Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00001525 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-N0220) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 29.6 MILLION (US$ 41.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF CÔTE D'IVOIRE FOR A RURAL LAND MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT February 8, 2011 Agriculture and Rural Development Unit (AFTAR) Country Department AFCF2 Africa Region i CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS(Exchange Rate Effective August 31, 2010) Currency Unit = FCFA (XOF) US$ 1.00 = FCFA 500.00 US$ 1.00 = SDR 0.72 FISCAL YEAR January 1 ­ December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ANADER Agence National de Développement Rurale (National Rural Development Support Agency) APIMR Appui à l'Investissement en Milieu Rural (Support to Rural Investment component) ASFR Appui à la Sécurisation Foncière Rurale (Support to Land Tenure component) BNETD Bureau National d'Etudes Techniques et de Développement (National Bureau of Technical Studies and Development) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDD Community-driven Development CNO "Centre-Nord-Ouest" (Center-North-West: Rebel zone) CGFR Comite Gestion de Foncier Rural (Rural Land Management Committee) CGVFR Comite Gestion Villageois de Foncier Rural (Rural Land Management Committee) ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FRAR Fonds Régionaux d'Amenagement Rural (Regional Rural Infrastructure Fund) GEF Global Environment Facility ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Agency LCU Local Coordination Unit LDP Local Development Plan M&E Monitoring and Evaluation PDO Project Development Objective PFR Plan Foncier Rural (Rural Land Plan) PMP Pest Management Plan PNAGER Projet National de Gestion de l'Espace Rural PNER Projet National d'Equipement Rural PNGTER Projet National de Gestion des Terroirs et Equipment Rural (Rural Land Management and Community Infrastructure Project) RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SIGFIP Système Intégré de Gestion des Finances Publiques (Integrated Financial Management System) SIL Specific Investment Loan Vice President: Obiageli K. Ezekwesili Country Director: Madani M. Tall Sector Manager: Karen Mcconnell Brooks Project Team Leader: Daniel Sellen ICR Team Leader: Yao Haccandy i CÔTE D'IVOIRE Rural Land Management and Community Infrastructure Development Project CONTENTS 1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design .............................................. 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 7 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 13 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 16 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 17 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 19 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 21 Annex 2. Outputs by Component (at restructuring) ..................................................... 23 Annex 3. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 24 Annex 4. Summary of Borrower's ICR ......................................................................... 26 Annex 5. Comments of other Partners (Ministry of Agriculture)................................. 41 Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 43 ii A. Basic Information CI-IVC PNGTER Rural Country: Cote d'Ivoire Project Name: Land Management Project ID: P001194 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-N0220 ICR Date: 02/15/2011 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: COTE D'IVOIRE Original Total XDR 29.6M Disbursed Amount: XDR 20.6M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 29.6M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: PNGTER Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 03/15/1995 Effectiveness: 04/17/1998 04/17/1998 Appraisal: 04/29/1996 Restructuring(s): 08/19/2008 Approval: 05/30/1997 Mid-term Review: 06/30/2000 Closing: 06/30/2004 08/31/2010 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Unsatisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Moderately Quality at Entry: Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Implementing Quality of Supervision: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Unsatisfactory Performance: Unsatisfactory Performance: i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Unsatisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 28 49 General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector 16 37 Other social services 20 13 Roads and highways 16 1 Sub-national government administration 20 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Land administration and management 13 37 Other environment and natural resources management 25 1 Participation and civic engagement 13 13 Personal and property rights 25 35 Rural services and infrastructure 24 14 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Jean-Louis Sarbib Country Director: Madani M. Tall Shigeo Katsu Sector Manager: Karen Mcconnell Brooks Jean-Paul Chausse Project Team Leader: Daniel M. Sellen Giuseppe Topa ICR Team Leader: Yao Alexis Hacandy ICR Primary Author: Yao Alexis Hacandy Daniel M. Sellen ii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project will help create the enabling conditions necessary for raising the standards of living of Cote d'Ivoire rural population by (a) improving the land tenure system; (b) strengthening the capacity of the people and institutions in the project area to plan, make decisions, govern and manage their affairs at the local level; and (c) supporting small- scale investments for sustainable management of natural resources, agriculture and rural infrastructure. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) Despite restructuring the PDO remains the same. Components and outcomes, however, have been revised as per the July 29, 2008 restructuring document. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Percent of land titles deeds requested and processed Value quantitative or 0% n/a 60% 0% Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments Although the project stimulated demand for land titles, it was unable to supply (incl. % them due to incomplete project implementation. achievement) Indicator 2 : Percent of micro-project investment plans for which counterparts were mobilized Value quantitative or 56% n/a 70% 72% Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments When project was able to finance micro-projects, communities were willing and (incl. % able to contribute. However, very little of this component was implemented. achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Number of Land Management Committees (CGFRs) which are functioning Value (quantitative 6 n/a 18 6 or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 iii Comments (incl. % These committees were functioning, but failed to deliver land titles achievement) Indicator 2 : Number of Village Land Management Committees (CVGFRs) formalized Value (quantitative 62 n/a 1200 372 or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments These committees were formalized, trained, and functional. They stimulated (incl. % demand, but supply of land titles was not forthcoming. achievement) Indicator 3 : Number of village land boundaries delimited Value (quantitative 103 n/a 223 123 or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Number of departments in which computer system for title deeds are already Indicator 4 : introduced Value (quantitative o n/a 5 5 or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments (incl. % These were established in the final months of the project. achievement) Indicator 5 : Number of Local Development Councils in rebel (CNO) zone are formalized Value (quantitative 45 n/a 65 59 or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 6 : Number of rural communities with an Emergency Investment Plan Value (quantitative 0 n/a 65 65 or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) Percent of micro-projects already established are managed in a satisfactory Indicator 7 : manner Value 0% n/a 60% 25% (quantitative iv or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments Thirty-seven out 146 were managed well, while the remainder were established (incl. % during the last month of the project so that management cannot be evaluated. achievement) Indicator 8 : Increase in rice yields in targeted perimeters (MT/ha) Value (quantitative 3.5 n/a 5.0 0 or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments Rice component added at restructuring. Input packages to farmers were (incl. % eventually distributed but