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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

TF08187

ON A

SMALL GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF USD 2.7 MILLION

TO THE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR LESTE

FOR

Building Climate/Disaster Resilience Along The Dili-Ainaro and Linked Road Corridors in
Timor-Leste (P144818)

May 7, 2019

Social, Urban, Rural And Resilience Global Practice
East Asia And Pacific Region

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CBDRM	Community-Based Disaster Risk Management
CDD	Community-driven Development
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EMP	Environmental Management Plan
FM	Financial Management
GoTL	Government of Timor Leste
IFC	International Finance Corporation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KPI	Key Performance Indicators
MDMC	Municipal Disaster Management Committee
MSSI	Ministry of Social Solidarity and Inclusion (formerly Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS))
NDRMD	National Disaster Risk Management Directorate (formerly National Disaster Management Directorate (NDMD))
NPC	National Procurement Committee
PARK	<i>Programa Aprendijazen Reziliensia Komunitade</i> (Program to Build Community Resilience)
PCRAFI	Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative
PDO	Project Development Objective
PHRD	Policy and Human Resources Development (Program of Japan)
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PLAN	PLAN International, the implementing partner (contractor) for Component 2 activities
POM	Project Operations Manual
RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
SDMC	Suco Disaster Management Committee
Suco	Administrative level below subdistrict and above community
TA	Technical Assistance
TL	Timor Leste

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID	Project Name
P144818	Building Climate/Disaster Resilience Along The Dili-Ainaro and Linked Road Corridors in Timor-Leste
Country	Financing Instrument
Timor-Leste	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)	Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Ministry of Social Solidarity	National Disaster Management Directorate

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO

To build the capacity of communities around the Dili-Ainaro and linked road corridors and district and sector agencies in community-based disaster risk management and adaptation for reducing the impacts of recurring landslides and floods.

FINANCING

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
Donor Financing			
TF-18187	2,703,850	2,703,850	2,673,912
Total	2,703,850	2,703,850	2,673,912
Total Project Cost	2,703,850	2,703,850	2,673,912

KEY DATES

Approval	Effectiveness	Original Closing	Actual Closing
27-Aug-2014	27-Aug-2015	30-Oct-2017	31-Oct-2018

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
26-Oct-2017	1.11	Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Implementation Schedule

KEY RATINGS

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Substantial

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	12-Nov-2015	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.25
02	21-Apr-2017	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.43
03	25-Oct-2017	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	1.11

04	12-Jul-2018	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.56
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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

Context

1. At the time of project preparation in 2014, the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste (TL), a newly established, post-conflict, small island state had made notable progress in building peace and stability, but was still grappling with major challenges in the areas of institutional and delivery capacity at national, district, sub-district and suco levels.¹ The Government of Timor Leste (GoTL) planned to invest heavily in infrastructure, agriculture, rural development and social capital with the launch of the Strategic Development Plan for 2011-2030. But it was clear that any investments would have to be made resilient to various shocks, including disasters and climate change impacts. Coupled with existing vulnerability, periodic hazard events such as flooding and landslides were constantly depleting the resiliency of rural communities. Impacts of disasters are often felt more acutely in fragile states² such as TL, because of weak institutions and low capacity to tackle them concurrently with both instability and disaster response.³ TL had an opportunity to preserve development gains by managing disaster and climate risks systematically and thus improve the living standards of its population and enable the country to emerge from fragility.

2. Disasters in TL are mostly localized and periodic, with serious impacts on local communities. Major hazards include flash floods, droughts, landslides and destructive winds, as well as a substantial risk of earthquakes and tsunamis in areas along the southern coast as the country is located in the Pacific Ring of Fire.⁴ TL has also been affected by cyclones multiple times including Esther (1983), Bonnie (2002), Inigo (2003), and Daryl (2006) which destroyed crops and over 500 houses.⁵ The country has pockets of vulnerable populations living in areas with difficult road accessibility and low capacity to respond to these disasters. Most of this population is agrarian, and even low intensity disasters add significantly to their vulnerability by increasing food insecurity. Agriculture contributes 26.5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product and employs 64 percent of the labor force in TL. Further, forest cover has decreased over the years, particularly given the widespread use of slash and burn agriculture, and due to wood being used as a source of fuel and uncontrolled logging. The resulting deforestation has contributed to increased flooding and landslide risks.

3. In the context of current and future disaster and climate change-related risks, there was a need to support the GoTL in adopting a holistic approach to managing disaster risks faced by the affected

¹ Timor Leste is divided into thirteen administrative districts, 65 sub-districts which are subdivided into 442 sucos.

² World Bank (2011). World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, p 103.

³ World Bank (2013). Strong, Safe, and Resilient. A Strategic Policy Guide for Disaster Risk Management in East Asia and the Pacific. Washington DC: World Bank.

⁴ Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI). Timor Leste. Risk Profile. 2011. Timor Leste is expected to incur, on average, US\$5.9 million per year in losses due to earthquake and tropical cyclones.

⁵ Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI). Timor Leste. Risk Profile. 2011.

population and the vulnerable sectors. In particular, support was required to: (a) systematically assess natural hazard risks that assets and livelihoods are exposed to; (b) enable risk-informed planning with the involvement of the affected communities; and (c) minimize losses to infrastructure assets and livelihoods by taking an approach to disaster risk management (DRM) that would combine both ex-ante and ex-post activities and also both structural (engineered) and non-structural solutions.

4. Despite exposure of assets to disaster and climate risks, key development sectors lacked a coherent framework to address these risks. A number of factors were contributing to increasing the country's vulnerability, including the lack of maintenance and poor design of infrastructure (e.g., road networks), and geological, hydrological, meteorological and human factors that trigger landslides and flash floods. The country's mountainous topography, location in an area of regionally high seismic activity, and exposure to heavy monsoon rain also make infrastructure assets susceptible to disasters. The effects of disasters on TL's transport infrastructure have multiplier negative impacts on the national and local economy, restricting connectivity and accessibility, hindering the movement of people, goods, agricultural products and services.

