TRANSPORT NOTES URBAN TRANSPORT THEMATIC GROUP THE WORLD BANK, WASHINGTON, DC Transport Note No. TRN-3 February 2005 Regulation of Taxi Markets in Developing Countries: Issues and Options Kenneth M. Gwilliam Taxis perform an important function in urban transport markets in both developed and developing countries. Because of the perceived vulnerability of passengers to exploitation by operators, entry to the market and fares have been tightly regulated in many industrialized countries. This has typically produced high premium values for licenses, implying some monopoly profit for operators at the expense of users. Curiously, however, total deregulation has often increased fares. This note considers the reasons for increased fares despite deregulation, the regulatory options available, and the relevant considerations in applying this experience to developing countries. THE NATURE OF THE TAXI MARKET comfort, convenience and relative speed of the taxi, as well as the demand from lower income groups for The traditional taxi is a vehicle offering point-to-point emergency and essential trips for which no public transport on demand for individuals and small parties. transport alternatives exist. There is also often a strong Formally and informally, a taxi market exists in most leisure market, typically peaking in the late evening and industrialized and developing countries. In many after midnight, when there is an absence of public developing country cities, the single-passenger taxi transportation alternatives. Long waiting times in market overlaps with the shared taxi market on a regulated regimes tend to be concentrated in this number of fixed and flexible routes (for example, in the market. Middle East and North Africa). Shared taxis can bring down unit costs through high occupancy. ORGANIZATION OF THE TAXI MARKET The conventional (non-shared) taxi market operates in Taxi services are provided by companies and individual three distinct ways: owner-operators. In many countries, including most industrialized countries, the market is dominated by through direct telephone requests to a taxi company owner-operators who act independently when cruising. In from specified fixed taxi stands only a few large cities are taxi services supplied by large by cruising to find passengers. companies. More generally, vehicle ownership and operation are fragmented, though dispatching groups and Single-passenger taxis are prevalent in low-demand radio circuits are more unified and operate at a larger markets, such as those in less-populated rural areas, and scale. It is also common, particularly in developing for journeys from dispersed residences into activity countries, for a company or an individual to own a vehicle centers. In denser urban areas, the latter two, referred to or fleet of vehicles and charge drivers a fixed monthly as "cruising" or "plying for hire," co-exist with the taxi "rent." This rental fee may cause drivers to work long market that responds to direct-telephone requests. hours. In some countries, all modes of operation are subject to In the direct-telephone taxi market, however, companies the same regulation in a single-tier system. In others, and owner-operators are often affiliated with a dual or multi-tier systems operate. The most common centralized dispatching service. This enables operators to regulatory distinction is that made between cruising, utilize their vehicles more intensively and gives which is subject to stringent controls, and direct- customers increased certainty in obtaining a taxi within a telephone taxi requests, which are regulated more short period of time by making a single call. In some liberally. In the U.K. and many European countries, there "single-tier" countries, such as Canada and New Zealand, is a consequential distinction between taxis which it is obligatory for operators to belong to a dispatching operate in both markets and private hire vehicles (PHVs) system, which offers twenty-four hour service to which can only operate in the former. In some developing customers. For company operations, separate regulatory countries, multiple tiers relate to the operational regime, requirements may apply to operators and drivers. as in La Paz, Bolivia (see annex one). Taxi services are normally self-financing, though Sweden Demand for taxi services is heterogeneous. In most subsidizes taxis in rural markets, presumably as a cities, there is a strong business trip market during cheaper option than running subsidized public buses daylight hours. This business trip market is based on the during low-demand hours. Page 2 Transport Note No. TRN-3 February 2005 THE SHARED TAXI MARKET the cruising market, namely, asymmetry of information. This has the effect of reducing the effectiveness of price The shared taxi, exemplified by both the "trufi" and the competition and bringing into play a process through normal taxi in La Paz, Bolivia, but found in different forms which the quantity of supply and fares exceed what in many developing country cities, falls between the might be considered socially optimum. traditional taxi and the public transport markets. The shared taxi sector, sometimes legal and sometimes The argument is as follows: In a cruising cab market, illegal, typically offers services that are quicker and more customers typically do not know how frequently a taxi direct than normal bus service, though usually at a will pass. Moreover, if fares are unregulated and can vary premium price. This sector often overlaps with, and can between taxis, patrons will not know whether to accept be indistinguishable from, small minibus services. Shared or reject the first and subsequent fares