too late to impact on yields within the project period. achievement) Indicator 9 : Percent of envisaged contracts have been issued Value (quantitative 0% n/a 75% not calculated or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Difficult to estimate because many of the micro-projects which were to be Comments financed under the community development component were never (incl. % implemented (the component only disbursed 25%). Half of the contracts in the achievement) last procurement plan w Indicator 10 : Percent of indicators are updated quarterly Value (quantitative 75% 75% n/a 100% or Qualitative) Date achieved 08/19/2008 06/01/1997 08/19/2008 08/31/2010 Comments (incl. % achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 07/02/1997 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 02/09/1998 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 07/01/1998 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.43 4 01/20/1999 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.13 5 05/24/1999 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.50 6 12/01/1999 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.59 7 06/30/2000 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.26 8 12/15/2000 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.37 9 06/29/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.38 10 12/26/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.37 11 04/08/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.37 v 12 10/10/2002 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 11.67 13 05/27/2003 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 12.11 14 11/23/2003 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 13.05 15 05/13/2004 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 14.55 16 06/14/2004 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 14.56 17 11/29/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.20 18 05/23/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 21.38 19 11/16/2009 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 25.03 20 06/09/2010 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 26.84 H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions Different country context after years of war and suspension by 08/19/2008 N U U 14.88 Bank. PDO remains the same, but components, indicators, costs were altered. I. Disbursement Profile vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design 1. Côte d'Ivoire's prosperity over the two decades after independence gave way to long period of decline since the early 1980s, following declining cocoa and coffee prices, excessive public spending, and growing debt. Rapid population growth, in part a result of a liberal immigration policy to stimulate agricultural development, put increasing pressure on natural resources and exacerbated social conflict over land. Poverty rates increased drastically, particularly in rural areas: in 1985 roughly one in ten Ivorians was poor, whereas today one in two are poor.1 2. The Rural Land Management and Community Infrastructure Development Project (PNGTER) aimed to create an enabling environment for sustainable rural development. Appraised in 1997 for an IDA Credit of US$41 million, the Project was to accomplish this in two ways: (a) by supporting the implementation of a land tenure program to provide tenure security to producers, and (b) paving the way for decentralization through community empowerment and rural development. 3. Despite the hopeful prediction in the 1997 Staff Appraisal Report that "Côte d'Ivoire is heading for a period of political and economic stability", the country soon descended into civil war. Early into Project implementation, an October 1999 coup triggered a series of political and social crises and a decade of conflict, which eventually resulted in suspension of the Bank's program due to non-payment of arrears2. With the Crisis dividing the country into government-controlled south and rebel-controlled north, six of the eleven project zones were inaccessible by the project. 4. Despite suspension of Bank financing, the Project remained in place, albeit with staff losses and greatly curtailed operational activity. When settlement of arrears and resumption of the Bank program came in April 2008, the Project and three others were quickly restructured and approved in August of that year. PNGTER was extended for two years, and closed on August 31, 2010 as one of the oldest projects of the World Bank. Closing came at a time as Côte d'Ivoire was finally heading into long-awaited elections, and attempting to regain democracy and the prosperity it once enjoyed. At the time of finalizing this ICR, however, the country has again descended into political crisis. 1.1 Context at Appraisal 5. The importance of land tenure security was widely perceived at appraisal in terms of its potential to boost investment in agriculture and reduce rural conflict. Since 1989, a pilot initiative known as the Rural Land Plan (Plan Foncier Rural, PFR) which was 1 Government of Cote d'Ivoire, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2009. 2 There were two periods of suspension: one from October 2000 ­ January 2002 and another from June 2004 ­ August 2008. 1 financed by the World Bank and Caisse Française de Developpement) attempted to tackle the thorny problem of tenure security, and demonstrated that there exists a strong demand for the clarification of land rights. By October 1996, the PFR pilot had completed fieldwork on about 495,000 hectares, corresponding to 27,300 plots in 360 villages. Land tenure rights were established for 270,000 people, including many migrants. The PNGTER, therefore, was seen as the vehicle for expanding the pilot program to reach over two million hectares in the five years of the project. 6. Government also recognized that decentralization was key to rural development and, since 1995 began to focus on expanding a democratic system for fostering local- level planning and administration to rural areas. Law 95-893, approved on October 27, 1995 gave legal status to rural villages3, and sanctioned their right to be administered by locally-elected governing bodies with administrative and financial autonomy. The Law also established the authority of rural communes to formulate Local Development Plans (LDPs) in consultation and collaboration with higher-level governing bodies (rural districts, departments and regions). The Regional Rural Infrastructure Fund (Fonds Régionaux d'Aménagement Rural, FRAR), initiated in the early 1970s, had become the primary instrument by which the government and donor community (including the PNGTER) agreed to channel resources to promote local initiatives, and foster decentralization and community empowerment. 7. The Project was supportive of the 1994 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the 1996 CAS Progress Report, which focused on five priority areas: (a) maintaining macro-economic stability; (b) promoting private sector development; (c) increasing the effectiveness of human resources development and poverty alleviation; (d) strengthening institutional capacity; and (e) intensifying environmental work. PNGTER was viewed as important for promoting private sector development, improving infrastructure, and alleviating poverty. In addition, the Bank's strategy for the rural sector had three components which were fully consistent with the approach proposed by the PNGTER. These were: (a) the institution of sound sectoral and macro-economic policies and structural reforms; (b) the improvement of production systems, community organization and rural infrastructure; and (c) the implementation of sound environmental management. 8. In summary, at appraisal Government had already created two important instruments to enable local governance and improved management of infrastructure and natural resources. These had been tested and found successful, and Government looked to the PNGTER to carry the two programs forward. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 9. The project's PDO is to help create the enabling conditions necessary for raising the standard of living of Côte d'Ivoire's rural population by empowering 3 Pays ruraux (rural districts) were established by the Ministry in charge of planning and finance as a planning unit in the 1970s and are groupings of six to nine villages that are similar in terms of accessibility and socio-economic profile, with at least five to six thousand inhabitants and 300 km2 of land. 2 communities, stimulating local investment and facilitating sustainable management of natural resources and rural infrastructure. The 1997 Staff Appraisal Report further breaks this down into three broad objectives: (i) enhance land tenure security on over two million hectares of rural land; (ii) increase local capacity to plan, make decisions, manage resources; and (iii) support investments for sustainable natural resource management and small-scale infrastructure development. The original key performance indicators were: Number of land titles issue and area covered Percentage of land under dispute out of total land covered under the Project Value of land management investments made on land with tenure versus land without tenure Number of Local Development Plans (LDPs) approved and implemented Proportion of land under sustainable management systems in five percent of villages Number of fully operational village and inter-village interest groups undertaking sub- projects Level of financing provided in cash by local communities. 10. The Staff Appraisal Report contains no baseline and few target figures for these indicators, apart from the global objectives to cover 2 million hectares of land under the land tenure component, have 5 per cent of villages using sustainable land management, and reach 1.3 million people under the community development component. 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 11. The PDO was judged to be relevant and was not changed at restructuring in 2008. The components and indicators, however, were revised in light of changes in the country context and the final two-year planning horizon. Baseline and target figures were added retroactively. The new key performance indicators are: 60% of land title deeds requested and processed (from baseline of zero) 70% of micro-project investment plans for which counterparts were mobilized (from baseline of 56%) 8 Rural Land Management Committees are functional (from baseline of 6) 100 Village Land Management Committees are formalized (from baseline of 62) 65 Local Development Councils in rebel-controlled (CNO) zone are formalized 60% of micro-projects are managed in satisfactory manner Increase in rice production among targeted beneficiaries to 5 MT/ha (from baseline of 3.5 MT/ha) 75% of envisaged contracts have been issued 12. The 2008 Project Paper outlines the reasons for the project restructuring in light of the fact that the country had changed considerably since the Project was appraised. Local elections were only just taking place, so that the focus on decentralization had to be dropped. Full Project involvement in the North was doubtful, since the north of Côte d'Ivoire was (and still is) controlled by the rebel Forces Nouvelles, and the country was only just beginning to work towards unification which would allow free movement of 3 civilians and government staff. Restructuring was therefore necessary to better align the Project's efforts and resources with the substantial emergency needs of the rural population, through a rapid updating of LDPs. A further reason for the restructuring was to add specific support to rice production given the "food price crisis" at the time. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. The PNGTER originally aimed to substantially improve the quality of life of 1.3 million people living in 110 rural districts, including 660 villages4. These villages were selected on the basis of willingness to collaborate with the project and level of poverty and local infrastructure. Initially, these were located in 13 administrative departments, i.e. Abengourou, Bangolo, Béoumi, Bouaké, Bondoukou, Dabakala, Daoukro, Daloa, Ferké, Korhogo, Sakassou, Soubré and Odienné. 14. After the 2008 restructuring, the project narrowed its focus to 110 villages in eight departments. Five of these (Abengourou, Bondoukou, Daoukro, Daloa and Soubré) were in government-controlled south, while three of these (Béoumi, Korhogo et Bangolo) were in rebel-controlled terrritory. Some of the new beneficiary communities were surrounding the Comoé national park (the country's largest), which is the focus of a new GEF- financed project called PARC-CI.5 1.5 Original Components 15. At appraisal the project included four components: Clarification of land tenure: Land surveying, mapping and land tenure clarification to certify land rights, facilitate conflict resolution, and help identify land management and development options. Enhancement of local management capacity: Assisting communities to develop participatory Local Development Plans (LDPs), which describe ways to sustainably manage agriculture, pasture, and forest land as well as associated water resources, and to develop and maintain village and inter-village infrastructure. Local investments: Financing for improving community investment capacity and implementation of the LDPs described above, provided that communities make financial contributions and are capable of helping manage and maintain investments. 4 Côte d'Ivoire has 1,236 pays ruraux, 7,825 villages and the current population is about 20 million. 5 The idea was that the PNGTER would assist these communities with income-generating activities that would deter them from deriving livelihoods (e.g. poaching, herding) inside the protected area. This strategy is a hallmark of most biodiversity projects, and the Bank attempted to created synergies between the two projects in this way. 4 Support to decentralization, and coordination and the environmental mitigation plan: Material support and training to locally-elected governing bodies which would emerge in the process of decentralization, coordination of the agencies implementing the project, and monitoring implementation of the policies and programs launched under the Project, including the environmental mitigation plan. 1.6 Revised Components 16. Restructuring was aimed at streamlining the original components and related activities to adapt to the changing circumstances in the post-suspension period. In addition, a component on emergency assistance to boost rice production was added to respond to the food crisis. As such, two of the original components were merged, and one added. Clarifying land tenure. This component did not change. However, the context in 2008 was quite different from that a decade earlier. The land tenure law (Law No. 98- 750 of 23 December 1998) was in effect, and the major challenge for the restructured Project was to implement it. In addition, a Department of Land Tenure was created in the Ministry of Agriculture (financed largely by the European Union throughout the Crisis) with the same mandate as the Project, thus presenting coordination challenges. Enhancing local management capacity and financing of local investments. This combines the original components on local participatory planning (Enhancement of Local Management Capacity) and related financing (Local Investments). As such, this restructured component aimed to update or create new LDPs and as well as implement them. Supporting project coordination. This is the same as the original component, but without the emphasis on local governence. At restructuring in 2008, redeployment of the administration had started with local governments (communes) in existance but not fully functional pending long-awaited presidential and municipal elections. As a result, the Project continued to work with communities, rather than local governments. Boosting rice production. In the face of the 2008 "food price crisis" in Côte d'Ivoire (and globally), a new component was added to support the National Rice Program. The aim was to help vulnerable farm households and stimulate rice production through provision of input "kits" containing fertilizer, hybrid seed, and hand implements.6 Forty thousand families were expected to receive support. This component was intended as a one-time effort to stimulate rice production in poor areas and not as long-term program to provide subsidized inputs to farmers at the 6 Subsidizing inputs, particularly fertilizer, is not usual practice for Bank financing. However, given the degree of the crisis and the need to respond urgently, this can be justified if fertilizer subsidies do not crowd out agricultural sector spending, if they are clearly targeted, and if there is a clear exit strategy, which was judged to be the case with PNGTER. 5 expense of market-based approaches. If successful, this component would increase rice production in the targeted areas from 3.5 to 5.0 MT/ha. 1.7 Other significant changes 17. National-level coordination arrangements were maintained at restructuring, i.e., with a national coordination unit chaired by the Prime Minister's office, responsibility for the land tenure component with the Ministry of Agriculture, and responsibility for the community development component with the Ministry of Planning. However, local-level implementation arrangements were simplified, with Local Coordination Units (LCUs) and associated field teams charged with overseeing both land tenure and community development components. 