5. Investment in the road sector was expected to increase, opening an opportunity to integrate disaster and climate resilience in the sector, and to engage local communities in the process. The road sector in TL was expected to receive a significant portion of public investment given the healthy fiscal posture of the GoTL and the need to improve connectivity between districts to spur local economic growth. As the sector is also capable of absorbing a generally low skilled workforce, it also had the potential of benefitting the wider local community by providing labor intensive jobs that also promote resilient development practices.

6. Contribution to Twin Goals. The project was aligned with the twin goals of ending poverty and increasing shared prosperity. Poverty and vulnerability to flooding and landslides are interlinked. Improved understanding and communication of flooding and landslide risks faced by communities around the Dili-Ainaro road corridor facilitates risk-informed planning and investments to reduce disaster impacts on communities, manage disaster risks proactively, and strengthen the capacity of people and institutions to prepare for and respond to disasters.

7. Alignment with Country Partnership Strategy. The project was consistent with the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2013-2017 which identified disasters and climate change as major risks. A major focus of the CPS was to build climate and disaster resilience of the road infrastructure on the Dili-Ainaro corridor and improve the livelihoods of communities benefitting from increased connectivity and accessibility. The activity was also consistent with the strategic priorities of the Bank's Engagement Note 2013-2016 for Disaster and Climate Resilient Development Programming in the Pacific Islands Region. The strategic priorities supported are: (a) strengthening policy, institutional and evidence-based decision-making capacity; and (b) investments in disaster and climate resilient development.

8. Alignment with PHRD. The project was also in line with grant financing requirements with respect to the priority areas of the Disaster Reduction and Recovery Program of the Policy and Human

Resources Development Fund (PHRD), supported by the Government of Japan. The project addresses three of the five priority areas: (a) Priority area 2: Natural disaster risk assessment, mapping and public awareness, through hazard risk assessment around the Dili-Ainaro corridor; (b) Priority area 4: Development of early warning and evacuation systems for communities at risk; and (c) Priority area 5: Capacity development and technical assistance through training of the National Disaster Management Directorate (NDMD), its sub-national agencies and community members on disaster risk planning and management.

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

9. The PDO was *to build the capacity of communities along the Dili-Ainaro and linked Road Corridors and district and sector agencies in community-based disaster risk management and adaptation for reducing the impact of recurring landslides and floods*. The project's one key performance indicator (KPI) was "number of direct project beneficiaries, of which female, benefiting from enhanced disaster/climate resilience". It had three intermediate indicators: (i) number of officials and community members trained on various aspects of community-based disaster risk management; (ii) disaster risk management plans prepared at the suco level; and (iii) disaster risk management pilots implemented at the suco level.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

10. The expected outcome of the project was more resilient communities living in sucos along the Dili-Ainaro road corridors resulting from the implementation of community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) which included awareness-raising, development of suco disaster risk management plan, and implementation of pilot community infrastructure sub-projects to reduce the risks from landslides, flood, drought and strong winds. The primary target group consisted of the communities living along the Dili-Ainaro and linked road corridors, plus government officials and other development stakeholders who would benefit from training and capacity building. The Key Performance Indicator (KPI) was the number of estimated cumulative direct beneficiaries originally 87,000. Based on GoTL suco population statistics, the count was revised to 49,311 in March 2017⁶ when the grant was only 16% disbursed. Some 25 percent of beneficiaries were to be women.

⁶ During the Implementation Support Mission in March 2017 when final selection of targeted sucos were made, the Government presented new official statistics of the total population of the selected sucos to be around 49,311 people, lower than the estimated population during the design (which was 87,000). This change in final target based on actual population was documented in the mission Aide Memoire, and was reflected in the revised target beneficiary data in the project records.

Components

11. **Component 1: Strengthening Capacity for Planning and Delivering Community-Based Disaster Risk Management at Sub-district level.** The task involved communicating the results of hazard risk assessments, produced by a preceding GFDRR grant, at the community level, and combining them with local knowledge to prepare community hazard maps. The component was to build capacity at the central, sub-district and community levels to: (a) improve community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM); (b) identify small scale CBDRM activities; and (c) prepare comprehensive community level DRM plans for the project areas. An estimated 780 officials and community members from the 26 selected sucos were to benefit from this training, of which about a third were to be government officials.

12. **Component 2: Community-Based Disaster Risk Management and Adaptation Plans and Pilot Projects.** This component supported 26 sucos in four sub-districts along the Dili-Ainaro and linked road corridors to prepare comprehensive DRM plan for each suco. This included: (a) supporting sub-district governments and suco councils to identify small scale structural and non-structural risk reduction measures, and prioritize them for implementation; and (b) supporting sub-district suco councils to implement up to three prioritized risk reduction / adaptation activities.⁷ The design and methodology used for some of the risk reduction measures were documented to help GoTL prepare and/or refine standard design and construction guidelines for increasing climate resilience in the national roads sector. A CBDRM manual defined the eligibility criteria, selection criteria, sub-project amounts etc. The manual also described the procedures, methodologies, roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders for preparing and implementing the CBDRM plan and the mechanism for longer-term maintenance of sub-projects. Implementation of this component was contracted out to a third party (See paragraph 17 under summary of implementation).

13. **Component 3: Project Management, Monitoring & Evaluation, and Knowledge Dissemination.** This component supported the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) set up in the National Disaster Risk Management Directorate (NDRMD) for project financial management, procurement, monitoring and evaluation and audit reporting.