offered. Hence, taxi services tend to develop and expand in times of most patrons will take the first taxi that stops, regardless economic recession and high unemployment, exemplified of price. Under these circumstances, taxi drivers might by the proliferation of "remises" in Buenos Aires after the not benefit from offering lower fares in hopes of economic crisis. increasing patronage. There will be no downward pressure on prices through the taxi hiring process. Public transport operators tend to view the shared taxi Moreover, new entrants into the market reduce the and minibus sectors as undesirable competition since number of fares a taxi can obtain (assuming that demand they attract patrons who would otherwise use traditional is relatively inelastic to the level of supply). As a bus services. Yet the very fact that they can attract consequence, taxi drivers may in turn increase fares to passengers demonstrates that they are providing a protect total earnings since this will not significantly differentiated service that some passengers value more affect the level of patronage. If, however, fares rise to a highly than traditional public transport services. For that level that makes the taxi business seem profitable, more reason, it would be advisable to consider carefully the entrants will be attracted. As a result, occupancy rates benefits and costs of all transport options, in the context will reduce further, fares will rise further, and the cycle of a broader public transport regulatory strategy, before continues. resorting to an outright ban on the shared taxi sector. Fortunately, there are limits to this cycle, especially in ADMINISTRATION OF TAXI REGULATION areas where several types of taxi services exist. As fares for cruising taxis rise, patrons may begin telephoning taxi In non-federal countries, taxi regulation is usually the companies and comparing rates. Shared taxis services subject of national laws administered at the local, county are also likely to attract patrons unwilling or unable to and municipality levels. Political control often rests with a pay the higher single-passenger prices of cruising taxis. committee of a local council, with enforcement through Moreover, in cities such as Lima and Bangkok where the normal policing arrangements. Vehicle examination, often number of taxis is high, the frequency of taxi arrivals requiring standards distinct from those of ordinary makes it possible for customers to bargain. Under these passenger cars, is also undertaken locally. circumstances, required regulation may relate more to congestion and the disturbances associated with Local administration often permits regulation that competition for passengers than the charging of high responds to local needs. However, for transport issues, it fares. is important that geographic areas under regulation be sufficiently large to ensure there are enough patrons for In principle, where taxis are required to operate from the number of taxis and competitors do not cross over designated ranks or stands, it should be easier, in theory, from neighboring jurisdictions and operate without for passengers to respond to fare differentials. In regulation. Restrictions on picking up passengers in areas practice, however, "first in, first out" conventions at taxi outside a taxi's licensing zone create difficulties for stands undermines the competitive process, making taxi drivers and patrons. However, the absence of restrictions stand systems and prices similar to those of the cruising in operating out of an area of registration encourages taxi market. operators to register where conditions are most liberal. This undermines the effective regulation of service The direct-telephone taxi market is potentially free from quality. It is therefore desirable that regulatory areas be the information failure problem. Passengers can shop fairly large and self-contained to minimize cross- around to compare fares. This can be facilitated if there is boundary activities. In metropolitan areas, it is thus an obligation to publish a fare schedule (boarding important that regulation be administered at the charges plus rate per mile and/or per minute) and quote metropolitan level. In federal countries, such as the U.S., rates for standard trips, for example, as in Sweden. The taxi regulation may be a state prerogative, with the disadvantages of this system are the time and costs effect that very different regulatory regimes co-exist incurred in shopping around, especially if there are many within the same country (Teal and Berglund, 1987). small operators. Therefore, the direct-telephone taxi market tends to be dominated by medium to large THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF TAXI MARKETS companies and dispatch associations. The main risk in this market is that there will not be enough companies in the market for competition to be effective. Given the large number of customers and suppliers, the taxi market appears, prima facie, to be a classical case of As a result of the differences in the way each taxi market a perfectly competitive market requiring no economic functions, many countries adopt a liberal approach to regulation. In practice, however, it has been argued that regulating fares and entry in the direct-telephone taxi there is an important element of market failure present in market and a stricter approach with respect to cruising. Page 3 Transport Note No. TRN-3 February 2005 REGULATION OF THE TAXI MARKET Provision of information to first-time users of a city's taxi system is important to address the asymmetry of Governments in industrialized countries often have information and the frequently-voiced concerns