18. The project was initially designed to intervene in thirteen departments, five in the Government-controlled area in the south and eight in the area rebel-controlled zone (CNO). The latter were reduced to three, given the remaining security risks. With the very different implications of operating in the North versus the South, implementation was tailored to capacity, with regional-specific approaches to be adopted. 19. As such, in the northern areas under control of the rebel Forces Nouvelles, the land reform component was to focus on sensitizing communities on the land tenure law, whereas in the southern Government-controlled areas the process of tenure certification would continue. Bank and the Government agreed that the Project's land tenure component should provide support for implementation of this Law under (i) Sensitization-Information-Training, (ii) establishment of the mechanism for implementing the Law, (iii) test Operations, and (iv) support for the Land and Monitoring Commission of the Law. 20. In the North, the Project's community development component was to target urgent needs quickly and proceed on the basis of "Emergency Investment Plans", which were to by-pass the prolonged period of community empowerment (a hallmark of the CDD approach) and target obvious investment priorities. In the South, the Project was to proceed on the basis of (updated) LDPs, which had been drafted earlier during Project implementation. 21. Changes in Project costs at restructuring were substantial and reflect the change in components and emphasis explained above toward consolidating the land tenure program, delivering required micro-projects, and diverting resources into rice production (see Table 1). Table 1. Project costs (US$ million) at Appraisal and Restructuring Component At Appraisal (1997) At Restructuring (2008) Clarification of Land Tenure 30.8 5.89 Enhancement of local 6.6 management capacity 17.22 Local Investments 26.6 6 Support for decentralization and 7.5 2.34 project coordination Boosting rice production n/a 2.78 Total 71.5 28.23 Note: Appraisal costs include counterpart financing. Costs at restructuring cover only undisbursed IDA. 22. Finally, the environmental category of the restructured Project was downgraded from A to B in light of the neutral or benign impacts expected and seen to date. As part of the reactivation, a new environment and social management framework (ESMF) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was prepared in June 2008 to guide evaluation of social and environmental implications of Project-financed sub-projects. In addition, considering the new rice component, a Pest Management Plan (PMP) was also prepared. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 23. Project preparation was carried out over an extensive period of time.7 There were over two years between the Concept Note (March 1995) and Board presentation (May 1997). Lending costs were approximately $500,000 (see Annex 3). 24. The project was prepared by an experienced task manager and multi-sectoral team. During its design phase, this project drew on an impressive collection of studies, including social and poverty assessments, environmental impact analysis, and several reviews of the pilot FRAR and PNR programs. The preparation team also included strong participation from the French Caisse Francaise de Developpement. 25. At the time, the PNGTER was designed according to emerging "best practices" of what would soon be labeled as Community-Driven Development (CDD). CDD is based on a decentralized and participatory approach whereby communities are empowered to articulate their development priorities with local development plans (LDPs), financing these LDPs through project and beneficiary contributions, and take charge of the procurement, monitoring of implementation, and maintenance. The PNGTER was part of an early generation of CDD-type projects being prepared by the Bank across West Africa. An innovative feature of the PNGTER in this respect was the anticipation of local elections and the need to transfer eventually the responsibility to local governments. Securing land tenure was to be closely linked to local-level planning. The PNGTER, in its conception, was to promote sound land management (through delimitation of village lands, identification of natural resources, and securing title deeds) as the basis for community development. 26. As clearly stated in the Staff Appraisal Report, the PNGTER emerged as the fusion of two existing programs, namely the Rural Land Plan (PFR), and the rural 7 The ICR team was unable to discover why the project code was created as far back as FY91. 7 investment program financed by FRAR. Unifying these programs, which were managed different ministries, was recognized at the time as a challenge. The solution proposed was the creation of a component to harmonize the two programs, while assigning coordination to a committee chaired by the Prime Minister's office. However, the consequences of merging two projects into one were to have grave consequences on project implementation, as described below. 2.2 Implementation 27. Three phases of implementation may be identified: (i) 1998-2002 is the initial phase during which time the project was engaged in sensitization, training, and other start-up activities, (ii) 2002-2008 is the period of socio-political crisis with slow-down of activities and suspension of disbursement by the Bank; and (iii) 2008-2010 follows restructuring within a new, post-Crisis context (Figure 1). Figure 1: ISR ratings and disbursements during implementation 6 30 Startup phase Crisis phase Restructured phase ISR Rating: HU=1, U=2, MU=3, MS=4, S=5, HS=6 25 5 Disbursements ($US million) 20 4 2nd suspension 15 1st suspension 3 10 2 5 1 0 7/1/1997 7/1/1998 7/1/1999 7/1/2000 7/1/2001 7/1/2002 7/1/2003 7/1/2004 7/1/2005 7/1/2006 7/1/2007 7/1/2008 7/1/2009 DO Rating Disbursement 28. Start-up phase (1998-2002): With Government's intent to use PNGTER as the main instrument for scaling up its land security policy and decentralization program, the initial phase was a time for all stakeholders to get acquainted with the participatory approach. 29. Start-up was slow. The Project required almost a year to become effective (there were eight conditions of effectiveness). Disbursement proceeded on track until 2000, when, instead of the anticipated rate of increase, expenditures stagnated as a result of the first 14-month suspension of Bank disbursement. 8 30. The initial phase operated within a difficult environment in terms of mobilizing resources. The first difficulty was the scarcity of government resources. The second was the introduction (by the IMF) of the Integrated Financial Management System (SIGFIP) which effectively centralized payment of all project expenses and the management of all special accounts in the hands of a single person. This caused bottlenecks for all projects in the Bank portfolio. 31. In addition, the Ivorian Treasury was highly reluctant to send funds directly to communities, arguing that they were not trained or accustomed to handling funds (a classic criticism of the CDD approach, which has been challenged by evidence in many successful projects in Africa and elsewhere). All these problems together caused significant delay in implementating this project and others in the Bank portfolio, but particularly delayed the Local Investment component, which accounted for one third of Project (SDR 10.5 million). 32. Despite the slow start, significant outcomes were achieved early on by the land tenure component, with impressive results visible on the ground. Out of the target of two million hectares, 1.12 million hectares were surveyed, 44,209 village parcels demarcated, and 708 villages sensitized on rural land tenure. These results served as the basis for the eventual drafting of the Rural Land Law (n° 98-750 du 23 décembre 1998) and the texts that applied it. 33. For the community development component, 995 villages made contact with the Project, and 224 Village Development Committees and 45 Local Development Councils were established. Sixty-three LDPs were prepared which included 841 community micro- projects. In addition, 56 HIV/AIDS committees were set up on the basis of risk mapping (a community mobilization tool designed and prepared by PNGTER). 