Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2913 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA H3050, TF092325, TF094016) ON A ON A PRE-ARREARS CLEARANCE GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 3.3 MILLION (US$5.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND ON A FOOD PRICE CRISIS RESPONSE TRUST FUND CO-FINANCING GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$3.0 MILLION AND ON A EUROPEAN UNION TRUST FUND CO-FINANCING IN THE AMOUNT OF EUR 8.047 MILLION (US$11.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA FOR THE SECOND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT PROJECT (CEPII) January 19, 2014 Social Protection Unit for West and Central Africa Country Department West Africa 1 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective July 31, 2013) Currency Unit = Liberian Dollars (LR$) US$1.00 = LR$ 75.05 US$1.00 = 0.66 SDR US$1.00 = 1.3 EUR FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AA Administrative Agreement CBO Community Based Organization CDD Community-Driven Development CEPI First Community Empowerment Project CEPII Second Community Empowerment Project CF Community Facilitators CfWTEP Cash-for-Work Temporary Employment Project CMU Country Management Unit EGIRP Economic Governance and Institutional Reform Project EPP Emergency Project Paper ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan EU European Union FA Financing Agreement FAPM Financial and Accounting Procedure Manual FD Finance Director FM Financial Management FPCRTF Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund GoL Government of Liberia HDN Human Development Network ICM Implementation Completion Memorandum ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IFR Interim Financial Report ILO International Labor Organization IP Institutional Performance IPRS Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy ISR Implementation Supervision Report LACE Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment LGA Local Government Authorities LYEP Liberia Youth Employment Program MAAFP Manual of Administrative, Accounting, and Financial Procedures M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MOH Ministry of Health MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTR Mid-Term Review NCB National Competitive Bidding PDO Project Development Objective OM Operations Manual PMC Project Management Committee PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Program QAG Quality Assurance Group QALP Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio RFTF Results Focused Transitional Framework ROM Results Oriented Monitoring RPF Resettlement Policy Framework RAP Resettlement Action Plan TA Technical Assistance UNICEF United Nations Children’ Fund UNDP United Nations Development Program WASH Water, Sanitation, and Health WFP World Food Program Vice President : Makhtar Diop Country Director : Yusupha B. Crookes Country Manager : Inguna Dobraja Sector Manager : Stefano Paternostro Project Team Leader : Suleiman Namara ICR Team Leader : Emily Weedon Chapman REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA SECOND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT PROJECT CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information........................................................................................................ i B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................... i C. Ratings Summary ........................................................................................................ i D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... ii E. Bank Staff .................................................................................................................. iii F. Results Framework Analysis ..................................................................................... iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ................................................................... iv H. Restructuring (if any) ................................................................................................. v I. Disbursement Profile ................................................................................................. vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 11 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 19 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 20 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 23 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors .............. 24 List of Annexes Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 25 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 27 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 32 Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ....... 35 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 37 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 43 Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ........................ 44 Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...................... 67 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 68 IBRD Map No. 33435 R2 ........................................................................................... 70 A. Basic Information Community Country: Liberia Project Name: Empowerment II IDA H3050,TF092325, Project ID: P105683, P112084 L/C/TF Number(s): TF094016 ICR Date: January 16, 2014 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: LIBERIA H3050: XDR 3.30M H3050: XDR 3.30M Original Total TF092325: EUR 8.05M Disbursed Amount: TF092325: EUR 8.33M Commitment: TF094016: US$3.0M TF094016: US$3.0M H3050: XDR 3.30M Revised Amount: TF092325: EUR 8.33M TF094016: US$3.0M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: European Union B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 03/27/2007 Effectiveness: 08/02/2007 08/02/2007 06/21/2008 04/24/2009 Appraisal: 04/11/2007 Restructuring(s): 06/20/2011 04/18/2012 06/25/2012 Approval: 06/14/2007 Mid-term Review: 06/30/2009 01/28/2010 Closing: 06/30/2011 07/31/2013 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory i C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Highly Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): QALP conducted in April Problem Project at any Quality of 2010 rated Likelihood of Yes time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): Achievement of the PDO as 2 = Satisfactory/Likely DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual (TBD) Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 16 20 Health 16 5 Other social services 36 20 Primary education 16 20 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 16 35 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 29 30 Education for all 14 20 Health system performance 14 5 Other social protection and risk management 14 15 Participation and civic engagement 29 30 ii E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Yusupha B. Crookes Mats Karlsson Country Manager: Inguna Dobraja Ohene Nyanin Sector Manager: Stefano Paternostro Eva Jarawan Project Team Leader: Suleiman Namara Giuseppe Zampaglione ICR Team Leader: Emily Weedon Chapman ICR Primary Author: Kathryn Johnston F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) As part of the government response to the social and economic emergency in Liberia, the Project will improve poor rural communities’ access to basic services and economic opportunities through a Community-Driven Development approach, by investing in community sub-projects and in capacity building at the community and local government levels. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) To improve communities' access to basic infrastructures and provide economic opportunities for vulnerable households in urban and rural areas, through: (a) a community driven approach; (b) a labor-intensive public works program; and (c) the provision of capacity-building at the community and local government levels. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Formally Actual Value Original Target Indicator 1 Baseline Value Revised Achieved at Values Target Values Completion Percentage of sub-projects undertaken that reflect beneficiaries’ priorities and are implemented in collaboration with local authorities. 0 100% 90% N/a 02-Aug-2007 31-Jul-2013 Number of children attending primary school in ‘improved’ facilities as defined by technical assessment. 0 8596 02-Aug-2007 N/a 8910 31-Jul-2013 Percentage of reduction in poverty gap of targeted vulnerable households at least 20%. 0 27% 20-Jun-2008 20% N/a 31-Jul-2013 1 Indicator wording below reflects final revisions as formalized in the June 21, 2008 (Level 1) and June 25, 2012 (Level 2) Restructurings. See Annex 2 for detail. iii (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Formally Actual Value Original Target Indicator 2 Baseline Value Revised Achieved at Values Target Values Completion (a) Number of schools constructed/rehabilitated, (b) Number of markets constructed/rehabilitated, (c) Number of bridges constructed/rehabilitated, (d) Number of water and sanitation projects built, (e) Number of health facilities constructed/rehabilitated, (f) Number of culverts constructed/rehabilitated (a) 30 (a) 33 (b) 6 (b) 6 (c) 49 0 (c) 52 02-Aug-2007 N/a (d) 85 (d) 69 (e) 1 (e) 1 (f) 89 (f) 88 31-Jul-2013 Person-days of temporary jobs created 0 680,000 800,000 N/a 20-Jun-2008 31-Jul-2013 Percent of PMCs that are inclusive and at least 50% of their members are women 0 100% 90% N/a 02-Aug-2007 31-Jul-2013 Percentage of communities that have minutes of the meeting electing PMCs 0 90% 90% N/a 02-Aug-2007 31-Jul-2013 Percent of PMCs that have their own bank account 0 100% 100% 90% 02-Aug-2007 31-Jul-2013 Number of PMC members successfully trained yearly 0 2650 2600 2650 02-Aug-2007 31-Jul-2013 Number of county/district officials successfully trained yearly 0 530 360 N/a 02-Aug-2007 31-Jul-2013 Percentage of project management expenses as part of total budgeted annual expenditures 0 10.8% >13% N/a 02-Aug-2007 31-Jul-2013 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 3 1 10/30/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/27/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.35 3 06/20/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.64 4 12/12/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.07 2 Indicator wording below reflects final revisions as formalized in the June 21, 2008 and June 20, 2012 Restructurings. See Annex 2 for detail. 3 This column only reflects H3050. iv 5 03/27/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.47 6 10/30/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.38 7 03/15/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.99 8 01/02/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.13 9 05/24/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.13 Moderately 10 03/15/2012 Moderately Satisfactory 5.13 Unsatisfactory Moderately 11 06/24/2012 Moderately Satisfactory 3.02 Unsatisfactory 12 11/17/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.72 13 06/24/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.11 H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD 4 millions US$3.0M co-financing from the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund; Revise the Project’s 06/21/2008 5 Y MS MS 0.64 results framework; Extend the Project Closing Date to 07/31/2012 EUR8.047M co-financing from 04/24/2009 N S MS 3.38 the European Union (EU) EUR0.285M increased funding from EU; Modify the funding allocation under the table of 06/20/20011 N S S 10.76 Category of Eligible Expenditure; Extend the EU TF Closing Date to 06/30/2012 Correct error in representation of percentages of financing in 04/18/2012 N MS MU 14.24 the table of Category of Eligible Expenditure in the previous Restructuring Extend the Closing Date of the 06/25/2012 N MS MU 14.99 IDA Grant 7/31/2013; (ii) Extend the Closing Date of the 4 This column reflects all three funding sources (H3050, TF092325 and TF09016). 5 The Restructuring was approved by the World Bank Board of Directors on 05/29/2008 as reported in the Operations Portal. The 06/21/2008 date as recorded here and used throughout the ICR is the date that amendments to the Project’s legal documents were signed with the Government. v ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions 4 EU TF to 08/31/2012: (iii) revise the Project’s results framework I. Disbursement Profile 6 6 The disbursement graph from the Operations Portal only reflects IDA Grant Number H3050. Note that the decrease in disbursements on March 16, 2012 results from the reposting of expenses originally incurred under the IDA Grant to the co-financing EU Trust Fund. While not materially affecting the overall funding allocations under CEPII, it allowed LACE to fully utilize the EU funding before its closing date of August 31, 2012 (11 months prior to the closing of the IDA Grant). vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal: Post-War Emergency Challenges and Project Rationale 1. Liberia was a middle-income country before the civil war began in 1989, but the fourteen years of war diverted resources away from development. The conflict devastated the country's economy and destroyed its physical, social, and human capital. By the time hostilities ended in August 2003, with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), the country’s GDP stood at negative 31 percent. Following the CPA, a democratically-elected Government took office in January 2006 and completed an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) in early 2007. The GDP growth rate reversed and grew from 5.3 percent in 2005 to 7.8 percent in 2007. Despite this macro-level growth, the 2007 Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ) found that more than 60 percent of the population lived below the poverty line, with rural poverty at nearly 68 percent. Government capacity to delivery services remained limited; this was particularly true in the rural areas, which historically had little access to the relatively centralized Government structures.7 In addition, the institutional space for local decision-making had been undermined by population dislocation, limited local economic activity, lack of social capital, and widespread dependence on international relief agencies. 2. The long-lasting implications of the country’s post-conflict condition continued to have negative impacts for Liberian households. Liberia’s Human Development Indicators, as measured by the UNDP, were among the worst in the world. Infant and under-five mortality rates were 157 and 235 per 1,000 live births, respectively. Nearly 40 percent of children under five years old were stunted. Education fared no better. About 70 percent of the population was illiterate and over half of the children of primary school age were not in school. At the county and district levels, physical infrastructure was unusable. Most hospitals and clinics were damaged or destroyed and only 10 percent of communities had a health care facility. 3. Economic decline precipitated by the conflict also left behind excessively high levels of unemployment. Only 4 percent of the population was estimated to be engaged in the formal employment, with nearly half of all these workers employed by the public sector. The rest of the population worked in informal activities, many relying on subsistence farming. The creation of job opportunities, therefore, was a key element in the post-conflict strategy and deemed essential to ensure peace and stability. 4. The 2008 international food price crisis further threatened the well-being of Liberia’s vulnerable households. By March 2008, the Liberian consumer price index (in which food carried a weight of 45 percent) had increased 14 percent in March 2008, with a typical food basket costing 25 percent more than in January 2007. Based on the results of the CWIQ survey, it was estimated that a 20 percent increase in the price of rice could lead to an increase of 3 to 4 percentage points to the headcount poverty rate. By 2008, this increase had already been witnessed in Monrovia. 5. The Government’s IPRS and the Bank’s corresponding Interim Strategy Note (ISN) identified community-driven development (CDD) as an appropriate vehicle for delivering emergency social and economic recovery activities as necessitated by the factors outlined above. 7 In Liberia, the Local Government Authorities (LGA) are appointed by the President and report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, rather than being elected through local processes. 1 The ISN noted “scaling up of community-driven development efforts is thus a high priority of both donors and government.” This approach was deemed particularly relevant in the rural areas, which had suffered from both the war and historically limited access to basic services, and sought to encourage accountability and responsiveness of Government delivery of basic services. 6. Within this context, the Second Community Empowerment Project (CEPII) was the outcome of two factors: satisfactory implementation of the first Community Empowerment Project (CEPI) and donor efforts to harmonize community rehabilitation. CEPI was successfully implemented by the Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE), which had been created by Government to support CDD projects. The LACE CDD approach centered on community identification of their needs for basic services, participation in the selection and monitoring of contractors to build the chosen facilities, and management of the funds to pay the contractors. 8 Through this model, CEPI generated attention from both the Government and beneficiaries as a successful intervention that should remain ongoing. Furthermore, CEPII was in line with donor plans for CDD, and especially timely given that the Project would fill part of the gap left by the phasing out of the UNDP-financed Community Recovery Program. CEPII also provided the basis for EUR8.5 million co-financing from the European Union (EU). 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 7. The PDO as expressed in the original Emergency Project Paper (EPP) for CEPII was: “as part of the Government response to the social and economic emergency in Liberia, the Project will improve poor rural communities’ access to basic services and economic opportunities through a community-driven development approach by investing in community sub-projects, and in capacity building at the community and local government levels.”9 8. Progress toward achieving this objective was to be measured by two Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): a. All supported communities have benefited from social mobilization and at least 90 percent of sub-projects undertaken reflect the emergency priorities of targeted communities and beneficiaries, and are implemented in collaboration with local authorities. b. Increased access to basic services, in particular in health and education, especially in: i. Primary education, as measured by the attendance rate of primary schools one year after completion ii. Health, as measured by the population of the catchment area of the facilities 10 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators 9. The CEPII PDO was amended once during implementation to improve the relevance of CEPII and adapt to the evolving country context. On June 21, 2008, Grant Agreement (TF092325) provided US$3.0 million co-financing to CEPII for the Cash for Work Temporary 8 Section 1.5 provides additional details on the Project’s operational details. 9 The Financing Agreement (FA) used the same language for the Project Objective. 10 This is taken from the Results Framework and Monitoring Annex of the EPP, which also included several intermediate indicators. The FA did not distinguish between KPI and intermediate indicators. See ICR Annex 2: Outputs by Component. 2 Employment Program (CfWTEP). 11 It was part of a larger Food Price Crisis Response (FPCR) Trust Fund to address the sudden and dramatic increase in food prices. The CEPII PDO was revised as: “to improve communities’ access to basic infrastructure and provide economic opportunities for vulnerable households in urban and rural areas through: (a) a community driven approach; (b) a labor-intensive public works program; and (c) the provision of capacity building at the community and local government levels.” The revisions added the labor-intensive public works program funded by the FPCR TF to the PDO and also expanded the target population from “poor rural communities” to “vulnerable households in urban and rural areas.” 10. The June 2008 Restructuring added a new KPI to measure the outcomes of the labor- intensive public works program and revised the original two KPIs. The wording of the first indicator was simplified and reference to collaboration with local authorities removed. The health indicator (originally included with the KPI on school enrollment) was dropped given ongoing challenges under the CEPI of properly staffing and equipping such facilities.12 a. Percentage of completed sub-projects reflecting beneficiary’s priorities; b. Number of children attending primary school in “improved” facilities as defined by technical assessment; 13 and c. Percentage of targeted vulnerable households (at least 10,000) reporting increased income by at least 20 percent.14 11. On June 25, 2012, the Project KPIs were revised again to (i) restore the measure of local authority engagement in the Project; (ii) add a target value of 8,910 students for the second KPI (no target value was set previously); and (iii) reword the third KPI from “Percentage of targeted vulnerable households (at least 10,000) reporting increased income by at least 20 percent” to “Percentage of reduction in poverty gap of targeted vulnerable households at least 20 percent.” The school enrollment target had not been set at appraisal given the community-driven nature of intervention. However, once communities had selected sub-projects, this target was adopted by calculating the number of school sub-projects identified (33) by number of classrooms in a primary school (6) and the national standard class size of 45 students capacity standards set for the national primary school design (270 students per school). The third KPI was reworded to reflect the limited availability of household data in Liberia; poverty measures by asset index, rather than specific income levels, are more common within national surveys. 15 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 12. Poor rural communities were originally the primary beneficiary of the Project. The CfWTEP expanded this target group to include urban communities and made more explicit the emphasis on benefiting women. 16 Local government authorities (LGAs), which were to be 11 This June 2008 Restructuring also was the first extension of the Project closing date, extending it from June 30, 2011 to July 31, 2012. 12 See Section 3.2 for additional detail. 13 The FPCR TF EPP defined “improved” facilities as schools that (i) function during the rainy season; (ii) with access to water and sanitation facilities' in the school area; and (iii) with furnished classrooms. 14 The Results Framework was also modified to incorporate Intermediate Indicators for the CfWTEP, as well as a greater focus on gender and financial accountability of the Project Management Committees (PMCs) through management of their bank accounts. See Annex 2: Outputs by Component. 15 The Project quantitative assessment surveyed 1,000 participants after the CfWTEP. Since no baseline survey was conducted, national household data (CWIQ 2007) was used as a comparator for participant households. See Section 1.7 and Annex 2 for additional changes adopted under this Restructuring. 16 See Annex 2 for additional detail. 3 strengthened in line with the Government’s policies to encourage accountability to communities, and LACE, which was to be strengthened as a Government implementing agency, also were expected to benefit. 1.5 Original Components 13. As given in the FA and EPP, the original components comprised: a. Part A: The Community Driven Program (US$4.0 million or US$13.0 million with EU Co-financing) would provide sub-grants to beneficiaries for financing sub-projects, including but not limited to reconstructing and rehabilitating infrastructure in health, education, water, sanitation services, and as related to agriculture, including rural roads, markets, and storage facilities, as well as improving delivery of and access to economic services. The Project was designed to assist beneficiaries throughout this process through technical assistance and training, social mobilization, and collective action. Communities were to form Community Based Organizations (CBOs) to represent them vis-à-vis the activities, including procurement, monitoring, and payment of local contractors responsible for constructing sub-projects. 17 Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were to support implementation at the county level, including social mobilization, training, and contractor monitoring. 18 b. Part B: The Capacity Building Program (US$0.4 million or US$1.3 million with EU Co-financing) would provide training and technical advice to enhance the capacity of communities and other sub-project stakeholders, including local government, in participatory planning and development. Under LACE supervision, Community Facilitators (CFs) were to conduct training programs to enable communities to play a leading role in the identification and implementation of the activities. This component also included technical assistance to build LACE capacity. It was envisioned that CEPII might finance technical assistance to Government on local governance policy. 