14. The project was designed to be implemented in two phases. During the first phase, which was implemented with a Bank-executed trust fund (P133265), a hazard and risk assessment was conducted in 49 sucos to provide a detailed risk profile of each suco. This phase produced the

⁷ Mitigation options that were to be carried out by the communities included structural measures, such as small-scale bio-engineering, slope stabilization, river embankment, improving and clearing drainage systems of roads, and strengthening roofing of schools ; and non-structural measures included improving access to weather information and databases, evacuation planning, community-based early warning system. The aim was to support a balanced approach between structural and non-structural measures for to ensure long-term sustainability and resilience.



CBDRM manual and technical guidelines to guide the CBDRM implementation in the second phase. It also strengthened the technical capacity of the National Disaster Risk Management Directorate (NDRMD) through a series of trainings, workshops and an exchange visit with participation from key agencies. The second phase, financed with this Recipient-executed trust fund FROM Japan PHRD (P144818) was to be implemented by NDRMD, and focused on strengthening the capacity at the sub-district level for planning and delivering CBDRM and the adaptation and piloting of plans and sub-projects in the selected sucos.

15. On 29 September 2017, the GoTL submitted a request for an 18-month extension of the Grant from its original closing date of 31 October 2017, but the PHRD approved a 12-month extension. The GoTL also requested reallocation of budget between cost categories to add shift some resources to Component 2. A level 2 restructuring was approved on 26 October 2017 for the 12-month extension and the reallocation shown below.

Category	Current Amount in the Grant Agreement (expressed in USD)	Proposed Amount after Reallocation (expressed in USD)
(1) Consultants' Services for Parts 1 and 3 of the Project	543,650	293,650
(2) Training for Parts 1 and of the Project	200,200	200,200
(3) Operating Costs	70,000	150,000
(4) Goods for Parts 1 and 3 of the Project	18,000	38,000
(5) Good, works and consultant services for Subprojects under Part 2 of the Project	1,872,000	2,022,000
TOTAL AMOUNT	2,703,850	2,703,850

16. The assessment below was made against the USD 2.7 million PHRD grant financed activities as per the above restructuring.

II. OUTCOMES

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

Outcome Rating: Satisfactory

17. As per the project design, the project built community resilience using a Community Demand-Driven (CDD) approach by first increasing community awareness on the disaster and climate risks confronting them, and by facilitating the community through the Suco Disaster Management Committee (SDMC) to identify the most significant risks to be addressed, and the priority measures that could be undertaken through participatory risk assessment. By preparing Suco Disaster Risk Management Plans, the communities documented the risks and priority mitigation measures into one easy-to-follow document. With the support of the community facilitators, local engineers and government officers, trained by experts provided by the Bank and supported by Component 1, the community then designed and implemented small infrastructure projects to address the risks identified during the risk participatory assessment. Construction works to build gabions, evacuation roads and bridges, water supply systems as well as school rehabilitation and other structural measures, were carried out by the community themselves with the support of local masons. The community capacity building, planning and project implementation constituted CBDRM core activities facilitated by PLAN International as the implementing partner/contractor under Component 2.

18. **Outputs.** The most tangible outputs of the Project were the 90 suco DRM pilot subprojects scattered in 27 sucos across four municipalities addressing different types of hazards. As this was a CDD project, the outputs of the subprojects could not be estimated in advance. The subprojects included installation of gabions to prevent landslides, culverts and drainage to prevent erosion and flooding and construction of evacuation roads and rehabilitation of schools to protect them from strong winds. The outputs at closing are presented below:

No.	Item	No.	Unit
1	Evacuation Centers established - new or refurbished Beneficiaries:18,474; 9,256 (M); 9,218 (F)	9	Centers/buildings
2	School wind resilient repairs Beneficiaries: 1,855 students, 47 teachers	7	schools
3	Windbreak wall Beneficiaries: 98 students, 5 teachers	1	windbreak wall
4	Total length of retaining walls (m.)	309	m
5	Total length of evacuation roads (m.) concrete surfacing	490	m (in 6 locations)

6	Total length of evacuation roads (m.) graded, not surfaced (including along drainages, 10m. buffer grading on each side of crossings / bridges)	3,769	m (in 23 locations)
7	Total number of road bridges / crossings built	23	road crossings /bridges
8	Total number of foot bridges in length (m.)	3	bridges
9	Total length of drainage (m)	2,949	m
10	Total volume of gabions used (m3)	2,050	m ³
11	Emergency Water system installations / improvements	9	systems
12	No. of taps (waterpoints) - new or rehabilitated	73	tap stands
13	Supply capacity	80,000	liter
14	Sanitation facilities constructed / renovated	6	facilities
15	Suco nurseries (seedlings, bamboo, grasses) established	13	Nurseries

19. The combination of the above outputs addressed priority and local specific disaster and climate risks confronting the community. Overall, in total 27 sucos (from originally planned 26) developed 27 DRM plans, and 90 DRM pilot sub-projects were implemented (from the 30 originally targeted by the project). The overall community resilience awareness and pilot projects benefited more than 59,000 beneficiaries, or 9,689 above the revised target KPI of 49,311. Some 45 percent were women, well exceeding the original target KPI of 25%. By closing, all targeted indicators were achieved or surpassed (See Annex 1). The above outputs in the forms of infrastructure were delivered and community groups and officials proficient in CBDRM were formed, contributing to the achievement of the outcome of building disaster and climate resilient community in the targeted sucos. The project outcome is rated as Satisfactory as all the targeted KPIs were surpassed, although with a 12-month delay in achievement of benefits.

