Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00002839 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-057323) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US $55.55 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN FOR A NATIONAL EMERGENCY TRANSPORT REHABILITATION PROJECT December 18,2013 Africa Transport (AFTTR) Sudan Country Department (AFCE4) Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2013) Currency Unit = Sudanese Pound (SDG) US$ 1.00 = SDG 5.70 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BP Bank Procedure CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement ESIA Environment and Social Impact Assessment ESMF Environment and Social Management Framework ESMU Environment and Social Management Unit FPP Final Project Proposal FM Financial Management GA Grant Agreement GLA Grant Letter of Agreement GONU Government of National Unity GoS Government of Sudan GOSS Government of South Sudan IA Implementing Agency ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report INA Infrastructure Needs Assessment ISR Implementation Status and Result Report JAM Joint Assessment Mission KPI Key Performance Indicators KM Kilometer MA Monitoring Agent MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund MDTF-N Multi-Donor Trust Fund for National Unity MDTF-SS Multi Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan M&E Monitoring & Evaluation MoFNE Ministry of Finance and national Economy MTRB Ministry of Transport Roads and Bridges MTR Mid-Term Review NETREP National Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project NHA National Highways Authority NTMP National Transport Master Plan OC Oversight Committee OP Operational Policies PDO Project Development Objectives PMS Pavement Management System PMT Project Management Team QAG Quality Assurance Group RTC River Transport Corporation SDG Sudanese Pound SPLM Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement SRC Sudan Railways Corporation TA Technical Assistance USD United States Dollars Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Bella Bird Country Manager: Stephan M. Mukaindo Sector Director: Jamal Saghir Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Project Team Leader: Tesfamichael Nahusenay ICR Team Leader/Primary Author: Haileyesus Adamtei REPUBLIC OF SUDAN NATIONAL EMERGENCY TRANSPORT REHABILITATION PROJECT CONTENT A. Basic Information ............................................................................................................ i  B. Key Dates ........................................................................................................................ i  C. Ratings Summary ............................................................................................................ i  D. Sector and Theme Codes................................................................................................ ii  E. Bank Staff ....................................................................................................................... ii  F. Results Framework Analysis .......................................................................................... ii  G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ....................................................................... vi  H. Restructuring (if any) .................................................................................................... vi  I. Disbursement Profile .................................................................................................... vii  1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1  2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ................................................ 12  3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 18  4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome. Rating – Substantial .......................... 26  5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 26  6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 28  7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors................... 29  Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 31  Annex 2A. Outputs by Component ................................................................................... 32  Annex 2B: Revised Results Framework and Monitoring (June 2012) ............................ 34  Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 37  Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ........... 39  Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) .................................................................. 40  Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ............................ 42  Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders .......................... 47  Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 48  Annex 10. MAP ................................................................................................................ 49 A. Basic Information SD - National Country: Sudan Project Name: Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project Project ID: P098837 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-57323 ICR Date: 12/19/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR REPUBLIC OF Lending Instrument: ERL Grantee: SUDAN Original Total USD 43.50M Disbursed Amount: USD 53.34M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 55.55M Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: Sudan Railway Corporation National Highway Authority Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 12/12/2005 Effectiveness: 10/01/2006 01/29/2007 04/09/2008 05/06/2009 Appraisal: 08/11/2006 Restructuring(s): 06/23/2011 06/22/2012 Approval: 08/28/2006 Mid-term Review: 05/11/2010 Closing: 12/31/2009 06/30/2013 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Grantee Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: i Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General transportation sector 2 Ports, waterways and shipping 25 Railways 50 26 Roads and highways 25 72 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Infrastructure services for private sector development 33 100 Trade facilitation and market access 67 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Bella Deborah Mary Bird Ishac Diwan Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Project Team Leader: Tesfamichael Nahusenay Mitiku George A. Banjo ICR Team Leader: Haileyesus Adamtei ICR Primary Author: Haileyesus Adamtei F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) To facilitate the country's economic and social recovery through improved physical access to goods, markets, and administrative and social services. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) NA ii (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Share of rural population with access to an all-season access (proportion) (i) Indicator 1 : Number of people within 2 km of all-season access Value quantitative or 0 248,000 None 287,000 Qualitative) Date achieved 01/29/2007 06/30/2011 06/22/2012 05/31/2013 People living within 2 km of the Babanusa-Wau rail line, Kadugli-Kaouda road Comments (Lot B), Gadamai- Hamshkorieb road and Damazin -Kurmuk road section 2. No (incl. % data for share of rural population collected. Indicator revised during achievement) restructuring. Direct/ Indirect project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage)-(i) Indicator 2 : Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage); (ii) Indirect project beneficiaries (number), 301,500 people- Value Direct 287,000 quantitative or 0 287,000 people beneficiaries- people Qualitative) female (48 %); Date achieved 01/29/2007 06/30/2011 06/30/2013 05/31/2013 Comments People living within 2 km of Babanusa-Wau rail line, Kadugli-Kaouda road (Lot (incl. % B) Gadamai- Hamshkorieb road and Damazin-Kurmuk road section 2. Indicator achievement) revised during restructuring. Average travel time to closest market, health facilities, administrative services Indicator 3 : and nearest school (Rail- Hours average) Value The rail line was out of quantitative or None 15 Hrs service. Qualitative) Date achieved 01/29/2007 05/11/2010 12/31/2010 Comments (incl. % Reduction in travel time on Babanusa-Wau rail line achievement) Average travel time to closest market, health facility, administrative centers and Indicator 4 : schools - Roads (Hours average) Value quantitative or 11.6 2 Hrs 2 Hrs Qualitative) Date achieved 05/11/2010 07/28/2013 05/31/2013 Comments Average travel time on Gadamai- Hamshkorieb, Kadugli - Kaouda, Damazin - (incl. % Kurmuk roads. Indicator revised during restructuring. achievement) Indicator 5 : Travel volume (freight) - rail (ton/annum) Value Rail line was out of quantitative or 650 ton per annum None 650,000 service Qualitative) iii Date achieved 01/29/2007 05/11/2010 05/11/2010 12/31/2010 Comments Total volume of freight along Babanusa-Wau rail line. Indicator revised during (incl. % restructuring. achievement) Indicator 6 : Travel volume - roads (Number of medium trucks /day) Value quantitative or None 120 None 320 Qualitative) Date achieved 01/29/2007 06/30/2011 06/22/2012 05/31/2013 Comments Gadamiai -Hamashkorieb, Kadugli -Kaouda and Damazin - Kurmuk roads. (incl. % Indicator revised during restructuring. achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Rail line rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 446 km None 446 km or Qualitative) Date achieved 01/29/2007 06/30/2010 06/30/2010 12/31/2010 Comments The rail line rehabilitation was completed in February 2010 and providing (incl. % service after 25 years of closure achievement) Action Plan for Private Sector Participation in Railway Sector adopted by Indicator 2 : Ministry Value (quantitative New Yes None Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/11/2010 06/30/2010 06/30/2010 12/31/2011 Comments (incl. % The study was completed in August in 2010 and action plan adopted achievement) Action Plan for Port Sudan Trade Facilitation adopted by Ministry and Indicator 3 : recommendations under implementation Value (quantitative New Yes None Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/11/2010 06/30/2010 06/30/2010 05/29/2011 Comments (incl. % Study completed in August 2010 and action plan adopted achievement) Indicator 4 : Diagnostic study of the regulatory body in the River Transport Sector completed Value (quantitative New Yes None Yes or Qualitative) iv Date achieved 05/11/2010 12/31/2010 12/31/2010 05/29/2011 Comments Diagnostic study completed and recommendations regarding organizational (incl. % framework and functions implemented. achievement) Indicator 5 : Environment and Social assessment Framework adopted Value (quantitative New None Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 01/31/2007 05/11/2010 05/29/2011 Comments (incl. % Framework adopted by the High Council for Environment achievement) Indicator 6 : Environment and Social Assessment Unit Established under the Ministry Value (quantitative New Yes None Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 01/31/2007 09/30/2008 05/11/2010 06/30/2012 Comments (incl. % ESMU established under MTRB and focal person assigned in NHA and SRC achievement) Indicator 7 : Roads rehabilitated, Rural, km Value (quantitative 0 112 None 112 or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/11/2010 06/30/2011 06/30/2011 05/29/2011 Comments Rehabilitations of Gadamai-Hamashkorieb ( 81.5 km) road & Kadugli-Kaouda (incl. % road Lot B ( 30 km) achievement) Indicator 8 : Roads rehabilitated, Non-rural, km Value (quantitative 0 93 45 38 km or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/11/2010 06/30/2011 06/22/2012 02/28/2013 Comments Rehabilitation of Damazin-Kurmuk road section 2 completed to all-weather (incl. % gravel road. Indicator revised during restructuring. achievement) Indicator 9 : Feasibility and detailed design studies for new roads, km Value (quantitative 0 995 None 945 km or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/11/2010 06/30/2011 06/30/2011 06/30/2011 Comments Feasibility and design activities for 945 km (based on final design) of national (incl. % and rural roads completed in June 2011.About 20% of these are under achievement) construction through funding from other funding agencies. Staff trained in planning, budgeting, financing [specific areas ] (number) - (for Indicator 10 : all components), No. Value None- to be (quantitative 0 None 67 determined or Qualitative) v Date achieved 01/29/2007 01/29/2007 05/11/2010 05/31/2013 Comments (incl. % 67 NHA staff had short term training in procurement, budgeting and finance. achievement) Indicator 11 : Feeder and community access road program prepared Value (quantitative No Yes None Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 01/29/2007 05/11/2010 05/11/2010 06/30/2012 Comments Feeder roads and community access development plan and and design and (incl. % bidding document for selected roads in the three states were delivered in June achievement) 2012 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) Moderately 1 06/23/2008 Moderately Satisfactory 5.71 Unsatisfactory 2 12/24/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.95 3 06/28/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.87 Moderately 4 11/30/2009 Moderately Satisfactory 14.16 Unsatisfactory Moderately 5 04/06/2010 Moderately Satisfactory 22.72 Unsatisfactory 6 06/10/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 24.18 7 01/04/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 30.14 8 08/24/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 41.85 9 03/11/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 45.34 10 10/29/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 47.24 11 05/21/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 47.41 Moderately 12 07/01/2013 Moderately Satisfactory 47.42 Unsatisfactory H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions (i) transferring responsibility for implementing river transport related activities from RTC to 04/09/2008 N 5.71 MTRB;(ii)dropping procurement of equipment for port operation,(iii) reallocation of funds vi ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions (i) AF($43.75m) to increase allocations for road improvements;(ii) reallocations funds and dropping of some 05/06/2009 N MS MS 11.85 river transport activities; (iii) cancellation of $19.75 m from the Grant; and (iv) provision of TA, and extension of project closing date to June 30,2011 (i) Reallocation of funds;(ii) repackaging of works contracts and dropping of some 06/23/2011 N S MS 39.17 activities; and (iii) extension of project closing date to June 30,2012 (i) reallocation of funds to complete on going works;(ii)dropping of some activities that would not be implemented under the project; 06/22/2012 N MS MS 46.37 (iii) revision of targets; (iv) cancellation of $US2.8 m from the Grant; and (v) extension of project closing date to June 30,2013 I. Disbursement Profile vii 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. At the time of appraisal in 2006, with a land area of 2.5 million square kilometers, Sudan was the largest country in Africa and the ninth largest country in the world. Its land area encompasses dense forest in the south and desert in the north, and contains 32 percent of the Sub Saharan African irrigable lands.1 Although well-endowed with natural resources, Sudan’s economic performance has been substantially below its potential. Per capita income for the year 2006 was about US$ 1085.2 2. The civil war, which lasted more than 20 years, and the related governance failures have had an adverse effect on Sudan’s development.. The war ended in January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Among others, key features of the CPA were the formation of Government of National Unity (GONU) and establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) with extensive autonomy and inclusion of special provisions for the three conflict-affected areas in northern Sudan, namely: South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei (referred to hereafter as the Three Areas). 