34. Based on these encouraging results, the Government and the Bank agreed during mid-term review in June 2001 on ways of accelerating implementation and ensuring achievement of development goals through: (i) explicit support for implementation of the new law on rural land tenure, (ii) effective implementation of new financial procedures for carrying out local development activities, (iii) internal restructuring of the project to facilitate operation of central or decentralized government services in charge of implementation of ongoing activities. However, these recommendations could only be partially implemented, the restructuring did not take place until August 2008. 35. Crisis phase 2 (2002-2008): The Bank's supervision mission was completed on June 30, 2002, and the Ivorian Crisis started soon after, on September 19. Bank staff were temporarily evacuated and there was suspension of disbursements to Côte d'Ivoire due to non-payment of debt arrears. 36. Despite this difficult environment, Government remained committed to Project objectives, and pre-financed the project during the Crisis phase with its own resources and retained part of the project staff to continue project activities. In the context of the 9 Rural Land Law, the land tenure component became devoted to its application. As such, the PNGTER contributed to the establishment of six regional Rural Land Management Committees (CGFR) and 62 village-level Rural Land Management Committees (CGVFR). In addition, it would delimit lands in 56 villages and establish a land tenure information system. The community development component was able to implement 93 micro-projects totaling US$ 2.6 million, which were financed with Swiss donor support through the UNDP. 37. The micro-projects program was finally able to implement new procedures for financing micro-projects. An arrêté from Minister of the Economy and Finance authorizing the transfer of funds to communities was signed seven years after project approval, on June 26, 2004. This allowed for the direct transfer of funds for financing community micro-projects into accounts managed by the beneficiary communities themselves. The communities quickly demonstrated their ability to proceed through the micro-project cycle: including approval of LDPs, community-based procurement, fund management, implementation, and monitoring of works. 38. Restructured phase (2008-2010): The Bank finally re-engaged in Côte d'Ivoire in April 2008 under an arrears payment operation and an Interim Strategy Note, which included reactivation of four projects, three of which were restructured. Based on the large undisbursed balance of US$ 28.23 million, PNGTER was reoriented to focus on targeted activities to meet the population's priorities within a post-crisis context. Drawing on earlier lessons, Government issued exceptional regulations to the SIGFIP and put in place a more enabling project financial management mechanism so that procedures would not hamper project implementation over the next two years (management's deadline for completing this and the other three projects). 39. During this period, the Project Coordinator was changed at the insistence of the Bank (since he jointly held a Government position), and the National Coordination Unit was reinforced through: (i) recruitment of a procurement specialist to expedite and improve quality of procurement, (ii) empowerment of the M&E specialist to implement the Project's environmental and social safeguard measures, and (iii) creation of LCU coordinators to help ensure coherence between components. The Bank and Project jointly prepared a detailed roadmap for completing Project activities. 40. Despite these arrangements, and the fact that staff capacity for teamwork and collective achievement of results was earlier appreciated by the Bank's 2002 supervision mission, the PNGTER coordination team for 2008-2010 was unable to meet the deadlines contained in the road map, and therefore could not effectively implement the Project. Procurement delays were substantial. Recruitment of new staff, including the critical Local Coordinators, took over a year. Government support was lacking, and the Steering Committee did not convene once during this period, leaving the Project coordination team solely responsible for management and supervision. 10 41. The Project thus failed to reach its new targets and closed with an undisbursed balance of approximately US$ 10 million.8 On several occasions Government informally requested an extension of the PNGTER, but this was not granted by the Bank given the weak performance of the Project, and institutional pressure to close out old projects (at thirteen years old, the PNGTER had the dubious distinction of being one the oldest projects in the Bank's global portfolio). 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation and Utilization 42. Project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) are considered moderately unsatisfactory.9 Targets and baseline figures were largely missing from the Staff Appraisal Report. The results framework created at restructuring and component indicators were reviewed and amended during Bank supervision missions, and should have served as a guide for monitoring activities and taking corrective action. Unfortunately, the sequence of project activities was not methodically and rigorously programmed to achieve development goals. For example, programming of the training of community members one month prior to project completion made no sense, when they should have been involved throughout the micro-project cycle. 43. This Project experience highlights the need for reflection on the preparation of an M&E plan for projPects to be managed by communities. In its design, the M&E mechanism remained conventional and consisted of monitoring the results framework for the Bank and roject team, but did not include the participatory approach, which is at the heart of the CDD approach. Beneficiaries and other stakeholders should have played a key role in the M&E. Such an arrangement would have had the advantage of requiring the Project coordination to report periodically to these stakeholders. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 44. Implementation of environmental and social safeguard policy is judged to be moderately unsatisfactory. An extensive environmental impact review was created during preparation, and further supervision correspondence points to the intention of the Project to create a handbook and environmental mitigation plan. However, there is no evidence in Project files that these were ultimately written, much less applied. 45. At restructuring, the Bank downgraded the environmental category from "A" to "B", given the fairly benign effects predicted from project activities. Accordingly, three instruments were duly prepared and disclosed (the ESMF, RPF, and the PMP) soon after restructuring. (It is odd that it is only when the environmental category is downgraded that the safeguard instruments are finally prepared.) 8 This figure is approximate pending settling of project accounts. Almost all this amount is to be reallocated elsewhere in the FY11 program. 9 The M&E rating is from the last supervision, since the ICR does not provide formal ratings for M&E. 11 46. However, these instruments were never implemented. On the institutional side, the project designated the M&E Officer to be responsible for following up on safeguards, but this officer was never fully empowered. The environmental and social screening checklist contained in the ESMF was not routinely applied at the field level for the micro- projects. Project staff were unable to provide the checklist forms and document mitigating measures when asked during the ICR workshop. The Project organized a sensitization workshop on these three instruments, but never trained community/regional Government officers on how to apply them, despite the Bank's assistance in preparing the terms of reference for the training. In summary, the Project paid very little attention to environmental and social safeguards throughout implementation. 47. Procurement was judged to be unsatisfactory. The fiduciary risk of PNGTER procurement remained high during the post-restructuring phase, despite the recruitment of a procurement specialist. There was inadequate control of procurement procedures at project level with the following consequences: (i) non-compliance with procurement procedures leading to a relatively large amount of ineligible expenditure of Bank financing (approximately $550,000); (ii) relatively low spending, especially on micro- projects (21%), and (iii) non-compliance with deadlines specified in the procurement plan. Lack of cohesion between the different project coordination organs had a negative impact on project procurement. 