Overall Outcome Rating

Implementation Performance, Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

20. Phase 1 of this project was Bank-executed with two key outputs: 1) the risk assessment identifying and mapping priority risks in the project areas along the Dili-Ainaro road corridor, and 2) the CBDRM manual outlining a step-by-step process for facilitating the implementation of community projects. As a result, no GoTL implementation capacity was built. The NDRMD had regularly implemented annual training on CBDRM, but it had no experience in supporting actual

CBDRM implementation at the community level beyond providing training. In order to familiarize the key officials of the Ministry of Social Solidarity and Inclusion (MSSI) and other ministries with CBDRM and its role in building community resilience at the suco level, a comparative study visit to Indonesia (West Timor and Yogyakarta) was organized in May 2014. Three cabinet level officials participated in the study tour to see first-hand how CBDRM was being carried out in village communities with a similar cultural and geographic context as sucos in TL. The combination of the project preparation support and the comparative study greatly improved the understanding and readiness of the MSSI/NDRMD to implement the project.

21. Maintaining GoTL commitment with leadership changes. One of the main challenges for the project was the frequent political changes which slowed down operations and decision-making processes at the MSSI and NDRMD. In order to strengthen the ownership of the Project, a second comparative visit was organized in June 2016, this time involving senior and technical officials as well as project personnel. This was carried out in preparation for the selection process of the consultancy services for the CBDRM implementation. The visit involved discussion with the equivalent of PIU and facilitators as well as village level teams in Indonesia to share more detailed experiences and operational practices that could be adopted by TL in CDD approach. This training built strong understanding and commitment by the officials to fully own the project throughout implementation.

22. Low capacity of GoTL. Another key factor negatively affecting implementation was the relatively under-developed administrative capacity of GoTL institutions. The relatively small civil service and the still on-going governance consolidation after independence posed a specific challenge in terms of decision making and administration, such as funding disbursement, procurement, and financial management. As this was a recipient executed project, the limited delivery capacity of GoTL resulted in implementation delays.

23. Slow implementation led the Bank to rate the project unsatisfactory in the second Implementation Status Report (ISR) of April 2017, two years after approval in February 2015. The Executing Agency and the Bank jointly identified the chief impediment as lengthy procurement processing for packages above \$1 million, and devised a plan to remedy the situation. The selected consultant firm, PLAN International, negotiated the reduction of the scope of the work by prioritizing the project activities to reach the larger community to implement pilot projects.

24. With the above strategy, the project was able to deliver the first 25 pilot projects in only four months, hence making a strong case for restructuring/extension. Through the hard work of the MSSI/NDRMD and partner agencies, the project experts and facilitators of PLAN International as the implementing partner for Component 2, all-of the implementing machinery including the Municipal Disaster Management Committees and the SDMC were activated and able to showcase the delivery of community-driven risk mitigation projects.

25. Once these implementation hurdles were overcome, the confidence of GoTL, the PHRD officials and the Bank improved, and the Bank upgraded the project's rating to moderately unsatisfactory in the ISR of October 25, 2017. On October 26, 2017, the Country Director approved a restructuring as described in para 15. By July 2018, the project's performance had improved substantially, and progress toward meeting the PDO was upgraded to moderately satisfactory in the fourth and final ISR. Given the implementation challenges as described above, the project Implementation Performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

Other Outcomes and Impacts

26. **Capacity Development.** The disaster mitigation measures carried out as described in para 18 reflected not only physical achievements, but also institutional and community capacity to collaborate and implement development subprojects using a participatory approach. It also proved that local talents had the capability to deliver CDD despite all the administrative challenges. An evaluation carried out by independent consultant (see Annex 3). The evaluation interviews with Chefe de Suco and community members revealed a high level of community satisfaction with project outcomes. The evaluator also confirmed a high level of female involvement in the project, this has included membership of SDMC ranging from 30 to 50 percent participation rates for female community members, as well as the inclusion of the needs of vulnerable beneficiaries and disabled in project planning and implementation.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

27. Implementation Procedural Delays. The project experienced several initial delays totaling 20 months. The first was the Grant Agreement signing which was only on February 2015, six months after World Bank approval of the project in August 2014 due to a change in Government procedure concerning the authorized signatory of the Grant Agreement from the Ministry of Finance to the MSSI. The second six-month delay was attributed to the lack of capacity in completing the POM, which led to delays on the project being declared effective only on 27 August 2015. The third major delay led to an eight-month interval when Component 2 had to be centrally procured by GoTL as the contract size was above the US\$1 million threshold requiring the involvement of NPC which managed all large procurements for GoTL.

28. By the time the consultancy services for Component 2 were procured, the remaining implementation period was too short to implement CBDRM in all 25 of the targeted sucos. The project team was however, confident that the project could successfully implement CBDRM subprojects in all 25 sucos with 12-month extension proposed under restructuring. The restructuring would also allow the project to fully achieve the PDO and ensure all indicators achieved or even exceeded their targets especially given that the capacity of NDRMD/MSSI as the

implementing agency had increased in the first two years of implementation, and PLAN International was ready to complete work in all 26 sucos. The project, up to the restructuring had also worked towards increasing the capacity of officials at the national and municipal levels along with the capacity of community and officials at the suco level.

29. On October 26, 2017, the project underwent one Level-2 restructuring approved by the Country Director. It consisted of: (i) an extension of the closing date of the project and grant agreements from October 31, 2017 to October 31, 2018; (ii) change in the component costs where the cost of Component 1 was reduced by US\$150,000 and the cost of Component 2 was increased by that amount to allow the community to implement more risk mitigation project activities; and (iii) reallocation between disbursement categories to reflect the component cost changes.

