. Newlyn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. 38 World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development in a Changing World, World Bank, 2006. 39 Deininger, K., Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction. Washington, DC and Oxford: The World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003; Deininger, K. and H. Binswanger, "The evolution of the World Bank's land policy," in Access to Land: Rural Poverty and Public Action, edited by Alain de Janvry, et al, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 37 increased farmer control over land via land shares. In some cases there are shares but no control while in other farmers are not aware of shares or the land restructuring process altogether. Thus the main task in the study area is to give control of the productive lands now under the collective system to farmers. The Tajik Government with assistance from the World Bank is working on further land restructuring that will give control of land to individual farmers by breaking up the collectives. While it is not the purpose of this report to endorse a particular model of land restructuring or prescribe any alternative methods, it is certain that shift of control over land and agricultural activities should include management of the proceeds as well as crop choice. This means that the current collusive structure of surplus extraction must be dismantled and replaced. Furthermore, the goals of food security, equitable income distribution, and poverty alleviation will not materialize unless land rights are augmented with access to credit, infrastructure, technology and know-how, and certain other auxiliary services (in particular education and health). Despite its appearance, the land situation may be thought of as an opportunity as well in Tajikistan. The government theoretically owns all the lands which is certainly not the case in most other developing countries that urgently require land reforms. This means that with relative ease the government can restructure the lands in a way that farmers gain control over what they grow and the agricultural surplus. The problem is that cotton production, as a main foreign exchange earning activity of the country, is maintained by the government through the collective farm system. That is why, excluding a few pilot programs, public policy is reluctant to release control of the collective farm system through genuine land restructuring. Unfortunately, as mentioned, the current cotton production and export structure will not help to alleviate poverty or increase investment in agriculture or other productive activities. Currently, due to the low prices offered for cotton in Tajikistan, no household is willing to grow cotton on the lands s/he fully controls (household plots and presidential lands). Small land plots and inadequate access to water further preclude cotton farming on household-controlled lands. Cotton is for the most part grown on lands over which the government has control and for whose cotton produce it can set quotas. Yet, there are many international examples of farmers with full control over their lands choosing to produce cotton. Therefore, the problem is not cotton production per se, but the structure of cotton production in Tajikistan, which now requires heavy government intervention to sustain. However, if control over prime lands is relinquished to farmers and cotton middlemen are taken out of the picture so that farmers receive a fair price, then cotton exports could be sustained, and perhaps even enhanced. This system would return enough cotton proceeds to farmers to lift them out of poverty, and the government share would arise through taxes, instead of being extracted through a structure that maintains the poverty cycle. For Tajikistan with its highly rural character to really develop what may also be needed is export 40 substitution. This would be a gradual shift of Tajikistan's export basis from traditional goods to other products that are still labor intensive but embody relatively simple technologies that allow for international competitiveness. The labor-intensive production process of the new products can expand to provide adequate employment and eventually higher wages. Under such a scenario, farmers who are given control over land and their production can produce for the national market whereby surplus can 40 Ranis, G. "Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Asia's Superexporters: Implications for Manufactured Exports from Latin America," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, Vol. 21, Summer 1981, pp. 204-226. 38 circulate locally and regionally, thus giving rise to a gradual process of reinvestment and development. Surplus workers will also be absorbed into the new export industry. Export substitution would be a medium- to long-term program which requires an overhaul of the economic orientation. Immediate benefits as described above can however result from land restructuring with the output of individual farms or perhaps true cooperatives with tightened operations so that surplus is better distributed to workers and reinvested locally. Yet, another issue that has an intimate connection with land rights and food security is water provision and drainage management. The current water and drainage situation has become an obstacle to increased food security and incomes on household plots and presidential lands. Potable water scarcities are also negatively affecting health and by extension economic wellbeing of households. Furthermore, canal infrastructure is designed mainly to feed and irrigate large cotton farms with their characteristics described above. Since those farthest from the main canals have less access to water, their ability to engage in alternate, personal sources of farming is restricted. Farmers in these areas then find themselves at the mercy of low-paying cotton farming arrangements and dependent on the petty wages, in-kind payments and terms dictated by large farm managers. This in turn only re-enforces the current cotton farming practices at long term detriment to the majority of rural population. Immediate attention to these issues is therefore required and must go hand in hand with farm restructuring discussed above. Since water and drainage are the main areas of focus for the FVWRMP, the report provides a full synthesis of its findings and its recommendations on access to water, structure of water provision, and water users associations in a separate section after this. Turning back to gender issues, despite the traditional character of gender relations, exploitation of women in the study area is not exactly overt. There are no laws that discriminate against women or set lower wages for them. Women are as likely as men to have shares on large farms--at least on paper. Water shortages and drainage shortcomings are not specifically targeting women. Nonetheless, as detailed in this report, poverty, infrastructure and services shortcomings, opaque land rights, water and drainage problems, and most importantly the structure of cotton production affect women more negatively than men. Indeed, the collapse of the former socialist system, the civil war that resulted in many deaths and displacements, and the economic upheavals that followed have caused widespread impoverishment and a public sense of despair and are believed to have progressively worsened the position of women. Perhaps the most far reaching social and psychological fallout of the current situation and the continuing challenges around household access to land, water, and basic necessities is the increasing feeling of disempowerment in relation to ones own fate among women which in turn affects perceptions of possibilities and resignation. It has the ironic effect of reinforcing the very same policies that are responsible for the current predicament in the first place as so many women find themselves with no viable alternative but to return to the fields and further entrench the inequitable system. Therefore, recognition of land rights through an overhaul of the structure of collective farms, proper water and drainage management, and provision of infrastructure may be hypothesized to strengthen the position of women in the study area. Yet, these will still not be adequate unless all programs target women specifically in their development agendas. Furthermore, in the short-term women will have to be targeted by specific enabling programs and auxiliary services. As women shoulder most of the burden and become central in daily livelihood activities due to shifting responsibilities traditionally shared or undertaken by their male counterparts, their involvement in key decisions effecting access to livelihood assets become more crucial. In particular, following the dramatic increase in the number of female headed households, it is only in best interest of women to take up active engagement in all potential 39 instruments of well being. While the level of women's participation in local governing mechanism is not minimal, it nevertheless requires active encouragement. 5.3 IMPROVING THE WATER PROVISION STRUCTURE This study has captured the extent of water and drainage difficulties faced by the rural sector and rural households in the study area. Much of the irrigation and melioration networks in the study area are in a state of disrepair or collapse as a result of the removal of earlier state subsidies and investment. Water provision has thus faced serious disruptions in many areas while water-logging due to non-operating melioration networks has made large tracts of land impossible to cultivate. Water contamination spreads water-borne diseases and increases salinity and toxicity that damages agricultural production. Obtaining potable water is a severe problem for local people, and water conflicts are becoming widespread. Increasing productivity and output and reducing poverty in rural Tajikistan hinges upon addressing these problems. Water users associations have been proposed and established in a few cases as a response. While there are some successful stories, on balance, the work of water users associations has faced difficulties that stem from their structural set-up as well as unclear land rights. Against this background, it is possible to provide the following water-related recommendations as short-term measures, interim strategies, and long-term solutions. General Recommendations on Water Provision New focus and structure for water provision institutions In the aftermath of limited privatization undertaken in the study area, no agency or organization has clear responsibility for operating and maintaining secondary and tertiary irrigation and drainage canals. This vacuum has triggered a downward spiral in the condition of the water and drainage networks resulting in water access conflicts that damage local livelihoods. Therefore, the state must first redefine the roles and responsibilities of institutions that administer water resources, and create new local-level institutions that fill the void created by privatization. Furthermore, system repair and rehabilitation efforts must aim to protect household consumption needs and strengthen livelihoods of households that depend on personal farms and livestock rearing. Improving quality of potable and homestead water and preventing adverse health effects Comprehensive national guidelines and regulations are required to control, limit, and reverse damage caused by pollution and agricultural runoffs from industry and farmlands. As the main employer and patron of large-scale industry, the central government has authority to mandate such standards. International donors can provide incentives by stipulating standards as a condition of engagement. Sustained pressure should also be placed on upstream governments through incentives, negotiations, and international instruments such as joint monitoring commissions, to achieve responsible use and preservation of water resources. In spite of the current economic difficulties, recent trends demonstrate a moderate increase in spending in Tajikistan's health sector. World Health Organization estimates total national expenditure on health in Tajikistan at five percent of GDP in 2006,41 a modest but significant rise over the previous years. Some of the increased funding should be targeted to coping with adverse effects of poor water quality and to 41 World Health Organization; Country Data - 2006 40 bridge the gap left after independence. Programs could include providing water purification tablets and nutritional supplements as well as and increasing awareness. Community outreach programs could also be developed for local awareness of beneficial health and sanitation practices to improve hygiene and safety behaviors. Local solutions addressing settlements' multiple-use water allocation needs should be developed in collaboration with water authorities and community-based water initiatives (e.g., redirection of water from irrigation sources or underground streams for collection and use in homesteads, irrigation of household plots, or providing allocations for hawzes). Local solutions must be found for construction and rehabilitation of boreholes and communal wells, as well as provision of small pumps to mitigate problems of water-logging and to harness irrigation water for small plots and household use. Local drinking water initiatives could include construction of reservoir tanks and point-of-use filtration and purification outlets. Measures should be developed for safe water storage to lower risks posed by mosquitoes, snails, and insects to prevent spread of infectious diseases. Infrastructure add-ons for village use, such as access points for livestock, would prevent contamination and improve sanitation conditions. Perhaps water treatments such as iodine could be introduced. Community-based groups would be the best place to start addressing local gaps and devising ongoing development and monitoring schemes in collaboration with local water authorities. Organic village arbitration and monitoring initiatives at access points should be encouraged to resolve conflicts and ensure equitable water distribution. Outreach programs to educate local people about their legal rights as well as instruments and options available for conflict arbitration, particularly for women, should be encouraged. Sustaining institutional financial resources Low water fee collection rates contribute to a chronic lack of resources within water administering institutions, leading to non-payment of salaries, staff absenteeism, and serious challenges to operating capacity. Efforts must to be made to improve the collection system through community-based initiatives, while maintaining rate fairness and stability through a clear mechanism of mutual agreement between water suppliers and users. The state water authorities must reassess water collection fees based on achieving some cost-recovery for providing lift and gravity irrigation that considers water destination, type, crops, and other factors. Rate setting should be revisited regularly taking into consideration the incremental improvements to infrastructure, land policies, and user affordability. Recommendations Concerning Water Users Associations Prerequisites for optimal WUA operation In the context of unequal land-holding and state restrictions on crop diversity, bypassing the state governance structures and focusing only on WUA improvement may not be effective despite all the benefits of WUAs. Consolidation of WUAs should be addressed in the context of state regulations on water use, rights, and fees. Progress in meaningful land reforms and removal of distortions in the cotton industry are pre-requisites to optimal functioning of WUAs. Strengthening institutions peripheral to the operation and viability of WUAs, increasing public spending on maintenance and management of infrastructure, and providing technical expertise and input technology are also required. Water supply deficiencies must be resolved and system breakdowns addressed to establish and maintain trust among water users. Further requirements include better information dissemination and transparency regarding land and water rights. Possible functions of WUAs WUAs could participate in canal cleaning and canal lining (with Vodkhoz), collection of user fees, water distribution conflict resolution, and drinking water and drainage infrastructure investment and 41 maintenance. Recent experience elsewhere demonstrates possible roles for WUAs in agricultural services, particularly as delivery channels for inputs and intermediaries for contract farming arrangements or marketing. These will require land use rights and tenure. Need for adequate seed money and front-end development To increase WUA success rates and sustain community engagement, more time and resources should be allocated to front-end development. Seed money is required for initial set-up to provide better management of information and data, technology for water gauging and regulating equipment, and logistical support. These resources should be augmented with capacity-building initiatives such as workshops and seminars on management, business plan development, accounting, record keeping, taxes, contracting and procurement, and arbitration and consensus-building. Regarding physical works, improvement of local water delivery networks through cleaning drainage systems and repairing pumps and basic infrastructure are essential. Other front-end initiatives should include building technical capacity for efficient water management, expanded farm activities, crop maximization, sanitation, and conservation. WUA financial sustainability Regulations for WUA financial and technical solvency are needed to grant tax exemptions and provide long-term, low-cost loans for seed money to acquire expertise or technology crucial to WUA operations. Local empowerment Local participation is key to finding local solutions; any community-based initiative will require strengthening and using local institutions. Mahalla committees provide a good base from which to launch grass roots mobilizing for WAUs and other community-based initiatives. Mahalla committees are influential among local people and have a traditional role as conflict mediators and social organizers, for example for hashar to clean drainage systems during floods, or marshaling village resources around a collective concern. Other mechanisms to consolidate and promote a shared sense of community could be built around existing local groups; special efforts should be made to include young people to foster a sense of community responsibility from an early age and entrench good practices. Building a knowledge base WUA users workshops are useful for exchanging ideas and good practices, building a knowledge resource base, establishing WUA users assistance networks, encouraging dialogue and more effective WUA participation, and enhancing participation, including among marginalized groups such as women and ethnic minorities. Raising public awareness Efforts must be made to develop a strategy for raising public awareness about the benefits of participation in WUAs to improve water management, including enhanced livelihoods, improved health indicators, and reduced conflicts. The public awareness strategy could include tactics such as outreach campaigns on water use, canal maintenance, contamination and environmental concerns, and collective responsibility. This information strategy should be based on an information audit of local capacity, channels, and existing knowledge base, among others, and include monitoring and evaluation indicators. 42 Accountability and trust Tajikistan's traditional top-down governance structure is not conducive to community-based initiatives in terms of perceptions, collective democratic principals, and pro-activeness. If WUAs are to address community needs, their organic powerbase should be strengthened. Local hukumats should rethink their traditional roles with respect to authority and management of their jurisdiction and relinquish some control of water management to water users. Lobbying mechanisms to strengthen the voice of WUAs within the legal system and the hukumat should be promoted. The possibility of overrule by authorities or local interests in spite of formally agreed policies must be contained. Attempts to exert influence, extract illicit payments, or manipulate WUAs decisions should be checked. Since organic initiatives have previously been challenged by corruption and mistrust of authority, fostering accountability and trust is an important building block. A formal contract between the WUA and the Vodkhoz could create a mutual commitment to facilitate public scrutiny and accountability. To this end, all efforts must be made to preserve transparency through democratic processes such as secret ballots, open book policy for member inspection, public discourse on policies, and full financial disclosure to members. Inclusion and voice The report has stressed elements of inequality between men and women in its probe of livelihoods and water system impacts. While gender inequality may be more subtle than inequalities among households due to differences in land ownership and access to water, it is nevertheless quite important to highlight. Although no formal barriers to female participation exist in the public sphere, societal factors present challenges because most women are subordinate to their male counterparts in making decisions regarding property, household finances, and use of remittances. Considerable work remains to be done to encourage women to participate in WUAs. Inclusion strategies targeting women could build on specific outreach programs and on mahalla village structures. Male and female participation quotas could be considered in WUAs. female forums within the structure of WUA and local women's groups designed for conflict resolution might help overcome some social conventions. Creating a multi-tier WUA structure Based on findings on water allocation at meso- and micro-levels (i.e., inter-village/dihqon farm, and watercourse/household level), and to accommodate all users, it is suggested that the WUA structures include several levels of functioning--apex bodies/federations (at least) at the secondary level, WUAs at the tertiary level, and water user groups (WUG) at watercourse level. That is, new WUAs could include two tiers. The WUA itself with legal entities as members (dihqon farms and WUGs organized as associations) comprise the first tier. The secondary tier comprises village-level WUGs with membership from among senior male and female householders. The WUGs could be organized especially around multiple-use issues, including potable water infrastructure and drainage pump rehabilitation. Such bottom-up WUG organizing could build local organizational experience and serve user-identified needs at watercourse and village level (e.g., ensuring that household plots, water storage ponds, and individual presidential land plots get water allocations). Later-stage WUA functioning at distributaries and canal levels could be strengthened by sharing WUG experiences and priorities at the WUA-level. This sequencing of interventions would build local capacity and advance project efforts in institutional development. Safeguards are necessary to ensure continued public ownership of water delivery systems and long-term protection of user interests. When donors relinquish the newly established resources to users, there is a risk of capture by profit-driven private ownership that could compromise the collective interests of end 43 users. Therefore, stipulating a clause between the water user group, local hukumat and the participating investor of the new infrastructure (as has been done in some WUA cases) would be advisable. Furthermore, clarity should be established how land size, political prominence, and individual authority of WUA members affect water interests and allocations because conflicts will undoubtedly arise between the needs of households and large farms and have to be resolved within the same governing and managing WUA body. These potential conflicts must be considered in the design of the multi-tier WUA structure. Moreover, WUAs solve problems of water management within their own territory, that is, on the level of secondary and tertiary channels. Yet, responsibility, access, and use of the main canal remain unresolved. One solution would be to establish a WUA federation to organize the canal management for equitable user benefits. After all WUAs conclude a "horizontal agreement" among themselves for equitable distribution of water and payments for system operation and maintenance, the federation can be formed and can conclude an agreement with the District Water Resource Management Department on water delivery from primary sources as well as operation and maintenance of the irrigation structure of the main canal. 