of enacted taxi market regulations when concerned about tourists and other occasional users who get "taken for a the vulnerability of passengers to fraud and mistreatment ride." Fare regulations can take different forms: by unscrupulous taxi drivers and companies. Concerns about taxi domination of heavy traffic flows that lead to obligatory tariffs: to be observed at all times urban congestion are also a major issue, especially now posted tariffs: to be determined by the operator, but in many large Chinese cities. Schreiber (1975) argues once declared and posted in the vehicle, to be the that regulation is necessary to secure stability of supply maximum chargeable by ensuring that "serious" long-term providers of taxi maximum tariffs: to be declared and shown, but services stay in business. Protecting long-term providers subject to downward negotiation. from temporary market entrants during recessions when other employment opportunities are limited provides Arrangements that allow price variation by day and time stability in taxi service provision. As a result of such of day may be legitimate from both demand and supply arguments, markets have been tightly regulated. sides. For example, in some countries, where fares are negotiated rather than controlled, fares may increase Regulation of taxi markets typically relate to the during bad weather. While such opportunistic fare following: increases may be unacceptable in situations where the customer is in a position of weakness, scheduled quantity of supply: specified in terms of the number variations, such as those for late nights and weekends, of operators or number of vehicles might be both acceptable and economic. quality of supply: including the quality of the vehicle, the financial capability of the operator, the While quality regulation is applied in most countries, in competence and trustworthiness of the driver, and industrialized countries, quantity and fare regulation vary sometimes the efficiency of the dispatching widely (table one). arrangements fares: either in terms of fixed or maximum tariff Table 1. Taxi Regulation in Industrialized Countries schedules. FARES Quantity regulation is applied in many jurisdictions in the form of limiting the number of licenses available at any Deregulated Regulated time. In the U.K., limitations originated when traffic Deregulated Sweden Ireland congestion was perceived to be the result of a proliferation of taxi licenses. In industrialized countries, New Zealand Netherlands taxis rarely dominate traffic flows, though this is not the Few U.S. cities Some U.S. cities case in developing countries. For example, eighty percent ENTRY Some U.K. cities of the vehicles circulating in central La Paz, Bolivia are Regulated Norway Canada public transport vehicles, mostly some form of taxi. Some U.S. cities Larger Chinese cities are especially vulnerable to congestion caused by public transport vehicles. Some U.K. cities In industrialized countries, arguments for quantity Where all factors ­ quantity, quality and fares - are regulation now tend to focus on limiting quantity to regulated simultaneously, as was the case in most maintain quality and achieve sufficiently high utilization industrialized countries for many years, the license to rates to keep down fares per carriage. operate (referred to in some countries as a "medallion" and in others as a "plate") became a valuable asset. In Quality regulation is important because passengers some countries, operating licenses became directly and cannot easily ascertain the safety and security of taxi indirectly tradable, often at a premium. The premium services offered. Quality regulation typically covers the represents broadly the capitalized value of the expected vehicle, the driver and (less commonly) the actual vehicle future profit flows associated with protection from free owner. For vehicles, regulations frequently cover market entry. In the U.K., the average license premium passenger space, minimum engine power, age limits, in areas subject to quantity regulation is $30,000, though emissions and safety tests (usually more frequent than the amount can reach $100,000. In Hong Kong and some those for private cars), vehicle identification, and regulated U.S. markets, the premium value of the license metering. For drivers, regulations often require a criminal is even higher. Observation of these high artificial background check, a rigorous medical examination, a premiums has led many industrialized countries to minimum age and/or level of driving experience, and liberalize regulation. adequate geographical knowledge of the area in which they intend to operate. Proprietors may also be required Even in cruising, where the case for economic regulation to have a clean criminal record and carry appropriate is strongest, optimal regulations are difficult to identify. comprehensive insurance for their taxi operations. There may be a trade-off between waiting times, which can decrease as the taxi supply increases, and fares, Fare regulation is generally applied to protect passengers which might increase as occupancy rates decline. The from exploitation due to the dispersed nature of effect of increased supply and reduced waiting times transactions, the asymmetry of information in the tends to benefit peak-period passengers, while fare cruising market, and the administrative difficulties of increases affect all. There may also be a differential effect providing for differential access to crowded taxi stands. between business users, who tend to use taxis during the Page 4 Transport Note No. TRN-3 February 2005 day, and leisure users, whose demand is concentrated at stands on weekends. As