Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00001384 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-43770, IDA-44400) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 10.7 MILLION (US$16.5 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF BOLIVIA FOR AN EMERGENCY RECOVERY AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROJECT March 30, 2014 Sustainable Development Department LC6 Country Management Unit Latin America and Caribbean Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective January 13, 2014) Currency Unit = Bolivian Boliviano US$ 1.00 = BOB 6.73 US$ 1.00 = SDR 0.65 FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS Country Assistance Strategy CPS Country Partnership Strategy EA Environmental Assessment ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean EMP Environment Management Plan ERDMP Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project ERL Emergency Recovery Loan FM Financial Management FPS National Fund for Productive and Social Investment, Fondo Nacional de Inversión Productiva y Social FY Fiscal year GDP Gross Domestic Product GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery GoB Government of Bolivia IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IFR Interim Financial Report ISN Interim Strategy Note MPD Ministry of Planning for Development, Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo OP/BP Operational Policy/ Bank Procedure PCU Project Coordination and Management Unit PPCR Pilot Program for Climate Resilience PRRES National Plan for Sustainable Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación y Reconstrucción Sostenible SENAMHI National Meteorology and Hydrology Service, Servicio Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SINAGER National Information System on Risk Management, Sistema Nacional Integrado de Información para la Gestión del Riesgo SISRADE National System for Risk Reduction and Disaster and Emergency Response, Sistema Nacional para la Reducción de Riesgos y Atención de Desastres y/o Emergencias SNID National Information System for Sustainable Development, Sistema Nacional de Información para el Desarrollo Sostenible UPRRD Unit for Disaster Risk Prevention and Reduction, Unidad de Prevención y Reducción de Riesgos de Desastres VIDECI Vice Ministry of Civil Defense, Viceministerio de Defensa Civil VPC Vice Ministry for Planning and Coordination, Viceministerio de Planificación y Coordinación VPTA Vice Ministry of Territorial Planning and the Environment, Viceministerio de Planificación Territorial y Ambiental VIPFE Vice Ministry of Public Investment and External Financing, Viceministerio de Inversión Pública y Financiamiento Externo Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy Acting Country Director: Livia Benavides Sector Manager: Anna Wellenstein Project Team Leader: Armando E. Guzmán Escobar ICR Team Leader: Armando E. Guzmán Escobar BOLIVIA EMERGENCY RECOVERY AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROJECT CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information........................................................................................................ i B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................... i C. Ratings Summary ........................................................................................................ i D. Sector and Theme Codes ........................................................................................... ii E. Bank Staff ................................................................................................................... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ..................................................................................... iii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs .................................................................. vii H. Restructuring ........................................................................................................... viii I. Disbursement Profile .................................................................................................. ix Main Document 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................................. 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 11 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 17 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 17 6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 20 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners............... 21 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 22 Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 24 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 29 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes................. 33 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................... 35 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 36 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 39 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 53 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 54 Annex 10. Map.................................................................................................................. 56 A. Basic Information Emergency Recovery Country: Bolivia Project Name: and Disaster Management Project Project ID: P106449 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-43770, IDA-44400 ICR Date: 12/23/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: BOLIVIA Original Total XDR 10.7M Disbursed Amount: XDR 5.73M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 6.08M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD) Vice Ministry of Civil Defense (VIDECI) National Fund for Productive and Social Investment (FPS) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 10/18/2007 Effectiveness: 12/11/2008 12/11/2008 06/28/2012 Appraisal: 10/26/2007 Restructuring (s): 03/07/2013 09/26/2013 Mid-term Approval: 12/20/2007 10/29/2010 Review: Closing: 06/30/2011 09/30/2013 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory i C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Implementing Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Supervision: Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating Performance any) Potential Problem Project Yes Quality at Entry (QEA): None at any time (Yes/No): Problem Project at any Quality of Supervision Yes None time (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 18 18 General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 23 23 Housing construction 23 23 Roads and highways 23 23 Sub-national government administration 13 13 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Natural disaster management 67 67 Other urban development 33 33 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy Pamela Cox Country Director: Livia M. Benavides Carlos Felipe Jaramillo Sector Manager: Anna Wellenstein Anna Wellenstein Project Team Leader: Armando Eduardo Guzman Escobar Joaquin Toro ICR Team Leader: Armando Eduardo Guzman Escobar ICR Primary Author: Claudia Soto Orozco, Steven Anderson ii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The 2008 Financing Agreement stipulates that “the objectives of the Project are: (i) to support the Recipient in the implementation of its National Plan for Sustainable Rehabilitation and Reconstruction following the El Niño 2006-2007 event; and (ii) to strengthen the Recipient's ability to respond to future adverse natural events.” Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) There were no changes to the original PDO throughout the life of the Project. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Values Formally Actual Value Achieved Baseline Indicator (from Revised at Completion or Target Value approval Target Values Years documents) Indicator 1: A1. Number of infrastructure facilities restored. Value Quantitative or 0 180 225 244 Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 05-15-2013 09-30-2013 Comments Target surpassed (109% achieved). The target of 225 restored infrastructure (Incl. % of facilities was surpassed, attaining 244 by Project closure. achievement) Indicator 2: A2. Number of beneficiaries with restored access. Value (Quantitative 0 236,233 406,181 446,156 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 05-15-2013 09-30-2013 Target surpassed (109% achieved). The target 406,181 beneficiaries with Comments restored access was surpassed, attaining 446,156 by Project closure Extension (Incl. % of of the Project’s final closing date allowed the completion of works benefiting achievement) an additional 39,975 individuals. Indicator 3: B1. Disaster Risk Management Units established in 9 target sectors. Value (Quantitative 0 9 9 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Achieved. Nine target sector DRM Units were established. In line with a more Comments integrated DRM approach, the GoB revised the list of sectors for which to (Incl. % of establish DRM Units, and incorporated these units within the Planning achievement) Departments located in each ministry. iii Indicator 4: B2. Disaster Risk Management Units established in 9 departments. Value (Quantitative or 0 9 9 Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Achieved. DRM Units were established in nine departments. Some of these Comments take the form of an administrative office, others as a technical department or a (Incl. % of focal point (an individual). These Units strengthen national and sub-national achievement) DRM planning by providing differentiated approaches and data particular to local contexts. Indicator 5: B3. Disaster Risk Management Units staff trained. Value (Quantitative or 0 100% 100% Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Achieved. DRM Unit trainings benefit more than 500 staff. DRM Unit Comments personnel received instruction on risk management, preventative measures, (Incl. % of and vulnerability in more than 20 different training courses and workshops, in achievement) addition to an online risk management course. Indicator 6: B4. Disaster Risk Management Units staff fully paid by respective entities. Value (Quantitative or 0 100% 100% Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Comments Achieved. Staff of DRM Units at sectoral and departmental levels are fully (Incl. % of paid by their respective institutions. achievement) B5. Submission by all 9 sectors of sectoral risk management strategies to Indicator 7: MPD. Value (Quantitative or 0 9 6 Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Partially achieved. Six out of the nine sector strategies were produced. The Comments number of sector strategies was modified to 8 by the GoB and 2 were partially (Incl. % of completed by the closing of the Project. However, this modification was not achievement) reflected in a formal restructuring. iv (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)1 Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Target Values documents) Years COMPONENT 1: Strengthening The National System for Risk Management A. Recommendations for a National Risk Management System submitted to the Indicator 1: MPD for consideration. Value (Quantitative 0 100% 100% or Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Comments Achieved. MPD received recommendations for a National Risk Management (Incl. % of System more capable of assessing and addressing Bolivia’s DRM challenges. achievement) B1. Number of territories implementing pilot projects that integrate risk Indicator 2: management concepts. Value (Quantitative or 0 2 1 1 Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 05-15-2013 09-30-2013 Achieved. A territory of Oruro integrated risk management concepts in its Comments departmental land planning. The approach and results of their pilot project (Incl. % of enabled the MPD’s Territorial Planning Unit to incorporate DRM as one of its achievement) key transversal themes. B2. Draft of legislation for incorporation of risk management in territorial Indicator 3: planning submitted to the MPD for consideration. Value (Quantitative 0 100% 50% or Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Partially achieved. MPD received recommendations for a draft of legislation for incorporation of risk management in territorial planning which was implemented Comments by Oruro Department (this is in line with the 2010 Autonomy and (Incl. % of Decentralization that mandates departments to implement territorial planning). achievement) The MPD is planning to apply the methodology used in Oruro for territorial planning exercises in other departments. C2. Percentage of trainees scoring above 75% in skills test administered post Indicator 4: training in risk prevention and vulnerability reduction at the sectoral and departmental levels. Value (Quantitative 0 100% 100% or Qualitative) 1 The 2012 Project restructuring cancelled the following indicators: C1 (Draft legislation for vulnerability reduction in public investments); E (Draft national risk financing strategy); and F (Draft legislation for recovery operations). In addition, the core indicator C (Number of kilometers of rural roads rehabilitated) was added in Component 2. v Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Achieved. Capacities in risk prevention and vulnerability reduction are re- Comments (Incl. % enforced at sectoral and departmental levels. Capacity building trainings for data of achievement) management, risk assessment, and integration to GeoNode was carried out with participants scoring over 75% in the post training tests. Indicator 5: D1. Development support provided for the National Information System (SNID). Value (Quantitative 0 100% 100% or Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Achieved. ERDMP development support enabled SINAGER (National Information System on Risk Management, which replaced SNID) to improve Comments linkages and access to information necessary to DRM-related planning by (Incl. % of consolidating risk-related information from multiple sectors, making it achievement) accessible (GeoNode platform), and on generation of data at local (departmental) levels. D2. Development support provided for the National Meteorology and Hydrology Indicator 6: Service (SENAMHI). Value (Quantitative 0 100% 100% or Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Achieved. ERDMP development support enabled SENAMHI to increase its forecasting capability, update, standardize, and centralize data from its Comments meteorological stations, develop new data collection methodologies and (Incl. % of climatologic index for risk assessment, make data accessible via the GeoNode achievement) platform, improving linkages and access to information systems necessary to DRM-related planning. D3. Percentage of trained territorial planning vice ministry personnel in 9 target Indicator 7: sectors responding above 75% to skills test administered post training. Value (Quantitative 0 100% 100% or Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Achieved. Risk management capacity was re-enforced for territorial planning Comments vice ministry personnel. A series of capacity building trainings for risk (Incl. % of management in territorial planning was carried out with participants scoring over achievement) 75% in the post-training tests. G. Risk management strengthened in sectors. Percentage of trainees scoring Indicator 8: above 75% in skills test administered post-training in risk prevention and vulnerability reduction in sectoral risk management units. Value (Quantitative 0 100% 50% or Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Partially achieved. SENAMHI, SINAGER and VPC conducted workshops and Comments trainings on risk prevention and vulnerability reduction for sectoral risk (Incl. % of management unit personnel. More than 200 staffers successfully completed the achievement) courses, however post-training testing was not applied to grading of outcomes. vi COMPONENT 2: Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Small Mitigation Works A. Percentage of affected population reporting improved access to basic Indicator 9: infrastructure in 5 regions (through standard citizen report cards issued once works implementation has begun). Value (Quantitative 0 100% 100% or Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Comments (Incl. % Achieved. All citizen report cards confirmed that access to basic infrastructure of achievement) was improved. B. Citizen report cards and team supervision visits to random sample sites will Indicator 10: also report on quality of improved infrastructure. Value (Quantitative or 0 100% 100% Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Comments Achieved. Citizen report cards and regular team supervision visits to a (Incl. % of representative, randomly selected sample of subprojects confirmed the good achievement) quality of infrastructure. Indicator 11: C. Numbers of kilometers of rural roads rehabilitated. Value (Quantitative or 200 200 331 Qualitative) Date achieved 12-04-2007 06-30-2012 09-30-2013 Comments Target surpassed, 160% achieved. The target of 200 kilometers of rural roads (Incl. % of rehabilitated was surpassed, attaining 331 kilometers by Project closure. achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 01/23/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 Moderately 2 10/16/2008 Satisfactory 0.00 Unsatisfactory 3 01/29/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.50 4 07/22/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.18 5 12/10/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.94 6 05/30/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.42 7 02/22/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.03 8 09/27/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.26 9 05/07/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.69 10 11/17/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.48 11 06/20/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.09 12 10/18/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.38 vii H. Restructuring 2008 Additional Financing. Approved by the Board on June 5, 2008, signed on November 18, 2008, and effective on June 22, 2009, the AF provided additional funding to support the GoB’s reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts to address adverse effects of La Niña. The Original Credit increased by SDR 2.7 million (US$4.2 million equivalent) representing 25 percent of the new total Credit (Original Credit + AF) of SDR 10.7 million (US$16.5 million equivalent). The AF expanded the ERDMP to (i) geographically scale up small rehabilitation, reconstruction, and mitigation works to cover the five prioritized areas of the original project, and (ii) rehabilitate the productive capacity to cover the affected communities. June 2012 Project Restructuring. The Level Two restructuring approved on June 28, 2012 included: (i) reallocation of funds within subcomponents under Components 1 and 2; (ii) complete and partial cancellation of some subcomponents under Component 1; and (iii) extension of the Project closing date from June 30, 2012, until May 15, 2013. The reason for the changes made within Component 1 was the GoB’s use of other funds to implement the activities (see Section 1.7). These modifications did not trigger changes in safeguard category or in the PDO. February 2013 Project Restructuring. A second Level Two restructuring approved on March 7, 2013 included the extension of the Project closing date from May 15, 2013 to September 30, 2013. The principal reason for this was to permit completion of the Alpacoma Basin integrated management study. September 2013 Project Restructuring. A third Level Two restructuring approved on September 26, 2013 cancelled SDR 0.7 million (US$1.1 million equivalent) due to the fact that certain civil works could not be contracted and completed before the Project closing date.. See Annex 1 for a detailed table on Credit evolution. viii US S Millions C) (J1 .... C) .... (J1 2001 Q4 ' 2009 Q2 I. Disbursement Profile 2009 Q4 2010 Q2 0 ~. IQ = !!. 