44 Annex A: Supplementary Notes on Methodology A.1 QUANTITATIVE SURVEY METHODOLOGY A total of three districts (nohiya) were covered by the survey. Two of the districts, Ghafurov and Konibodom, are in the Farghona Valley in the north while the third one, Yovon, is in the south where the WB Farm Privatization Support Project (FPSP) has been active. In each district, 3 jamoats were purposively selected to ensure diversity as much as possible. In Konibodom and Ghafurov, two selected jamoats were from FVWRMP while a third one was a jamoat with a different set of attributes. In Yovon, two jamoats were those with WUAs developed under the WB project, while a third one was a jamoat with different attributes. The selected jamoats are: In Yovon: Ozodi and Chargul (WB); and Obi-Muki (non-project) In Ghafurov: Qataghon and Isfisor (WB); and Ovchikalacha (non-project) In Konibodom: Lohuti and Sharifov (WB); and Ortiqov (non-project) Sample size in each district was 425 divided among 3 jamoats in proportion to their populations. The draft questionnaire was revised several times after two rounds of training with enumerators and pilot- testing around 15 questionnaires in Bobojon Ghafurov and Konibodom. Furthermore, a total of 50 questionnaires (5 percent of sample size) were pilot-tested again before the finalization of the questionnaire. Quantitative sample selection is discussed in the next subsection. The questionnaire is provided in Annex C of this report. Sample Selection After assigning sample sizes for each village to be covered based on its population weight, it was envisaged that random sampling for the quantitative part of the survey would be achieved by making use of a comprehensive village household list and a sampling step. However, in practice there were instances where either the list did not become available or the list could only be partially used due to various errors. In the latter case, the research team divided up a village into clusters and used appropriate steps to draw the sample households. The steps and clustering introduced small discrepancies between the planned sample sizes for the villages and the actual number of questionnaires filled in each. The size of the sample in each district was strictly observed at 425 households. 45 Table A.1.1: Sample breakdown in Bobojon Ghafurov Jamoat Village Number of Population Number of households questionnaires Ovchiqalacha 8 villages 3559 18020 125 Qalacha 1261 6593 44 Ovchi 942 4502 33 Shaikhon 522 2714 18 Dehnav 181 845 6 Pakhtaobod 121 581 4 Michurin 443 2258 16 Yangi mehnat 18 52 0 Sebzor 71 475 4 Qataghon 2 villages 1950 10648 68 Qataghan 1822 9954 64 Mehnatabad 128 694 4 Isfisor 6 villages 6612 33816 232 Isfisor 5956 30120 209 Madaniyat 65 308 2 Kuptulyuk 89 419 4 Yangiyor 83 340 3 Shaukhak 67 313 2 Gorkiy 352 2316 12 Table A.1.2: Sample breakdown in Konibodom Jamoat Village Number of Population Number of households questionnaires Ortiqov 9 villages 4010 24183 151 Kuykuziyon 133 657 6 Tagoykuychi 473 2584 18 Firuzoba 556 3007 21 Shurkurgon 630 3172 24 Tutiqabola 265 4381 10 Shohidqarayantoq 1028 5469 38 Qurghoncha 326 1857 12 Kalinin 366 1930 14 Ainy 233 1126 8 Sharifov 6 villages 4665 20884 149 Niyozbek 1817 9335 66 Mahram 1370 7364 52 Madaniyat 313 1573 12 Pakhtakor 311 1596 12 Botirkurgan 817 828 6 Yangibotirkurgan 37 188 1 Lohuti 3 villages 3268 17441 142 Lohuti 1230 6633 64 Qarakchikum 1727 9093 66 Jigdalik 311 1715 12 46 Table A.1.2: Sample breakdown in Yovon Jamoat Village Number of Population Number of households questionnaires Ozodi 20 villages 32924 2419 151 Ozodi 1653 183 12 Beshbulak 1550 174 11 Beshbulak 2 372 46 3 Ohujar 970 120 8 Charoghchi 14501 185 12 Hasani 1031 124 8 Shrinbuloq 1559 192 12 Tutak 1023 122 8 Mulobaroti 464 70 4 Kuymot 1092 146 9 Darai 505 55 3 Chormaghzak 1153 132 8 Utagak 535 56 3 Navobod 810 112 7 Dashtiroki bolo 763 104 6 Dashtiroki poyon 1882 203 12 Dusti 535 77 5 Zulmobod 1737 219 14 Toshokhur 625 76 5 Duniyo 164 23 1 Obi Muki 10 villages 23054 3048 173 Dashtobod 2273 530 20 Parchasoy 4424 499 32 Kaynama 1485 171 10 Sarayantoq 1120 129 8 Obi muki 3826 500 30 Qirgochak 2577 325 20 Qashqaraha 3036 379 23 Tagoyobod 1634 216 13 Kirgizobod 629 75 4 Pingirchar 2050 224 13 Chorgul 5 villages 12694 1648 101 Chorgul 1287 175 10 Gulafshon 3224 386 24 Kulobod 3214 392 24 Sabzazor 1442 237 15 Shurcha 3527 458 28 A.2. QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY Focus Group Discussions Focus group discussions were conducted with around 15 farmer groups in the districts covered by the quantitative part of the survey. It was made sure that the groups covered all diverse household categories. Participants comprised heads of households and cotton workers. The discussions were conducted with the aid of mapping and wealth ranking tools. These were augmented by walking surveys and interviews with local and municipal authorities, members of various NGO's, and organizations involved in the 47 establishment of water users associations. Focus group discussion guides used in the study are provided in Annex C of this report. Literature Review, Interviews, and Institutional Analysis A literature review and a total of 38 interviews were conducted to inform the project team of previous studies on water, land, and gender in Tajikistan and to understand the structures in charge or in place that deal with water provision and water users associations. The literature was partially reviewed in main body of the report. Furthermore, the literature review and the interviews were used to provide an institutional analysis of water resources management and water users associations. The interviews also augmented the findings of the focus group discussions whenever possible. The list of interviewees is provided in the following table. Table A.2.1: List of interviewees in Konibodom, Ghafurov, and Yovon Organization Interviewees Deputy Chairman; key specialists of divisions on economic development, social division; division on work with women and family, statistics Districts Hukumat division, district agency on land management, agricultural management, healthcare division and others. Chairman, Deputy Chairman, specialist on work with women and family, Jamoat land management specialist and others. State Water Resources Heads of Departments, irrigation specialists, mirobs. Department Heads and members of collective dihqon farms, production cooperatives, Agricultural enterprises family and individual dihqon farms, association of dihqon farms; WUA Heads, key specialists, mirobs, and members of WUA. NGO Heads, key specialists, members . A.3 CALCULATION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME MEASURE Variables used to calculate the income measure are: 1. Average monthly cash wage of all household members from working on farms not individually owned (joint-stock farm, collective farm, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or large dehkan farm cultivated by more than one household) 2. Average value of monthly in-kind wages paid at a regular basis of all household members from working on farms not individually owned 3. Total annual value of produce or cotton-stem or other in kind items any of the household members has on occasion received from working on farms not individually owned 4. Total annual value of dividend from shares owned by family members 5. Value of total sales of produce from individual dihqon farm during the entire year excluding what was consumed by household 48 6. Value of total sales of produce from your presidential land excluding what was consumed by household 7. Value of total sales of produce from your household plot excluding what was consumed by household 8. Value of sales of livestock, poultry, silk or fish products for the entire year excluding what was consumed by household 9. Average monthly value of wages all household members have received for work in non- agricultural activities 10. Total household earnings from work at home during the year 11. Total value of pension received by all household members per month 12. Total value of social assistance received by all household members during the year 13. Total value of any other income any of the household members have received (cash or in kind) during the year 14. Approximate total value in of gifts received by household during the year 15. Total value of rents the household has received from any assets during the past year 16. Total value of remittance the household has received in the past year 17. Total value of all agricultural products produced and consumed by household during the year (crop, fruits, animal meat and products) For record, the following procedure was used to make the calculation. After summing all variables, households with missing values were excluded. Furthermore, to find outliers, z-scores were calculated. In an iterative manner comprising several rounds, households with z-scores higher than 4 (considering the relatively large number of data) were excluded. A total of 1248 household remained. Household incomes were thus calculated based on the above variables. 49 Annex B: Supplementary Notes on Methodology B.1. INTRODUCTION This Annex was prepared to supplement discussions on water resources management and water users associations in Parts III and IV. It first provides general information on water resources, distribution channels, drainage networks and melioration in the study area. It then turns to a review of legal and institutional aspects of water resources management as well as water management difficulties. The last portion of this Annex is dedicated to a legal and institutional examination of water users associations. Sources for the tables in this Annex are provided in footnotes. Quantitative information from our questionnaire survey used in one subsection is clearly identified. While much of the rest of information cited here are from interviews and focus group discussions a list of which was provided in Annex A, other used references are listed at the end of the Annex. B.2. WATER RESOURCES, DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS, DRAINAGE NETWORKS, AND MELIORATION General Tajikistan has significant water resources although their geographical distribution is extremely uneven (with few sources in Sughd, Kizilsu-Yakhsu, Khatlon, Kafernigan). Irrigation of farmlands accounts for around 85 percent of water consumption with the rest divided between drinking/household use and industrial consumption. Over 500 km3 of high quality fresh water, that is almost 52% of total reserves of fresh water of the region, is preserved in Tajikistan's glaciers (about 10 thousand units). Around 44 km3 of water is in the lakes from which 20 km3 of fresh water has drinking quality. Average annual river flow on the territory of Tajikistan is 64 km3. Surface flow control is performed by water reservoirs with a total capacity of 15 km3, and the possibilities for flow control of up to 68 km3. The total volume of underground water reservoirs is estimated at 6.6 km3. Around 66.82 km3 of water is accessible for consumption and use in Tajikistan. The Omudaryo river basin provides 63.12 km3 or 95.46% of accessible water resources. Intake capacity from all sources in Tajikistan is in the range of 14.6-12.8 km3, and water consumption is in the range of10.9-12.6 km3. Water Resources in the Surveyed Districts a) Konibodom. The total area of Konibodom is 32,436 ha. The district's irrigated land area is estimated as 23,450 ha. A major source of water supply in the district is the Kairakkum water reservoir42, served by 42 Kairokkum water reservoir has a length of about 65 km, a width ranging from 8 to 20 km, and a water-surface area of 513 square km. The general capacity of the water reservoir is 3413.5 million m3, with a conservation zone (the project data) of 2743 m3. The length of the floodwall is about 30 km, located on the left-bank of the water reservoir in the surveyed region. The current condition of this floodwall is causing serious anxiety, since it is being washed by water in a number of places (approximately 18.0-20.0 km). 50 Sirdaryo River,43 which provides water for the irrigation of 3,940 ha of land. The Big Farghona Canal44 irrigates 13,944 ha of land and Isfarinka River45 irrigates an area of 4,439 ha. Based on 2006 figures, the number of water-using entities in the district is estimated as 174 organizations, which use 133,284 thousand m3 of water. Water loss during delivery is assessed as considerable in the Konibodom district, estimated at 41,318 thousand m3 or 32% of the total. b) Ghafurov. Irrigated lands are reported as 34,646 ha. The main sources of water supply of the district are Kairakkum water reservoir, Sirdaryo River, and to some extent Big Farghona Canal and Khojabakirgon River. According to 2006 estimates, the number of water-using entities in the district is 101 units taking 309,445 thousand m3 of water. Water loss is reported to amount to 52,606 thousand m3 in the Ghafurov district or 17% of the water intake. c) Yovon. Irrigated lands in Yovon are estimated to cover 25,783 ha in the district. The Baigazi water facility on Vakhsh River is in this district with a rock-filled embankment 55 meters in height and 450 meters in width. Irrigation water delivery to the valley is made from the Vakhsh River through a 7.4 km tunnel with a throughput of 70 m3/sec. Water is distributed from the tunnel through the Left Feeder Main Canal (LFMC) and the Right Feeder Main Canal (RFMC). Water is delivered to the lands situated higher than the main canals through pumping stations. About 12,401 ha of land are irrigated by pumps in this district. Irrigation of lowlands does not require pump action. The total length of the canals is 221.4 km. Around 60-70 percent of the agricultural land in Yovon is irrigated. Manifold-Drainage Networks in the Surveyed Districts a) Konibodom. The total length of the manifold-drainage network in Konobodm is 676.55 km with open networks between farms having a length of 80.44 km and those within farms being of 596.11 km in length. All discharge from manifold-drainage system is carried out to Kairakkum water reservoir through pumping stations and three gravity dischargers. Previously, a considerable part of the irrigation canals in the Konibodom district was counted on the statement of assets and liabilities of large agricultural enterprises. The smaller farms that have appeared following land reforms do not feel responsible for the canals since these are not included on their statements of assets and liabilities. At the moment, in the Konibodom district somewhere between 837 and 155 km of irrigation channels between farms are on the statement of assets and liabilities of water resources department, while another 682 km or 81% of the total is in an ambiguous state. The same situation prevails with the manifold-drainage networks. Around 540 km or 87% of the total length of the manifold drainage networks previously on the statement of assets 43 Sirdaryo River is second in volume of water and first in length in the Farghona region (3019 km from Naryn). The source of water is in central Tine Shan and Sirdaryo is formed after Karadaryo and Naryn merge, with the outflow of the river taking place in Kyrgyzstan. Sirdaryo crosses Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and flows into the Aral Sea on the territory of Kazakhstan. The total capacity of water resources from Sirdaryo amounts to 37, 2 km3, including 27.6 km3 of trans-border waters. Spring-summer tide is typical for the water regime, which starts from April. The basic outflow of Sirdaryo River is formed on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. 44 Big Farghona Canal, on the territory of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, was built in 1939-1940 with the involvement of 160 thousand collective farm workers. It is formed from the basic source of Sirdaryo-Naryn River. Over 1000 hydraulic structures are on the canal (50 are large ones). The canal is used for water refilling to Naryn and Karadaryo, for redistribution of river outflow of southern outskirts of Farghona Valley, and for direct irrigation of agricultural lands. 45 Isfarinka River is rather a small river originating in the mountains of Batkent oblast of Kyrgyzstan and flowing onto the territory of Tajikistan. It provides water to Isfara and Konibodom. 51 and liabilities of big agricultural enterprises has fallen into an ambiguous state. It is estimated that over 50 percent of the manifold-drainage network is in an unsatisfactory condition due to erosion. b) Ghafurov. The total length of manifold-drainage network of the district is 414.89 km from which the network between farms (that is on the statement of assets and liabilities of the state structures on regulation water using) is 110.89 km in length, and the inter-farm network (that is on the statement of assets and liabilities of dihqon farms and joint stock companies) has a length of 304.0 km. Land reforms have had a rather slow pace in this district. Large farms have been kept in the form of joint stock companies and production cooperatives (very similar to kolkhozes and sovkhozes). Around 3,707 km of irrigation channels and 415 km of manifold-drainage network are in the district. From them 3427 km or 92% of irrigation channels, and 304 km or 73% manifold-drainage network are on the statement of assets and liabilities of indicated agricultural enterprises. Material and technical basis and financial difficulties do no allow these farms to maintain irrigation and manifold-drainage network in working conditions. c) Yovon. The Inter-farm irrigation network was built in the form of closed gravity asbestos cement pipe lines situated through 400-500 m, in 1.5-4.0 km length, with hydrants through 60-120 m. The total length of the closed irrigation network is 976 km and gutters of channels are around 79 km. A drainage network was built in the district on an area of 19,448 ha for drainage discharge -- including closed tubular network on 19,154 ha and open network on 294 ha. However, many closed drains are obstructed for different reasons, including improper garbage disposal, and do not function. Melioration Wells in Surveyed Districts There are currently 300 melioration wells in Konibodom and Ghafurov districts, which are on the statement of assets and liabilities of Water Resources Departments of both districts (107 units in Konibodom district and 193 units in B. Ghafurov district). Their main task is to decrease groundwater level and to reduce the level of mineral formation. Unfortunately, at the moment, due to various reasons (insufficient funds, electricity shortages, and absence of spare parts for repair of equipments) a majority of these wells are not up to their tasks. Gravity irrigation systems and pumping stations have experienced over 50% and 65% deterioration/wear respectively. Thus, in Ghafurov, only 41 units or 21.3% of the 193 wells are operational. The corresponding figure for Konibodom is around 14% of the 107 wells. All this means that water table has risen to critical levels (up to 1.8 m) in significant parts of the farmlands. For example, in 2006, the total area with critical water level was reported as 5,696 ha. When wells do not function, water table rises, salinity increases, health problems become widespread, and poverty levels worsen. Furthermore, it is reported that about 30% of the population must purchase drinking water for cash with its negative impact on the financial situation of the households.. There are also significant areas in Yovon with melioration problems. The situation is evaluated as unsatisfactory for an area of 5,465 ha (including Right Branch of Main Canal occupying 1938 ha; there is also percolation from Right Branch of Main Canal). B.3 LEGAL BASIS OF WATER MANAGEMENT AND PROVISION According to the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, water is the exclusive property of the state which guarantees the effective exploitation and protection of water on behalf of the people. The main legal documents concerned with water resources management are Water Code of the Republic of Tajikistan and a number of laws and acts that to some extent interpret the implementation of the Code provisions. 52 In November 2000, a new Water Code was ratified in Tajikistan, in which the economic mechanisms, organizations, and regulatory systems of water use are detailed. The code also deals with water users associations (WUAs). Work is also currently under way to bring other legislations in line with the Water Code. Furthermore, the National Conception of Rational Exploitation and Protection of Water Resources passed in 2001 is of high significance in the development of water and nature protection legislation in Tajikistan as well as for the country's bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other Central Asian countries on water-related issues. Water resources management system according to the Water Code is based on a combination of basin and administrative-territorial principles. Regulation of water relations inside the country is carried out on the basis of licensing of water usage and requiring payment for services toward water delivery. Issues of the right of management of hydro-economic irrigation systems by domestic and foreign legal bodies are yet to be dealt with at the legislative level. National legislation also deals with the development of democratic processes and market relations, guaranteeing equal rights to water for all consumers, participation of water users in water resources management, and organizational forms of hydro-economic and water protection activities. The Water Code of the Republic of Tajikistan also provides the basis for the establishment of Water Users Associations (WUAs). According to the Code, the Government is responsible for determining water consumption fees which are to cover operations and maintenance costs. The Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan dated June 25, 1996 Ref.#281 augments the Water Code on this. Also, the Law on Water Users Associations (of which more later) signed by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan on November 21, 2006 further compliments the Water Code and provides significant legal basis for the work of water users associations. B.4 WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS National Level Water resources management in Tajikistan is organized on a multi-branch/diversified basis with the main management body being Ministry of Melioration and Water Economy. The possibility of transition to hydrographic (basin) water resources management principles have also been considered ­ taking into account inter-sectoral interests and privatized enterprises of various water using sectors of the economy. Currently, the main organizations in charge of water management and provision are: i. Ministry of Melioration and Water Economy of the Republic of Tajikistan is the main body responsible for the management of agricultural water supply, including water for pasture, as well as overseeing water exploitation in river basins, in territories, and in the Republic as a whole. It is in charge of the provision of water to consumers/users based on specific regulations, limits and forecasts of water consumption. The Ministry is also responsible for the introduction of a melioration cadastre; certification of irrigation, drainage, and other hydrological systems and structures; and data collection and analysis on melioration cadastre, certification, hydro- economic measures, plans and forecasts of rational water usage, and amount and quality of surface and underground water. The Ministry cooperates with other state organs toward 53 exploitation of water resources (taking into account water users demands and economic expediency), preventing water resources exhaustion and negative impacts of water on land productivity, and a number of other related issues. ii. State Department for Nature Protection and Forestry under the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Tajikistan coordinates water preservation and protection measures. iii. State Geological Department, directly under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, controls and monitors underground water reservoirs. iv. Committee for State Oversight on Safe Works in Industry and Mountainous Areas, directly under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, oversees the conditions and rational exploitation of medicinal, mineral and thermal, and industrial underground water. v. Ministry of Health of the Republic of Tajikistan monitors the quality of drinking water and sources of potable water supply. Oblast, District, and Local Levels Oblast and district structures of Ministry of Melioration and Water Economy are oblast units, district water resources departments, and productive operational-melioration units. Their responsibilities include irrigation water delivery to water users with a view of land protection, quality control of irrigation water, and control of water discharge to the drainage network. All are state organizations funded through the state budget and have their own settlement accounts. Water supply to consumers is based on specific contracts and is in accordance with water delivery schedules. Fees for services of water suppliers, amount of delivered water, and other terms and conditions are set in the contracts. As a rule, water provision plans at the level of each district down to the level of farm, depending on structure of sown area of irrigated crops, are drawn by specialists of district hydro-economic bodies once every three to five years. Planned water application rate and irrigation rate per 1 ha of gross field are based on existing standards and maximum hydro-module. Depending on technical equipment, scale of irrigation, and type of irrigation and drainage system these services differ according to their terms of reference, number of workers and status. At the district level, water resources institutions exist based on the above-mentioned conditions. Sometimes two or more districts are served by an inter-district association of irrigation systems. In this way, there may only exist an operational section in each of the districts, which forms a part of the inter-district association and is thus not financially independent. In contrast, a water resources department responsible for a district is more independent in terms of finances and is included in the structure of the oblast units. The three districts covered by this study have the following types of water institutions: 4. Konibodom district ­ Konibodom State Water Resources Department (KSWRD); 5. B. Ghafurov district ­ Ghafurov State Water Resources Department (GSWRD); 6. Yovon district - Yovon Productive Operational-Melioration Unit (YPOMU). 