3. The civil war had a devastating effect in terms of loss of human life, destruction of infrastructure and social services, and internal displacement of people. As a result, large parts of Sudan were isolated and underdeveloped with very minimal access to basic services and infrastructure; this was particularly the case in the South, war-affected areas of the North, West, East; and the Three Areas. Indeed, the country was characterized by wide disparities along regional lines, between urban and rural areas, and by gender. 3 Beyond widespread human suffering, the conflict resulted in isolation from the international community and limited development assistance. 4. The signing of the CPA in January 2005 provided an unprecedented window of opportunity to turn the devastation of years of war, displacement, and underdevelopment into a new era of peace and prosperity. The strategy for meeting the reconstruction and development needs of Sudan was initiated in January 2004 by forming a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) which produced a comprehensive report on the strategy and priority areas for reconstruction and development requirements of the country. 5. The challenges of Sudan's reconstruction called for an unprecedented response by the international community, both in terms of funding and in terms of coordination of the reconstruction effort. In a series of donor meetings during the 2003-2005 periods, donors agreed on the need for advanced planning for, and effective coordination of, the reconstruction 1 Irrigation Investment Needs in Sub-Saharan Africa, June 2008 2 World Development Indicators 3 Sudan JAM Final report, Volume 1: Framework 1 6. Process as well as overall leadership of GONU and GOSS. It was in this context that the formation of Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) was conceived. 7. As part of the wealth-sharing protocol, the CPA called for the creation of two Multi- Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs): one for the Government of National Unity (MDTF-N), and one for the Government of South Sudan (MDTF-SS). The two TF were officially established following the Oslo conference in April 2005. Donors from more than 10 countries, including the European Union (EU), pledged over US$500 million. The World Bank made a historic contribution of US$10 million from its net income. 8. MTDF-N (TF057323) was established for the war-affected areas in the north (including the Three Areas), MDTF-SS (TF054777) was established for the rehabilitation and improvement of basic services in Southern Sudan. After considering different options, the GoS and the SPLM requested the World Bank to administrator both MDTFs. The rationale for the World Bank’s involvement as fiduciary administrator was that, given its worldwide experience and expertise in institution building in conflict-affected areas, and its experience in transport infrastructure projects in post-conflict environments, the Bank was uniquely positioned to manage the MDTF. The Bank also supported the reconstruction and development efforts by playing a coordinating role among development partners and the Government. 9. The MDTF-N is governed by an Oversight Committee (OC) consisting of representatives from the Government of National Unity, Development Partners, together with the World Bank as administrator of the fund and associated projects. The National Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project (NETREP) for which this ICR is being prepared, was one of the projects conceived within the framework of the MDTF-N to improve selected transport infrastructure considered critical to enhancing the benefits of the peace agreement by focusing on the Three Areas. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators4 10. The development objectives of the project as outlined in the Final Project Proposal (FPP) were to facilitate the country’s economic and social recovery through improved physical access to goods, markets, and administrative and social services. 11. To achieve the PDO, the project focused on two key trade routes linking the North and the South with Port Sudan, namely: (i) the Wau-Khartoum-Port Sudan corridor; and (ii) the Port Sudan – Kosti – Malakal – Juba corridor. The other focus was on addressing the isolation of communities in the three conflict-affected areas in northern Sudan, namely: South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. 4 Due to the emergency nature of the project, the PDO indicators at approval were generic, and specific, measureable, attainable and realistic targets were established at the Mid-term review in May 2010. 2 12. To attain the project development objective, NETREP was designed with three broad components : (i) removing key transport bottlenecks that seriously hamper trade and recovery efforts; (ii) providing equipment and technical assistance related to operation, maintenance and supervision of works, thereby building capacity in management, implementation and subsequent operation and maintenance; and (iii) strengthening multi-modal operations and improving sector management capabilities of the Government 13. The project was designed as an emergency operation to contribute as quickly as possible to economic recovery and peace-building by restoring existing assets and improving access to basic services. The NETREP was prepared, from concept stage to approval in 12 months, and designed to have an implementation period of 36 months, consistent with the expected tenure of the MDTFs. Given the emergency nature of the intervention and the limited available information, the focus in defining the results framework at design stage was rightly placed on measurable outputs rather than more nebulous outcomes in a post-conflict environment, to measure progress towards the attainment of the PDO. Accordingly, monitoring was envisaged to focus on the physical deliverables, when they would become functional and timeliness of other interventions. 14. The key PDO performance indicators were: 1. Rural accessibility is improved in areas affected by project investments; 2. Time taken for villagers to reach closest markets and services reduced; 3. Cost of key commodities reduced in villages and towns affected by project investments; 4. Training of staff provided and basic capacity restored/increased in implementing agencies; 5. Normal traffic operations resumed on the key rail and waterway arteries to facilitate movements on the key import/export links; 6. The civil works, equipment and subsequent operation and maintenance financed through the project provide employment for the local population in all rehabilitations, operations and maintenance activities. 1.2.1 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification5 15. While the PDO and expected outcomes remained unchanged, key outcome indicators were changed four times during the course of implementation: at the time of additional financing (AF) in May 2009, at the Mid Term Review in May 2010, during project restructurings in 2011; and 2012. The main reasons for the changing the KPI were to make them specific and measurable, to introduce the Bank’s core indicators, and to try and ensure that, as better information became available, the substantive outcomes associated with the project were better reflected in the formal monitoring framework. Table 1 provides the changes made to the PDO indicators in the course of project implementation. 5 List of indicators presented in the datasheet are based on changes made during restructuring, see Table 1 below and Annex B for more details. 3 16. As the modifications mainly reflected changes to outcome indicators, changes in project scope, cancellation of project activities, and extension of grant closing dates, all restructurings were treated as Level 2, and approved by the Country Director. 17. For comparison purposes, the original and the final (June 2012) PDO indicators and intermediate KPI are presented in Annex 2B: Revised Results Framework and Monitoring. 4 Table 1 : Change of PDO indicators in the course of project implementation Original Revised Outcome Indicators FPP, 20061 AF, May 20092 MTR - AM; May 20103 Restructuring June Restructuring June 20114 20125 Original closing date : Closing date extended to Closing date remains as Closing date extended to Closing date extended to December 31, 2009 June 30, 2011 June 30, 2011 June 30, 2012 June 30, 2013 Rural accessibility is improved in Increase in access to an Share of rural population Number of people with Number of people with areas affected by project all-season road with access to all -season all-season access ( all-season access investments access (proportion) ; (i) roads/rail) (roads/rail) Number of people with 2 km of all season access (number ) Time taken for villagers to reach Reduction in average Travel time on selected Travel time on selected Travel time on selected closest markets and services travel time to closest routes (rail, road)- hrs. routes routes reduced market, health clinic, average;  Ba Babanusa-Wau • Ba Babanusa-Wau Rail- primary school & Rail-hrs; hrs; administrative center  Kadugli-Kauda Road, •Kadugli-Kauda Road, hrs.; hrs.;  Hamshakorieb- • Hamshakorieb-Gedamai Gedamai road, hrs.; road, hrs.;  Damazin-Kurmuk, • Damazin-Kurmuk, road road hrs. hrs. Cost of key commodities reduced Travel volume for Travel volume for in villages and towns affected by  rail (Babanusa-Wau) – • rail (Babanusa-Wau) – project investments; ton ton  road (Gadamai- • road (Gadamai- Hamashkorieb; Hamashkorieb;  Damazin- Kurmuk; • Damazin- Kurmuk; Kadougli – Kaouda) Kadougli – Kaouda) – Number of Medium – Number of Medium Trucks/day Trucks/day Training of staff provided and Reduced incidence of Travel time to market, health Direct project Share of rural population capacity increased in implementing slowdown and derailment facilities administrative beneficiaries (number), with access to an all- Agencies on Babanusa-Wau to Wau centers and nearest school, of which female (%) season road (proportion) rail line hrs- Average 5 Normal traffic operations on the Travel volume (freight) in Roads in good and fair key rail and waterway arteries to selected routes condition as a share of facilitate movements on the key  Rail (Babanusa-Wau)- total classified network import/export links Ton/annum; roads Supplemental  Road (Gadamai- value: Size of the total Hamashkoreib; Damazin- classified network: Kurmuk; Kadugli-Kaouda) Breakdown: No. of medium trucks/day;  Ferry (Sobat river) Ton/annual Additionally, the civil works, Direct/Indirect project Direct Project equipment and subsequent beneficiaries (No.) of which Beneficiaries (number), operation and maintenance female (%); of which female (%) financed through the project will  Direct project beneficiaries provide employment for the local (no.) of which female (%); population in all rehabilitation and  Indirect project subsequent operation and beneficiaries (no.) of maintenance activities which female (%) Note: 1. Final Project Proposal, August 2006 4. Restructuring paper, June 2011 2. Additional Financing, May 2009 5. Restructuring Paper, June 2012 3. Mid Term Review Aide Memoire, May 2010. Base line target were established for the first time. 6 1.3 Main Beneficiaries 18. The main beneficiaries as described in the FPP were: (i) the transport construction industry and users of road, rail and waterway transport facilities throughout Sudan; and (ii) the local population in the hinterland of project interventions, including communities in the Three Areas. In addition, staff of the implementing agencies that received training also benefited from the project. 19. Through the project, critical rail and road links were rehabilitated providing all weather transport access to 261,000 and 26,000 residents in the serviced hinterland of the infrastructure respectively, thereby improving greater improving the integration of people and communities, and indirectly facilitating economic and social cohesion of the country. The project also enabled the communities living along the roads to benefit from growth in trade and various economic activities, such as increased employment opportunities, improved accessibility to markets and essential social services such as health and education; and marked reductions in travel time. 1.4 Original Components 20. NETREP consisted of three components: Component 1 was to cover rail related activities and some interventions to promote multi-modal operations at Port Sudan and improve sector management; Component 2 was to focus on activities related to river transport; and Component 3 was to improve accessibility mainly through the rehabilitation of roads in the Three Areas. Components 1, 2 and 3 were to be implemented independently by the Sudan Rail Corporation (SRC), River Transport Corporation (RTC) and the National Highway Authority (NHA) respectively. The Sudan Port Corporation (SPC) was to assist RTC with the physical works of river port development activities; and the Inland River Navigation Department was to assist with the studies related to dredging and hydrographic survey of the White Nile. The MTRB through its Planning Unit coordinated project activities and monitored progress of implementation. 21. The original components consisted of the following activities:  Component 1: Rehabilitation of critical rail infrastructure and services which consists of: (i) rehabilitation of Babanousa-Wau railway line; (ii) de-mining related to rehabilitation of Babanousa-Wau railway line; (iii) rehabilitation of Bridge number 353 on the Khartoum to Port Sudan rail section; (iv) rail connections to the container depot in the Damadama area of Port Sudan; (v) improvement of rail connections at existing and new Port at Kosti; (vi) studies on enhancing private sector participation in railway operations; (vii) support for project management; (viii) enhancement of sector management capacity; and (ix) improving inter- modal operations at Port Sudan.  Component 2: Improvements to River Transport Services which consists of: (i) Provision of equipment in support of port operation; (ii) concessioning of the 7 new port at Kosti; (iii) study to establish emergency dredging and navigational needs; and (iv) support for project implementation including targeted institutional development and capacity building activities.  