30. Monitoring and Evaluation. Throughout implementation, especially during the execution of the CBDR activities, closed monitoring visits as well as mentoring engagement were carried out jointly by the officers from the DNRMD/MSS, Municipal Government representatives, Bank staff and consultants, and experts and facilitators from PLAN International. During implementation, two separate M&E exercises were carried out, one by PLAN International M&E expert during the peak of CBDRM implementation, and the final one by independent M&E expert reviewing the entire program since the start until the final closing workshop. The summary of the M&E report is presented in Annex 3. Given the important role of the combined monitoring and mentoring/TA support in ensuring the project final achievement, the M&E is rated as Substantial.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

Bank Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

31. Project Design and Preparation. The project was designed assuming GoTL had the basic capacity to administer an externally financed project, including administering a large consultancy procurement. Realizing the limited capacity of the GoTL institutions and the thin market of professional experts in the country, the Bank deliberately initiated the project with a Bank-executed Technical Assistance (TA). This TA not only enabled the Bank to assess the partner's readiness, but it also provided the necessary support to undertake a risk assessment, design the project, and begin preparation of phase 2 of the project, e.g., preparing a draft CBDRM Manual, mentoring GoTL staff in preparing the POM, etc.). In practice, the design that included a large allocation (around 68% of the budget) that was to be procured under a single consultancy contract was the main cause of delayed disbursement and suco level activity implementation.

32. While the overall theme of the project is capacity building with many training and community empowerment activities, throughout implementation the Bank also combined implementation support in the sense of project supervision, and mentoring in the sense of providing close TA and advisory services in undertaking day-to-day project activities. During peak project implementation, the Bank fielded a mission every month, sometimes for two weeks in a row, in order to assist the GoTL to prepare and organize training, and monitor implementation.

33. The combination of intensive project preparatory TA and close mentoring and supervision during implementation, resulted in timely identification of project impediments, and timely resolution of issues which required response at the policy (minister and directors general), management (directors) and operational levels (PIU and implementing partners and beneficiaries). The Bank also fielded two missions to assist the Executing Agency in completing project implementation, including fulfilling administrative requirements. While the project design posed sufficient risk of delay for a country with a very limited domestic capacity of expertise like Timor Leste, but with all the remedial efforts and the final positive outcome, the Bank performance was rated as Satisfactory.

Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

34. Environmental Safeguards. The project was categorized as a “B” project with three policies triggered: Environmental Assessment, Involuntary Resettlement and Indigenous Peoples. To comply with the environmental policy, an environment management plan (EMP) was developed in line with the EMP of the Dili-Ainaro Road project financed by the Bank, and disclosed on January 20, 2014. Environmental impacts were expected to be minimal. Recommendations on the use of personal protective equipment during work by the community were properly followed. The completion of structural measures such as drainage improvement, slope stabilization and water supply system improved the overall environmental conditions against natural disasters. Overall, implementation of environmental safeguards was satisfactory and the policy was complied with.

35. Social Safeguards. Implementation of the social safeguard policy and compliance were satisfactory. The project did not adversely affect people’s cultural and social conditions as it only involved small-scale infrastructure intended to improve the community’s resilience to natural disasters. Nevertheless, a Resettlement Policy Framework (RFP, Report RP1614, disclosed September 1, 2013) and a social assessment on Indigenous Peoples (Report IPP 707 disclosed March 21, 2014) were developed and outlined mitigation measures, in the event that implementation of disaster risk reduction (DRR) infrastructure pilot projects utilize community lands. In practice no land acquisition was required, as only small parts of the constructed infrastructure such as retaining walls and drainage were built on the border of lands belonging to the community. The RPF detailed

the mechanisms to ensure that thorough consultations were undertaken with stakeholders to identify culturally appropriate benefits and ensure that they were not disadvantaged by the project.

36. The grievance system was provided in the POM. This grievance system was based on existing traditional community structures in Timor Leste, such as using structures under Suco level that is responsible for addressing any dispute within community in a Suco. A Grievance Redress Mechanism was put in place during the implementation of Component 2. Training, signboards as well as complaint boxes were provided in each project suco, and monitoring and analysis as well as responses of the inputs were carried out. There was no major grievance put forward other than normal suggestions for improvement.

37. Procurement was consistently rated Moderately Satisfactory. There were difficulties due to the client's limited understanding of Bank procurement procedures, and weak planning and follow-up actions. Lengthy administrative processes for procurement of equipment by the MSSI often resulted in delays in the availability of the equipment for use by the project. The delays in the selection of the consultant firm for CBDRM activities resulted in slow progress during the first two years of the project. With the procurement technical support from the NPC, the consulting firm was competitively selected to implement the Component 2. Policy was complied with.

38. Financial Management (FM) performance was also rated consistently as Moderately Satisfactory. Proper records of eligible expenditures were maintained by the PIU established within MSSI. The books of records were maintained in excel throughout the project duration. The internal controls overall were reasonably adequate. The IFR and bank reconciliation was done on a monthly basis. The advance monitoring system was effective, and the list of fixed assets was maintained and up-to-date. The filing system is well organized. The only weakness was holding cash in large amounts in the safety box on the PIU premises, this was done to facilitate project payments as it took time to make payments through the designated account. Although holding large amounts of cash potentially resulted in internal control risks, there was no misuse of cash. The first external audit was done in 2017 covering the period from August 2015 to December 2016. During the life of the project there were two audits. The first audit was for the period from August 2015 to December 2016 and second, for the period from January to December 2017. The audit opinion for the first audit was unqualified with some internal control issues. For the second audit, the auditor issued an Unmodified Opinion noting concern relating to the cash balance at the year end. However, the cash balance at year end has been fully settled and verified by the Bank FM team. The FM policy was complied with.

Risk to Development Outcome

39. At the suco level, the risk that the DRR infrastructure built by the project will not be maintained is low. This is because the community considered the infrastructure as the result of their own work and hence that it is their responsibility to maintain. The project also provided training and simple guidelines for maintenance of structures such as gabion, drainage, bridges and roads.