54 Water resources departments and operational-melioration units have different functions, and responsible for different tasks. The work of the district water resources management departments has the following scope: Operation and maintenance of canals, drainage systems, and pumping stations, toward high and sustainable yields of crops on irrigated lands. Oversight of melioration of irrigated lands and prevention of rising water table and soil salinity. Rationalization of water consumption through irrigation system (control and measuring) and timely and uninterrupted water delivery to water users according the established schedules. Water fee collection from water users. Operational-melioration units (legally not independent, without separate budgets, and subordinate to extra-district water associations or district water resources departments) have the following responsibilities: Maintenance and repair of pumps and other irrigation structures. Regulation and control of water delivery and measuring water flow on hydraulic engineering stations. Drawing water consumption schedules and plans. Conclusion of formal agreements and signing water contracts with farms and water using enterprises. The following table provides information on the staff and salaries of the water resources management. Table B.4.1: Water resources management institutions staff and salaries by district46 Districts According to Actually Vacancies Average Salary debt as of the staff list working salary April 01, 2007 (somoni) (somoni) Ghafurov SWRD 709 666 43 119 558,296 Konibodom SWRD 352 306 46 123 275,000 Yovon POMU 329 297 32 121 98,000 There is a three-level administrative structure below the national government in Tajikistan consisting of Oblasts (managed by Oblast Public Authorities), Districts (managed by District Public Authorities), and village councils (managed by Jamoats). The form and distribution of responsibilities among different levels are described in the Constitution. There has been an initiative in the last few years to clarify the various roles of each level of public administration with regards to various functions and tasks. The responsibility and authority of oblast and district public authorities regarding water management and provision are provided in Article 7 of the Water Code. Some of their main responsibilities include: Outlining the main directions and providing the legal basis of water exploitation and protection on their territories; taking measures to preserve and improve water-related infrastructure and institutions with the view for water conservation, pollution control, and riverside and flood control; provision of drinking water and protection and development of the centralized and decentralized water distribution systems of 46 Data from Ghafurov, Konibodom, and Yovon, Districts' State Water Resources Departments, 2007 (in Tajiki). 55 drinking water to consumers; and providing a framework for the work of related enterprises. In accordance with Article 114 of the Water Code, Jamoats have the responsibility of resolving disputes between citizens on issues of water exploitation within their jurisdictions. Legally speaking, units, departments and operational irrigation systems are not subordinate to districts hukumats, but since their areas of coverage for the most part coincides with those of the hukumats, these water institutions are responsive to the hukumats in practice. There are also older structures in existence at the village level, the most important of which are mahalla committees acting as village councils. These institutions have considerable informal power and in many cases discuss and frequently solve problems which the community faces, including resolution of conflicts related to water use. Mahalla committees often play active roles in the collection of community members' contributions directed toward village improvements and providing services to residents of the community. Furthermore, there are many instances village elders or "patriarchs" which wield significant although informal influence in a large number of villages. They are often involved in conflict resolution and can act as arbiters in water conflicts. B.5 CURRENT WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT DIFFICULTIES General The last table in the pervious sub-section, apart from providing information on the number of workers in each district, is also indicative of financial difficulties of the water institutions. The last column indicates the amount of debt owed by the respective organizations to their staff members in terms of unpaid salaries while the column to the left of the last column shows the average amount of salary drawn by workers. Indeed, an analysis of district water services shows significant difficulties in the area of irrigation water which are related to short finances of institutions and water users on the one hand and interrupted and unreliable work of pumping stations. Other problems related to finances that may be easily discerned include lack of modern means of communication (bicycles and other individual means of transport are used to check water-related infrastructure). Yet, a major issue is also the fact that sections of manifold-drainage networks and vertical boreholes/wells on current farms remain on the statement of assets and liabilities of large agricultural enterprises (joint-stock companies, productive cooperatives and collective dihqon farms). Indeed, in case of any reorganization and divestment of enterprises/farms, the question is posed regarding the responsibility for the networks and infrastructures. It is in this connection and with the purpose of effective water resources management that the establishment of water users associations (WUAs) has been felt, proposed, and established in some instances. The rest of this sub- section provides more details on the problems faced in water provision in Tajikistan. After this, we turn the discussion to WUAs. Funding After Tajikistan's independence, the earlier sources of funding for the maintenance and repair of the irrigation system were reduced. Current, albeit reduced funding comes from national and local budgets. Yet, actual financing for 2006 from these sources as well as from water delivery fees was one tenth that of the 1990. These budget shortages have translated into the deterioration of more than half of the basic assets of irrigation and manifold-drainage systems, especially water pumps and vertical drainage wells, as well as heightened soil salinity water logging. Up to 40% of irrigated lands in the Republic are served 56 by pumping stations (64% of these located in Sughd oblast, especially in Ghafurov and Konibodom districts). State funding from national and local budgets together with the paid fees for water delivery amounted to only 70% of the actually approved budget in 2006 which was itself 11 times smaller than the corresponding budget for 1990. Part of the problem is also that water users are not able to cover their fees. All this means that, for example, water resources departments in Sughd have been unable to fulfill their planned duties concerning repairs and maintenance of irrigation systems. To provide a more detailed example, the following table depicts the result of the funding shortages in the B. Ghafurov district. Table B.5.1: Bobojon Ghafurov water infrastructure repairs and maintenance operations in 200647 According to the plan Achievement in Types of works Actually achieved for 2006 percentage Cleaning of irrigation networks 75 thousand m3 10 thousand m3 13% Cleaning of drainages 120 thousand m3 22 thousand m3 18% Repair of hydraulic structures 24 units 13 units 54% Repair of water-meters 16 units 8 units 50% Shore protection 50 thousand Somonis 15 thousand Somonis 33% Repair of pump station buildings 12 units 5 units 42% Repair pump substations 6 units 2 units 33% Yet in Yovon, which is the third district covered in this study, no funds have become available for the repair of the irrigation system in the last 3 to 4 years. Whatever fund available from local and state budgets and from water delivery fees have not even been enough to cover salaries of the district water resources department workers. The situation has been exacerbated due to the large debts owed by water users to the system. Water Fee Collection Water sector reforms were initiated with the adoption of Decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan dated April 8, 1996, Ref.#460 "On introduction of fee for water delivery services to consumers from the state irrigation and water systems." This has been rather a first step on the way to introduce market mechanisms in the water sector, as fee set by the state does not commensurate all expenses for water delivery, not mentioning water's opportunity cost as a natural resource. Due to the financial problems faced by farming enterprises and a number of other issues, fee collection amounted to 15%-17% of the actual set capacity in 1996-1999 and to 60% of the expected amount in 2006. Our quantitative part of the survey probed the issue of fee payments for water received at home and household plot and on presidential lands through the questionnaire. It found either a small indication of payments or small payments for the water households received for house garden and home use as well as for presidential lands. Concerning house garden, in Ghafurov and Konibodom, more than a quarter and more than a third of households respectively indicated that the large farm was still providing them with water for free. The corresponding figure for Yovon was quite low in comparison. Around 15 percent or so of the respondents in Yovon and Ghafurov stated that they were already paying for water they use on household plot while the corresponding figure in Konibodom was half as much. The percentages of respondents indicating they would pay for water if the quality was improved were found to be 15, 12, and 23 in Ghafurov, Konibodom, and Yovon respectively. Furthermore, the percentages of those stating they would pay if the reliability of water improved were 16, 12, and 5 in Ghafurov, Konibodom, and Yovon respectively. For presidential land, the percentages of responses indicating households were getting water from large farms for 47 Data from Ghafurov District State Water Resources Department, 2007(in Tajiki). 57 free were 27, 47, and 8 in Ghafurov, Konibodom, and Yovon respectively. The percentage of responses indicating payments was found to be very low for all three districts. Across the three districts about one quarter and more than one third of respondents indicated they would pay if the quality and the reliability respectively improved. The number of respondents in the quantitative part of the survey to the question addressing individual or multi-family small farms was too low to draw any meaningful conclusions (see table below). Table B.5.2: Access to water for free and willingness to pay for water48 Total The large farm still provides us water for free % of total responses* 21.28 We have already been paying for our water % of total responses* 12.59 We are willing to pay for the water we have been getting Household plot % of total responses* 0.73 until now If the quality of water improves we are willing to pay % of total responses* 16.25 If the reliability of water improves (more frequent access) % of total responses* 38.02 we will pay We are not willing to pay no matter what % of total responses* 11.13 Total number of responses 1231 Total count of all those responding for household use and garden 1165 The large farm still provides us water for free % of total responses* 30.92 We have already been paying for our water % of total responses* 2.66 We are willing to pay for the water we have been getting Presidential land % of total responses* 0.48 until now If the quality of water improves we are willing to pay % of total responses* 6.76 If the reliability of water improves (more frequent access) % of total responses* 24.15 we will pay We are not willing to pay no matter what % of total responses* 35.02 Total number of responses 414 Total count of all those responding for presidential land 407 *Percentages are calculated taking all responses to first and second responses together as an overall measure of the importance of a category. Table B.5.3: Water Users Debts to Water Suppliers as of May 1, 2007 (in Somoni) 49 Districts Total debts Ghafurov Water Resources Department 4,454,821 Konibodom Water Resources Department 1,275,339 Yovon Productive Operational-Melioration Unit 2,118,679 Table B.5.4: Debts of water suppliers as of April 1, 2007 (in Somoni)50 Districts Main debts Debts on salaries Ghafurov Water Resources Department 7,317,888 558,296 Konibodom Water Resources Department 1,166,200 275,000 Yovon Productive Operational-Melioration Unit 1,116,880 98,000 48 Data based on findings from quantitative survey conducted for this study. 49 Data from Ghafurov, Konibodom, Yovon Districts' State Water Resources Departments., 2007 (in Tajiki). 50 Ibid. 58 Water users still owe large sums to the public sector for water delivery, as depicted in Table B.5.3 for the three districts under investigation. In fact, almost all water users in the surveyed districts have debts to water resources department for water delivery services. Yet, the main debtors are agricultural enterprises, which owe 4,142,348 somonis in Ghafurov, 1,003,476 somonis in Konibodom, and 1,864,409 somonis in Yovon. No penalties have been considered in the case of water-users' non-payment. In fact there is no real mechanism to settle accounts among various users and providers (considering the seasonality of agricultural activities) since the system is still based on the old style command structure rather than market mechanisms. Needless to say, the debt of water users translates into the debt of water departments as depicted in Table B.5.4. Total debts of water users to water suppliers in Tajikistan currently stands at around 72 million somonis while that of water suppliers to other organizations is estimated at 34 million somonis. It is reported that the staff members of many water resources departments are frequently absent from work due to low salaries or late wage payments. What should however be noted is that even if fee collection is fully achieved, it will still not compensate all expenses for the upkeep of the irrigation system. Indeed, the fee, set at 0.6 dirhams for one cubic meter of water or 6 somonis for 1000 cubic meters of water, is not high enough to achieve the intended results. There are suggestions to introduce different fees for various climatic zones, delivery means, and levels of profitability. Extent of Water-Logging Rising ground water table and heightened mineralization in the Ghafurov district were recorded on 6,474 ha of irrigated land in 2006. In Konibodom, land area with critical ground water level was reported as 8895 ha or 39.4% of whole irrigated area in the same year. The following tables detail the situation. High level of ground water means close to swamp conditions while medium level refers to a situation when cultivation is not possible. Low level means difficulties are just becoming discernable. Table B.5.5: High ground water level in agricultural enterprises51 Districts and jamoats High level (ha) Medium level (ha) Low level (ha) I. Konibodom region Jamoat Sharipova 580 1607 1071 Jamoat Lahuti 128 552 1932 Jamoat Artiqow 913 1435 747 II. Gafurow region Jamoat _Katagan 270 146 80 Table B.5.6: High ground water level on presidential lands52 Districts and jamoats High level (ha) Medium level (ha) Low level (ha) I. Konibodom Jamoat Sharipov 480 - - Jamoat Lahuti 392 - - Jamoat Artiqov 90 205 - II. Gafurow region Jamoat Qataghon 40 8 12 51 Data on socioeconomic indicators of the region obtained from Jamoats of Kanibadam and Ghafurov Districts, 2007 (in Tajiki). 52 Ibid. 59 Table B.5.7: High ground water level in villages (in %)53 Districts and jamoats High level (ha) Medium level (ha) Low level (ha) I. Konibodom . Jamoat Sharipov 1 Mahram 35% 45% 10% 2 Niezbek 30% 50% 10% 3 Pahtakor 65% 30% 5% 4 Madaniyat 50% 40% 10% 5 Dashtqarayantoq 60% 30% 10% 6 Botir-Kurgan 55% 35% 10% B. Jamoat Lahuti 1 Lahuti 40% 2 Karakchikum 45% 3 Chigdalik 30% C. Jamoat Artiqov 1 Shurkurgan 55% 30% 15% 2 Tagai-Kuichi 60% 35% 5% 3 Firuzoba 65% 30% 5% 4 Kuikozien 50% 40% 10% 5 Tutikavala 60% 30% 10% 6 Shaitqarayantoq 55% 35% 10% 7 urgancha 45% 30% 25% 8 P. Kalinin 50% 35% 15% 9 P.Aini 65% 30% 5% II. Gafurow region . Jamoat Qataghon 1. Qataghon 47% 32 % 21% B.6 WATER USERS ASSOCIATION Legal Basis Until the end of 2006 the legal establishment of WUAs in Tajikistan was based on the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Water Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Civil Code of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan dated June 25, 1996 Ref.#281 concerning water fees, and a few less important acts. However, due to the inadequacy of this legal framework for the establishment and regulation of WUAs and the importance the government has attached to the issue of efficient water provision, the Law on Water Users Associations was signed by the President of the Republic of Tajikistan on November 21, 2006. The aim was to create a firm legal basis for WUA establishment as well as to regulate the relations between the state water organizations and water users through the participation of the latter in management and distribution of water. According to this Law, "A water users association is a non-profit organization established by legal bodies that have rights to land exploitation for agricultural production... established with the purpose of keeping and exploiting farm irrigation networks that are in common and individual use for a fair, effective, and timely 53 Ibid. 60 distribution of water among members and other water users, for fee collection against water delivery, and for conflict resolution among members and other water users." WUAs main tasks are defined as54: Concluding agreements with water resources departments for water supply in the Water Users Association coverage zone; Managing irrigation systems in the Water Users Association's service area and distributing water on a contractual basis among Water Users Association's members as well as non-members; Maintaining, rehabilitating, repairing and if necessary constructing irrigation system in the Water Users Association's service area and, if necessary, implementation of construction works; Procuring, assembling, and maintaining hydraulic engineering equipment in the service area; Keeping records of capacity and quality of used water and submitting statistical reports to authorized state organs concerned with regulation and exploitation of water; Preventing water contamination in Water Users Association service area; Protecting and improving the melioration conditions of land in the service area; Training WUA members and other water users on irrigation techniques and on water saving methods; Resolving water disputes among members and between members and non-members. Members of the WUA may be either individuals or legal bodies that have rights to agricultural lands located in the service area of the association. Their participation in the WUA is entirely voluntary. WUA members have the following rights according to the Law: to demand irrigation water from Water Users Association in accordance with norms and plans of water use; to enjoy Water Users Association's services regarding water supply according to established norms; to participate in the WUA decision-making process as stipulated in the Charter of the association. to participate in the General Assembly or an assembly of reprehensive to introduce measures in these gatherings; to nominate themselves for the leadership of the WUA; to demand their rights in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan and the charter of WUA; to demand compensation for land or property in case of damages as a result of the work of the WUA in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Tajikistan; to have access to the records of the WUA; to cancel their memberships in the association upon the completion of a fiscal year according to the legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan. The Law states that a WUA must be led by a Board headed by a Chairman elected by WUA members in the General Assembly. The affairs of the executive organs of a WUA are governed by the Charter of WUA. Fees to cover the expenses of the WUA including for the upkeep of the irrigation system are decided upon by the General Assembly of the association. These fees are to be collected from both WUA members and non-members using the services of the WUA in the association's service area. Water users associations can procure property and other tangible and non-tangible assets (including through imports) although they do not have the right to sell or rent out their basic assets of irrigation and 54 Republic of Tajikistan, Law on Water Users Associations, Dushanbe, 2006 (in Tajik). 