2010 Q4 ., ix 0 2011 Q2 3 !!. < ;:IC 2011 Q4 ,. < Ill ,. Q. 2012 Q2 I I )> :l 2013 Q2 c !!. 2013 Q4 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Country Context. At the time of appraisal in 2007, the Bolivian economy recorded a favorable performance, with a steady growth of the hydrocarbons and mining sectors at 10 and 5.2 percent respectively. Bolivia also experienced a significant current account surplus (12.8 percent of GDP) as well as a budget surplus of 1.7 percent of GDP. Additionally, between 2005 and 2007 public investment in infrastructure increased by 36 percent. Official estimates projected economic growth at around 5 percent for 2007 However, due to devastating floods affecting the agricultural sector that year GDP growth rate reached only 4.6 percent.2 2. Bolivia is highly exposed to adverse natural conditions, a situation exacerbated by an important proportion of the poor living in vulnerable areas. The 2006–07 El Niño3 phenomenon produced exceptionally high rainfall which, coupled with inadequate maintenance of infrastructure, led to inundation, landslides, and flash floods. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimated that the El Niño event affected 258,460 individuals and that its aggregate economic impact in losses and damages was US$443 million,4 almost 4 percent of Bolivia’s 2007 GDP. In March 2007, the Bank reallocated US$8 million from the Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (BO-3630) to address immediate transport sector needs, including road repair and rehabilitation. 3. The political landscape of Bolivia underwent significant change after the inauguration of President Evo Morales in 2006. Promising democratic and cultural revolution, he carried out agrarian reform, raised the minimum wage, and increased state control or taxation of companies in hydrocarbon, mining, transport, and energy sectors. By the end of his first term he had succeeded in bringing up living standards of the poorest Bolivians. Nonetheless, the energies and attention of the first Morales Government in the 2006-09 period were often diverted; they were invested in resolving an autonomy dispute in the country’s easternmost regions (2006-08), campaigning against a referendum to recall the President (2008), drafting a new Constitution (2008-09), and finally, organizing new elections (2009). This period was marked by very high turnover of government officials. It was primarily due to these events that the ERDMP experienced delays in effectiveness and early implementation. 4. Government Strategy. Due to the losses caused by the El Niño event, the President of the Republic of Bolivia declared a “State of National Emergency” by 2 Center for Economic and Policy research “Bolivia’s economy – An Update,” 2007. 3 El Niño is an irregularly occurring, abnormally warm tropical Pacific Ocean weather pattern. The phenomenon is characterized by an above-average increase in surface water temperatures along the coast of South America and westward into equatorial portions of the Pacific Ocean. The result of this ocean warming is generally a significant increase in rainfall. This notwithstanding, the “El Niño Effect” has also been blamed for severe drought in some areas. 4 Alteraciones Climáticas en Bolivia: Impactos Observados en el Primer Trimestre de 2007, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe – CEPAL, P 8. 1 Supreme Decree 29013 (January 28, 2007). In response, the Ministry of Planning for Development (MPD) presented the National Plan for Sustainable Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (PRRES). This plan incorporated two core principles: (1) recovery activities focus on emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction so as to enable rapid restoration of productivity and (2) implementation methodology is premised on risk- mitigation and prevention, such that future vulnerability is reduced. In addition to providing a framework for immediate response, the PRRES also stipulated development of clear guidelines and policies for integration of disaster reduction/prevention in all future development activity at national, decentralized, and community levels. 5. Bank Strategy. This 2007 Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project (ERDMP) in the amount of SDR 8.0 million (US$12.5 million equivalent) was approved by the Board on December 20, 2007, signed on February 11, 2008, and effective on December 11, 2008. The ERDMP qualified as an emergency recovery activity, and was not foreseen in advance of the emergency situation. However, it was consistent with the 2007-2008 Interim Strategy Note (ISN)5 proposal to further develop working knowledge on reducing vulnerability to natural disasters (floods, landslides and drought in densely populated areas, particularly the Altiplano and the Titicaca Basin). Furthermore, the Project strengthened the legislative framework pertaining to disaster- risk management and response, in addition to executing small works aimed at reducing the impact of adverse natural events that could jeopardize Bolivia’s development. 6. El Niño’s impacts were greatest on transport and agriculture sectors, but also caused damage to potable water infrastructure, sewage treatment, and other critical infrastructure. Starting in December 2007, the ERDMP addressed basic needs relating to rehabilitation and reconstruction on roads, on infrastructure in the agricultural sector, and worked to strengthen GoB institutional capacity to prepare for and respond to similar events in the future. In March 2008, the GoB requested an Additional Financing (AF) to the ERDMP in the amount of SDR 2.7 million (US$4.2 million equivalent) to address additional damages resulting from the 2008 La Niña6 phenomenon, namely floods and landslides, which had an aggregate economic impact of US$511 million in losses and damages,7 affecting 618,740 individuals.8 The AF—approved by the Board on June 5, 5 Despite the strong mandate of the GoB at the time, uncertainties and risks, particularly regarding the final outcome of the Constitutional Assembly and the on-going nationalization program, prevented the design of a five-year WBG CAS with accompanying scenarios, triggers, and results projections. The GoB and the Bank agreed that a two-year ISN would provide the most appropriate instrument to continue supporting Bolivia through investment lending and technical assistance and to provide help in evaluating the country’s policy options as the government moves forward to define its development priorities and policies. 6 La Niña is characterized by unusually cold ocean temperatures in the Equatorial Pacific, essentially the opposite of El Niño (associated with warmer temperatures). When normal gravitational effects pulling ocean waters away from the Equator are amplified by La Niña’s unusually strong tail-winds, inordinately large quantities of warmer surface-water are drawn away. These are replaced by colder waters rising from below. The colder ambient temperatures that result serve in turn impede the formation of clouds and tropical thunderstorms in the overlying atmosphere, leading to generally drier conditions for proximal landmasses, among them South America. 7 Evaluación del Impacto Acumulado y Adicional Ocasionado por La Niña, Bolivia 2008, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe – CEPAL, P. 98. 8 Evaluación del Impacto Acumulado y Adicional Ocasionado por La Niña, Bolivia 2008, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe – CEPAL, P. 25. 2 2008, signed on November 18, 2008, and effective on June 22, 2009—provided funding for the geographic scaling up of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and small mitigation works. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 7. The project was designed as an Emergency Recovery Loan operation (ERL) for DRM. The 2008 Financing Agreement stipulates that “the objectives of the Project are: (i) to support the Recipient in the implementation of its National Plan for Sustainable Rehabilitation and Reconstruction following the El Niño 2006-2007 event; and (ii) to strengthen the Recipient's ability to respond to future adverse natural events.” 8. These objectives were achieved through (i) Strengthening the National System for Risk Management through capacity building at the national, sectoral, and subnational levels; and (ii) Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Small Mitigation Works. The Project’s original key indicators were:  Number of infrastructure facilities restored and number of beneficiaries with restored access;  DRM Units established in 9 target sectors and 9 departments (staff trained, fully funded by respective agency, and 6 sector risk management strategies submitted to the MPD);  Recommendations for a National Risk Management System submitted to the MPD;  Number of territories implementing pilot projects integrating risk management concepts;  Draft of legislation for incorporation of risk management in territorial planning submitted to the MPD;  Draft of legislation for implementation of vulnerability reduction strategies in public investments submitted to the MPD. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and key indicators, and reasons/justification 9. There were no revisions to the PDO during the life of the Project. However, the PADs for the original credit and additional financing (IDA-43770 and IDA-44400 respectively) provide a slightly rephrased version of the PDO wording of the Loan Agreements. 1.4 Principal Beneficiaries 10. The Project’s 446,156 direct beneficiaries included: (i) rural, predominantly poor communities situated in 54 different municipalities, which benefit from reconstruction of transport, health and education infrastructure; (ii) participating municipalities in 8 3 different departments, 9 which receive support for disaster preparedness and response, implementation of DRM units and preparation of sustainable land use-plans; (iii) national agencies dealing with disaster risk management including National Meteorology and Hydrology Service (SENAMHI), Vice Ministry of Civil Defense (VIDECI), Vice Ministry for Planning and Coordination (VPC), National Fund for Productive and Social Investment (FPS), which benefit from improvement of information systems, disaster preparedness and response trainings, delivery of computer equipment and proposals for DRM plans by sector; and (iv) the National Government, benefitting from a reinforced “National System for Risk Reduction and Disaster and Emergency Response” (SISRADE) from proposed legislative revisions and selected sector strategies. 11. Additionally, the Project was expected to benefit the general population by means of overall strengthening and institutionalization of DRM policy and practice in Bolivia. 1.5 Original Components 12. The project had two original components: A. Strengthening the National System for Risk Management (SDR 1.4 million or 17 percent of total credit at appraisal). Activities in this component were designed to focus on the development of strategic plans and norms relating to reconstruction/rehabilitation and risk mitigation, and on the integration of the various sectors in an emergency recovery framework. Efforts focused on the requirements needed to implement the reconstruction activities executed under PRRES, and on identifying necessary small mitigation measures following La Niña, including the development of norms, legislation, and information systems required to support disaster recovery operations. This component built on experience of reconstruction programs then in place to improve the recovery operation model and to integrate associated sectors in a structured recovery framework for use in future disaster situations. B. Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Small Mitigation Works (SDR 6.7 million or 83 percent of total credit at appraisal). A series of rehabilitation/reconstruction subprojects were undertaken in an effort to restore damaged infrastructure in specific areas determined to have been particularly affected by El Niño. These included rehabilitation of water and sewage systems, repairs to basic infrastructure in small schools, housing, and small health centers; bridge and road repairs; and investments in water intakes, small earthen irrigation structures, riverbank protection, filtration galleries, and related activities. Subprojects were identified by local communities, and then forwarded by municipalities for selection by the MPD. This component included a Project Preparation Advance of SDR 3.2 million which was subsequently cancelled/not used, as the GoB decided to bear the cost. 9 Departments include Chuquisaca, La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosí, Santa Cruz, Pando, Tarija, and Beni. 4 1.6 Revised Components 13. Components 1 and 2 remained throughout Project implementation. However, the 2008 AF and 2012 and 2013 restructurings introduced the following changes: A. Strengthening the National System for Risk Management: the AF increased allocated funds by SDR 0.2 million (US$0.3 million equivalent), representing 7 percent of the AF, to provide additional technical assistance to the National Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan (PNRR) developed by the GoB to address effects of La Niña. The June 2012 Project restructuring reallocated funds from subcomponent 1.1.4 “Development support for the National Information System” to subcomponent 1.2.2. “Incorporating Risk Management in the territorial planning process” in order to: (i) cover the cost of the Alpacoma Watershed Study and the Oruro Land Planning, and (ii) cancel three activities for which the GoB opted to use other funding sources. B. Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Small Mitigation Works: the AF increased funds by SDR 2.5 million (US$3.8 million equivalent), 93 percent of the AF, to geographically expand subcomponents 2.1 Execution of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Works and 2.3 Execution of Small Mitigation and Rehabilitation Works accommodating additional needs resulting from the La Niña Emergency. The September 2013 Project restructuring included the cancellation of some civil works subprojects that could not be contracted and executed before the Project closing date. 1.7 Other significant changes 14. 2008 Additional Financing. The AF provided additional funding to support the GoB’s efforts to address adverse effects of La Niña. The Credit increased by SDR 2.7 million (US$4.2 million equivalent) representing 25 percent of the new total Credit (Original Credit + AF) of SDR 10.7 million (US$16.5 million equivalent). The AF expanded the ERDMP to: (i) geographically scale up small-scale rehabilitation, reconstruction, and mitigation works to cover five prioritized areas as in the original project; and (ii) rehabilitate the productive capacity to cover the affected communities. 15. June 2012 Project Restructuring. The Level Two restructuring approved on June 28, 2012 included: (i) the reallocation of funds within subcomponents under Components 1 and 2 to allow the completion of the Alpacoma Watershed Study and Oruro Land Management Study; (ii) the total or partial cancellation of some subcomponents under Component 1; (iii) and the extension of the closing date from June 30, 2012, until May 15, 2013. The cancellation totaled SDR 3.9 million (US$6.1 million equivalent). It is important to note that the SDR 3.2 million (US$4.9 million equivalent) cancellation was part of the Refund of Project Preparation Advance, which the GoB did not use in the end. These modifications did not trigger any safeguards or affect the PDO. 16. The restructuring reallocated proceeds within Project components and cancelled subcomponents as follows: 5  Subcomponent 1.1.3 “Incorporating Risk Management in Public Investment”: The Vice Ministry of Public Investment and External Financing (VIPFE) decided to carry out this activity with a grant from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).  