Component 3: Road improvements with focus on the Three Areas which consists of: (i) Spot improvements on Kadougli to Kaouda road (135 km) and section 2 of the E’ Damazin to El Kurmuk road (55km) and Hamashkraid to El Gahwa road (90 km); (ii) de-mining associated with road design and improvement activities; (iii) detailed design of Abu Jubayah to Talodi to Kadugli road (310 km), Damazin to Geissan road (160 km) and Toker to Garora road (215 km); (iv) feasibility studies and detailed design of Geissan to Kurmuk road (160 km), Damazin to Renk road (200 km), Kadugli to Hegleig road (170 km), and Muglad to Abyei road (160 km); and (v) project management and institutional development and capacity building including: (a) carrying out of various studies on sustainable road sector financing, road safety and axle load control; (b) establishment of pavement management system; (c) improvements to materials testing laboratory; and (d) training, workshops, study tours and targeted TA. 1.5 Revised Components 22. As a result of a government decision to privatize the RTC, those related elements of Component 2 were cancelled and the Grant Agreement revised to reflect the necessary changes in implementing arrangements. The RTC Subsidiary Agreement was terminated, all related activities were cancelled, and responsibilities of implementing those remaining activities were transferred to MTRB. The changes were formalized through an amendment of the Grant Letter in April 2008. Accordingly the revised components and implementation arrangements were as follows:  Component 1: Rehabilitation of critical rail infrastructure and service would be implemented by Sudan Railways Corporation (SRC);  Component 2: Institutional Strengthening and improvements to River Transport Services. This component would include the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges activities and the residual old Component 2 activities. This component would be implemented by the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges; and  Component 3: Roads improvements with focus on the three areas would be implemented by the National Highway Authority (NHA). 23. In addition to revising components, further changes were made to a number of other activities within each component. This was done on four occasions through project restructuring, primarily to respond to various emerging needs during implementation, and a change in the priorities of the GoS. The table below summarizes changes made to the project components/activities during the course of implementation. 8 Table 2: Revised Components and activities during project implementation Original Components6 Changes When, timing of Reasons made restructuring Component 1: Rehabilitation of critical rail infrastructure and services (i) de-mining related to rehabilitation of Dropped June 2011, This was seen as a priority and Babanousa-Wau railway line Restructuring so financed from GoNU funds. The allocated funds within the project were reallocated to other activities (ii) Rehabilitation of Bridge Number 353 on Dropped 1st grant This was seen as a priority and the Khartoum to Port Sudan rail section amendment, April so financed from GoNU 2008 funds. The allocated funds within the project were reallocated to other activities (iii) Rail connections to the container depot Dropped 2nd Grant This was seen as a priority and in the Damadama area of Port Sudan Amendment 19 so financed from GoNU March 2009 funds. The allocated funds within the project were reallocated to other activities (iv) Improving rail connections at existing Dropped 1st grant This was seen as a priority and and new Port at Kosti; amendment, April so financed from GoNU 2008 funds. The allocated funds within the project were reallocated to other activities (v) Studies on enhancing private sector Moved to 1st grant For better management of the participation in railway operations; Component 2 amendment, April activity with MTRB as 2008 IA (vi) Enhancement of sector management Moved to 1st grant For better management of the capacity; and improving inter- modal Component 2 amendment, April activity operations at Port Sudan with MTRB as 2008 IA Component 2: Institutional Strengthening and Improvements to River Transport Services (i) Provision of Equipment in Support of Dropped June 2012, Partly due to privatization of port operation; (and purchase of ferry restructuring RTC and partly due to boat for Sobat River) separation of South Sudan (ii) Concessioning of the new port at Kosti; Dropped 1st grant Dropped due to privatization amendment, April of the RTC 2008 (iii) Study to establish emergency dredging Dropped 2nd Grant Dropped due to privatization and navigational needs; Amendment 19 of the RTC March 2009 (iv) Hydrographic survey Dropped 2nd Grant Dropped due to privatization Amendment March of the RTC 2009 (AF) (v) Support for project implementation No change 1st grant Responsibilities for including targeted institutional amendment, April implementing the studies were development and capacity building 2008 transferred to MTRB 6 As describes in the original Letter Agreement, 29 October 2006 9 Component 3: Road Improvements with focus on the Three Areas (i) Spot improvements on: Only about 30 June 2011, A 105 km section was (a) Kadougli to Kaouda road (135 km was Restructuring financed by the GoNU. Scope km); financed by of the technical intervention the project changed from the original intention, so cost increased. (b) Section 2 of the E’ Damazin to El Activity June 2012, Scope of the technical Kurmuk road (55km); continued but Restructuring intervention changed from the scope changed original intention (c) Hamashkraib to El Gahwa road No change Scope of the technical intervention changed from the original intention (ii) De-mining g associated with road Dropped 2nd Grant This was seen as a priority and designs and improvement activities Amendment March so financed from GoNU 2009 (AF) funds. The allocated funds within the project were reallocated to other activities (iii) Feasibility studies and detailed design June 2011, of (a) Geissan to Kurmuk road (160 Restructuring Dropped due to security km) Dropped reasons (b) Kadugli to Hegleig road (170 km Dropped June 2011, Dropped due to non-clearance Restructuring of mines 1.6 Other significant changes 24. Project restructuring: During the course of implementation, to address emerging challenges, the project was restructured four times: in April 2008, May 2009, June 2011 and June 2012. The main reasons for project restructured were: (a) financing re- arrangement between MDTF and GONU, with the latter keen to accelerate the implementation of some priority components from their own resources, the change of implementing agency and the resulting reallocation of funds within and among components; (b) requirements for additional financing; and (c) dropping of activities reflecting the privatization of RTB and changes in scope of some of the remaining interventions (changing from gravel to asphalt surfacing for a number of the road sections necessitating reallocation and an AF to cover the increased costs) to respond to emerging challenges. As a result of these changes, the project closing date has been extended three times: in 2009, 2011 and 2012. Details of the changes are presented in Table 3. Table 3: Details of restructuring It. Project Restructuring Changes made Reason for change Implication on the project Date 1 Amendment to  Termination of RTC  Government Policy to  Changes of project cost the Grant Subsidiary Agreement privatize RTC estimate from original Agreement,  Dropping of all commercial  Changes in cost US$140.36 m to April 2008 activities related to RTC from estimate and design US$129.07m NETREP approaches since the  Except works, all other  Reallocation of funds within project was approved activities to be financed and among components 100% from MDTF  Change of implementing  Work related activities agency for component 2 from continue to be funded with RTC to MTRB one to two ratio between 10  Change of financing MDTF and GONU arrangement between MDTF and GONU( without changing the ceiling) 2 Amendment to  Provision of AF in the amount  Scope change to  AF in the amount of the Grant of US$43.75 million works component: US$43.75 provided raising Agreement ,  Cancellation of RTC activities Damazin-Kurmuk (57 the MDTF portion to March 2009;AF (Hydrographic survey of the km) to be upgraded US$87.25 Project Paper White Nile and study to from gravel to  Avail additional resources May 2009 establish emergency dredging) asphalt; and the to institutional  Extension of project closing whole section of strengthening activities date Kadugli-Kaouda and works components (135 km ) to be  Project closing date improved extended from 31  Privatization of RTC December 2009 to 30 June  Project closing date 2011 extended to allow completion of additional works 3 June 2011  Reallocation of funds within  Reallocation of funds  As result of contract re- and among components was required to packaging, Damzin-  Dropping of activities that optimize benefits Kurmuk section 1 would be would not be implemented  Decision was made to 100% financed from under the project re- focus on activities MDTF up to sub base  Repackaging of the civil work that would help to  The base and asphalt works contract of section one of the achieve the PDO were agreed to be financed Damazine – Kurmuk Road.  Project closing date by the Government  Extension of the project extended to allow  Project closing date closing date completion of on- extended to 30 June 2012 going activities, and thus achievement of PDO  Cancellation of unutilized funds 4 June 2012  Repackaging of the Damazine  Government request  Damazin Kurmuk section – Kurmuk road and trading off to utilize the funds 1 was dropped from funds between the two sections earmarked by the MDTF, and taken up by the of the road as proposed by the MDTF-N for section local administration. Government 1 (US$6.59), to meet  Project closing date  Relocation of funds from compensation extended from 30 June contract 1 to contract 2 of requirement of the 2012 to 30 June 2013 Damazin Kurmuk road to contractor’s claims on meet the Government’s section 2, request  Purchase of boat was  Dropping of purchase of ferry dropped due to the boat that was to be provided to separation of the Sobat River South Sudan;  Reallocation funds  Extension required to  Extension of the project ensure completion of closing date road construction work and other on- going activities  Cancellation of unutilized funds 11 25. Extension of project closing dates: The project closing date was extended three times: (i) at the time of AF in May 2009; (ii) at the third project restructuring in 2011; and (iii) at the last restructuring in June 2012. The first extension from the original closing date of December 2009 to June 2011 was required to allow sufficient time for completing the additional works included as result of the AF. The second and third extensions, from June 2011 to June 2012 and then to June 2013 were required to allow completion of on-going activities and ensure achievements of the PDO. 26. Financing Arrangements: The original financing arrangement for all activities was on a one to two ratio for MDTF-N and GoNU respectively. However, this arrangement was changed during the first Grant Amendment in April 2008. Consequently, it was agreed that the one to two ratio for MDTF-N and GoNU respectively be maintained only for works, and all other expenditure related to services and trainings be 100% funded from the MDTF-N. Grant Cancellation: A total amount of US$31.70 million was eventually cancelled from the grant amount due to: (i) mis-procurement associated the taking-over of sections A,C,D, and E of Kadugli-Kaouda road by the respective local Government that awarded a contract to a local contractor, while the procurement process under NETREP (US$19.75 million) remained underway; (ii) In addition, there was cost savings from various activities including PMS (US$5.95 million), which were cancelled consistent with OP/BP 13.25 7 , and (iii) unutilized funds from Damazin-Kurmuk road section-2 (US$6.0 million). Thus, the allocation to the project from the MDTF-N was finally reduced from US$87.25million to US$55.55 million. (A summary of the original and final Grant allocation is presented in Annex 1). 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 27. Although some activities of the project were dropped, and some taken forward with parallel support from the GoNU outside the project,, NETREP is considered to have achieved its objective of facilitating the country’s economic and social recovery through improved physical access to goods, markets, and administrative and social services as an all-weather road was provided along the Demazin – Kurmuk, Kadugli - Kaouda and Gadamai-Hamashkorieb road sections; and the Babanusa-Wau rail line was restored and became operational after 25 years under the project. 28. However, implementation of the project was confronted by a number of challenges soon after effectiveness, which is possibly not surprising in an emergency operation in such a fluid context, including the secession of South Sudan. Key factors affecting implementation were the relatively weak capacity of the implementing agencies, the changes in the priorities of the GoNU, delays in release of counterpart funds 7 Project Restructuring Paper, June 2012. 12 and security issues. More detailed information on the factors affecting implementation is provided in the relevant section below. 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 29. Soundness of background analysis: NETREP was designed as an emergency intervention to support the immediate recovery and peace-building effort in the country as per the JAM framework. The selected road and rail corridors were the most critical routes to connect conflict affected areas and remove isolation of the population thereby bringing cohesion of the country - which was directly related to achieving the objectives of the CPA. The project was considered to be timely, was delivered in an impressively short period of time, and is considered to have contributed in a substantive manner to sustainable peace building in Sudan. 30. Due to highly fragile and post conflict environment, and hence absence of active construction market at appraisal and the difficulties of conducting robust surveys ex ante, detailed cost estimates were difficult to generate at appraisal, and hence reliance was placed on comparative estimates for similar interventions in similar contexts, together with a risk premium to reflect the particular circumstances. . 31. Lessons from previous emergency infrastructure projects were taken into account during preparation, as were a number of other sources including: (i) the detailed assessment of the transport sector to better understand sectorial issues; and (ii) the capacity assessment of implementing agencies with regard to procurement, financial management and disbursement. As a result, major risks were identified and mitigation measures put in place. 32. Assessment of Project Design: The project was designed with the objectives that were relevant at the time and was responsive to the needs of Sudan in the early post conflict period. A detailed review of the existing transport sector situation (including financial and procurement assessments) was undertaken which provided a very solid foundation, for a post-conflict environment, to identify and implement the project. 33. Because of pressing needs at the time for reconstruction and recovery, NETREP was designed to provide financing to the Government for rehabilitation works combined with policy advice, institutional development and reform assistance; all of which are essential for long-term sustainability of investments in the road sector. The project was considered to be designed in a flexible manner to permit rapid responses to changing circumstances, and allow adjustments (through restructuring) to the size and scope of components as implementation progressed. 