61 maintenance. In case a WUA is liquidated, its assets will be returned to the original owners. They are expected to enter into formal agreements with the state water resources departments on the one side and water users on the other. They should pay fees to the water departments and charge fees to water users. They may gain access to land if necessary for laying canals, drainage network and roads, and in case of damages to compensate the owners according to the Land Code of the Republic of Tajikistan. WUAs can form Water Users Association Federation. They are supposed to maintain irrigation structures in working condition and, if necessary, to construct new structures on the one hand and oversee fair distribution and control over effective water exploitation on the other. They are also supposed to work towards environmental protection and prevention of natural disasters and submit proposals for their activities to the relevant state organs. Water Users Associations are regulated by the state organ put in charge by the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan which keeps a list of registered WUAs. This organ provides legal, technical, and financial assistance to the WUAs and monitors all aspects of water exploitation in order to ensure water resources are used in a rational manner and are protected in accordance with a set plan. WUA Formation and Registration Process The process of WUA formation and registration consists of several phases. At the outset it is necessary that water users form a group that also includes a water management specialist, an economist, and other qualified and experienced persons. The group, after familiarizing itself with the methodologies and procedures, convenes its General Assembly to discuss and reach agreement on the organization and structure of the WUA within the territory of dihqon farms, the name of the WUA, and the charter of the WUA. The General Assembly also elects WUA Board Members, including its chairman and the members of the Inspection Commission. The second phase entails the official registration of the WUA. The WUA Board needs to submit the following documents for the institution's official registration. i. Protocol of decisions of the General Assembly on the organization of WUA with signatures of all founders. ii. WUA Charter passed in the General Assembly of water users. iii. Statement of the Chairman of WUA to Ministry of Justice about juridical appraisal and official registration of WUA. iv. Certificate of local Hukumat about location and address of WUA as well as personal file of WUA Chairman with photo. v. Certificate showing that founders (dihqon farms) are officially registered in the local notary office. vi. Certificate from local tax organ about debt or clearance of debt of the founders. The above documents are submitted to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Tajikistan. After the registration of WUA Charter in the Ministry of Justice, the WUA receives permission from the Internal Affairs Organ to make its own seal and to open a bank account. The WUA gets registered in the State Statistics Office, District Tax Office and the Pension Fund. Following these steps, the WUA becomes a full legal body and start its official work in accordance with its charter. WUA Support Units Success of WUAs depends to a large degree on the support of the public sector. Yet, earlier unsuccessful attempts, convinced MMWR officials to seek international assistance in this regard and also set up specialized units in support of the effective establishment of WUAs. Based on recommendations by specialists and through the Minister's decree dated May 10, 2007, the central WUA Support Unit was established in the 62 central office of MMWR and its area offices were set up in oblast and district departments. The establishment of these units as part of the structure of the Ministry is a sign of the long-term commitment of the state to strengthen the institutional mechanisms of irrigation system development in Tajikistan. Policy support to the central Unit has been provided on monitoring reform and on improving farm and water management by some international organizations, in particular, the Asian Development Bank. The staff of the central WUA Support Unit at the Ministry consists of 5 specialists. The main objective of WUA Support Units is to make WUAs viable, since established WUAs have faced numerous institutional and operational difficulties. Since its establishment, the central WUA Support Unit has prepared a set of administrative guidelines, operational guidelines, and financial plans. It has also worked out a detailed plan for the establishment of regional support units. Furthermore, the Unit has identified needs for financial and technical assistance (including training). While the Unit has studied the structures and functions of WUA founded by other projects and water users, the level of their sustainability and their forms of interaction with MMWR, consultation with various key players are still under way to develop a program of successful WUAs duplication across the country based on the experiences gained through earlier pilot projects. Specific guidelines are to be developed on WUA establishment, its areas of responsibility, its financial bases, and its basic structures and functions to be adopted across Tajikistan. It is also necessary to define what modalities of long-term support by MMWR will be required for the most efficient way of facilitating WUA development. WUA Support Unit of MMWR Oblast Water Resources Department At present three regional WUA Support Units are being organized under Sughd Oblast Water Resources Department, Kurgantube Territorial Water Resources department and Kulyab Territorial Water Resources Department. Their respective offices have been set up in oblast and territorial water resources departments. Their staff consists of 3 specialists: WUA specialist, water resources management specialist and engineer- irrigator. WUA Specialist provides assistance and support on all aspects of establishing and strengthening of WUA, helps in the arrangement of training programs for the management of WUA, works with treasurers and financial officers of WUA, and coordinates with the personnel of district WUA Support Units (see below). Water Resources Management Specialist helps to develop programs within oblast directed to increase efficiency of water exploitation, coordinates training programs to strengthen WUA capability in the sphere of operations and maintenance of irrigation system, acts as an instructor or selects instructors for training water management at the farm level, and helps WUAs in preparing annual plans of their irrigation system maintenance. Engineer-irrigator provides assistance in making plans of repair of irrigation network, teaches WUAs' irrigators on methods of proper maintenance, operation of irrigation system and irrigation at the farm level. Oblasts and territorial WUA Support Units work with districts consultative groups, which are headed by Chairman of a district Hukumat and consist of representatives of concerned ministries as well as private farmers and such agricultural organizations as suppliers of agricultural resources and ginneries. Oblasts and territorial WUA Support Units work under the MMWR WUA Support Unit, based on the latter's strategy on the introduction of effective programs of WUAs development within oblasts/territories. Oblast and territorial Units are responsible for making programs on WUA advocacy and for providing training which should satisfy specific local demands. Furthermore, these units should work with District Water Resources Departments and establish under within them WUA Support Units with the purpose of working out a dynamic plan on WUA establishment. Taking into consideration that the personnel of Oblasts Water Resources Departments do not have particular experience with farmer organizations, they may recruit appropriate specialists. 63 Main objective of the Oblasts and territorial WUA Support Units is to help development long-term implementation programs on forming sustainable WUAs in the oblasts/territories. These programs will be worked out in cooperation with central WUA Support Unit of MMWR as well as jointly with WUA Support Units in corresponding districts. While Central WUA Support Unit of MMWR in Dushanbe will be involved in the development of macro-policy, including preparation of training material, the oblasts and territorial WUA Support Units will be working closely with appropriate district units, helping them to develop sustainable WUAs. The functions of WUA Support Units under Oblast Water Resources Departments include: i. Planning of WUA advocacy campaign at oblast and district levels as well as among farms located on the territory of the oblast; ii. Working out long-term and annual plans as well as required budgets for WUA establishment in the oblast; iii. Providing juridical registration of WUA in the oblast and solving problems related to their registration with the Ministry of Justice; iv. Identifying instructors and personnel responsible for arrangement of training courses and seminars; v. Developing programs on raising efficiency of farms' water exploitation; vi. Working with personnel of district WUA Support Units; vii. Monitoring WUAs establishment process within WUA Support Unit activity area. WUA Support Unit of District Water Resources Department The staff of districts units, at the moment, consists of 1 specialist on WUA support. WUA specialist works with leaders of district WUAs so as to direct their actions in the process of preparation of necessary materials for their WUAs registration. In the framework of the given process, the specialist provides assistance in arrangement of educational programs on guiding and managing a WUA. This specialist also works with financial consultants of different projects so that treasurers of WUAs on the district territory may set up transparent accounting records and accounts. WUA Specialist cooperates with WUA hydraulic engineers when planning annual programs of infrastructure maintenance. The specialist also trains them to define annual demands in repair and construction works. Besides, s/he arranges training of accountants and accounts clerks of WUAs. The functions of District WUAs Support Units consist of: i. Conducting WUA advocacy campaign among farms located on the territory of the district; ii. Working out long-term and annual plans as well as required budgets for WUA establishment in place of the earlier kolkhoz and sovkhoz structures; iii. Helping establish WUAs so that they would be registered as juridical entities; iv. Organizing educational courses and seminars for WUAs personnel; v. Organizing educational programs for technical personnel of WUAs toward perfecting irrigation management at the farm level; vi. Helping WUAs in keeping solid financial positions and establishing transparent audit systems; vii. Assisting WUAs in solving any institutional, financial and technical problems; viii. Monitoring and documenting WUA establishment process within the district. WUA Support Units need to set up a monitoring process with the involvement of concerned parties in order to check the work of each newly formed WUA in the district. Inevitably, with a rapid pace of WUA establishment, some WUAs will have problems of personnel recruitment, funding or leadership. WUA Support Units will need to be very familiar with such water users groups and to be aware of potential 64 difficulties in any WUA. Since the strength of WUAs is an extremely important factor for providing a solid financial basis for Districts Water Resources Departments, it is in the interest of the Departments to work with WUAs and to keep them in sustainable condition. WUAs' Record of Establishment and Performance Within the last half a decade or more, about one hundred WUAs have been established in Tajikistan through different projects funded by international organizations and local communities. Some of the major examples are given below. World Bank: Farm Privatization Support Project (9 WUAs); Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (21 WUAs); Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Project (has started WUAs establishment in Konibodom and B. Ghafurov); Project on registration and cadastre system of land for sustainable development of agriculture (WUA establishment following agricultural enterprise reorganization). Asian Development Bank: Agriculture Rehabilitation Project (21 WUAs); Support for Policy Reform and Monitoring and Improvement of Farm and Water Management (financial and technical support toward the establishment of WUA Support Unit in Asht, Vahdat, Rushon, Farkhor and Pyanj districts). USAID/Winrok: Rendering assistance in setting up 26 WUAs. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC): Funded from 2001 Central Asia Irrigation Sector Reform (basic element of these investments is Integrated Water Resources Management in Fergana Valley Project). Other NGOs such as ACTED, GAA, Merci Corp: Involved in WUA and WUG establishment and development. Local hukumats, District Water Resources Department, and Dihqon Farm Assocaitons (DFA) have also begun to participate in WUA establishment. In particular, local hukumats and DFAs are in the process of establishing WUAs in Konibodom. A WUA has already been registered in the Sharifov Jamoat (in the service of Area of Nazarov DFA) and preparatory WUA work is underway in Lahuti and Artykov. Work on WUA establishment in Ghafurov is going forward at a much slower pace since farm privatization has been delayed in this district. The following table summarizes basic information about some of the established WUAs, as the last part of this Annex. Table B.6.1: WUAs established through Farms Privatization Support Project funded by the World Bank55 Districts WUA title Registration Irrigated Number of Water date lands, ha water users users group 1 Ittifoq 18/10/2002 472 147 1 Kolkhozabad 2 J. Rahimov 30/08/2002 2770 822 5 3 Firdavsi 10/06/2000 415 37 4 Yovon 4 "10 years of Tajikistan" 15/02/2002 1500 308 9 5 . Azizov 05/10/2001 1789 108 3 Matcha 6 E.Ashrapov 01/08/2002 7070 1862 4 7 Rudaki Chiltan 22/06/2000 1539 327 5 8 Shahrinav irob 12/12/2001 1200 466 9 9 Zafarobod Kanz 15/08/2001 2152 612 15 All 9 18907 4689 55 55 From World Bank's Farm Privatization Support Project, Dushanbe, 2004 (in Russian). 65 Table B.6.2: WUAs established through Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project of the World Bank56 Districts WUA title Registration Irrigated Number of Water users date lands, ha water users group 1 Kolkhozabad Toshrabod 07/01/2003 3600 57 6 2 Vakhsh 10/01/2003 4437 50 2 3 Huroson Mehnat 03/01/2003 2644 122 6 4 Farhod 04/01/2003 2463 72 5 5 Yovon Chorgul 15/11/2002 1503 58 8 6 Norin 03/01/2003 2214 31 9 7 Navkoram 05/02/2003 1677 50 4 8 Zafarobod Obi Haet 28/03/2003 2650 205 3 9 Sarob 03/02/2003 2282 145 9 10 Obshor 12/02/2003 2500 85 5 11 Obron 26/02/2003 3700 43 5 12 Sugd 17/06/2003 1898 107 5 13 S. Kenjaev 27/05/2004 1500 70 9 14 ehrigon 26/02/2003 2200 170 5 15 Matcha Ch.Odinaev 20/05/2003 1420 28 3 16 Rudaki Obodoni 29/09/2003 1662 190 8 17 Zainab 04/08/2004 1200 218 10 18 Kuktosh 23/06/2003 2124 340 4 19 Shahrinav Obi Toza 07/01/2003 1724 65 17 20 Navruz 14/10/2003 1060 11 3 21 Guliston 23/12/2002 1106 17 9 All 21 45564 2134 135 REFERENCES Asian Development Bank, "Support for Monitoring Policy Reforms and Improving Farm and Water Management Project," No.4472-TAJ, Dushanbe, 2007 (in Russian). Asian Development Bank, "The Irrigation Rehabilitation Project," No.4143-TAJ, Dushanbe, 2004 (in Russian). Bobojon Ghafurov District State Water Resources Department, Data on water use, 2007 (in Tajiki). Government of Republic of Tajikistan, "Conception of Water Use," Dushanbe, 2001 (in Tajiki). Government of Republic of Tajikistan, "Conception of Land Tenure," Dushanbe, 2004 (in Tajiki). Johnson, H. III, "Appraisal Mission Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project." Republic of Tajikistan, World Bank ECSSD. February-March 2000. International Water Management Institute (SICWC), "Integrated Water Resources Management in Ferghana Valley: How to establish a Water Users Association?," March 2003 (in Russian). 56 From World Bank's Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, Dushanbe, 2005 (in Russian). 66 Bobojon Ghafurov District, Data on socioeconomic indicators of the region, 2007 (in Tajiki). Konibodom District, Data on socioeconomic indicators of the region, 2007 (in Tajiki). Yovon district District, Data on socioeconomic indicators of the region, 2007 (in Tajiki). Konibodom District State Health Department, Data on health indicators, 2007 (in Tajiki). Konibodom District State Water Resources Department. Data on water use, 2007 (in Tajiki). Baumann P., "Social Diagnosis," Irrigation Distribution System and Management Improvement Project, 2002. Republic of Tajikistan. Land Code of Republic of Tajikistan: Law on Land Tenure, Dushanbe, 1996 (in Tajiki). Republic of Tajikistan, Law on Dihqon Farms, Dushanbe, 1998 (in Tajiki). Republic of Tajikistan, Law on Land Reform, Dushanbe, 1997 (in Tajiki). State Statistical Committee of Republic of Tajikistan, "Socioeconomic conditions of the Republic of Tajikistan in 2006," Efficient Information, Dushanbe, 2007 (in Tajiki). State Statistical Department of Hukumat of Sughd Oblast, "Facts for 2006," Khujand, 2007 (in Tajiki). Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Dissemination of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) Experiences Project, Dushanbe, 2007. Republic of Tajikistan, Law on Water Users Associations, Dushanbe, 2006 (in Tajiki). UNDP, "National Human Development Report 2003: How to Improve Management of Water Resources in Tajikistan, 2004 (in Russian). UNIFEM, "Gender Equality in the Agriculture Sector," Dushanbe, 2007 (in Russian). UNIFEM, "Women's Rights to Land Tenure," Dushanbe, 2005 (in Tajiki). Republic of Tajikistan. Water Code and Bylaws: Regulation of Water Relations, Dushanbe, 2004 (in Tajiki). Winrock International, The Water User Association Support Program, 2005. World Bank, Community Agriculture and Watershed Management Project, Dushanbe, 2007. World Bank, Farm Privatization Support Project, Dushanbe, 2004 (in Russian) 67 World Bank, Fergana Valley Water Resources Management Project, Dushanbe, 2007. World Bank, "Irrigation in the Central Asia: Social, Economic and Nature Protection Consideration," Washington, D.C., 2003. World Bank, Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, Dushanbe 2005 (in Russian). Yovon District State Productive Operational-Melioration Unit, Data on Water Use, 2007 (in Tajiki) Creibull, Y., et al, "Swiss Strategy in Central Asia on Water Use Sector for 2002-2006: Potential Strengthening of Regional Water Use Management," 2002. 68 Annex C: Survey Instruments C1. QUESTIONNAIRE 1. Codes: ____ ____ ________________ nohiya jamoat qishloq questionnaire # Survey Questionnaires Fergana Valley Water Resources Management Project (FVWRMP) (World Bank) Hello, my name is___________________________________________________ I work on a research project to inform the "Fergana Valley Water Resources Management Project". This project is very important for the inhabitants of this region to increase their agricultural output and enhance their livelihood by understanding: 1) The existing irrigation practices and how they impact your socio-economic status and living conditions. 2) Existing problems related to water and irrigation and how they affect your choice of crops and socio-economic well ­being. 3) Current/future water use habits and behavior for both personal and farm use and women's role in this regard. Remarks: * It is advisable that at least one of the enumerators be a woman to make sure female household members do not become shy in answering questions. ** Socialize briefly and establish rapport/confidence with interviewee *** Respondent must be head of household, a spouse, or some other adult member of the household who is very much informed about the household situation. The enumerators should also try to include an adult female member of the household in the interview. Discontinue interview if resident is not available and select a replacement sample household. Control information Questionnaire was filled out: [.....] [.....] [.....] [.....] 2007 Day Month Time interview started: ________________ Time interview ended: ___________ Supervisor ________________________________________ Interviewer 1________________________________________ Interviewer 2________________________________________ This household has replaced household no._______________________ Reasons: Dwelling not found.........1 Household absent .........2 Refusal............................3 Other...............................4 69 Data entry supervisor _____________ Date of data entry _____________________________ Data entry staff ________________________________ Name of head of household: ______________________________________ Name of respondent: _______________________________________ Address and Telephone number: ________________________________________________ Interviewers should write any general and interesting observation they have on this household here: ___________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________________________ Note 1: This page contains confidential household information. Enumerators must explain to respondents that all links between the responses and households will be destroyed. Note 2: Enter ­99 for not applicable. 70 SECTION A: HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION Please provide the following detailed information about your household members (must be living in the village with the household. For example, if husband has migrated write head of household for wife). Note: A household consists of persons who live in the same dwelling and pool resources and expenses. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Reference Name Relations Sex Marital Status Age, Able to Total Now If between 6 and Disability? Full time Second Third number of hip to years read years in attend 18 why not? employment employment (or employment members head of and school School (if no full time part-time) household write employment fill out next column) 1 Respondent 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1=M 1=Single 1=Yes If too 1=Yes -99=Not -99=Not 1=Self-employed in non-farm private business outside 1=Head of household 2=F 2=Married 2=No young to 2=No applicable applicable= home or owner of such private business 2=Spouse 3=Separated or go to 1=Difficult to get 2=Farming and related activities on any type of collective 3=Son/daughter divorced Not school, Write 1= Hearing farm including Khojagii Dihqonii Kollektivi to school 4=Sister / brother 4=Widow(er) applica write -99 for all 2=Seeing 3=Farming, etc. on Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi/Infirodi 5=Son in law/daughter in law -99=Not ble membe 2=Cannot afford 3=Speech 4=Farming, etc. on own presidential land/household plot 6=Mother / father applicable, too since If no rs even charges 4=Movement 5=Farming, etc. some other type of land 7=Grandson / young too schooling, if old 3=Needs to 5=Mental 6= Farming, etc. on land you do not own/ do not have granddaughter young= write "0" contribute 6=Other shares of 8=Grand mother/grand farther -99 to household 7=Office or management employee on farm 9=Mother in law / Father in law income 8=Teacher or medical presonnel 10=Other (specify)... 4=Other 9=Employee in industry/factory or workshop 10=Employee in any type of services including transport 11=Housewife or other homemaker without pay 12=Private paid domestic work 13=Handicraft production at home 14=Pensioner 15=Has no job but is looking for a job actively now 16=Has no job and is not looking for another job actively 17=Pupil/student 18=Doing military service but staying at home 19- Cannot work due to old age or a handicap -99= Too young to work 71 16. Language spoken mainly at home : Tajiki...1 Uzbek...2 Russian...3 Qirqiz...4 Other...5________________________ How many people in this family migrated to other places in the last 5 years? (if no one, write "0") 17. Previous head of family (Enter 1 if this is the case; otherwise write "0") 18. Number of other males (Enter number if the case; otherwise, write "0") 19. Number of other females (Enter number if the case; otherwise, write "0") 20. How many of the above migrants have returned? #____________________ (if no one has migrated to begin with, write -99; if you entered some number in the previous question, but no one has actually returned, write "0") What was the main reason for migration among your family members? (Maximum three reasons) 21. 22. 23. First Second Third reason reason reason Not applicable -99 Education 1 1 1 Work 2 2 2 Marriage 3 3 3 Military service 4 4 4 Other 5 5 5 24. If you have had migrants in your family, what has been the impact on the family? 1st 2nd Not applicable -99 Not much impact can been seen 0 Migrants send money and that is good 1 1 Migrants send very little money, so there is no positive impact in terms of extra money 2 2 Migrants' absence from the family means that women have to take care of all household chores which is difficult 3 3 Migrants' absence from the family means that women have to take care of all household chores. While this is 4 4 difficult, it has also empowered women to some extent Main Agricultural Activities of the Household in general as a whole (circle one only in each column) Type 25. First 26. Second 27. Third 28. Fourth most important most most most important important important Not involved in agricultural activities -99 Cotton 1 1 1 1 Grain 2 2 2 2 Fruits 3 3 3 3 Vegetables 4 4 4 4 Animal husbandry 5 5 5 5 Poultry production 6 6 6 6 Sericulture 7 7 7 7 Fishing/aquaculture 8 8 8 8 Other (specify)...................... 9 9 9 9 72 SECTION B: INFORMATION ON LAND AND AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES Do you have presidential, nazdi howoli or any other land (not to include Khojagii Dihqonii Inferodi and Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi or share in Khojagii Dihqonii Kollektivi or Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, and large collective). Note: by rental land we mean you actually rent a land plot, pay for it, and can sell or consume what you grow on this plot 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. % of 1st reason 2nd reason Under whose name do you have Sex of Amou Activity land proper documents for this land? that nt you Unit: Type of on land? cul- Why is it that you do not person paid to Size 1-ha Farm tivated cultivate all of the land? get 2-sotiq this a b c land? a. House Garden b. Presidential c. Rental land d. Other -99=Do not have this type -99=We do cultivated all -99=Have no documentation 1=M If not of land 1= Part of it is used as fallow 0=Head of household 2=F paid, 1=Not much to be rejuvenated 1=Spouse write 2=Cotton 2 = Low quality of land 2=Son/daughter -99= 0. For 3=Grain 3=lack of access to water 3=Sister / brother Not rental 4=Fruits 4=No money to buy inputs 4=Son in law/daughter in law Applic write 5=Vegetables 5= No one to work on land 5=Mother / father able annual 6=Animal husbandry 6=No market for produce 6=Grandson /granddaughter fee. 7=Poultry production 7=Land is too far 7=Grand mother/grand farther -99= 8=Sericulture 8= Land is fragmented 8=Mother in law / Father in law Not 9=Dry farming 9= High water table 9= A migrant to other places Applic 10=Other 10=Other 10=Other (specify relative to head able (specify)..................... (specify).................. of household .....................) 38. Have you experienced land restructuring of the Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large collective farm system? Not applicable since our household was never involved in agricultural activities at the Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, -99 JSC, or large collective farm Not really, our Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large collective farm system has only been renamed and some of 1 our household members work on the renamed farm Yes, the (earlier renamed) JSC, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or large collective farm has been broken down into 2 Khojagii Dihqonii Kollektivi on which some of our family members work Yes, the JSC, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or large collective farm has been broken down and we have land on 3 which our extended family works (Khojagii dihqonii oilagi) Yes, the JSC, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or collective farm has been broken down and our family has received its 4 own land (Khojagii dihqonii infirodi) Information on family members who work on (renamed) Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large collective farm or a restructured Khajagii Dihqonii Kollektivi or have shares in the farms. 