Subcomponent 1.1.5 “Preliminary studies for the development of a risk financing strategy”. VIPFE decided to carry out this activity with its own resources and its own schedule.  Subcomponent 1.1.6 “Technical Assistance for the development of a contingency plan for la Niña”: This activity was carried out under a Bank-executed technical assistance trust fund from the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) by the Vice Ministry of Civil Defense (VIDECI). 17. February 2013 Project Restructuring. The Level Two restructuring approved on March 7, 2013 included the extension of the Project closing date from May 15, 2013 to September 30, 2013 to allow sufficient time to finalize the Alpacoma Watershed Study. 18. September 2013 Project Restructuring. The Level Two restructuring approved on September 26, 2013 cancelled SDR 0.7 million (US$1.1 million equivalent) due to civil works that could not be contracted and completed before the Project closing date. 19. Extension of Closing Dates. The Project ended in September 2013 after three closing date extensions (including the AF). The original credit closing date was extended from June 30, 2011 to June 30, 2012 upon Board approval of the AF in June of 2008. The June 2012 restructuring extended the closing date to May 15, 2013, and the February 2013 restructuring extended the closing date to September 30, 2013. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 20. Soundness of Background Analysis. Project design was based on analysis of Bolivia’s existing DRM program. At the time of project preparation, there was a growing body of knowledge and lessons learned on disaster risk management and emergency projects within and outside the Bank. Moreover, the Project design benefited from lessons learned with the Bank-financed 1998 El Niño Emergency Assistance Project (Project P055974), the objective of which was to support immediate prevention and reconstruction activities. 21. The Project design and preparation were based on a Bank and ECLAC damage and loss assessment conducted after the 2007 El Niño. While funds were reallocated from an ongoing project and disbursed quickly, the Bank team began preparing the ERDMP to secure additional funding to continue recovery and reconstruction activities. 6 22. While ERDMP was an Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL), prepared under OP/BP 8.00 – Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies 10 procedures, its design included aspects of long-term development; the project did not simply finance the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, but rather it invested in reconstruction adhering to higher standards (than for original structures), integrating flood-resistance and landslide- prevention standards in design. The 1998 El Niño Emergency Assistance Project in Bolivia specifically addressed the recovery of damage to economic and social service infrastructure. Incorporating a long-term vision, the ERDMP contributed to reducing vulnerability of Bolivia’s public infrastructure to future disasters. 23. Assessment of Project Design. The original PDO focused on increased capacity for disaster vulnerability reduction by legislative and policy reforms feasible within the duration of the Project, though the majority of the Credit was destined for reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. This objective was clear and important for the country as indicated in the 2007-2008 ISN. 24. The strategic choices underlying the original Project design reflect lessons learned and imperatives of the emergency situation then prevailing. The first choice was to focus on emergency recovery and disaster management, including capacity building on risk reduction activities. On this basis, project design emphasized: (i) support to local capacity development; (ii) assistance to a selected number of vulnerable municipalities, especially those that El Niño and later La Niña, left most at risk; and (iii) reliance on existing agencies in the post-disaster situation rather than creating new ones under the Project. 25. To manage safeguard risks, an additional strategic choice was made to limit the eligibility of civil works to those that would not cause physical or economic displacement (as defined in the Bank’s involuntary resettlement safeguard policy, OP 4.12). Given the substantial need for a wide variety of mitigation investments, the works remained relevant for Project design. The Bank team furnished assistance to the FPS in designing specific and streamlined processes and procedures, including the definition of roles and responsibilities of both entities and the municipalities, with detailed work plans reviewed and agreed upon with the Bank, ensuring adequate construction norms as well as compliance with environmental safeguards. 26. Project components were clearly formulated and conducive to PDO achievement. The Project design was flexible, including additional SDR 2.7 million (US$4.2 million equivalent) of AF to respond to 2008 La Niña effects, adjusting and scaling up the components. The initial set of natural hazards–floods and landslides–was broadened to include droughts and forest fires, which emerged as critical issues in certain municipalities. 10 On October 25, 2012, OP/ BP 10.00, Investment Project Financing have been updated and now include provisions formerly contained in OP 8.00. 7 27. Risk Assessment. Overall Project risk was deemed significant at appraisal. In retrospect, this rating correctly gauged the challenges as relate to the volatile political situation, institutional weaknesses, and requirements of successful institutional capacity building. Most of the risks identified in the PAD materialized at some point during Project implementation. One of these risks materialized early on; it involved the disagreement between the national and departmental governments over responsibility for prevention, preparedness, and rehabilitation. Initial mitigation response measures foreseen in Project design were to keep the Project at a distance from the political constraints by focusing on implementation of the PRRES. High turnover of implementing agency officials, especially in the ERDMP’s first four years, was effectively mitigated by securing GFDRR grant, enabling recruitment of qualified technical assistance to meet short- and long-term needs where capacities were lacking, insufficient, or in need of strengthening. 2.2 Implementation 28. For most of its lifespan, project implementation was satisfactory as reflected in the ISRs and Aide Memoires. Factors that facilitated implementation were: 29. Continuous GoB-Bank partnership. GoB-Bank collaboration grew progressively stronger, especially in the ERDMP’s last three years, when the GoB demonstrated its full commitment to PDO achievement. The Autonomy and Decentralization Law (July, 2010) redefined administrative prerogatives at central and decentralized levels, compelling adaptation of the national DRM framework. And after 2011 in particular, a renewed commitment from the GoB expedited Project implementation. A project implementation unit within the Vice Ministry of Planning and Coordination, led by the Vice Minister himself, was put into place and a Technical Committee composed of representatives of the three implementing agencies (MPD, VIDECI, and FPS) was formed. 30. Provision of additional international expertise through grant funding. Project implementation benefited from the provision of specialized technical assistance financed by (i) Bank-executed trust fund from the Bank-GFDRR totaling US$0.6 million, and (ii) Country-executed grant from the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) totaling US$1.5 million. The GFDRR grant enabled the ERDMP to develop sectoral risk management strategies, a municipal-level risk assessment methodology, and a GIS-based disaster risk management information platform, all key components in Bolivia’s current DRM program. Several factors – some outside and some within the control of government and implementing agencies – adversely affected the Project: 31. Initially, Project implementation was slowed by a long delay in credit effectiveness. The GoB was unable to secure the National Assembly’s enactment of a law approving the credit for a year following the Board’s approval largely due to a prolonged 8 period (2006-2009) of major changes in Bolivia, including regional autonomy disputes, the National Assembly’s focus on revision of the Constitution, campaigning for two different referenda and re-election, and high turnover of government officers. High turnover of GoB counterparts was especially detrimental (e.g. the Minister of Planning for Development—a key Project interlocutor—was changed three times in 2008 and then again in 2009). The situation stabilized after mid-2009, following re-election of President Morales for a second term. From 2009 to the Project’s closing in 2013, the turnover rate of GoB counterparts slowed to the point that it no longer posed an impediment to Project implementation. 32. Project management shortcomings. The Mid-Term Review found the Project’s Overall Objective achievable and the indicators and institutional arrangements to be fully on track for implementation. Initially, timely submission of audits and observance of Bank procurement processes represented a challenge to implementation. In one instance, due to delay in an external audit, close supervision was required, after which the MPD took corrective measures—contracting the audit—and resolving the situation. 33. Institutional coordination shortcomings. Despite recent progress on revision of Bolivia’s legislative DRM framework, institutional norms governing collaborative inter-agency coordination are relatively few. The same situation prevails at decentralized levels, in departments and municipalities. Building functional collaborative relationships between multiple agencies, including shared leadership responsibility, was most clearly manifested by formation of the ERDMP Technical Committee, composed of representatives of the three implementing agencies (MPD, VIDECI, and FPS). This process took longer than anticipated and was not operational until the second half of the Project with substantive Bank support. None the less, rendering this collaborative inter-agency approach workable was an investment necessary to building organizational and operational norms conducive to long-term sustainability. A similar effort was carried with Bank technical assistance to foster a multi-sector DRM program that is now under consideration by the parliament. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 34. M&E design. Project objectives were realistic and relevant at the time of design and the M&E was mainstreamed into all project components and conducted at three levels: (i) contract compliance; (ii) impact monitoring; and (iii) project implementation. As an emergency project, the M&E focus on reconstruction and rehabilitation with indicators at the output level. The framework could have gone further to include more outcome indicators, which would have supported fuller assessment of it development impact. 35. M&E implementation and utilization. Semi-annual FPS monitoring of Project progress permitted adjustment of activities, budget and procurement plans. M&E for Component 1 was carried out by the Vice Ministry of Planning and Coordination (VPC) and for Component 2 by FPS. M&E consisted of evaluating results against pre- established indicators according to the operations manual, results of which were included 9 in progress reports. In particular, for Component 2, the implementing agency (FPS) has monitored all of its subprojects using a SAP computerized system that keeps track of progress at all stages of implementation, from approval, through contract signing, execution, reception and submission of closing documentation. This allowed monitoring of specific indicators, including resources used by subproject, type and number of works executed by department and municipality, and beneficiaries by gender. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 36. Safeguards Compliance. Based on an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) and the needs assessment, the type of works considered fell under the environmental classification Category C (likely to have minimal or no adverse environmental impacts). 37. Environmental Safeguards. Field visits carried out during Project implementation corroborated that the civil works were of small scale, occasioning minimal and no lasting impacts on the environment. In the few instances that there were effects on air, water, or soil, all were transitory. The Project also strengthened environmental management through local preventative planning and non-structural mitigation works. 38. Social Safeguards. The Social Assessment began during the pre-appraisal mission, prior to Board approval, in order to develop a benefit-sharing strategy reflecting stakeholder interests and participation. The assessment contained five parameters: (i) social consensus; (ii) social access; (iii) social equity (ensuring subprojects benefit more than 50 percent of the population); (iv) social capital and cultural identity; and (v) social control (the community to exercise decisive control over the requested work). This Social Assessment, which included data collection and analysis and consultations with key stakeholders, provided the MPD with the tools necessary to begin to study long-term land use policies, including the resettlement of communities highly vulnerable to future occurrence or recurrence of natural disaster. 39. FPS field-technicians employed consensus-building mechanisms and participatory methodologies for site-selection and follow-up stakeholder feedback. The 2013 FPS report on social safeguards states that Project beneficiaries consisted of 52 percent women and 48 percent men. A detailed analysis breaking down beneficiary by gender for nine types of civil works shows that the beneficiary ratio varied between 46 percent female to 54 percent male and 56 percent female to 44 percent male. With regard to indigenous peoples, beneficiary communities gave satisfactory ratings to all civil works. The approach ensured equitable inclusion of another vulnerable subgroup, the acutely impoverished; 44 percent of subprojects benefitted impoverished municipalities (i.e. in which 90 percent of the population earns under US$1 per day). 40. Fiduciary Compliance. No major fiduciary issues requiring GoB or Bank attention emerged during Project implementation, as corroborated by audit reports and procurement post-reviews. 10 41. Financial Management. At Project closing the overall Financial Management was rated as Moderate Satisfactory due to delays in compliance with internal controls and external audits. The MPD was proactive in addressing minor shortcomings in the supervision of external audits and complying with overall financial management (including accounting records and Interim Financial Reports). 42. Procurement. Procurement performance at project closing was rated Moderately Satisfactory. Close supervision and extensive support were needed to improve MPD overall procurement capacity. Initial shortcomings in terms of contract management and low participation in the bid process —largely related to lack of experience with Bank procedures—were identified and addressed in the Procurement Unit at FPS (responsible for civil works). By closing of the ERDMP, the Unit demonstrated adequate capacity for compliance with Bank procurement standards and procedures. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 43. The Project promoted the establishment of a solid basis for DRM in Bolivia. Regional initiatives and specific country efforts by other agencies, including the Bank, assure the investment’s sustainability. DRM has been one of the four pillars of the 2012- 2015 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)11 in the country. Not incidentally, 70 percent of DRM investment in Bolivia is financed by the GoB, 30 percent by external partners, of which the ERDMP constituted 9 percent. The GoB has taken ownership of the Project’s outputs (e.g. recommendations from the pilot land planning study are implemented by the Department of Oruro and rehabilitation works from Component 2 are managed and maintained by municipalities). With Bolivia's acquired experience and access to IBRD financing as of fiscal year 2014, potential new Bank-funded operations are currently under discussion with the Government. The Project has helped mainstream DRM in the GoB, contributing to incorporation of risk reduction and mitigation measures in other projects, formulation of sectoral DRM strategies for Agriculture, Basic Sanitation, Watersheds, Irrigation, Decentralization, and Civil Defense, and establishment of sectoral and departmental DRM units within the GoB. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 44. The Project Development Objective (PDO) remained highly relevant and was consistent with the current Bank strategy and national development plan. But while progress has been made, disaster risk reduction challenges have intensified. Significant increase in frequency, intensity and duration of rainfall and/or drought pose imminent threat to food security, health conditions, and access to basic services for much of the populace. Between 2006 and 2008, aggregate economic impact in losses and damages in 11 The four pillars of the 2012-2015 CPS are: (i) sustainable productive development; (ii) climate change and disaster risk management; (iii) human development and access to basic services; and (iv) public sector effectiveness. 