48. Project financial management is also judged as unsatisfactory.The complexity of the financial management arrangement inherent to the project design hampered the efficiency of the internal control especial in the area of micro-project expenditures where ineligible expenditures were identified by auditors and Bank supervision missions. These weaknesses have set the project FM risk as substantial in spite of the good quality of the project's financial management team involved in the project. Also, the lack of adequate project activity planning has led to the implementation of a large number of micro- projects in a short period of time close to the project end date. This situation has increased the risk of effectiveness and poor quality of deliverables; and untenable pressure on the Treasury to expedite so many payments during the grace period. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 49. Government and the donor community look to the Bank to continue to finance Côte d'Ivoire's land tenure program. However, given the overall poor performance of the PNGTER, the Bank is reluctant to re-enter this sector at this time. The Country Assistance Strategy thus outlines the importance of sustainable land management to address environmental concerns and to boost agriculture, but does not include a follow- up operation on land until Government is able to propose a more suitable option to PNGTER. In the absence of the Bank, the European Union is the only active donor in this sector with their support to the Ministry of Agriculture's Land Reform Department. 50. Decentralization of administration and financial resources has been occurring across the country (although once again stalled with the present political Crisis). The 12 Country Assistance Strategy proposes an IDA operation in FY13 which would accelerate Côte d'Ivoire's decentralization process, focusing on local development and financing of social and economic infrastructure investment to promote rural livelihoods. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 51. Thirteen years after appraisal of the project, the PNGTER's objectives remain highly relevant, perhaps even more so. It widely recognized that conflict over land is one of the root causes of the Crisis and will continue to be a feature of rural life until land titles clarify ownership. Moreover, tenure insecurity continues to discourage rural producers from investing in the land they occupy. The resulting pattern of shifting cultivation has devastated forests, even in so-called "protected areas", so that only five percent of the country is forested (at independence it was roughly 50 percent). Tenure security for owners and farmers is one of the major objectives of the Government's agricultural strategy.10 52. Decentralization and community empowerment are equally relevant today. Local governments (communes) are finally in place, with high expectations that the resources will follow. In particular, disaffected and under-served communities in the rebel CNO zone will be waiting to see what benefits a re-unified country will bring. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 53. The project's PDO remained relevant and was maintained throughout the thirteen- year implementation period. 54. In the post-restructuring period (2008-2010) the PDO is assessed on the basis of contribution of project outcomes to the achievement of the two key indicators: (i) 60% of land title deeds requested and processed and (ii) 70% of micro-project investment plans for which counterparts were mobilized. 55. In the first case, no land title deeds were requested and processed directly through the Project, although the Project can be credited with contributing to the definition of the land policy and establishment of mechanisms for implementing the rural land law and sensitizing the population. Indeed, PNGTER continued implementing the Rural Land Plan (PFR), which helped to identify local and customary practices used in preparing and adopting legislation11 on rural land tenure, and statutory instruments (decrees and orders) which are the implementing texts for the law. The Project completed the demarcation of 10 National Agricultural Investment Programme for which a pact was concluded between development partners, the West African Economic Community, and the Government in July 2010. 11 Law No. 98-750 of 23 December 1998 enacted on 14 January 1999 13 lands in 122 villages out of 352 villages, representing a completion rate of 35 percent. This exercise had the merit of identifying difficulties in implementing the law, and proposing an appropriate strategy. In a sense, the Project stimulated the demand for land titles, but was inadequate in supplying them. 56. PNGTER contributed to the establishment and strengthening of institutions for implementing the law in eight administrative departments. Thus, 809 Village Rural Land management Committees (CVGFR), 21 Rural Land Management Committees (CGFR) and the Rural Land Commission have been established and are operational. The Ministry of Agriculture's land services at departmental, regional and central levels have received training and procured vehicles and computer equipment. Others involved in implementing the law, including the Administrative Authorities of departments covered by PNGTER have received training to upgrade their skills. PNGTER also developed the Land Information System (SIF), a geographic information system that facilitates computerized management of implementation of the rural land law at all stages of the process. 57. The results of the community development component were very modest. The project was instrumental at initiating the participatory approach to local-level planning, and successfully helped many communities to development LDPs. However, the expectations that came with LDPs were rarely met, due to reluctance of the Government to transfer funds to communities, suspension of project disbursements, and slow implementation of this component. 58. Fifty micro-projects were financed during the Bank's suspension period, using Swiss funds. However, forty-eight were for health and education (dispensaries, schools, housing for teachers and mid-wives). This raises serious questions about the correct application of the CDD approach, in which LDPs reflect a wide variety of sectoral priorities, not just demands for social infrastructure. 59. Bank missions after restructuring found that the Project's preference to finance social infrastructure persisted, and encouraged productive infrastructure and income- generating activities. In the latter period, IDA funded 125 micro-projects, of which six were economic infrastructure and 15 income-generating activities. The majority of projects supported health and education: seven health centres, fourteen lodgings for mid- wives and nurses, equipment for eight maternities, five ambulances, 104 primary school classrooms, 25 lodgings for teachers, 16 latrines, and 3,125 school benches. This is in clear contrast to the original project's intention to finance investments in rural infrastructure and sustainable natural resource management, and explains the large differences in the sector and thematic coding (see Data Sheet for original and actual breakdowns). 60. The rice component, added at restructuring, failed to deliver on its target to increase production, despite the urgency demanded by the food price crisis in August 2008. The objective of this program was to produce at least 28,750 tons of paddy per year in double cropping, i.e. 53,720 tons of milled rice on 2,875 hectares. A consultant was 14 hired by the Bank to evaluate quantitative returns to this component. The consultant found that two seasons had passed before any distribution of agriculture inputs (seed, fertilizer, and herbicide). The contract between the project and ANADER (the service provider for extension) was not signed before March 2010, and therefore beneficiaries were not trained on safe use of pesticides on a timely basis. Equipment for rice milling was not in place before June 2009. As a consequence, only 43 percent of the rice areas were covered, and no production increases were realized before the end of the project. 