19 c. Part C: Project Management (US$0.6 million or US$1.95 million with EU Co-financing) was to support the operating capacity of LACE to effectively manage the Project by financing and strengthen its management capacity. Specifically, the Project would support: (a) development of an M&E system to collect data from the community, regional, and central levels; (b) information, education, and communication activities; (c) financial, technical, procurement, and management audits; (d) assistance for social and beneficiary assessments, community mobilization, and environmental studies; and (e) incremental operating costs for LACE. 1.6 Revised Components 14. The Letter Agreement dated April 24, 2009 providing the EU co-financing to CEPII did not change the three components but made slight modifications to their descriptions, as follow. 17 The Project adopted the use of Project Management Committees (PMCs) as the name for these CBOs. Contracts for sub-project construction were signed by the contractor, LACE, and the PMC. 18 The Project adopted the use of Community Facilitators (CFs) as the name of these local NGOs. 19 The possibility of supporting Government efforts to decentralize was mentioned in the description of the component only. It was never formalized in either the PDO or KPIs for CEPII. 4 a. Part A: Community Driven Program (US$16.0 million) 20 : Provide support to local communities to select, design, implement, and maintain small-scale sub-projects that will help in restoring social and economic infrastructure, and increase the income of community members. b. Part B: Capacity Building Program (US$1.3 million): Support for the carrying out of capacity building activities (including preparation of various training modules) for communities, local authorities, and other key stakeholders to enable them to play a leading role in identification, design, and implementation of community-based activities as a means of ensuring greater sustainability. c. Part C: Project Management (US$1.95 million): Provision of support to strengthen the operational capacity of the LACE to effectively manage the Project by, inter alia, strengthening its management capacity, including its monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, all through the provision of technical advisory services and operating costs. 1.7 Other significant changes 15. The Project was restructured five times. As discussed in Section 1.3, on June 21, 2008, the Project’s first Restructuring provided US$3.0 million co-financing from the FPCR TF, amended the PDO and KPIs, and extended the closing date from June 30, 2011 to July 31, 2012.21 16. On April 24, 2009, the second Restructuring established Trust Fund Number 094016 to provide EUR 8,047,200 for CEPII. 22 EU co-financing increased the following intermediate indicator targets: (i) sub-projects (from 80 to 260), (ii) training of PMC members (from 800 to 2600), and (iii) training of county and district officials (from 60 to 360). As noted in Section 1.6, this Restructuring also streamlined the wording of the Project components. 17. On June 20, 2011, the third Restructuring modified the Letter Agreement for TF094016 to reflect the EU contribution of an additional EUR 285,000. The Letter Agreement was amended to modify the categories of eligible expenditure (Table 1) and to extend the Closing Dates from June 30, 2011 to June 30, 2012. The funding was allocated toward the completion of five additional sub-projects, although the Project’s M&E Framework was not formally revised. 20 The entirety of the CfWTEP funding is allocated to the Community Driven Program. While the CfWTEP EPP refers to “Component 4: Cash for Work Employment Program” in discussion of the new KPI (see Section 1.3), the corresponding June 21, 2008 Grant Agreement does not specify that an additional component was created. Moreover, the Letter Agreement dated April 24, 2009 states: “pursuant to a FPCR Trust Fund Grant Agreement … dated June 21, 2008, the Recipient has received from the World Bank, a grant in an amount not to exceed US$3,000,000 from the FPCR Trust Fund towards the co-financing of certain activities under Part A of the Project.” 21 See Section 1.3 and Annex 2 for additional detail. 22 The Grant Agreement between GoL and the Bank did not include the five percent administrative and management fee charged by the Bank for administering the EU TF or the fee of US$35,000 to defer the costs to establish the Trust Fund. 5 Table 1: Categories of Eligible Expenditure for TF094016 modified June 20, 2011 Category of Expenditure Allocation (Euro) % of Financing Current Revised Current Revised Current Revised Goods Goods 200,000.00 87,000.00 2.5% 1.0% Sub-grants for sub- Sub-grants for sub- 6,665,000.00 6,520,000.00 82.8% 78.3% projects projects Consultants’ Consultants’ 470,000.00 1,030,000.00 5.8% 12.4% services (including services (including audits) and training audits) and training Incremental Incremental 330,000.00 695,204.57 4.1% 8.3% operating costs operating costs Unallocated Unallocated 382,200.00 0.00 4.7% 0.0% 18. On April 18, 2012, the fourth Restructuring corrected errors in the June 20, 2011 Amendment to the TF094016 Letter Agreement regarding the financing percentages. It restored the applicable percentage for each item (100 percent) for each respective Category of Eligible Expenditure (Table 2), as was the original intent of the Trust Fund (TF) and consistent with standard Bank practice, as specified in the Amendment. Table 2: Categories of Eligible Expenditure for TF094016 modified April 18, 2012 Category Amount of the Grant Percentage of Expenditures to Allocated (Euro) be Financed Goods 87,000.00 100% Sub-grants for sub-projects 6,520,000.00 100% Consultants’ services (including 1,030,000.00 100% audits) and training Incremental operating costs 695, 204.57 100% Unallocated 0.00 TOTAL AMOUNT 8,332,204.57 19. On June 25, 2012, the Project’s fifth and last Restructuring extended the IDA Grant Closing Date to July 31, 2013 and the EU TF Closing Date to August 31, 2012. In addition, as detailed in Section 1.3 above, the Restructuring revised to the Project’s M&E Framework. 23 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 20. The Project was designed in support of the Government and donor partner, including the EU, USAID, and Bank, commitment to continuing to improve community access to basic services and economic opportunities through the CDD approach. At the time of preparation, Her Excellency President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf had endorsed LACE as the primary vehicle for community empowerment and, as noted above, the IPRS endorsed CDD as contributing to the Strategy’s fourth pillar regarding infrastructure and basic service delivery. The Bank’s ISN contained a similar pillar (infrastructure and basic services) that was supported through three investment lending operations, including CEPII. 23 Also see Annex 2. 6 21. Project preparation benefitted from the implementation structures and lessons learned under CEPI. LACE remained as the implementing partner for CEPII, thereby building on the institutional capacity established under CEPI. Improving on the CEPI design, CEPII placed greater emphasis on the participation of line ministries and local authorities to incorporate CEPII sub-projects into county and sectoral development plans. The Ministries of Education (MOE) and Health (MOH) were asked to sign Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) that acknowledged LACE’s responsibility for constructing facilities with previous approval from the relevant ministry and to secure ministry agreement to provide staff and other critical inputs to these facilities.24 Although, in the end, only the MOU with MOE was signed, the one health post under CEPII was constructed with approval from and close coordination with the MOH. LACE did not initiate a MOU with the Ministry of Public Works (MOPW) regarding the Project’s road rehabilitation sub-projects, although the Borrower’s ICR does specify that MOPW approval was sought for culverts, bridges, and water, sanitation, and health (WASH) sub-projects. 25 22. The CfWTEP design complemented the Project’s original design by providing a direct cash transfer to poor communities in the wake of the international increases in food prices in 2008. The design benefitted from the Project’s existing implementation arrangements and LACE’s capacity for execution. Without LACE’s existing networks and relationships across the country, a nationwide scale-up of the size and speed of CfWTEP would not have been possible. Project activities were deliberately labor intensive, to maximize the necessary labor force, and included work such as roadside brushing and backfilling of potholes. The design also leveraged the capacity of the private sector by engaging a commercial bank for the payment system. 23. The Project design, however, may be considered overly ambitious in the scaling up of activities from CEPI to CEPII. CEPII did include support for a capacity building program and program management and another IDA-financing operation (Grant H3850), the Economic Governance and Institutional Reform Project, provided supplemental support to LACE. CfWTEP further allowed for the hiring of new LACE staff to manage these activities. Still, under CEPI, LACE managed 100 sub-projects, whereas CEPII set an original target of 260 sub-projects within a similar timeframe. This did not adequately reflect the continued post-conflict, low-capacity operational context. In particular, even with Project resources available, LACE struggled to find qualified professional staff, particularly in the areas of program management and procurement. 24. The environmental and safeguard screening classified CEPII as a Category B project, triggering Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12). A local consultant prepared an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) of good quality. Although LACE had demonstrated its commitment to environmental and social safeguard issues under CEPI, weaknesses in LACE’s safeguard compliance had been identified under CEPI. Options for strengthening LACE’s capacity were identified during preparation but did not translate into concrete actions.26 25. The EPP for CEPII rated procurement risk as substantial and the financial management risk as moderate. Procurement under CEPI had been generally acceptable; even so, the EPP for CEPII outlined additional capacity building and monitoring measures, such as hiring of new 24 No independent assessments of Government capacity to staff education or health facilities or provide other key inputs (i.e. textbooks and drugs) were conducted. In addition to the MOU, the MOE and MOH capacity to fulfill these functions was determined primarily through their coordination with CEPI. 25 The Borrower’s ICR is attached as Annex 7. 26 See Section 2.4 for details. 7 procurement staff, regular procurement assessments, and intensive Bank supervision. Within the much constrained Liberian context, the Task Team opted for the pragmatic approach of on-the- job training during implementation; however, this could have benefitted from more precise identification of mitigating measures to address problems as they arose. LACE’s financial management performance under CEPI was satisfactory, with submission of acceptable audits to IDA; therefore, FM arrangements for CEPII largely mirrored those of CEPI. Although the FM risk for CEPII was rated as high, primarily due to the country context, LACE’s performance under CEPI and mitigating measures proposed under CEPII led to the residual risk of moderate. 26. There was no Quality at Entry Review conducted for CEPII. 2.2 Implementation27 27. Institutional capital in Liberia remained extremely weak throughout implementation, with the threat of political instability a constant problem. The fiduciary environment had few established control mechanisms and lacked modern payment systems, leaving financial transactions often cash-based. Limited judiciary capacity compounded the situation, while individuals with project management and procurement skills were virtually non-existent. 28. Given this context, the generally satisfactory implementation of CEPII (and LACE’s performance as implementing agency) is commendable and certain innovations under the Project noteworthy. This is especially true in light of two other factors: the additional responsibilities LACE took on during the Project (discussed in Section 2.1 above) and the changes to Liberia’s status as a Bank borrower. In 2007, at Project appraisal, Liberia was eligible for emergency preparation and implementation procedures; by the Project’s closing in 2013, the country had cleared its debt through achievement of the HIPC Completion Point and became eligible for IDA Credits. The changing conditions and regulations required revision of LACE operating procedures to ensure of compliance with Bank guidelines and judgments of performance. 29. CEPII retained its satisfactory/moderately satisfactory implementation performance ratings throughout most of its implementation, although significant delays contributed to a moderately unsatisfactory rating between March and November 2012. The delays were due to several challenges. First, EU co-financing did not become available until mid-2009, primarily due to delays in signing the Administrative Agreement for the parent TF between the EU and the Bank. Second, weaknesses in LACE’s procurement capacity identified during the 2009 Mid- Term Review (MTR) necessitated development of new procurement templates, delaying approval of a large number of sub-projects, particularly those funded under the EU TF. Finally, the weak capacity of local contractors led to significant delays in completing sub-projects on time. 28 30. The LACE team adopted several measures to overcome the delays. With Bank support, LACE focused on improving its procurement capacity through hiring new procurement staff, retaining an international procurement specialist, and revising its standard procurement 27 A Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP) evaluation was undertaken in April 2010. It assessed the overall likelihood of achieving the development objectives as “2 = Satisfactory/Likely”. The QALP ratings generally agree with those of the ICR. Differences, along with the rationale for the diverging opinions, are noted. 28 These challenges were not fully evident at the time of the QALP, which regarded implementation performance as satisfactory. 8 documents. 29 LACE also adopted a series of effective tools that improved project management. These included submission of monthly sub-project completion reports for Bank review, creation of four regional teams to conduct intensive site supervision, and – with Bank approval – the development of new payment methods to increase contractor liquidity. One of the innovations involved a materials advance to contractors, which sped up construction considerably. Even so, implementation delays required extension of the Project by two years. 31. The Project’s MTR had significant impact on LACE’s implementation of CEPII. It improved LACE’s planning and budgeting process by allowing LACE to pre-determine the number of each sub-project type and develop its annual work program and budget accordingly. It improved LACE’s procurement management and bid evaluation process by shifting the emphasis to cost estimates of sub-projects and qualifications of contractors. Although the actions taken to strengthen procurement resulted in Project delays, the changes strengthened LACE’s capacity in this key area and led to an improvement in Project implementation overall. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 32. The Project’s M&E design and results monitoring was basically solid. The PDO and KPIs generally focused on outcomes for which CEPII and LACE could be held accountable. Indicators were generally appropriate to Project objectives and the ability of LACE to monitor them. The school attendance indicator, however, was beyond the Project’s capacity to control or influence. Moreover, the target of 8,910 students was based on standard norms used for school design – not actual enrollment projections. Also, as noted in the QALP, there were no indicators specifically directed at measuring social impact. The intermediate indicators regarding PMC training and composition sought to measure relevant outputs, but including outcome indicators to assess changes in communities’ capacity for collective action—while difficult to measure—could have strengthened the M&E framework. 33. LACE was responsible for day-to-day monitoring of CEPII’s performance and did a credible job of data collection and utilization of this information throughout the implementation period. IDA supervision missions rated M&E reporting as satisfactory except for the period from June 2008 to September 2010, when the rating slipped to moderately satisfactory because reporting on sub-projects was found to be inadequate. Findings from a Rapid Technical Assessment of sub-projects during the MTR were instrumental in improving LACE oversight, including increasing frequency of site visits and reporting. Experienced program staff also was given more responsibility for M&E. Finally, a computerized data system for project monitoring, adopted towards the end of the project, further strengthened the M&E function. 2.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance 34. Environmental and Social Safeguards. Safeguard compliance was rated moderately satisfactory throughout much of implementation, except from March 2009 to December 2010 when it was rated moderately unsatisfactory. Early supervision missions found that contractors were carrying out their work without recourse to environmental, health, or safety considerations and that supporting documentation relating to acquisition of land for sub-projects was weak. A social and environmental compliance review undertaken in advance of the MTR found that significant shortcomings persisted in the area of safeguard compliance, specifically in terms of LACE’s monitoring and supervision of sub-projects. This led to the adoption of moderately 29 See Section 2.4. 9 unsatisfactory rating. Specific MTR recommendations included more clearly delegated responsibilities for safeguard monitoring and the adoption of a safeguard template for field monitoring. The template provided a simplified version of applicable policies which could be widely distributed and used as a basic information sheet. This helped LACE make progress toward the actions identified during the MTR and the rating was upgraded to moderately satisfactory in December 2010. Throughout the remainder of implementation, however, some weakness in reporting remained evident, likely owing to a failure to assign clearly the safeguard responsibility to specific individuals in LACE. 35. Fiduciary Compliance. FM under CEPII was rated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory throughout implementation. Throughout Project implementation, review of the FM systems and detailed action items sought to strengthen LACE capacity in this area. A detailed FM review was conducted in January 2009 that made several recommendations, including: hiring a new Internal Auditor; improving budgetary controls; strengthening the M&E unit; improving petty cash management by PMCs; and revising conditions for staff bonuses. Action was taken to implement these recommendations; however, a subsequent in-depth FM review in March 2012 advised to strengthen performance of the Internal Auditor; bolster FM capacity at the community level; and improve the quality of the Interim Unaudited Financial Reports (IFRs). A new Internal Auditor was hired in May 2012 and Bank supervision noted improvements by the final FM mission in May 2013. Particularly, LACE had instituted monthly preparation of IFRs to ensure reconciliation and addressed issues of record keeping and petty cash management. FM capacity at the community level, however, remained weak and LACE had difficulty conducting routine reconciliations of its financial records with those of the PMCs. Although delayed in a few cases, LACE submitted annual external audits throughout the CEPII, which were without qualification. 36. Procurement Management. Procurement compliance was rated moderately unsatisfactory from March 2009 to April 2011, although the rating improved to moderately satisfactory by the Project’s closure. Issues concerning: i) adequacy of OM procurement guidelines; ii) procurement planning; iii) LACE procurement capacity; iv) misunderstanding of key aspects of the bidding and IDA approval processes; and v) undercapitalized and inexperienced contractors surfaced early and remained significant impediments throughout the implementation of CEPII. A 2009 procurement review identified challenges in several of these areas and prepared a revised bid evaluation document, strengthened relevant sections in the OM, and recommended that LACE use the revised bid evaluation form to re-conduct evaluations of 65 sub-projects prior to awarding contracts. The MTR in 2010 found that the changes from the 2009 review were not being followed, prompting more thorough review and revision. Developing new procurement procedures took time. The bidding templates in particular required extensive consultation between LACE and the Bank, as well as within the Bank team, to balance the CDD approach with procurement regulations. A 2012 Post Procurement Review (PPR) identified continuing shortcomings with contract documentation and record keeping, as well as the constitution of bid evaluation panels. In 2012, a new International Procurement Specialist, experienced in Bank procurement regulations, was hired and helped improve LACE procurement management. The final PPR, conducted at the Project’s closing in June/July 2013, noted improvements in overall procurement capacity, although identified the need for continued progress on document management. Throughout implementation, as noted above, LACE struggled to find qualified procurement staff. 37. Under the Project, there was one incidence of a cancelled procurement, valued at US$6,500. Recruitment for the FY11 external audit was conducted according to Bank prior review guidelines; however, the final contract was signed on September 16, 2012 prior to the 10 issuance of the No Objection for the selection of the firm on December 22, 2011. This contract was paid through the Government budgetary support received by LACE. 2.5 Post-Completion Operation/Next Phase 38. As noted elsewhere, CEPII helped to establish LACE as a capable implementing agency of and for the Government of Liberia. Since its inception, LACE has received Government funding to support its operating costs; however, in FY13, Government support for LACE was expanded to include a US$3.3 million programmatic allocation for construction of basic social services throughout the country. These activities mirror those undertaken through CEPII and build directly on the capacity that LACE developed under the Project. The Government’s FY14 budget allocates an additional US$5.0 million to LACE to continue these activities. 39. In addition, CEPII contributed to a number of social protection initiatives by providing an entry point for the Bank to open a broader dialogue with the Government on social protection policies and programs. Bank support for CEPII provided opportunities for routine interaction with Bank social protection specialists, which was critical to both the development of the social protection dialogue within Liberia and the Bank’s current social protection agenda in the country. This included development of the public works-based activities under CfWTEP, which served as a basis for design of the ongoing US$16 million Youth, Employment, Skills (YES) Project, funded by the Bank and jointly implemented by LACE and the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MOYS). Additional financing of US$3.4 million for the LACE activities of the YES Project is currently under preparation, with the aim of informing future Bank investment lending envisioned for FY15. The CfWTEP design also has informed activities under the MOYS-implemented Liberia Youth Employment Program (LYEP), a nationally-funded initiative. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 40. The following assessment of outcomes maintains a single narrative assessment of the achievement of the PDO given that the revision to the PDO occurred early during the Project’s implementation on June 21, 2008, when only 3 percent of the total Project allocation had been disbursed. The revisions expanded the scope of the PDO, to add urban beneficiary areas and the labor-intensive public works program, and this expanded scope is discussed throughout this section. Changes to the KPIs under the June 21, 2008 Restructuring (3 percent disbursement) and June 25, 2012 (79 percent disbursement) are discussed in Section 3.2 as related to the achievement of each KPI. 