Although a large theoretical literature discusses the possible inefficiency of sharecropping contracts, empirical evidence on this phenomenon has been ambiguous at best. Household level fixed-effect estimates from about 8,500 plots operated by households who own and sharecrop land in the Ethiopian highlands provide no support for a Marshallian inefficiency. At the same time, a factor adjustment model suggests that the extent to which rental markets...
Voir la suite
INFORMATION
-
2006/10/01
-
Document de travail
-
48699
-
1
-
1
-
2010/07/01
-
Disclosed
-
Land rental in Ethiopia : Marshallian inefficiency or factor market imperfections and tenure insecurity as binding constraints?
-
rental market
TÉLÉCHARGER
RAPPORT COMPLET
Version officielle du document (peut inclure des signatures etc…)
-
Total Downloads** : 379
*La version texte est une version à reconnaissance optique de caractères non-corrigée. Cette version est fournie uniquement pour accommoder les utilisateurs disposant de connections lentes.