in Sweden, a large night. Determining the optimal level of supply requires proportion of rural trips are subsidized. information about the elasticity of demand with respect In the U.K., the intent to deregulate entry was to changes in fares and waiting times and involves frustrated in many cities by a loophole which allowed judgments on the value different individuals place on authorities to continue to restrict entry unless there time. Beesley and Glaister have argued that writing was evidence of significant unmet demand. Hence, regulations requiring the evaluation of such detailed and changes have been muted, and the issue is under fluctuating information requirements would be so reconsideration. demanding that it is better not to intervene at all. In Norway, the supply has increased, especially for nights and weekends. Differential fare increases THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DEREGULATION were implemented to attract service suppliers at those times. Toner and Mackie (1992) have argued that it is possible In Canada, where the concern was with quality and to make a welfare assessment of taxi regulatory systems fares and entry continues to be controlled, increases by examining changes in waiting times, fares, and service in mandated quality have resulted in fare increases. quality in countries that have deregulated. The British In the U.S., where there is local discretion on Office of Fair Trading (OFT) studied recent deregulation licensing policy, fares have increased wherever entry experiences. The findings are summarized in table two. or fares have been deregulated. Despite these national differences, some general Table 2: The Effects of Regulatory Change conclusions on regulatory systems can be reached. As might be expected, when entry is liberalized, supply increases to a degree that depends on the rigidity with Regulation EFFECTS OF CHANGE ON which supply was previously controlled. New small Post- Country entrants to the industry tend to focus on cruising, while Reform Supply Fares Quality deregulation of the direct-telephone taxi market tends to increase the size of existing firms and associations in the Sweden Large Initial + Little market. In rural areas and thin markets, however, taxi + Then 0 Change supply tends to increase less than in dense urban All New + Rural + + markets. If cruising continues to be controlled when Deregulated Zealand 160% Urban 0 entry is deregulated, PHVs will continue to complement taxis in the direct-telephone market, but they may also Some U.S. Large + Stable enter the cruising market on a full-time or part-time + (peak hours) basis. The British Office of Fair Trading Ireland + N/A + review thus concluded that quantity controls reduced 100% availability and limited mode of transport, increased waiting times, and had adverse impacts upon safety since Entry Free The + Initial + + illegal and unregulated operators picked up excess Fares Netherlands Later - demand at peak times (the late night leisure market in Regulated the U.K.). This suggests that deregulation from quantity U.K. Small N/A Small control will usually increase the welfare of taxi users. + + Some U.S. + + Stable The main argument against that conclusion arises where Fares Norway 0 Initial + + heavy congestion is caused by taxis. Under those Deregulated Night circumstances, the reduced waiting times associated with Entry Then 0 increased supply might be offset by slower speeds and Regulated Some U.S. 0 + Stable increased journey times. Even in these circumstances, however, it is important to attempt an empirical All Canada 0 + + assessment of the balance between the countervailing Regulated Some U.S. 0 0 N/A effects, rather than simply assuming that any contribution to congestion from taxis is an automatic The outcomes reveal the following: warrant for quantity regulation. The combination of empirical evidence on the relationship between waiting In Sweden, the direct-telephone taxi market times and taxi volume (examined in the OFT review) and dominates and more than half of all trips are an urban traffic model can be used to make this government subsidized, especially in rural areas. The assessment. This suggests that where taxis contribute to cost of subsidies rose substantially. Curiously, congestion, a careful study of total journeys and waiting although waiting times decreased, surveys revealed times should be undertaken to determine to what extent, no change in consumer satisfaction. if any, quantity control is justified. In New Zealand, supply increases were concentrated in urban areas and fares were little affected. As with the consideration of quantity controls in the Whereas in rural areas, supply fell and fares rose. traditional taxi market, the main disadvantage of the In Ireland, where the taxi stand and cruising markets shared taxi market arises where it attracts an increased dominate in major cities, the supply increase was number of larger vehicles that significantly increase particularly large, but the PHV-sector declined. congestion. That is most likely to be the case for services In the Netherlands, where changes were phased in, in central areas of larger cities. Careful analysis may the increase in quality is most noticeable in taxi suggest that the external, congestion, costs are sufficiently great to justify some restrictive regulatory Page 5 Transport Note No. TRN-3 February 2005 policy. The appraisal of the case for restraint of the tightening of quality controls and increased enforcement, shared taxi market should therefore take a similar form especially with respect to the quality of vehicles and of cost-benefit appraisal to that suggested for quantity