1. Project Data

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

This project in Cote d' Ivoire, was the second phase of the Abidjan - Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation Program (ALTTFP). The objectives of the Adaptable Program Loan (APL) were "to reduce the trade and transport barriers in the ports and on the roads along the Abidjan - Lagos coastal corridor".

The first phase of the APL program covered Ghana, Togo and Benin. Although Nigeria was initially included in the second phase of the program, it decided not to borrow under the program in late 2010. The Project
Development Objectives (PDOs) as stated in the Financing Agreement (Schedule 1, page 5) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 18) were:

"To reduce trade and transport barriers in the ports and on the roads along the Abidjan-Lagos corridor in Cote d' Ivoire''.

This review is based on the three sub-objectives: (1) To reduce trade barriers in the port in Cote d'Ivoire: (2) To reduce trade barriers on the road along the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire: and (3) To reduce transport barriers on the roads along the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?  
No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?  
No

d. Components  
There were four components (PAD, pages 18-20).

1. Trade Facilitation. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$6.3 million. The actual cost was US$1.8 million.

This component aimed at financing the following activities: (i) facilitating data collection and sharing relevant information for interconnectivity between the customs agencies in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana: (ii) equipment and technical advisory services for implementing a trade facilitation Singe Window (an electronic facility that allows the parties involved in trade and transport to submit relevant information required for fulfilling trade-related regulatory requirements at a single entry point) in Abidjan port, and strengthening the capacity of the port's border (customs and immigration) agencies: (iii) conducting training programs for stakeholders: (iv) streamlining customs procedures, formulating customs procedures manuals and dissemination to stakeholders: (v) strengthening the operational capacity of Cote d'Ivoire's National Facilitation Committee.

2. Improvement of the Road Corridor's Infrastructure in Cote d'Ivoire. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$138.8 million. The actual cost was US$109.9 million.

This component aimed at financing the following activities: (i) technical designs and engineering studies for road rehabilitation: (ii) rehabilitation of 130 kilometer (km) on the Grand Bassum - Aboisso - Noe section of the corridor, construction of rest stops at Noe and Aboisso and rehabilitation of a freight terminal at Vridi: (iii) rehabilitation of the access roads to Abidjan port: (iv) a study on traffic management in the port access zone: (v) implementing social and environmental measures: and (vi) equipment and technical studies for road safety measures.

3. Project Management and Coordination. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$2.9 million. The actual cost was more than twice the appraisal estimate at US$7.0 million (discussed in 2e).
This component aimed at providing technical advisory services, training and project management logistical support.

4. Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) programs and corridor performance monitoring. This activity was originally financed under APL 1. This component aimed at providing support to pending activities in the first phase of the project (discussed in section 3). No funding was allocated to this component at appraisal. The actual cost was US$1.50 million.

Activities in this component included: (i) executing activities aimed at reducing the impact of HIV/AIDS and preventing the spread of HIV infection among communities along the portion of the corridor; and (ii) collecting data for monitoring HIV/AIDS prevention and dissemination of data across Cote d'Ivoire.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project cost. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$148.0 million. The actual cost was US$120.3 million. The difference between the appraisal estimate and actual cost (about US$28.0 million) was due to combination of factors including: (i) significant changes in the exchange rate (the Grant was designated in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and disbursements were in West African CFA francs). This resulted in approximately US$18.0 million in savings; and (ii) lower counterpart funding. The cost of road rehabilitation (component two activity) was seven percent higher than estimated at appraisal, due to changes in project scope, scale-up of activities to include new works and unforeseen site conditions not properly identified at appraisal. Due to the extensions of these activities, the supervision cost (component three activity) increased as well (discussed in Section Five). The cost overruns were covered through the savings due to exchange rate changes between SDR and the West African CFA francs.

Project financing. The project was financed by an IDA Grant of US$90.0 million. The actual amount disbursed was US$80.4 million. The difference between actual disbursements and appraisal grant was due to exchange rate changes during implementation. There was parallel financing for complementary trade facilitation activities on the corridor from European Union (EU) during implementation.

Borrower contribution. The borrower contribution was estimated at US$58.0 million. Their actual contribution was significantly less than planned at US$39.9 million.

Dates. The project was approved on May 31, 2012, became effective on October 16, 2012 and was scheduled to close on June 30, 2018. The project closed nine months behind schedule on March 29, 2019.