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: Substantial 41. The Project’s relevance is rated substantial given that its objectives, design, and implementation arrangements remained relevant to the country context, Liberian development priorities, and Bank assistance policies and programs throughout implementation. CEPII objectives continued to be consistent with the development policies of both the Government and the Bank as they evolved during the Project period. The Government’s first full PRS in 2008 noted, “one of the Government’s foremost objectives was … the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the rebuilding of systems to deliver basic services.” The second PRS, launched in 2012, maintained a focus on infrastructure development and added a pillar devoted to human development, including social protection, which corresponded with the original PDO of CEPII as well as the PDO as expanded under CfWTEP. Social protection was included as part of the third 11 pillar (supporting pro-poor growth) in the Bank’s FY2009-2011 CAS, and CEPII was specifically mentioned as a vehicle for achieving this objective. 42. The Project design responded to the country’s ongoing and evolving needs. As noted above, at preparation, the Government and donor partners supported design of a coordinated CDD intervention based on the successful implementation of CEPI. However, while the consolidation of CDD interventions reflects well on the Project design, the resultant increase in the size of the CEPII, as compared to CEPI, may be considered a design flaw in light of the country context, LACE’s extant capacity, and the time allocated for Project implementation. 43. The expansion of the CEPII design to include CfWTEP provided a mechanism for rapid relief from the food crisis and contributed to the continued relevance of the Project design. The temporary employment activities were modeled on LACE’s CDD approach developed under CEPI and CEPII, helping to ensure that the public works could be rolled out quickly. As noted in Section 2.5, this revision of the Project’s design led to the expansion of public works activities under the Bank-funded YES Project and also provided lessons for implementation of the Government-funded LYEP, launched in 2013. 44. Implementation reinforced the continuing relevance of the CDD approach and LACE’s capacity as the Government’s primary vehicle for community empowerment. The LACE implementation arrangements prioritized community mobilization and engagement, while also building capacity of its local NGO partners. LACE’s ability to accommodate the new needs of CfWTEP further speaks to the appropriateness of these arrangements. As noted in Section 2.5, the Government’s allocation of resources to continue similar activities in FY13 and FY14 is a concrete demonstration of its confidence in this approach. 45. Finally, two recent Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) reports confirm the continuing relevance of CEPII’s objectives, design, and implementation. The Liberia: World Bank Country- Level Engagement on Governance and Anti-Corruption (Working Paper No. 11/8) noted: “the Bank’s engagement … through LACE has been very relevant in supporting the Government’s primary goal of delivering results.” The IEG Liberia Country Program Evaluation: 2004-2011 states: “In the area of social protection, early interventions have produced positive results, including the rehabilitation of war-torn communities, the mitigation of adverse effects from the food crisis, and the development of institutional capacity at LACE.” 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: Substantial 46. The achievement of the revised PDO is rated substantial given the Project’s performance against its key performance indicators. The Project’s three KPIs related directly to the achievement of the PDO to improve communities’ access to basic infrastructure and provide economic opportunities for vulnerable households in urban and rural areas through: (a) a community driven approach; (b) a labor-intensive public works program; and (c) the provision of capacity building at the community and local government levels. As detailed below, two of the Project’s revised key indicators were achieved and the third was largely achieved. Achievement of the PDO is further supported by the attainment of five of the seven intermediate indicators. 47. The Project achieved the KPI that at least 90 percent of sub-projects undertaken reflect beneficiary priorities and are implemented in collaboration with local authorities. In fact, 100 percent of sub-projects appear to reflect beneficiary priorities. The Beneficiary Assessment (BA) and ICR missions affirmed that all sampled communities were satisfied with the type of sub- 12 projects constructed through the Project. Communities sampled in the BA confirmed that the sub-projects had met basic needs and improved living standards (the schools and WASH facilities), strengthened economic opportunities (the markets), and opened up transport corridors, enhancing trade (culverts and bridges). In the BA, WASH was the most commonly requested type of sub-project, with nearly all communities (97 percent) expressing this need. These accounted for nearly one third of all completed CEPII sub-projects. The large number of transportation infrastructure sub-projects (culverts and bridges represented 56 percent of sub- projects) also reflected the expressed needs of communities. Many BA respondents stated that good roads allowed for transportation of materials to build other essential infrastructure and participate more actively in commerce. One mismatch of the Project appears to be in health services. Ninety percent of the sampled communities listed a clinic, hospital, or health center among their needs, yet only one health post was built under the Project. This resulted from staffing constraints within the MOH, as previously discussed, suggesting that the allocation of resources to other types of sub-projects was appropriate. 30 48. Collaboration with LGAs, most specifically through attendance of groundbreaking and dedication events, was reported by LACE and confirmed by the ICR mission. In addition, the over-achievement of the intermediate indicator regarding the project management training for LGAs (530 district/county officials as compared to the targeted 360) highlights LACE’s engagement of the local authorities. The BA assessment found that LGAs were involved in two- thirds of the sub-projects sampled. 49. In total, 244 sub-projects were completed under CEPII, representing 92 percent of the 265 targeted sub-projects. During the February 2013 supervision mission, the Bank and LACE agreed not to initiate any new sub-projects given the likelihood that they could not be completed by the July 2013 closing date. At the time, 260 sub-projects were ongoing; this decision was not reflected through a formal Restructuring of the intermediate indicator. In regards to types of sub- projects constructed, the following targets were set: 33 schools, six markets, 52 bridges, 85 WASH facilities, one health clinic, and 88 culverts. 31 By the Project’s closing date, 30 schools, six markets, 49 bridges, 69 WASH facilities, one health post, and 89 culverts had been completed. LACE has committed Government of Liberia resources to completing the remaining 16 sub-projects. Of the 260 sub-projects launched, 82 were in urban areas while the remainder was spread throughout rural communities in all 15 counties. 50. The Project achieved 92 percent of the KPI target of having 8,910 children attending school in “improved” facilities as defined by technical assessment. 32 By October 2013, at the start of the 2013/14 school year, 8,596 children were enrolled in the 30 schools completed under CEPII. 33 School attendance was a poor indicator, as ensuring school attendance was well beyond LACE’s ability to influence or control. Moreover, enrollment targets were based not on actual enrollment projections, but on standard norms used for school designs. LACE followed MOE 30 The findings of the BA are discussed in further detail in Section 3.5 and Annex 5 below. 31 These targets were adopted in the June 2012 Restructuring after LACE had engaged communities regarding their priorities for the types of sub-project constructed. 32 The target for this indicator was adopted on June 25, 2012 (79 percent disbursement); however, this value is used to measure achievement of this key performance indicator throughout the Project period given that the CDD approach did not allow for targets to be set at preparation. In addition, revisions to the M&E Framework at the MTR attempted to broaden this KPI to measure access to other services, particularly markets and WASH, but these proposals were never reflected in the Project Restructurings. 33 This figure was collected by LACE M&E Staff as reported by MOE staff. 13 guidelines and built six-room primary schools designed to accommodate 270 students each. Of the target of 33 primary schools under CEPII, LACE launched construction of 31 and 30 were completed by the Project’s closing date. The one additional school construction is being completed with Government resources. 51. The 30 completed schools meet the three set criteria for “improved” facilities, as defined under the June 2008 Restructuring. 34 The buildings follow the national MOE designs, to allow for year-round functionality, and include WASH (with separate latrines for boys and girls) and furniture in the standard school sub-project package. The Project’s technical assessment was conducted at the MTR. This allowed for assessment of the CEPI schools to inform construction of the CEPII schools but, therefore, was completed before the majority of CEPII schools were constructed. However, funding for second technical assessment resources was not sufficient to cover this work without further reducing the number of beneficiary communities. 52. Originally, the Project’s KPI on access to basic services included not only school enrollment but also access to basic health services, as measured by the population of the catchment area of the facilities. LACE estimates that the one health post constructed under CEPII has a catchment area of 20,000 persons. This is against an original Project target of at least 7,500 people per health clinic. However, this part of the access to basic services KPI was dropped during the Project’s June 2008 Restructuring (3 percent disbursement). The emphasis on health clinics was reduced when the challenges of properly staffing and equipping such facilities became clear. At the close of CEPI in December 31, 2008, of the ten clinics constructed under that Project, five were supported by Government, one was operated by an international NGO, and four remained without staff. Given that this challenge was recognized and addressed early during implementation, the removal of this indicator is not seen to significantly impact the Project’s overall achievement of the PDO. 53. The Project exceeded the third KPI, both in its original and revised wording, as measured by a quantitative assessment of CfWTEP. 35 Originally the KPI specified that at least 10,000 targeted vulnerable households report increased income of at least 20 percent. An independent quantitative evaluation of CfWTEP estimates that 80 percent of beneficiaries (approximately 13,600 persons) fell below the country’s poverty line. The CfWTEP wage of US$120 per beneficiary represents 50 percent of both the urban and rural poverty lines (US$241 and US$242 per annum, respectively). 36 As revised, the indicator set a target of a 20 percent reduction in poverty gap of targeted vulnerable households. The CfWTEP evaluation found achievement of a 27 percent reduction in the poverty gap of the vulnerable households targeted. The CfWTEP activities reached 17,000 individuals, although the number of unique households participating was not recorded. Of these individuals, 8,293 resided in urban and 8,707 were in rural communities. 54. Moreover, the CfWTEP evaluation provided encouraging results about the possible long- term impact of the Project on livelihoods and economic opportunity. The quantitative assessment showed that a significant portion of wages went to investments in children’s education (31 percent) as well as for farm and non-farm investments (14.2 percent). These results may be due in part to the timing of payments, in some cases just after school fees were due, although the fact 34 See Annex 2 for additional detail on this definition. 35 The third KPI was added with the Project’s first Restructuring on June 21, 2008 (3 percent disbursement). It was reworded under the Project’s last Restructuring on June 25, 2012 (79 percent disbursement). 36 See Liberia’s first PRS Chapter 3: Poverty in Liberia for details on the establishment of the poverty line. 14 that the wages received represented a high share of the household’s total earnings may also have allowed for these investments. In addition, 90 percent of respondents reported that, through CfWTEP, they had their first interaction ever with a commercial bank. 37 55. The intermediate indicator linked to the temporary employment activities was not achieved. LACE created 680,000 work days through these activities, below the target of 800,000. The shortfall was due to the fact that, in the CfWTEP Operational Guidelines, the Government and the Bank agreed to raise the daily wage rate for the program from US$2.50 (as originally outlined in the EPP) to US$3.00 per day to align with other ongoing temporary employment programs. Given the funding available, this meant reducing the number of person-days of temporary employment. The change in daily wage was made in direct response to the Government’s request for this harmonization and did not impact the total value of the cash transfer to beneficiary households through the Project. 56. The five remaining intermediate indicators were achieved. These indicators aimed to measure the achievement of the PDO by providing communities the opportunity to identify their needs, support design, implementation, and management of sub-projects in a gender-balanced manner, and be responsible for bank accounts and the appropriate and efficient utilization of sub- project resources -- all of which contributed to the higher level goal of empowering communities. 57. Regarding gender equity, the Project exceeded the intermediate target that women constitute half of the membership in at least 90 percent of the PMCs. In fact, gender parity was achieved in all cases, as evidenced by the recorded minutes of the meetings electing PMC members and confirmed during the ICR mission. Although a specific male/female ratio was not verified in the BA, respondents confirmed the broad-based and inclusive nature of PMC membership, noting the presence of men and women, as well as elders and youth. 58. The organizational capacity of and empowerment at the community and local government levels were measured through three interrelated indicators: i) number of PMC members and county/district officials successfully trained; ii) percentage of PMCs managing their own bank accounts; and iii) the percentage of communities that have minutes of the meeting electing PMCs. Targets for training (2,650 PMC members and 360 local officials) were fully achieved. As reported by LACE, 2,650 PMC members and 530 local officials were trained during CEPII. For the second two indicators, targets were 90 percent. LACE affirmed that 100 percent of the communities managed their own bank accounts and that 90 percent of the communities had minutes from the meetings where PMC members had been elected. The ICR mission verified a sample of the LACE records on PMC bank accounts and clarified with LACE what was meant by PMCs managing their own bank accounts. LACE noted that, according to the Operations Manual (OM), transactions required the signatures of designated individuals from both LACE and the PMCs. The ICR mission also undertook a random review of the records of the meetings in which the PMCs were elected and confirms the reporting by LACE on this indicator. Section 3.5 below discusses further the social impact of CEPII at the community level. 59. Lastly, a target to keep project management expenses below 13 percent of expenditures was set to measure management efficiency of the Project. Percentages varied slightly over the years, but always fell below the target. At Project closing, the management expenses, as measured by the final Project allocation of all three funding sources, were at 10.8 percent. 37 See SP Discussion Paper No. 1114, Liberia’s Cash for Work Temporary Employment Project: Responding to Crisis in Low Income, Fragile Countries, June 2011. 15 3.3 Efficiency Rating: Substantial 60. Overall efficiency of the Project is rated as substantial based on the cost effectiveness of the CDD approach and LACE’s ability to deliver both community-based, small-scale construction sub-projects, albeit with some delays in implementation, and CfWTEP in a cost-effective manner. 61. Although there were no economic rate of return (ERR) calculations for CEPII, recent projects with similar CDD infrastructure components can be used as an indication of the efficiency likely achieved under CEPII. The Comoros Services Support Project, for example, demonstrated very high ERR for several types of sub-projects, such as schools, WASH, and road rehabilitation, that are similar to those constructed under CEPII. The Comoros analysis underscored the efficiency of CDD sub-projects by noting the economic and social gains realized within beneficiary communities through improved transportation, greater access to markets and cultivable land, improved health conditions through access to potable water and cleaner public areas, reductions in household time spent finding clean water, and costs savings on market goods through improved roads. It also found positive ERR correlated with the school sub-projects, specifically regarding time saved through reduced walking distances to classrooms. These benefits are similar to those reported by CEPII beneficiaries in the BA. 62. In addition, the Project appears to have represented the least-cost solution for improving community access to basic services, especially given the post-conflict context. LACE efficiently allocated resources for the construction activities in comparison with regional norms. For example, schools constructed under CEPII cost approximately US$90,000, with six classrooms and WASH facilities. This is approximately US$15,000 per classroom. By comparison, data from recent education sector ICRs in other low capacity and fragile contexts (Benin, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Northern Uganda, and Tanzania) show per classroom construction costs between US$20,000 and US$25,000 when using national competitive bidding procurement methods. 63. The efficiency of the temporary employment component also appears satisfactory based on wage share, targeting performance, and proportionate wage gain. Cost effectiveness of the CfWTEP component is estimated at 0.51 based on the methodology developed in Ravallion (1998) based on these three factors. 38 First, the labor intensity (share of wages paid in total public works costs) was 68 percent. This is on par with international standards; public works in India, Bangladesh, and Korea have rates between 60 and 70 percent, with higher rates in Ethiopia (85 percent) and lower rates in Argentina (40 to 50 percent). Second, the wage targeting performance (proportion of the wages paid to poor workers), as detailed in Section 3.5, was found to be approximately 80 percent. This compares well to programs in Ethiopia (87 percent) and Argentina (70-80 percent poor), although the Liberian poverty rate of over 60 percent likely contributes to this positive targeting performance. Third, the net wage gain (share of the gross wages received after accounting for foregone income) was very high (93 percent). Approximately 75 percent participants had no other income or employment before the program. In comparison, public works in India estimated net gain at 75 percent, while in Argentina the estimate was only 50 percent. 39 This cost analysis does not capture economic gains resulting from public works activities that opened and improved road infrastructure. 38 See World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1995, Appraising Workfare, 1998. 39 The calculation of the effectiveness of the CfWTEP is detailed in Annex 3. 16 64. In terms of program management, LACE delivered good value-for-money as an implementing agency; however, implementation delays, and the resulting two-year extension of the Project period, reduced its overall efficient implementation. As noted above, at Project closure, LACE’s operating ratio for CEPII was 10.8 percent, below the project target of 13 percent. 40 This operating cost was achieved despite two additional years of operating costs resulting from the Project’s extensions. Nevertheless, delays in implementation of the sub- projects negatively affected the Project’s efficiency. The BA noted that delays experienced at the time of these focus groups contributed to a sense of frustration among many participants. 3.4. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 65. The Project’s overall performance outcome is rated as moderately satisfactory based on its relevance, achievement of the PDO, and efficiency. Despite some overly ambitious targets of the Project’s design, CEPII remained relevant to Liberia's post-conflict development needs and the Bank’s priorities for support. It engendered the creation of an institution capable of implementing Government and donor-financed programs effectively and efficiently. The addition of the temporary employment activities was highly relevant under the circumstances and led to development of a new free-standing IDA-funded operation. CEPII achieved the target that over 90 percent of sub-projects reflect community priorities and exceeded its targeted poverty gap reduction amongst CfWTEP beneficiaries. Enrollment in CEPII schools, the third KPI, was 92 percent of the target.41 Five of seven of the intermediate indicators were achieved. Moreover, these achievements appear to have been made fairly efficiently. Efficiency outcomes in the temporary employment component, as well as cost comparisons of the CEPII-built schools, were good relative to regional norms. LACE also maintained an operating ratio below the Project target. Implementation delays, however, meant that many of the sub-projects were completed in 2013, as compared to an original end-target date of 2011. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 66. As evidenced from the evaluations of CfWTEP and the Project’s BA, the Project appears to have had a positive impact on poverty, gender dynamics, and social development. Project benefits, in terms of increased access to better basic services, improved to economic infrastructure and employment opportunities, and reached the intended target groups, which originally had limited access to basic social services.42 Moreover, results of the qualitative and quantitative assessments of CfWTEP indicate that the targeting of the program was effective with an estimated 80 percent of the target group being either poor or extremely poor. Using a variety of indicators (wealth asset and estimated consumption level) as well as methods (different matching techniques for estimating consumption and wealth indicators were considered), the 40 This does not include the Government budgetary allocation provided to LACE during implementation. 41 The KPI regarding health clinics was not achieved, but the fact that it was dropped soon after implementation began (3 percent disbursement) was entirely appropriate and demonstrated the Bank’s and the Government’s ability to adapt quickly to the emerging reality that the clinics would not be adequately staffed. 42 See Section 3.2 and 3.6, and Annex 5. 17 share of the participants estimated to be poor varied from 60 to 90 percent, with the estimate of about 80 percent of participants being poor being the most likely. 43 67. The gender impact also appeared to be largely positive. As noted earlier, the target of having 50 percent women on PMCs was achieved. In addition, 46 percent of the CfWTEP beneficiaries were women, exceeding the 30 percent quota adopted in the CfWTEP Operational Guidelines. However, the BA found that women, while involved in the PMC, were less knowledgeable about the sub-project, particularly on selection and cost, than their male counterparts. In one third of the sampled communities, women who were not part of the PMC were not involved in the sub-project selection process. 44 68. The BA suggests that the Project was successful in empowering communities, a finding underscored during the interviews and site visits conducted by the ICR mission. 45 The BA highlights that the creation of PMCs had a positive impact in getting community members more involved in attending town meetings and participating in decisions that affected them and their communities’ development. PMC members benefited from their PMC membership, building civic skills such as team-work, problem solving, effective listening, and advocacy, as well as learning how to conduct productive meetings, motivate people, and represent themselves vis-à-vis others (i.e. LACE, contractors, CFs, and local authorities). The BA noted that roughly two-thirds of the communities surveyed reached out to NGOs or Government for additional assistance following the CEPII intervention. CEPII also connected many beneficiaries to formal banking systems for the first time, strengthening their ability to operate in a modern financial environment. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 69. At both national and local levels, the positive institutional impact of CEPII was considerable. As noted above, LACE emerged as an effective implementing agency, evidenced by its continued funding from both the Bank and Government. Community-level implementing capacity was also strengthened through creation of PMCs, which the BA noted had a positive impact in terms of increasing communities’ awareness about and involvement in their town’s development. Thus, while there is no evidence suggesting that PMCs will continue functioning as formal implementing agencies, they have enhanced communities’ ability to understand how such entities must be organized to function as agents of economic development and operate in a transparent, accountable, and participatory manner. However, the BA found little change to the way community members viewed their local authorities, suggesting minimal overall impact on enhancing the role of local governments in community development or in strengthening the link between communities and their local government. 46 70. One area where CEPII did not appear to have much institutional impact was in advancing the Government’s decentralization agenda. As outlined in the original EPP, the Project would explore the role for LACE to work with LGAs to strengthen their role in community development. Project resources were devoted to training of county and district officials in this capacity and early supervision missions put forth specific steps to engage the LGAs more actively in sub- project activities and community life. While the trainings did take place as intended, LGAs 43 See SP Discussion Paper No. 1114, Liberia’s Cash for Work Temporary Employment Project: Responding to Crisis in Low Income, Fragile Countries, June 2011. 44 See Section 3.6 and Annex 5. 45 The findings of the BA are discussed in additional detail in Section 3.6 and Annex 5. 46 Ibid. 18 participation in the sub-project process, as reported in the BA, was mixed and, as noted above, the BA found little to no change in communities’ perceptions of the LGAs following the CEPII intervention. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 71. As discussed above, the CfWTEP activities achieved their intended impact to increase economic opportunities for beneficiaries; however, this activity, under which people were paid for work, had an unintended consequence on the other CEPII subprojects. While the benefit under the CfWTEP was the wages earned through the public works, the other CEPII subprojects benefitted communities through the construction of basic services and asked these communities to contribute ten percent of the subproject value toward its completion. In practice, this was done primarily through in-kind contributions of local materials or labor. Following the introduction of the CfWTEP, LACE witnessed, in some instances, a change in community willingness to contribute labor without compensation. Separate from the community contribution aspect, LACE does note that the CEPII construction subprojects had a positive local effect on job opportunities, through the use of Liberian contractors who would hire locally when possible. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 47 72. The CEPII BA was undertaken in May and June 2012 and substantiates a number of key findings regarding CEPII and LACE performance. 48 A random sample of 30 communities across 6 counties was selected, which constituted about 12 percent of all sub-projects eventually completed. Focus group discussions were organized separately for PMC and non-PMC members, with both disaggregated by gender. The BA confirmed that the sub-projects selected reflected community choice. The vast majority of communities expressed satisfaction with the type of infrastructure provided and was uniform in the opinion that the benefits of sub-projects would be positive and widespread. However, neither the BA nor the ICR mission found concrete maintenance plans in place or arrangements for financing maintenance and minor repairs. 49 As highlighted in Section 3.5(b) above, the BA found the positive impact of the PMCs in getting community members more involved in attending town meetings, participating in decisions that affected them and the development of their town, and building skills useful to the development of a functioning civil society. Approximately three quarters of the communities sampled for the BA expressed satisfaction with LACE’s performance. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial 73. The overall risk to the development outcome is rated substantial. Of the risks identified at project preparation, the most important ones entail future maintenance of the physical infrastructure. The BA and ICR missions confirmed community commitment to support maintenance of the facilities; however, no concrete maintenance plans were developed in any community involved in the BA or visited by the ICR mission. Moreover, various supervision 47 Annex 5 provides a detailed summary of the BA, along with observations the ICR mission. 48 The BA focus groups were conducted during a period when the Project and the sub-projects surveyed were experiencing delays. In fact, only four of the 30 sub-projects surveyed were complete. Many others had barely started. This undoubtedly had an impact on participants’ responses to some questions. The BA did not cover CfWTEP activities, which had been evaluated previously. 49 See Section 4 for additional detail. 19 missions reported that the backfilling of bridges and culverts (a necessary undertaking each year after the rainy season) was incomplete and left these structures subject to erosion. Another risk centers on recurrent costs for the infrastructure investments, particularly for schools. The MOU between the MOE and LACE helps to mitigate this risk, but the MOE struggles with these provisions nationally and therefore may not be able to staff these schools fully. During its site visits, the ICR mission did note community willingness to recruit teachers locally when the MOE does not meet its obligation. 74. The Project did not materially contribute to decentralization of decision-making to local authorities or build up their role vis-à-vis community development. This was not an explicit objective of the Project and is unlikely to affect the specific CEPII sub-projects but could affect the wider development agenda. The 2013 global IEG study, World Bank Assistance to Low- Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, highlights a general shortcoming that “CDD programs are not joined up with local governments … (and that) the Bank has not instituted alternative mechanisms to ensure their viability beyond the live of the project supporting them.” As noted elsewhere, this risk is mitigated in Liberia where LACE programming is supported directly by Government budget contributions; however, like CEPII, this funding emphasizes expanding basic service infrastructure, not decentralization. Decentralization reforms in Liberia have not progressed and LGA officials remain centrally appointed. Instead Government’s focus has been on deconcentration, led by the line ministries with each ministry independently responsible for these processes. Over the longer term, failure to sufficiently address this key linkage between communities and the Government could affect evolution of a more responsive governmental structure overall. The IEG Liberia Country Program Evaluation: 2004-2011 identified the failure to develop a coherent decentralization strategy as a failing, not of CEPII, but of the Government’s program. It notes that “progress on decentralization has been constrained by limited devolution of decision-making authority, although to some extent administrative functions are being transferred from central to local agencies (with officials appointed from the center).” 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 75. During preparation, the Task Team was led by an experienced Bank staff member with strong post-conflict and CDD experience. Adequate resources were available to the Team, which was supported by the SDV’s coordinator for CDD and a senior staff from HDN specialized in CDD and social protection. Bank senior, regional, country, and sector management placed high priority on delivery of the overall Liberia portfolio and CEPI and CEPII benefitted accordingly. 76. Preparation strengths and weaknesses, many of which were attributable to the Bank, have been discussed under Section 2.1. Assessment of fiduciary risk was realistic. Attention to social and environmental safeguards was generally satisfactory, but could have been improved by insisting upon more detailed monitoring arrangements to oversee compliance in place during preparation. Gender and community empowerment issues were adequately addressed as evidenced in the design of effective targeting mechanisms, gender balance in the composition of PMCs, and emphasis on stakeholder participation at every step in the sub-project process. The need to strengthen LACE’s institutional capacity through staffing and continuous professional training was incorporated into the design as well. Additional staffing for CfWTEP was adequate, 20 as evidenced by its smooth implementation. Finally, the arrangements for M&E were satisfactory, with exception of the school enrollment/attendance indicator. 77. A weakness in Bank performance was ensuring that LACE’s procurement management arrangements were satisfactory. It is not entirely clear where the problem lay: in the failure to recognize and sufficiently address endemic weaknesses left over from CEPI; the country context, which made finding qualified procurement staff difficult; or the Bank’s adoption of regular, rather than emergency, procedures during the Project period that resulted in demonstrably higher implementation standards for LACE. But the fact that early CEPII supervision missions raised issues that had surfaced under CEPI suggests that some lessons were not learned or sufficiently addressed during project preparation through a clear program of actions to mitigate risk. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Highly Satisfactory 78. The Bank worked closely with LACE throughout CEPII. There were 13 formal supervisions missions that were pro-active in identifying implementation issues and following up on their resolution in subsequent missions. There was a good balance of skills on Bank missions, with nearly universal participation of Financial Management and Procurement Specialists and frequent participation of the Social and Environmental Specialist. The Bank team also drew on cross-country post conflict and CDD experience in providing relevant and practical advice, including on techniques for targeting in the absence of data, fiduciary issues, adjusting LACE’s structure and staffing as its mandate grew, designing a cash-for-work scheme quickly and efficiently, and developing guidelines covering LACE’s relations with LGAs and social sector ministries. Although the Project’s Task Team Leader changed three times, there was good transition and hand-over between them. The EU was an early and active partner in the CEPII design and remained so throughout implementation. 79. The Bank team also ensured regular in-depth review of the Project. The MTR was successful not only in gathering information through various in-depth reviews, such as compliance and technical assessments, but also in discussing and reflecting on the findings, then developing workable solutions in a collaborative manner. 50 The CEPII technical studies undertaken by the Bank were of good quality. They informed implementation, evaluated the impact of sub-projects on beneficiaries, and contributed to the assessment of CfWTEP as a successful and replicable project. As in Section 3.2, the Project could have benefited from a second technical assessment regarding the quality of the sub-projects from an engineering perspective, but resources were not sufficient to cover this work without further reducing the number of beneficiary communities. 80. The Bank also demonstrated good flexibility during implementation. The fact that construction of clinics was stopped early on was appropriate under the circumstances and a good judgment call on the Bank’s part. The timely addition of CfWTEP to CEPII also allowed the Government to respond quickly to the international food price crisis. Two areas of Bank flexibility were especially appreciated by LACE. One was the Bank’s willingness to repost 50 The technical studies included: i) Rapid Technical Assessment of Completed Infrastructure under CEPI and CEPII (2010); ii) Liberia: Cash for Work Temporary Employment Project: A Qualitative Assessment (2010); iii) Ex Post Assessment of the Impact of Public Works in Liberia (2011); iv) Liberia’s Cash for Work Temporary Employment Program: Responding to Crisis in Low Income, Fragile Countries (2011); and v) CEPII: A Beneficiary Assessment Report (2013). See Annex 9 for full citations. 21 expenses originally incurred under Bank financing to the EU TF. While not materially affecting the overall funding allocations under CEPII, it allowed LACE to fully utilize EU funds by the TF closing date of August 2012. The other action was the Bank’s decision to allow for an advance of construction materials to contractors. This innovative solution allowed contractors to mobilize more quickly and thereby speed up construction. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory 81. The overall performance of the Bank is judged to be satisfactory. Preparation benefitted from a strong Task Team of diverse specialists and lessons from CEPI, although failure to identify weaknesses in procurement capacity from the outset likely contributed to later delays to build procurement capacity during the Project. However, the Team’s supervision of the Project was highly pro-active. Missions and external assessments, of both LACE capacity and the Project activities, were conducted on a regular basis. The Bank’s flexibility, innovativeness, and responsiveness during implementation were exemplary. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory 82. The Liberian Government supported a CDD approach from the outset. It endorsed the creation of an independent implementing agency to oversee CDD and highlighted the importance of this approach in its development planning policies. Support for LACE remained strong throughout CEPII and was evident at the highest levels. In fact, the Government has increasingly used LACE for implementation. Moreover, although counterpart financing was not a requirement, the Government provided funding to LACE during CEPII to support its management and administrative costs. This contributed to keeping the proportion of operating expenditures financed by the Project under 13 percent. This supplemental funding also was critical to LACE’s ability to continue construction of the 16 sub-projects that remained incomplete on the Project’s closing date. The Government ensured that LACE was a full and active partner in any and all discussions affecting its status and operations, especially as concerned the donor community. 83. Against this picture, two areas of weakness could be considered: i) the limited engagement of the MOH, which compromised the feasibility of the rehabilitation/construction of health clinics and ii) limited enhanced capacity of LGA to be a proactive and responsive participant in the development agenda of communities. 51 Nevertheless, it is the opinion of the ICR that these weaknesses do not materially affect the Government’s satisfactory performance rating, particularly considering the overall low capacity context that, as noted above, limits the availability of qualified personnel. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 84. LACE was successful as an implementing agency and it is likely to be a sustainable institution, thanks in large part to the experience gained under CEPII and the funds and support 51 The BA found LGA participation in approximately two thirds of samples communities; however, much of this engagement was limited to the groundbreaking and/or dedication ceremonies for sub-projects. 22 provided by the World Bank and EU. LACE’s good performance was due in part to its strong and effective management, the consistent support from high levels of Government, a stable and qualified staff, and an active and involved Board of Directors. 85. LACE remained fully committed to achieving the CEPII PDO. The Project was intended to involve communities throughout sub-project identification, design, and implementation, and LACE ensured that this consultation took place in a timely and participatory manner. The BA confirmed communities’ satisfaction with LACE’s performance. Early in implementation LACE also developed an MOU with the MOE that outlined the responsibilities of each with respect to the schools being constructed. This framework provided a good context for a continuous dialogue between the two agencies, and contributed to the MOE also engaging LACE for school construction outside of CEPII. 52 86. LACE’s organizational structure was generally appropriate to and adequate for its responsibilities, although the substantial scaling up of LACE activities (from 80 to 265 sub- projects and the addition of CfWTEP) presented a challenge to its institutional capacity. Overall LACE had strong and consistent management throughout the Project, which was certainly to its credit, although other staffing issues arose during implementation which had a negative impact on implementation, including that the Deputy Executive Director post was vacant for about two years. Vacancies in other key areas (internal audit, procurement, M&E) also hampered LACE’s effectiveness. Issues of compliance with Bank guidelines and those in its own OM did arise during implementation (particularly, as noted above, surrounding procurement). Once these problems surfaced, LACE management moved quickly to address them, although with varying degrees of success. In some instances, when responsibilities grew or changed, such as with the addition of CfWTEP, LACE was able to adjust quickly and effectively. In other key areas, implementation delays arose from prolonged capacity weaknesses. As noted above, revision to the LACE procurement unit and procedures required extensive assistance and resulted delayed Project activities for over one year following the MTR. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 87. In light of the Government’s satisfactory performance (as evidenced by its ongoing support to improving access to services and of LACE) and the implementing agency’s moderately satisfactory performance (as evidenced by its strong commitment to achieving the PDO and overcoming implementation challenges toward this end), the overall borrower performance is rated moderately satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 88. The following are some of the lessons learned from implementing CEPII:  The CDD approach can be an effective instrument not only to empower communities but also to develop leadership and implementation capacity of local institutions that can enhance social service delivery in the short term and facilitate between different stakeholders in fragile environments. While line ministry and local authority capacity 52 As noted elsewhere, a similar MOU with MOH was drafted but never finalized. This did not materially affect the outcome of CEPII, however, as only one clinic was constructed and, for this sub-project, there was active engagement between LACE and MOH. 23 remains relatively limited, there is the institutional space for complementary local institutions, such as LACE, to act as intermediaries between communities, LGAs, and the central Government and line Ministries. This is particularly applicable when the relevant line ministries and local governments understand and agree to adhere to their respective sector norms and standards including the maintenance of facilities and provision of staff and recurrent costs in the post-completion phase. The Bank and EU support was instrumental in developing LACE’s track record of successful implementation and contributing to its evolution into a self-sustaining implementing agency capable of facilitating different stakeholders. In particular, the quick and successful implementation of CfWTEP highlights the capacity of such structures to adapt quickly to meet the changing needs of vulnerable households in a post-conflict setting.  Stakeholder and donor coordination is essential in all development activities in a post- conflict context, especially during the transition from relief to development phase where priorities need to be clearly identified and sequenced. Under CEPII, effective harmonization of donor efforts was encouraged by collaboration among the donors and development partners supporting CDD during the transition period. In addition, the LACE Board of Directors brought together representatives from key Government ministries, civil society and women’s organizations, and donor partners.  Careful attention to fiduciary and project management skills in a low capacity, post- conflict setting proved to be a critical factor that contributed to the success of the Project. The Bank’s hands-on, proactive, and continuous support on fiduciary and project management was essential in meeting project targets and overcoming implementation delays. Bank fiduciary staff were based in the country office and paid particular attention to the Project. Around the MTR, when Project delays began, an international Bank consultant was hired in the country office to specifically provide regular support to the Project. These efforts yielded great benefits and contributed to achievement of Project objectives. In future however, the Bank could focus more resources on improving these fiduciary areas as part of the Project preparation and routine engagement.  Transparency in the payment process to Project participants contributed to improving the CEPII administration in such a low capacity environment. Although the banking sector in Liberia continues to expand, the majority of counties only have bank branches in their capital cities. Despite this constraint, CEPII established bank accounts for all PMCs and facilitated direct payment through a commercial bank to all CfWTEP beneficiaries. For most of the CEPII participants, this was the first interaction with a formal bank. In addition, the CfWTEP assessments found positive responses from the beneficiaries surveyed in terms of transparency in dealing with these banks. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors (a) Grantee/Implementing Agencies 89. The Borrower has prepared a final evaluation report, which is attached as Annex 7. (b) Co-financiers/Donors 90. The EU is in the process of preparing an evaluation of the CEPII that is to be finalized in March 2014, however, the preliminary findings so far of this assessment concur with the overall ICR ratings of Moderately Satisfactory. 24 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Appraisal Appraisal Appraisal Appraisal Estimate Estimate Estimate Percentage Estimate of Actual/Latest of 1st EU of 2nd EU of Appraisal of Original CfWTEP Estimate Components Co- Co- of Total Grant Co- (USD Financing Financing Project (USD Financing millions) (USD (USD Costs millions) (USD millions) millions) 54 millions) 53 Part 1: Community Driven Program 4.00 7.00 16.00 16.54 14.73 89% Part 2: Capacity Building Program 0.40 0.00 1.30 1.75 2.19 125% Part 3: Program Management 0.60 0.00 1.95 1.62 2.41 149% Estimated Total Project Costs 19.91 19.33 55 53 As noted above, the entirety of the CfWTEP funding is allocated to the Community Driven Program. While the CfWTEP EPP refers to “Component 4: Cash for Work Employment Program” in discussion of the new KPI in Section 1.3, the corresponding June 21, 2008 Grant Agreement does not specify that an additional component was created. Moreover, the Letter Agreement dated April 24, 2009 states: “pursuant to a FPCR Trust Fund Grant Agreement entered into between the Recipient and the World Bank, dated June 21, 2008, the Recipient has received from the World Bank, a grant in an amount not to exceed US$3,000,000 from the FPCR Trust Fund towards the co-financing of certain activities under Part A of the Project.” 54 Appraisal Estimate of 2nd EU Co-Financing is derived from the Categories of Eligible Expenditure for TF094016 modified April 18, 2012 (see Table 2 in Section 1.7). In keeping with practice during Project implementation, the “Goods” and “Incremental Operating Costs” Categories are combined under “Part 3: Program Management”. “Sub-grants for Sub-projects” is considered synonymous with “Part 1: Community Driven Program” while “Consultants’ services and training” is considered likewise for “Part 2: Capacity Building Program”. The historical exchange rate of 1.31 is used for the conversion from EUR to USD. The Appraisal Estimates from the Original IDA Grant and CfWTEP Co-Financing are then added to the figures from the 2nd EU Co-Financing estimates. 55 Discrepancy between Appraisal Estimate and Actual/Latest Estimate is due to currency fluctuations. 