39. Have 40. Do you 41. Did you shares? know boundary have to pay to of share? get share? 1=Yes 1=Yes 2=No 2=No No one in the family works on this type of farm or has shares -99 Some family members work on this farm, but no one has shares 0 All family members who work on this type of farm have shares 1 Only some family members who work on this farm have shares 2 No family member works in the farm but some have shares 3 We only get a plot of land from the large farm to grow what they 4 ask us to do (for example grow cotton); we get some benefit our of this by getting for example cotton stems or because we are allowed to cultivate part of this for our own use 73 If you have experienced land restructuring and you now have a Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi or Khojagii Dihqonii Infirodi fill out the following. Otherwise write -99 in the first column and skip the table. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. Type of Size Unit: Activity % of 1st reason 2nd reason # of full- # of Amou Type of Sex of Farm 1-ha on land? land time fami- nt you document person 2-sotiq cul- Why is it that you do not persons lies paid to under tivated cultivate all of the land? working get whose on the this name land land in documen a b c Somo t is ni issued 1=Khoja 1=Not much -99=We do cultivated all 1=None 1=M gii 2=Cotton 1= Part of it is used as fallow to be rejuvenated 2=Single 2=F Dihqonii 3=Grain 2 = Low quality of land Certificate/ 3=M & F oilagi 4=Fruits 3=lack of access to water Shahodatno 2=Khaja 5=Vegetables 4=No money to buy inputs ma -99=Not gii 6=Animal 5= No one to work on land 3=A joint applicabl Dihqonii husbandry 6=No market for produce certificate e Infirodi 7=Poultry 7=Land is too far or -99=No production 8= Land is fragmented Shahodatno such 8=Sericulture 9= High water table ma land 9=kishti lolmi 10=Other (specify).................................... 10=Other If there are some people in your villages who have not received land or share of land, please provide the following information on land allocation (for renamed or broken down kolkhoz or large farm, nazdi howli, and presidential)? Land from big farm Nazdi howli Presidential (Maximum two reasons) 54. 1st 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd There is no such person that we know of -99 -99 -99 Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large collective farm system was just 1 1 1 1 1 1 renamed and no one received any shares Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large collective farm system was 2 2 2 2 2 2 either renamed or restructured (broken down) and they did not give some farmers shares or any land Getting land or land share cost money and some people could not 3 3 3 3 3 3 afford it Some farmers were married to someone from somewhere else and they 4 4 4 4 4 4 got shares or land elsewhere Some farmers were married to someone from somewhere else and they 5 5 5 5 5 5 did not get shares either here or elsewhere Some farmers had lost their spouses and did not get shares or land 6 6 6 6 6 6 Some farmers whose spouses were absent (migrated) did not get shares 7 7 7 7 7 7 or land Some farmers who had become handicapped did not get shares or land 8 8 8 8 8 8 Due to other reasons some farmers did not get land or shares 9 9 9 9 9 9 There was not enough Nazdi howli land available for everyone 10 10 10 10 10 10 There was not enough Presidential land available for everyone 11 11 11 11 11 11 Only influential people could get land or land share 12 12 12 12 12 12 60. Who are the people that did not get land or share of land? Mostly men....1 Mostly women....2 Men and women, equally....3 Not applicable or do not know....-99 74 Livestock assets 62. Do you market you animal products (live or Has the number of your aminals 61. At this moment how many do you produce)? increased in the past 2 years? have? 1=Yes 2=No 63. 64. a. Dairy cows b. Other cattle c. Sheep, goats d. Poultry e. Other, specify...... -99=Not applicable 4=Yes, because of Better access to credit 0=No it has not 5=Yes, because of Better veterinary services 1=Yes, because of Higher profit 6=Yes, because of Received money from remittance 7=Yes, because of Received money from other sources 2=Yes, because of Better access to information 8=Yes, due to natural birth 3=Yes, because of Better access to input 9=Yes, other 75 SECTION C: ACCESS TO WATER What are the main sources of water you actually use for drinking, other home use, or watering your household plot (nazdi howli)? Source 65. We 66. 67. Approximate 68. 69. Freque 70. Satis 71. Who provides the 72. Reasons for 73. Distance use this source Actual use? cost per month in Level of ncy of faction with water? this choice of source? to the main (enter number somoni. If you use satisfact availability amount and source of water? for all) the source but it is ion with reliability? ((Write in KM the free write zero. quality? distance to the actual main canal i ii iii or well) a.Canal/stream/river b. Rain collection c. Pipes (pluming) d. Communal well in village e. Individual well f. Spring in village g. Bottle /container 1=Yes 1=Cultivating household plot 1=Hig 1=Every day 1= OK 1=Kolkhoz/ Sovkhoz, 1=One of few sources 2=No 2=Livestock breeding h 2=Every other 2=To some JSC, etc. of water available to 3=Poultry 2=Ave day extent 2=Khajagii Dihqoni us 4=Sericulture rage 3=Half of the 3=Not very Kollektivi 2=Cost 5=Drinking 3=Low week satisfied 3=Water users' 3=It is reliable 6=Household Needs 4=Only some 4=Not association 4=Easy access 7=Other (specify)............ days during satisfied at 4=Mahallah 5=Other the month all 5=Vodkhoz (specify............... 5=It is not 6=Private ........................ regular company/persons .........) 7=Other (...........) Do you save water at home? If your answer is yes, fill this out. Otherwise place -99 in the first column. 74. Do you save water this way? 75. Importance for you family Hawz Container 1=Yes 2=No -99=Not applicable 1=Very important 2=Somewhat important 3=Not important 76 What are the main sources of water you actually use for your presidential land or individual khojagii dihqoni (Infirodi) or Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi farm? If you do not have this type of land, place -99 in the first row of first column. Source 76. 77. 78. Approx 79. Level of 80. Frequency of 81. Satisfaction 82. Who provides 83. Reasons for 84. Distance to We use Actual use? imate cost per satisfaction with availability with amount and the water? this choice of source? the main source of this month in quality? reliability? water? ((Write in source somoni. If you KM the distance to (enter use the source the actual main number but it is free canal or well) for all) i ii iii write zero. a.Canal/strea m/river b. Rain collection c. Pipes (pluming) d. Communal well in village e. Individual well f. Spring in village g. Bottle /container h. We have very little access to water for this type of land 1=Yes 1=Cultivating plot 1=High 1=Every day 1= OK 1=Kolkhoz/ 1=One of few 2=No 2=Livestock breeding 2=Average 2=Every other day 2=To some extent Sovkhoz, JSC, etc. sources of water 3=Poultry 3=Low 3=Half of the week 3=Not very satisfied 2=Khajagii Dihqoni available to us 4=Sericulture 4=Only some days 4=Not satisfied at all Kollektivi 2=Cost 5=Drinking during the month 3=Water users' 3=It is reliable 6=General Needs 5=It is not regular association 4=Easy access 7=Other (specify)............ 4=Mahallah 5=Other 5=Vodkhoz (specify............... 6=Private ........................ company/persons .........) 7=Other (...........) 77 If you were accessing water free of charge for your household use, household plot, presidential land, or Khojigii Dihqonii Oilagi/Infirodi but now the newly-established water user's association or Vodkhoz is asking you to pay, under what condition are you willing to pay? 85. Nazdi 86. Presidential 87. Khojagii Howli or household land Dihqonii Oilagi/ use Infirodi Not applicable: either source of water is different or no such land -99 -99 -99 We are under (renamed) Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, etc. or under Khojagii 0 0 0 Dihqonii Kollektivi and they still provide us water for free We have already been paying for our water 1 1 1 We are willing to pay for the water we have been getting until now 2 2 2 If the quality of water improves we are willing to pay 3 3 3 If the reliability of water improves (more frequent access) we will pay 4 4 4 We are not willing to pay no matter what 5 5 5 Does water you are receiving first go through other neighboring farms before reaching you? 88. Nazdi 89. Presidential 90. Khojagii Howli or household land Dihqonii Oilagi/ use Infirodi Not applicable: our source of water is different or do not have such land -99 -99 -99 No, water comes to our land first 0 0 0 Yes, it goes through (renamed) Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large 1 1 1 collective farm Yes, it goes through a Khojagii Dihqonii Kollektivi 2 2 2 Yes, it goes through a Khojagii Dihqonii Infirodi/Oilagi 3 3 3 If water you are receiving first goes through other neighboring farms, fill out the following. Otherwise choose -99 in the table. 91. Nazdi 92. Presidential 93. Khojagii Howli or household land Dihqonii Oilagi/ use Infirodi Not applicable: our source of water is different or do not have such land -99 -99 -99 Water goes through a neighboring farm first and they either give us very 1 1 1 little water or give us water whenever they have extra Water goes through a neighboring farm first and they give us bad quality 2 2 2 water Water goes through a neighboring farm first and they have or want to 3 3 3 charge us a lot of money for the water The water goes through a neighboring farm first and they are very 4 4 4 cooperative with regards to providing us with water 94. Do you think in your village some people have more/less access to water? (circle all that apply) a. No, every one has equal access 0 b. Yes, people who are poor have less access 1 c. Yes, influential people have better access 2 d. Yes, men have better access than women 3 e. Yes, those who are farther away from the main source have less access 4 95. In your village, if people face shortage of water (or cannot afford to pay for water) what do they do? (circle all that apply) a. Not applicable -99 b. They do nothing 1 c. They try to divert water from neighboring houses 2 d. They divert water from somewhere along the main source 3 e. They try to get water when there it is not their turn 4 f. They try to bribe mirobs 5 g. Other (specify................) 6 78 96. If you are either in possession of a Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi/Infirodi or work in a Khojagii Dihqonii Kollektivi, is your Khojagi a member of a water users' association (WUA)? If question does not apply to you, choose -99. Yes......1 No.....2 Not applicable...... -99 97. If you now have a WUA , what do you think about the impact of this institution? Not applicable -99 Many things have improved 4 We have better access to water 1 Some things have improved but the cost of water has actually increased 5 Water quality has gotten better 2 No change 6 Water reliability has improved 3 Overall, things have gotten worse 7 98. If you have a WUA, are women also members of the WUA or participate in the meetings? (circle only one) Not applicable -99 Yes, some women are members or participate in meetings but they do not 2 have much say in the decisions Women are seldom members or 1 Yes, many women are members or participate in meetings and they have 3 participate in the meetings a lot of say in water decisions 99. If you do not have a WUA, are you willing to establish one to have a more organized way of distributing the water? (circle only one) We already have a WUA.....-99 I do not know much about WUAs to say anything.....1 No, we do not believe such organizations can help us....2 Yes, but we are not sure how such organizations can help us....3 Yes, I think such organizations can help us.....4 Who decides on the source of water and how it should be used for household purposes and on the household plot, presidential land, or infirodi/oilagi dihqoni land in possession of your household? (circle only one in each row) Head of Family Other Male Other Female Whoever Not Applicable 100. For household use 1 2 3 4 -99 101. For farming/animal husbandry 1 2 3 4 -99 Who from the household does the negotiation on water-related issues for household use and for the household plot, presidential land, or infirodi/oilagi dihqoni land Negotiation Head of Family Other Male Other Female Whoever Not Applicable 102. Accessing water in general 1 2 3 4 -99 103. Cost 1 2 3 4 -99 104. Conflicts with others 1 2 3 4 -99 105. With the WUAs 1 2 3 4 -99 106. If there is a WUA in the village, who from your household is a member or represents your household in the WUA? Whoever Not Applicable, do We have WUA but our family is not Head of Family Other Male Other Female not have WUA directly representated 1 2 3 4 -99 0 79 SECTION D: AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES 107. If you own household plot, presidential land, Khojagii Dihqonii Infirodi or Khojaii Dihqonii Oilagi, have you increased your production in the last two years, including livestock production if that is a major activity of yours? Not applicable (we do not have such land or agricultural activities are not a major source of our livelihood)......-99 Yes, we have increased.........1 No, it has actually decreased........2 No, it has been the same.......3 What are the main difficulties in increasing your agricultural/livestock produce from household plot, presidential land, Khojagii Dihqonii Infirodi or Khojaii Dihqonii Oilagi (Maximum two answers)? 108. First 109. Second difficulty difficulty Not applicable: We do not have or cultivate such land commercially -99 Not difficult, we have been increasing our produce or we can increase our produce if we want to 0 Limited or lack of access to water 1 1 No access to market outside the village and/or no agriculture processing business nearby 2 2 Our quality of soil is low 3 3 Water table has risen and we cannot cultivate land or use it for other purposes 4 4 Limited access to or high cost of inputs 5 5 Limited access to or high cost of machinery 6 6 Limited access to or high cost of credit 7 7 Out produce is of low quality and not marketable 8 8 Other 9 9 (specify..........................................................................................................) If you market your farm produce, fill out the following table (choose only one option in each row; if you do not market, choose -99 on all options) Who is responsible for this marketing? Not Head of Other male Other Whoever, applicable household in female in does not household household matter 110. We sell them in the market -99 1 2 3 4 111. We barter them with other households -99 1 2 3 4 112. We barter them with the future companies for input -99 1 2 3 4 113. Other (specify______________________________) -99 1 2 3 4 Access to inputs for cultivation of your presidential land, household plot, Khojagii Dihqoni Oilagi/Infirodi, or to raise livestock/poultry (If not applicable choose -99 on all options) Farm Assets Not applicable Self-produced Bought in the Self-produced and Have no access market bought in the or no money to market buy 114. Seeds -99 1 2 3 4 115. Fertilizer -99 1 2 3 4 116. Crop production -99 1 2 3 4 chemicals 117. Animal feed -99 1 2 3 4 Access to machinery on your presidential land, household plot, Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi/Infirodi, or to individually raise livestock/poultry (Maximum choose two) 118. First 119. Second Not applicable -99 We use no or very little machinery (tractors, etc.) 0 We use our own machines 1 1 We borrow machines from friends and neighbors 2 2 The large farm lets me use their machines for free 3 3 We rent the machines from the large farm, leasing companies or others 4 4 80 Do you think women have less access to machinery or inputs that men in your village? 120. Machinery: Yes...1 To some extent....2 No, whoever has money can get what they want....3 121. Inputs: Yes...1 To some extent....2 No, whoever has money can get what they want....3 Division of labor for each task in agricultural activities on the khojagi farm on which you work Categories 123. On Khojagii Dihqonii 122. On household plots or Kollektivi, JSC, 124. On Khajagii Dihqonii presidential land Kolkhoz/sovkhoz, or other Infirodi or Oilagi joint farms a. Basic cotton worker b. Basic gardener c. Taking care of livestock (basic) d. Taking care of poultry (basic) e. Taking care of sericulture (basic) f. Other basic worker g. General technician h. Mirob i. Tractor/maching operator j. Animal technician k. Sardar of Khajagi l. brigadier m. Accoutant n. Engineer o. Other 1=Men 2=Women 3=Both men and women 4=Mostly men 5=Mostly women -99=Not applicable SECTION E: HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BORROWING AND EXPENDITURE Indicate wages of those household members who are engaged in agricultural activities on a full-time or part-time basis on JSC, large collective or cooperative, large joint Khojagii Dihqoni, or Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi (in possession of more than one family) 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. Annual value of Annual Annual Enter reference occasional cash or value of value of any Part- Total Monthly Value of number from in-kind payment Divident other type of time or number of Type of cash monthly in- first table in this (such as during from owning payment full- months work on payment kind questionnaire cotton-picking or shares (somoni) time on worked last farm in payment in and write name from receiving (somoni) farm? year somoni somoni cotton stem (somoni 1=Part 1=Basic cotton worker 9=Tractor/machine operator -time 2=Basic gardener 10=Animal technician 2=Full 3=Taking care of livestock (basic) 11=Sardar of Khajagi -time 4=Taking care of poultry (basic) 12=brigadier 5=Taking care of sericulture (basic) 13=accountant 6=Other basic worker 14=Engineer 7=General technician 15=Other 8=Mirob 81 133. If some of your household members are engaged in agricultural activities on a full-time or part-time basis on JSC, large collective or cooperative, large joint Khojagii Dihqoni, or Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi (in possession of more than one family), in their experience are women's wages (cash and in-kind) on such farms lower that male wages? Not applicable.... -99 No, they are the same.....1 Yes, women's wages are generally lower.....2 Yes, but this is because men and women do different things on the farm....4 Family income last year Somoni 134. Average monthly cash wage of all household members from working on farms not ......x 12= individually owned (joint-stock farm, collective farm, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or large dehkan farm cultivated by more than one household) 135. Average value of monthly in-kind wages paid at a regular basis of all household members ......x 12= from working on farms not individually owned (joint-stock farm, collective farm, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or large dehkan farm cultivated by more than one household) 136. Total annual value of produce or cotton-stem or other in kind items any of the household members has on occasion received from working on farms not individually owned (joint-stock farm, collective farm, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or large dehkan farm cultivated by more than one household) 137. Total annual value of dividend from owning shares (somoni) owned by family members 138. Value of total sales of produce from your individual dehkan farm during the entire year (if you have such land) excluding what you have consumed yourself 139. Value of total sales of produce from your presidential land (if you have such land) excluding what you have consumed yourself 140. Value of total sales of produce from your household plot (if you have such land) excluding what you have consumed yourself 141. Value of sales of livestock, or poultry, or sericulture [abrisham, pila] or fish (meat, silk, cheese, milk, eggs, fish, etc.) for the entire year excluding what you have consumed yourself (either product or whole animal) 142. Average monthly value of wages all household members have received for work in non- ......x 12= agricultural activities 143. Total household earnings from work at home (for example handicraft production) during the year 144. Total value of Pension received by all household members per month ......x 12= 145. Total value of social assistance received by all household members during the year 146. Total value of any other income any of the household members have received (cash or in kind) during the year 147. Approximate total value in somoni of gifts received by household during the year 148. Total value of rents the household has received from any assets during the past year 149. Total value of remittance the household has received in the past year 150. Total value of all agricultural products produced and consumed by household during the year (crop, fruits, animal meat and products) during last year 151. How has your family income from all income sources changed in the past 3 years? INCREASED.........1 NO CHANGE.....2 DECREASED ....3 152. How do you estimate your family's financial status? (circle ONE only) Money is enough, no problem 1 Money is enough to make large purchases (furniture, household appliances), but purchase of a car not possible 2 Money is enough to satisfy all our requirements for clothes and food, but larger purchases (furniture, household 3 appliances) is inaccessible to us Money suffices only for minimal requirements of clothes and food 4 Money does not suffice even on purchases of food 5 82 Borrowing in 2006 (Not to include group borrowing for joint khojagii dehqoni, collective, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or JSC) 153. In the last 12 months, 154. What was 155. What was 156. What kind 157. how many times did this the main reason the total amount of guarantee did Rate of household borrow any money for borrowed in the the borrower interest that he/she had/has to repay? borrowing/obtaini last 12 months? provide the (Place -99 if no access in your ng this/these (Somoni) lender(s) for village to this source; place 0 if loan(s)? this/these loan(s)? you did not borrow) a. Banks b. Credit union, formal borrowers groups, credit cooperatives, or credit NGOs c. Informal borrowers groups d. Friends, neighbors, or relatives e. Money lender 1= Agricultural inputs 2=Farm equipment 1=Land asset 2=Crop 3=Animals 4=Acquiring land 3=Livestock 5=Non-farm business 6=Consumption 4=Machinery or vehicle 7=Home repare 8=Consumer durables 5=None 8=Medical and emergency 9=Other 6=Other (specify).............................. 83 Households sometimes experience unexpected sudden events. I would like to ask about any bad surprises that have affected the family financially over the past 1 year Incidences 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. Did this When did it How long What proportion How did the household cope with this problem? Has the event occur happen? did it last? of household (enter up to three coping mechanisms) household in your Month Year (months) income was lost A B C recovered from household? due to this event? this event? a. Serious injury or illness that kept household member from doing normal activities b. Loss of a regular job of a household member c. Cut-off or decrease of remittances / regular transfers from relatives or others d. Termination or decrease of government subsidies or payments e. Abandonment or divorce f. Theft, fire, or destruction of home or property (including vehicle or livestock) g. Failure of business / bankruptcy h. Other (specify)............................. Enter month if 1=All -99=Did nothing 1=Not 1=Yes known, else 2=Most 1=Spent savings or investments recovered 2=No 3=Half 2=Sold or pawned household assets 2=Partially only enter year 4=Some 3=Sold livestock, poultry, etc. recovered 5=None 4=Other members worked more 3=Completely 5=Borrowed/got help from relatives recovered 6=Borrowed/got help from friends/neighbors 7=Obtained loan from bank 8=Borrowed from money lender 9=Obtained help from charity/NGO 10=Stopped consuming some products or services 11=Insurance benefits 12=Unemployment benefits 13=Other (specify) ............................................................. 84 SECTION F: MISCELLANEOUS 164. Is there any water conflict in the village and if there is how is it solved? Yes, community leaders/elders arbitrate 1 Yes, it is taken to the police or judiciary 2 Yes, officials arbitrate (jamoat or mahalla committee) 3 Yes, religious leader arbitrate 4 Yes, local mirobs arbitrate 5 Yes, officials from WUAs or their mirobs arbitrate 6 Yes, and no one arbitrates 7 Yes, neighbors arbitrate 8 Yes, others arbitrate (specify.......................................................................) 9 Yes, but we usually reach an agreement ourselves 10 No, we have no conflicts over water 11 Division of labor within the household (not concerned with farming activities) (circle all that apply) a. Adult male b. Adult female c. Young male d. Young female members of members of child of household child of household household household (Under 16) (Under 16) 165. Shopping 1 2 3 4 166. Fetching water 1 2 3 4 167. Cooking 1 2 3 4 168. Washing and cleaning 1 2 3 4 169. Keeping and accounting 1 2 3 4 family money 170. Other 1 2 3 4 (specify))...................... 