Other changes. There were two Level 2 restructurings. These changes were made through the first restructuring on June 2017.

- A new activity was created under component four to allow the Abidjan -Lagos Corridor Program train the staff of the Observatory For Transport Fluidity (OFT). According to the clarifications provided by the team, OFT is an administrative structure, attached to the Ministry of Transport. The aim of the OFT is to control and regulate activities and operations that are likely to impede corridor transport movements. The missions of the OFT in this project were to: (i) collect data related to traffic movements on the Ivorian territory; (ii) create awareness of transport operators and police officers; and (iii) dismantle illegal roadblocks.
A new disbursement category of expenses was created for implementing the above-mentioned activity and funding was allocated for this activity, from the savings realized due to exchange rate changes.

The project closing date was extended by nine months from June 30, 2018 to March 29, 2019, in order to complete the ongoing activities through the second restructuring on April 24, 2018.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Country and regional context. The Abidjan-Lagos regional corridor, links some of the largest and economically dynamic cities in Africa - Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), Accra (Ghana) and Lagos (Nigeria) and handles over two-thirds of trade in West Africa. The corridor is also a global gateway to the regional landlocked countries. The transport cost on this corridor was high at appraisal (with the cost on average two times more than in Western Europe) due to a combination of factors, including poor roads and non-infrastructure related factors inhibiting movement of freight and passengers on the corridor (such as, deficient implementation of regional transit agreements, poor information sharing between customs agencies and port operators, excessive checkpoints and road blocks, costly and cumbersome customs procedures due to lack of automation of customs procedures and equipment at border posts). Reducing transport prices along the corridor through addressing these issues was therefore important for boosting the intra and inter regional trade of West African countries.

Country and Regional strategy. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for Cote d'Ivoire underscored the need for transport infrastructure improvements and regional integration. At appraisal, the PDOs were consistent with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development's (NEPAD) Action plan to improve transport and transit trade along regional corridors. The Abidjan - Lagos corridor was identified by both the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS) and the West African and Monetary Union (WAMEU) as a sub-regional priority corridor, due to the large population covered by the corridor. Before appraisal in 2007, a protocol of cooperation was signed between the Ghanaian Customs and the Ivoirian Customs. This protocol identified implementation of a Single Window as a major reform of customs connectivity and information sharing which would contribute to expediting the customs clearance process.

Alignment with the Bank country and regional strategy. At the country level, the Bank's Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Cote d'Ivoire for 2010-2014 explicitly supported the need for regional integration and cooperation in matters pertaining to trade and transport facilitation. The fourth pillar of the CPF articulated the need for infrastructural renewal and improving basic service delivery through rehabilitation/expansion/upgrading of essential basic transport infrastructure. The CPF also highlighted the need for reducing trade and transport barriers along the Abidjan-Lagos corridor by improving road conditions, modernizing customs procedures and reducing road blocks (CPF, page 34). The PDO was relevant for the Bank's Regional Integration Assistance Strategy (RIAS) issued in 2008. The RIAS highlighted the need for creating an open, unified, regional economic space for creating an enabling environment for fostering a competitive and efficient private sector in Africa. The three pillars of the strategy were: (i) improving cross-border connectivity through developing regional infrastructure: (ii) institutional cooperation and economic integration to increase trade and investment with regional and non-regional economies: and (iii) coordinated interventions to provide regional public goods for improving regional,
environmental, health and social conditions (such as addressing HIV related issues): The PDOs were well-aligned with the Bank's current Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Cote d'Ivoire for 2015-2019. Under pillar D Regional Integration, the CPF highlighted the need for accelerating structural reforms, aimed at lowering the cost of cross-border activities and strengthening infrastructure development. The CPF also underscored the need for interventions aimed at policy coordination and infrastructure development and investments, to promote regional synergies (CPF, page 22). According to the clarification provided by the team, the existing CPF was extended to 2022, in order to align it with the electoral cycle and Cote d'Ivoire's National Development Plan (2016-2020).

This project in Cote d'Ivoire, was the second phase of the Bank-financed Abidjan- Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation Regional Program. The first phase focused on a regional approach for reducing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS along the corridor. The prior project achieved its objectives and demonstrated that a regional approach can have a substantial effect in reducing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS disease. Since the prior project exceeded targets, the scope of this project was broadened to address transport, transit and trade facilitation issues along the corridor (besides addressing some remaining regional HIV/AIDS prevention issues). The relevance of objectives is High, given that the project scope was elevated following the success of the prior project.