40. The risk of the project's CDD approach not being continued/replicated is in fact quite substantial, at least in the short term. This is because the task of DRM within GoTL was recently split between two institutions. Tasks related to disaster preparedness and response are being moved from the MSSI to the Ministry of Interior (Directorate General of Civil Protection), while tasks related to post disaster recovery will remain at MSSI. This may mean that while the DRM institutions are being consolidated, the management experiences and capacity built by the project may be scattered among different ministries, and the trained personnel may no longer handle the same tasks as during the project.

41. Another risk is from climate change, which is resulting in ever greater storms, bringing higher rain totals, exacerbating flooding and landslides, and potentially causing wind damage. While the project did provide infrastructure to strengthen resilience against these types of disasters, the possibility of further damage cannot be denied.

V. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

42. ***GoTL's ability to make timely policy and management decisions was the main impediment to project implementation.*** This is not necessarily a reflection of the professional capacity of the government personnel, but rather a systemic issue where systems and procedures inherited from the pre-independence era have not been fully transformed into a framework that fits with reality. Allocating sufficient resources and time for raising awareness, building ownership and assembling the implementation team should not be taken for granted. The required project implementation period should be counted onward from the day that project implementation outfit is fully in place and operational, taking into account cascading decision delays during preparation.

43. ***Capacity building should be the core approach/philosophy of development projects in countries with low delivery capacity.*** Providing policy-makers with comparative experiences and strengthening the technical mastery of civil service, national professionals, and community members should be prominent features in project design. Pilot projects served as proof-of-concept and showcase to build confidence. Resources for regional study visits to neighboring country with similar development challenges, instead of going to developed countries, and for mentoring and TA and South-South learning should be sufficiently allocated and programmed as low cost capacity building solution.



44. ***Entrusting the community to make development decisions is critical to building collective accountability.*** Putting development resources in the hands of the community with proper facilitation and TA is an effective approach to build trust among community members and trust of the community toward the authorities. The CDD model is ideal for building the trust and strengthening a community's social capital.

45. ***International mentorship with the view of building national professional capacity is key in the design of the project management and sustainability strategy.*** TL still has major challenges finding national professionals capable of advising the government as it is the largest employer of trained professionals. Engaging international professionals to help establish a management system and processes, with a view of handing them over to national professionals half way through project implementation, should be considered.



ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: to build the capacity of communities along the Dili-Ainaro and linked Road Corridors and district and sector agencies in community-based disaster risk management and adaptation for reducing the impact

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct project beneficiaries	Number	0.00	87000.00	49311.00	59730.00
		01-Sep-2015	08-May-2014	31-Oct-2018	31-Oct-2018
Female beneficiaries	Percentage	0.00	0.00	25.00	45.00
		01-Sep-2015	08-May-2014	31-Oct-2018	31-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): The target was reduced following a census of the population, and all the originally targeted sucos as per the project design were assisted

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: 1. Strengthening Capacity for Planning and Delivering Community-Based Disaster Risk Management at Sub-district level




Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Officials and community members trained on various aspects of community based disaster risk management	Number	0.00	780.00	780.00	3466.00
		01-Sep-2015	08-May-2014	31-Oct-2018	31-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved/surpassed (444%)					

Component: 2. Community-Based Disaster Risk Management and Adaptation Plans and Pilot Projects

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Disaster risk management plans prepared at the suco level	Number	0.00	26.00	26.00	27.00
		01-Sep-2015	08-May-2014	31-Oct-2018	31-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved/surpassed (108%)					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Disaster risk management pilots implemented at the suco level	Number	0.00	30.00	30.00	90.00
		01-Sep-2015	08-May-2014	08-Jun-2018	31-Oct-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved/surpassed (300%)					





A. ORGANIZATION OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PDO

Objective/Outcome 1: Community capacity in disaster and climate resilience built	
Outcome Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Direct beneficiaries 2. Percentage of female
Intermediate Results Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Officials and community members trained in various aspects of Community based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) 2. Number of Suco Disaster Risk Management Plans developed 3. Number of community DRM pilot project implemented
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Community Based Disaster Risk Management Manual adopted by MSSI 2. 2,949 m of drainage for flood prevention 3. 2,050 m³ of gabion made of rocks 4. 3,769 m of evacuation roads in 23 location 5. 23 road bridges and 3 foot bridges 6. 9 evacuation centers and 7 schools rehabilitated from string winds impacts 7. 309 m retaining wall 8. 6 sanitation facilities and water storage with total capacity of 80,000 liters 9. 13 nurseries for reforestation



ANNEX 2. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components	Amount at Approval (US\$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)	Percentage of Approval (US\$M)
Strengthening Capacity at sub-district level for Planning Delivering Community-Based Disaster Risk Management	309,400.00	249,400.00	80.6
Community-Based Disaster Risk Management and Adaptation Plans and Pilot Projects	2,022,000.00	1,992,061.61	98.5
Project Management and Administration	372,450.00	310,594.89	83.6
Total	2,703,850.00	2,552,056.50	94.00



ANNEX 3. RECIPIENT, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

Highlight of Monitoring Evaluation Carried out by Independent Consultant

Monitoring and Evaluation was carried out by an independent international expert consultant, from 18-31 October 2018 involving meetings at the national level as well as field visit to project sites. The M&E mission included a combination of interviews and Focus Group Discussions involving a total of 43 respondents. The highlights extracted from the consultant's report are provided below.

Achievement of Project Indicators Component 2

Project Indicators

Achievement of Project Indicators

- (a) PDO Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage) benefiting from enhanced disaster/climate resilience.

Current indications from Plan Final Reporting for Phase 1 and Phase 2 are that this has been satisfactorily fulfilled.

- (b) Intermediate 1: Officials and community members trained on various aspects of community based disaster risk management.