11 Bolivia due to El Niño and La Niña was estimated at US$954 million, affecting an estimated 877,200 people. The 2010-2011 Interim Strategy Note and 2012-2015 CPS acknowledge and reiterate the importance of investing in risk reduction. Similarly the country's development plans include disaster risk management as a key objective within the framework of environmental management and climate change-mitigation and adaptation. 45. Project design is consistent with the PDO and relevant in addressing challenges inherent to disaster risk reduction. As an Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) instrument, the Project was flexible, allowing for important adjustments, including institutional capacity building, engagement of decentralized echelons of the GoB (departments and municipalities) and communities, as well as financing of mitigation works when it became clear that these were integral to effective DRM in Bolivia. 46. Project implementation supported the evolution of the legal and institutional framework for DRM in Bolivia. The difficulty inherent to effective institutional capacity building, especially with the changes in political landscape occurring during the first half of the ERDMP’s lifespan, in large part explains the extended period required to implement a relatively modest credit. This was exacerbated by implementation and procurement challenges faced by small municipalities and the limited capacity of FPS. Implementation arrangements retained their relevancy throughout the life of the Project, ultimately contributing to institutionalization of results and consolidation of Bolivia’s disaster management agencies. In addition, the risk-mitigation and vulnerability methodologies developed under the Project were compatible with territorial planning exercises. Lastly, the Project contributed to development of a national framework for resettlement of inhabitants of zones susceptible to recurrent non-mitigable risk from natural disaster. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objective 47. Strengthening the National System for Risk Management 48. Working through the National Plan for Sustainable Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (PRRES), Component 1 supported Bolivia’s efforts to reinforce its National System for Risk Reduction and Disaster and Emergency Response (SISRADE). 49. Interinstitutional coordination support for disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation under the PRRES included: (i) strengthening inter-agency coordination at national and sub-national levels; (ii) incorporating DRM as a key component in national development planning processes; (iii) building capacity of sectoral DRM unit personnel; and (iv) improving linkages and access to information systems for DRM-related planning. 50. Incorporation of risk management in the territorial planning processes. The Alpacoma Watershed Study and Oruro Land Planning pilot project approached risk management and vulnerability assessment from a holistic, multidisciplinary perspective. For Oruro in particular, the pilot project’s approach and results enabled the MPD’s 12 Territorial Planning Unit to incorporate DRM as one of its key transversal themes. They generated proposals, alternatives and solutions to problems in a wide array of fields, including civil works, bio-engineering, drainage, hydrology and livelihoods/socio- economic activity. Above and beyond the risk-mapping, territorial zoning, and sustainable land-use pilot project that these activities yielded, their larger outcome was to permit testing and validation of DRM as a core concept in effective preventative planning (as opposed to reactive measures and strategies). Strongly endorsed at departmental and sectoral levels (Stakeholder Workshop), replication of this methodology in other zones is projected. 51. Development support provided for the National Information System (SNID) and the National Meteorology and Hydrology Service (SENAMHI) strengthened SENAMHI by (i) updating and centralizing the information from meteorological stations; (ii) standardizing data by categories for better processing; (iii) developing data collection methodology; (iv) developing the climatologic index for risk assessment; (v) and linking meteorological information to GeoNode (a disaster risk management data platform, via the National Information System on Risk Management [SINAGER]) to consolidate and standardize data from different sectors at national and decentralized levels useful in risk mapping. The increased forecasting capability of SENAMHI has been key to integrating risk management criteria in GoB decision making and strategic planning. Currently, 23 public institutions access and contribute to the GeoNode platform, contributing to improved reliability and availability of DRM data. 52. Strengthening of the National Risk Management System through implementation of Component 1 recommendations was effectively achieved by institutional capacity building, this with a comparatively small portion of the total credit (US$1.4 million). Today, the GoB has the improved institutional framework and increased technical capacity necessary to identifying and formulating responses to Bolivia’s DRM-related challenges. 53. Strengthening of risk management in sectors and territorial entities by creation of DRM units in nine target sectors in nine different departments. 54. Sector strategies have been submitted to the MPD, including assessments and contingency plans. Despite high turnover of officials, competing priorities, and capacity problems that posed a major challenge to timely implementation, the ERDMP successfully oversaw drafting of six sectoral strategies, including Agriculture, Basic Sanitation, Watersheds, Irrigation, Decentralization, and Civil Defense. Two were realized but not approved by the GoB due to quality concerns (Transport and Housing), and one (Treasury) was retracted by the GoB during its redefinition of target sectors). Together, these sectoral methodologies are the basis for the National Disaster Response Strategy and have contributed to preparation of the National Disaster Risk Management Program (NDRMP, 2013-17). The Program is currently awaiting approval by the National Assembly and will provide the basis for continued dialogue between the GoB and the Bank. 13 55. Professional capacities have been strengthened by means of more than 20 different DRM courses and workshops, in addition to an online risk management course. These covered risk assessment and prevention, vulnerability reduction, data management, and GeoNode’s integration. 56. Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Small Mitigation Works 57. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of prioritized works in the five regions. The Project repaired, restored, or rebuilt damaged infrastructure at 244 sites. The Project repaired 331 kilometers on a total of 105 roads and built 80 culverts and river-bank reinforcement/anti-erosion works, in addition to rehabilitating infrastructure related to educational, health, water, and agriculture/irrigation sectors. The ERDMP contributed to effective application of DRM principles and practices to civil works executed by municipalities, particularly concerning the use of higher quality materials, adherence to higher standards of construction, and to municipalities becoming better able to carry out tasks related to civil works implementation and procurement. Furthermore, subprojects were implemented using methods that created local employment, as subcontractors recruited their workforce from among beneficiary communities. 58. Accompanying technical support for works execution provided. The Project provided supervision of and assistance to municipalities in execution of civil works, ensuring compliance with quality construction norms. The works were built to better standard than the original infrastructure to improve their resilience with regards to future adverse natural events. FPS assessment of 48 subprojects (19.7 percent of total subproject portfolio) report 82.8 percent of beneficiaries to be highly satisfied/satisfied, 17.2 percent to be moderately satisfied, and no incidence of beneficiary dissatisfaction. 3.3 Efficiency 59. At the aggregate level, the Net Present Value (NPV) of investments in Component 2 attains $8.4 million using a discount rate of 10 percent and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) reaches 24.4 percent. These figures were estimated taking into account all project costs, including counterpart, and maintenance cost of road improvement subprojects. On the other hand, only some benefits were taken into account due to the limited information and difficulties to quantify less tangible benefits. In particular the cost-benefit analysis takes into account the benefit of protecting arable land through riverbank protection works and reducing inaccessibility risk in the rural area through roads improvements—road improvement and riverbank protection works represent 85 percent of investment carried out under component two. The positive financial result of the project is linked with high return of road improvement sub-projects that more than compensate the negative returns of riverbank protection projects linked with low agriculture productivity. 14 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory 60. The satisfactory rating also takes into account the trend toward improvement, from moderately satisfactory to satisfactory, evident in the last four ISRs. The Project design and objectives remained highly relevant during Project implementation. Six out of seven PDO indicators were achieved; one partially achieved, four fully achieved, and two surpassing target values. This resulted in improved DRM capacity at national and sub- national levels and reduction in local vulnerability. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 61. Disasters affect the poor disproportionately. Project intervention contributed to increased resilience of these more vulnerable substrata within the general population; 44 percent of subprojects (107 out of 244) benefitted impoverished municipalities. The Project’s inclusive approach accorded equitable opportunity for these groups to become involved and to manage their respective subprojects. It also fostered operational collaboration between such groups and the municipal and departmental agencies mandated to oversee their welfare and development, making them active partners in conception and implementation of DRM activities. 62. The Social Assessment shows that men and women benefitted equitably from the infrastructure subprojects realized under Component 2. Of the Project’s 369,370 beneficiaries at the date of the assessment in early 2013, 52 percent were women and 48 percent men (191,141 women and 178,229 men, respectively). In a more detailed analysis of nine types of civil works the beneficiary by gender breakdown shows variation between 46 percent women/54 percent men and 56 percent women/44 percent men. With regard to indigenous peoples, beneficiary communities gave satisfactory ratings to all civil works. Consensus-building mechanisms and participatory methodologies were employed for site-selection and follow-up stakeholder feedback. Interviews conducted by the FPS reveal men and women beneficiaries’ general satisfaction concerning their degree of inclusion in subproject site-selection, implication in decision making processes, involvement in implementation, and follow-up controls. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 63. The Project contributed to the institutionalization of a DRM system in the country. Key agencies such as VIDECI and MPD, coordinate with sub-national entities (departments and municipalities), and all have benefitted from training to improve technical and methodological capacities. In addition to the improved weather forecasting network at SENAMHI, strengthening the SINAGER system (including the GeoNode data platform) for disaster-risk assessment and simulation modeling. And lastly, participating municipalities today possess better methodological approaches and improved capacity for responding to local DRM issues, this with heavy involvement of local communities. 15 (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 64. The Project served as a vehicle for innovations within GoB, which have since become common practice in DRM local activities, notably: (i) a methodology for risk and vulnerability analysis and preventive planning that dynamically integrates complex technical and scientific expertise (with community knowledge through an educational and awareness-raising process); and (ii) a bottom-up approach that balances municipal and local communities’ roles and capacities with central coordination and support. 65. Through the ERDMP, the GFDRR Trust Fund (TF) grant contributed crucially to creating sectoral DRM strategies. A US$0.6 million TF grant supported the Project’s recruitment of technical assistance to formulate the sectoral strategy terms of reference at a time in which internal GoB issues (high turnover of officials, competing priorities, and capacity problems) posed a major challenge to timely implementation. The grant enabled strategies to be drafted for six sectors, including Agriculture, Basic Sanitation, Watersheds, Irrigation, Decentralization, and Civil Defense. Today, these sectoral methodologies constitute the cornerstone of Bolivia’s National Disaster Risk Management Program (NDRMP, 2013-17). This Program’s objective is assimilation of national DRM policy and strategy with Bolivia’s 2025 Strategic Agenda and Integrated National Planning System (SPIE, an inter-ministerial coordinating unit). The ongoing GoB-Bank dialogue on DRM—an exchange that continues after the close of the ERDMP—is in no small part due to GFDRR collaboration during the life of the Project. 66. As concerns Component 1, additional positive outcomes identified include increased demand for mitigation investments and better understanding of the importance of territorial planning, particularly with reference to the challenge of controlling growth in urban and high-risk areas (Stakeholder Workshop, see Annex 6). Under Component 2, subproject implementation generated employment for local populations on civil works such as roads, schools, riverbank-protection, and the like. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 67. In November 2013, representatives of governmental agencies directly involved with the project implementation were interviewed for firsthand views on the Project’s results and impact. During the same month additional input was sought during a stakeholder workshop involving both the Bank and GoB representatives. 12 Points emphasized by participants in terms of major impacts of the project were: (i) institutional capacity building in DRM at national, departmental, and municipal GoB levels; (ii) preserving, systematizing, and making accessible DRM data vital to vulnerability assessment and planning (SENAMHI and SINAGER); (iii) integration of DRM in land- use planning (Oruro and Alpacoma Studies, multi-sectoral risk-mapping exercises that will be replicated in other departments); and (iv) the rehabilitation or reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and repair of roads to improve the sustainability of livelihoods and quality of life for 446,156 beneficiaries. 12 See Annex 6 for principal findings and commentary. 16 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 68. After initial delays, the GoB has demonstrated firm commitment to DRM policy and programs. Sustainability of these is likely, given strong local ownership of Project investments and demands from a better informed, more engaged population. Integration of DRM issues in planning processes and increased awareness of climate-change consequences are likely to also contribute to the continuity of efforts initiated by the Project. This notwithstanding, the Development Outcome faces several internal risks: 69. Maintaining and building institutional coordination. Currently, there exist significant legislative gaps and lack of operational experience as concerns inter-agency coordination, whether at national or decentralized levels. Promoting legislation to bridge these gaps and continued efforts at inter-agency process-building and collaborative method are integral to developing technically and operationally sound DRM strategy. 70. Sustaining technical capacities at the local level. High staff turnover following government reshufflings can challenge the effectiveness of investments in capacity building. Especially at municipal levels, emphasis will need to be maintained on recruiting and retaining qualified technical staff; this is a critical prerequisite to genuine strengthening of DRM programs. 71. Securing adequate funding. National budgetary constraints necessitate development of a risk financing strategy. Such strategy should secure resources specifically intended to address emergencies and to strengthen DRM investment in risk mitigation works, hydro-meteorological data-collection infrastructure (including electronic platforms), and community-based multi-hazard early-warning systems. 