34. To mitigate capacity constraints in the sector, the overall project management responsibilities were entrusted to Project Management Teams (PMT) established in each IA. This arrangement, together with other technical assistances, contributed to ensuring local ownership and strengthened institutional capacities of the IAs. 35. The overall design, however, was ambitious in that it attempted to address sectorial issues in a single operation in a very short period of time: from railway 13 rehabilitation, road improvements, detail engineering design of 945 km and feeder roads development study to capacity building and institutional strengthening - all in 3 years. There was no explanation provided in the project documents as why the project was designed to be implemented only in 36 months, although the suspicion is that it was tied in some way to the perceived duration of the MDTF.. However, given the scope and scale of the project, inadequate implementation capacity at the time, and security uncertainties, it was with the benefit of hindsight unrealistic that such a project could be implemented and achieve its objectives in only 3 years. This was borne out by the fact that the project eventually required 6.5 years of implementation. 36. Risks and Mitigation: The risk assessment undertaken at appraisal classified the project as a high risk in terms of financial management, procurement and security issues. Security issues were rightly identified as the primary risks to implementation and appropriate mitigation measures were beyond the control of the project. Additional risks were seen as: (i) lack of capacity and experience in using World Bank Guidelines and procedures; (ii) limited local consulting and contracting industry; and (iii) potential delays in demining activities. The rating of the risk associated with the timely release of counterpart funds appeared to overestimate the GoNU’s financial situation at the time; rated as low. During the course of project implementation, the provision of counterpart funds became a major challenge as early as 12 months in project implementation. a. Lack of capacity and experience in using Bank Guidelines and procedures: this was identified at appraisal as potential risk to implementation and dedicated PMTs were established in each implementing agency (IA) to mitigate the problem. The PMTs were staffed with experts seconded from each IA and were supported by external experts as and when needed. Each PMT was responsible for implementation of its respective component. This arrangement contributed to the success of the project although did not bring the required level of implementation support. b. Fiduciary risk: Given the number of activities, weak institutional arrangements, absence of financial rules and regulation, the FM risk was high. To minimize these risks additional FM arrangements were put in place, including: (i) recruitment of consultants to support the financial management staff of the IAs; (ii) the use of direct payments; (iii) use of parallel accounting records to reflect project activities; and (iv) submission of monthly and quarterly progress reports by the PMTs. The internal audit and expenditures were monitored by a Monitoring Agent (MA) hired by the Bank to assist all projects funded by MDTF. The project was audited by Sudan Auditor General according to international standards. All these arrangements have positively contributed to the performance of the project. c. General security risk. This was mainly associated with resumption of conflicts in the conflict affected areas of Sudan and was largely outside the control of the project. Although the issue was discussed at appraisal, there was no concrete mitigation measure put in place. Indeed, conflict in the Blue Nile area had disrupted the construction of Damazin - Kurmuk road which led to suspension of the contract in September 2011 and eventual termination in March 2013 without the works being completed. 14 37. As an emergency operation, the project did not go through a Quality-at-Entry review by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG). 2.2 Implementation 38. The major factors that contributed to the slow implementation of the project were related to scope changes, inadequate capacity of the IA, delays in release of counterpart funds and uncertainty of security issues. To address problems arising during implementation, the project was restructured four times and closing date extended three times to allow completion of on-going activities. The following paragraphs provide a summary of each factor that contributes to the slow progress of the project. 39. Scope changes: The project initially sought to reestablish basic transport services in the war affected areas through spot improvement and maintenance of the existing roads. However, because of heavy deterioration on Damazin - Kurmuk road, spot improvement was no longer the preferred option, and required upgrading of the road to a higher standard which caused delays in the startup of the operation and excessively increasing the cost. 40. Implementation capacity constraints: Although attempts were made to mitigate capacity constraints by establishing dedicated PMTs in each IA, the PMT lack qualified personnel, particularly for procurement activities and M&E. This has contributed to the delays in implementation of project activities. 41. Insecurity and clearing of landmines: Some project sites, especially roads, experienced security challenges during implementation. Design works were cancelled on Kadugli - Heglige section and Damazin – Geissan– Kurmuk roads due to presence of mines; and road construction works were terminated on Damazin - Kurmuk section due to ongoing conflict in the Blue Nile States. These problems negatively affect the outcomes of the project. 42. Delays in release of counterpart fund: The financing arrangement being joint between the GoNU and the MDTF has also affected implementation as the Government was unable to meet its obligation of availing counterpart funds on a timely manner. Timely release of counterpart funds was a challenge throughout project implementation negatively affecting progress, and at times, was put as a condition by contractors for completing outstanding works.8 43. Contract Termination and Construction Claims: The conflict in the Blue Nile State had left a negative impact on the overall project performance as part of the Damazin - Kurmuk road; section 2 had to be terminated in March 2013 before completion. The situation was beyond the control of project and was considered as force majeure. As per the Government’s proposal, the MDTF-N allocation for the gravel works on Damazin - 8 Project Implementation Status and Results Report Numbers 11 & 12 15 Kurmuk road section 1 was swapped with the provision for compensation (settlement of claims) for section 2. The proposal was to utilize the amount of US$6.59 million earmarked by the MDTF-N for section 1 to meet the compensation of the Contractor’s claims on section 2. Thus section 1 was dropped from NETREP. The Government took over the responsibility of financing the outstanding works for section 1, and the contractor’s claim in the amount of US$6.55 million for damages sustained due to the force majeure and termination of the contract has been paid from the Grant amount.9 44. Mid-Term Review (MTR): A midterm review was not envisaged at preparation. As implementation progressed, it was agreed to hold MTR (ISR#3) to review project implementation and planned for November 2009. The MTR actually held in May 2010 and confirmed that the project was likely to achieve its objectives at completion of project activities. By the time of the MTR, most of the activities in component 1, 2, and 3 were either completed or progressing well. The review identified the following issues as the main reasons for delays in implementation: (i) logistics problems in some project sites because of the remoteness of the sites from administrative centers, (ii) presence of mines and delays in demining activities, (iii) delays in procurement process; and (iv) delays in release of counterpart funds; and suggested recommendations to improve the situation. The main outcome of the MTR, however, was establishing baseline and target data for PDO and intermediate KPIs which were then used monitor the progress of the project. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 45. M&E Design: The emergency nature of the project and post conflict environment meant that obtaining information for the baseline data was extremely challenging. According to the design, monitoring and evaluation was to focus on outputs and results, which were to be measured by the project and contracted specialists. The project was to utilize existing data sources supplemented by regular routine data collection, and further updates to be carried out by contracted specialists. As such, the project focused on monitoring whether physical deliverables are produced and made functional, and that key studies are completed timely. To monitor overall project performance, five indictors for the PDO, and some additional KPIs for each component were selected at project preparation. These were later redefined and streamlined with commonly used Bank sector indicators. It is worth noting that the original indicators were directly derived from what the project would do although were not specific and measurable. 46. Implementation: The selected indicators were collected by the Monitoring Agent through the IA as implementation of the project progressed, and were disseminated in quarterly progress reports. The IA supplied the relevant data and the Bank monitored the progress through regular supervision missions. It must be noted, however, that data was not provided regularly and reliability of the information at times was questionable due to inconsistencies in data collections. 9 Project Implementation Status and Results Report Number 12. 16 47. The completed road sections and railway line have now become part of the national network system and are subject to regular monitoring by the respective Government agencies. SRC and NHA have dedicated M&E departments that monitor performance of completed infrastructures as part of the network. 48. Utilization: Baseline indicators were established half way in the project life at MTR in May 2010. Before the establishment of the baseline, outputs were measured to monitor progress. After the MTR, indictors were tracked through the pro reject and used to monitor progress. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 49. The project was prepared under OP 8.00: Rapid Response to Crises and Emergency which stipulates that the project could follow simplified procedures regarding social and environment safeguard policies. However, in the course of implementation, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) were prepared for all components where physical works were likely to cause impacts. In addition, on Damazin-Kurmuk road section, a resettlement action plan was developed and resettlement of 58 businesses was successfully completed to the satisfaction of project affected people. For most of the implementation period compliance to environment and social safeguards was rated as moderately satisfactory. 50. Through the project an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared and has been used as a basis for preparing environment and social impact assessment on road projects. In addition, the project supported the establishment of the Environmental and Social Management Unit (ESMU) in the MTRB; and staff were trained in application of basic safeguard requirements in projects. It is expected that this unit will lead the implementation of safeguard related issues for the Ministry. 51. Financial Management (FM): At appraisal, the project was assessed as a high risk, because of weak institutional arrangements, regulatory environment, lack of capacity and absence of financial rules and regulations. Mitigation measures were put in place to strengthen the FM system, including supporting the FM staff of the IA with a consultant. As a result, FM compliance in general was satisfactory. 52. Audit reports and Interim Financial Reports were submitted to the Bank on a timely manner. There are no unresolved fiduciary issues at project completion and, to a large extent the implementing agencies have complied with financial management covenants. 53. Final project cost: As at 27 Nov.2013, US$53.34 million was disbursed from MDTF-N bringing the disbursement level to 96%. 54. Procurement: At project appraisal, the procurement capacity assessment was carried out in the three implementing agencies to verify whether there was adequate capacity to carry out procurement activities in compliance with World Bank procedures. As a result of this assessment, a procurement specialist was recruited for the project to 17 strengthen the capacity of the IA. Although all procurement activities were carried out in accordance with relevant World Bank Procurement Guidelines, the project faced two major challenges: (i) mis-procurement with grant cancellation on part of Kadulgli-Kauda road section; and (ii) contract termination of Damazin-Kurmuk road Section 2 due to security reasons. Misprocurement was declared when the Kadugli -Kaouda road (Lots C, D & E) was awarded to a national contractor by the local authorities while the bid for the same lots was floated under NETREP. The Bank declared misprocurement and funds allocated to these lots in the amount of US$19.75 million were cancelled from the Grant. Another challenge was termination of Damazin-Kurmuk section 2 to due force majeure associated with security issues. By the closing of the project, there were no unresolved procurement issues and the above mentioned challenges did little influence to the outcome of the PDO. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 55. Maintenance of the roads improved under the project: NHA has a road toll collection system in place to finance maintenance of the national road network. To improve utilization of funds, and increase engagement of road users in the administration of funds, the National Transport Master Plan prepared under the Technical Assistance Facility recommended the establishment of an independent Road Fund office. Currently, the recommendation is under review by the Government. For the roads improved under the project, NHA has already included them in its annual maintenance program to ensure sustainability of the investment. As an alternative option of long term maintenance, it is recommended that NHA considers long term Performance Based Maintenance contracting in the future. In addition, when the pavement management system (PMS) becomes operational, it would allow the NHA to monitor performance of the road network and develop appropriate maintenance program on technically sound grounds. 56. As for the railways infrastructure system, its maintenance is financed by government annual budget and from collections of railway user fees from the private rail transport operators. SRC has been maintaining the Babanusa-Wau rail in the past as part of its annual maintenance program, and this will continue to be the case in the future. 57. There are a number of activities completed under NETREP that could be considered for financing by GoS and/or development partners in near future. Engineering design of 945 km of national and rural roads is complete and could further be refined with additional information to make them ready for implementation. The feeder road development plan initiated under the project could also be a good starting point to develop a feeder road master plan. Thus, 185 km of rural road (Toker – Garora Road) in the East has already been selected for construction with a financial support from Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Relevance of Objectives: Significant 18 58. The project objectives are highly relevant to the country’s development agenda. As outlined in the Country Economic Memorandum, ensuring access to basic services and connectivity is an essential factor to support basic livelihoods of the population, especially in the lagged regions such as the South, and The Three areas10 - confirming the relevance of the project objectives and areas of interventions. 