25 (b) Financing Appraisal Appraisal Appraisal Appraisal Estimate of Estimate of 1st Estimate of Actual/Latest Estimate of Percentage CfWTEP Co- EU Co- 2nd EU Co- Estimate Source of Funds Original of Financing Financing Financing (USD Grant (USD Appraisal (USD (USD (USD millions) millions) millions) millions) millions) Borrower 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/a International Development 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.05 101% Association (IDA) – H3050 Food Price Crisis Response (FPCR) Trust 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 100% Fund – TF092325 European Union (EU) 0.00 0.00 11.25 0.285 11.25 98% Trust Fund – TF094016 26 Annex 2. Outputs by Component A. Overview of Project Indicators as Revised during Implementation May 2007 Emergency Project May 2008 FPCRTF Emergency June 2012 Restructuring Paper Paper 56 (Original) Project Paper and June 2008 Grant Agreement 57 Key Project (“Outcome”) Indicators All supported communities have % of completed sub-projects reflecting Percentage of subprojects undertaken benefited from social mobilization beneficiary’s priorities (Target 90%) that reflect beneficiaries’ priorities and and at least 90% of sub-projects are implemented in collaboration with reflect the emergency priorities of No material change from original local authorities (Target 90%) targeted communities and are KPI implemented in collaboration with No material change from original local authorities KPI Increased access to basic services in # of children attending primary school Number of children attending primary particular in health and education, in in “improved” facilities as defined by school in ‘improved’ facilities as particular in: technical assessment 58 defined by technical assessment (Target A - primary education, measured by 8,910) the attendance rate of primary “Improved” school facilities defined schools one year after completion as schools that (i) function during the Specific target value adopted (target of at least 90% of the rainy season; (ii) with access to water planned attendance); and sanitation facilities' in the school B - health, measured by the area; and (iii) with furnished population of the catchment area of classrooms the facilities (target of at least 7,500 people for health clinic). Sub-indicator regarding health clinics was dropped % of targeted vulnerable households (at Percentage of reduction in poverty gap least 10,000) reporting increased of targeted vulnerable households at income by at least 20% 59 least 20% Indicator added to measure outcome Indicator wording revised of the new temporary employment activities 56 Indicators from the EPP are used and match the core wording of the indicators as presented in the Original Financing Agreement dated June 15, 2007, although the original EPP indicators provide additional detail. The FA did not distinguish between key project outcome indicators and intermediate results indicators. 57 Wording of indicators from the FPCRTF EPP are used. The June 21, 2008 Grant Agreement only included five indicators and did not specify between key project outcome indicators and intermediate results indicators. Where possible, target values in this column are adopted from the June 21, 2008 GA, as no targets were specified in the EPP. 58 Wording from June 21, 2008 GA was “Increase in access to basic services, in particular in education by end of Project implementation.” The EPP language is more specific and therefore adopted above. Neither document set a target value. 59 This indicator was not included in the June 21, 2008 GA. 27 May 2007 Emergency Project May 2008 FPCRTF Emergency June 2012 Restructuring Paper Paper 56 (Original) Project Paper and June 2008 Grant Agreement 57 Intermediate Result Indicators by Component Component 1: Community Driven Program PMCs are inclusive, well- Indicator was moved to Component representative, and well-trained 2 Completion of at least 80 sub- # of schools constructed/rehabilitated Number of schools projects by end of project # markets constructed/rehabilitated constructed/rehabilitated (Target 33) implementation (or completion of at # bridges constructed/rehabilitated Number of markets least 260 sub-projects if EU # wells built constructed/rehabilitated (Target 6) financing is secured) # health facilities Number of bridges constructed/rehabilitated (Target 52) Number of water and sanitation projects built (Target 85) Number of health facilities constructed/rehabilitated (Target 1) Number of culverts constructed/rehabilitated (Target 88) Change from “wells built” to “water and sanitation projects built” to reflect that latrines were provided as part of this sub-project type Culverts added to this indicator to reflect community demand Specific target values adopted. Targets equal 265 sub-projects to reflect the additional EUR285,000 provided in June 2011 to the Client on behalf of the EU, which corresponded to the targeting of five additional communities (The June 2011 Restructuring did not include specific revision to the M&E Framework) # of person days provided in labor # of person days provided in labor intensive works (Target 800,000) 60 intensive works (Target 800,000) New intermediate indicator. No change to indicator; however, the reference to Component 4 was removed. The Letter Agreement dated April 24, 2009 (providing the first EU co-financing to CEPII) included the temporary employment activities under the Community Driven Program component. 60 Wording from June 21, 2008 GA was “At least 800,000 person-days of temporary jobs are created”. 28 May 2007 Emergency Project May 2008 FPCRTF Emergency June 2012 Restructuring Paper Paper 56 (Original) Project Paper and June 2008 Grant Agreement 57 Component 2: Capacity Building Program At least 400 PMC members are # of PMC members successfully # of PMC members successfully successfully trained per year in sub- trained yearly trained yearly (Target 650 people project management (simplified trained annually, 2,650 people total) financial and procurement No material change management, reporting, monitoring Annual target maintained, although and evaluation, etc.) (or 650 if EU total target increased by 2,650 (50 co-financing is secured) persons) to reflect the June 2011 additional funding, as discussed above Number of county/district officials # of county/district officials # of county/district officials successfully trained every year (30 successfully trained every year successfully trained every year (Target annually or 90 if EU co-financing) 90 people trained annually, 360 people No material change total) No change . % of PMCs that have 50% women 61 % of PMCs that are inclusive and at least 50% of their members are women Revision of original indicator (Target 90%) regarding inclusive nature of PMCs Wording from June 21, 2008 GA adopted % of PMCs that have their own bank % of PMCs that have their own bank account (Target 100%) 62 account (Target 90%) New intermediate indicator Revision of target from 100% to 90% % of communities that have minutes of % of communities that have minutes of the meeting electing PMCs the meeting electing PMCs (Target 90%) New intermediate indicator No change Component 3: Project Management Project management expenses, as % of project management expenses as a % of project management expenses as a defined in Chapter V of the existing part of total budgeted expenditures part of total budgeted expenditures Administrative Manual of LACE, (Target 13%) are less than 13% of total budgeted No change. annual expenditures No change. 61 Wording from June 21, 2008 GA was “PMCs are inclusive and 50 percent of their members are women”. 62 Wording from June 21, 2008 GA was “100 percent of CBOs implementing sub-projects under sub-grants have maintained a separate bank account in which funds corresponding to the respective sub-project can be deposited and managed accountably under the respective PMC”. 29 B. Results Framework at Project Closure (July 31, 2013) Indicators Measurement Baseline End-Project Target Cumulative Achievement by Value Date July 31, 2013 Project Development Objective Indicators Percentage of subprojects 0 08/01/2007 90% 100% of the targeted 260 sub- undertaken that reflect projects beneficiaries’ priorities and are implemented in Based on Project M&E records and collaboration with local verified by Beneficiary Assessment authorities Increase in the number of 0 08/01/2007 8910 8596 children attending primary school in ‘improved’ Children enrolled for 2013/2014 facilities as defined by school year by October 2013 as technical assessment reported to LACE by MOE and school staff Percentage of targeted 0 06/21/2008 20% 27% vulnerable households reporting increased income As measured in Project’s by at least 20% quantitative assessment Intermediate Indictors Component 1: Community Driven Program Completion of sub- 0 08/01/2007 (a) 33 (a) 30 projects: i (b) 6 (b) 6 (a) schools (c) 52 (c) 49 (b) markets (d) 85 (d) 69 (c) bridges (e) 1 (e) 1 (d) wells and latrines (f) 88 (f) 89 (e) health facilities (f) culverts Total: 265 Total: 244 As reported by LACE Person-days of temporary 0 06/21/2008 800,000 680,000 jobs created With the preparation of the OM, the overall number of person-days was reduced from 800,000 to 680,000 due to an increase in the wage paid to workers from US$2.5 to US$3.0 per day Component 2: Capacity Building Program Percent of PMCs that are 0 08/01/2007 90% 100% inclusive and at least 50% of their members are Based on Project M&E records and women verified by ICR mission review of LACE records of PMCs Percent of PMCs that have 0 08/01/2007 90% 100% their own bank account 30 Based on Project M&E records and verified by ICR mission review of LACE records of PMCs Percentage of communities 0 08/01/2007 90% 90% that have minutes of the meeting electing PMCs Based on Project M&E records and verified by ICR mission review of LACE records of PMCs Number of PMC members 0 08/01/2007 650 per year (2,650 total) 2,650 successfully trained yearly Based on Project M&E records Number of county/district 0 08/01/2007 90 per year (360 total) 530 officials successfully trained yearly Based on Project M&E records Component 3: Project Management Percentage of project 0 08/01/2007 13% 10.8% management expenses as part of total budgeted Based on final Project annual expenditures disbursements 31 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 1. The following economic and financial analysis was prepared of the CfWTEP during preparation of the YES Project, which built on the public works activities under CEPII. Program Impact on Households 2. The results of the quantitative assessment of the exiting CfWTEP are very encouraging regarding both the short- and long-term impact of the program on households. The results of how project income was used for instance indicated that as much as 30 percent of the income of participants was spent on education and 25 percent on various types of investments (See Table 1 below). This implies that the program is not only achieving short-term impacts, but is also having some longer-term impact on the targeted households. The relatively high share of the income used for education and investments is in part possible because of the wage rate of US$3 a day, which may be considered high for an emergency program aiming to address food insecurity. Yet, given that the program only provides one single episode of employment to participants, a relatively high wage rate that allows not only for increased temporary consumptions but also some level of investment may be warranted. Table 1: Use of the Income from CfWTEP Relation to Head Gender All Head of Other Male Female Total Education 31.2 30.2 32.4 29.3 31.0 Healthcare 8.5 8.3 8.1 8.8 8.4 Living expenses 28.8 25.3 27.4 28.5 28.0 Funeral 1.2 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.2 Celebration 0.7 2.2 1.2 0.9 1.1 Investment farm 8.3 8.1 7.3 9.4 8.2 Investment, non-farm 6.5 4.3 7.3 4.5 6.0 Debt repayment 2.3 8.0 2.7 4.7 3.6 Transfer 1.1 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 Repairing the house 8.8 6.2 7.9 8.6 8.2 Acquiring hh assets 2.7 3.6 2.7 3.1 2.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Preliminary results of the quantitative assessment of the Liberia CfWTEP. Cost-Effectiveness of the CfWTEP 3. The program appears highly cost-effective compared to international comparators. This is due to its high labor intensity of activities, the effective geographical and household level targeting, and the low foregone income from participation. 4. To estimate the “cost-effectiveness ratio” or the relative efficiency of converting program funding to income benefit for the poor, this analysis adapts the methodology developed in Ravallion (1998). 63 The calculation is based on only three variables as other data on the benefits 63 Ravallion. 1998. Appraising Workfare. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1995. Washington DC: World Bank. 32 of the infrastructure outputs are not available. Some estimates in this regard will be made however. The three variables are:  Labor Intensity (The share of all wages paid in total public works costs). Labor intensity of CfWTEP was 68 percent. This is good by international standards. Other public works programs show rates of around 60 percent in India (National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme), 70 percent in Korea’s public works program, 85 percent in the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia, 40-50 percent in Argentina’s Trabajar Program, and 60-70 percent in Bangladesh’s Food for Work Program. There are two caveats to this nevertheless. The first is that these programs are of a much larger scale than the program in Liberia. The second is that the government contribution in terms of project management in Liberia is zero. This is important as in most other programs the cost of government officials managing the program is not fully factored into the project costs thus enabling higher labor intensities to be achieved.  Wage Targeting Performance (The proportion of the wages paid out that goes to poor workers). By using different matching approaches for analyzing the results of the quantitative survey, it was found that between 71 and 85 percent of the households benefiting from the program were from the first three income quintiles. The findings of the previous Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) survey found that all those in the first three quintiles in Liberia are classified as poor, as 63 percent of the entire population was found to be living below the poverty line. When taking this into account, it is estimated that between 74 and 86 percent of program participants were below the poverty line. For the purposes of the assessment the average value of 80 percent will be used. 64 This compares fairly well with the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Project (PSNP), for instance, where it was found that 87 percent of beneficiaries were among the target group. It was estimated that 70-80 percent of Argentina’s Trabajar Program beneficiaries were under the national poverty line.  Net Wage Gain (Share of the gross wages received by the poor after taking into account any foregone income). Because of the high wage paid, extreme poverty, and lack of other income opportunities in Liberia, the quantitative survey found that the net wage gain of the CfWTEP was very high. Approximately 75 percent participants had no other income or employment before the program and so the foregone earnings were very low. The net wage gain was found to be 93 percent. In comparison, a finding from India estimated net gain at 75 percent. In comparison, a study of Argentina found that net wage gain was only 50 percent, where more work alternatives are available. 5. Overall cost-effectiveness is thus: Cost-effectiveness of the wage transfer: Labor intensity (.68)* wage targeting performance (.80)* net wage gain (0.93) = 0.51. 6. The estimated cost-effectiveness of the wage transfer on the current CfWTEP is 0.51, so the total cost of transferring US$1 in net wage benefit to a food insecure person through CfWTEP is US$1.96, which includes the US$1 in net wage. A 0.51 overall cost-effectiveness is somewhat lower than for instance Ethiopia’s PSNP where the cost-effectiveness of the wage transfer was 64 This is consistent with the analysis in SP Discussion Paper No. 1114, Liberia’s Cash for Work Temporary Employment Project: Responding to Crisis in Low Income, Fragile Countries, June 2011. 33 also about 0.55. Although no data is available regarding the benefits of the infrastructure provided, given the effective targeting in the CfWTEP and the fact that projects are generally located within the communities participants are from, it can be assumed that a fair amount of the benefits accrue to the poor. If it is assumed that the same program participants are beneficiaries of the infrastructure maintenance outputs then a value 0.80 can be retained as a measure of the effectiveness of the infrastructure benefiting the poor. 34 Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Lending/Grant Preparation Giuseppe Zampaglione Team Leader AFTSP Adriana Da Cunha Costa Program Assistant AFTHD Eduardo Brito Supervision/ICR Giuseppe Zampaglione Team Leader AFTSP Tidiane Toure Consultant Allan Rotman Lead Procurement Specialist AFTPW Ribes Ros Consultant AFTSW Suleiman Namara Team Leader AFTSW Kathryn Johnston ICR Primary Author/Consultant AFTSW Endashaw Gossa Team Leader AFTSW Peter Darvas Sr. Education Specialist AFTEW Emily Weedon Chapman Social Protection Specialist AFTSW Josiane M. S. Luchmun Program Assistant AFTSW Harold Alderman Consultant DECPO Beatrix Allah-Mensah Sr. Operations Officer AFCW1 Adriana Da Cunha Costa Program Assistant AFTHD Robert DeGraft-Hanson Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Paul Geli Consultant MNSSP Sophie Grumelard Consultant AFTCS Milena Bereket E T Consultant AFMJB Francis Peter Buckland Consultant AFTED Prema Clarke Senior Education Specialist HDNFT Yasser Aabdel-Aleem Awny El-Gammal Sector Manager MNSHD Prosper Nindorera Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Bassam Ramadan Country Manager MNCKW David Stephen Rudge Consultant ECSS5 Christopher J. Thomas Adviser MDM Michel J. Welmond Lead Education Specialist CMEIC Frederick Yankey Sr. Financial Management Specialist AFTFM 35 (b) Staff Time and Cost under P105683 Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle US$ Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY07 8.00 38,973 Total: 8.00 38,973 Supervision/ICR FY08 5.91 49,718 FY09 17.28 98,660 FY10 16.16 149,295 FY11 8.03 113,728 FY12 14.68 118,826 FY13 12.85 58,853 Total: 74.91 439,934 (c) Staff Time and Cost under P112084 Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle US$ Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY08 0.00 0 Total: 0.00 0 Supervision/ICR FY09 0.00 0 FY10 0.00 0 FY11 0.00 0 FY12 0.00 0 FY13 0.00 17,430 Total: 0.00 17,430 36 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results 1. A beneficiary assessment (BA) of the impact of CEPII sub-projects was undertaken in May and April 2012. 65 Its focus was sub-projects financed by the Bank and the EU. It did not include an evaluation of CfWTEP, which had been done earlier. Objectives of the assessment were to: • Determine the degree and depth of community participation • Assess the nature and degree of beneficiary satisfaction with the sub-projects • Understand CEPII’s success in targeting poor and vulnerable populations • Assess community willingness to maintain the sub-projects, thereby increasing sustainability • Ascertain beneficiary attitudes toward LACE and local government authorities (LGAs) 2. A random sample of 30 communities across 6 counties which had benefited from CEPII was selected to participate, which constituted 12 percent of all completed sub-projects. The communities and counties were chosen randomly, although the counties were selected so that each of the country’s four administrative districts was included. The sub-project sample was representative and included six bridges, six schools, two market buildings, eight WASH facilities, and eight box culverts. 3. The field work for the BA was conducted by a Liberian research firm between May 8 and June 15, 2012. The evaluation team conducted focus group interviews with 4 groups in each community: female PMC members, male PMC members, female non-PMC members, and male non-PMC members. Each group had between three and five participants. It is important to note that focus groups were conducted during a period when the sub-projects surveyed were experiencing delays. In fact, only four of the 30 sub-projects surveyed were complete. Many others had barely started. This undoubtedly had an impact on some participants’ responses. 4. The BA verified that LACE had appropriately identified the communities to participate in CEPII. Only two of the 30 communities had access to education, health services, drinking water, and a market within their community. The rest lacked one or more of these facilities. 5. Nearly all communities (97 percent) expressed a need for wells and/or hand pumps. Despite that 80 percent of communities had wells and hand pumps in town, they were almost always broken or insufficient to provide water for everyone in the community. Access to drinking water therefore remains a major concern in most Liberian rural communities. The request for wells or hand pumps was often accompanied by a request for latrines and toilets. This demand matches the high number of WASH sub-projects conducted under CEPII. 65 In an effort to confirm the findings in the BA, the ICR mission visited several sub-project sites (including one school, one market, two WASH facilities, and two bridges) and met with beneficiaries and CFs, as well as interviewed LACE staff and reviewed their files. There were instances where the BA findings differed from what had been reported by LACE. The ICR mission looked into these discrepancies, paying particular attention to cases involving achievement of targets or indicators. This Annex incorporates findings of the ICR mission where relevant and offers possible reasons for any differences. 37 6. The comparatively large number of transportation infrastructure projects also reflected the expressed needs of sampled communities and the importance of transportation in the development of these rural areas. Eighty percent of sampled communities noted their need for improved roads. Four communities said they were nearly or completely cut off from the rest of the country during the rainy season. Many respondents stated that good roads would allow for transportation of materials to build other essential infrastructure and participate more actively in commerce. 7. Meanwhile, access to education and healthcare are very important priorities for the Liberian populations. Although 77 percent of the communities reported having access to education, meaning they either had a school or used existing buildings (i.e. the church, old houses) to teach classes, many of these schools lacked equipment such as desks and chairs, were overfilled with students, and were in need or qualified teachers. Many respondents explained that they wanted their children not to be like them (meaning with little education), and to have the opportunity to go to school. Education is seen by many as a benefit to the future of all the Liberian people. In Butter Hill for instance, education is deemed to play a critical role in bringing children – who had for the most part been idle or engaged in farming activities – into adulthood. 8. One mismatch of the Project appears to be in the delivery of health services. Ninety percent of the sampled communities listed a clinic, hospital, or health center among their needs, yet only one health post was built under the Project. This resulted from staffing constraints within the Ministry of Health, suggesting that the allocation of resources to other types of sub-projects was appropriate; however, high community demand also highlights the need for additional investment in this sector. In addition, almost half of the surveyed communities expressed the need for a market, 30 percent asked for a guesthouse, and 27 percent for a meeting hall. A very small number of communities also asked for GSM network coverage, a peace house, a church, a mosque a youth center, a police station, teachers’ quarters, teachers, training for midwives, and assistance with farming activities.66 9. The decision-making structures in the communities appeared to reflect those of the society at large. Elders played a major role and were cited as decision-makers in about 90 percent of the communities. However, decision-making was also a participatory and inclusive process involving men and women as well as youth. All 30 communities were able to identify who was responsible for bringing the sub-project to the community and, in 25 cases, also articulated how the sub-project was selected. In these 25 cases, community respondents said that they had held a town or community meeting to decide on the sub-project, with six of these communities specifically referencing a vote. Project selection was unclear in the remaining five communities: while there was some mention of a meeting and/or vote, respondents also referenced a lottery in one instance and the town elders in another. 10. Respondents stated that PMC members were chosen during a town meeting in about half of the cases. A more few communities said that they held a vote, although without specifically noting whether the vote was in the context of a meeting. In some cases, PMC members appeared to be self-appointed or appointed by local authorities or LACE. Although focus group 66 The BA did not limit the discussion about what services communities needed; therefore, respondents often cited the need for multiple services. 38 respondents were somewhat vague in the justification for selecting PMC members, trustworthiness, character, behavior, and past experience were important. Thus, the BA did not confirm that 90 percent of communities had minutes of the meetings or concrete processes by which PMC members were selected. LACE was able to demonstrate to the ICR mission that communities had: i) held meetings in which PMC members were elected, ii) kept minutes of these meetings; and iii) had elected 50 percent women as members. In fact, attendees at these meetings, convened by the CFs, had signed their names to the minutes, which were verified by the ICR mission. Divergent findings may be due to BA respondents’ misunderstanding of the question or lack of awareness or memory of what actually happened. Given the large catchment area for some of the communities, it is also possible that not all BA respondents actually attended the meeting. 