72. Additionally, there are several external risks relating to the country’s growing disaster-vulnerability and the magnitude of DRM challenges. It is not possible to guarantee that infrastructure as well as hazard-monitoring systems will not be damaged by a major catastrophic event. Furthermore, effects of environmental degradation and substantial and increasing population numbers living in high-risk areas could render insignificant the impacts of mitigation investments. If properly conceived, preventative planning could have an effective mitigatory influence on these future contingencies. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 73. This rating is based on the fact that the ERDMP was an ERL (Emergency Recovery Loan) project, identified in a very short period, which was unusual in that it rose to the challenge of institutional capacity building, an essential component of recovery. It also takes into account the quality of collaboration between Bank and 17 Borrower, inclusion of innovative elements that enhanced Project impact, and the design’s efficacy in delivering response to client needs. On the other hand, limitations to risk assessment and in the analysis of the complex institutional environment resulted in a long delay in effectiveness. They slowed attainment of Project objectives initially. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 74. The rating reflects that the Bank proactively identified and resolved challenges to achievement of relevant development outcomes. Bi-annual supervision missions were timely and resulted in effective decision making, resolving critical issues affecting Project implementation. Inventive responses were fielded to overcome problems, the most noteworthy being recourse to a TF grant to resolve capacity issues and which was also directly responsible for successful completion of sectoral risk management strategies. The Bank also had a Sr. DRM Specialist based in Bolivia during the last half of the Project’s life, providing constant, hands on support to implementation. Procurement and financial management were well supervised and solution oriented. Supervision of safeguards was conducted regularly. The Project’s three restructurings enabled it to attain its major development objectives despite the complexity and scope of transformative changes affecting the political and institutional landscape of the country at the time. However, supervision could have gone further in ensuring that the challenges in meeting certain objectives were addressed more effectively and that unused funds were promptly reallocated or cancelled.13 Additionally, the Bank should have taken action earlier in re- evaluating project costs and re-assessing GoB’s real financial needs in order to avoid the approval of a US$ 4.2 million Additional Financing and a subsequent total cancellation of Project funds of US$ 7.1 million. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 75. The rating reflects the moderately satisfactory performance of the Bank in ensuring quality at entry and quality of supervision. Evaluation of overall performance is based on the Bank’s recourse to the GFDRR to improve technical assistance, specialists in the Bank’s country office, and restructurings that supported PDO achievement. None the less, a more thorough assessment of the political and institutional complexities in the country as well as a more assertive evaluation of the GoB’s financial needs and project costs would have facilitated execution. 13 The Bank could have considered redefining the original Project results matrix as well as more closely monitored the achievement of indicators (e.g. PDO indicator 7 and intermediary indictor 3). Additionally, the Bank should have dealt with the unused PPF funds at a much earlier stage as well as better supported the GoB to allocate resources in Component 2 more adequately which may have avoided such a large cancellation of funds at the very end of the Project. 18 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 76. The rating is based on the delayed implementation that occurred due to institutional coordination problems (leadership rivalry and unclear definition of roles and responsibilities among implementing partners) and revolving door turnover of government officials that challenged the Project during its first three years of its existence. Moreover, the decentralization process happening in the country created disagreement between the national and departmental governments over responsibility for risk prevention and rehabilitation. This questioned the relevance of certain indicators, leading the GoB to find alternative solutions to implementation requirements14 . However, the GoB demonstrated more sustained commitment to PDO after 2010, beginning with consolidation of the legal and institutional framework essential to improved DRM policy (notably, the July 2010 Law N° 31 on Autonomy and Decentralization, delegating territorial planning prerogatives to departmental [not national] authorities). Naturally, implementing an ERL project premised on an innovative form of multi-sectoral cooperation and institutional capacity building did not occur without complications. In the last half of the Project’s lifespan, the GoB collaborated effectively with the ERDMP to attain the major development objectives. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 77. The rating reflects the differing performance levels of the various agencies— MPD, VIDECI, and FPS—responsible for Project implementation. In the initial stage (up to one year after the effectiveness), these agencies suffered inter-agency coordination and management difficulties that slowed decision making and implementation, especially as concerned timely submission of audits and observance of Bank procurement processes. Close supervision, training, and technical assistance helped strengthen capacities, just as greater stability in terms of government officials’ turnover after the re-election of President Morales in 2009 contributed to an accelerated pace and improved quality of implementation. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 78. Borrower performance is rated as moderately satisfactory considering that both government and implementing agencies’ performances are rated as moderately satisfactory. Initial agency performance suffered shortcomings which were addressed and resolved through capacity building (workshops, trainings, and online courses) and 14 For intermediary indicator 3, only recommendations for a territorial planning legislation with a DRM focus could be produced as territorial planning responsibilities had shifted from the national to the subnational level during the life of the Project. 19 provision of intense and qualified technical assistance. These steps, in addition to increased political stability and sustained GoB commitment after 2011, contributed to improved performance and successful PDO achievement. 6. Lessons Learned 79. Bundling of infrastructure subprojects can produce catalytic effects. For example residents on one rural settlement that benefited from project investments (rehabilitated primary school complex, a rebuilt access-road, and improved potable water infrastructure) 15 recounted that the net result of these enhancements had been to transform their community into a pole of attraction; families from nearby farms now send their children to attend the school, and many from more distant districts have moved “into town.” The bundle of improvements has had a transformative effect on population and livelihoods dynamics. 80. A national DRM strategy should respond to the particular needs and conditions prevailing in the country in question. The Project is illustrative of a DRM strategy capable of adapting to changing conditions. At numerous intervals the Project’s inbuilt flexibility allowed it to adjust effectively to a legislative and institutional environment in flux and to deliver the expected results. However, this challenging environment slowed down the pace of a project that was pioneering the application of OP/BP 8.00, limiting the possibilities to see the actual benefits of an expedited project implementation following an abbreviated approval process vis-à-vis a regular approval procedure for a standard investment operation. 81. DRM awareness at community level contributes to ownership and sustainability of results. Prior to this project, departmental authorities, municipalities, and grassroots communities were often not included in DRM-related decisions and processes. Participatory in approach, this project reserved crucial decision making and supervisory roles for beneficiaries, leaving them better informed and more engaged with regard to DRM issues, thus more likely to demand continued GoB attention to them. 82. Development of monitoring and evaluation systems for Emergency Projects is critical to accurate assessment of results and balanced inference of lessons. Despite consensus on the importance of prevention and mitigation, monitoring and evaluation of DRM activities linked to Emergency Projects must receive greater attention. 83. The importance of the Bank’s GFDRR grants in providing highly qualified and intensive technical assistance to enhance and help build national capacities and hazard-monitoring systems. This has been an indispensable strategic advantage in a context in which institutional capacities are lacking. The GFDRR resources enabled the ERDMP to develop sectoral risk management strategies, a municipal-level risk 15 The first two were Bank-supported, the third funded by another development organization. 20 assessment methodology, and a GIS based disaster risk management information platform. 84. The importance of frequent supervision and qualified Bank staff in Bolivia. The frequent supervision and presence of an on-site team composed of specialists in DRM, engineering, economics, procurement, and social development, was indispensable to the ERDMP’s successful implementation and wide variety of beneficial outcomes. 85. Institutionalization of DRM priorities. Collaboration with the ERDMP contributed to FPS’ developing a set of guidelines and standards for subproject maintenance and repair. This signals ownership of DRM concepts and is a positive indicator of sustainability of the new or rehabilitated infrastructure. 86. Multiple restructurings may create high transaction costs. Multiple restructurings may create high transaction costs for small operations like the ERDMP and can divert both Government and Bank resources away from implementation, especially in a context in which inter-agency coordination is already difficult. 87. Undertaking a large amount of small-scale reconstruction works may not be a viable model in this type of context. Given the challenges in implementation and procurement faced by small municipalities and the limited institutional capacity of the implementing agency (FPS) in the initial staged of the Project, undertaking a large amount of small-scale reconstruction works may not be a viable model in this type of context. Additional support is needed for those small municipalities that are lacking basic technical capacity to formulate project profiles and carry out procurement processes. This is an approach that FPS should be prepared to implement in the future, and for which the Bank will need to build in additional counterpart costs to ensure additional staffing and logistic support. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies 88. The GoB recognized the positive outcomes of the project and agreed with the findings and ratings of the draft ICR. The Borrowers’ evaluation found that the objectives were successfully met and the overall project performance to be satisfactory. The full evaluation report, as well as a summary of the important lessons learned identified by the GoB appear in Annex 7. (b) Cofinanciers Not applicable. (c) Other partners and stakeholders Not applicable. 21 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Table A: Credit evolution, AF and Restructurings, in SDR and USD SDR Additional Restructuring Restructuring Total cumulative Component Original Financing 2012 2013 by component Comp 1 1,350,000 200,000 -669,892 - 880,108 Comp 2 3,450,000 2,500,000 -67,074 682,479 5,200,447 PPF 3,200,000 - -3,200,000 - - Total 8,000,000 2,700,000 -3,936,966 682,479 6,080,555 Total cumulative 8,000,000 10,700,000 -6,763,034 6,080,555 Total amount cancelled: SDR 4,619,445 US$ Additional Restructuring Restructuring Total cumulative Component Original Financing 2012 2013 by component Comp 1 2,075,895 307,540 -1,030,093 - 1,353,342 Comp 2 5,305,065 3,844,250 -103,140 -1,049,447 7,996,728 PPF 4,920,640 - -4,920,640 - - Total 12,301,600 4,151,790 -6,053,872 1,049,447 9,350,070 Total cumulative 12,301,600 16,453,390 10,399,518 9,350,070 Total amount cancelled: US$ 7,103,320 SDR/US$ exchange rate 13 January 2014: 1.5377 22 (b) Table B: Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Estimate, Percentage of Components Estimate (USD including AF Appraisal millions) (USD millions) Component 1 Strengthening the National 2.4 1.4 58% System for Risk Management Component 2 9.2 Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, 8.0 87% and Small Mitigation Works Refund of Project Preparation 4.9 0 0% Total Baseline Cost 16.5 9.4 57% Physical Contingencies 0 0 0% Price Contingencies 0 0 0% Total Project Costs 16.5 9.4 57% Front-end fee PPF 0 0 0% Front-end fee IBRD 0 0 0% Total Financing Required 16.5 9.4 57% (c) Table C: Financing Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Type of Estimate Percentage Source of Funds including AF Cofinancing (USD of Appraisal (USD millions) millions) Borrower 16.5 9.4 100% Local Communities 0.00 0.00 0.00 International Development Association 0.00 0.00 0.00 (IDA) Other if any 0.00 0.00 0.00 23 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Strengthening the National System for Risk Management through capacity building at the national, sector, and sub-national levels (achieved) Appraisal Estimate (including AF): US$2.4 million Actual/Latest Estimate: US$1.4 million Working through the National Plan for Sustainable Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (PRRES), Component 1 supported Bolivia’s efforts to reinforce its National System for Risk Reduction and Disaster and Emergency Response (SISRADE). Principal implementing partners were the Ministry of Planning for Development (MPD)/Vice-Ministry for Planning and Coordination (VPC) and the Vice-Ministry for Civil Defense (VIDECI).  Inter-institutional coordination for disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation. At Project inception, technical assistance was provided to prioritize reconstruction and rehabilitation needs as well as to improve design and supervise construction works. This process contributed to improve local capacity and inter-agency coordination in DRM. In addition, a national and sub-national DRM-related agencies assessment by sector was carried out by the MPD, through a consultation process, in order to support the strengthening of the National Risk Management System. These recommendations included: (i) strengthening inter-agency coordination at national and sub-national levels; (ii) including DRM as a key component in national development planning processes; (iii) capacity building of sector DRM units’ personnel; and (iv) improve linkages and access to information systems for DRM-related planning.  Risk management incorporated within territorial planning processes. The Alpacoma Watershed and the Oruro Land Planning studies were conducted to assess the impact of the 2007-2008 El Niño/La Niña adverse effects. The biophysical and topographic characteristics analysis of the studied areas identified landslides and floods as the principal disaster risks. The studies’ findings will provide: (i) engineering designs for land stabilization to reduce landslides risk and (ii) inputs supporting future territorial planning and sustainable organization of socio-economic activities. The Decentralization and Autonomy Law (2010) confers mandate for territorial planning on departmental—not national—authorities. Accordingly, the Oruro Study was carried out under the aegis of Oruro Department authorities. The Study’s results and methodologies later helped the MPD’s Land Use Planning Unit (at national level) to better integrate DRM in its approach to planning.  Development support provided for the National Information System (SNID) and the National Meteorology and Hydrology Service (SENAMHI). The Project led to improvements in the reliability and distribution of information supporting risk management decision making. The successful implementation of the GeoNode, a 24 disaster risk management data platform, through the National Information System on Risk Management (SINAGER) centralized risk information from all sectors at the national and sub-national levels. Currently, 23 public institutions access and contribute to the GeoNode platform, including line ministries, departmental and municipal governments, and research institutes. In addition, government officials were trained in the use of GeoNode and how to integrate risk prevention and vulnerability reduction in decision making processes. The Project strengthened SENAMHI by (i) updating and centralizing the information from meteorological stations; (ii) standardizing data by categories for better processing; (iii) developing data collection methodology; (iv) developing the climatologic index for risk assessment; (v) and linking meteorological information to GeoNode for risk mapping. The increased forecasting capability of SENAMHI has been key in supporting risk management decision making. The Government of Ecuador has shown its interest in a South-South cooperation to learn from Bolivia’s experience and improve its meteorological forecasting service as well as risk management data platform.  