59. The project continue to be relevant as the results achieved through the project are serving the population affected by the civil war, and contributed to the realization of sustainable peace, thereby facilitating cohesion of the country. As a result of the project interventions, war affected areas have now all-weather access to essential social services and market places for the first time; journey times and travel cost have reduced markedly due to improved roads and rail line - facilitating trade and commerce between regions. In some places cost of goods has fallen by up to 20% compared to the pre-construction period.11 60. In addition, the studies conducted under the project have focused on the transport sector and were able to reveal a number of problems and issues that would be considered by the policy makers. Relevance of design: High 61. The core concept design was extremely relevant, in that it set out to respond to the country immediate challenges of restoring damaged infrastructure and removing transport bottle necks in war affected areas, thereby improving connectivity and facilitating sustainable peace in post conflict Sudan. The activities defined under each component were particularly relevant at the time of preparation and project approval and were in line with JAM framework; and have remained relevant at completion. 62. The design of the project was also particularly relevant in that it combined the restoration of access through the implementation of infrastructure investments with institutional capacity strengthening across three institutions and helped developing partnerships, e.g. involvement of staffs of the implementing agencies in the PMT in managing the respective project components. 63. Throughout project implementation relevance was refined by the project’s flexibility to adapt to the client’s emerging needs; and thus operations remained important to achieving development objectives. 64. Considering the relevance ratings discussed above for objectives and design, the overall relevance rating is HIGH. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 10 The World Bank (2009) Sudan-The Road Towards Sustainable and Broad -Bases Growth, Report No54718. 11 Project Mid-term Review Report August 2010 19 65. As explained in Section 1 of this ICR, while key outcome indicators were changed at various occasions to reflect changes made to the components, the PDO and expected outcomes remained unchanged throughout project implementation. The following paragraphs asses the efficacy of the project at the time of each restructurings. Original PDO Efficacy at the time of 1st restructuring: Moderately Unsatisfactory 66. Achievement towards the original PDO indicators at the time of first restructured (First Amendment to Letter Agreement, April 24, 2008) is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The recorded results at this time (ISR#1), when 48% of the project time was elapsed, reflect that major works contracts that would result the achievements of PDO were just signed, and no actual works were commenced, and hence no results were achieved. Delays in release of counterpart funds and delays in de-mining of project roads were major challenges affecting project implementation. As a result the project disbursement was only 13% against 48% of project time. Efficacy at the time of 2nd restructuring: Moderately Satisfactory 67. The performance of the project after the first restructuring has improved. The revision of the financing arrangement (1st restructuring) has improved the ability of the Government to fulfill its commitment, and thus avail counterpart funds timely. The ISR has made a note that at this stage all outstanding counterpart funds were paid, improving overall performance of the project. The recorded results at this time (ISR#3) reflect that contracts for all road improvement and design works were concluded, and about 90 percent of the grant amount was committed. Also, rehabilitation of 252 km Babanusa- Wau rail line (56% of the total) was complete providing access to the community to markets and social services; and construction works on Gadamai-Hamashkorieb road was progressing well. As a result, disbursement has reached 27%. As such, progress towards achieving PDO is rated moderately satisfactory on account that all major works contracts are progressing well and the railway line has become partially operational. At this stage the Grant closing date was extended to June 2011 to allow completion of on-going activities. Efficacy at the time of 3rd restructuring: Satisfactory 68. With the injection of additional financing (2nd restructuring) in the amount of US$43.75, the project has shown significant improvement when the 3rd restructuring was approved in June 2011. At this stage, rehabilitation of Babanusa-Wau rail line (446 km) was completed connecting north and south Sudan, providing access to over 200,000 people and transporting over 650,000 tons of freight per annum. Two more road improvement works in the war affected areas with a total length of 112 km were completed providing all-weather access to about 5,500 people, and reducing travel time from 11.6 hours to 6.6 hours. Also, engineering design of 995 km of national and rural roads was completed; and studies on private sector participation in rail transport, Port Sudan trade facilitation, and Inland River Navigation Diagnostics, as well as the preparation of the National Transport Master Plan (NTMP) were completed. As a result of improved performance, disbursement has reached a record level of 45% and key 20 performance indicators were largely achieved (ISR#8) contributing to the overall achievement of the PDO. Efficacy at the time of the 4th restructuring: Moderately Satisfactory 69. The third restructuring left the project with cancellation of US$19.75million due to mis-procurement, and also the project faced implementation challenges resulted from suspension of Damazin-Kurmuk road section due to security reasons. Although most of key activities delivering outputs were completed or progressing well, suspension of the part of Damazin Kurmuk road contract wouldn’t allow full achievement of the PDO, and thus progress towards PDO is downgraded to moderately satisfactory. However, the completed rail line and road projects continue providing the population access to social and administrative services and market places, thereby facilitating trade and connectivity among regions. During 2010 and within eight month, SRC was able to run 25 trains that handled 10,819 tons of goods. Also between 1/09/2010 and 5/11/2011 it carried 42,492 tons and was able to run 76 trains. SRC has also managed to operate 5 blocked trains for passengers for carrying the returnees back to South Sudan after its independence. The Gadamai-Hamashkorieb road (81 km) and Kadugli-Kaouda road (30 km) were fully completed while Damazin-Kurmuk was improved to passable condition providing access to over 26,000 people, and reducing travel time from 11.6 hours to 2 hours. The institutional development studies have initiated policy dialogue that would help to improve the performance of the transport sector. As such, progress towards achieving PDO was rated moderately satisfactory. Efficacy at project completion: Moderately Satisfactory 70. The last restructuring left the project with a reduced scope as Damazin Kurmuk section 1 was dropped from NETREP because, by the request of the Government, the MDTF-N allocation for this section was transferred to section 2 to pay compensation to the contractor for section 2 which was terminated due to emerging insecurity in the project area. As a result, responsibilities of completing all outstanding works on section 1 were transferred to the Government and Damazin-Kurmuk section 1 was dropped from MDTF reducing the scope of the project from 95 km to 45 km. In addition, to reflect the impact of reduced scope on Damazin-Kurmuk road, outcome targets for reduction in travel time, beneficiary population, and increase in traffic volume were reduced accordingly.12 However, the project has largely achieved its PDO as a result of completed activities under each component prior to the last restructuring, and given the benefits realized under the project (and summarized in the Results Framework), the efficacy rating at completion is held as moderately satisfactory despite the reduced scope. 12 Project Restructuring Paper, June 2012. 21 3.3 Efficiency 71. There was no detailed economic analysis conducted at project preparation because of the emergency nature of the operation, and preparing a reliable and meaningful demand forecast would have been difficult if not impossible from such a low base. At the time of project preparation, traffic was negligible on the destroyed infrastructure, and the demand for transport infrastructure was latent and driven by the need to remove key bottlenecks for: (i) peace keeping operations; (ii) distribution of relief goods; (iii) opening and improving of physical access to goods, markets and social services; and thus the traditional cost benefit analysis and feasibility indicators such as the Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) and the Net Present Value (NPV) were no longer feasible in such post conflict situation where transport needs determined the nature, size and magnitude of the transport interventions. More generally, the transport development interventions were needed to be socially sound and contribute to the peace building process and cohesion of the country. As the project passed through a number of restructurings, for the purpose of ICR evaluation, efficiency was assessed at the time of each restructuring, as detailed in the following paragraphs. Original PDO Efficiency at the time of 1st restructuring: moderately unsatisfactory 72. The efficiency of the project for the period before restructuring, January 2007 till April 2008 is rated low. By the time of the first restructuring, only 13% of the Grant had been disbursed with very limited delivery of results against 42% of project implementation period. By June 2008 only few contracts were signed and no actual physical work commenced, as a result few economic benefits has been realized at this time. Efficiency at the time of 2nd restructuring: Moderately satisfactory 73. The second restructuring was done when disbursement has reached 27% against 77 % of implementation period. By this time, all design projects were contracted out, 50% of the rehabilitation of the railway line was completed, road works on Gadamai- Hamashkoreib was progressing well, and as a result tangible economic benefits in terms of improved access were being felt by the resident population along the completed sections; and overall 90% of the Grant amount was committed. According to disbursement, 252 km (50%) of the railway line was rehabilitated with only 26% of the allocated budget, indicating that the railway line would be completed within budget. Completion of the part of the railway line provided access to local communities to markets and social services. In addition, design works of 995 km of roads, and technical assistance to the implementing agency were progressing well. As such the efficiency of the project at this stage was moderately satisfactory primary because although there had been delays in implementation, there has been significant progress and real economic benefits as improved access (rehabilitation of part of the railway) had been realized. Efficiency at the time of 3rd restructuring: Moderately satisfactory 74. The third restructuring was done in June 2011 when disbursement has reached 45% of the revised project cost (with additional financing). During the period between 22 the 2nd and 3rd restructurings, the focus of the project was on delivering of the physical infrastructure works. Thus, at this time, the Babanusa-Wau railway line and the Kadugli- Kauda road section were completed; and Gadamai-Hamashkorieb road construction has reached 80% - all delivering restored infrastructure and tangible economic benefits. In addition four out of five studies and engineering design of 995 km of roads were largely completed. More generally, at this stage results against the revised indictors were substantially achieved and the resources expended over this time were considered to be reasonable in comparison with both the benefits and with recognized norms (see table 4 below). 75. No economic analysis was done for the Babanusa-Wau rail line where 445 km of line was rehabilitated and resumed operations in March 2010. From actual expenditures, the cost of rehabilitating the Babanousa-Wau rail line, including telecommunication equipment was US$76,400 per km, which is reasonable for rehabilitation of a railway line of similar nature. However, it is worth mentioning that the rehabilitation works was carried out by SRC own force which may not reflect the market cost of doing similar works. Efficiency at the time completion: Moderately satisfactory 76. At the time of project completion disbursement has reached 82% with all works component completed except Damazin Kurmuk road section 1. 77. As implementation progressed and the original scope was changed, an additional financing was provided in 2009 for upgrading of Damazin- Kurmuk road to an asphalt road standard; and a cost benefit analysis was made for the same. The EIRR at a discount rate of 15 percent for the upgrading of the road was 23.32 percent, while the Net Present Value (NPV) was SDG135,866, implying that upgrading of the road to an asphalt standard would provide a real benefit that was not dissimilar from the average return to transport projects in a recent review conducted by World Bank. 13 However, due to various reasons (See paragraph 42 and 70 above) the scope was reduced to a gravel road standard and part of the works contract was terminated due to insecurity in the area, although the section of road is in passable condition. Hence, the economic evaluation cannot be used to assess the efficiency of the project. Further, due to insecurity in the project area, a revised economic analysis could not be conducted at completion. The improved road section, however, has provided all-year access to the community and improved physical access to goods, markets and social services, as planned originally. 78. An economic analysis was done for the Gedamia-Harmashkoraib road section at completion. The EIRR at a discount rate of 15 percent for the upgrading of the road was 5 percent, while the NPV was - 43,658, indicating that with the current level of use, the road has limited economic return in terms of user benefit, but benefits will be social reflecting the improved access and realized as traffic builds up.. Thus, the population in 13 The World Bank (2007) A Decade of Action in Transport: An Evaluation of World Bank Assistance to the Transport Sector, 1995-2005 23 the project area (355,700) will now easily access social services thereby improving their livelihood, which is in line with the objectives of the project. The completed road will also provide access to agricultural areas with livestock where development has been hampered for years due to insecurity, isolation and poor accessibility to markets, employment and social services. 