Rating

High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

**OBJECTIVE 1**

**Objective**

To reduce trade barriers in the port in Cote d'Ivoire.

**Rationale**

**Theory of Change.** The causal links between the project activities, outputs and outcomes were logical and the intended outcomes were measurable. Implementing national custom modernization plans, training customs agencies, establishing a Single Window and supporting interconnectivity between Ghanaian and Ivorian customs were aimed at streamlining customs procedures. The outputs of these activities can be expected to address some of the trade barriers in the port of Cote d'Ivoire and thereby aid in the long term development outcome of increasing competitiveness of the ports along the Abidjan - Lagos corridor.

**Outputs** (pages 13-14 and page 35).

- The computerized single window - *Guichet Unique (GUCE)* - was established at the Abidjan Port through Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) arrangements (and not through IDA resources as originally envisioned). With the establishment of *GUCE*, all cargo manifests were transmitted by consignees and shared through the single window and all customs declarations processed through *GUCE*.
Customs procedures manuals for streamlining customs clearance processes were developed at the port as targeted.

Technical assistance was provided for strengthening Cote d'Ivoire's National Facilitation Committee.

Annual campaigns were held by the Abidjan - Lagos Corridor Organization to collect data on port dwell times in ports of the Abidjan - Lagos corridor.

Outcomes. (ICR, paragraph 27).

The proxy measure used for monitoring performance was reduction in port dwell time. (Dwell time is a measure of the time elapsed, from the time imported goods arrives at the port till the time goods leave the port for final inland destinations, after all the permits and clearances had been obtained. Shorter port dwell times enable cargo owners to save on storage costs charged by the ports). The port dwell time declined continuously over the project timeline, decreasing by 21% from a baseline of 14 days in 2012, to 11 days as targeted in 2018.

Since reducing port dwell time is necessary for realizing the higher level objectives for improving port competitiveness, this review concludes that the project activities significantly contributed to reducing trade barriers in the Cote d'Ivoire port.

Rating
Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2
Objective
To reduce trade barriers on the roads along the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire.

Rationale
Theory of change. The causal links between the project activities, outputs and outcomes were clear and the intended outcomes were monitorable. Facilitating data collection and sharing of data between the customs agencies of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, development of customs manuals, training the customs staff, conducting regional meetings of the National Facilitation Committees and sensitization workshops to raise awareness among road users on the protocol between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, were aimed at reducing trade barriers on the roads along the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire. These activities were likely to reduce border crossing time of trucks/merchandise at Eluba- Noe segment of the Abidjan - Lagos corridor.

Outputs (pages 14 -16).

- The activity of interconnection between the customs agencies of Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, for simplifying and reduce customs clearance procedures at the port and at the border, was partially completed. The interconnection was operational since 2017 at only three customs offices in Cote d'Ivoire (Transit Bureau, Vridi Petroleum Bureau and Noe Bureau at the border) and two offices in Ghana (Afalo and Elubo).

- Technical assistance via capacity building and training was provided to the following customs departments of Cote d'Ivoire: the investigation office, the customs services performance department
and the communications department. An evaluation survey organized by customs in 2018 on 428 customs agents concluded that the reforms had a positive impact on the organization and customs performance.

- Awareness campaigns on the reduction of border crossing time were organized by the National Facilitation Committee.
- A regional customs guarantee mechanism was established to simplify clearance procedures of transit goods. This mechanism is currently being implemented by the chambers of commerce in Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.
- The following activities were completed as targeted: The freight terminal at Vridi and the related access roads (approximately 8.9 kilometers) and a transit office to improve traffic fluidity within the port zone and its neighborhood: The parking lot was rehabilitated for on-site establishment of customs and Chamber of Commerce offices issuing transit documents: and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) devices were installed on transit trucks to decongest the port area.
- Stakeholders dialogue led by the National Facilitation Committee contributed to revising the parking fees and this in turn allowed for higher turnover of trucks.
- The activity associated with establishment of a "Joint Border Post" (JBP) with Ghana at Noe - Elubo border was dropped, following the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to coordinate the establishment of JBPs in West Africa with support from the European Union.