11. With regard to gender equity and gender balance in decision making, BA findings were mixed. While only one community specifically stated that half its PMC members were women, all PMCs had both men and women members. Thus, LACE’s assertion that 100 percent of participating communities had PMCs in which 50 percent were women could not be confirmed by the BA, although again this is contradicted by the signed minutes in the LACE records. However, the BA found that women (both PMC and non-PMC members) were less knowledgeable about the sub-project, particularly on issues of sub-project selection and cost, than their male counterparts. In one third of the communities surveyed, women who were not PMC members did not participate in PMC meetings, were not involved in the sub-project selection process, and did not know how the project was chosen. This was not the case for a similar proportion of the men who were not PMC members. 12. The creation of a PMC appeared to have a positive impact in getting community members more involved in attending town meetings and participating in decisions that affected them and the development of their town, thus enhancing their sense of empowerment. PMC members, in turn, became more aware of community needs and benefited from their PMC membership by building civic skills such as team-work, problem solving, effective listening, and advocacy. They learned how to conduct productive meetings, motivate people, and represent them vis-à-vis others involved in the sub-project process (i.e. LACE, contractors, CFs, and local authorities), certainly a good contribution to the development of a stronger civil society. 13. Communities, however, were not aware of the costs of the sub-projects. In only one community were most respondents seemingly aware of the costs of the project. Indeed, in the majority of communities, only a portion of the respondents claimed to know how much the project cost. Moreover, in most surveyed communities, only men were able to provide information about the project’s cost, and in eight communities, only the men who belonged to the PMC knew how much the project cost. In five communities, no one knew the cost of the project. A signboard indicating the cost of the project was supposed to be placed in a visible place in each community. It is thus possible that this board was not placed, as requested, in many of the communities. 14. All communities made material contributions to their sub-projects and most contributed labor/manpower. Four communities also gave financial contributions, demonstrating that they did consider the sub-project important to the community. A technical supervisor (a community member appointed by LACE) was supposed to monitor the construction of sub-projects, and this arrangement was acknowledged in about two-thirds of the communities surveyed. One third of 39 the communities stated that the technical supervisor was also assisted by other community members. In most cases where issues or complaints arose, communities took action. 15. Most respondents said that the community as a whole -- supervised by the PMC, town chief, or maintenance committee -- would be responsible for maintaining their project, further indicating a broad sense of ownership of and responsibility for the facilities provided and therefore the likely sustainability of the investment. Types of maintenance support included cleaning, surveillance, and direct financial contributions. However, none of the communities had a concrete maintenance plan in place, including the four where sub-projects had been completed. 67 16. Out of the sampled sub-projects, the vast majority of communities are satisfied with the type of infrastructure built. Residents noted that the projects implemented in their towns were right for their communities for four main reasons, depending on the project type: 1) it will attract more development to their town; 2) community members will no longer have to walk or carry sick people to the clinic or hospital; 3) it will create opportunities for additional income by opening up communities to the outside world and decreasing travel time and cost; and 4) it will give children access to education, which is essential. 17. Moreover, focus group participants were uniform in their opinion that the benefits of sub- projects would be positive and widespread. The communities universally said that everyone in the community would benefit from the project and, in a few towns, respondents gave an estimated number of direct beneficiaries. For instance, in Ziah Town, residents specified that over 500 children would benefit from the town’s new school. In addition, nearly two-thirds of the communities said that their project would benefit nearby towns, the entire district, or even Liberia as a whole. This opinion was particularly evident for the bridge and culvert sub-projects. 18. In terms of geographic reach and total number of direct beneficiaries, the impact of bridges and culverts was reported to be the most widespread. By nature, they expand the coverage of the roads network and connect people from different areas more easily. Nevertheless, all types of projects included in the CEPII are expected to improve the life of people beyond the community. For example, in Zealakpala, community members said that the school would benefit surrounding towns because neighboring communities would also send their children to the new school. In Butter Hill, respondents explained that the school would benefit the entire nation because education is a common good. In Kpaye, community members explained that the new market would attract people from nearby towns and thus give the opportunity for more people to sell and buy products. In Dartu-ta, respondents said that the new wells and latrines would benefit newcomers who are building houses in town, perhaps creating opportunities for outsiders to settle in the community. In fact, it is interesting to note that in Telemu – which is also receiving wells and latrines – residents pointed out that the project would benefit outsiders. 19. The BA research suggests that all types of sub-projects included in the CEPII are expected to benefit communities in the long-term. In six communities, respondents specifically 67 The ICR mission confirmed community willingness to maintain CEPII facilities, although none had a specific maintenance plan or arrangements for financing maintenance and repairs. In fact, in one or two cases visited by the mission, communities wanted LACE to return and undertake repairs, which were relatively minor and could be undertaken by communities themselves. 40 noted that their projects, which include wells and latrines, two bridges, a school building, and two box culverts, would benefit future generations. Expanding access to education through the construction of new schools also was commonly noted to have a long-term benefit. 20. Most respondents said that everyone would benefit equally from the project. However, a few respondents in 27 communities claimed that some people would benefit more from their respective projects. Generally, people who were said to benefit more from the different projects fall into three categories: 1) those who live closer to the project; 2) businessmen, traders, farmers and those who generally need to travel between towns to increase revenues (this concerns mainly bridges/culverts and markets); and 3) those who own a motorized vehicle such as a motorbike, truck or car (this concerns mainly bridges/culverts). It is also interesting to note that some community members explained that residents who did not contribute to the project (i.e. did not provide labor/manpower) but will nevertheless get to use the project would benefit more from the project. Furthermore, in a few communities, residents said that those who care about the broader implications of the project will benefit more. For instance, according to respondents, Pronoken’s community members who are more serious about learning will benefit more from the new school. 21. The implementation delays experienced at the time focus groups were conducted contributed to a sense of frustration among many participants. Interestingly, these frustrations emanated not only from the fear that the projects would not be completed but from a lack of communication and knowledge about the reasons for the delay. In several cases there had been miscommunication or misunderstanding regarding financial compensation of community members, and this also contributed to frustration expressed in some interviews. The misunderstanding appears to have centered on the community contribution (as discussed above), which was meant to make-up 10 percent of the total sub-project cost. This contribution was frequently misconstrued as an allocation of 10 percent of the total sub-project cost that would be given to communities as an additional benefit of the Project.68 22. Assessing the beneficiary communities’ satisfaction about the quality of the sub-projects also was impacted by the construction delays. Communities’ satisfaction stemmed principally from the fact that the project was useful, relevant, and directly addressed their most essential needs. Meanwhile, the dissatisfaction expressed by some communities seemed directly and mostly related to residents’ frustration about the construction delays. Twelve of the 30 communities highlighted problems with the quality of the building materials. Issues with construction quality included mainly weak or poorly-installed foundations, inadequate rods (too thin), erosion, inadequate height or width of bridges (prone to flooding), and the use of materials of inferior quality. In a few communities, issues with construction became a safety concern. For instance, in Telemu, the contractor had difficulties reaching water underground and left open a hole that was unsuccessfully drilled, which became an important safety hazard for the community. 23. Overall, approximately three quarters of the sampled communities expressed satisfaction with LACE’s performance. Most frustrations or disappointments concerning LACE were related to delays in project implementation. Respondents saw LACE as primarily responsible for bringing the projects to the community and building them, including being responsible for hiring contractors and monitoring their work. They also saw LACE as responsible for hiring the CFs that assisted in identifying projects and providing training. In reality, however, community 68 The ICR mission found confusion over financial compensation to communities in all five site visits. 41 members did not necessarily distinguish between the role of LACE and that of the CFs, and generally judged LACE and CFs as if they were one. By and large, satisfaction (or frustration) with LACE meant satisfaction (or frustration) with CFs. 24. Under CEPII, LGAs were required to give their approval for the implementation of sub- projects and attend groundbreaking ceremonies. The majority of communities sampled did confirm that the LGAs were present at the groundbreaking and gave overall approval for the CEPII activities. Beyond this, about two thirds of the sampled communities noted greater involvement of the local authorities in the sub-project. 69 This involvement, however, varied significantly. In addition, about one third of the communities surveyed spoke about the role of the LGAs in terms of their broader engagement. According to their comments, LGAs run the political and administrative affairs of the county and district, but do not necessarily pay much attention to community development activities. Among all local authorities, town chiefs seemed to have been the ones most consistently involved with the sub-projects, and county and district officials less so. 25. Overall, implementation of the project did not change the way community members viewed their local authorities, except in three cases: two in which authorities’ disregard for the sub-project had pushed residents to lose faith in their leaders and one in which respondents claimed to have gained more respect for their local authorities after the Project. In light of this, it appears that CEPII did not have much impact on enhancing the role of local governments in community development nor in strengthening the link between communities and their local government, the training provided to the 530 local officials notwithstanding. 69 Local authorities were present at all sites visited by the ICR mission, participated actively in group discussions, and were very pleased with the sub-projects and LACE performance. Some made a point of stating how involved they had been throughout sub-project implementation. 42 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Not applicable. 43 Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE) Horton Avenue, Monrovia, Liberia Implementation Completion Report CEP II Funded by the World Bank (WB) and European Union (EU) September 2013 LACE Project complete Report Outline 44 Glossary AfT Agenda for Transformation CBO Community Based Organization CDA Community Development Agenda CDD County Development Agenda CEP II Community Empowerment Project II CFs Community Facilitators CSO Civil Society Movement of Liberia DDA District Development Agenda DSA Daily Subsistence Allowance ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan EU European Union GIMPA Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration GOL Government of Liberia LACE Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment MAAFP Manual for Administrative, Accounting and Financial Procedures MOE Ministry of Education MPEA Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs MPW Ministry of Public Works NGOs Non-Governmental Organization PDO Project Development Objectives PMCs Project Management Committees PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy RAP Resettlement Action Plan RPF Resettlement Policy Framework US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development WB World Bank 45 Table of Contents 1.0 About LACE 2.0 The Community Context 3.0 Community Empowerment (CEP) II 3.1 PROJECT Development Objectives 3.2 Subcomponent 1 3.3 Subcomponent 2 3.4 Subcomponent 3 3.5 Design Principles 4.0 Project Categories and Budget allocation 4.1 Goods 4.2 Community Driven Development (Subproject) 4.2.1 Identification 4.2.2 Financial Management 4.2.3 Impact 4.3 Consultancy, Training and Audit 4.4 Project Management 5.0 Achievement of Objectives and Outputs Framework 6.0 Assessment of Project Implementation (Ratings) 6.1 Project Development Objectives (PDO) 6.2 Component Implementation 6.2.1 CDD/Subprojects 6.2.2 Capacity building, Consultancy 6.2.3 Project Management 7.0 Social Accountability 8.0 Challenges 9.0 Lessons Learned 10.0 Bank Performance 11.0 GOL Performance 12.0 Attachments 70 - Completed subproject - Ongoing subprojects - List of school/students enrollment 70 See full Borrower’s ICR. 46 1.0 About LACE LACE was created by the Community Empowerment Act promulgated by the National Legislature on July 22, 2004 under the new Executive Law, also known as the Community Empowerment Act. Title 12 Chapter 50.B, Liberian Code of Laws. The objectives of LACE are to improve the living standard of the poor communities through the provision and strengthening of basic social services, and to promote a community based approach in sub-projects identification, preparation, implementation and maintenance. LACE has a nine member Board of Directors, including the Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs (MPEA), Ministry of Gender and Development (MoDG), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), USAID, European Union (EU), Women NGO Secretariat, Civil Society Movement of Liberia (CSML-CSO), and a private person as Chairman. LACE’s Secretariat is headed by an Executive Director (ED), Deputy Executive Director for Administration (DED-A), and Finance Director (FD), supported by Project Managers, Engineers and other professional and support staff. The Board provides overall policy guidance and formulates policies. It ensures that LACE operates within the provision of its mandate in accordance with the Act. The Board approves the annual workplan and budget; and also approves the geographical coverage of the Agency’s program. LACE Board is appointed by and reports to the President of Liberia. 2.0 The Country Context Since 2003, following the cessation of hostilities, Liberia has enjoyed ten years a relative peace. It has conducted two successive general and presidential elections; and the government has been able to pursue Poverty Reduction and Economic Development Strategies, including 150 days Action Plan, Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, the PRS, and the Agenda for Transformation (AFT). Nonetheless, Liberia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, both in terms of infrastructure and human capital development. The country’s 14 years of civil war caused massive devastation and destruction of socio-economic infrastructure, including roads, energy, water, as well as human development institutions, i.e., educational and health facilities. The Government is under tremendous pressure to rebuild and restore these facilities. The incidence of poverty remains high, with over 60% of the population living on less than US$1.00 per day. 68% of the population in rural areas and 55% of the poor are in rural areas (AFT). LISGIS Labor Force Survey puts unemployment at 3.7%, but vulnerable employment at over 70%. Youth unemployment is one of the insurmountable challenges for the current Administration. According to the AFT the Liberian economy has been growing at 7% per annum for the past seven years and therefore the national budget has increased from US$80 million in 2005 to over US$500 million in 2013/14. Nonetheless, the growth must be shared in the form of development of the entire population (AFT) through the creation of short-term and long-term jobs; strengthening skills development institutions, formal and informal; strengthening small businesses and increasing opportunities for self-employment. 47 Very few labor intensive jobs are being created to match the growing youth population that is moving into the country’s labor force annually. Majority of the youth are illiterate and lack employable skills. The economy must create productive and sustainable job opportunities for the youth in order to ensure sustainable peace, which means the necessary policies should be promulgated that will create the enabling environment to attract private domestic and foreign investment. The rural social economic infrastructure must be improved, including small bridges and culverts that connect villages and towns, support small holder agriculture in order to produce cash crops and food crops, generating income in the rural areas where over two thirds of the population lives. The financial and accountability institutions must also be strengthened; as well as the judicial system for the transparent and fair dispensation of justice. The predictability of the justice system can attract investors, spur economic growth, create jobs and enhance human development. 3.0 Community Empowerment Project (CEP) II In 2007, the Government of Liberia, through the Ministry of Finance signed an administrative agreement providing a grant of US$5.0 million to LACE for the implementation of 80 community subprojects throughout Liberia, using the Community Driven Development approach. The CEP II was to be co-financed by the World Bank and European Union. The EU grant was not effective until two years into project implementation. LACE implemented CEP II/WB #H3050 up to 2009, completing 69 community subprojects. In the middle of 2009, the World Bank, the EU and the Government of Liberia signed a co-financing agreement for the CEP II with 8.047 million Euros, for LACE to implement additional 180 subprojects, another 285,000 Euros for five subprojects were also added, for a total target of 265 subprojects. The total funds available to LACE for the implementation of these projects was approximately US$16.0 million; but as the project was being implemented, US$0.5 million was lost due to the fluctuation in the exchange rate between the Euros and the U.S. Dollars. In addition, on June 21, 2008, the Government of Liberia and the World Bank signed the Agreement providing Additional Financing of US$3.0 million to the CEPII. This funding was from the Global Food Price Crisis Trust Fund and supported the Liberia Cash for Works Temporary Employment Project (CfWTEP). The CfWTEP aimed specifically at responding to the immediate detrimental effects of escalating prices of food commodities on the lives of the poor in Liberia; creating temporary job opportunities for the food insecured population in targeted urban and rural areas. The project targeted 17,000 vulnerable people throughout Liberia, in the food insecure counties. 3.1 The Project Development Objective (PDO): The CEP II’s PDO was to improve communities’ access to basic infrastructure and economic opportunities for vulnerable households in urban and rural areas through (a) a community driven approach; (b) a labor-intensive public works program; and (c) the provision of capacity building at the community and local government levels. The project consists of three components: 3.2 Component I: Community Driven Program 48 (a) Assisting Beneficiaries to select and design small-scale community sub- projects, through: the provision of technical assistance and training; social mobilization; and collective action. (b) Providing Sub-grants to beneficiaries for the financing of sub-projects, including but not limited to sub-projects aimed at:  Reconstructing and rehabilitation of infrastructure in the health, education, water and sanitation sector;  Reconstructing and rehabilitating infrastructure in the agricultural sector, including, inter alia: (i) rural roads; (ii) markets; and (iii) storage facilities; and  Improving the delivery of and access to, economic services. (c) Activities for the CfWTEP (known as subprojects) will be identified by the community members themselves with support from the implementing partners. The projects should be simple and for a public good; all work must be done on public or community own land, but not on private land. The project shall benefit a wider community; not a few; it should not negatively affect the environment. Activities to be undertaken are:  In rural areas: Bush brushing, either along roads or to clear non- private agricultural land (or for another purpose that would serve a community or public need); Rock breaking for the roads; Cleaning and replacement of culverts; Drain clearance along roads; Construction of small wood bridges along roads that would be rehabilitated under the project but would remain otherwise impassable at some points.  In urban areas: Street sweeping/cleaning; Drainage clearance; Painting of cross walks; Rehabilitation of recreational spaces; Small rehabilitation of schools, health posts and other community buildings. 3.3 Component II: Capacity Building Program (a) Providing training and technical advisory services to enhance the technical and managerial capacity of community members and other sub-project stakeholders in participatory planning and development. (b) Providing technical support to LACE for the design of detailed guidelines for the involvement of local authorities in the identification, preparation, and implementation of the sub-projects. 3.4 Component III: Project Management (a) Supporting the operational capacity of LACE to effectively manage the project by, inter alia, strengthening its management capacity, including its monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, all through the provision of goods, technical advisory services, training and incremental operating costs. 3.5 Design principles The key project design principles were as follows: 49 i. Sub-projects must be community driven: The beneficiary community must identify projects that meet their priority needs using the CDD approach. ii. Subprojects must support Government’s development agenda (CDA/DDA/PRS/AFT). Subprojects must be in line with the development objectives of the districts, the communities and counties at large. iii. Community sub-projects must be accessible. iv. Beneficiary communities must be vigilant, willing to make their 10% community contribution in the form of local materials, land, labor, etc.; the local beneficiaries must be prepared to take off time to work on their projects, and to provide some inputs free of charge. v. In order to ensure sustainability, all social infrastructure subprojects must be approved by the appropriate line ministries before LACE can finally approve the sub grant to the community. Primary schools must be approved by the Ministry of Education (MOE); clinics by Ministry of Health & Social Welfare (MHSW), and bridges, culverts, wells and latrine projects by the Ministry of Public Works (MPW). vi. The project must be implemented within the context of the World Bank’s Operational Manual, the MAAFP, ESMP, RPF/RAP. The project must follow the WB procurement guidelines. vii. Subprojects must follow the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Safeguards Guidelines. viii. Operational expenditure must not be more than 13% of the total expenditure under the grant. Project design principles for the CfWTEP were: i. Targeted 17,000 vulnerable people. ii. At least 30% women. iii. Apply participatory approach (CDD) in activities implementation. iv. Project to smoothing consumption of the vulnerable people. v. Project activities shouldn’t adversely affect the environment. vi. Each beneficiary is paid US$5.00 for skilled labor and US$3.00 for unskilled labor. vii. Local authorities to provide leadership and help resolve problem; ensure their participation. viii. Lottery system to be used when more people turn-out for recruitment than the target number. ix. Recruitment based on self-selection. x. Target counties with high level of food insecurity. xi. Payment of beneficiary wages will be done through a commercial bank. xii. CFs to handle recruitment, sensitization and mobilization in their localities. xiii. Each beneficiary will sign a one page contract outlining conditions of contract. xiv. I.D. Cards issue to each beneficiary. xv. Certificates issue to each beneficiary. Conditions of the CfWTEP contract with participants specified: 1. Employment is for a limited number of days (40 days only). 