The National Risk Management System strengthened. The National DRM Program developed with support of the Project allowed for a better understanding of Bolivia’s challenges and provided recommendations to address them. In addition, the experience of the 2007-2008 El Niño/La Niña recovery efforts supported the preparation of a draft legislation formalizing recovery operations responsibilities and authorities. This proposal included a methodology and implementation model for execution of emergency work incorporating DRM as a transversal theme.  Risk management strengthened in sectors. As planned, DRM units were created in 9 target sectors in 9 departments. The sectors chosen by the GoB did not include the Treasury (as first set forth in the PAD) and added Health and Education, which did not figure in the PAD. Different approaches were taken to operationalizing these units; some of them were incorporated as administrative offices or technical departments and others were represented by an individual (serving as “focal point”). The DRM Units located within ministries were incorporated as part of their planning departments, and linked to the MPD instead of functioning as independent technical units. Sector strategies submitted to MPD included assessments and contingency plans by sector. These were presented in six documents covering eight out of nine sectors. The strategies served as inputs to strengthen the National DRM Program by cross- referencing key sector information to improve coordination in disaster prevention and mitigation. In addition, over 20 courses and workshops were carried in DRM, prevention, vulnerability, risk assessment, data management, and integration to GeoNode. A risk management on-line course “Educate” was also carried out by VIDECI with more than 122 participants. 25 Table A: Output indicators for Component 1 COMPONENT 1: Strengthening The National System for Risk Management Formally Actual Value Achieved Output Original Baseline Value Revised at Completion or Indicator Target Values Target Values Target Years A. Recommendations for a National Risk Management System submitted to Indicator 1: the MPD for consideration. Value 0 100% 100% B1. Number of territories implementing pilot projects that integrate risk Indicator 2: management concepts. Value 0 2 1 1 B2. Draft of legislation for incorporation of risk management in territorial Indicator 3: planning submitted to the MPD for consideration. Value 0 100% 50% C2. Percentage of trainees scoring above 75% in skills test administered post Indicator 4: training in risk prevention and vulnerability reduction at the sectoral and departmental levels. Value 0 100% 100% D1. Development support provided for the National Information System Indicator 5: (SNID). Value 0 100% 100% D2. Development support provided for the National Meteorology and Indicator 6: Hydrology Service (SENAMHI). Value 0 100% 100% D3. Percentage of trained territorial planning vice ministry personnel in 9 Indicator 7: target sectors responding above 75% to skills test administered post training. Value 0 100% 100% G. Risk management strengthened in sectors. Percentage of trainees scoring Indicator 8: above 75% in skills test administered post-training in risk prevention and vulnerability reduction in sectoral risk management units. Value 0 100% 50% 26 Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Small Mitigation Works Appraisal Estimate (including AF): US$9.2 million Actual/Latest Estimate: US$8.0 million Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Small Mitigation Works Principal implementing partner for Component 2 was the National Fund for Productive and Social Investment (FPS).  Rehabilitation and reconstruction of prioritized works in the 5 regions. The Project rehabilitated or reconstructed 244 damaged infrastructure that needed to be repaired and restored to its original operational capacity. In some cases, modifications were made to improve disaster resistance based on a review of vulnerability. Civil works were primarily carried out by FPS with the support of the municipalities, and the hiring of local workers supported socio-economic rehabilitation efforts. Official FPS reports found that the level of acceptance for civil works was favorable in all communities, using a sample of 23 projects (9.5 percent of project portfolio).  The Project intervened to repair 331 kilometers on a total of 105 roads and built 80 culverts and river-bank reinforcement/anti-erosion works, in addition to rehabilitating infrastructure for educational, health, waterworks, and agriculture/irrigation sectors.  Accompanying technical support for civil works execution. Supervision of civil works and assistance to municipalities in works execution were provided by the Project to ensure compliance with quality construction norms. FPS assessments report 100 percent beneficiary satisfaction with both the quality of the civil works realized and the improvement of their standard of living. These works included infrastructure rehabilitation/reconstruction relating to potable water supply, sewage evacuation, water intake, irrigation systems, bridge and road repairs, riverbank reinforcement, filtration galleries, and schools, among others. The target areas for these works were those determined to have been particularly hard hit by effects of the El Niño and/or La Niña events. Component 2 civil works were identified by local communities, and then proposed to the local municipality. Thereafter, the municipality collaborated with the FPS on implementation, quality- control, monitoring, and evaluation. A total of 244 civil works were completed, improving the quality of life for a total of 446,156 stakeholder/beneficiaries. 27 Table B: Output indicators for Component 2 COMPONENT 2: Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Small Mitigation Works Actual Value Output Formally Original Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target Values Completion or Target Values Target Years A. Percentage of affected population reporting improved access to Indicator 9: basic infrastructure in 5 regions (through standard citizen report cards issued once works implementation has begun). Value 0 100% 100% B. Citizen report cards and team supervision visits to random sample Indicator 10: sites will also report on quality of improved infrastructure. Value 0 100% 100% Indicator 11: C. Numbers of kilometers of rural roads rehabilitated. Value 200 200 331 28 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis The Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management project aimed to restore access to basic infrastructure in five target regions, and to strengthen the Government’s ability to respond to disasters. It had two components: Component 1, strengthening the National System for Risk Management, and Component 2, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Works. The project implemented 244 subprojects in the departments of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Potosí, La Paz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija for about US$7.8 million. These subprojects included civil works such as riverbanks protection, improvement of roads and bridges, reconstruction of education and health infrastructure and irrigation systems As the project has not followed any output or outcome indicators that allow directly estimating the economic benefit, this annex shows the results of a cost benefit analysis based on rough but cautious assumption on costs avoided by riverbank protection works and roads improvements—these projects amounts 85 percent projects and disbursements carried out under Component 1 (Figure 1). The benefits of remaining civil works are not included due to difficulties to estimate benefit of heterogeneous infrastructure projects such as the rehabilitation of sport infrastructure, irrigation projects and reconstruction of schools perimeter walls, classrooms and other education and health infrastructure. Seemingly, the benefits of institutional strengthening and policy development are also excluded as the benefits of these activities are difficult to capture in a cost-benefit analysis. Figure 1: Composition of subprojects under Component 1 Number of subprojects Disbursements on civil works Education Education infrastructure, infrastructure, 14.4 14.5 Roads, 48.4 Roads, 52.6 River works, River works, 32.9 37.2 Source: FPS Source: FPS Methodology and assumptions The aggregate financial analysis consider all project cost but only take into account benefits and recurrent cost of river protection works and road improvements projects. This analysis is a low bound estimate of cost-benefit analysis of the project as it passes over the benefit of 15 percent of subproject which heterogeneity did not allow quantifying specific benefits. Moreover, this analysis does not include the benefits 29 resulting from reduced environmental damages, cultural losses, injuries, stress and overwork in relief participants, health risks and social fragmentation. Seemingly, the analysis does not factor in the intangible effect of institutional strengthening and policy development supported under Component 1. In addition, specific cost-benefit analysis of river banks protection works and roads improvement are also carried out to qualify the specific financial effect of these kinds of projects. The assumptions were carefully selected to avoid overestimation of the benefits in order to have conservative estimates that supplement the lack of hard information on the effect of sub-projects on economic activity. The direct investment costs of the project are taken into account as well as the counterpart financing reported by FPS (Figure 2). In the case of riverbanks protection works, no maintenance cost is taken into account as Bolivian municipalities do not make maintenances of this kind of infrastructure. As counterpart of this assumption, it is assumed that riverbanks protection works will endure only 10 years on average. In the case of road improvements, a yearly maintenance cost of 10 percent of initial investment is assumed, allowing to extent the average lifetime of this infrastructure to 15 years. All costs were expressed in 2010 US dollar using the GDP deflator to avoid distortions generated by inflation. The benefits of riverbanks protection works were estimated assuming that each meter of river protection cost about US$400 and that each meter of gabions protect, on average, 200m2 on midlands municipalities and 500m2 in lowlands municipalities—no riverbanks protection works take place in highland municipalities. The amounts disbursed in riverbanks protection works divided by the unit cost of gabions allows estimating the length of gabions constructed by region each year. The length of gabions and the assumptions on area protected by each meter of protection allows estimating the total area projected by region. The resulting protected areas was used to estimate the avoided cost using the departmental agriculture Gross Domestic Product per cultivated hectares— the cultivated hectares at department level were attained using national estimates of national cultivated area published by the National Statistical Institute and area cultivated at departmental level presented in the 2008 national agriculture survey. The attained figures should be consider a low bound estimates as the lack of riverbanks protection may have other impacts not quantified in this analysis and the fact that productivity of land close to river tends to be higher than the departmental average. 30 Figure 2: Cost and benefits Aggregate cost-benefits analysis 4.5 4.0 3.5 US$ million of 2010 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 Costs Benefits Cost-benefit analysis of riverbanks Cost-benefit analysis of road protection works improvements 1.0 4.0 0.9 3.5 0.8 US$ million of 2010 3.0 US$ million of 2010 0.7 2.5 0.6 0.5 2.0 0.4 1.5 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 The benefits of road improvements were estimated assuming that these improvements avoid cost resulting from the lack of mobility in rainy season affecting agriculture sector. It is assumed improvements will reduce the days without traffic by 20 days in the raining season. The number of direct rural beneficiaries of road improvements time the days of normal transit allow to estimate the total number of days lost avoided by region—urban beneficiaries were excluded the analysis as urban population may have better access to alternative roads that may help to mitigate the effect of rains. The lost time the department agriculture output per urban population allow estimating the cost avoided by road improvements. As in the previous case, these figures should be consider as a low bound estimate as the agriculture loss estimate are not taking into account that losses could be higher due the raining season occurs during the harvest season. Moreover, the lack of improved roads may generate cost to other economic sector such as commerce and may increase maintenance costs of roads. Finally, the analysis is not taken into account the effect of road improvements on urban population that could suffer higher transportation cost and delays. 31 Results and sensitivity analysis At the aggregate level, using a discount rate on 10 percent, the Net Present Value (NPV) attains of US$8.4 million, The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) reaches 24.4 percent. This positive results are linked with the high returns on road improvement subprojects which specific IRR attained 45 percent showing that road improvements may avoid severe economic damages in region where rains compromise access of rural roads. In contrast, the specific IRR of riverbank protection sub-projects is negative due to the Bolivian low agriculture productivity and the fact the most of these projects were carried out in middle land region where average protected area is smaller and productivity tend to be lower. Table 1: Cost-benefits analysis and sensitivity analysis River Road Aggregate banks improveme analysis protection nts analysis analysis Base case Internal rate of return, percent 24.4 -13.8 45.3 Net present value, US$ million of 2010, 10% discount rate 8.4 -1.4 11.8 15% less benefits Internal rate of return, percent 20.6 -15.7 39.5 Net present value, US$ million of 2010, 10% discount rate 5.9 -1.5 9.3 30% less benefits Internal rate of return, percent 16.4 -17.9 33.1 Net present value, US$ million of 2010, 10% discount rate 3.3 -1.5 6.8 Taking into account the assumptions used in the analysis, two alternative scenarios were built to check the robustness of result to lower benefits. In the first scenario, it is assumed that benefits are 15 percent lower in the base case scenario, and in the second scenario a 30 percent reduction is assumed. As expected the reduction of benefits reduce the aggregate NPVs and IRRs but they continue showing positive result at aggregate level. 32 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Francis Ghesquiere Regional Hazard Risk LCSWS Disaster Risk Management Management Coordinator Joaquin Toro Task Team Leader LCSWS Disaster Risk Management Fabiola Altimari Legal LEGLA Law Miriam Cespedes Procurement Analyst Procurement Maricarmen Esquivel Junior Professional Associate LCSWS Teddy Landaeta Financial Specialist Financial management Lourdes Linares Sr. Financial Management LCSFM Financial management Specialist Ruth Llanos Social Specialist LCSBO Social issues Gerald Meier Environmental Specialist LCSWS Environmental issues Nara Meli Monitoring and Evaluation LCSWS Monitoring and Specialist evaluation Xiomara Morel Sr. Financial Management LCSFM Financial management Specialist Luis Tineo Procurement Specialist Procurement Kimberly Vilar Social Specialist LCSSO Social issues Supervision/ICR Elma I. Rossel Temporary LCCBO Program Assistant Patricia M. Acevedo Program Assistant LCSDU Program Assistant Violeta Wagner Program Assistant LCSDU Program Assistant Juan Carlos Enriquez Uria E T Consultant LCSEN Environmental Specialist Shirley Foronda Consultant MNAFM Finance Analyst Shirley Leigue Gutierrez Program Assistant LCCBO Program Assistant Jose Yukio Rasmussen Kuroiwa Procurement Specialist LCSPT Procurement Specialist Marco Antonio Joaquín Senior Disaster Risk LCSDU Senior DRM Specialist Rodríguez Corrales Management Specialist Luis Alberto Aviles LCSDU DRM Analyst Juan Marcelo Berthin Heredia Financial Management LCSFM FM Specialist Specialist Wendy Claribel Guerra Navarro Consultant LCSEG DRM Consultant Sarah Gutierrez Barzola Consultant LCSDU Consultant Adam John Behrendt Social Development Specialist LCSSO Social Development Specialist Claudia Ruth Soto Orozco Consultant LCSDU JPA 33 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY07 3.7 23.16 FY08 18.29 120.43 Total: 21.99 143.59 Supervision/ICR FY08 6.78 79.85 FY09 24.59 124.46 FY10 36.36 141.23 FY11 37.67 120.14 FY12 30.91 124.92 FY13 14.49 93.60 FY14 14.07 75.68 Total: 164.87 759.88 34 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Not applicable. 