Indications are that this has been satisfactorily fulfilled based on Plan Final Reporting for Phase 1 and Phase 2 are that this has been satisfactorily fulfilled, this has also been validated through community and stakeholder interviews.

- (c) Intermediate 2: Disaster risk management plans prepared at the suco level.

Achieved in 25 Suco according to Plan reporting, DRM plans for all Suco sighted.

- (d) Intermediate 3: Disaster risk management pilots implemented at the suco level

Achieved in 25 Suco according to Plan reporting, 10 pilot projects directly sighted by the evaluator and further verified by interviews with Chefe de Suco, Administrator Post Administravo and Municipal Administrators.



Level of Community Satisfaction with Project Outcomes

The evaluation interviews with Chefe de Suco and community members have validated reporting from Plan's own Evaluation which have identified a high level of community satisfaction with project outcomes.

Gender

The evaluation interviews with Chefe de Suco and community members have validated reporting from Plan detailing a high level of female involvement in the project, this has included membership of SDMC ranging from 30 to 50 percent participation rates for female community members.

Vulnerable beneficiaries/Disability

Plan Reporting indicates that 25 gender and disability sensitive community action plans have been completed for Phase One and Two respectively. These plans have been sighted by the evaluator. Interviews undertaken by the Evaluator and discussions with community members have validated the inclusion of the needs of vulnerable beneficiaries and disabled in Project Planning and implementation.

What Worked Well and What Didn't

What didn't Work Well

- UNDP and World Bank Project Cooperation beyond that mandated by the Government.
- MSSI Procurement Processes for Component Two
- PIU Management in part during 2015 and 2016 (note resignation of PIU Manager 2017)
- Delay in signing of Project Grant Agreement in 2014-2015
- Governance Process for Project in 2015-16 failed to address major delays

What worked well

- The *Programa Aprendizagem Resiliência Comunidade (PARK)*/CBDRM Materials and concept (noting some delays and need to translate some components to Tetum)
- The RMSI hazard and Risk Assessment



- Establishment/Reinstatement of SDMC by Plan
- SDMC Management of Project activities
- Community engagement in Project activity
- Plan, NDRMD, WB and MSSI ramp up of phase one, component two in first half of 2017
- Engagement of Municipalities in Project Process
- Engagement of Public Works in Project Process
- NDRMD acting as stop gap for phase one pending recruitment of Community Project Facilitators in Phase one
- The underlying philosophy of the Plan/PARK approach involving and mobilising the community bring physical and non-physical project activities in on time and below the cost of comparable Government Projects
- Cash for work component combining employment with project activities
- “Gotong Royong” approach communities providing voluntary labour to facilitate projects
- The physical projects themselves, improving road access, protecting infrastructure, enhancing livelihoods and well being
- Female engagement in SDMC and Project activities, room for improvement but sitting at around 30-50 percent for SDMC
- WB DRR Senior Specialist, key role in liaison and mobilisation following resignation of PIU Manager

Also, please note Evaluator comments against Plan Evaluation Reporting matrix below.

Evaluator comments against Plan Evaluation Reporting matrix



Plan Evaluation October 2018	MSSI appointed Evaluator comments October 2018
<p><i>How relevant were the project outputs and outcomes to the needs of community members, marginalised groups and different levels of government?</i></p> <p>PARK Process:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Well organised and inclusive community events that developed consultative maps and plans • Conducted too quickly for many of the community members to understand the process well – NDRMD methodology too formal for most participants • Risk analysis and maps produced are a good community resource, but SDMC officials require more support to be able to utilise them – similar with many Municipal and AP level officials • Link to development planning hampered by lack of appreciation of DRR integration among local and municipal level officials, which is linked to the short-term nature of the project 	<p>Confirmed through Evaluator visits and interviews</p>
<p>Community projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extremely well received by communities and officials as they found them to be very appropriate and with timely and efficient implementation • Selection process involved good community participation • Engagement with line ministries at municipal level was very high and monitoring from MDMC and AP level was strong • Selection of projects combined a DRR lens and day-to-day needs (e.g. water supply) – a practical approach that was well suited to the situation and built strong community support • The ground is prepared for follow-up support to build greater emphasis on disaster and climate change resilience and adaptation 	<p>Confirmed through Evaluator visits and interviews.</p> <p>Community members and SDMC team members indicated the community members were very happy with projects. Some comments on minor delays.</p>



<p>How appropriate was the project approach to the local context, including the specific needs of women, girls, PLWD and other marginalised groups?</p> <p>SDMC members were new and couldn't engage as much as if more time was available, therefore didn't learn as much from the process</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Content went over the heads of many community members •Evidence of good engagement with PLWD, particularly in consultation phase, specific targeting during implementation could have been higher •Even a minimal implementation period would have enabled the project to tailor the capacity development of local officials and community members – as noted in previous reports •Projects that indirectly benefitted women and girls above men and boys were encouraged and supported •More direct targeting of women and girls may have contributed to higher achievement of gendered targets 	<p>Community members and SDMC interviewed in 10 Suco confirmed inclusive nature of project ways of working.</p> <p>Lack of time was mentioned by many respondents.</p>
<p>To what extent were project activities informed by input from project stakeholders? What was their comparative level of input?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Stakeholders at community and AP levels had very high contribution to activity selection, particularly community leaders and administrators •Community members had strong input to project selection (those selected to participate in the process) •Capacity to make informed selection choices was reduced by the very short training and risk assessment processes •Municipal level (DDMC members) had clear 	<p>Broad level of satisfaction with project choice from respondents.</p> <p>Limiting factor of time constraints mentioned by many respondents.</p>