Outcomes. (ICR, paragraph 30).

- The border crossing time from Elubo to Noe declined from a baseline value of 37 hours in 2012 to 14 hours when the project closed in March 2019. This exceeded the target of 29.6 hours. However, the ICR (paragraph 30) notes this outcome was significantly undermined and the border crossing time reverted to 47 hours one year after the border closed, due mainly to the Ghanaian border agencies and changes in Ghana customs procedures in 2017 (trucks were allowed to enter the customs border area before some required customs documents were ready). It is not clear from the ICR, whether the Ghanaian authorities have taken any steps to address the issue.

Although the project did achieve its targets when the project closed, given that the outcomes were significantly undermined by the deterioration of the border closing time, this review concludes that the project made a modest contribution to realizing this PDO.

Rating

Modest

OBJECTIVE 3

Objective

To reduce transport barriers on the roads along the corridor in Cote d’Ivoire.

Rationale

Theory of change. The causal links between the project activities, outputs and outcomes were logical and the intended outcomes were monitorable. Rehabilitation of the road sections along the segment of the
corridor, together with collection and dissemination of data required to measure and monitor performance, were aimed at reducing trade barriers on the roads along the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire and these were likely to reduce the transport time on the rehabilitated sections of the corridor. These were aimed at the long-term outcome of seamless movement of people and goods along the corridor.

**Outputs** (pages 15 - 16 and page 36).

- 113.59 km of non-rural roads on the corridor were rehabilitated at project closure, slightly short of the target of 130.3 km.
- The market at Elubo was rehabilitated but was not yet functional when the project closed.

*These activities were completed as targeted.*

- The transit and parking areas at Noe and Aboisso, the freight terminal at Vridi, access roads (about nine km), the Aboisso and Noe bridges, and a footbridge in Aboisso to reinforce road safety conditions.
- The staff of the Observatory for Transport Fluidity (OFT) of Cote d'Ivoire were trained on data collection and analysis.
- Speed bumps and improved road safety signs were placed in the proximity of villages along the corridor for road safety.
- The percentage of truckers that were familiar with at least two means of prevention of HIV/AIDS increased from 80% to 98% and the percentage of truckers reporting the use of condoms increased from 72% to 97%. 206,000 people were sensitized on HIV/AIDS prevention at project completion. Of this, 32% were women.

**Outcomes** (ICR, paragraphs 37 and 38).

- 92% of the roads of the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire were reported to be in good or fair condition at project closure in March 2019, as compared to 71% at the baseline in September 2012. This exceeded the target of 77%.
- Travel time (the journey time from Abidjan to Noe) dropped to two hours at project closure as compared to up to five hours in 2012. This outcome was achieved through reducing the number of legal and illegal checkpoints and road blocks on the corridor. The target of three checkpoints per 100 km at the end of the project was surpassed, with four checkpoints along the 170 km from Noe to Abidjan in 2018, equivalent to 2.4 checkpoints per 100 km.
- 53 million people living in the vicinity of the corridor benefitted from the project activities. This exceeded the target of 50 million. 33% of the beneficiaries were women (This was short of the target of 55%).

Given that the outcomes were realized, this review concludes that the project development objective was substantially achieved.

**Rating**

Substantial
**OVERALL EFFICACY**

**Rationale**

There is adequate evidence that the project substantially contributed to realizing the project objectives of reducing trade barriers in Cote d'Ivoire and reducing transport barriers on the roads along the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire. Regarding the objective of reducing trade barriers on the roads along the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire, although the targets were realized when the project closed, the outcomes were significantly undermined leading to deterioration of the border closing time on the Ghana side. On balance, overall efficacy is considered to be Substantial.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**

Substantial

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**5. Efficiency**

**Economic analysis.** An economic analysis was conducted both at appraisal and at closure for project activities associated with rehabilitation of roads on the Noe-Abidjan section of the corridor (component two activity). This component accounted for 94% of the estimated cost at appraisal and 91% of the actual project cost. The analysis was conducted using a simplified version of the Bank's Highway Development Management (HDM -4) model. The overall project benefits were assumed to come from: (1) travel time savings due to improved road infrastructure; and (2) savings in Vehicle Operating Cost (VOC) due to the improved quality of roads. The quantifiable benefits were assumed to come road infrastructure improvements, leading to gains from decreased delays. The Net Present Value (NPV) at 12% discount rate was US$32.4 million of the revised appraisal cost by the ICR team (as the PAD's detailed cost analysis was not available) and the NPV at closure was US$46.6 million. The ex post Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) was slightly higher at 20% as compared to the ex ante EIRR of 17%. The ex post EIRR was higher than the ex ante EIRR due to the higher than anticipated traffic flows on the corridor.