drivers. controls on the traditional taxi market. Wherever entry has been deregulated, the value of an If the conclusions of such studies are that some quantity existing license plate falls to a level determined by the control is justified, then it is likely that the immediate administrative charges made for the issue of a new one. effect will be to increase the profitability of taxi operation The U.K. OFT concluded that, as licenses could not legally and generate a premium value for a taxi license. Part of be bought and sold, there was no need to attenuate the the benefit of the restraint will thus leak as a windfall policy of deregulation on that account. But in situations gain to existing license holders. Another way of viewing where licenses could be traded, and even in situations this is that fares will tend to be higher than necessary to where they had been traded on a large scale in the past, secure the desired volume of supply. There are two main the impact on the welfare of low-income people might be ways of trying to ensure that benefits accrue to the public significant. Where the distributional impact was seen to rather than to the operators, namely: be strongly adverse, this could be attenuated by phasing in the change over a substantial period (perhaps by Attempting to control fares at a level which prevents auctioning defined tranches of licenses each year until no the emergence of a premium on licenses new entrants offered to buy the licenses). It would be Auctioning licenses of fixed duration of validity prudent to examine the distributional impacts of (perhaps three years) so that the excess profit immediate quantity deregulation. accrues to the municipal coffers. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING Neither of these is likely to be easy. The first poses a COUNTRIES considerable burden of information collection. The second introduces the need for an administrative procedure which may give scope for corruption (though a rather Both the theoretical and empirical considerations suggest similar system has been applied successfully to the some recommendations for developing countries: limitation of certificates of entitlement to purchase private automobiles in Singapore). The conclusion is that Taxi regulation needs to be tailored to local wherever quantity licensing is applied for congestion problems, objectives and market conditions, with the reasons, it should be accompanied by carefully greatest attention paid to behavior in the cruising considered policies on fare regulation or charging for market. licenses. Quality control regulations should cover vehicles (safety and emissions) and drivers (good character, When both entry and fares are deregulated, international safe driving skills, good health and geographical experience shows that fares tend to rise. This increase is knowledge). highest where demand is low (in rural areas) or the In the cruising market, neither total regulation (fare competitive process most constrained by market failures and entry) nor total deregulation is likely to be as (in cruising, and particularly at ranks). In contrast, prices effective as partial regulation involving fare control tend to become differentiated by time of day (for accompanied by quality-controlled free-entry. example, late night surcharges) and location (with the Where quantity control is deemed necessary to development of fixed fare systems for high demand reduce congestion, tight price control and/or locations such as airports). This suggests that continued competitive tendering of annual operating licenses regulation of fares is necessary to prevent the adverse should also be implemented. effects of total deregulation. Strong enforcement capability is necessary to maintain quality. Some aspects of quality, such as waiting times for service Where liberalization of a previously strict regulation or probability of getting a successful hire with a single is involved, it may be necessary to undertake the lib- telephone call, are a function of supply quantity. For eralization gradually, paying attention to the effects example, when entry to the market was deregulated in on the livelihood of poorer individual operators. Ireland, the average size of companies in the direct- In cities where taxis contribute significantly to air telephone markets increased and the success rate in pollution, tight environmental controls should be phone bookings increased. Other aspects of quality, such considered, taking into account the demonstrated as driver performance, is independent of quantity control, local availability and capability of maintaining cleaner but tends to fall over time and become difficult to enforce technology and cleaner fuel vehicles. in a deregulated market. In some countries, such as The position of shared taxi services should be Canada, the main emphasis of taxi policy in recent years assessed in light of a broader public transport has been on quality enhancement. Hence, either full or regulatory strategy, allowing for the benefits of a partial deregulation needs to be accompanied by the differentiated supply, but full taking into account the external congestion costs. Page 6 Transport Note No. TRN-3 February 2005 ANNEX ONE: TAXI REGULATION IN LA PAZ, BOLIVIA The applicability of the main conclusions of this paper to To limit congestion, the Municipality of La Paz restricts developing countries can be exemplified by reference to vehicle entry to the central area using license plate the situation in La Paz, Bolivia (Vasquez Blacud, 2004) numbers. Bolivian Police control operation in the streets and enforce vehicle safety regulations and driving The metropolitan area of La Paz