171. Are there in your village employable people who don't have a job at the moment? YES .........1 NO.......2 DO NOT KNOW ..........-99 Who are mostly these unemployed people? (from huge to small size) 172. First 173. Seco 174. Thir group nd group d group (circle (circle (circle ONE only) ONE only) ONE only) Not applicable -99 Men 1 1 1 Women 2 2 2 Youth 3 3 3 Educated people 4 4 4 Disabled people 5 5 5 Other (please, specify)............... 6 6 6 85 175. Do you carry out some farm activities jointly with other farms/farmers/relatives (related to your Nazidi howli, presidential land, or Khojagii Dihqonii Infirodi; not related to larger Khojagi dihqonis)? Activities a. Not applicable -99 b. Yes, in production of Crops/Animal 1 c. A i lA i Yes, in processingk 2 d. Yes, in joint use of machinery and equipment 3 e. Yes, in purchasing farm Inputs 4 f. Yes, in receiving Credit 5 g. No, WE DO NOT 6 h. Other (specify) ______________ 7 176. Do you think in the last ten years women have become poorer as compared to men in your village? Yes, they have, since men have more options....1 Yes, to some extent.....2 No, women and men in the same household are at the same level...3 Women have always done worse than men financially....4 177. Do you think women are often coerced to do very low paying work (such as picking cotton) on the farms? Yes, it is often the case....1 Yes, but it is because they need to work....2 No, they are note coerced; they financial situation dictates that....3 No, never.....4 178. Has the high level of water table caused illness in your village? Not applicable.....-99 We have the problem of high level of water table, but it has caused little health problem....1 We have the problem of high level of water table and it has caused a lot of health problem among women who work in the fields...2 We have the problem of high level of water table, and it has caused a lot of health problems among both men and women....3 In your opinion, what are the main problems facing the village community or women in particular? (write down answer and post-code, only 3 answers are possible for each part) 179. Village Community: a. __________________________________________________________________________________________ b. __________________________________________________________________________________________ c. __________________________________________________________________________________________ 180. Women: a. __________________________________________________________________________________________ b. __________________________________________________________________________________________ c. __________________________________________________________________________________________ 86 C.2. FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION ISSUES Note: The guide is intended to serve as a general tool for leading focus group discussions. It is not necessary to pose each and every question especially since different types of FGDs will be held with different groups; rather the guide is to assist in probing deeper and bringing added focus into the discussions. Each focus group discussion should last about 2 hours. Land: Main issues: type of land, ownership status, the use of land, the role of the respondent on that land (working for a wage, cultivating for household use), and division of labor on the land. Ownership status: Do they have land? What kind of land do they have ­ dihqon farm, presidential land or household plot? What is the quality of their land? Can they cultivate it? Is there water? Is it contiguous? Do they have shares/certificates for their land? Do they know exactly where their land is? Did they have to pay anything for it? Did they know how to get land (where to go, who to go to, how much to pay)? If they have agricultural land, are they happy with the land they got? Is it close to them or close to the water? Can they grow anything on it? How has it changed their life? If they don't have land what are the reasons for that? Who do they think got the best land? Do they know if there are workers on the farm who did not receive land shares? Why and who (probe for their characteristics and reason)? For those who did not receive land or a share, did they get land elsewhere? Use and income from the land: Are they working on their own land or do they get a salary? If working on cotton fields, do they get money as wages or do they get in-kind or both? How much or what do they get? Is that what they want? Do they think they are paid fairly for their work? Can they ask for more? Who determines the rates? Do they have other sources of income? If they have HH plot or other land, do they grow anything on their land? How did they decide what to grow on their private land or HH plot? Are they free to decide what to grow? Do they make money from it? How many in their HH work on cotton fields? What do they get paid? Do they want to work on the cotton fields? If not, why do they do it and do? Do large farms provide any services for the village? What do they think is their responsibilities and what services would they like to see them provide for them? Water: Main issues: sources of water, different use, cost, affordability, reliability, access Sources: Where do they get water for their HH plots, presidential land, livestock and personal use? What is their water source? How close or far are they from the source of water? How is the quality of water they use? Who fetches water if it is far? Do they get water from the large farm or does it flow to them directly? Do they pay anyone for it? To whom? Access and affordability: Do they have enough water for their HH plots, private farms, and HH needs? What do they do when there is not enough or no water at all? Where do they get water from? Do they buy water? Are they able to pay for it? What happens if they cannot pay? What are the other means of getting water? 87 Conflicts: Do they have any conflicts with their neighbors over water? What is the nature of these conflicts? Can they give some examples? How do they solve it? Where do they take their issues in general? Are they satisfied with how they are being handled? Reliability: Do they know what are the best and the worst timings of their water flow? Can they tell us which months they have more or less? If large farms provide them with water, do they get it as needed or as available? How reliable is receiving water from them? Is there a WUA in their village? if so how reliable is getting water from them? How does the lack of water affect their lives and how do they live differently during the months where there is less water? Other water-related issues: Do they have livestock? What do they have? Do they have enough water for their livestock? Who takes care of them? What do they do if there isn't enough water for their livestock? Do they ever have to ration water? What gets priority? Who do they think has better access to water? How and why? Do they think their access to water is affected by the fact that they are women? In what way and how? Are there people in the village who get a lot less than they need? If so, what are their characteristics? Are there any water-related problems and humidity in their house? Do they or their families get sick because of it? Can they give some examples? What is the prevalence of water-related maladies in their area? Do they have medical facility near them? If not, what do they do? Has the problem of humidity affected their HH crops? How about their other crops or livestock? Participation: What do they think can be done to give them better and more constant access to water? Are they involved in any community meetings, WUA's, Jamoat or other gatherings in order to better voice their concerns regarding water use and control? Do they take any leadership roles in such gatherings? What have they experienced as women participant in such gatherings? Are they allowed to participate freely? can they easily voice their opinions? If there is no WUA where they live, are they willing to establish one? If yes, for what purpose? Who do they think should be members of such association? At what level such associations should be established? Do they participate in any social clubs in their village? Are there women in their village who have similar concerns and problems? Do they have any leadership roles in these gatherings? Do they think they should pay for water? Are they willing to pay for water if they would have more reliable flow and access? Are they willing to pay for water used in their HH, for drinking and for their livestock? How do they think they could improve the water flow? Do they think it is the responsibility of large farms to resolve water flow issues for them? How about the Vodkhoz or Hukumat? What services would they like to see them provide? Who do they think is responsible to address their water issues? Why? Division of Labor and Control Over Assets: Issues: What is the division of labor in their household? Who does what and what is a typical day like? What is life like in their household? Who takes care of them if they are sick or out of work or have no money? Who manages their money? Do they have any other assets of their own (livestock, etc.)? If it is someone other than them in control, why is that? Is this by choice? Do they know of households in their village who are really in need? Why are they in need? Are these households mostly headed by men or women? Do they think women have a harder life in this village? Why? 88 Migration and Household Well Being: Has anyone from their HH left this village in search of work? Where have they gone? How do they feel about that? How often do they return? Do they send money? What did they do before they left and who performs those tasks now? How has their life changed since they left? Was it easier when they were here and without work or is it easier now that they have gone but send them money? Are there households that are moving up in the village? What are their characteristics? Main Problems: What are some of the problems in their village? How do they see the lives of women in their village? How can they help? Do they know of other women in this village who are head of household? Do they think life here is more difficult for them as a woman? In what way? Do others in the village help them if they need food or water? Are there any social problems in their village like alcoholism, violence, divorce? Have these problems increased in the past few years or has it always been the same? If increased why is that? Have they experienced any type of discrimination or particular problems being a woman? Please explain? Why do they think? What institutions are used to provide support, mediate or resolve conflict in the village? Are they effective? How can they be better utilized? What are some of their ideas to make life better in this village? If there was one thing they could change in their life, in their HH or in their village, what would it be? Life Situation and Coping Strategies: How is their life? What are some of their problems and issues? Is their life better or worse than 5 years ago? If better why do they think? If worse why do they think? What do they think can be done? Do they think things are getting better now? Do they have enough money to buy input (seeds, fertilizer etc.)? If not, who do they borrow from? Do they have enough machinery to work the land? How did they get them? If they don't have any, can they get help or borrow machinery? Can they borrow money to buy them or not? Do they have debt? To whom and why? When do they think they will be able to pay it off? How? What are they doing to pay off the debt sooner? Are they optimistic? Do they pool together HH production for barter or sale? What changes would they make in their current farming practices to make things better? What other kinds of village activities or gatherings can they help form and participate in to take their issues to? Other Issues: Do they have any comments or suggestions for the wellbeing of their village? Are they hopeful and optimistic? Do they think life is getting better or worse? How do they see the lives of their children? Do they think their children are going to have a better life than theirs? In what way? Who do they consider a rich person in their village? What asset does a rich person have? Do they think they can ever be rich? Do they consider themselves rich or modest or poor? 89 Annex D: Tables AGE AND LITERACY Table D.1: Age Years of household District Total members Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon N 1274 1266 1745 4285 Median 23.00 24.00 20.00 26.21 Male Mean 26.52 28.04 24.66 22.00 Minimum 0 0 0 0 Maximum 92 95 95 95 N 1333 1321 1701 4355 Median 23.00 24.00 20.00 22.00 Female Mean 27.50 27.84 24.23 26.33 Minimum 0 0 1 0 Maximum 96 92 85 96 N 2631 2637 3509 8777 Median 23.00 24.00 20.00 22.00 Total Mean 26.94 27.88 24.28 26.16 Minimum 0 0 0 0 Maximum 96 95 95 96 Table D.2: Ability to read and write District Sex of household members Total Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Count 999 1026 1332 3357 Literate Male %within district 95.8% 96.1% 96.5% 96.1% %of Total 28.6% 29.4% 38.1% 96.1% Count 1042 1035 1307 3384 Literate Female %within district 92.7% 93.8% 95.5% 94.1% %of Total 29.0% 28.8% 36.3% 94.1% Count 2053 2094 2670 6817 Literate Total %within district 94.2% 94.8% 96.0% 95.1% %of Total 28.6% 29.2% 37.2% 95.1% 90 Table D.3: Total years of schooling District Years of schooling Total Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon N 1069 1098 1416 3583 Median 10 10 10 10 Male Mean 9.14 9.30 9.12 9 Minimum 0 0 0 0 Maximum 17 18 18 18 N 1150 1146 1402 3583 Median 10 10 9 10 Female Mean 8.53 10 8.27 9.18 Minimum 0 0 0 0 Maximum 18 18 17 18 Table D.4: School Attendance Sex of household members School Attendee Count 968 Attending %within district 85.0% school Male %of Total 85.0% Count 171 Not attending %within district 15.0% school % of Total 15.0% Count 931 Attending %within district 81.8% school %of Total 81.8% Female Count 207 Not attending %within district 18.2% school %of Total 18.2% Count 1925 Attending %within district 83.3% school %of Total 83.3% Total Count 385 Not attending %within district 16.7% school %of Total 16.7% 91 MIGRATION Table D.5: Households with migrants in the last five years Migrants Other than head of HH Total No. of At least HHs Previous Two or One Two or one with at head of more female more male least one HH males member females member member Count 83 109 35 14 2 214 Ghafurov % within District 19.5% 25.6% 8.2% 3.3% .5% 50.35 % of Total 6.5% 8.5% 2.8% 1.1% .2% 16.78 Count 100 160 56 44 5 288 District Konibodom % within District 23.5% 37.6% 13.2% 10.4% 1.1% 67.76 % of Total 7.8% 12.5% 4.4% 3.5% .4% 23 Count 83 104 123 2 1 291 Yovon % within District 19.5% 24.5% 21.7% .5% .2% 68.47 % of Total 6.5% 8.2% 9.7% .2% .1% 22.82 Count 266 373 214 60 8 793 Total % of Total 20.9% 29.3% 16.8% 4.7% .6% 62.20 Table D.6: Return of migrants Return of migrants Total No. of HHs with at least one member Two or having more returned 1 migrant migrants Count 80 25 105 Ghafurov % within District 18.8% 5.9% 24.7% % of Total 6.3% 2.0% 8.2% Count 108 39 147 District Konibodom % within District 25.4% 9.2% 34.6% % of Total 8.5% 3.1% 11.5% Count 69 35 104 Yovon % within District 16.2% 8.2% 24.5% % of Total 5.4% 2.7% 8.2% Count 257 99 356 Total % of Total 20.2% 7.8% 27.9% 92 Table D.7: Purpose of Migration Percent for first reason cited Counts for first Counts for second Counts for third Purpose among HHs with reason reason reason actual migrant and with response No migrant 482 - - - No response 38 - - - Education 2 .3 3 2 Work 745 98.7 3 0 Marriage 3 .4 10 5 Military Service 0 0 2 0 Other 5 .7 24 7 Total 1275 - - - Table D.8: Total value of remittance the household has received in the past year District Mean N Median Maximum Ghafurov 3196.97 156 2500.00 30000 Konibodom 3712.63 216 3000.00 71500 Yovon 4351.79 251 3500.00 27600 Total 3841.02 623 3400.00 71500 Table D.9: Impact of Migration Percent for first main Counts for Counts for impact cited second Impact first main among HHs main impact with actual impact migrant with response No migrant 482 - - No response 30 - - Not much impact can been seen 28 3.7 0 Migrants send money and that is good 588 77.1 0 Migrants send very little money, so there is no positive impact in 123 16.1 21 terms of extra money Migrants' absence from the family means that women have to 20 2.6 419 take care of all household chores which is difficult Migrants' absence from the family means that women have to take care of all household chores. While this is difficult, it has 4 .5 22 also empowered women to some extent Total 1275 - - 93 EMPLOYMENT Table D.10: First, second (part-time), third, and overall important employment District Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon time) time) time) Third Third Third Second Second Second Overall Overall Overall (or par- (or par- (or par- activity* activity* activity* Full time Full time Full time important important important employment employment employment employment employment employment employment employment employment Self-employed in non-farm private business outside 7.2% .2% .3% 4.0% 11.8% .2% .1% 6.7% 11.1% .6% .0% 6.6% home or owner of such private business Farming and related activities on any type of collective farm including Khojagii Dihqonii 9.1% 1.2% .3% 5.4% 6.6% .4% 0 3.8% 4.8% 1.3% 0 3.2% Kollektivi Farming, etc. on Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi/Infirodi .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .1% .0% .0% 1.9% 2.7% .1% 1.9% Farming, etc. on own presidential land/household plot 1.4% 47.4% .3% 15.3% 1.7% 45.1% .4% 13.8% .1% 39.3% .4% 10.9% Farming, etc. some other type of land .1% .3% .1% .2% .2% .0% .0% .1% .5% 1.5% .0% .8% Farming, etc. on land you do not own/ do not have .4% .1% .0% .2% .0% .0% .0% .0% .4% 1.5% .0% .8% shares of Office or management employee on farm 3.9% .5% .0% 2.3% 4.1% 1.1% .0% 2.6% 3.0% .9% .0% 2.0% Teacher or medical personnel .7% .1% .0% .4% .3% .2% .0% .2% .1% .0% .0% .1% Employee in industry/factory or workshop 1.4% .1% .1% .8% 1.0% .2% .0% .6% .9% .1% .0% .5% Employee in any type of services including transport 2.7% .1% .3% 1.5% 1.7% .2% .0% 1.0% 1.1% .1% .0% .6% Housewife or other homemaker without pay 9.5% .1% .1% 5.2% 10.2% .1% .0% 5.8% 12.2% .3% .0% 7.2% Private paid domestic work .9% .0% .3% .5% .3% .1% .3% .2% .0% .2% .1% .1% Handicraft production at home .3% .1% .0% .2% .0% .2% .0% .1% .1% .2% .0% .1% Pensioner 8.2% .0% .0% 5.1% 10.3% .1% .0% 5.6% 6.1% .5% .0% 3.9% Has no job but is looking for a job actively now 9.2% .4% .0% 5.1% 9.9% .1% .0% 2.6% 6.6% .2% .0% 3.9% Has no job and is not looking for another job actively 1.4% .1% .0% .8% .8% .0% .0% .5% 3.6% .1% .0% 2.1% Pupil/student 23.9% 16.9% 33.7% 23.2% 22.9% 18.9% 35.6% 23.7% 27.1% 9.1% 17.2% 20.7% Doing military service but staying at home .3% .0% .0% .1% .6% .0% .0% .3% .2% .0% .0% .1% Cannot work due to old age or a handicap 1.4% .3% .0% .8% 1.2% .0% .0% .7% .7% .0% .0% .4% Too young to work 18.1% 32.1% 64.3% 29.4% 16.6% 33.3% 63.5% 28.4% 19.5% 41.5% 80.6% 34.2% Total Count 2571 1447 722 4740 2584 1299 683 4566 3334 1573 810 5717 *Percentages are calculated taking all responses to first, second, third major activities together as an overall measure of the importance of an activity 94 Table D.11: First occupation by sex across the three districts Male % Female % Total % Self-employed in non-farm business outside home 780 42.60 73 3.71 853 22.47 Farming and related activities for a wage 205 11.20 376 19.13 581 15.30 Farming, etc. on Khojagii Dihqonii Oilagi/Infirodi or other type of farm (not including household plot or presidential 28 1.53 37 1.88 65 1.71 land) Farming, etc. on own presidential land/household plot 7 0.38 75 3.81 82 2.16 Teacher or public employee 24 1.31 5 0.25 29 0.76 Employee in trade enterprise, industry/factory, or 319 17.42 223 11.34 542 14.27 transport/services Housewife or other homemaker without pay 21 1.15 885 45.02 906 23.86 Private paid domestic work 20 1.09 10 0.51 30 0.79 Handicraft production at home 5 0.27 6 0.31 11 0.29 Unemployed (has no job but is looking for a job actively 422 23.05 276 14.04 698 18.38 now) Total 1831 100.00 1966 100.00 3797 100.00 95 INCOME AND BORROWINING Table D.12: Borrowing in 2006 Number of times HH borrowed money in last 12 months 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 10 Tot No access or response al Count 17 388 5 4 2 0 0 0 0 416 Ghafurov %within district 4.1% 93.3% 1.2% 1.0% .5% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 3 407 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 416 Konibodom %within district .7% 97.8% 1.2% .0% .0% .2% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 0 395 24 3 0 0 0 0 0 422 From banks Yovon %within district .0% 93.6% 5.7% .7% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 20 1190 34 7 2 1 0 0 0 1254 Total %within district 1.6% 94.9% 2.7% .6% .2% .1% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 19 386 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 410 Ghafurov %within district 4.6% 94.1% .5% .7% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 18 396 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 414 Konibodom %within district 4.3% 95.7% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% BG, or credit Count 0 411 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 419 Yovon %within district .0% 98.1% 1.4% .5% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% From CU, formal cooperative/NGO Count 37 1193 8 5 0 0 0 0 0 1243 Total %within district 3.0% 96.0% .6% .4% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 18 390 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 411 Ghafurov %within district 4.4% 94.9% .0% .7% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 18 396 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 414 Konibodom %within district 4.3% 95.7% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 0 410 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 420 Yovon %within district .0% 97.6% 1.9% .5% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% From informal borrowers groups Count 36 1196 8 5 0 0 0 0 0 1245 Total %within district 2.9% 96.1% .6% .4% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 4 331 35 30 10 2 1 0 1 414 Ghafurov %within district 1.0% 80.0% 8.5% 7.2% 2.4% .5% .2% .0% .2% 100.0% Count 2 316 60 24 6 3 3 0 1 415 relatives Konibodom %within district .5% 76.1% 14.5% 5.8% 1.4% .7% .7% .0% .2% 100.0% Count 0 349 36 16 8 4 2 1 3 419 neighbors, or From friends, Yovon %within district .0% 83.3% 8.6% 3.8% 1.9% 1.0% .5% .2% .7% 100.0% Count 6 996 131 70 24 9 6 1 5 1248 Total %within district .5% 79.8% 10.5% 5.6% 1.9% .7% .5% .1% .4% 100.0% Count 4 386 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 401 Ghafurov %within district 1.0% 96.3% 1.5% 1.0% .2% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 2 391 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 401 lenders Konibodom %within district .5% 97.5% 1.2% .5% .2% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% From Money Count 0 414 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 417 Yovon %within district .0% 99.3% .2% .2% .2% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% Count 6 1191 12 7 3 0 0 0 0 1219 Total %within district .5% 97.7% 1.0% .6% .2% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 96 Table D.13: Main reason for borrowing/obtaining lone(s) Agricult. Farm Acquiring Non-farm Consumption Home Consumer Medical and Animals Other Total inputs equipment land business repair durables emergency Ghafurov .0% 12.5% 25.0% .0% 25.0% .0% .0% .0% 37.5% .0% 100.0% % within District Konibodom .0% .0% 20.0% .0% .0% 20.0% .0% .0% 60.0% .0% 100.0% % within District Yovon 7.7% 7.7% 23.1% .0% 11.5% 15.4% 3.8% 3.8% 26.9% .0% 100.0% % within District 2 3 9 0 5 5 1 1 13 0 39 Count Total 5.1% 7.7% 23.1% .0% 12.8% 12.8% 2.6% 2.6% 33.3% .0% 100.0% From banks % within District Ghafurov .0% .0% .0% 33.3% .0% 33.3% .0% .0% 33.3% .0% 100.0% % within District Konibodom .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% % within District Yovon 14.3% 14.3% 28.6% .0% .0% 14.3% .0% .0% 28.6% .0% 100.0% % within District 1 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 3 0 10 Count Total 10.0% 10.0% 20.0% 10.0% .0% 20.0% .0% .0% 30.0% .0% 100.0% % within District From CU, formal BG, or Ghafurov .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% .0% 100.0% % within District Yovon 12.5% .0% .0% .0% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% .0% 50.0% .0% 100.0% % within District 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 9 18 Count Total 11.1% .0% .0% .0% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% .0% 55.6% 100.0% 100.0% % within District From informal borrowers groups credit cooperative/NGO Ghafurov 1.3% .0% 1.3% .0% .0% 18.2% 13.0% 7.8% 58.4% .0% 100.0% % within District Konibodom .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 27.7% 4.3% 9.6% 58.5% .0% 100.0% % within District Yovon .0% 1.4% .0% .0% 1.4% 38.6% 7.1% 11.4% 40.0% .0% 100.0% % within District 1 1 1 0 1 67 19 23 128 0 241 Count Total .4% .4% .4% .0% .4% 27.8% 7.9% 9.5% 53.1% .0% 100.0% % within District From friends, relatives Ghafurov .