**Administrative and Operational inefficiencies.** There were several administrative and operational issues both at preparation and during implementation. One, the cost of civil works was underestimated at appraisal, with the cost of civil works increasing rather substantially during implementation (the cost of civil works was about 30% higher than the awarded contract in the beginning of the project and by seven percent when compared to the appraisal estimates). The cost overruns were due to a combination of factors, including poor quality of preparation studies and unforeseen site conditions for the Vridi freight station and its access roads which had been prepared in a crisis environment. Underground utility services, such as lines used for electricity distribution, traffic lights, street lights, natural gas transportation, telecommunication, water/wastewater pipelines and broadband internet services were not properly identified. This necessitated extension of the work contracts and increased supervision cost as well (the actual supervision cost was more than twice the appraisal estimate). (2) major shortcomings in compliance with safeguards, led to partial suspension of disbursements for eight months in 2016 (discussed in section 10a). This necessitated additional costs for extra environmental and social measures and contributed to delays during implementation. and (3). Recurrent delays in counterpart funding which at appraisal was estimated to be as much as 40% of the appraisal estimate, impacted the implementation.
of activities on the ground throughout the life of the project. and (4). Inadequate cooperation between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire with respect to the signing and implementation of the customs interconnectivity at the Noe-Elubo border contributed to delays and at closure this activity was partially completed.

In sum, despite the significant administrative and operational issues, efficiency is rated substantial, considering the difficult conflict environment under which the project was operating during preparation and the fragile post conflict environment in the initial years of implementation.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

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* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of the PDO to the government and Bank strategy is High. Efficacy of the two objectives - reducing trade barriers in Cote d'Ivoire and reducing transport barriers on the roads along the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire are rated as substantial. Although the targets were realized, efficacy of the third objective - reducing trade barriers on the road along the corridor in Cote d'Ivoire was seriously undermined by the deterioration of the border crossing time on Ghana side, one year after the project closing date. Given this, overall efficacy is rated as substantial, although marginally so. Although there were serious administrative and operational drawbacks, efficiency is rated as substantial, considering the difficult conflict environment under which the project was operating during preparation, and the fragile post conflict environment in the initial years of implementation. Taking these factors into account, outcome is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

Government commitment. The ICR (paragraph 82) notes that trade facilitation and customs modernization is a major concern of the Economic Community of West African States. However, the government's decision
to physically inspect imports would undermine the benefits of the single window activity. When the project closed, Cote d'Ivoire had still not signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Ghana on the operation and maintenance of the Noe bridge (ICR, paragraph 84). Further, without regional commitment, there is risk associated with the activity pertaining to the number of roadblocks and checkpoints on the corridor, given that these are subject to local security conditions and political direction (ICR, paragraph 83).

Institutional risk. There is risk of underfunding for road maintenance activities on the rehabilitated sections of the corridor. The ICR (page 26, footnote 18) notes that over the period 2012-2015, the financing needs for road maintenance amounted to West African CFA francs 741.28 billion as compared to the requirements of 471,56 billion. This corresponded to a financing gap of 269.72 billion (approximately US$539.0 million).

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

This project was prepared based on the experiences from the first phase of a Bank-financed project and from the other projects financed by the Bank in the region (East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project and the West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project). As a “first generation corridor project, the project activities included hard infrastructure road investments alongside trade facilitation components (such as activities aimed at trade facilitation awareness campaigns at the national level). Several risks were identified at appraisal, including risks associated with the multi-dimension of the project (as the activities required concerted efforts by customs and other border control agencies), and governance risks. The mitigation measures incorporated at design, included efforts aimed at improving the customs internal reporting systems and public disclosure of the number of illegal road blocks along the corridor (PAD, page 74). The project design appropriately included a Project Preparation Advance (PPA) for recruiting fiduciary specialists before the project became effective. The arrangements made at appraisal for monitoring were appropriate (discussed in section 9).