35 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results La Paz, Bolivia November 21, 2013 The workshop was entitled, “Validation of Results for the Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project—ERDMP.” Its primary objective was to bring together representatives of the Bank, Borrower (GoB), and implementing agencies to share, discuss, and validate the results of the Project. Present at the workshop were representatives of:  The World Bank (Country Office and Headquarters);  Ministry of Development Planning (MPD) / Vice Ministry for Planning and Coordination (VPC);  Vice Ministry for Civil Defense (VIDECI);  National Fund for Productive and Social Investment (FPS);  General Directorate for Territorial Planning (DGOT);  Vice Ministry of Housing and Urbanism;  Vice Ministry of Waterworks and Irrigation;  Vice Ministry of Environment, Biodiversity, and Climate Change;  Vice Ministry of Basic Sanitation;  Ministry of Rural Development / DRM Unit Department of Oruro;  Autonomous Municipal Government of La Paz. The event lasted one day and was participatory in character as described below. -Opening remarks were delivered by Armando Guzman, the Project TTL. -Official opening discourse was delivered by the Vice-Minister of the MPD. -These were followed by a series of presentations concerning Component 1 of the Project for strengthening the National System for Risk Reduction and Disaster Emergency Response (SISRADE) through capacity building at national, sectoral, and local levels. -Three different presentations were given, by MPD/VPC, VIDECI, and the Bank. After each presentation question-and-answer and sessions were opened to all parties present. -The morning session concluded with validation of Component 1 indicators as set out in the PAD. -The afternoon session proceeded in the same fashion but concerned elements of Component 2, which focused on rehabilitation, reconstruction, and small mitigation works. 36 -Presentations were given by the Bank, VPC, and FPS followed by discussion, queries, and response. -The session concluded with validation of the results figuring in the matrix of indicators. -Various lessons learned and recommendations were forwarded, followed by closing remarks. The workshop was above all an inclusive forum. The presence of an ample cross-section of Bank, Borrower, and other stakeholder interests fostered highly productive discussion and interchange in a relatively short period of time. The salient points of consensus are as follow:  Compared to the 2007 pre-Project situation, 2013 disaster-response capacities of the GoB are significantly improved, thanks notably to the building of new coordination processes and inter-agency relationships necessary to implementing Component 1. Although successful continuation of cross-sectoral cooperation and collaboration will require clearer definition of roles and prerogatives of the various actors involved, the Project-supported dialogue that has been inaugurated represents the crucial and perhaps most difficult first step in a long-term process.  The Project has contributed crucially—notably through the Alpacoma and Oruro Land-use Studies—to developing baseline data and multi-disciplinary methodologies for identification of zones susceptible to disasters and other adverse events.  The Project has been crucial to preserving and making accessible institutional memory as concerns data pertinent to DRM. Current and historical archives have been digitally catalogued in systematized fashion (SENAMHI and SINAGER) and then made accessible via an electronic platform (GeoNode), two signal achievements without precedent in Bolivia.  Another ground-breaking aspect of the Alpacoma and Oruro Studies has been to unite a wide array of scientific and technical expertise in service to integral area plans, providing future DRM and development activities with holistic profile of natural and social contexts based on high-quality, geo-referenced, up-to-date information.  Sustainable rehabilitation is an indispensable component of reconstruction. Future development planning must involve genuinely balanced assessment of whether or not recurrence of disaster in a particular locale or situation is foreseeable, and avoid simply rebuilding where future disaster is imminent. Resettlement may present an opportunity to improve the standard of living of vulnerable groups in high-risk areas, functioning as both a response to factors underlying vulnerability and addressing exposure to existing risk. 37 Implementation process for subproject identification should be more flexible. Many municipalities lacked sufficient funds and/or capacities required to assemble competitive subproject proposals, with the result that they were unable to engage with the Project. This could be resolved if expenses incurred for subproject identification could be reimbursed upon approval of the application.  A contingency line of credit or special emergency fund could effectively alleviate certain difficulties that slowed crisis-response time at the outset of the Project.  Effective DRM is inherently multi-sectoral. It should henceforth be implemented in holistic fashion, integrating inputs from a multitude of sectors and levels (national, departmental, municipal, and community).  Long-term vision, coherent policy, and integrated implementation are essential prerequisites of effective DRM.  From both economic and human life lost/saved standpoints, it is far more effective to concentrate on prevention than on mitigation.  Many of the Project’s successes that do not show up in the indicators. These include but are not limited to: the catalytic effect of rebuilt schools in attracting new residents seeking high-quality education for their children; DRM strategy is beginning to be developed by the GoB directly from Bolivian experience, not imported from elsewhere; and providing development ideas for integrating DRM in planning for urban contexts, in which close to 60 percent of Bolivia’s populace resides.  To be genuinely effective, DRM must become an integral part of territorial planning.  Territorial planning should take into account multiple facets, including environment/ecology, livelihoods, resource-management, climatic shocks, and various other crucial elements.  The new risk assessment tools and methodologies are ground-breaking in that they actively engage participation local authorities and populations, namely departmental and municipal. Risk assessment can thereby achieve maximal efficacy, as it (1) is nuanced to reflect socio-economic and environmental particularities of a given zone and (2) is appropriated by the stakeholder / beneficiaries themselves. 38 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Summary of points raised in the Borrower’s evaluation report. 1. The Government believes that integrating Disaster Risk Management with land use planning is crucial in identifying risk at the local level and formulating preventive measures. In parallel, Disaster Risk Management should be incorporated as a transversal theme within each sector. These two complementary approaches will ensure a comprehensive development planning process in the short, medium and long term. 2. The GoB recommends providing incentives for the resettlement of populations established in urban areas with high landslide risk. 3. In terms of project implementation, the Government considers that execution of reconstruction and rehabilitation works should happen more quickly, especially in the context of an ERL. First, it becomes difficult to evaluate the effects of El Niño and la Niña on damaged infrastructure many years after the disaster. Secondly, due to the execution delays in component 2, many civil works identified in the original design became irrelevant as municipal governments chose to bear their cost outside of the project. In the future, the Government plans to improve its ability to identify and prioritize reconstruction works. 4. The GoB acknowledges that the procurement process needs to be better adapted to the context of poor and remote municipalities in order to make small civil works more attractive for construction companies. Maintenance should be provided by municipalities after the life of the project in order to ensure sustainability. 5. The Government highlights the importance of conducting a high-quality social assessment and involving local communities during project preparation and implementation. 6. A clear and independent financial management framework on the Client side needs to be in place at the very start of the project in order to avoid bureaucratic bottlenecks and delays in payments and disbursements. 7. The early establishment of a strong project implementation unit within the implementing agency will be crucial in ensuring effective project execution in future operations. The Government also underlines the importance of Monitoring and Evaluation procedures to improve reporting and project management. 8. A contingency line of credit could effectively alleviate certain difficulties that slowed crisis response at the outset of the Project. This would be part of a risk financing strategy in the country. 39 Summary of Borrower’s comments on Draft ICR 1. The GoB points out an inconsistency between the wording of Component 1 intermediate outcome indicator “Draft of legislation for incorporation of risk management in territorial planning submitted to the MPD for consideration” 16 in the PAD and the project’s Operations Manual. The Client explains that the 2012 Operations Manual refers to “methodologies” not “draft legislation”. Therefore, even though the Alpacoma and Oruro studies only provided methodologies to incorporate disaster risk management in territorial planning, the Client considers this indicator as fully achieved. The Bank’s team however, assigns a 50% achievement level since only recommendations for a draft legislation were submitted, not the actual draft legislation. 2. With regards to project management shortcomings identified within the implementing agency17, the GoB notes that Mid-Term Review results were not clearly communicated to the VPC. 3. The Client clarifies that not all municipalities have difficulties in maintaining riverbanks protection works18. This is only the case in small municipalities such as the ones included in the Project. 16 See intermediate outcome indicator 3 B2 in section F “Results Framework Analysis” p. v. 17 See section 32, p. 9 18 See second paragraph of Economic Analysis, p. 30 40 Borrower’s evaluation report and comments on Draft ICR Viceministerio de Planificaci6n v Coordinaci6n INFORME FINAL DE EVALUACION Proyecto RecupcraciOn de Emefgenclas y Gesti6n de oesastfe.s - • EST ADO PLURINACIONAL DE BOLIVIA ~PO MINISTERIO DE PLANIFICACION DEL DESARROLLO VICEMINISTERIO 1)1: PLAN IFICACION Y COORI)INi\CION PROYECTO DE RECUPERACION DE EMERGENCIAS Y GESTION DE DESASTRES "PREGD" Convenio de Financiamiento - AIF Cr. B0-4377 y Cr. B0-4440 JNFORME FINAL DE CIERRE 41 Viceministerio de Planificaci6n y CoordinatiOn INFORME FINAL DE EVALUACION Proyecto Recuperaci6n de E mergencias y Gesti6n de Ocsastres INFORME FINAL DE CIERRE I. ANTECENOENTES OEL PROYECTO El proyccto se gencr6 como una estratcgia para miligar los efccws del Fcn6mcno del N ino que causo considet·ablcs pcrdidas fisicas. econ6rnicas, socialcs y ambicntal cs en Boli via entre Novicmbrc de 2006 y Junio de 2007. El Gobicrno Nacional dcclar6 Estado de Emergcncia mediante Occrcto 290 13 de 2007, dis1>on iendo recursos y csqucmas institucionales para lfrontar Ia tragcdia. Considcrando Ia magnitud de Ia afcctaei6n. el Gobierno declaro Situacion de Dcsastrc N,.cional mediante Decrcto 29040 < del 2007. El Minislcrio de Plani ficaci6n del Desarrollo fue encargado de claborar el Plan Naci onal de Rehabilitaci6n y Reconstrucci6n para Ia 7.ona afcctada - I'RRES. enmarcado en el PN D. cl cual fuc prcseruado en abril de 2007. Este Plan fue dise~ado condos objctivos f\mdamentalcs: i) dclinir ac.ciones de rccupcrnci6n para atcndcr Ia emergencia con mims a restaurar Ia producti vidad. cs deci 1 ·. Ia gcneraci6n de ingrcs()S especialmente en los scctorcs que gcnemn mayorcs nivclc.s de cmplco (trnnsporlc y abaslccimicnlo nacional); ii)· analizar opciones de mitigaci6n del ricsgo pam implementarse end pnis y disminuir I<• vulncrabilidad ante pr6xirnos cvcnlos. A p<:tici6n del Gobicrno 13oliviano. se gcstion6 un empn!stito de cmcrgencia con un pcriodo de 6 ailos a pllrtir del ano 2008 n traves del 13anco M undial, que incluye mcdidas de rchabilitaci6n y rcconstrucci6n de Ia infracstructura afectada. med ida~ para fortalccim icnto institucional de las entidades del ni vel central. dcpanamcntal y municipal a cargo del lema de gcsti6rr del ricsgo. Los scctorcs que scriin contcmplados por las invcrsioncs scctot·ialcs de rchabilitaci 6n y reconstruccit\n con cstc Proycc.to entre olras scran: agricuhura. transporte. vivienda. agua potable, ricgo~ cuencas. dcsccnt.rali.£aci6n y dclensa civi l. 2. OESCRIPC ION DEL PROYECTO 2. f. Objetivo General El obj ct ivo general del l'royecl<> cs apoyar al Oobicrno de Bolivia en Ia impletnentaci6n de l os trabajos de recuperaci6n propuestos en el PN RR por los fcn6mcnos N ino y N iiia. para rcstaurar el acceso a infi'acstructura l!>asica y Ia rehabilitaci6n del sector productivo de una parte de Ia poblaci6n afectada en los nueve dellartamentos. y lonalccer Ia eapaeidad institucional del Gobierno Nacional, sectorial y local para responder ante finuros cventos naturales adversos. 2.2. Objetivos Espccificos Fonalcccr cl Sistema Nacional para Ia Rcducci6n de Riesgos y A tcnci6n de Desastres y/ o 12rnergcncias- StSRAI)E. a travcs de Ia construcci6n de capacidad de rcspucsta institucional para atcnci6n de desasrrcs, prcvcnci6n )' rcconstrucci6n. en cl nivcl nacional. sectorial y local. lmplcmcntar los trabajos pequc~os idcnt i ficados y validados en el Plan Nacional de Rchabilitaci 6n y Reconstrucci6n Sost cn ible - I>RRES y rccopilados en cl PNRR. l)csa>Tollar un planlcamiento del marco de politica para oricntar futuros programas de rchabi litaci6n y reconstruccion. Ampliar geogritficamcntc Ia cobcrtura del l'royecto a trabaj os pcqucnos de rchabilitaci6n. rcconstntcci6n y mitigaci6n, para cubrir las 5 areas priorizadas como en cl prO)'CCIO original. Re~abilitar Ia capacidad productiva para cubrir las conHrnidal)lcrncntarios al Programa de f'oi1alecimicnto lnstitucional en Rcducci6n de Oesastres que esta implcmcntando actualmcnlc cl l'rograma de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo - PN UD con cl Gobicrno !3oliviano. Los componcntcs son: Componcntc I: Fonalecimiento dd SISRA DE. Componcnte 2: Trab4jos de reconstrucci6n y rchabili taci6tl. l l 42 Viceministerio de Planificac:i6n y Coordinad6n INFORME FINAL DE EVALVACION Provecto Recuperaci6n de Emergcncias y Gesti6rl de De-sastre-s 3. CUM PLIM I ENTO DE LOS 06J ETI VOS DEL PROY ECTO . CUADRON o. - Ob' CIIVOS PIan tea d OS Vs. Ob' · JCIIVOS Logr:o OS CUAOIW C OMPARATI VO OD.JF:TI VOS PLANT£AOO Vs. OBJ£TIVOS LOGRADO Objttivos lnici,.les Evaluation de los Objetivos logrados .,/ Sc ha logr;tdO fortalcccr Cas ERI'Is a tmvCs de In comrataci6n de consultorcs individuulcs por producto en cl marco de Ia gcst i6n de ricsgos para el fortakcimiento do las Unidadcs de Gcsti6n de Ricsgos. .,/ Se ha for1alccic.lo con d cquipamicnto de cF.S I 2 Scrvidores 9 3 ComMtadoras Estae•ooana.s de 'I'mba o 18 4 po de COOIIJOUiacion port;ltil ( l.aptop) 4 II lm >resom l.aS!!r IS VJI)EC.:I • UGR's 12 GI'S 4 13 Foroco >•~d0t3 (lmpfesora. Ese4net. fk<) I 14 Liccnci3s Sofhvate I SUilTOT ,\L U:-oiOADES 40 TOTAl. UN rDAllf.S .IJJQUIIIII)JIS 78 ~ /\si mismo. Ia' ERFis ha' sido bcncticiadas con cl dcsMrollo de'"' sistema GeoNodc (alcna tcmpnma a cargo del S INAGllR). ~ Sc ha llcvado adclante ialleres con las insmncias invrllucradns en Ia Gcs1i6n de Riesgos a travcs del f'REGO (Taller de "Expcricncias de RchabiIitaci6n y Rcconstrucci6n Post Dcsas tre (2008-2012)". junio 2013) y las consultorias por producto al momento de val idar sus productos finales con Ins instancias y scctorcs ~· los cuales se ha lol!.mdo fortalecer en cl marco de lagcsti6n de ricsgo. Se ha irnplcmentado: hnplcmcntar los 1rabajos pequcrios ~ 5 pcquco 1os tnlb•yos de Mitugllci6n y Rchabilitaci6n, idcntiticados y validados en cl idcntiiicados y validados col cl Plan Nacionul PRRES y I'NRR: de Rchabili1aci6n y Rcconstruccion Sostonible .,/ 3 subproyectos en cll)epartnra oricnu1r futuros programas de Po~t l)<;sastrc y rchabilitaci6n y rcconstrucci6n. ,/ 'J)Oraci6n de Ia gcsti6n del ricsgo cu Ia Una Propuesta de normat iva para Ia iiiCOI planilicacion territoria l. Ampliar· gcogr~ficamentc Ia cobcrtum del l'royccto a trabajos pet1uc~os de rchabilitaci6n, .,/ De Ia 5 cinco regiones pr·iol'izadas. se ha arnpliado lartamcntos y 54 Municipios "cxccpdon del Departamento de Oruro. tireus priori r..adns como en cl proyccto original. ~ M~diante cl Proyccto sc ha rchabilitado Ia capacitad productiva a tmvcs de 82 RchabilitR£G D SU BTOTAL UNIOI\ OES I 2 I Scrvidores 9 SINAGER 3 I Computadoras Estacionarias de Trabajo 18 4 JEquipo de cornputaci6n portillil (Laptop) 3 31 44 Viceministerio de Planificaci6n y Coordinaei6n IN FORME FINAL DE EVALUACION Proyecto Recuperaci6n de Emergencias y Gesti6n de Oesastres 5 hnoresora Laser 4 6 llma Show I 7 GPS I 8 Plotter I SUBTOTAL UNIOAOES 37 9 Compu ladoras Eslacionarias de Trabajo 15 10 Eonsablc de los resultados. cronograma de aetividades. resultados y productos del cquipo. tambicn es neccsaria Ia definicion de las consultorias importnntcs que cuenten con tiempo complcto para que scan de asistcncia y apoyo al cquipo. La cxpericncia del E.studio de Gcstion lnteg.ral de Ia Cuenca A lpacoma ha dcmostrado que un estudio de esta naturaleza debe tener un conocimicmo del problema a de1allc y de esta forma plantcar los u bjctivos gcncmlcs, espccflicos y actividades de manera espeeilica y no gen~rica. En lo posiblc Ia practica indica que cs preferible Ia contratacion de una empresa privada para cjccuci6n de cstudios cspccilicos, dcbido a Ia rneior capacidad y agilidad para Ia cjccucion del estudio, mientras que una cmprcsa pt1 blica para Ia subcomrataci6n de especialistas ncccsiia de procesos de eontrataci6n y de Ia misma lonna Ia burocracia en una empresa p(oblica es inucho mayor a Ia de una cmprcsa pri vada. L a expcricncia en Ia d nra un correcto cumplimicrno del estudio y por cndc del contruto. Los contratos de estudios necesariamcnte deben contemplar sanciones y multas por incumplimicnto de tcnninos del contrato. como tambiCn fiJ~u plazo limite de ticmp() para prcscntaci6n de productos obscrvados.. de parte de las cmprcs.as consultorus y/o consuhorcs por producto, en raz6n de que no cxiste un mecan ismo artieulador de exigcncia de los produclos. Eltcma de GdRD ncccsita una mils amplia difusi6n en los diferentcs scctores e instituciones involucradas, como ser eapaeitaciones. asesorarniento. tallcres entre otros. 