Political Economy;incentive problem;Political Economy Analysis;misuse of public funds;large tracts of land;political incentive;household survey data;national government ...  Voir la suite agency;political economy considerations;structural adjustment program;national health insurance;analysis of utility;incentive for farmer;public opinion survey;de facto use;provision of advice;privileges and immunity;continuity and change;political economy dynamic;Early Childhood Development;access to fund;political economy environment;foreign policy considerations;allocation of fund;natural resource rent;political support;stakeholder interest;fiscal pressure;donor agencies;national parliament;energy subsidies;commercial agriculture;commodity price;subnational levels;Health Service;ownership pattern;infrastructure reform;electricity provision;public resource;civil society;good policy;telecommunications reform;institutional change;resource-rich country;Social Welfare;intergovernmental relation;secondary sources;contract opportunity;political actor;political capital;incentive structure;subsidy system;survey questions;social transfer;political views;fiscal deficit;public source;specific issue;Government Performance;Social Protection;opportunistic behavior;Fuel Subsidies;agency staff;policy position;informal interview;geographic area;rural area;property right;fiscal allocation;utility pricing;foreign mining;sustainable fiscal;quantitative information;community for use;historical trajectory;participatory approach;historical analysis;national politics;community characteristic;investment fund;fiscal space;intergovernmental transfer;aid allocation;spoils system;discretionary authority;power tariff;target resources;similar way;ethnic dimension;institutional rule;diagnostic approach;smallholder farmer;election result;electoral system;empirical underpinning;unintended consequence;non-governmental organization;economic institution;resource endowments;demographic dynamic;institutional strength;social cleavage;regulatory body;Regulatory Bodies;road map;agricultural service;good governance;regulatory rule;political constraint;learning process;explanatory variable;teacher absenteeism;independent regulation;private benefit;electoral campaigns;technocratic approach;mineral rent;vested interests;neoclassical economics;institutional dysfunction;horse trading;social security;local council;financial resource;local elite;administrative support;electricity distribution;international aid;ward levels;local infrastructure;allocation decision;political commitment;Economic Policy;governance cluster;large-scale investment;formal property;veto power;contract farming;governmental actors;distribution capacity;power company;binding constraint;budget process;descriptive statistic;operational decisions;tariff rate;electoral competition;health outcome;subnational governance;engagement strategies;preferential access;commercial purpose;Cash Transfer;citizen voice;sectoral strategy;infrastructure sector;study including;small-scale infrastructure;state policy;democratic country;private investor;regression analysis;government effort;economic rent;geographic distribution;decentralized level;historical perspective;credible commitment;primary purpose;sectoral development;current investment;electoral rules;telecommunications sector;political influence;political elite;government plan;  Réduire