79. Out of the three originally planned road improvement works, the scope of two (Kadougli–Kaouda and Damazin-Kurmuk) was changed during the course of implementation, and hence it would not be easy to assess the efficiency as the original cost estimate was based on a different assumption and scope of works. From actual expenditure, however, can be asserted that cost of civil works completed under the project was reasonable as shown on the table 4 below. For example, the Gadamai- Hamashkoreib road was constructed to a double bituminous surface treatment standard at a cost of US$0.25million per km, which is below the cost of doing similar works in neighboring countries (Uganda and Ethiopia) -which is between $0.4 and $0.5 million per km. Table 4: Construction cost of road works at completion Road section Length, Project cost , US$ m Comments km At Appraisal At completion Kadougli Kaouda 30 NA1 4.0 Spot improvement Damazin Kurmuk 93 NA2 22 Scope changed twice Gadamai-Hamashkorieb 81 33 20 Upgraded to DBST 1- NA- Not applicable as the cost estimate at appraisal was for 135 km of spot improvements 2- NA- Not applicable as the cost estimate at appraisal was for 55 km of spot improvements 80. In addition, engineering design of 995 km of national and rural roads has been completed and ready for construction. The feeder roads study has delivered feeder roads development plan, and produced design and bidding documents for selected roads in three states (Blue Nile, Kassala and South Kordofan). As part of the capacity building effort (i) short term training was provided to 67 staff of NHA; and (ii) all the PMS equipment have been delivered and specialized training provided to 12 NHA engineers on use of and application of PMS equipment. 81. By the end of the project all institutional development studies were completed and have initiated policy dialogue that would help to improve the performance of the transport sector. The formation of a functional ESMU under the Ministry would help strengthening similar units in NHA and SRC. To strengthen the ESMU, 16 staff was trained in the application of environment and social management plan in infrastructure projects. 82. On account of the above mentioned outcomes, progress towards achieving PDO at completion is moderately satisfactory. 24 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome. Rating - Moderately Satisfactory 83. The overall outcome rating for the project is Moderately Satisfactory based on relevance, combined evaluation of the efficacy and efficiency at each restructuring as explained above. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development. Rating 84. Poverty Impact: The project was delivered in areas with high agriculture potential where transport plays critical role in improving the livelihood of the communities. The improvement of roads and the rail line in these areas enhanced the economy through increased agricultural production and access to market and social services. The project also enabled the provision of all-year transport services for the population living within the influence areas of the improved road corridors, providing lower transport cost, creating employment opportunities and boosting local economy. The MTR established that, due to improved access, commodity prices have shown reduction of up to 20% compared to the situation prior to the project interventions. 85. Gender Aspects: It was estimated that 48% 14of the beneficiaries in the project area are women, reflecting the national gender split as a coarse indicator. The project presented no evidence on gender mainstreaming in its activities and no data was collected on gender. However, given the isolation of the project area prior to realization of the project, improved transport will enable youth and women to have better access to social services such as hospitals and schools. 86. Social Development: The project was able to provide better access to social services such as schools, health centers and markets which improved development of business activities and livelihood of people. The project also facilitated the resettlement of internally displaced people and improved cohesion of the country by breaking the isolation of war affected communities. The immediate socio-economic impact has been positive on the restoration of travel and livelihoods in areas served by the improved roads, with visible increases in traffic volumes on the key roads on which improvements have been carried out. 87. Institutional Strengthening: The project assisted the MTRB to streamline environment and social impact assessment studies into transport projects. To this effect a dedicated Environment and Social Management Unit (ESMU) has been established in the MTRB to oversee implementations of safeguard requirements in road projects. This will assist proper screening of projects for environmental and social impacts before they get- off for implementation. 14 Implementation and Results Report Number 12. 25 88. River transport has become operational with a joint venture agreement with the government. Thus, with 70% and 30% share of private and Government respectively, regular service between North and South has been continued until the separation of the two countries in June 2011. Once the boarder issues are resolved the service will continue between the two countries. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Not Applicable 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome. Rating – Substantial 89. Although a road toll collection system intended for maintenance of the national network is in place, effective utilization of funds remains a challenge. And also, as the network expands, the country is likely to face revenue mobilization challenges. Inadequate capacity for maintenance planning poses another challenge to ensure sustainability of the investment. The PMS initiated under the project would support planning and prioritization of maintenance operation if implemented as designed, which requires Government’s commitment. 90. To improve the application of funds for the intended purpose, the NTMP study has suggested the establishment of an independent Road Fund to oversee funds administration. However, the proposal by NTMPfor establishing a Road Fund office has not been implemented by the end of the project. 91. While the initiatives mentioned above are all promising and the Government has shown its commitment to maintain the completed road and railway line by including them in the annual maintenance plan, the risk to development outcomes in the medium term depends on how soon the above mentioned recommendations will be implemented by the Government. Given the fact that at the time of preparing the ICR (i) establishment of the RF is still under discussion; and (ii) the implementation of the PMS has not yet started, the risks to development outcomes remain substantial. 92. Sustainability of the infrastructure is further challenged by the uncertainty of the security in the project area. Part of the Babanusa-Wau rail line and Damazin- Kurmuk road has already been affected. Thus, the above mentioned factor suggests that the risk to development outcomes to be significant. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry. Rating - Moderately Satisfactory 93. Bank performance during project entry was moderately satisfactory. The process of identification and preparation of the project is detailed in Section 2 of this report. The JAM recommendation and GoNU priorities together with the Bank’s experience in post- 26 conflict countries served as a strategic plan and guided the identification and preparation of the project. 94. The design was relevant and appropriate in addressing key transport bottlenecks in conflict affected areas of Sudan and improving institutional capacity constraints of implementing agencies at the time. 95. Given the weak implementation capacity at the time, acceptable implementation arrangements for financial and procurement activities were provided at project design. Major risks were also assessed and appropriate mitigation measures were put in place to the extent possible at the time of design. However, risks related to counterpart funding, security issues and compliance (by the Client) to the Bank’s operational procedures were underestimated. 96. The relevant operational policy (OP/BP8.0) was employed for processing the operation. However, the project scope was ambitious to be achieved in the original intended period; and outcome indicators were broad and not always specific and measurable. 97. It has to be noted that despite gloomy situations in post conflict environment where risks to PDO were high, the Bank’s attempt to quickly respond to the country’s immediate transport challenges, and not being risk avert, is commendable. (b) Quality of Supervision. Rating - Moderately Satisfactory 98. The Bank performance during implementation was moderately satisfactory. The Bank carried out supervision every six months, and reports were sufficiently detailed and well written highlighting key issues with action plans for next steps. Project design changes were made timely to respond to emerging challenges. This was best demonstrated in restructuring the project four times to align to the PDO. Although the project was supported by dedicated PMT, implementation could have been improved through specialized trainings in safeguards, procurement and general Bank procedure and process to the implementing agencies. Performance ratings given in the Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) were realistic, and sufficient attention was paid to the project’s likely development impact. However, while the project became effective in January 2007 and the first supervision was conducted in May/June 2007, first ISR was filed in the system in June 2008; and it is not clear as why the production of the first ISR was delayed. c ) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance. Rating - Moderately Satisfactory 99. The overall Bank performance is rated moderately satisfactory on account of the observed shortcomings in project preparation and implementation which led to several changes in the project, even if the overall objective was maintained. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance. Rating - Moderately Unsatisfactory 27 100. The major challenge during project implementation was the Government’s inability to timely release counterpart funds. Despite revised financing arrangement (from the original) in favor of the GoNU, availing counterpart funds was a challenge throughout project implementation negatively affecting project performance. As a result, completion of on-going activities suffered due to lack of counterpart funds, e.g. on Gadamai- Hamashkorieb project road marking was not completed due to nonpayment of counterpart funds. (b) Implementing Agencies Performance. Overall Rating - Moderately Satisfactory 101. Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges (MTRB): The Ministry was proactive and committed to achieving the PDO. It played a critical role in coordinating various activities and all the studies under its direct supervision were completed timely. Given its limited capacity and being new to working with the Bank, its overall performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. 102. National Highway Agency (NHA): NHA played a key role in administering most of road works and associated studies. Except Damzin-Kurmuk section 2, which was terminated due to security issues, all other road works and studies are complete. However, NHA was slow in addressing contractual which was largely associated with technical capacity of the institution. As such, the performance of NHA is rated as moderately satisfactory. 103. Sudan Railway Corporation (SRC): All the activities under its responsibility were completed timely. The Babanusa-Wau rail line became operational soon after rehabilitation and communication equipment was also delivered with minimal delays. As such the performance of SRC is rated satisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance - Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 104. Although most of the activities under each implementing agencies were completed, on accounts of weak capacity, delays in releasing counterpart funds, mis- procurement, weak project management and delays in resolving implementation issues, the overall performance of the Borrower is rated moderately satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 105. The transport infrastructure improvement and institutional development initiatives of the MDTF-N had to overcome hurdles of reoccurring insecurity, low capacity, slow procurement and challenging design and construction tasks before delivering results. The key lessons drawn from the project are summarized as follows:  Counterpart funding: The joint co-financing arrangement has been challenged by the slow flow of counterpart funding for payment certificates for works 28 executed by contractors and consultants. This has slowed the progress of the contracts and in some cases led to suspension of works. Parallel financing where government finances separate standalone projects may have reduced the risk, as contractors would make the necessary provision from the outset and delays in the release of counterpart funding would not affect every contract under the project.  Changes in standard of interventions: The project initially sought to reestablish basic transports services in the areas that came out of a protracted civil war, through spot improvement and maintenance of the existing roads. However, local governments insisted for the upgrading of the roads to a higher asphalt road standard, which caused delays in the startup of the project and excessively increased the project cost. Therefore, it would be prudent to agree with key stakeholders, at the planning stage, on priorities and sequencing of interventions.  Capacity building: Capacity of the implementing entities was weak and Technical Assistance was sought in critical areas. However, the institutions were reluctant to have TA. Although the establishment of Project Management Teams helped to pool some staff from within, the absence of TAs has resulted in a lengthy planning period, delays in procurement and difficulties in managing complex contractual matters. Going forward, TA for capacity building needs to be planned at project inception and has to focus on institutionalizing capacity development at all levels.  Proactive project management is necessary to respond to changing circumstances. The design of the NETREP was substantially modified during implementation to take into account the changing situation. Decisions were made to drop activities that would not be completed under the project and activities were repackaged and restructured to make sure that their outcomes supported the achievements of the PDO.  Selectivity in project activities can improve outcomes: NETREP was designed to address sectorial challenges in a single operation within a short period of time. The activities selected were many and diverse in scope. Some of the activities could not be completed in the original project period, and had to be dropped, and some were scaled down requiring restructuring of the project. On the other hand, the rehabilitation of Babanusa-Wau railway line has brought significant impact with relatively little intervention.  Bank being proactive: Despite difficult situation in post conflict environment where many things are uncertain and risks to PDO were high, the Bank’s decision to quickly respond to the country’s immediate challenges, and thus taking risks to help, is commendable. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors 106. The Government has not provided comments on the Bank’s ICR. However, it produced its own ICR, the summary of which is presented in Annex 7. The Borrower 29 ICR commented that the GONU has played a minor role in the preparation and the design of the project, the reason of which the GONU did not give the project the degree of support it deserves during implementation. This situation did not encourage the government to own the project and to give enough weight and focus to the implementation of the project in its initial stage in terms of proper staffing. However, the Bank ICR team could not find evidence in the project documents (Final Project Proposal or any other project preparation document) that supports the clients comment. (a) Grantee/Implementing agencies (b) Co-financiers/Donors Not applicable (c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGoS/private sector/civil society) Not Applicable 30 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions)1 1. Rehabilitation of critical rail 41.95 12.29 29.30 infrastructure and services(SRE) 2.Institutional Strengthening & Improvements to River Transport 10.96 1.05 10.45 Services( MTRB) 3. Road Improvements with focus 89.27 101.91 114.16 on the Three Areas (NHA) Total Baseline Cost 142.18 115.25 81.06 Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 142.18 115.25 81.06 Project Preparation Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Financing Required 142.18 115.25 81.06 1. Cost at 27 Nov. 2013 (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Co- Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds financing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Counterpart Fund-GONU 98.68 62.03 63 Multi-donor Trust Fund-National - 43.50 53.22 122 Foreign Private Commercial Sources 0.00 0.00 0.00 (unidentified) Total 142.18 115.25 81.06 31 Annex 2A. Outputs by Component Component/Activity Description* End of Project Target Outputs/Remarks Component 1: Rehabilitation of critical rail infrastructure and services Equipment and Rehabilitation of 446km of rail line rehabilitated and  Rehabilitation of the railway line Babnousa Wau (BW) Railway Line opened for traffic completed in Feb.2010 and corridor provided service until March 2012 border closure between South Sudan and Sudan.  Telecommunication equipment delivered Component 2: Institutional strengthening and Improvement to River Transport services Environment and Social Environment and Social  ESMU established in MTRB and Management Unit (ESMU) Management Unit ( ESAU) focal persons were nominated from established and functional Established under the Ministry NHA and SRC. Planning Department of MTRB Planning Department of MTRB TA for the Planning Directorate and strengthened and satisfactorily strengthened and satisfactorily ESMU of MTRB provided discharging its oversight role discharging its oversight role River transport regulatory body Diagnostic study of the regulatory Diagnostic study completed and strengthened body in the River Transport Sector implementation of the study is in completed progress Action plan agreed for trade Action Plan for Port Sudan Trade  Port Sudan trade facilitation and facilitation at Port Sudan Facilitation adopted by Ministry and Inland River Navigation recommendations under Diagnostics, studies completed and implementation action plan adopted;  National Transport Master Plan (NTMP) prepared. Participation of the private sector Action Plan for Private Sector Study completed and action plan in rail transport increased Participation in Railway Sector adopted adopted by Ministry Environment and Social Assessment ESAF developed and approved by Framework adopted the Sudan High Council for Environment Staff trained in planning, budgeting, TA provided and 67 staff from financing NHA and SRC trained in planning, budgeting and finance Component 3. Road Improvements with focus on the Three Areas Road improvements 205km of rural roads improved Rehabilitation of Gadamai- Hamashkorieb (82km) & Kadugli- Kaouda road Lot B (30 km) completed. Lot A,C& D of Kadugli-Kaouda (85 km) were cancelled from the project due to mis procurement. 93km non-rural road improved Rehabilitation of Damazin-Kurmuk sec.1. road section completed up to sub base level and sect. 2 was completed 70% before it was suspended due to force majeure. However, the full road length is in a passable condition. 32 Design of secondary and tertiary roads Feasibility and detail studies Feasibility and design activities for completed for 1125 km roads 945 km (based on final design ) of national and rural roads completed in June 2011 Feeder and community access road Feeder roads and community access program prepared 2,500 km of feeder and community development plan and design and access roads completed. bidding document for selected roads in the three states were delivered in June2012 Pavement Management System Pavement Management system PMS study not completed but established established survey equipment delivered to NHA * The Project went through four restructuring where component were dropped and/or changed. The result table is as per the last restructuring done in June 2012 33 Annex 2B: Revised Results Framework and Monitoring (June 2012) PDO Indicator Original (FPP) Revised Rationale for changes Rural accessibility is improved in 1. Number of people with Redefined to streamline with areas affected by project investments; all-season Commonly used as well as core access (roads/rail) indictors 2. Share of rural population with access to an all-season road (proportion) 3. Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads Supplemental value: Size of the total classified network Time taken for villagers to reach 2. Travel time reduction on Redefined to streamline with closest markets and services reduced selected routes Commonly used as well as core 2.1 Babanousa-Wau Rail) – indictors hours average 2.2 Kadugli-Kauda Road (hr) 2.3 Hamsahkoreib-Gadamai Road (hr) 2.4 Ed Damazin – El Kurmuk Road) (hr) 3. Travel volume in selected routes 3.1 rail (Babanusa-Wau) – ton/annum 3.2 road (Gadamai- Hamashkorieb; Damazin Kurmuk; Kadugli – Kaouda) – Number of Medium Trucks/day Cost of key commodities reduced in Dropped It was difficult to measure the villages and towns affected by project change of commodities in relation to investments project investment. Reduction in cost of commodity could be a result of multiple factors, not only project investment. Training of staff provided and No changed. Moved to capacity increased in implementing intermediate KPI agencies; Normal traffic operations on the key Replaced. See above it. 2 Replaced with travel time reduction rail and waterway arteries facilitating and 3. and volume on Babanusa to Wau movements on the key import/export rail line (proposed change item 2 & links; 3 above) 34 The civil works, equipment and Direct Project Beneficiaries Redefined to streamline with core subsequent operation and (number), of which female indicators maintenance financed through the (%) project provide employment for the local population in all rehabilitations, operations and maintenance activities. Intermediate Results indicators Original (FPP) Revised Rationale for changes Component 1 BW Railway capable of carrying at Rail line rehabilitated (km) streamline with least one pair of trains per day standard/commonly used indicator description Bridge # 353 in commission Dropped Financed by the GoNU without disruption in the rainy season rail movement capability to the Dropped Financed by the GoNU Port Sudan container terminal for returning empty containers Kosti Port rail rehabilitation Dropped Financed by the GoNU completed .New Port rail extension commissioned PSP study completed; institutional Action Plan for Private Streamlined with actual outcome and structural changes started and Sector Participation in support for right sizing staff and Railway Sector improving infrastructure on Port adopted by Ministry Sudan-Khartoum section (Yes/No) Study completed and Environment and Social Streamlined with actual outcome implementation underway Assessment Unit established under the Ministry (Yes/No) Staff recruited into the Planning Continued. ( Unit of Activity continued, but stopped Unit and TA in place measurement Yes/No) monitored as it was achieved at the beginning of the project. Monitoring reports on 1.Environment and Social Streamlined with actual outcome implementation of environmental Assessment Framework and social safeguards provisions of adopted (Yes/No) the being produced and reviewed Satisfactory project management Staff trained in planning, streamline with and capacity building activities. budgeting, standard/commonly used indicator Annual Training programs carried financing (number) description out. (for all components) Baseline survey conducted. Dropped Dropped due to the privatization of River Transport Authority TA Component 2 Two vessels rehabilitated and operational The corresponding activities were Two ferry boats operational dropped from the project due to the Passenger waiting shed and Dropped privatization of the River Transport facilities in use Authority and implementing the Kosti Key wall reconstructed and studies was transferred to MTRB. no longer a risk to traffic 35 Container handling quay/floating platform at Juba operational Four Negative lift reach stackers procured and operational at Kosti, Juba, Malakal Study for concessioning of Kosti New Port and concessioning complete Study completed Hydrographic survey completed TA for QC of Juba Container quay design and construction procured and effective Satisfactory project management See above and capacity building activities. Annual training programs carried out Component 3 180 km key regional link Roads rehabilitated ,- non Use of Core Indicator rehabilitated to bitumen standard in rural (km) the Blue Nile sate 85 km of key regional link Roads rehabilitated ,- Rural Use of Core Indicator rehabilitated to bitumen standard (km) Spot improvement Merged with the above Use of Core Indicator Feasibility studies and detail design Continued ( unit of streamline with measurement, km) standard/commonly used indicator description Studies and institutional development Continued ( unit of * measurement, km) 36 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis a) Economic Analysis 1. There was no detailed economic analysis conducted at project preparation due to the emergency nature of the operation. However, in 2009 an economic analysis was done for upgrading of Damazin- Kurmuk road to an asphalt road standard; and a cost benefit analysis was carried out for the same. The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) at a discount rate of 15 percent for the upgrading of the road was 23.32 percent, while the Net Present Value (NPV) was SDG135, 866, implying that upgrading the road to an asphalt standard could result a positive benefit. However, due to various reasons the scope was reduced to a gravel road standard and part of the works contract was terminated due to force majeure, but road is in passable condition; and thus the economic evaluation could not be used to assess the efficiency of the project at completion. The improved road section, however, has provided all-year access to the community and improved physical access to goods, markets and social services, as planned originally. 2. There is no economic analysis carried out for the Babanusa-Wau railway line which has been out of service 25 years prior to project approval. 3. For Gedamia-Harmashkoraib road section, which was upgraded to double surface treatment (DBST) standard, an economic feasibility assessment was done at completion. The result of the analysis shows that the Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) at a discount rate of 15 percent for the upgrading of the road was 5 percent, while the Net present value (NPV) was negative (- 43,658), indicating that with the current settings, the road has limited economic return, rather it is a social project mainly aimed at opening up the area and remove the isolation of the community of Hamashkoraib and its surroundings. Assumptions, Inputs and Methodology considered 4. Traffic count: In 2002, the NHA has conducted traffic count in the project area and has come up with a total of six vehicles per day (vpd). With a 5% estimated growth, the total expected annual traffic by 2006 was 3141 or 8.6 vpd, and this was taken as base year traffic. It was also assumed that: (i) a minimum of 5% traffic grown will be maintained during the project life (25 years);(ii) construction started in 2009 and opened for traffic in 2012. During its service life, periodic maintenance was assumed to happen every five years after opening, the first one being at year 2017. 5. Result of economic analysis: The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) at a discount rate of 15 percent was 5 percent, while the Net present value (NPV) was negative 43,658, indicating that with the current settings, the road has limited economic return, rather it is a social project mainly aimed at opening up the area and remove the isolation of the community of Hamashkoraib and its surroundings. The result of the analysis is shown in table 3.1 below. 37 Table 3.1 Indictors of economic analysis Discount Rate 15% 18% Benefits SDG 221,476.79 SDG 184,482 Cost SDG 920,014.68 SDG 763,132 NPV (SDG 43,658.62) (SDG 30,455.27) IRR 5% 6. However, in terms of social benefits, the population in the project area (249,000) will now easily access social services thereby improving their livelihood, which is in line with the objectives of the project. The project will also provide access to agricultural areas with livestock where development has been hampered by insecurity, isolation and poor accessibility to markets, employment and social services. 7. As has been shown above, the economic indicators of the analysis demonstrated that the nature of the project is mainly of social benefits and its purpose was humanitarian seeking to remove the isolation of the project area. But in the near future, the road is expected to generate traffic. 38 Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending/Grant Preparation George A. Banjo Sr Transport. Spec. ECSTR Ronald J. Kopicki Consultant CMEIC Vijay Raman Consultant PRMTR Colin P. Rees Consultant OPCQC Terje Wolden Consultant MNSTR Supervision/ICR Mohamed Yahia Abd El Karim Sr Financial Management Specialist MNAFM Jamal Abdulla Abdulaziz Senior Procurement Specialist MNAPC Antonio J. Cittati Consultant LCSPP Nina M. Jones Program Assistant AFTTR Abdelmonem Osman Kardash Consultant AFMSD Tesfamichael Nahusenay Mitiku Senior Transport. Engineer AFTTR Mohamed Elkheir Osman Beshir Consultant AFTTR Shalonda Robinson Program Assistant AFTTR Yasmin Tayyab Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Haileyesu Adamtei Highway Engineer (ICR TTL) AFTTR (b) Staff Time and Cost* Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY07 15.09 122,694 FY08 16.09 133,655 FY09 2.23 28,652 FY10 60.41 212,013 FY11 12.40 185,700 Total 682,714.00 Supervision/ICR FY08 16.01 80,390 FY09 66.75 203,479 FY10 29.83 115,835 FY11 5.33 119,602 FY12 11.59 266,777 FY13 2.33 54,333 FY14 3.95 49830 Total 890,246.00 * to be generated from the system 39 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) Not Applicable 40 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any), Not Applicable 41 Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Summary of the Government’s ICR 1. Key Factors Affecting Implementation, outputs and outcomes 1. Concept & Rationale: While NETREP rationale, concept and background are pretty sound and timely and coincides with the JAM framework and the GONU agendas and strategies, yet the key factors that have affected the project implementation were generally associated with the project design. The design was described to be weak in terms of its stated objectives, life (timeframe), management structure, financing arrangement, recommended technical assistance as well as its monitoring and evaluation plan. 2. The project objectives were considered to be very broad to be achieved within the life of the project specified in the implementation plan. Given the scope, scale and magnitude of the project, its management & staff’s capacity as well as the level and terms of funding, it will be very difficult to believe that such a project can be concluded and attained its objectives within the said time frame. Well–defined, quantifiable and realistic objectives are necessary pre-requisites for the success of such a project. Designing an implementation plan for 39 months to conclude this project with such a magnitude is an underestimation to the time required to conclude each activity and each component in a developing country such as Sudan. 