consists of two main behavior. They are responsible for ensuring proper municipalities with a combined population of 1.5 million. maintenance of vehicles according to the law. The La Paz city is the industrial, economic and financial Superintendancy of Telecommunications grants center of the country, while the town of El Alto is a frequency licenses for radio taxis. largely residential satellite. Because of a certain degree of concurrency in decree The total vehicle stock of the metropolitan area is about provisions, there are inter-institutional agreements 150,000, of which nearly 25,000 are public transport between the Superintendance and the municipalities vehicles (including over 9,000 taxis). Most of the buses clarifying the allocation of functions (see Vasquez Blacud are small, with 14 to 21 seats. However, public for details). There are also institutional agreements with transport, including taxis, serves 93 percent of total the operators association relating to taxi traffic daily trips and accounts for 80 percent of the vehicles management and control and the provision of public circulating in the central area of the metropolis. road infrastructure. There are three classes of taxi service, all provided by The regulatory regime in operation thus consists of the same type of four-seat vehicle: freedom of access to the market associated with fairly tight fare and quality regulation. This results in a well- The radio taxi, supplied almost entirely through differentiated set of services meeting different types of telephone hiring, provides conventional door-to-door demand, with a high level of taxi service availability. The individual hiring services and is used mainly by upper radio taxi in particular is viewed as a safe, reliable and and middle income groups for a wide range of journeys. comfortable service, while the trufi and normal taxis are Radio taxis have a low average utilization of 0.6 viewed as lower in quality, but more economical. passengers per vehicle during the day, with higher utilization at night when other means of public transport The main problems perceived concern the contribution are scarce. that taxis make to congestion and environmental The normal taxi operates to a destination determined by degradation in city centers. Despite license plate the first passenger, but the vehicle can stop to pick up restrictions (applied to all vehicles) stricter traffic other passengers going in the same direction. These volume control is still being sought. taxis are used by medium to high income people and lower income passengers traveling to work and with luggage. Taxis have an average occupancy of 1.2 TO LEARN MORE passengers per vehicle. The "trufi" operates on fixed lines, though with 590 such An extensive discussion of taxi market issues and recent lines, it is often possible to get effective door-to-door international experience in taxi market regulation are service. "Trufis" carry mainly worker from suburbs to contained in the recent report on taxi regulation town centers. Trufis have an occupancy average of 2.8 published by the U.K. Office of Fair Trading, accessible passengers per vehicle. at: All classes of service have free access, established by a http://www.oft.gov.uk/Market+studies/Studies/taxis.ht supreme decree of 1987, though there is still a strong m union presence through the Chauffeurs Confederation of Bolivia. However, there is strong quality and price Cairns, R.D. and C Liston-Heyes. 1996. "Competition control. and Regulation in the Taxi Industry." Journal of Public Economics 59 (1) pp1-15. A national body, the Superintendance of Transportation, part of the sectoral regulation organization SIRESE, Beesley, M.E. and S. Glaister. 1983. "Information for grants vehicle authorizations to operate, establish Regulating: the Case of Taxis." Economic Journal 93, pp technical standards, process all complaints, and enforce 594-615. standards. Radio taxis must not exceed five years of age. The Superintendance also approves the maximum Schreiber, C. 1975. "The Economic Reasons for Price prices and tariffs for all transport modes "trufis" and and Entry Regulations of Taxicabs." Journal of Transport normal taxis currently have maximum flat fares of 40 Economics and Policy 9 (3), pp 268-293. U.S. cents per trip, while radio taxis have distance- related reference tariffs of 2 to 15 times higher. Teal, R.F. and M. Berglund. 1987. "The Impacts of Taxicab Deregulation in The United States." Journal of Other authorities have some contingent or concurrent Transport Economics and Policy 21 (1), pp 37-56. powers. The Municipal Governments of La Paz and El Alto are responsible for traffic management, Toner, J. 1996. "English Experience of Deregulation of establishing operational standards, and determining the the Taxi Industry" Transportation Review 16 (1), pp 79- number and location of routes for fixed route services. 94. Page 7 Transport Note No. TRN-3 February 2005 Toner, J. and P.J. Mackie. 1992. "The Economics of Transport Notes are available on-line at: Taxicab Regulation: A Welfare Assessment." Paper http://www.worldbank.org/transport/publicat/tdinflst.ht presented to the 6th World Conference on Transport m Research. Urban Infrastructure Notes are available on-line at: Vasquez Blacud, J. 2004. Analysis of the Regulation http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/urban/publicat/pub System and the Market of Taxi Services in the City of La _note.htm Paz. The World Bank. Urban Notes are available on-line at: Transport Infrastructure Notes are available on-line http://www.worldbank.org/urban/upgrading/urban- at: notes.htm http://www.worldbank.org/transport/publicat/pubs_tp&t n.htm