2. Workers need to be at least 18 years old. 50 3. Pregnant women are not allowed to work under the project. 4. No insurance is provided. 5. No child care is provided; and children are not allowed on the work sites. 6. Payments are made every 4 weeks (modified for every two weeks); payments are made in cash in USD. 7. All tools and equipment provided need to be returned, until transfer at the end of the project. 8. No transport is provided. 9. No other benefit than the daily wage is provided 10. Payment of US$3.00 per day wage for unskilled workers; and US$5.00 for skilled labors. 4.0 Project Categories and budgetary allocations CEPII IDA and CfWTEP Category Description EU Amount Amount US$ % US$ 1 Goods 153,406 151,935.00 1.6% 2 Subgrant for subprojects 11,993573.82 2,295,666.00 75.1% 3 Consultancy service (including audit and training) 2,243,456.02 137,610.00 12.5% 4 Incremental Operating Costs 1,646,881.88 414,788.14 10.8% Total 16,037,317.72 3,000,000.00 100% 4.1 Category I - Goods This category allocation was intended to enable LACE to purchase the needed vehicles and equipment to facilitate the implementation of the project. Under this component, a. vehicle 1- EU-Cofinancing US$52,000.00; 2 vehicles IDA US$92,000.00; 1 generator US$8,000.00; and air conditioner/printer US$975.00 were procured for the monitoring and supervision of subprojects, as well as for office use. Under CfWTEP, goods included vehicles (2 pickups for $40,000.00 each and 1 jeep for $50,000.00) for supervision and monitoring of projects around the country over the two years period. Motorbikes for CFs and monitors also were provided on loan to local NGOs to facilitate effective community mobilization, consultations & monitoring of projects implementations. (1 motorbike assigned to LACE monitor for monitoring visits in places where vehicles cannot reach. The cost of the 16 motorbikes is at $3,631.00 per motorbike. 4.2 Category 2 - Community Driven Development (Subprojects) The number of subprojects under the entire CEP II was stipulated in the project grant document. The subprojects were distributed within the following principles in mind: (a) To improve livelihood and economic opportunities especially for the rural poor, and (b) to ensure that the project resources are deployed in places where they are most needed. To achieve this objective, LACE considered the following parameters for the allocation of subprojects per county: (1) population (2) incidence of poverty (3) level of development intervention already ongoing in the county by LACE and/or other development partners, (4) remoteness and accessibility of the beneficiary communities, and (5) the county’s overall development strategy. Very poor communities, with high 51 youthful population and food insecurity are considered for intervention. The Community people must be willing to get involved in the implementation of their community subprojects, i.e. physical labor, provision of local materials, and the management of the project. A total of eighty (80) subprojects funded by the World Bank funds and 185 71 subprojects funded by the European Union funds, totaling 265 subprojects were planned for CEP II. However, due to the loss of some funds caused by fluctuation in the exchange rate, five subprojects were dropped from the total subprojects, leaving funding available for 260 subprojects. In particularly, the Euro/USD exchange rate dropped from 1.33 Euro to 1 USD in 2004 to 1.22 Euros to 1 USD in 2012. This resulted in a loss of approximately USD0.5 million). The final allocation of sub-projects was: 31 schools, 51 bridges, 92 culverts, 6 markets, 1 heath post and 79 wells and latrines subprojects. The EU Component of the CEP II Co-financing subprojects was closed on August 31, 2012. With the reposting 72 of the sub-projects from the WB’s CEP II list of completed subprojects to EU’s co-financing component of on-going subproject, the completion of the 185 subprojects was achieved. The WB Component of the CEP II was extended by another year, up to July 31, 2013 so as to enable LACE to continue working in order to complete the subprojects. Up to the closing date, LACE completed a total of 244 out of 260 subprojects (93%). The subprojects are benefitting over a million people throughout Liberia; the CEP II subprojects were implemented throughout the country. This progress was made partly due to the material advance to contractors; as well as intensive monitoring of contractors working at the project site by LACE Project Officers and Engineers. In addition to technical specification monitoring, the Engineers and Project Officers also follow-up on social and environmental safeguards compliance. They ensured that bridges were cleared of debris, for free flow of water, removal of construction materials from construction sites, covering of pits where soil was used for the production of the SSB bricks, closing of unused open wells. LACE intervention in this area was highly successful. And on the social safe-guard measures, LACE Staff secured some tribal certificates for the land on which the school or market projects are built. Some community authorities were however reluctant to sign the tribal certificates. This was a major challenge. This Community Driven Development (subprojects) Component of the CEP II absorbs 75% of the entire project grant. Once subprojects were identified and approved by LACE for the subgrants, the funds were placed in the subproject accounts in three allotments 71 Initially, these 180 subprojects were earmarked for the CEP EU Additional Financing projects, but during project implementation, Euro 285,000 was added to implement five (5) additional subprojects totaling 185 subprojects. 72 Reposting: LACE, with No Objection from the World Bank, transferred 39 completed subprojects to the EU Co-financing component of the project, and with the concurring expenditures. As such, US$2.1 million was transferred to IDA H#3050 for continuous implementation of subprojects as the CEP II EU Co-financing Component of the project closed on August 31, 2012. 52 of 40%, 40% and then 20%. By the end of the project, the expenditure on the subprojects per county was as follows: # County # of projects Expenditure 1 Bassa 17 716,551.07 2 Bomi 13 624,946.42 3 Bong 17 742,206.33 4 Cape Mount 25 1,159,180.70 5 Gbarpolu 15 717,249.19 6 Grand Gedeh 14 586,225.98 7 Grand Kru 14 735,658.54 8 Lofa 17 736,254.07 9 Margibi 23 936,245.34 10 Maryland 11 591,124.38 11 Montserrado 26 1,003,713.71 12 Nimba 14 693,717.65 13 River Cess 18 873,410.73 14 River Gee 18 776,135.70 15 Sinoe 18 1,100,954.01 Total 260 11,993,573.82 Project Identification: LACE recruited Community Facilitators (CFs) 73, sensitized and trained them. The CFs are community based; there are 19 CFs in all fifteen counties. The CFs undertook community sensitization, organization of the Project Management Committee (PMCs) 74, and assisted PMCs to identify their priority projects. LACE assisted PMCs with technical assessment; and along with the PMCs/CFs undertook the procurement process, management, monitoring and supervision of the project. Project Financial Management: 1. Project identified by PMCs; 2. Subgrant approved by LACE; 3. Subgrant signed by PMCs and LACE; 4. PMCs opened subproject Accounts in recognized commercial banks, with four signatories from the PMC’s Finance Committees; 5. LACE deposited project funds into subproject accounts (40%, 40% and 20%); 6. PMC Finance Committee authorized and made payments from the subproject accounts upon the completion of milestone by the contractors; 73 Community Facilitators (CFs) are local NGOs recruited in the communities to provide sensitization and facilitation services for the CEP II project; they are paid USD2,350.00 for facilitation- a subproject from start to completion. 74 PMCs are community people organized (5 men and 5 women) to manage the implementation of the subprojects on behalf of the community people. The PMCs are signatories to the subprojects accounts; they form part of the procurement committee along with LACE to evaluate bids and awarding of contracts. They are responsible to monitor and supervise the project, and authorize payments to the contractor upon completion of subproject milestones. 53 7. PMCs keep records of their financial transaction until the project is completed; 8. PMCs keep the project records after the project closes; 9. PMCs got petty cash for operations a. Finance Officers got stipends for bookkeeping services; b. Technical supervisors got stipends for daily monitoring of subprojects. CfWTEP: 500 persons were employed per subproject. 34 subprojects were be implemented over the two years period, costing on average $60,400.00 per subproject for labor. Each beneficiary was paid $3.00US per day and one foreman out of the group paid $5.00US per day for supervision of the workers. Beneficiary wages were paid through a commercial bank, EcoBank. Bank commission for payment services to beneficiary workers was estimated at $1,000.00 per project, i.e., payment to five hundred persons for one month (once a month payment). LACE proposed that payment to beneficiary workers will be done by commercial banks. Where there are no banks, the Community Facilitator, LACE and the Commercial Bank staff will design a strategy for the workers to receive their payments at their place of work. All payments will be made by commercial bank staff. Project materials/tools for 17,000 beneficiary workers was budgeted for a lump sum of $212,500.00 over a two-year period The allocation of beneficiaries were based on the 2006 CFSNS which was conducted by the U.N., the allocation were as follows: # County Beneficiary 1 Montserrado 1,500 2 River Gee 500 3 Grand Cape Mount 500 4 Bomi 1,500 5 Margibi 1,000 6 Rivercess 1,000 7 Gbarpolu 500 8 Nimba 1,500 9 Grand Gedeh 1,000 10 Sinoe 1,000 11 Maryland 1,000 12 Grand Kru 1,000 13 Grand Bassa 1,000 14 Bong 1,000 15 Lofa 1,500 Total Beneficiaries 17,000 4.3 Component II – Capacity building Consultancy/training LACE recruited local NGOs, CFs to provide community mobilization, sensitization, training and monitoring and supervision services. A CF was paid US$2,350.00 per project. For the infrastructure subprojects, the CFs and LACE trained the PMCs in 54 project Cycle management (sensitization and social mobilization, project management, financial management, procurement, monitoring and evaluation). The CFs were paid per output; that if a subproject fails because a contractor abandoned the project, the CFs would not get his balance pay for outputs not achieved. But almost all subprojects were completed, though many of the projects were delayed, which was partly due to capacity problem on the part of the contractors. For CfWTEP, CFs helped ensure that selected projects meet the “public good” standard, and does not adversely affect the environment; cooperate and coordinate with land authorities. Under the CfWTEP, in addition to the US$2,350 per subproject payment, LACE provided an amount of $2,500.00 to cover insurance, registration, fuel and maintenance cost for motorbikes assigned to CFs for the subproject period. Under this component, professional/technical LACE staffs were paid as consultants; auditors and other short-term consultants were also paid from this component. This component also covers cost for consultancy and training activities, including workshops, auditing; and technical studies, coordinate with local authorities and monitoring and supervision. 4.4 Component III- Project Management This component covers the management to the projects, ensuring that the subprojects were implemented prudently, keeping the operating cost as low as possible, not exceeding 13% of the total expenditure. This component covers the cost of rent, fuel, vehicles, DSA, staff cost, and other project operating expenses, as well as monitoring and evaluation of projects. Keeping the incremental operating cost as per target even though the duration of the project was extended by two years was difficult. No additional funds were provided to LACE to cover increasing operating cost; LACE relies on the GOL subsidy to cover cost overrun and other associated costs. For CfWTEP, LACE recruited 5 new staff to the Agency (CfW Project Manager, a CfW Project Monitor and three (3) drivers) to provide management and monitoring support for the project. This component covered the cost of the staff to be recruited as well as the allowances for the existing staff for taking on additional responsibilities under the Cash for Work project. 5.0 Achievement of objectives and outputs- Framework CEP II Status of agreed outcomes indicators: July 31, 2013 Indicators Measurement Baseline Value Progress To Date End-of-Project Target Value Number Date Number or text Date Number or Date or text text PDO Indicator Percentage of sub- 0 08/02/2007 100% of the 260 identified 07/31/2013 90% 07/31/2013 projects undertaken subprojects meet the priority of that reflect community people. Out of this beneficiaries priorities number, 244 subprojects have been and implemented in completed and the balance 16 55 collaboration with subprojects are on-going at local authorities different levels (with GoL funds) of implementation throughout the country. Number of children 0 08/02/2007 8,596 primary school students in 07/31/2013 8,910 07/31/2013 attending primary 30 primary schools are attending in school in improved improved facilities. 75 facilities In addition, approximately 20,000 people in the area will access health services at the Togbaville Health Post in Sinoe County. Approximately 250,000 villagers are accessing safe drinking water from the handpumps, and using the improved latrines in the villages constructed by the project. Approximately 3,000 marketers are holding weekly markets in the newly constructed market buildings under the projects. Percentage of 0 06/21/2008 27% 07/31/2013 20% 07/31/2013 reduction in poverty gap of targeted vulnerable households at least 20% Intermediate outcome indictor(s) Completion of 0 08/02/2007 Subprojects completed 07/31/13 33schools 07/31/2013 subprojects: (a) school • 30 schools 6 markets (b) markets (c) bridges • 6 market 52 bridges (d) wells & latrines • 49 bridges 85 wells (e) Culverts (f) health • 69 wells and latrines and latrines facilities • 89 culverts 88 culverts • 1 Health post 1 health post Percent of PMCs that 0 08/02/2007 100% 07/31/13 90% 07/31/2013 are inclusive and at PMC Members are 50% men, and least 50% of their 50% women. members are women Organizational 08/02/2007 (a) 100% of CBO/PMC have 07/31/13 (a)90% 07/31/2013 Capacity : (a) 0 project bank accounts Percentage of (b) 90% of community members (b)90% CBOs/PMC keep minutes of PMCs election. implementing sub- projects have a bank 75 LACE gets enrollment data from all 21 schools by visiting the schools and requesting the information from the principal, and by making the principal by phone to provide the enrollment information. In some of the communities, the CFs help LACE in collecting the data from the schools in their communities. School principals were requested to provide their current enrolment record. 56 account where funds can be managed under 0 PMC; (b) percentage of communities that have minutes of the meeting electing PMCs Training : (a) Number 0 08/02/2007 (a) 2,650 PMCs trained in Project 07/31/13 (a) 2,650 07/31/2013 of PMC members Cycle Management PMCs successfully trained (b) 530 local authorities were (b) Number of 0 trained along with PMCs on (b) 360 county/district Project Cycle Management LGA local officials successfully authorities trained Percent of project 0 08/02/2007 10.8% of the total project 07/31/13 <13% 07/31/2013 management expenses expenditure. as part of total budgeted annual expenditures Person-days of 0 06/21/2008 680,000 07/31/2013 800,000 07/30/2013 temporary jobs created 6.0 Assessment of Project Implementation (Ratings) 6.1 Project Development Objectives (PDOs) The project objective is to improve communities’ access to basic social services and provide economic opportunities to vulnerable households in urban and rural areas through a Community Driven Approach, a labor-intensive public works program, and the provision of capacity-building at the community and local government levels. LACE rates its performance as Moderately Satisfactory, because of the delay in completing some of the CEP II subprojects. The CEPII (with funding from the World Bank and EU) contributed to the Government of Liberia poverty reduction strategy, especially component II- Economic Revitalization and component IV infrastructure and basic social services as well as the Agenda for Transformation (AFT).Almost all subprojects were completed, and are now providing improved learning environment, safe drinking water and improved sanitation, access roads, and markets that contribute to ease in movement of goods and people, agriculture production, and sale. As a result of the effective implementation of these subprojects (though with some delays), the government is now assigning similar sub projects to LACE for implementation. The Government, through the National Legislature, budgeted US$3.0 million to LACE for implementation of social infrastructure projects in the various districts of Liberia in FY 2012/2013 though not all the funds were released. LACE has started implementing some of these projects, including schools, markets, youth centers, etc. The CfWTEP was satisfactorily implemented in all 15 counties of Liberia and as a result, the Government of Liberia requested the World Bank for a bigger project for 45,000 vulnerable youths which was approved in 2010. The new Youth Employment Skills 57 Project grant was US$7.5 million. LACE therefore rates result as satisfactory for this project. 6.2 Component implementation 6.2.1 Component I- Community Driven Development (subgrant/subprojects) This component was rated Moderately Satisfactory because of the many challenges during implementation of the community subprojects. The CfWTEP subproject activities were implemented satisfactorily. The subgrants supported subprojects to meet the needs of the beneficiary communities. In total of US$11,993,573.82 was paid-out to the community subgrants for the implementation of the subprojects. as follow: 1. Schools constitute 31 US$2,981,603.88 (includes one ongoing with GOL funds) 2. Health post 1 US$85,212.23 3. Bridges 50 US$4,218,522.09 (includes one ongoing with GOL funds) 4. Culverts 92 US$2,777,742.70 (includes three ongoing with GOL funds) 5. Wells and latrines 80 US$1,587,837.95 (includes 11 ongoing with GOL funds) 6. Markets 6 US$342,654.97 Through our school construction and rehabilitation subprojects, LACE has completed 30 schools in the remotest parts of the country. The schools are furnished with furniture, chairs, blackboards, reading room, teacher’s lounge, Latrines, and wells fitted with hand pumps to provide safe drinking water for teachers and students while attending classes. The schools in most locations are the only educational facilities in those communities, and are enabling many students for the first time to attend school and/or attend classes in a conducive building with safe drinking water and latrine facilities. In the area of health hygiene and sanitation, LACE has completed 69 wells and latrine subprojects, and is implementing 11 other wells and latrines subprojects. The wells and latrines subprojects are intended to provide safe drinking water and improve hygiene and sanitary condition for people in towns and villages throughout Liberia approximately 250,000 people will access safe drinking water. Safe water and clear latrines will improve the quality of lives and health of children and their mothers, and the population at large. That means productive labors force that can achieve economic growth for the country. Where the health post is located in Togbaville, it is the only health facility in the district. The nearest health post is about 30 Km to Greenville or to Cestos, in River Cess County either way from Togbaville. The importance of this facility is enormous. It serves the entire population within the district, approximately 20,000 people. Pregnant women will be able to deliver safely at the health post, which will contribute to reducing the maternal and child mortality in that area. As for bridges and culverts on feeder roads, as well as markets, they support Government’s effort to revitalize economic activities in the rural areas. With 138 bridges 58 and culverts completed, along with six markets, the CEPII project is enhancing the standard of living of the rural population throughout Liberia. The project is improving transport and bolstering rural agricultural production and income for the rural poor. The bridges and culverts are enhancing transportation to villages and towns. Without such facilities, it would be difficult for rural dwellers. Before the construction of these bridges and culverts, they had difficulty to couldn’t commute easily, and to transport their goods to the villages, and to the main roads and markets for sale; to go to clinics, and for the children to go to the next accessible school facility. The market buildings are providing selling spaces for the market women and men, avoiding selling in the sun and rain. The market buildings also have ware-houses for the storage of dry goods, and offices for the leadership of the markets. The markets are built along with handpumps for safe drinking water, and latrines for sanitation purposes. Approximately 3,000 people will benefit from the market. Through these construction subprojects, the CEPII provided job opportunities for over 150 small Liberian construction contractors, who also each employed a minimum of 6 artisans, i.e. carpenters, steel benders, masons, manual laborers, etc. As subprojects were bid and won by small Liberian construction companies, jobs were being created in the urban and rural construction industry; income was being earned by owners or employees of small construction companies who were able to pay for education and health services, acquire household assets, improve their standard of living, and escape poverty. The impact of the community empowerment project in towns and villages throughout Liberia cannot be over emphasized. The impact is enormous. In total, 34 CfWTEP subprojects also were undertaken and engaged 17,000 participants in temporary employment. A subproject by definition comprises of 500 persons working together in a town/village carrying out agreed activities. These subprojects were implemented in all 15 counties of Liberia with the help of the CFs who did the sensitization, recruitment, assignment, supervision of tasks, oversee payroll preparation, and the payment process. Of the 17,000 vulnerable people recruited, 54% male, 46% female. They were recruited on self-selection basis; where there were more people than the allotted number, a lottery system was used to select participants under the project. The selection process included screening, selection, signing of a one page contract, and photographing of each beneficiary worker, which was preceded by sensitization and social mobilization by CFs. US$2,053,600 or 68% was paid as wages directly to the beneficiaries, out of a total of US$3.0 million grant. 184 communities benefitted from the CfWTEP between October 2008 to June 2010 (LACE’s CfWTEP final report). During project implementation, beneficiary workers were engaged in the rehabilitation, roadside brushing, drainage clearing and/or reconstruction, backfilling of newly constructed bridges and culverts, and backfilling of pot holes on the trunk roads, general clearing of urban and provincial cities, towns and villages, and appropriate disposal of garbage/debris. The participants also undertook productive activities such as swamp rice production, cassava production, specifically, in the area of agriculture; project participants in Bong County rehabilitated a paddy rice demonstration site used to produce high yielding, short duration and resilience varieties for rice at the Central Agriculture Research Institute (CARI) and Kpatawee rice production sites. 