<p>engagement with approving activities, which was appropriate, but also suffered from lack of depth of DRR knowledge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Municipal Ministry of Education officials were able to influence selection by requesting emergency support to damaged schools, which was fully considered by project management at Ministry of Social Solidary (MSS), Plan and WB, indicating flexibility from all parties •Municipal level stakeholders gave more attention to the project than might have been expected, due to the relative dearth of government activities, and greatly appreciated having the project’s strong presence in the communities 	<p>Municipality representatives interviewed very happy with project outcomes.</p>
<p>Effectiveness To what extent has the project achieved its intended outputs and outcomes?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Outputs as per the project document were achieved at a high level (PARK process and community activities), with surprising quality given the time-frames •All designated outputs were achieved, and almost all targets, although no indicators of quality were designed into the project framework •Outcomes were difficult to assess, given the short-term nature of the project and a lack of clear and verifiable outcomes and indicators as described in the project documentation, as well as the lack of baseline data; however, it is possible to determine some general conclusions: •The project has significantly increased the focus of municipal and sub-municipal level officials on disaster risk reduction and activities that strengthen communities’ resilience •Levels of integration of DRR into regular planning are very low, with minimal examples 	<p>Respondents confirmed that they were generally very happy with the effectiveness of the project.</p> <p>One minor example where community members mentioned they were unhappy with a project outcome and planning process was the Grotu, water supply project where community members disagreed with location of headworks.</p> <p>Efficiency and speed of construction was frequently mentioned by respondents.</p>



<p>found, indicating that ongoing support from MSS and others is required to support any noticeable shift in behaviour</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Practical applications of DRR will be readily taken on by communities and local officials, as evidenced by the popularity of the bio engineering training and planting 	
<p>What factors contributed to the achievement of outputs/ outcomes (including contextual factors and aspects of the project approach and activities)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong collaborative planning with MSS and local officials enabled the rapid project scale-up • Entire process was consultative, through the PARK process to implementation of community activities, enabling high levels of engagement and community support • Timing of implementation during a period of very low government activity assisted the project as local officials were not otherwise occupied 	<p>The high level of engagement of Municipality staff was frequently mentioned.</p> <p>The assistance rendered by Public Works in the municipality was frequently cited.</p> <p>Consultative nature of process frequently mentioned</p>
<p>Impact & Sustainability What kind of long-term improvements in community resilience might the project contribute to and how? Difficult to judge contributions towards longer-term impact with such a short project, however, some comments can be made:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SDMCs were formed/revitalised and members given access to strong CBDRM material, increasing their potential to build disaster resilience • Exposure to alternative means of implementing community projects, combining community inputs with technical support from relevant 	<p>The enhanced role of SDMC mentioned by many respondents, many mentioned the sense of pride in SDMC doing the bulk of management and planning at community level.</p> <p>The role of SDMC in ensuring maintenance of Projects was mentioned frequently, as were budget difficulties and constraints.</p>



<p>officials, facilitates improved engagement and ownership with future interventions</p>	
<p>What aspects of the project design and approach should be replicated and scaled up and what level of support is there from different project stakeholders to facilitate replication/ scale-up?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The project’s strong capacity to integrate planning across multiple departments and ministries, with strong community engagement and leadership, provides a clear model for similar actions •The project management system for the diversity of small-scale structural activities showcases how to implement numerous activities over a wide geographic area •Municipal administrators and other key officials can be strongly engaged with similar projects, particularly when there are apparent benefits over standard government models (commonly noted were speed of implementation and value for money, by both officials and communities) 	<p>Community members mentioned the income generation aspects of the Project frequently (cash for work).</p> <p>Municipal Administrators and MSS Regional Directors mentioned the need for subsidiarity, i.e. oversight at Municipal Level rather than National Level.</p>
<p>What roles and responsibilities should different stakeholders assume to facilitate future scale-up of the project, particularly for local authorities?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •World Bank should ensure that suitable timeframes are in place for such DRR projects, as the potential for effective implementation and eventual impact is greatly reduced by timeframes of less than 12 months •MSS at national should take on stronger coordination and training role with municipal and AP officials, as well as their own MSS municipal level staff •Municipal to suco level officials should improve integration of DRR into planning (with support and training) •Implementing agencies should continue the pragmatic approach of supporting local level infrastructure, but efforts to include more 	<p>Community members mentioned that the project activities were good but “only half done” i.e. a pedestrian bridge already built should be augmented with a vehicle bridge.</p> <p>Capacity constraints of NDRMD team mentioned frequently.</p>



<p>disaster resilience is recommended, particularly against flooding, landslide and strong winds</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Selection of sucos solely on proximity to certain corridors, rather than level of risk, doesn't provide the best targeting: Scale-up should avoid such artificial parameters	
<p>Conclusions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Outputs achieved across the board and almost all indicators met• Project design was on the right track but very short timeframe was not conducive to effectiveness at outcome level• Design and implementation of community activities was extremely successful, particularly given the time constraints• Local officials at municipal level down to aldeia level were overwhelmingly positive about the project and requested expansion to other sucos and administrative posts• Householders highly appreciated the interventions	<p>Observations and interviews confirm that generally beneficiaries and officials were happy with project outputs.</p>
<p>Recommendations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Follow-up activities required to achieve outcomes of improved integration of DRR in planning• Future interventions aiming for behaviour change allow for significantly longer implementation periods• Indicators relating to behaviour change be included in similar projects• More attention to influencing the knowledge and attitudes of key officials should be a higher priority in future DRR activities	<p>All recommendations validated.</p>



- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">•MSS/NDRMD should take a more active role in supporting implementation and monitoring of similar DRR activities and should work with Municipal authorities on risk analysis and planning so that Municipal officials have active roles and there is coordination between National and Municipal levels•PARK training material for communities and SDMCs be made more practical to allow for better comprehension•DRR structural activities be more focused on mitigation of underlying livelihood and safety risks, rather than others (e.g. evacuation routes, which are also access to markets and services) | |
|--|--|