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 10.0% .0% 10.0% 70.0% 10.0% 100.0% % within District Konibodom .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 27.3% .0% 9.1% 63.6% .0% 100.0% % within District Yovon .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% .0% 50.0% .0% 100.0% % within District 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 2 15 1 23 Count Total % within District .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 21.7% .0% 8.7% 65.2% 4.3% 100.0% From Money lenders neighbors, or 97 Table D.14: Mean and median household income by district District N Mean Median Ghafurov 417 4536.6327 3850.0000 Konibodom 416 4613.2104 3971.0000 Yovon 415 6421.4130 5588.0000 Total 1248 5188.9085 4550.0000 Table D.15: Annual income quintiles by district Quintiles Second Second Highest highest Middle lowest Lowest Total Ghafurov Count 58 78 82 85 114 417 % within District 13.9% 18.7% 19.7% 20.4% 27.3% 100.0% Konibodom Count 54 83 91 97 91 416 % within District 13.0% 20.0% 21.9% 23.3% 21.9% 100.0% Yovon Count 137 92 74 68 44 415 % within District 33.0% 22.2% 17.8% 16.4% 10.6% 100.0% Total Count 249 253 247 250 249 1248 % within District 20.0% 20.3% 19.8% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% Table D.16: Change of family income in the last three years Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Increased Count 69 87 112 268 % within District 17.2% 21.2% 27.1% 21.9% No change Count 98 79 89 266 % within District 24.4% 19.3% 21.5% 21.7% Decreased Count 234 244 213 691 % within District 58.4% 59.5% 51.4% 56.4% Total Count 401 410 414 1225 % within District 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98 Table D.17: Own estimate of family's financial status Konibodom Ghafurov Yovon Total Count 1 0 0 1 Money is enough, no problem % within District .2% .0% .0% .1% Money is enough to make large Count 4 1 1 6 purchases (furniture, household appliances), but purchase of a car not % within District 1.0% .2% .2% .5% possible Money is enough to satisfy all our Count 22 33 26 81 requirements for clothes and food, but not larger purchases % within District 5.3% 7.9% 6.2% 6.5% Money suffices only for minimal Count 178 178 157 513 requirements of clothes and food % within District 43.1% 42.7% 37.3% 41.0% Money does not suffice even on Count 208 205 237 650 purchases of food % within District 50.4% 49.2% 56.3% 52.0% Count 413 417 421 1251 Total % within District 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99 LAND Table D.18: Size of house garden and presidential land Area of house garden in Sotiq Area of presidential land in Sotiq Mean 4.9 5.9 N 420 103 Ghafurov Maximum 50 18 Minimum 0.1 1 Median 4 5 Mean 5.1 8.0 N 414 240 Konibodom Maximum 30 15 Minimum 0.02 3 Median 4 7 Mean 9.8 11.3 N 416 170 Yovon Maximum 50 60 Minimum 0.5 1 Median 8 7 Mean 6.6 8.7 N 1250 513 Total Maximum 50 60 Minimum 0.02 1 Median 5 7 Table D.19: Percentage of land cultivated Percent of presidential land Percent of house cultuvated garden cultivated Mean 80.92 74.04 Ghafurov N 103 419 Percentage cultivating 100% 58.71 74.76 Mean 69.04 80.48 Konibodom N 240 414 Percentage cultivating 100% 67.63 60.00 Mean 77.41 87.99 Yovon N 170 416 Percentage cultivating 100% 80.77 74.12 Mean 74.20 80.82 Total N 513 1249 Percentage cultivating 100% 69.02 67.64 100 Table D.20: Reason for not cultivating all house garden Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total First Second First Second First Second First Second reason reason reason reason reason reason reason reason Count 247 - 280 - 324 - 851 - All of the land is cultivated % within District 58.81 - 67.63 - 77.88 - 68.08 - Count 8 - 27 - 6 - 41 - No response % within District 1.90 - 6.52 - 1.44 - 3.28 - Count 103 1 73 0 22 0 198 1 Part of it is used as fallow % within District 24.52 1.33 17.63 0.00 5.29 0.00 15.84 0.59 Count 15 0 2 2 15 9 32 11 Low quality of land % within District 3.57 0.00 0.48 3.03 3.61 32.14 2.56 6.51 Count 11 72 24 47 45 17 80 136 Lack of access to water % within District 2.62 96.00 5.80 71.21 10.82 60.71 6.40 80.47 Count 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 No money to buy inputs % within District 0.00 1.33 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.16 0.59 Count 4 1 3 3 1 1 8 5 No one to work on land % within District 0.95 1.33 0.72 4.55 0.24 3.57 0.64 2.96 Count 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 No market for produce % within District 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.18 Count 0 0 3 11 0 0 3 11 High water table % within District 0.00 0.00 0.72 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.24 6.51 Count 32 0 1 1 2 1 35 2 Other % within District 7.62 0.00 0.24 1.52 0.48 3.57 2.80 1.18 Total Count 420 75 414 66 416 28 1250 169 101 Table D.21: Reason for not cultivating all presidential land Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total First Second First Second First Second First Second reason reason reason reason reason reason reason reason Count 77 - 144 - 126 - 347 - All of the land is cultivated % within District 74.76 - 60.00 - 74.12 - 67.64 - Count 12 - 35 - 14 - 61 - No response % within District 11.65 - 14.58 - 8.24 - 11.89 - Count 0 0 4 0 1 0 5 0 Part of it is used as fallow % within District 0.00 0 1.67 0 0.59 0 0.97 0 Count 1 0 7 12 5 5 13 17 Low quality of land % within District 0.97 0.00 2.92 32.43 2.94 38.46 2.53 32.69 Count 9 0 33 1 9 2 51 3 Lack of access to water % within District 8.74 0.00 13.75 2.70 5.29 15.38 9.94 5.77 Count 0 0 1 2 4 1 5 3 No money to buy inputs % within District 0.00 0.00 0.42 5.41 2.35 7.69 0.97 5.77 Count 2 0 7 3 5 5 14 8 No one to work on land % within District 1.94 0.00 2.92 8.11 2.94 38.46 2.73 15.38 Count 1 2 2 17 2 0 5 19 No market for produce % within District 0.97 100.00 0.83 45.95 1.18 0.00 0.97 36.54 Count 0 0 4 2 2 0 6 2 High water table % within District 0.00 0.00 1.67 5.41 1.18 0.00 1.17 3.85 Count 1 0 3 0 2 0 6 0 Other % within District 0.97 0.00 1.25 0.00 1.18 0.00 1.17 0.00 Total Count 103 2 240 37 170 13 513 52 102 Table D.22: Land documentation for house garden is under this person's name Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 3 4 0 7 No documentation % within District .7% 1.0% .0% .6% Count 402 401 414 1217 Head of HH % within District 95.7% 96.9% 99.5% 97.4% Count 4 3 0 7 Spouse % within District 1.0% .7% .0% .6% Count 2 0 1 3 Son/daughter % within District .5% .0% .2% .2% Categories Count 1 0 0 1 Sister/Brother % within District .2% .0% .0% .1% Son in law/daughter in Count 0 0 1 1 law % within District .0% .0% .2% .1% Mother in law / Father in Count 6 4 0 10 law % within District 1.4% 1.0% .0% .8% Count 2 1 0 3 Grandfather/Grandmother % within District .5% .2% .0% .2% Count 0 1 0 1 Other % within District .0% .2% .0% .1% Total Count 420 414 416 1250 Table D.23: Documentation for presidential land is under this person's name Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 4 9 9 22 No documentation % within District 3.9% 3.8% 5.3% 4.3% Count 84 187 152 423 Head of HH % within District 81.6% 77.9% 89.4% 82.5% Count 1 21 4 26 Spouse % within District 1.0% 8.8% 2.4% 5.1% Count 11 18 2 31 Son/daughter Categories % within District 10.7% 7.5% 1.2% 6.0% Count 1 0 0 1 Sister / brother % within District 1.0% .0% .0% .2% Son in law/daughter in Count 1 5 0 6 law % within District 1.0% 2.1% .0% 1.2% Count 1 0 2 3 Mother / father % within District 1.0% .0% 1.2% .6% Mother in law / Father in Count 0 0 1 1 law Count .0% .0% .6% .2% Total Count 103 240 170 513 103 Table D.24: Sex of document holder for house garden Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 3 4 0 7 Have no documentation % within District .7% 1.0% .0% .6% Count 3 3 0 6 Categories No response % within District .7% .7% .0% .5% Count 325 345 388 1058 M % within District 77.4% 83.3% 93.3% 84.6% Count 89 62 28 179 F % within District 21.2% 15.0% 6.7% 14.3% Total Count 420 414 416 1250 Table D.25: Sex of document holder for presidential land Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 4 9 8 21 Have no documentation % within District 3.9% 3.8% 4.7% 4.1% Count 1 1 2 4 Categories No response % within District 1.0% .4% 1.2% .8% Count 84 180 140 404 M % within District 81.6% 75.0% 82.4% 78.8% Count 14 50 20 84 F % within District 13.6% 20.8% 11.8% 16.4% Total Count 103 240 170 513 Table D.26: Experienced land restructuring of the Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large collective farm Konibodom Ghafurov Yovon Total Count 252 281 277 810 Not applicable or no response % within District 59.3% 66.1% 65.2% 63.5% Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large collective farm Count 59 10 8 77 system renamed and some household members % within District work on renamed farm 13.9% 2.4% 1.9% 6.0% The (earlier renamed) JSC, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or Count 113 131 106 350 large collective farm has been broken down into % within District Khojagii Dihqonii Kollektivi on which some of 26.6% 30.8% 24.9% 27.5% our family members work The JSC, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or large collective Count 1 3 26 30 farm has been broken down and we have land on % within District which the extended family works (Khojagii .2% .7% 6.1% 2.4% dihqonii oilagi) Yes, the JSC, Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, or collective Count 0 0 8 8 farm has been broken down and our family has % within District received its own land (Khojagii dihqonii .0% .0% 1.9% .6% infirodi) Total Count 425 425 425 1275 104 Table D.27: Possession of individual or multi-family farm Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 1 2 3 6 No response % within District 100.0% 50.0% 2.3% 8.3% Count 0 2 23 25 Multi-family % within District .0% 50.0% 53.5% 52.1% Count 0 0 19 19 Individual % within District .0% .0% 44.2% 39.6% Total Count 1 4 45 50 Table D.28: Total area of individual or multi family farm in sotiq District N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Konibodom 2 150.00 150.00 100.00 200.00 Yovon 4 519.77 300.00 5.00 6000.00 Total 47 504.04 200.00 5.00 6000.00 Table D.29: Type of document for individual or multi family farm Category Number Count 5 No response % within District 10.4% Count 4 None % within District 8.3% Count 28 Single certificate/shahodatnoma % within District 58.3% Count 11 A joint certificate/Shahodatnoma % within District 22.9% Total Count 48 Table D.30: Sex of person on document for individual/multi-family land Category Number Count 4 Not applicable % within District 8.3% Count 5 No response % within District 10.4% Count 30 M % within District 62.5% Count 3 F % within District 6.3% Count 6 Male and female % within District 12.5% Total Count 48 105 Table D.31: Reason why people in your area did not get shares in big farm Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Combin Combin Combin Combin ed ed ed ed reasons reasons reasons reasons in in in in First percent First percent First percent First percent reason * reason * reason * reason * Count 325 331 335 989 There is no such person that we know of - - - - % within District 76.00 77.88 78.35 77.41 Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz, JSC, or large collective farm system Count 55 19 1 75 37.41 12.26 0.67 16.59 was just renamed and no one received any shares % within District 12.94 4.47 0.24 5.88 Large farm was renamed or restructured (broken down) Count 26 43 31 100 21.77 30.32 22.15 24.78 and they did not give some farmers shares or any land % within District 6.12 10.12 7.29 7.84 Getting land or land share cost money and some people Count 2 2 3 7 2.72 1.94 2.01 2.43 could not afford it % within District 0.47 0.47 0.71 0.55 Some farmers were married to someone from Count 4 1 11 16 2.72 1.29 7.38 3.76 somewhere else and they got shares or land elsewhere % within District 0.94 0.24 2.59 1.25 Some farmers were married to someone from Count 3 0 8 11 somewhere else and they did not get shares either here 2.04 1.29 5.37 2.88 or elsewhere % within District 0.71 0.00 1.88 0.86 Some farmers had lost their spouses and did not get Count 1 4 5 10 2.04 5.81 6.04 4.65 shares or land % within District 0.24 0.94 1.18 0.78 Some farmers whose spouses were absent (migrated) Count 1 3 3 7 0.68 1.94 5.37 2.65 did not get shares or land % within District 0.24 0.71 0.71 0.55 Some farmers who had become handicapped did not Count 4 8 5 17 4.08 7.74 6.04 5.75 get shares or land % within District 0.94 1.88 1.18 1.33 Due to other reasons some farmers did not get land or Count 4 10 5 19 23.13 29.68 32.21 28.32 shares % within District 0.94 2.35 1.18 1.49 Count 0 4 18 22 Only influential people could get land or land share 3.40 7.74 12.75 8.19 % within District 0.00 0.94 4.24 1.73 Total Count 425 - 425 - 425 - 1275 - *Percentages are calculated taking all responses to first, second, third and fourth response together as an overall measure of the importance of a category. 106 Table D.32: Reason why people in your area did not get house garden Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Combin Combin Combin Combin ed ed ed ed reasons reasons reasons reasons in in in in First percent First percent First percent First percent reason * reason * reason * reason * Count 327 325 273 925 There is no such person that we know of - - - - % within District 76.94 76.47 64.24 72.55 Some farmers were married to someone from Count 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.65 0.28 somewhere else and they got shares or land elsewhere % within District 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.08 Some farmers had lost their spouses and did not get Count 0 0 2 2 0 0 1.31 0.56 shares or land % within District 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.16 Some farmers who had become handicapped did not Count 0 1 0.97 0 1 0 0 0.28 get shares or land % within District 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.08 Due to other reasons some farmers did not get land or Count 17 16.83 10 7 34 9.71 4.58 9.52 shares % within District 4.00 2.35 1.65 2.67 There was not enough Nazdi howli land available for Count 79 89 89.32 142 310 everyone 80.20 93.46 88.52 % within District 18.59 20.94 33.41 24.31 Count 2 2.97 0 0 2 Only influential people could get land or land share 0 0 0.84 % within District 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.16 Total Count 425 - 425 - 425 - 1275 - *Percentages are calculated taking all responses to first, second, third and fourth response together as an overall measure of the importance of a category. 107 Table D.33: Reason why people in your area did not get presidential land Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Combin Combin Combin Combin ed ed ed ed reasons reasons reasons reasons in in in in First percent First percent First percent First percent reason * reason * reason * reason * Count 280 294 221 795 There is no such person that we know of - - - - % within District 65.88 69.18 52.00 62.35 Getting land or land share cost money and some people Count 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.49 0.21 could not afford it % within District 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.08 Some farmers were married to someone from Count 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.49 0.21 somewhere else and got land elsewhere % within District 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.08 Some farmers whose spouses were absent (migrated) Count 3 1 3 7 2.04 0.76 1.47 1.45 did not get land % within District 0.71 0.24 0.71 0.55 Some farmers who had become handicapped did not Count 0 0 2 2 0 0 0.98 0.41 get land % within District 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.16 Count 34 46 52 132 Due to other reasons some farmers did not get land 23.13 35.11 25.49 27.39 % within District 8.00 10.82 12.24 10.35 There was not enough residential land available for Count 107 84 145 336 72.79 64.12 71.08 69.71 everyone % within District 25.18 19.76 34.12 26.35 Count 1 0 0 1 Only influential people could get land or land share 2.04 0 0 0.62 % within District 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.08 Total Count 425 - 425 - 425 - 1275 - *Percentages are calculated taking all responses to first, second, third and fourth response together as an overall measure of the importance of a category. 108 AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES Table D.34: Household's agricultural activities Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon First Second * Overall ** First Second * Overall ** First Second * Overall ** Not involved in Count 9 - 13 - 6 - - - - agricultural activities % within District 2.1 - 3.1 - 1.4 - Count 70 4 52 3 49 0 Cotton 8.11 5.65 4.31 % within District 16.5 1.11 12.2 0.82 11.5 0 Count 7 11 42 18 108 41 Grain 1.96 7.23 14.30 % within District 1.6 3.06 9.9 4.95 25.4 10.59 Count 194 137 196 128 108 97 Fruits 32.44 34.48 24.94 % within District 45.6 38.06 46.1 35.16 25.4 25.06 Count 78 152 70 148 64 151 Vegetables 26.02 24.93 22.18 % within District 18.4 42.22 16.5 40.66 15.1 39.02 Count 59 40 46 46 87 90 Animal husbandry 19.25 18.35 28.35 % within District 13.9 11.11 10.8 12.64 20.5 23.26 Count 1 4 1 4 1 5 Poultry 6.42 2.69 4.71 % within District .2 1.11 .2 1.10 .2 1.29 Count 1 4 0 2 0 1 Sericulture 2.58 1.30 0.73 % within District .2 1.11 .0 0.55 .0 0.26 Fishing and Count 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.19 0 aquaculture % within District 0 0 0 0 0 0 Count 6 8 5 15 2 2 Other 3.21 5.19 0.49 % within District 1.4 2.22 1.2 4.12 .5 0.52 Total Count 425 360 - 425 364 - 425 387 - Notes: *Numbers and percentages are given for only those households who provided answers to inquiries about their second important agricultural activities. **Percentages are calculated taking all responses to first, second, third, and forth major agricultural activities together as an overall measure of the importance of a category. 109 Table D.35: Main difficulties in increasing agricultural production Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Taking Taking Taking Taking all all all all First responses First responses First responses First responses response * response * response * response * Not applicable: We do not have Count 21 20 15 56 or cultivate such land commer % within District 4.94 - 4.71 - 3.53 - 4.39 - Not difficult, we have been Count 5 3 2 10 increasing our produce or we can % within District 1.18 - 0.71 - 0.47 - 0.78 - Limited or lack of access to Count 236 268 353 857 water % within District 55.52 33.7 63.06 33.8 83.06 45.0 67.22 37.6 No access to market outside the Count 7 4 0 11 village and/or no agricultur % within District 1.65 1.1 0.94 1.3 0.00 0.1 0.86 0.8 Count 15 27 8 50 Our quality of soil is low % within District 3.532 9.3 6.35 18.0 1.88 12.0 3.92 13.3 Water table has risen and we Count 14 34 9 57 cannot cultivate land or use it % within District 3.298 5.5 8.00 8.2 2.12 2.7 4.47 5.5 Limited access to or high cost of Count 89 45 24 158 inputs % within District 20.94 25.8 10.59 21.7 5.65 25.4 12.39 24.2 Limited access to or high cost of Count 4 3 0 7 machinery % within District 0.94 5.9 0.71 3.5 0.00 1.8 0.55 3.6 Limited access to or high cost of Count 2 1 0 3 credit % within District 0.478 3.7 0.24 4.4 0.00 0.1 0.24 2.7 Out produce is of low quality Count 8 8 0 16 and not marketable % within District 1.88 6.7 1.88 5.2 0.00 0.8 1.25 4.2 Count 24 12 14 50 Other % within District 5.65 8.5 2.82 3.9 3.29 12.1 3.92 8.1 Total Count 425 733 425 862 425 827 1275 2422 *Percentages are calculated taking first, second, third, and fourth responses together. The percentages do not include not applicable as well those stating that there is no difficulty in increasing agricultural product. 110 Table D.36: Access to machinery Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total First Taking all First Taking all First Taking all First Taking all response responses* response responses* response responses* response responses* Count 318 251 229 798 Not applicable - - - - % within District 74.8% 59.1% 53.9% 62.6% We use no or very Count 3 3 43 49 little machinery - - - - (tractors, etc.) % within District .7% .7% 10.1% 3.8% We use our own Count 2 0 0 2 2.9 0 0 0.7 machines % within District .5% .0% .0% .2% We borrow machines Count 1 0 12 13 from friends and 5.8 1.2 7.8 4.7 neighbors % within District .2% .0% 2.8% 1.0% The large farm lets me Count 7 2 1 10 use their machines for 7.7 1.2 1.3 2.8 free % within District 1.6% .5% .2% .8% We rent the machines Count 94 169 140 403 from the large farm, 92.3 99.4 91.5 94.9 leasing companies % within District 22.1% 39.8% 32.9% 31.6% Total Count 425 104 425 172 425 153 1275 429 *Percentages are calculated taking first, second, third, and fourth responses together. The percentages do not include not applicable responses as well as those stating that there is no difficulty in increasing agricultural product. 111 Table D.37: Agricultural activities on house garden District Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon First First First agricultural Overall* agricultural Overall* agricultural Overall* activity activity activity Count 19 23 15 Not much 2.06 2.67 1.77 % within District 4.52 5.56 3.61 Count 14 18 0 Cotton 1.84 2.21 0.24 % within District 3.33 4.35 0.00 Count 3 13 79 Grain 0.54 2.67 14.17 % within District 0.71 3.14 18.99 Count 206 214 126 Fruits 39.26 41.16 36.01 % within District 49.05 51.69 30.29 Count 126 93 94 Vegetables 33.95 30.00 32.11 % within District 30.00 22.46 22.60 Count 49 49 99 Animal husbandry 14.10 11.28 12.87 % within District 11.67 11.84 23.80 Count 0 0 1 Poultry 1.84 0.47 0.47 % within District 0.00 0.00 0.24 Count 0 0 1 Sericulture 0.43 0.12 0.12 % within District 0.00 0.00 0.24 Count 1 0 0 Dry farming 0.65 0.35 0.00 % within District 0.24 0.00 0.00 Count 2 4 1 Other 5.31 9.07 2.24 % within District 0.48 0.97 0.24 Total Count 420 - 414 - 416 - *Percentages are calculated taking all responses to first, second, and third agricultural activities together as an overall measure of the importance of an activity. 112 Table D.38: Agricultural activity on presidential land District Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Overall, Overall, Overall, First First First agricultural agricultural agricultural agricultural agricultural agricultural activity in activity in activity in activity activity activity percent* percent* percent* Count 16 64 36 Not much 42.55 20.25 20.34 % within District 15.53 26.67 21.18 Count 0 2 0 Cotton 1.06 0.63 0.00 % within District 0.00 0.83 0.00 Count 30 152 127 Grain 16.49 48.42 71.75 % within District 29.13 63.33 74.71 Count 8 2 1 Fruits 4.79 0.63 0.56 % within District 7.77 0.83 0.59 Count 17 1 2 Vegetables 11.70 0.63 1.69 % within District 16.50 0.42 1.18 Count 0 0 1 Animal husbandry 0.53 0.32 0.56 % within District 0.00 0.00 0.59 Count 4 0 0 Dry farming 2.66 0.32 0.00 % within District 3.88 0.00 0.00 Count 28 19 3 Other 20.21 28.80 5.08 % within District 27.18 7.92 1.76 Total Count 103 - 240 - 170 - *Percentages are calculated taking all responses to first, second, and third agricultural activities together as an overall measure of the importance of a category. 113 Table D.39: Livestock assets Sheep and Dairy cows Other cattle goats Poultry Other animals Mean 1.12 1.43 2.51 5.62 1.05 Ghafurov N 110 143 84 86 40 Median 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 1.00 Mean 1.07 1.27 2.58 5.63 1.00 Koni- N 171 104 64 48 37 bodom Median 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 1.00 Mean 1.35 1.83 5.26 5.88 1.08 Yovon N 327 250 138 100 76 Median 1.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 1.00 Mean 1.23 1.60 3.85 5.73 1.05 Total N 608 497 286 234 153 Median 1.00 1.00 2.50 4.00 1.00 Household markets 12.07 7.54 9.42 5.41 74.23 produce (%) Table D.40: Division of labor on household plot/presidential land Both men and Mostly Mostly Men Women women men women Total % % % % % count a. Basic cotton worker 18.64 49.15 32.20 59 b. Basic gardener 44.57 12.94 42.29 0.10 0.10 1012 c. Taking care of livestock 3.12 13.52 83.09 0.26 769 (basic) d. Taking care of poultry 3.17 22.75 74.07 189 (basic) e. Taking care of sericulture 3.36 10.92 85.71 119 (basic) f. Other basic worker 5.92 7.96 85.92 0.20 980 g. General technician 37.70 8.20 54.10 61 h. Mirob 59.31 6.91 33.33 0.22 0.22 897 i. Tractor/machine operator 78.72 4.26 17.02 47 j. Animal technician 90.00 10.00 20 k. Sardar of Khajagi (basically 89.59 10.41 394 head of household) l. brigadier 100.00 33 m. Accoutant 71.70 25.27 3.02 364 n. Engineer 85.71 14.29 14 o. Other 33.33 66.67 3 114 Table D.41: Division of labor on Khojagii Dihqonii Kollektivi, JSC, Kolkhoz/sovkhoz, or other joint farms Both men and Mostly Mostly Men Women women men women Total a. Basic cotton worker 17.12 39.64 43.24 222 b. Basic gardener 18.18 31.82 45.45 4.55 22 c. Taking care of livestock 16.67 11.11 61.11 11.11 18 (basic) d. Taking care of poultry 87.50 12.50 8 (basic) e. Taking care of sericulture 0.98 5.88 93.14 102 (basic) f. Other basic worker 10.07 7.19 82.73 139 g. General technician 94.64 5.36 112 h. Mirob 98.53 0.74 0.74 136 i. Tractor/machine operator 98.33 1.67 120 j. Animal technician 100.00 100 k. Sardar of Khajagi 95.90 1.64 0.82 120 l. brigadier 97.52 0.83 1.65 121 m. Accoutant 90.76 1.68 7.56 119 n. Engineer 98.04 1.96 102 o. Other 95.83 4.17 24 GENDER Table D.42: Women's wages lower than that of males Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 13 7 27 47 No, they are the same % within District 10.0% 2.8% 12.6% 8.0% Yes, women's wages are Count 76 156 131 363 generally lower % within District 58.5% 63.2% 61.2% 61.4% Yes, but this is because Count 41 84 56 181 men and women do different things % within District 31.5% 34.0% 26.2% 30.6% Total Count 130 247 214 591 Table D.43: Do you think in the last ten years women have become poorer as compared to men in your village? Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Yes, they have, since men have more Count 44 55 64 163 options % within District 10.6% 13.6% 15.3% 13.2% Count 31 15 38 84 Yes, to some extent % within District 7.5% 3.7% 9.1% 6.8% No, women and men in the same Count 96 106 94 296 household are at the same level % within District 23.2% 26.2% 22.4% 23.9% Women have always done worse than Count 243 228 223 694 men financially % within District 58.7% 56.4% 53.2% 56.1% Total 414 404 419 1237 *Percentages and counts are based on responses 115 Table D.44: Do you think women are often coerced to do very low paying work (such as picking cotton) on the farms? Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 51 108 17 176 Yes, it is often the case % within District 12.5% 26.8% 4.1% 14.3% Count 165 129 102 396 Yes, but it is because they need to work % within District 40.4% 32.0% 24.5% 32.3% No, they are not coerced; their financial Count 183 165 285 633 situation dictates that % within District 44.9% 40.9% 68.5% 51.6% Count 9 1 12 22 No, never % within District 2.2% .2% 2.9% 1.8% Total 408 403 416 1227 *Percentages and counts are based on responses ACCESS TO WATER Table D.45: Access to or use of various sources of water for house garden and home use District Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 288 414 372 1074 Canal/stream/river water % within District 67.8% 97.4% 87.5% 84.2% Count 2 8 248 258 Rain collection % within District 0.5% 1.9% 58.4% 20.2% Count 227 139 127 493 Piped water % within District 53.41 32.71 29.88 38.67 Count 18 20 0 38 Individual well % within District 4.24 4.71 0 2.98 Count 27 31 20 78 Communal well % within District 6.35 7.29 4.71 6.12 Count 10 9 119 138 Spring water in village % within District 2.35 2.12 28 10.82 Count 1 1 1 3 Bottle/container % within District 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 116 Table D.46: Main uses of various sources of water for house garden and home use Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Over-all Over-all Over-all Over-all First use use First use use First use use First use use in % in %* in % in %* in % in %* in % in %* Cultivating house plot 73.78 46.37 73.66 44.58 40.07 29.68 63.89 40.40 Livestock breeding 0.35 3.14 0 6.46 1.05 4.32 0.41 4.88 Canal/stream/river 0 0 0 0 Poultry 0.50 0.22 0.14 0.27 0 0 0 0 Sericulture 0.17 0.33 0 0.18 Drinking 25.87 24.92 25.85 23.22 58.89 32.85 35.5 26.71 0 Household Needs 24.59 0 24.75 0 33.00 0.2 27.29 0 Other 0.33 0.49 0.44 0 0 0 0.27 Total count (frequency) 286 - 410 - 287 - 983 - Cultivating house plot 100 50.00 11.11 11.76 54.22 32.07 53.08 31.52 0 Livestock breeding 50.00 0 0 0.4 2.74 0.38 3.03 0 Rain collection Poultry 0 0 0 0.4 0.84 0.38 0.81 0 Sericulture 0 0 5.88 0 0 0 0.20 0 Drinking 0 88.89 47.06 44.58 33.12 45.77 33.33 Household Needs 0 0 0 35.29 0 31.01 0 30.91 0 Other 0 0 0 0.4 0.21 0.38 0.20 Total count (frequency) 2 - 9 - 249 - 260 - Cultivating house plot 21.97 11.70 0.79 0.78 2.42 5.92 11.18 7.55 Livestock breeding 0.45 5.47 0 4.30 0.81 8.36 0.42 5.96 Pipes (pluming) Poultry 0 0.38 0 0.78 0 0.35 0.42 0.47 Sericulture 0.9 0.57 0 0.39 0 0 0 0.37 Drinking 76.23 41.89 98.43 49.61 96.77 42.86 87.55 43.99 Household Needs 0.45 40.00 0.79 43.75 0 42.51 0.42 41.57 Other 0 0 0 0.39 0 0 0 0.09 Total count (frequency) 223 - 127 - 124 - 474 - Cultivating house plot 52.94 21.95 0 0 0 0 24.32 11.69 Communal well in Livestock breeding 0 4.88 0 0 00 0 2.60 village Drinking 47.06 36.59 100 55.56 0 0 75.68 45.45 Household Needs 0 36.59 0 44.44 0 0 0 40.26 Total count (frequency) 17 - 20 - 0 - 37 - Cultivating house plot 20.83 11.67 3.85 3.64 55 31.43 24.29 13.33 Individual well Livestock breeding 0 3.33 0 3.64 10 11.43 2.86 5.33 Drinking 79.17 43.33 76.92 38.18 35 28.57 65.71 38.00 Household Needs 0 41.67 19.23 54.55 0 28.57 7.14 43.33 Total count (frequency) 24 - 26 - 20 - 70 - 1Cultivating house plot 22.22 15.00 0 0 5.93 4.76 6.62 5.30 Spring in village Livestock breeding 0 5.00 0 0 0 3.03 0 3.03 Drinking 77.78 40.00 100 69.23 94.07 49.35 93.38 49.62 Household Needs 0 40.00 0 30.77 0 42.86 0 42.05 Total count (frequency) 9 - 9 - 118 - 136 - /container Drinking 100 50.00 0 0 100 50.00 100 50.00 Bottle Household Needs 0 50.00 0 0 0 50.00 0 50.00 Total count (frequency) 1 - 0 - 1 - 2 - *Percentages are calculated taking all responses to first, second, and third responses together as an overall measure of the importance of a category. 117 Table D.47: Frequency of access to water for house garden and home use Only some days Every during Every other Half of the It is not day day the week month regular Total Ghafurov % within District 4.55 4.20 60.49 12.94 17.83 100.00 Canal/stream Konibodom % within District 3.41 6.08 28.47 25.55 36.50 100.00 /river Yovon % within District 0.70 2.09 2.79 24.04 70.38 100.00 Count 29 43 298 211 403 984 Total % within District 2.95 4.37 30.28 21.44 40.96 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 100.00 collection Konibodom % within District 80.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 Rain Yovon % within District 3.06 0.00 0.00 6.55 90.39 100.00 Count 12 1 0 15 208 236 Total % within District 5.08 0.42 0.00 6.36 88.14 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 50.67 9.78 7.56 5.33 26.67 100.00 (pluming) Konibodom % within District 51.91 12.21 13.74 12.98 9.16 100.00 Pipes Yovon % within District 71.54 2.44 6.50 6.50 13.01 100.00 Count 270 41 43 37 88 479 Total % within District 56.37 8.56 8.98 7.72 18.37 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 35.29 23.53 35.29 0.00 5.88 100.00 al well in Commun Konibodom % within District 95.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 100.00 village Count 25 4 6 1 1 37 Total % within District 67.57 10.81 16.22 2.70 2.70 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 66.67 0.00 7.41 3.70 22.22 100.00 Individual Konibodom % within District 96.55 3.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 well Yovon % within District 68.42 0.00 5.26 5.26 21.05 100.00 Count 59 1 3 2 10 75 Total % within District 78.67 1.33 4.00 2.67 13.33 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 40.00 30.00 10.00 0.00 20.00 100.00 Konibodom Spring in % within District 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 village Yovon % within District 84.75 0.85 0.85 3.39 10.17 100.00 Count 113 4 2 4 14 137 Total % within District 82.48 2.92 1.46 2.92 10.22 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 /container Konibodom % within District 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 Bottle Yovon % within District 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 Count 3 0 0 0 0 3 Total % within District 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 118 Table D.48: Satisfaction with quality of water for house garden and home use High Average Low Total Ghafurov % within District 7.37 41.75 50.88 100.00 Canal/stream Konibodom % within District 0.00 33.33 66.67 100.00 /river Yovon % within District 1.05 15.38 83.57 100.00 Count 24 300 658 982 Total % within District 2.44 30.55 67.01 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 collection Konibodom % within District 66.67 16.67 16.67 100.00 Rain Yovon % within District 1.69 8.90 89.41 100.00 Count 8 24 212 244 Total % within District 3.28 9.84 86.89 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 24.44 57.33 18.22 100.00 (pluming) Konibodom % within District 16.67 62.12 21.21 100.00 Pipes Yovon % within District 51.22 38.21 10.57 100.00 Count 140 258 82 480 Total % within District 29.17 53.75 17.08 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 5.88 58.82 35.29 100.00 al well in Commun Konibodom % within District 50.00 30.00 20.00 100.00 village Count 11 16 10 37 Total % within District 29.73 43.24 27.03 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 11.11 77.78 11.11 100.00 Individual Konibodom % within District 17.24 55.17 27.59 100.00 well Yovon % within District 31.58 26.32 42.11 100.00 Count 14 42 19 75 Total % within District 18.67 56.00 25.33 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 10.00 50.00 40.00 100.00 Konibodom Spring in % within District 66.67 33.33 0.00 100.00 village Yovon % within District 54.24 25.42 20.34 100.00 Count 71 38 28 137 Total % within District 51.82 27.74 20.44 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 /container Konibodom % within District 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 Bottle Yovon % within District 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 Count 0 2 1 3 Total % within District 0.00 66.67 33.33 100.00 119 Table D.49: Satisfaction with amount and reliability of water used for house garden and home use To some Not extent Not very satisfied OK satisfied satisfied at all Total Ghafurov % within District 12.37 36.75 40.28 10.60 100.00 Canal/stream Konibodom % within District 2.68 17.56 61.22 18.54 100.00 /river Yovon % within District 0.00 3.87 28.17 67.96 100.00 Count 46 187 445 299 977 Total % within District 4.71 19.14 45.55 30.60 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 collection Konibodom % within District 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 Rain Yovon % within District 9.52 1.59 15.87 73.02 100.00 Count 11 1 11 46 69 Total % within District 15.94 1.45 15.94 66.67 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 26.67 39.56 29.78 4.00 100.00 (pluming) Konibodom % within District 26.15 43.85 22.31 7.69 100.00 Pipes Yovon % within District 39.34 44.26 9.84 6.56 100.00 Count 142 200 108 27 477 Total % within District 29.77 41.93 22.64 5.66 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 11.76 52.94 29.41 5.88 100.00 al well in Commun Konibodom % within District 75.00 20.00 5.00 0.00 100.00 village Count 17 13 6 1 37 Total % within District 45.95 35.14 16.22 2.70 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 19.23 61.54 19.23 0.00 100.00 Individual Konibodom % within District 65.52 27.59 6.90 0.00 100.00 well Yovon % within District 44.44 5.56 22.22 27.78 100.00 Count 32 25 11 5 73 Total % within District 43.84 34.25 15.07 6.85 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 20.00 30.00 50.00 0.00 100.00 Spring in Konibodom % within District 88.89 11.11 0.00 0.00 100.00 village Yovon % within District 57.84 21.57 7.84 12.75 100.00 Count 69 26 13 13 121 Total % within District 57.02 21.49 10.74 10.74 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 /container Bottle Konibodom % within District 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 Count 0.00 1 0.00 1 2 Total % within District 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 100.00 120 Table D.50: Who provides the water for house garden/home use association Kollektivi Mahallah Sovkhoz, Kolkhoz/ Vodkhoz JSC, etc. Khajagii Dihqoni Private Water Other users' Total % within Ghafurov 60.07 37.46 0.00 0.00 0.35 1.41 0.71 100.00 District Canal/stream/river % within Konibodom 24.88 71.95 0.24 0.49 0.24 0.00 2.20 100.00 District % within Yovon 2.14 79.36 11.03 3.20 2.14 0.00 2.14 100.00 District Count 278 624 32 11 8 4 17 974 Total % within 28.54 64.07 3.29 1.13 0.82 0.41 1.75 100.00 District % within Ghafurov 66.67 18.67 0.00 3.11 7.56 0.00 4.00 100.00 District Pipes (pluming) % within Konibodom 12.40 55.04 0.00 15.50 3.88 4.65 8.53 100.00 District % within Yovon 0.00 11.11 1.71 64.10 0.85 0.00 22.22 100.00 District Count 166 126 2 102 23 6 46 471 Total % within 35.24 26.75 0.42 21.66 4.88 1.27 9.77 100.00 District % within Communal well in Ghafurov 52.94 11.76 0.00 23.53 11.76 0.00 0.00 100.00 District % within village Konibodom 0.00 25.00 0.00 35.00 0.00 10.00 30.00 100.00 District Count 9 7 0.00 11 2 2 6 37 Total % within 24.32 18.92 0.00 29.73 5.41 5.41 16.22 100.00 District % within Ghafurov 30.00 10.00 0.00 10.00 30.00 0.00 20.00 100.00 District Spring in village % within Konibodom 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 District % within Yovon 2.17 4.35 0.00 52.17 0.00 0.00 41.30 100.00 District Count 4 3 0.00 27 3 0.00 21 58 Total % within 6.90 5.17 0.00 46.55 5.17 0.00 36.21 100.00 District 121 Table D.51: Reasons for use of this source of water for house garden/home use One of few sources of water available Cost is It is Easy to us low reliable access Other Total Ghafurov % within District 96.10 0.71 1.42 1.77 0.00 100.00 Canal/stream Konibodom % within District 97.57 0.49 0.24 1.46 0.24 100.00 /river Yovon % within District 98.61 0.70 0.35 0.00 0.35 100.00 Count 955 6 6 11 2 980 Total % within District 97.45 0.61 0.61 1.12 0.20 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 collection Konibodom % within District 80.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 100.00 Rain Yovon % within District 99.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 100.00 Count 218 0.00 1 0.00 3 222 Total % within District 98.20 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.35 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 84.30 0.45 4.04 11.21 0.00 100.00 (pluming) Konibodom % within District 65.87 4.76 0.00 26.19 3.17 100.00 Pipes Yovon % within District 97.54 0.82 0.82 0.00 0.82 100.00 Count 390 8 10 58 5 471 Total % within District 82.80 1.70 2.12 12.31 1.06 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 87.50 6.25 6.25 0.00 0.00 100.00 al well in Commun Konibodom % within District 60.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 100.00 village Count 26 1 5 4 0.00 36 Total % within District 72.22 2.78 13.89 11.11 0.00 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 92.31 3.85 0.00 3.85 0.00 100.00 Individual Konibodom % within District 51.72 0.00 0.00 48.28 0.00 100.00 well Yovon % within District 78.95 0.00 0.00 21.05 0.00 100.00 Count 54 1 0.00 19 0.00 74 Total % within District 72.97 1.35 0.00 25.68 0.00 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 77.78 0.00 0.00 22.22 0.00 100.00 Konibodom Spring in % within District 62.50 0.00 25.00 12.50 0.00 100.00 village Yovon % within District 91.23 2.63 4.39 0.88 0.88 100.00 Count 116 3 7 4 1 131 Total % within District 88.55 2.29 5.34 3.05 0.76 100.00 Ghafurov % within District 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 /container Konibodom % within District 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 Bottle Yovon % within District 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 Count 2 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 3 Total % within District 66.67 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 122 Table D.52: Storing water at home Storing water by these means Importance of storing water this way Not Very Somewhat Not applicable Yes No Total important important important Total Ghafurov Count 55 90 280 425 89 37 1 127 % within District 12.94 21.18 65.88 100.00 70.08 29.13 0.79 100.00 Konibodom Count 68 180 177 425 178 1 0 179 % within District 16.00 42.35 41.65 100.00 99.44 0.56 0.00 100.00 Hawz Yovon Count 30 12 383 425 30 173 0 203 % within District 7.06 2.82 90.12 100.00 14.78 85.22 0.00 100.00 Total Count 153 282 840 1275 297 211 1 509 % within District 12.00 22.12 65.88 100.00 58.35 41.45 0.20 100.00 Ghafurov Count 127 47 251 425 89 37 1 127 % within District 29.88 11.06 59.06 100.00 70.08 29.13 0.79 100.00 Konibodom Count 206 9 210 425 178 1 0 179 % within District 48.47 2.12 49.41 100.00 99.44 0.56 0.00 100.00 Yovon Count 38 146 241 425 30 173 0 203 Container % within District 8.94 34.35 56.71 100.00 14.78 85.22 0.00 100.00 Total Count 371 202 702 1275 297 211 1 509 % within District 29.10 15.84 55.06 100.00 58.35 41.45 0.20 100.00 123 Table D.53: Access to water for presidential land, individual farm or multi-family small farm Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 89 207 93 389 Canal/stream/river % within District 20.94 48.71 21.88 30.51 Count 0 0 75 75 Rain collection % within District 0.00 0.00 17.65 5.88 Count 1 0 1 2 Water pipes % within District 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.16 Count 1 0 0 1 Individual well % within District 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.08 Count 1 1 0 2 Communal well % within District 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.16 Have very little Count 2 2 20 24 access to water for this type of land % within District 0.47 0.47 4.71 1.88 Table D.54: Cost of water for presidential land, individual farm or multi-family small farm from canal/streams/river Cost in Somoni N 89 Number of those citing zero 85 Ghafurov Maximum 11 Mean of those who pay some amount 4.5 N 207 Number of those citing zero 206 Konibodom Maximum 3 Mean of those who pay some amount 3 N 93 Number of those citing zero 48 Yovon Maximum 50 Mean of those who pay some amount 7 N 389 Number of those citing zero 339 Total Maximum 50 Mean of those who pay some amount 6.75 124 Table D.55: Satisfaction with water quality for presidential land, individual farm or multi-family small farm Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 8 1 0 9 from canal/stream/river Satisfaction with water High % within District 9.20 0.51 0 2.38 Count 58 67 30 155 Average % within District 66.67 33.84 32.26 41.01 Count 21 130 63 214 Low % within District 24.14 65.66 67.74 56.61 Count 87 198 93 378 Total % within District 100 100 100 100 Count 0 0 4 4 Satisfaction with Average water from rain % within District 0 0 5.88 5.88 collection Count 0 0 64 64 Low % within District 0 0 94.12 94.12 Count 0 0 68 68 Total % within District 0 0 100 100 Table D.56: Availability/frequency of water from canals, streams or rivers for presidential land, individual farm or multi-family small farm Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 2 5 0 7 Every day % within District 2.30 2.51 0 1.85 Count 3 11 5 19 Every other day % within District 3.45 5.53 5.43 5.03 Half of the Count 73 57 14 144 week % within District 83.91 28.64 15.21 38.10 Only some days Count 4 50 27 81 during the month % within District 4.60 25.13 29.35 21.43 Count 5 76 46 127 It is not regular % within District 5.75 38.19 50 33.60 Count 87 199 92 378 Total % within District 100 100 100 100 125 Table D.57: Provider of water for presidential land, individual farm or multi-family small farm from canal, steams, or rivers Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Kolkhoz/ Sovkhoz, Count 36 55 3 94 JSC, etc. % within District 41.38 27.64 3.37 25.07 Khajagii Dihqoni Count 51 139 68 258 Kollektivi % within District 58.62 69.85 76.40 68.80 Count 0 2 13 15 Water users' association % within District 0.00 1.01 14.61 4.00 Count 0 0 1 1 Mahallah % within District 0.00 0.00 1.12 0.27 Count 0 0 1 1 Vodkhoz % within District 0.00 0.00 1.12 0.27 Count 0 1 0 1 Private % within District 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.27 Count 0 2 3 5 Other % within District 0.00 1.01 3.37 1.33 Total Count 87 199 89 375 126 Table D.58: Outcome of water going through a neighboring farm The water goes Water goes through Water goes through through a a neighboring farm Water goes through a neighboring farm neighboring farm first and they either Not applicable or no a neighboring farm first and they have or first and they are give us very little Total response first and they give us want to charge us a very cooperative water or give us bad quality water lot of money for the with regards to water whenever they water providing us with have extra water Count 161 185 60 1 18 425 Ghafurov % within District 37.88 43.53 14.12 0.24 4.24 100 Count 37 113 265 0 10 425 Konibodom % within District 8.71 26.59 62.35 0.00 2.35 100 Count 248 49 124 0 4 425 Yovon % within District 58.35 11.53 29.18 0.00 0.94 100 Count 446 347 449 1 32 1275 House garden and use Total % within District 34.98 27.22 35.22 0.08 2.51 100 Count 361 36 22 1 5 425 Ghafurov % within District 84.94 8.47 5.18 0.24 1.18 100 Count 234 57 132 0 2 425 Konibodom % within District 55.06 13.41 31.06 0.00 0.47 100 Count 360 19 43 0 3 425 Yovon % within District 84.71 4.47 10.12 0.00 0.71 100 Presidential land Count 955 112 197 1 10 1275 Total % within District 74.90 8.78 15.45 0.08 0.78 100 Count 425 0 0 0 0 425 Ghafurov % within District 100 0 0 0 0 100 Count 424 0 1 0 0 425 Konibodom % within District 99.76 0.00 0.24 0 0.00 100 Count 413 7 4 0 1 425 Yovon % within District 97.18 1.65 0.94 0 0.24 100 Small khojagi Count 1262 7 5 0 1 1275 Total % within District 98.98 0.55 0.39 0 0.08 100 127 Table D.59: Is there any water conflict in the village and if there is how is it solved? Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 10 10 39 59 Yes, community leaders/elders arbitrate % within District 2.4% 2.4% 9.2% 4.7% Count 1 1 0 2 Yes, it is taken to the police or judiciary % within District .2% .2% .0% .2% Yes, officials arbitrate (jamoat or Count 21 45 7 73 mahalla committee) % within District 5.1% 10.8% 1.7% 5.8% Count 1 3 1 5 Yes, religious leader arbitrate % within District .2% .7% .2% .4% Count 70 16 1 87 Yes, local mirobs arbitrate % within District 16.9% 3.9% .2% 6.9% Yes, officials from WUAs or their Count 0 0 1 1 mirobs arbitrate % within District .0% .0% .2% .1% Count 119 122 267 508 Yes, and no one arbitrates % within District 28.7% 29.4% 63.1% 40.5% Count 47 97 18 162 Yes, neighbors arbitrate % within District 11.3% 23.4% 4.3% 12.9% Count 1 2 0 3 Yes, others arbitrate % within District .2% .5% .0% .2% Yes, but we usually reach an agreement Count 115 110 88 313 ourselves % within District 27.7% 26.5% 20.8% 25.0% Count 30 9 1 40 No, we have no conflicts over water % within District 7.2% 2.2% .2% 3.2% Total 415 415 423 1253 Table D.60: Do you think in your village some people have more/less access to water? Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total No, every one has equal Count* 221 298 191 710 access % within District* 40.18 51.92 35.83 - Yes, people who are poor Count* 18 5 12 35 have less access % within District* 3.27 0.87 2.25 - Yes, influential people have Count* 35 1 28 64 better access % within District* 6.36 0.17 5.25 - Yes, men have better access Count* 3 0 0 3 than women % within District* 0.55 0 0 - Yes, those who are farther Count* 273 270 302 845 away from the main source have less access % within District* 49.64 47.04 56.66 - Total count of responses 550 574 533 1657 Total count of all those responding in each district 421 421 424 1266 *Percentages and totals are based on responses. 128 Table D.61: Has the high level of water table caused illness in your village? Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 317 229 290 836 Not applicable % within District 78.1% 57.1% 69.5% 68.3% We have the problem of high level of Count 42 123 75 240 water table, but it has caused little health problem % within District 10.3% 30.7% 18.0% 19.6% We have the problem of high level of Count 27 38 26 91 water table and it has caused a lot of health problem among women who % within District 6.7% 9.5% 6.2% 7.4% work in the fields We have the problem of high level of Count 20 11 26 57 water table, and it has caused a lot of health problems among both men and % within District 4.9% 2.7% 6.2% 4.7% women Total 406 401 417 1224 *Percentages and counts are based on responses WATER USERS ASSOCAITONS Table 62: Impact of WUA District Total Konibodom Yovon Count 412 261 1097 Not applicable % within District 96.9% 61.4% 86.0% We have better Count 1 4 5 access to water % within District .2% .9% .4% Water quality has Count 1 1 2 gotten better % within District .2% .2% .2% Water reliability Count 0 5 5 has improved % within District .0% 1.2% .4% Many things have Count 1 0 1 Impact of WUA? improved % within District .2% .0% .1% Count 10 128 139 No change % within District 2.4% 30.1% 10.9% Overall, things Count 0 26 26 have gotten worse % within District .0% 6.1% 2.0% Total Count 425 425 1275 129 Table D.63: Willingness to establish WUA District Total Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon We already have a WUA Count 7 11 177 195 % within District 1.7% 2.6% 41.9% 15.5% I do not know much about Count 190 249 180 619 WUAs to say anything % within District 45.1% 59.4% 42.7% 49.0% No, we do not believe such Count 12 14 7 33 organizations can help us % within District 2.9% 3.3% 1.7% 2.6% Yes, but we are not sure Count 124 92 26 242 how such organizations can % within District help us 29.5% 22.0% 6.2% 19.2% Yes, I think such Count 88 53 32 173 organizations can help us % within District 20.9% 12.6% 7.6% 13.7% Total Count 421 419 422 1262 Table D.64: Representing family in WUA or member of WUA Ghafurov Konibodom Yovon Total Count 419 407 138 964 Not applicable % within District 99.1% 96.9% 32.6% 76.1% We have WUA but our Count 3 8 278 289 family is not directly represented % within District .7% 1.9% 65.7% 22.8% Count 1 2 5 8 Head of Family % within District .2% .5% 1.2% .6% Other Male Count 0 2 1 3 % within District .0% .5% .2% .2% Count 0 0 1 1 Other Female % within District .0% .0% .2% .1% Count 0 1 0 1 Whoever % within District .0% .2% .0% .1% Total Count 423 420 423 1266 wb247868 N:\!!!!SDV Front Office\PUBLICATIONS & GRAPHICS\!!! Social Analysis and Social Policy\Tajik Soc Asses\composite\Tajik Soc Assessment.doc 9/10/2009 3:48:00 PM 130