3. The project management team was in short of key expertise in the areas of procurement and M&E. This status has contributed to serious delays in implementation. 4. The project financing arrangement and the partnership responsibilities between the GONU and the MDTF has also resulted in long delays as the Government was unable to meet its obligation in availing counterpart funds. Since the GONU has played a minor role in the preparation and the design of the project, there was a feel that the GONU has not given the project the degree of support that this project deserves. This situation did not encourage the government to own the project and to give enough weight and focus to the implementation of the project in its initial stage in terms of proper staffing. 5. Due to lack of the required plan for monitoring and evaluation, the Project implementation has not been running smoothly and several delays could have been avoided. If the M&E system was in place. 2. Implementation 6. NETREP has undergone some drastic changes that involve: (a) an extension of the project closing date so as to complete the on-going road project which is stalled due to insecurity situation in the Blue Nile State; (b) reallocation within and among components to: (i) avail funds to institutional development to continue with the capacity building activities; (ii) provide additional funding to supervision services to cover the 42 increased cost of supervision, during the extended period of roads contracts execution; and (iii) allocate the balance of the Multi Donor Trust Fund for Sudan National Secretariat (MDTF-N) allocation for the first section of the Damazin-Kurmuk road to the second section of the Damazin- Kurmuk road contract to cover additional financing requirements due to the insecurity, increase in quantities of existing bill items and escalation of prices; (c) drop activities that would not be implemented under the National Emergency Transport Rehabilitation Project (NETREP); and (d) revision of targets to reflect the changes. The MDTF-N Grant closing date was extended to June 30, 2013, to allow the completion of ongoing contracts. 3. Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 7. There are no unresolved fiduciary, environmental, social or other safeguard issues. The audit for the year ended June 30, 2012 has been concluded without raising any financial concerns. The Interim Financial Report (IFR) for the quarter ended March 31, 2013 did not indicate any significant financial management issue. Financial management, procurement arrangement, and institutional roles and responsibilities remain unchanged. There are no changes to the PDO, except the adjustment of outcome targets on reduction in travel time, beneficiary population, and increase in traffic volume, due to the completion of the upgrading of part of the Damazin – Kurmuk road and the completion of Gadma-Humshkoraib 4. Key Factors Affecting Implementation, outputs and outcomes Assessment of objectives and outcomes: Component 1: Rehabilitation of Critical Rail infrastructure and services 8. SRC was able to complete the rehabilitation of the track on Babanousa/Wau link which extends for 446 km using its own force. It was originally estimated to cost USD$39.98 Million with a USD$ 15.09 Million contribution from the MDTF and USD$ 24.89 Million from the GONU. The actual expenditures show that the total cost comes to USD$37.15 Million, with the MDTF contribution equals USD$ 12.27 Million whereas the Government contributes with USD$24.88 Million. The total population benefiting from this project comes to 175,909 from the side of the Republic of Sudan and perhaps the beneficiaries on the side of South Sudan can be equal or more than the one cited here. 9. Originally this rail link has been designed to serve one united country. Currently, the situation is different and it becomes part of a corridor between two sovereign States. The link can easily accommodate two trains per day from each direction. During 2010 and within eight month, SRC was able to run 25 trains that handled 10,819 tons of goods. Also between 1/09/2010 and 5/11/2011 it carried 42,492 tons and was able to run 76 trains. SRC has also managed to operate 5 blocked trains for passengers for carrying the returnees back to South Sudan after its independence. 43 10. There is a considerable reduction in the journey time between Babanousa and Wau: before the rehabilitation, the rail trip used to take 30 days on the average whereas currently it only takes (35 hrs) or two days at most. Component 2: Institutional strengthening and improvement to river transport services: 11. The studies under this component were completed and have delivered sound reform principles and sector development strategies. Private sector participation in rail transport study was completed and final report submitted in August, 2009. Implementation of the study recommendation resulted in: financing the track access. The establishment of rail infrastructure manager, public rail transport operator and Regulator of rail transport operations is in progress. 12. Port Sudan trade facilitation: The study completed and the final report submitted in November, 2011. Recommendations consolidated in one document and most of them implemented. Diagnostics review study of the Inland River Navigation Department. The study has been completed and its final report has been submitted in November, 2010. The recommendations of the study were utilized in the:  Restructuring of the department;  Identification of the responsibilities of the department; and  Technical Assistance (TA). 13. Establishment of the environmental and social management unit.it has been established and currently it is part and parcel of the planning directorate. The head of the unit has been nominated whereas two focal points were established in SRC and NHA. 14. TA for the planning Directorate of MTRB: has been delivered and ESAF document was prepared and formally adopted by the Sudanese Government in October 2008. Component 3: Road Improvement Component 15. Construction of Gadamai – Hamashkoraib Road (81.5 Km) was substantially completed in June 2011. The outstanding installation of safety signs and road marking by the contractor awaiting the release of counterpart funds. Upgrading of Damazine – Kurmuk road 1st section (37 Km) was suspended in August 2011 due to the conflict in the area. Before the suspension the overall physical progress was estimated to be around 30%. 16. Upgrading of Damazine – Kurmuk road 2nd section (38 Km) work was suspended in the road due to the conflict in the area. Before the disruption of the work in August 2011 the overall physical progress was about 70%. It was eventually terminated due to force majeure. 44 17. Improvement of Kadugli – Kauda Road Lot B (30.4 Km) was fully completed in December 2010. Feasibility and detailed design study for 955 Km of national and rural roads were completed in June 2011. In addition, development of feeder roads study was completed and final report submitted in June 2012. 5. Assessment of the Government and the Bank Performance Bank Performance: 18. The bank was generally so cooperative during the implementation of NETREP though the Bank’s procedures were new and tend to be cumbersome for most of the staff in some of the Government entities. It was however an excellent opportunity for the counterpart staff to enrich their experience by exposing themselves to the procedures and systems of a major Donor such as the World Bank. 19. Though much benefits have been reaped from interacting with the Bank under this partnership arrangement, it is however fair to mention that this arrangement resulted in several cases of delays that could have been avoided if both partners were communicating on the same wave-length. The project management and staff benefited from the training and workshops organized by the Bank covering the areas of financial management, procurement and M&E. 20. Some of the Sudanese staff in some implementing agencies raised their concerns that sometimes they receive contradicting advices from the Bank. Also, some complained that when they dealt with the issues of procurement and compensation, they have received vague and ambiguous advices from the Bank. Assessment of the Government Performance 21. As has been motioned earlier, the Government has played a very minor role during the conceptualization and preparation of the project. This state of affairs was a key factor that influenced the implementation of the project and has been reflected in the apparent low level of commitment that the Government shows. This inactive role and negligence is well demonstrated in its inability of availing the counterpart fund in time. One would always believe that the Government would give a higher priority to fulfill its contractual commitment for counterpart payment. In the course of NETREP’s implementation however several delays were encountered due to the lack of counterpart funds. 22. During the implementation of NETREP, some of the Governmental entities were found to be lacking necessary experienced staff capable of working to international standards. Not only that but these entities are in need of capacity building and special housekeeping that pertains to putting the initial procurement procedures in place. 45 6. Lessons Learned 23. In the course of NETREP’s implementation, several delays that could have been avoided occurred. The following are some few cases (selected as examples) that needs to be taken into consideration to avoid delays and ensure sustainability when embarking on the execution of a project such as NETREP. 24. The Government’s internal structures together with its executing agencies require substantial capacity building and housekeeping in terms of procurement procedures in order to cope with the international standards. For example, the RTC required three months to revise the ferry boats documentations to comply with the World Bank procedures and guidelines. 25. The Government entities seem to require considerable coordination with some important units outside the transport sector like Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE), and the project design did not allow for that in the formation of steering committees. As an example, the MoFNE suspended items that did not comply with its procurement procedures which was not a requirement according to NETREP’s Grant Agreement and that has led to a three months delay. 26. In some cases, the project management was not aware of the Government policy in the areas of concern to NETREP like the delay that occurred in project requests for payments in USD$, whereas Sudan falls under USA sanctions. In other cases the World Bank procedure is an issue that needs to be addressed as it becomes cumbersome delaying implementation by considerable time. 27. To attain the sustainability of services, the flow of funds for maintenance and rehabilitation should be continuous. It is however believed that the only crucial issue to be addressed, in this respect, is the re-structuring of the road tolls system in order to generate substantial revenue for meeting road maintenance requirements. Detailed costing studies should be carried out to examine the elasticity of the road toll in respect to total transport costs. Initial studies indicated that the percentage share of road toll in transport cost doesn't exceed 2%, therefore doubling the current road toll rates will only lead to an increase in total transport cost to 3 or 3.5%. The doubling of the current toll rates may generate sufficient income that caters for road maintenance if effective measures of axle limit control were enforced. The NHA is also looking towards the establishment of road fund that will bring other sources of income such as the import taxes on road vehicles and their accessories, petrol and diesel taxes as well as the annual vehicles’ and driving licenses. 46 Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Not available 47 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents 1. Sudan Joint Assessment Mission Final Reports Volumes 1 and 3, March 18, 2005 2. Final Project Paper, August 2006 3. Integrated Safeguard Data Sheet (ISDS) SDS at Appraisal, Aug 2006 4. Original Letter Agreement, 29 October 2006 5. Aide Memoire Nov/Dec 2007 6. First Amendment to Letter Agreement April 9, 2008 7. Aide Memoire: April/May 2008 8. Aide Memoire: June 2009 9. Additional Financing and Restructurings Project Paper , May 2009 10. Aide Memoire mid-term review AM May 2010 11. Restructuring Paper, June, 2011 12. Restructuring Paper, June 2012 13. Implementation Status and Result Report No.12, June 2013 14. Project ISRs 48 SUDAN NATIONAL EMERGENCY TRANSPORT REHABILITATION PROJECT (NETREP) PROJECT COMPONENTS PAVED ROADS SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS UNPAVED ROADS STATE (WILAYAH) CAPITALS OPERATIONAL RAILWAYS NATIONAL CAPITAL STATE (WILAYAH) BOUNDARIES RIVERS INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES WADIS LOCATION OF ACTIVITY BY PHASE SECTOR ACTIVITY 1 PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 DE-MINING, REHABILITATION RAIL & REINSTATEMENT OF 1 . BABANUSA-WAU TBD RAILWAY LINE CONSTRUCTION TO 2 . GADAMAI-HAMASHKORIAB DAMAZIN-KURMUK ABU GEBEIA-TALODI (160 km) ROAD PAVED ROAD (81 km)-KASSALA STATE (SECOND SECTION - 55 km) TALODI-KADUGLI (150 km) DE-MINING AND SPOT 3 . KAUDA-KADUGLI (135 km)- IMPROVEMENT SOUTHERN KORDOFAN STATE GEISSAN-KURMUK (160 km.) DAMAZIN-RENK (200 km.) UPGRADING KADUGLI-HEGLIEG (170 km.) MUGLAD-ABYEI (160 km.) 4 . ABU GEBEIA-TALODI- DETAILED ENGINEERING KADUGLI (310 km)/SOUTHERN STUDY KORDOFAN STATE 5 . DAMAZIN-KURMUK (160 km)/ BLUE NILE STATE FEASIBILITY STUDIES 6 . TOKER-GARORA (200 km)/ AND DETAILED DESIGN RED SEA STATE 7 . DAMAZIN-RENK (200 km)/ BLUE NILE STATE 8 . MUGLAD-ABYEI (160km)/ WESTERN KORDOFAN STATE 1 Phase 2 and 3 activities subject to funding approval. Compiled by the Information Management Unit-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA-Sudan This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. GSDPM Map Design Unit 25˚E 30˚E 35˚E 0 200 Kilometers 0 200 Miles REPUBLIC A RA B REPUBL IC Lake EGY PT O F EGYP T Nasser Wadi Halfa Lake Nubia LIBYA R ed S ea 15˚N 20˚N NORTHERN RED SEA Port Sudan Kerma Dongola Ni Merowe Haiya Tokar le El‘Atrun 6 Barbar Karora Atbara RIVER Ed Damer 2 Gadamai r NILE wa CHAD Ho Hamashkroiab At ba i le ad Ni ra W ERITREA KASSALA NORTHERN KHARTOUM Kassala DARFUR KHARTOUM 15˚N 15˚N AL JAZIRAH NORTHERN White Ni Wad Medani WESTERN KORDOFAN Al Qadarif le DARFUR Geneina AL QADARIF Al Fasher Sinnar El Obeid Kosti Rabak Blue Nil HIO E T HI PIA OPI A e En Nahud WHITE SINNAR NILE Nyala 7 BLUE NILE SOUTHERN KORDOFAN Renk Ed Damazin Ed Da‘ein Al Fula 3 Kauda Abu Gebeia SOUTHERN Babanusa Kadugli 5 Muglad Gessan DARFUR 4 Talodi Kurmuk 1 8 SUDAN Ba hr 10˚N Heglieg 10˚N el 'A rab ABYEI Abyei RA L C E N T RAL Wau SOUT SO UT H SUD SUDAAN N R IC AN AF RIC AN OCTOBER 2013 IBRD 40425 REPU RE UBBLLIC IC 25˚E 30˚E 35˚E