59 Similarly, some of the local communities in Grand Cape Mount, and Gbapolu Counties reclaimed some of their arable land areas and cultivated it in rice and cassava crops for consumption and for sale to support community-wide development initiatives. Approximately 2.3 Million square meters of arable land was worked on by the beneficiaries during the period implementation. Summary of activities No Activity Area 1 Site clearing 122,860,854.56M2 2 Earthwork 2,082,482.76M3 3 Drainage 233,154.50M3 4 Agriculture 2,366,844M2 5 Agriculture 150,000M2 Source: LACE’s CfWTEP final report, 2010 Even though the objective of the project was to put money in the pocket of vulnerable people in order to smoothen consumption in the wake of galloping increase in the prices of essential food commodities, fuel and the like, the beneficiaries used two-thirds of their monies for more sustainable items including household assets, agriculture inputs, repair of houses, schools and health services (WB assessment study 2010); only about 28% of the income was used for consumption. 6.2.2 Component II- Capacity building, Consultancy Audits This component was satisfactorily executed. LACE was able to recruit all the needed NGOs as community facilitators in keeping with the OM and; trained them in project cycle management. LACE along with the CFs organized and trained the Project Management Committees in mobilization, sensitization, project management, procurement, financial management, monitoring and evaluation. These capacity building efforts contributed to successful implementation of the subprojects. The community people, as a result of the training, were able to identify and prioritize their subprojects; managed their construction works and paid contractors. The PMCs started keeping their financial records, as well as keeping minutes of their activities on the subprojects. During the project life, over 2,650 PMCs and 530 local Government authorities were trained in project cycle management. Under this component, LACE and the CFs also brought in the local authorities in support of the projects. The local authorities participated in the same training as the PMCs and were fully informed about project activities and implementation modalities. Because of the training, the local authorities were also able to mobilize the community people to make their 10% community contribution, in the form of land, round poles, sand, crushed rocks, and other construction inputs. The local authorities (Development Superintendents) also participated in the monitoring of the project; and follow-up with LACE whenever there was a problem at a project site. Also under this component, LACE was able to recruit and maintain competent project officers and engineers that constantly monitored the implementation of the project in the villages and towns. The role of these staff contributed immensely in achieving the quality of structures designed. LACE procurement staff also benefited from procurement 60 training in Ghana (GIMPA) and locally; and as a result, their outputs have improved immensely. The CfWTEP activities under this component started in communities through sensitization and social mobilization. This was followed by orientation workshops on a regional basis, one in Montserrado County in October 2008 for CFs in northern and central Liberia, while another one was conducted in Zwedru, Gand Gedeh County for counties in southeastern Liberia. The topics covered during the training were: measurement, using the metric system, writing or quantitative reports, recording of daily attendance, and preparation of workers payroll and attendance records so as to ensure effective implementation of project activities. Other topics covered were HIV/AIDS prevention, environmental protection, community mobilization, and project life cycle management. The workshops lasted for five (5) days each, and over 51 CFs and community leaders benefitted from the training. In addition, LACE procured and assigned on loan 15 motorbikes to the 15 CFs that were recruited and assigned supervisory and monitoring roles under the project. These motorbikes were retrieved at the end of the project and reassigned to CFs for the implementation of the YES-CW Component 1 project in the counties. At the end of the 40 working days, the beneficiaries through their organized group or a local Government authority (city mayor or town chief) were given the remaining tools so that the activities carried out under the project could continue after the project. 183 local government authorities and communities organized structures received the left-over tools after the close of the project in each community. The transfer of tools commenced on April 13, 2009 up to the end of the CfWTEP in June 2010 (LACE’s CfWTEP final report). The CEP II is audited annually by independent auditing firms in Liberia, approved by the World Bank. The auditors gave qualified opinions, and though with recommendations for strengthening internal controls, filing, and procurement. Independent procurement auditors and in-depth financial evaluators have reviewed LACE records and provided qualified opinions as well. LACE was diligent in its implementation and follow up on the recommendations from the external audits and other reviews. 6.2.3 Component III- Project Management This aspect of the project was moderately satisfactory. This is so because of two reasons: (a)Procurement capacity deficiency in LACE. LACE’s capacity to effectively handle the procurement process as required by the World Bank was weak; (b)The sudden change by the World Bank from the use of the Community Driven Development (CDD) procurement method (under the Bank O.P8) as spelled out in the original Operation Manual, the World Bank required that LACE used the World Bank’s standard procurement documents and guidelines, which were very difficult for LACE at the time. As a result, LACE lost a lot of time in 2010 and 2011 for the implementation of project. This is the main reason that LACE was not able to complete all the subprojects before the official closing of CEP II by the World Bank. No objections were not provided as quickly as 61 possible on bid documents, and the disbursement for project implementation was limited during this period. When the CEP EU Co-financing project was launched in 2009, the project’s mid-term review was held in January 2010. For almost one and a half years afterward, very little was achieved due partly to LACE’s inability to meet up with the World Bank’s new procurement requirements. Given delays in 2010 and 2011 while LACE and the World Bank reviewed the procurement process, disbursement and project implementation were delay. During the Mid Term Review, it was agreed that the procurement department be expanded with two additional procurement staff; and that the procurement department reports to the Executive Director. LACE then recruited two procurement officers to work in the department. Further, LACE requested the World Bank to field an international procurement specialist that would help in mitigating the capacity problem. With the fielding of two international procurement specialists, along with two national procurement staff, the subprojects were speedily implemented, thus enabling LACE to meet the project objectives. With respect to monitoring and supervision, LACE divided the country into four zones, and assigned its staff to monitor and supervise subproject implementation. This effort contributed to not only the quality of the subprojects implemented by contractors but also the speedy delivery of the projects. The community people were also sensitized to inform LACE staff if the contractors were not working; or if the building materials were not delivered, or being stolen. Also, even though the project was extended by two years beyond its original project period, the World Bank did not grant additional funding to LACE for operations. LACE managed to implement the project, keeping the operation cost below 13% of the grant. This was due to effective financial management of the project funds, and by charging some of the operating cost to the Government of Liberia subsidy to LACE. Project management for the CfWTEP is rated satisfactory. LACE kept the incremental operating cost below the 10% ceiling. The LACE maintains a fixed asset registry in order to account for all assets purchased with the project funds for use by the project. Project beneficiaries were issued ID cards and were paid directly by commercial bank tellers either on-site (banking hall) or off-site (on the field where the beneficiaries were working). 7.0 Social Accountability (Visibility) LACE is one of few Agencies in Liberia that works very hard in communicating to beneficiaries about their subprojects. LACE ensures that the community people are fully informed about their projects, i.e. when a subproject is completed, a sign board is erected detailing the logos of the donors (i.e. GOL, WB, EU), and LACE, project name/type, project cost, contractor and LACE. LACE operates a radio program to explain the CEP II activities in the communities to the public at large. LACE also publishes annual reports, calendars, T-shirts and flyers depicting the project and the donors. 62 For the CfWTEP, the public and community people (including the beneficiaries) were fully informed about project activities in terms of duration of the project (40 working days); payment time and process; the condition of work through the one page contract, type of activities to be implemented, payment about and timing, etc. 8.0 Challenges There were huge challenges in the implementation of this project, namely:  Procurement: LACE’s capacity to manage the WB’s procurement modalities was weak; as a result, when a decision was reached for LACE to follow the standard World Bank’s procurement rules, it was difficult; the project stalled for almost a year and half until international procurement specialists were hired and deployed at LACE. The No Objections were not given fast enough by the World Bank for contracts to be awarded.  Delays on the part of local contractors: majority of the local contractors were unable to source the required funding to implement the subproject on a timely basis. Some of the contractors took over a year to complete a six-month project. They complained of not being able to source loans from the commercial banks to start the work on time. As a result, many of the contracts had to be terminated and re-advertised. With the approval of the World Bank LACE piloted upfront payments to 18 contractors as a means to speed up project implementation. However in practice, this did not help to increase the speed of construction; and it has to be discontinued. Instead, during the last year of implementation, LACE instituted the option for materials advance to contractors. This was more successfully at increasing the rate of construction.  Bad roads/heavy rains: due to the heavy rain in most part of the year, the roads deteriorated. This was one of the main factors responsible for the delay in completing the subprojects. During the rainy season, the bridges and wells and latrines could not be done due to the high water level at the rivers, and underground. The work came to a vertical stop during the months of June- September because of the heavy rain and bad roads. For the CfWTEP, this was a major challenge especially in delivering tools in the communities in Southeastern Liberia, and monitoring project activities during the rainy season.  PMCs 10% contribution: Some PMCs did not make their 10% community contribution/work on the project, but insisted on getting petty cash or technical supervisors’ and finance officers payments. And will report to their local authorities that LACE refused to pay them. Some PMCs said LACE owes them 10% of the project grant when the project is completed even though they were trained to know that the PMCs and the community people were to make 10% contribution in kind to the projects.  Cost overrun: Because of the delay in implementing the project, the cost of building materials and transportation increased. This posed a serious financial constraint on LACE, as it is the desire of LACE to complete all 260 community subprojects that construction was begun on under CEPII.  Loss of Funds: The loss of the US$500,000.00 due to fluctuation in the exchange rate between Euros and USD, also posed a serious financial 63 constraint. LACE had to drop five (5) subprojects, including two (2) schools, from the target of 265 community subprojects. The initial exchange rate was (the exchange rate in 2010 was 1.32 Euros to 1 USD, and in 2012 the rate was 1.22 Euros to 1 USD).  Client Connection: LACE also experienced some difficulties in getting its replenishment from the World Bank, due to Client Connection error messages. For every little omission in the withdrawal application, there will be an error message. This took a lot of time and delay in disbursement.  Post Project Maintenance: Contractors and end users of subprojects do not want to maintain them but instead, will call on LACE to maintain the facilities after three (3) to five (5) years of usage.  Land Use: In the case of the market project in Sasstown, Caldwell, Montserrado County, the community people offered a piece of land for the construction of a market building. Upon completion of the building, some persons in the community claimed the land. This matter was subsequently resolved when the market provided documentary (receipts) proof that they purchased the land from the father of the claimer. This was attested to by the aunty of the fellow that was claiming the land.  Uses of subprojects: All subprojects are in use. The challenge is maintenance especially in the case of latrines. Some community people will use the latrine without cleaning it. They will discourage others from using the latrine. During the formation of the PMCs, and at training workshops, LACE will normally encourage the PMCs to organize management teams so as to ensure not only the usage of the subprojects, but also maintenance of the facilities. For the CfWTEP, there were more people showing-up than the targeted number in most communities where the recruitment was taking place. Everybody wanted to work, but many workers did not get the job, and so were disappointed. In such case, more time was spent on counseling and assuring people that they would be considered for future projects. To ensure fairness, a lottery system was used during the selection process. 9.0 Lessons Learned  Irrespective of the difficulties, the project was implemented with determination, effort, and constraint mitigation.  When a project delays, the local authorities report to their national leaders, Legislators for redress; sometimes the reaction is on radio and can be negative.  Advance payment to contractor, for most part did not yield the desire result, i.e., to speed up the implementation of the subproject. The subprojects with the worst delay records were those whose contractors received the first 30% advance payment (18 subprojects). This had to be discontinued. 64  With the introduction of the material advance as a strategy to speed-up project implementation, the result was remarkable. However, some contractors misapplied the materials and the cost had to be deducted from them.  The local authorities took ownership of the subprojects as soon as implementation is completed, sometimes with no reference to LACE. The projects are dedicated and turned over to the communities.  Work comes to a complete stop during the heavy rainy season, as well as during Christmas, New Year and the July 26 Independence Day celebrations. One can hardly get contractors to work during these festive seasons.  It is now very difficult to get community people to work free of charge on a community subproject. They will request for payment.  For all the subprojects, the local government authorities (LGAs), including the commissioners and Paramount and Clan Chiefs, Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent for Development are contacted and are involved in the identification of the project, and are informed about the subgrant, procurement and awarding of contracts. However, when there is a change and a new person is appointed, some of the new people will claim not to know about the project and will attempt to stop the project except for the intervention of the Minister of Internal Affairs or other administrator.  Information dissemination: increasing public awareness about CfWTEP activities helped to ensure confidence in the project and the achievement of the project objectives. The community people were fully informed about project activities including the type of work, duration, and the amount that they were to be paid.  Payments through the commercial banking system also ensured confidence in the project. Beneficiaries knew that they would get their “correct” payment during the payment period.  Economic empowerment of vulnerable can transform people and transfer potential conflict, violence situation into a more productive attitude, behavior, and promote social cohesion. The CfWTEP provided some level of protection for poor vulnerable household; contributed to improving food security, and access to social services/schools, clinics, markets, safe water, etc.). This contributed to integration and social cohesion in the communities.  The community people were happy with the US$3.00 per day paid to them (especially women) as wages. They made productive use of their income earned during the period of the work. The community people requested for the project to continue beyond the 40 days period.  With little money, the project contributed enormously to transforming lives in war- torn communities during the period immediately following the cessation of the Liberian civil war in 2008. It helped the vulnerable people returning to their villages and towns to settle down with some money to pay for their farming inputs and begin farming again; some used their money to rehabilitate their homes; to buy uniforms for their children. The project contributed to re-uniting families, 65 restore trust and confidence in one another again following the conflict; people that inflicted so much wounds on each other and could not speak to another began to speak again, while working together on the projects thus restoring social cohesion and community reintegration and resettlement.  Cross-organizational collaboration: some farmers used their cash benefits to purchase seed rice and begin farming again. Agriculture activities benefitted a large number of people, especially in areas where the project supported public agriculture seed bank, CARI, in Bong County. 10.0 Bank performance 10.1 World Bank Grant: The World Bank performed satisfactorily, working with the Government of Liberia (MOF) in identifying the funds and in consummating the CEP II and CfWTEP. The World Bank remitted all the grant funds to the project through the DA managed by LACE. 10.2 Procurement: The World Bank performed well by hiring and deploying international procurement specialists who helped in speeding up procurement documentations, and enabling LACE to obtain the required No Objection for the disbursement of project funding. Unlike the CEP II, there were no major procurement problems relative to the CfWTEP. 10.3 Supervision: The project supervision on the part of the Bank was effective and adequate. There was almost continuous monitoring and supervision, setting-up of timelines; holding mid-term reviews, video conferences, and regular field visits. Financial Management support and Monitoring was also very effective; which led to improved IFRs presentations. The Social and Environmental safeguards Specialist of the WB also had supervision missions, field visits and provided satisfactory capacity building support. The project was regularly reviewed and discussed with the Government (MOF), and the aide memoire with timelines were prepared and disseminated. Overall Bank performance: Satisfactory 11.0 Government The Government also performed satisfactorily by following up on the project implementation, and provided needed policy guidance through the Board of Directors that reports to the President of Liberia. 66 Annex 8. Comments of Co-Financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders The EU is in the process of preparing an evaluation of the CEPII that is to be finalized in March 2014, however, the preliminary findings so far of this assessment concur with the overall ICR ratings of Moderately Satisfactory. 67 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Backiny-Yetna, P., Q. Wodon, and G. Zampaglione, 2011. Ex Post Assessment of the Impact of Public Works in Liberia, in Q. Wodon, editor, Poverty and Human Development in Liberia, World Bank Study. Washington, DC. Backiny-Yetna, P., R. Mungai, C. Tsimpo, and Q. Wodon, 2011. Poverty in Liberia: Level, Profile, and Determinants, in Q. Wodon, editor, Poverty and Human Development in Liberia, World Bank Study, Washington, DC. International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, and African Development Fund, 2009. Joint Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Liberia for the Period FY09-FY11, Report No. 47928-LR, World Bank, Washington, DC. Making Enterprises Inc., 2010. Liberia Cash for Work Temporary Employment Project: A Qualitiative Assessment. Making Enterprises Inc., 2013. Liberia Community Empowerment Project II: Beneficiary Assessment Report. Republic of Liberia (no date). Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy. Monrovia, Liberia. Republic of Liberia, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, 2012. Agenda for Transformation: Steps Toward Liberia RISING 2030; Liberia’s Medium-Term Economic Growth and Development Strategy 2012 - 2017. Monrovia, Liberia. Ravallion, M, 1998. Appraising Workfare, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1995, Washington, DC. World Bank, various years. Aide-memoires of Supervision Missions for CEPII. 2008-2013. World Bank, various years. Implementation Status and Results Reports for CEPII. 2008-2013. World Bank, 2005. Community Cohesion in Liberia: A Post-War Rapid Social Assessment. Social Development Paper No. 21, Washington, DC. World Bank, 2007. Liberia Rapid Social Assessment. Social Development Notes: Community Driven Development, No. 107, Washington, DC. World Bank, 2007. Project Paper for a Proposed Pre-Arrears Clearance Grant in the Amount of SDR 3.3 Million (US$5.0 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Liberia for a Second Community Empowerment Project (CEPII), Report No. 39784-LR. Washington, DC. World Bank, 2008. Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Emergency Food Crisis Response Program to the Republic of Liberia from the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund for an Additional Financing Grant to the Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project (US$3.0 Million) and an Additional Financing Grant to the Community Empowerment Project II (US$3.0 Million); and a Grant for a Food Support Project for Vulnerable Women and Children (US$4.0 Million), Report No. 43788-LR, Washington, DC. 68 World Bank, 2009. Liberia: Employment and Pro-Poor Growth, Report No. 51924-LR, Washington, DC. World Bank, 2010. Rapid Technical Assessment of Completed Infrastructure under CEPI and CEPII , Washington, DC. World Bank, 2010. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of US$16.0 Million from the Africa Catalytic Growth fund (US$10.0 Million) and the Crisis Response Window (US$6.0 Million) to the Government of Liberia for the Liberia Youth, Employment, Skills Project, Report No. 53626-LR, Washington, DC. World Bank, 2011. Liberia’s Cash for Work Temporary Employment Project: Responding to Crisis in Low Income, Fragile Countries. SP Discussion Paper No. 1114, Washington, DC. World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, 2011. Liberia: World Bank Country-Level Engagement on Governance and Anti-Corruption, IEG Working Paper No. 11/8, Washington, DC. World Bank, 2012. Poverty and the Policy Response to the Economic Crisis in Liberia. Quentin Wodon (ed.), Washington, DC. World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, 2012. Liberia Country Program Evaluation: 2004- 2011, Washington, DC. 69 IBRD 33435R2 11°W 10°W 9°W 8°W 9°N 9°N LIBERIA GUINEA SIERRA To Irié LEONE To Voinjama Buedu Kolahun To Mt. Wuteve L O FA . Pendembu (1,380 m) ts M 8°N Vahun 8°N i e iz ng g To Ra i o no Kenema Gelahun g iz W Zorzor To o lo Lola . ya W ts be Yekepa Yekepa M nda G fa Via ba Nia of To im Nzérékoré N L Kongo GBARPOLU Gbalatuah Senniquellie To Danané To Ganta Karnplay Zimmi GRAND Bopolu Bo CAPE Gbarnga 7°N l Palala 7°N P au MOUNT St. Zeansue Zienzu BONG Yopie Sagleipie Tubmanburg Totota Bong Town Robertsport NIMBA CÔTE BOMI n Klay MARGIBI Botata Gloie Nu o D’IVOIRE Careysburg To hn Tapeta Tappita Toulépleu Kakata Jo St. Bensonville Tobli MONROVIA Harbel GRAND BASSA Guata Poabli Kola Town MONTSERRADO Hartford Gaamodebi Zwedru 6°N Babu 6°N RIVER CESS Buchanan Trade GRAND GEDEH Town Gonglee Dube Pyne tos Ce s Bokoa Cestos City SINOE Pelokehn Kopo Juazohn RIVER GEE AT L A N T I C OC EAN Sehnkwehn Kahnwia Kanweaken Fish Town Tawake Tawlokehn 5°N Greenville 5°N M GRAND A Nyaake Nana Kru RY K R U Barclayville LA Sasstown N LIBE R I A Grand Cess Plibo D To Tabou SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS Harper COUNTY CAPITALS NATIONAL CAPITAL 4°N RIVERS MAIN ROADS This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. 0 20 40 60 80 100 Kilometers The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information RAILROADS shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any COUNTY BOUNDARIES endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 0 20 40 60 Miles INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 10°W 9°W 8°W JULY 2007