There were several shortcomings at Quality-at-Entry. For one thing, as indicated in section 5, there were cost overruns. This was primarily due to the low quality of the technical studies for civil works at appraisal due to a combination of factors, including poor quality of preparation studies, and unforeseen site conditions at the Vridi freight station and its access roads. This necessitated revision of the civil works activities and led to cost overruns of the civil works activities and increased supervision costs as well. For another, the staff of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) staff had no experience executing Bank projects. This contributed to the long procurement process (the construction of the Vridi Trucks station and rehabilitation of the access roads was subject to an year’s delay due to poor management of the procurement process), significant delays in executing the Resettlement Action Plan and weakness in monitoring cross-cutting activities directly managed by the PIU (fiduciary management). and three, weak capacity to monitor safeguards led to the partial suspension of disbursement in 2016 (discussed in section 10). The PIU eventually had to be superseded by a new PIU in the Ministry of Economic Infrastructure (a condition imposed by the Bank for lifting the suspension of disbursement).
Quality at-Entry Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision
Twelve Implementation Status Results reports were archived during project execution (ICR, page 2). The supervision team included a customs consultant and a road engineer consultant with strong experience in the region and who had worked in similar projects. The supervision was aided by the presence of the Bank staff in Côte d’Ivoire, who were in close contract with the Project Implementation Unit and the respective government agencies. The supervision team provided candid assessments to the Government and the Bank management during implementation and immediately took the decision to partially suspend disbursements, in the wake of shortcomings in compliance with social safeguards (discussed in section 10). The supervision team worked closely with the government to resolve the issue with a Nine-Point Action Plan, which among other things transferred responsibility to a new PIU. The supervision team also worked proactively and led the dialogue on road safety with high level authorities.

There were shortcomings in supervision. The ICR (paragraph 77) notes that on average only one full supervision mission was conducted per year (as compared to the usual norm of two full supervision missions a year), although interim supervision missions were held as needed, especially in the last years of implementation. According the information provided by the team, there were as many as four Task Team Leaders over a project lifetime of seven years.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design
The results framework was clear and the two outcome indicators - reduction in port dwell time and reduction in border-crossing time of trucks/merchandise along the corridor in Elubo - Noe (border with Ghana) were appropriate for monitoring project performance. The indicators were easily measurable. The M&E framework however could have been strengthened, to include indicators on the assessment of transport costs, trade volume and passenger travel.

The indicators mentioned above were to be monitored through the data collected and monitored by the Abidjan - Lagos Corridor Organization (ALCO), based on a methodology to be developed during preparation. ALCO had already provided the data for the prior Bank-financed project and this aided in collecting data for monitoring performance. Baseline data had been collected by the ALCO for the port
dwell time and border crossing time and data for the first year had been collected by the ALCO under the first phase of the project.

b. M&E Implementation

Although M&E in the first phase of the project was funded by the Bank, ALCO was created under ECOWAS through the Accra Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2007. The recipient countries of the first phase of the program (Ghana, Togo and Benin) continued to benefit from monitoring and results dissemination until March 2019, more than a year beyond the closing data for the first phase of the program.

c. M&E Utilization

Comparative results across the regional countries were disseminated through stakeholder workshops, information sharing and awareness raising on trade and transport issues along the corridor. This provided a platform for continual regional policy dialogue on trade facilitation, including customs modernization reforms and port efficiency.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

This project was classified as a Category B project under World Bank safeguard policies. Three safeguard policies were triggered at appraisal: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01): Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11) and, Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12).

Environmental Assessment and Physical Cultural Resources. The PDA (paragraph 71) notes that preliminary field assessments conducted at appraisal revealed no possible adverse environmental impacts associated with the planned civil works (road and bridge improvement and rehabilitation of the Vridi trucks parking lot). The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) to address environmental issues, were prepared and publicly-disclosed at appraisal (PAD, paragraph 40).

The ICR (paragraph 72) notes that there were occupational and road safety issues during implementation. There were at least 22 accidents, including five fatalities, that had not been reported to the Bank and some led to protests from local communities. As a result, there was a partial suspension of disbursement during implementation. The suspension was lifted after eight months following the establishment of a new PIU.