41 45 ViGcministerio de Planificaci6n y coordinaci6n INFORME FINAL DE EVALUACIQN Proyecto Recuperaci6n de Emergencias y Gestl6n de oesastres Administralivos y r·intmcieros La gcstion linancicra de 1111 proycclo de emergencia rcqu ierc comar dcsdc su inicio con una ges1iim linanciern propia e independicnte y de csta forma cvi1ar utrdttn7n y burocracin por parte de Ia llnidades J\drninistrali va!\ y Financier-as para Ia gcsti6n de desembolsos y pagos. l.a implcmcntaci6n y adminislraci6n de un proycc1o de GdRD y/o Emcrgencia.~. dcsde cl inici o debe con1ar con un equipo rnultidisciplinario de trabajo (Coordinaci6n . especial i sla admin istr>llivo financicro. cspccialisw en adquisiciones y contralaciones, especial iSla en seguimicnlo y moni torco de proycc1os. Ambicntal. Social. Abogado. auxiliares, etc.) cslablccicndo de csta forma un exi1o en cl cumplimicnto de los objcl i vos del proyecto. Que las institucioncs prcvcan rccur"SOS ccon6m icos pclra prcvcnci6n. gt~ti6n y atenci6n oportuna a los clcsas1rcs. csto solo scr..i posiblc. si incorroran acti va y visiblcmcnte Ia Gcsti6n de Riesgos en los difcrcmcs planc.s de mcdiano y cor1o plazo. en los difcrcntcs nivelcs del Estado. l.as institucioncs cornprcndidas en Ia gcsti6n del ricsgo dcbcn gcncrar nnccanismos y/o procedimicnlos de atenciOn inmediattt. de tal manera que l()s lr{unitcs pucdan scr memos burocnlticos y dilatorias. de esta forma n.:ducir Ia vulnerabilidad. Ia exposici6n al riesgo y los cfc.ctos de los da•los. Se debe contar con instmmcnL OS dinfunicos de scgui micnto. monitOI'eo y cvaluaciOn para las difcrcnlc$ areas c instancias y de csta forma pr ·cscntnr intb•·maci6n actualizadn de los proccsos. 5.2. COMPO NENT E 2 l>ara Ia Contrataci6n de Comparaci6n de J>recios (CPN) sc debcn postular por lo mcnos trcs proponentes. cso conllcvo a que en proponcntc~ lo· que produjo que cl proycclO sc cncuentre en una etupa muy algunos proyljct()S sc licitcn varins vcc.cs por Ia H•lta de critica. retrasando los 1>roccsos de contra1aci6n y Ia ejecuci6n de In obra s. · Los subproyeclos del Cornponcntc 2, en su mayorfa se elaboraron y aprobaron en las gcstioncs 2007, 2008 y 2009, pcro · ternas de burocracia interinslitucional sc llcgaron a ~jccutar en las gcstioncs 20 I I , 20 1 lamcntablcmcntc po• 2 y 20 13. Ia di fercncia de anos entre Ia clnbomci6n del pcrlll y Ill adjudicaci6n y/o presemaci6n de tlimiento de Ia ejecuci6n fisica- liruoncicnt de Ia obms, asi tambicn de las medidas de mitigaci6n o prcvenci6n plantcadas en cl Manual de Buenas J>racticas Ambicntalcs, Plan de conlingencias y en Ia Ficha Ambiental. Los' proycc1os de rcconstrucd6n que incluyan accioncs de rctiro de Ia infracstructura daflada para Ia construcci6n de una nueva cstructura debe contar con cl plnnLc.am icnto de mcdidas de mitigaci6n y/o prevenci6n esp~cificas (indepcndienle de Ia categorizaci6n) y un plan de scguimicnto pcrmanentc para su cumpli micnlo. Sc rcquicrc mayor scguimiento in situ a los proycc1os en In fasc de cjccuci6n. para que las Empresas contrati stas cumplan l o cstablecido en Ia Ley 19668 l.cy General de lligiene Seguridad Ocupaeional y 13icncshtr, rcspecto a que los bnpleadorcs " dcbcn Adoptar todas las mcd idas de ordentecnico para Ia protceci6n de Ia vi da, Ia intcgridad tlsica y mental de los trabajadores. La rcposici6n de Ia infraesrructura datiada no solamente requiere de obras civiles sino rambicn de medidas bioingenicriles ( forcstaci6n) cspechtlmcnlc en dcfcnsivos que gcneralmcnlc son lllcilcs de cjecu1ar por su bajo cos1o. esto permitira dar mayor sostcnibilidad a Ia obra. Durante el dise~o de Ia obra cs ncccsario contar con medidas estructurales y no cstructuralcs que permita lograr restabl ecer las condiciones b{lsicas de Ia infracslructunt dai'lada para normalizar las actividadcs de Ia comunidad y Ia rcstauraci6n del medioambiemc. I ,a.realizaci6n de una Evaluaci6n Ambienlal Estrntegica que perm ita agiliz,lr c l proccso de licitaci6n de obras, adcmas que perm ita pl an i ficar Ia ubicaci6n. Ia canlidad o el tipo de proycctos que sc pucdcn1dcsarrollar en un dcterminado lunbito o 1crri1orio, desde un punto de vis1 a intcsrat, cs1ratCgico incluyendo critcrios basados en Ia participaci6n pUblica~ transparcncia adminis1rativ:l c informaci6n en 1 odos los niveles de involucmmicnto. 51 46 Viceministerio de Planiticaci6n y CoordinatiOn INFORME FINAL DE EVALUACION Proyecto Recuperaci6n de Emergencias y Gcsti6n de Ocsastres 6. EJECUCION FI NANCIERA POR CATEC ORIAS Y COMPONENT ES 2007-2013 Ejccuci(ln Fi nancicra del Compon ente I C uad ro No. 4· EJECUC JO N FINANCIERA DEL COMI'ONENTE I DEL I'REGD (En Oolares A mericanos) ,_ Sub. Comp. C4dfco Descripd6n Apoyo para Ia coordina66n J!SIIIUC. fJE ~NANallilaflo ..IICIAL PRIMERA ESTRUCTURA MOOIFI( AOA VIGENTE --- - - -- ......... "' .. - "' . Ejoaado ~ 31/!2171111!1 31/U/BI.O 31/17/21111 31/U/7412 ~ ................. 31/U/74l3 - ....-. - (loodu,e 20131 Ejecutado Acumulado . al febrero/2014 ......,.,_.. interin.stilucional del PREGO en procesos de ft'COnStfuCCI6n y 1.1.1.a. rehabiJrtaci6n bajo el 54.000.00 Z4.9Z6,00 79,ZO 79.20 7.041.32 21.520.00 2 .623.9 1 o.oo 50.015,49 proyecto de Recuperaci6n de Emergenc.iJ vGcs-ti6n de Oesastres (VPC). rncorporaci6n de l;t Gesti6n de Riesgo en los 1.1.2.a. procesos de Pl<)nificad6n 432.700.00 266.356,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 6.269,73 32.266,4 0 27.849,83 1311..294,33 Territorial de Oruro (VPC). tncorporaci6n de Ia 1.1.3. Gtsti6n de Riesgo en 14.500,00 0,00 0,00 0.00 0,00 0.00 lnversiones PUblicas. Apoyo al desarrollo del l.L4.a. SINAGER. 9.665,68 17.606,42 25.525,31 54.698,00 11 .718,51 0,00 155.619,87 Apoyo al SENAMHI para gcn.cn:tci6n de informaci6n 454.675,00 31Z.S09,00 1.1.4.b. Hidrometeoro '6eica para 0,00 3.969,2 1 4.543,10 4.543,00 0,00 0,00 60.302,32 I;) gcsti6n del riesgo a nivel sectorial v territoriaL Estudios preliminares para el desarrollo de una 1.1.5. estrate&ia de riesgo 344.000,00 0,00 0 ,00 0,00 0,00 finMc.iero. A.sistencia para el desarrollo del Pia•' de 1.1.6. Contingencia por el 200.125,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 F-enO meno de Ia N•na (VIOECI). Elaboraci6n a disti\o final de Ia carpeta de F'ortalecimiento al Sistema 1.2.1. Naclonal de Rcd ~.~cci6n de 37.000,00 3Z.6Zl,OO 0,00 1.384 ,84 0,00 9 .1115,79 Riesgos y Atenct6n de Oesastres y/o Emergendas SISRAOE. El~boracl6n a final de Ia carpeta de Gesti6n lntegtal 1.2.2.a. del Manejo de Ia Cuenca 0,00 1.701,00 1.701,00 222.343 ,8 1 126.434,73 37ZSa,.70 Alpacoma (VPC). Forte~ ledmlento de l.ls 456.000,00 555.972,00 Unldadt.s de Gesti6n de 1.2.2.b. Aieseos (UGFt) en 9 0,00 2.249,09 22.230 ,32 29.005,03 !Jt.625,81 senores y Entidades Tertitorial {VIOECI). Administraci6n de los Ae(tlrsos del Provecto v soporte de sestiOn en apoyo a Ia coordinaci6n del PREGD en 1.2.3.a. adquistciones v U.413,41 55.026,93 105.628,90 145.9 10,00 5.424,20 . 0,00 zou~ contr.nac1ones, 307.000,00 298.116,00 desembolsos y en Ia c.onsolidad6n de informaci6n teGnica pafa el compooente 1 (VPC). 1.2.3.b. Audito1ias Externas (VPC). 0,00 0,00 0,00 5.791,68 7.288 ,60 38.649.3 1 6111.:751!1,33 TOTALES ($us) 2.300.000,00 1.490.500,00 ZZ.1S8,Z9 76.681,76 144.439,63 242.682,49 919.728,26 221.938,90 1.141.667,16 TOTAL EJECUOON FINANOERA (DOIARES AMERICANOS) 1.141.667.16 PORCENTAJE EJECUCION FINANCIERA COMPONENTE 1 76,60% Fuente Archl\().':i PRF.GD Gcs116n 201 3 6 1Piig 47 Viceministcrio dt Pletnif1 cad6n y CoordinactOn I NFORME FI NA~ OE EVALUACION Proyecto Recuperaci6n de Emergentias y Gesti6n de Oesa.stres f.jecuci6n Finnnciern del Com ponentr 2 A conlinuacion ..: dctullc un resumen sobrc Ia cjccuci6n linnnci cm dd compo ncnte 2 del PRt;(;l), rclc rido a obras de rchabilitaci6n y rcconstruccion : Cundro No.5 - Ejecuci6n fin:on ciera del Componente 2 del PRECD (En Dolnres Amcricanos) ,\CT I\' 10 ,\0E C Oi\trON E:\TE 2 Sutxon111. 2009 2010 20 11 20 12 2013 Ejccuci6n de tmb:ljos de Rcconstrucci6n ) 2. 1 1.765. 166.59 1.288.661.15 2.079.90-1.70 1.390.955.58 2.Q.l3.39U5 Rchabilitaci6n Acompw1:.micnto rccnico de Supe" isi6n a Ia 2.2 97.2 12.25 57.685.57 112.736.65 (yl,(,27.42 119.736. 12 cjccuci6n de los pro)<:Ctos t::jccuci6n de pequcnos tmbajos d.: Mitigaci6n y 2.3 11. 122.82 8.084.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 Rchabilitaci6n ,._.- Slllfi'OTALES (Sus) 1.875.510.66 1.356.441 ,30 2. 194.652,35 1.457.595,00 2.165.143,47 T OTAL EJ£CUC ION COM1'0NENET F.2 9.049.342. 78 Fu~ue Rt.'l)O•tc dd HJoS a Scplctn1brc del2013 Grafica No.2- Ejecuci6n Finandtra del Componenle 2 EJECUCION FINANCIERA DEL COMPONENTE 2 $US 2,500,000.00 2,079,904 70 2,043,394.35 2.000.000.00 1,'>00.000.00 1,000,0 00.00 500,000.00 0.00 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 8 Ejecuci6n de trabaJOS dP ReconstruCCJOn y Rehabilitaa6n 8 Acompailamtento T~niCO dP Superv sr6n a Ia ejecuci6n de fo• proycctos Ejecuct6n de peque~os t raba1os d" Motlgacl6n y Rehabilitaclon 7. PRI NC II>At...ES RES ULTADOS DE LA EJEC UCI ON J)EJ. PllOYECTO Cuadro No.6 - R ESULTADOS DEL PROYt:CTO ... ---- ---...,. ., - . .. ..... .. ~--- ·-- . --·~-- - :~.·- Se ha fortalecido a las Unldades de Gesti6n de Riesgos, a traves de las ERFis con equipamiento, desarrollo de sostemas v productos con el desarrollo estud10s de estrategoas sectorlafes para Ia gesti6n del rlesgo, deslinados a los diferentes sectores priorizados por el proyecto. COMPONENTE 1 ... ... Se ha logrado entregar a los Municipios de El Alto, Achocalla v La Paz el Estudio de Gesti6n de Manejo Integral de Ia Cuenca de ALPACOMA, que permitir~ Ia gestion de recursos para Ia ejecucion de las obras propuestas ... Se ha desarrollado el Estudlo de Zonificaci6n Agroecol6&ica de los Munlclplos del Sur de Oruro con enfoque de Ordenamiento Territorial. A traves de Ia ERFis y las UGRs, se ha capacitado en temas de gestion de riesgos a diferentes Municipios, Gobernaclones y sectores de Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia . Se ha logrado rehabilitar y reconstruir 244 subproyectos, en las 5 rcglones priorizadas, beneficiando COMPONENTE 2 a 446.156 personas. 71 48 Vicemini$terio de Planificaci6n vCoordinaci6n INFORME FINAL DE EVALUACION Proye-cto RecuperatiOn de Emergencias y Gesti6n de Oesastres ----------------------· 7. 1. RESULT A DOS D EL COMPON ENTf: 2 Cuadro No. 7 - NUMERO 0 £ SU BI'ROY ECfOS EJ ECUTAOOS POR GESTION COMPONENTE 2 2009 201!.0 2011 2012 2013 Ejecuci6n de t rabajos de Reconstrucci6n y 76 56 41 23 43 Rehabilitaci6n Acompanamiento Tecnico de Supervision a Ia 79 58 41 23 43 ejecuci6n de los proyectos Ejecuci6n de pequeiios t rabajos de M it igaci6n y 3 2 Rehabilitaci6n SUBTOTALES 79 58 41 23 43 TOTAL 244 TOTAL EJl:CUCI ON FI SI CA DEL COJ\1PONEN ETE 2 100% f ue•He . Reporte del FPS a Scptetmbre del 2013 Gratica No.3 - % de Ejccucion de Obras (lOr SECfOR PORCENTAJE DE EJECUCION DE OBRAS POR SECTOR #DE SALUO VIVIENOA AG UA POTABLE SECTOR PROY. EDUC 1% 1% 4% CAM INOS 104 RECURSOS 88 HIORICOS 42% RIEGO 8 EDUCACION 31 SALUD 2 VIVIENOA 2 AGUA POTABLE 9 TOTAL 244 36% GrafiCJt No.4- II de Subtlroyc~tos Ejccutados (lOr Gratica No. 5-% de beneticiarios (lOr Departamento Departam ento NUMERO DE SUBPROYECTOS EJECUTADOS POR PORCENTAJE DE BENEFICIARIOS POR DEPARTAM ENTO DEPARTAMENTO EN RELACION AllOO% DE LA POBLACION BENEFICIARIA 90 80 3 7% 70 .~ 60 I 50 27% 40 16% • ... 30 20 10 0 ~ ..,.., Ita .,. c:r .. !<> ..... ,o~ ~"' ~ ,(,'tf-~,~ 0% • TARUA 10% 20% • SANTACRUZ 30% • POTOSI 40% ..,.., .. ,s ._o ff ~(J' ~>' ~ • PANDO • LAPAZ COCHAI3AMBA ,_~ &c • CHUQUISACA • BEN I 49 Vi<:eministerio de Planificad6n y Coordinad6n INFORME FINAL DE EVAlUACION as Proyecto Recuperaci6n de Emereencias y Gesti6n de Des_ _ re •_ _s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Crafica No. 6 · % de Ejecucion financicrA por Departamento PORCENTAIE DE EJECUCION FINANCIERA POR DEPARTAMENTO BENI PANDO CHUQUISACA 6% 2% 11% SANTA CRUZ 29% ORURO 0% POTOSI 32% Fuente: Reporte d'el f.PS a Septeimb(e dtl 2013 8. CONC LUS ION ES Y REC OM ENDA C IONES ./ l.a incorporacion del Orden,.micnto T erritorial y Ia Ges tion de Riesgos de Oesnstr es. res ulta imprcscindible en cualquier proceso de phmificacion integral ya que clio pcrrnitir;1. j unto a lo.s actores invo lucrados. idcntificar las po tcncialidadcs y dcbilidades del territorio y de csta rnancr:l. fo rmul;lr los objctivos q ue perm ican no solarnclllc disminuir Ia vulncrabilidad. s ino pro movcr cl dcs:mo llo . ./ A fin de implcmenlar e incor porar Ia GdRO en los procesos de plan i-fica cion. considerando el rol tran sversal q ue cstos jucgan. tkberfm (l>rmar pane de las unidadcs tccnicas de planHicaci6n de los d ifer emes scctore.~ . ./ La variables de am\lisis para Ia valoracion del riesgo dcbcn cstar lig.adas fundamenlahncnte en un orden generativo: primero dcstinada a prcscn•ar y garanti7"-r Ia vida por sobrc todas las cosas. en segundo Orden Ia salud y Ia sobcrania alimcntaria y tcrccro, Ia comunicaciOn y vcn cbraci6n camincra~ de wl rnancra que los programas o proycctos de rc.construcci6n cucntcn con una 1 6gica de implemcntaci6n. -"' Sc recom ienda Ja generaci6n de mecanismos. de incentivos 1>ara el re.a sentamiento de zonas urban as ya ascntadas en zonas identilicadas con un muy alto ricsgo de dcsli?.amiento. -"' Ccmsiderando Ia visi6 n de Ia planilicaci6n integra l, sc debe implcmcntar Ia gestion del riesgo agropecuario en los onunicipios allamcnL c productivos y municipios de gcncran produc- c i6 n de autoconsumo, articulando con los scctores de salud, educaci6n. transportes . ../ lmplemcntar cl sistema de alerta tempran:\ en municipios frecuentemente amenazados con cnfoquc de cuenca. -"' Cuando cval(o l o 6 La Niola, por lo a Ia inlracslructurn dcbido altiempo transcurrido. se haec dilicil cvidcncinr Ia afcctaci6 n de El nio cual sc cvidcncia q ue no debe pasar mucho tiempo entre Ia a llrobacion del proyecto y Ia ejecuci6 n d el mismo, ya que de suceder clio, especial mente en proycctos relacio nados con GdRO, sc com: cl ricsgo de no causar cl c fi:cto c impaclo dcscado y pcor alm, no atendcr en forma oportuna Ia..;; ncccsidadcs y rc.q ucri mientos de los afectados, peor aUn si son consider-ados pro yectos de cmergcncia . ./ Existen obr as de emergencia ya ejecutadas liOr los CAM s, csto debido a hi dcmo m en Ia idcntificaci6n. validaci6n, adjudicaci6n c inicio de las obras de rcconstrucci6n. -"' Se debcn dclin ir polflicas y procedimi cntos de i ncenlivo a las empresas constr uctoras. de mancra tal. que hagan atracliva Ia pos1Uiaci6 n a proycctos r>cqucnos. en municipios pobrcs, y q ue sc encuentran onuy alcjados . ./ En general, Ia ubicaci6 n de nuevas viviendas. infraestnoctura vital. infrae.~tructura agropccuaria c inlracSlrucwra industrial, no dcberfa ser permitida en ~reas con un alto y muy alto nivel de des lizamiento por todos los danos potcnciales a los que estarian cxpues1os a 1 >csar de Ia construcci6n de o bras de proteccion de g ran magnilud, por clio Ia importancia de incorporar Ia GdRD en los d ifcrcntcs lipos de planes y proyectos tcrritoriales )' sectoriales. 91 p >(I 50 Viceministerio de Planificacl6n y CoordinatiOn INFORME FINAL DE EVALUACIDN PfOyecto RecuperatiOn de Emergencias y Gesti6n de Desastres ./ Red ucir Ia vulnerabilidad de Ia infraestruclura y servicios del sector lransporles, y rnitig>tr los cfcctos negativos de Ia ocun·cncia del dcsastre. en areas que scan dcfin idas con las m6s vulncrablcs a fen6menos nuturalcs y antr6picos . ./ Sc cvidcncia Ia necesidad de contar con un instrumento como el CAT 0 00 q ue perrnitn a los prestatarios prepararse anticipadarnente ante posibles desastres natura Its ascgunmdo una fucntt:: de financian'licnto antes de que ocurra cl dcsastrc. La intcnci6n de cstc instmmento es scrvir de 11nanciamicnto transitorio, mientras sc movili1..Hn otras fucntcs de fi nanciamiento como consccucncia de un desastrc natural (por cjcmplo. prestmnos blandos, ayuda bilateral o prcstamos de reeonstrucci6n). El momo maximo disponiblc pM'd un prestamo con Ci\T IJDO no deberit superar el 0.25% del PIB o US$500 millones . ./ F. I CAT 0 00 r>ermitc a los gobicrnos arceder a fondos inmediatamenlc dcspucs de un dcsastre natural, momcnto en cl que el riesgo de liquidez es usualmtnlc alto. Este lipo de instrumcnto ex utilizado lipicamcnlc para tinanciar pCrdidas causadas por desastrcs naturnlcs rccurrentcs. El CAT DDO alcanza su mrimcros JIRSOS evidenciando claramente en el Plan de Desarrollo Economico y social, en 7 de los planes dcr>arlamcntales. y que las gulas metodologicas para Ia elaboraci6n de planes municipales, est~n incorporando Ia tematica de man era transve•·sal, es un logro. 10 I ~ g 51 COMENTARIOS ALICR PROYECTO DE RECUP ERAO ON DE EMERGENCIAS Y GESTION DE DESASTRES REFERENCIA ENUNOAOO COMENTARIO Segun el manual de operactones reformulado a octubre de 2012, el enunclado d el ind lcador mendona "M etodofoglas para mcorporar el tema de gestton de riesgos en Ia planlftcac.6n territOrial y del desarrollo a mvel mun•cipal'"; en este senhdo segun el informe de Calculo de lnd cadores, Numero de terntorlos que f . Anclhsts del M arco de Resultados consider ados productos ptesen l<~dos en Ia tem~teca. 1.-Zoneficacion implementan proyectos piloto que 1 -(b) lndecador es lntermed1os de Resultado Agr oeco16gica d e los Munic1pios del Sur de Oruro, que .ntegra los conceptos 1ntegran conceptos de gest16n de - lnd lcador 2· de gestl6n de riesgo en Ia planifrcac•6n terntorlal departament al 2 - Plan de ncsgos. Gestt6n Integral de ManeJO de Riego~ de Ia cuenca de Alpacoma que int egra los conceptos de Ia gcstJ6n de nesgo ante Dcsle zamiento~ en Ia plamf~eace6n termonal municipal. Por lo tanto se considera dos productos presentados, presentando un valor cuantJtallvo en elendicador del lO