Physical Cultural Resources (PCR). The ICR does not provide information on whether there were any issues associated with the safeguards on physical cultural resources during implementation. According to
the information provided by the team, there were no issues associated with the safeguards on Physical Cultural Resources during implementation.

Involuntary Resettlement. A Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was prepared and publicly-disclosed at appraisal in 2011 to address resettlement issues (PAD, paragraph 66). The ICR (paragraph 71) notes that the RAP was updated in 2013. The ICR (paragraph 72) notes that there were systematic delays in the implementation of RAP, due to delays in mobilization of resources during implementation. The ICR notes that there were 2411 Project-Affected Persons (PAPs). 94 percent of the PAP (2256) were compensated and 155 could not be reached. About US$7.2 million was disbursed for the RAP (of this 98% were paid directly to the PAP and the balance placed in an escrow account). At Noe, a platform was built under the project to relocate the affected traders. According to the information provided by the team, a platform refers to land that was built into a market for the relocated traders.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management. An assessment conducted at appraisal, concluded that the financial management arrangements of the Abidjan - Lagos Corridor Organization (ALCO) were satisfactory and the financial management risk was rated as modest (PAD, paragraph 62). The ICR (paragraph 73) notes that financial management arrangements during implementation were deemed to be satisfactory and the project complied with the reporting and accounting requirements as stated in the Loan Agreements. The ICR however provides no details on the quality of audits.

Procurement management. A procurement management assessment of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) and ALCO, was conducted at appraisal. A procurement plan for the first eighteen months was prepared and publicly-disclosed at appraisal. This plan was to be updated as required during implementation to reflect the actual needs during implementation (PAD, paragraph 43). The ICR (paragraph 75) notes that there were no instances of misprocurement in the project. The ICR however notes that there were significant delays in procurement of critical activities (such as, the construction of Aboisso and Noe rest stops and the rehabilitation of the Grand Bassam - Aboisso road section).

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

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d. Other

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11. Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratings</th>
<th>ICR</th>
<th>IEG</th>
<th>Reason for Disagreements/Comment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
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The ICR draws the following main lessons from the experience of implementing this project, with some adaptation of language.

1. The combination of "hard" and "soft" components in a "first generation corridor project" can help in strengthening the overall impact of the regional program. Investment activities financed along the road, port and borders in this project, were complemented through trade facilitation awareness. The lesson is that such projects can be a prelude to "second generation corridor projects" to include elements of growth and to encourage governments to improve coordination of joint regional reforms.

2. Implementation readiness is key to avoid potential delays and cost overruns. In this project, there was a long delay between the time when the technical studies were done and when the works had started (leading to additional degradations on the infrastructure). The technical designs needed to be modified and this contributed to the cost overruns and delays during implementation. The lesson is that infrastructure projects should ensure that all the required technical and economic studies are of high quality and, if needed, recruit specialists to strengthen the client capacity.

3. While counterpart financing can be helpful in raising the degree of government commitment, it is necessary to ensure that the government provides proof of adequate budgetary commitment. About 40% of the appraisal estimate of the project cost in this project, was to come through counterpart funding. Delays in mobilizing counterpart funding contributed to significant delays in implementing the infrastructure component of the project. The lesson is that when counterpart funding of this magnitude is involved, it is necessary to ensure that the government provides proof of adequate budgetary commitment and that this be made a condition of project effectiveness.

4. All measures available to the team (including hard decisions like the suspension of disbursement) should be used when important issues are identified during implementation. The partial suspension of disbursements due to shortcomings in social safeguards compliance in this project, served as the basis for increased high-level dialogue with the government. Due diligence measures (road safety and occupational health and safety measures) taken to lift the suspension, led to additional positive outcomes which benefitted the workers and the population living in the area of the project investments.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No
14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is clear and analytical. The ICR candidly discusses the issues associated with the regional dimension of the project. It is also candid in discussing the non-compliance with safeguards which led to partial suspension of disbursements. It is internally consistent and draws good lessons from the experience of implementing this project.

However, there were some shortcomings. The ICR (paragraph 48) notes that the overall outcome is moderately satisfactory, given the high relevance of objective, substantial efficacy and efficiency. High relevance and substantial efficacy and efficiency would imply a satisfactory outcome, according to the guidelines. The ICR provides no information on whether the audits were unqualified.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
   Substantial