3.3 Efficiency 61. In the original conception of the Project, it was assumed that the Project's micro- projects would be at least 45 percent productive activities and 10 percent for agriculture. The Staff Appraisal Report predicted financial and economic Internal Rates of Return (IRR) at 46.3 and 37.5 percent for revenue-generating activities, respectively, and overall IRRs at 5.2 (financial) and 23.7 percent (economic). 62. Given that fact that (a) the project did not directly produce land tenure security for any producer, and (b) that almost all micro-projects were in the social sector, it was not possible to calculate IRRs for project activities. Therefore, no attempt was therefore made to duplicate the appraisal analysis as presented in Annex XIII of the Staff Appraisal Report. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 63. Rating: Unsatisfactory. The overall project outcome is rated unsatisfactory based on the fact that project did not achieve any of its set objectives. Economic analysis was not possible to support a positive judgement of productive micro-projects or the rice component. However, the relevance of the project's objectives remained high throughout the implementation period, as they are today. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts and Social Development 64. Surveys were not conducted to quantitatively assess project impacts on the beneficiaries. In terms of poverty reduction, Côte d'Ivoire experienced large increases in poverty overall during the Project implementation, particularly in the west and north of the country, as a result of the Crisis. This national trend makes it difficult to calculate the Project's impact in this respect. However, it is judged to be minimal based on the conclusions in previous sections. 65. Most of the micro-projects implemented for the population focused mainly on social infrastructure (health centres, schools); thus the project helped to promote achievement of the Millenum Development Goals. As such, the Project was able to enroll approximately 5,000 additional students in areas with poor levels of schooling, and increase the coverage of primary health care in many villages. 15 66. Interviews with project beneficiaries made it clear that the Projet favoured toward the end of the Project access of the population, notably women, to a variety of goods and services generated by the implementation of productive infrastructure (markets and small-scale agricultural processing). Women also benefitted from the social infrastructure, such as maternities. Discussions with communities revealed that all elements of the community took part in the process of local development planning and that the priorities of the poorest groups were taken into account. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 67. Despite the project's modest achievements relative to its main objectives, the Project significantly contributed to insitutional change and capacity-building in Côte d'Ivoire. 68. The land tenure component was responsible for the establishment of land tenure services and instrumental in establishing the Land Tenure Information System (Système d'Informations Foncières) in the Ministry. Furthermore, it was able to build capacity of national capacity in land demarcation, through BNETD, the service provider. However this component was poorly linked with the national land reform program (see Annex 5). 69. The PNGTER experience in local development planning with a participatory approach served as the basis for the Ministry of Planning in preparing a practical guide for participatory local planning. Local planning has now emerged as a procedure made compulsory for local authorities by the Ministry. Compared to other ongoing or previous projects, PNGTER had the merit of testing the approach of broader empowerment of the population through their committees. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 70. With the progress in capacity-building, the Project raised high expectations in participating communities in terms of acquiring land titles and implementing priority micro-projects. These expectations were largely unmet, and resulted in the disappointment of communities and individuals who had mobilized human, material and financial resources for activities which would never materialize. The ICR mission visited several communities who were still waiting Project-financed activities. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 71. Rating: Significant. The major risks to the project's objectives relate to Government's ability to (a) pursue a policy of decentralization that empowers community institutions and local governments in rural areas; and (b) contribute significantly to the national land reform program in terms of mobilizing donors or domestic resources in the future. In terms of the Project's impacts, the empowerment of rural communities with respect to the planning and implementation of their own development priorities never achieved the objective of establishing legislated texts or regulations that would confirmer 16 the engagement of the Government in terms of putting communities at the forefront of rural development. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry 72. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. Preparation was lengthy, with over three years between Concept Review and Effectiveness. The M&E framework failed to define complete benchmarks or targets. There were eight conditions of effectiveness, which contributed to a slow start. The project was prepared based on existing "best practice" for CDD-type projects that have been implemented successfully in the sub-Region. However, a fundamental mistake was to fuse two different programs together within the same project, without adequate mechanisms to ensure harmonization and synergies between them. This flaw would never be rectified. Finally, the institutional arrangements with three ministries in charge diluted ownership of the Project. (b) Quality of Supervision 73. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. Supervision was regular and constructive during the first four years of the project and helped to identify activities for achieving the project objectives. However, with the 2002 crisis and the suspension of disbursements from 2004 to 2008, the first Bank mission took place after a six-year absence. The first field supervision mission was not until November 2009 (as there were no field activities in place prior to this time), with the completion mission in July 2010. The Bank's Task Manager was changed four times; this resulted in a loss of institutional memory, but should not be surprising given the fifteen years of preparation and implementation. Since May 2008, there was more regular Bank monitoring with the preparation of a roadmap in September 2008 and November 2009 and the organization of frequent meetings in 2010 with the Project and the entire (field-based) Bank team responsible for the project. 74. Safeguards supervision was weak for most of the implementation period, and lacked supporting documentation. Supervision was regular since August 2008, and the team benefited from regular guidance and advice from the Bank's field-based environmental specialist. However, this guidance provided was rarely put to effective use. 75. Supervision of financial management was satisfactory given the regular contact with the project and quarterly interim financial reports, in addition to six-month supervision consistent with the Project's substantial FM risk rating. An adequate follow- up on financial management issues was made to ensure that corrective actions were taken to address those issues, such as mission fees and fuel management. Also, good collaboration between the fiduciary team has improved the efficiency of supervision. 17 76. The project reorientation document (Project Paper) was prepared rapidly in 2008 by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire following resumption of disbursements by the Bank. In retrospect, the exercise was too rapid and restructuring did not sufficiently take into account the institutional changes that took place since 2002. Indeed, with the adoption of texts on decentralization, local development activities were henceforth to be supervised by local authorities. Within this context, PNGTER should have served as source of funding for these local authorities (departments and municipalities) to achieve the development goals that are exclusively within their competence, and especially to ensure sustainability of project activities. Furthermore, identification of specific activities (rice production, support for people living near the national park) in the community development component, at the request of the Bank, did not in retrospect seem compatible with the recommended approach to PNGTER implementation or Project capacity. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 77. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. While the project was conceived according to good practices and solid experience in Côte d'Ivoire, a fundamental mistake was made to fuse two programs into one, to be handled and coordinated by three ministries and based on parallel local-level arrangements. This occurred despite the express intention of the Bank (Staff Appraisal Report, page ii) to avoid creating two parallel structures and duplication, while integrating rural development activities into the national institutional set-up. Early and final supervision was regular, but the absence of the Bank for six years created a loss of institutional memory, and in restructuring the Project the Bank failed to realistically improve the Project's capacity to deliver during the last two years. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance 78. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. During the preparation phase and through early implementation, Government assumed ownership of the project, demonstrated commitment, and contributed to achievement of its outcomes. Government pre-financed continuation of activities during the suspension of disbursements from the Bank, although this effort by was discontinued following resumption by the Bank. However, the reluctance of Government (notably the Ministry of Finance) to commit to direct financing of communities until 2004, resulted in slowing down the largest component of the Project, progress which was never recovered. It appears that Government interest in the Project waned throughout the Crisis and in its last two years. Since Project restructuring, the national-level Steering Committee, to be chaired by the Prime Minister's office, never convened once. Furthermore, repeated communication by the Bank to Government on a variety of issues, such as the need for a full-time Project Coordinator, never received timely attention of Government. Thus, this rating recognizes that the Government effectively supported project preparation and early implementation, but failed to maintain interest and assume full responsibility in later efforts to achieve the Project objectives, at a time when this support was critical. 18 (b) Implementing Agency Performance 79. Rating: Unsatisfactory. PNGTER had been run as a loose partnership of two very different projects: with separate coordinators, distinct local management, different financial managers, and separate reporting. The National Coordination Unit never managed to harmonize the two approaches, and any synergies that might have been possible never materialized. In addition, the Project operated in almost complete autonomy from national programs of land tenure and decentralization that emerged during the Crisis (for land reform, see comments from Ministry of Agriculture in Annex 5). Project staff often approached the Bank to complain about communication problems and unbearable working conditions. Remedial action plans (road map) proposed by the Project to recuperate lost ground did not reflect reasonable assessments on what the Project could and could not deliver, and therefore the agreed-upon timelines could not be respected. Until the very end, the Project team continued to believe that extending the Project was possible, and thus their proposed timelines were not feasible. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance 80. Rating: Unsatisfactory. Despite promising progress early on in terms of institutional reform and building capacity, both Government and the Project implementing agency were unable to repair the damage inflicted on the Project by the Crisis, and appeared either incapable or uninterested in attaining project outcomes. 6. Lessons Learned 81. The following lessons emerged from the experience of PNGTER: Appreciate concerns expressed by Government. In view of the institutional environment at the time of preparation, Government resisted the idea of merging two projects under the umbrella of PNGTER. Had the Bank accepted this to finance separate projects, the impact would likely have improved for both objectives. Insist on key reforms that risk slowing down implementation. Bank teams should make sure that proposed institutional arrangements are realistic, achievable and acceptable to the government. It took seven years to convince the government to authorize the transfer of funds to communities. In cases like this where the Borrower is unwilling to move forward, tough decisions must be made on whether or not to proceed. Sustained and effective participation of beneficiaries is required in steering and maximizing impact. Despite active community participation in local development planning, discussions during development of the Bank's Country Partnership Strategy and the ICR mission revealed that there was generally a poor understanding of projects financed by the Bank. A lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of beneficiaries is likely one factor for the poor performance of PNGTER. 19 Restructuring first requires a critical evaluation of the Project. Restructuring was proposed as early as 2001 but did not occur until 2008. When the Bank reengaged, Bank management requested that all four suspended projects be restructured. In the case of PNGTER at least, there was no serious assessment on whether the Project could realistically be expected to achieve its goals in two years given its capacity limitations. This was partly a problem of having no institutional memory, and also a symptom of preparing the restructuring documentation (Project Paper) too quickly. Link Project closely to national programs. An important lesson learned is the necessity for Bank-financed projects to respect their committment to accompany the Government in the implementation of its policies. The PNGTER had the mission to help Government implement its decentralization policy and land tenure reforms. However, the institutional link between the Project and national programs was tenuous at best, and PNGTER operated largely independently, without coordination at a higher level. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies 82. See Annex 4 for an abridged version of the Borrower's assessment. (b) Other partners and stakeholders 83. Comments from the Ministry of Agriculture's Land Reform Department appear in Annex 5. 20 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Category Category Category Description Original Disbursed Percent New Final Costs Percent Allocation as of June Disbursed Allocation as of Aug Disbursed (in SDR) 2008 (in SDR) 2010 1 CIVIL WORKS 900,000 - 0% 40,000 22,000 55% 2 MICRO-PROJECTS 10,500,000 392,860 4% 5,050,000 3,135,000 62% 3 VEHICLES AND 4,100,000 1,314,912 32% 2,605,000 2,865,500 110% EQUIPMENT 4 CONSULTANTS AND 8,100,000 6,857,604 85% 16,825,000 12,458,700 74% TRAINING 5 OPERATING COSTS 900,000 881,210 98% 2,960,000 2,456,300 83% 6 PPF REFUNDS 1,600,000 1,254,988 78% 1,600,000 1,600,000 100% 6-a OPERATING COSTS 500,000 358,718 72% 360,000 360,000 100% 7 UNALLOCATED 3,000,000 - 0% 160,000 28,000 18% TOTAL 29,560,000 11,060,292 37% 29,560,000 22,925,500 78% (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Source of Funds Estimate Estimate Appraisal (USD millions) (USD millions) Borrower 0.00 0.00 0 International Development 41.00 41.00 100 Association (IDA) 21 Annex 2. Outputs by Component (at restructuring) Project development objective Outcome Targets Actual Outcomes To help create the enabling conditions necessary 60% of land titles deeds requested and 0% of land titles deeds requested and processed for raising the standard of living of Côte processed d'Ivoire's rural population by empowering 72% of micro-project investment plans for which communities, stimulating local investment and 70% of micro-project investment plans for counterparts were mobilized (from baseline of 56%) facilitating sustainable management of natural which counterparts were mobilized (from resources and rural infrastructure baseline of 56%) Intermediate outcomes Output Targets Actual Outputs Mechanisms for issuing title deeds in place 1. Functioning of the Rural Land Mgmt 18 CGFR are functioning (from baseline 6 CGFR are functioning Committee (CGFR) of 6) 2.Functioning of Village Land Management 1200 CVGFR are formalized (from 372 CVGFR are formalized Committee baseline of 62) 3.Delimitation of rural lands in 7 departments 223 village land boundaries have been 123 village land boundaries have been delimited delimited (from baseline of 103) 4.Installation of computer system at the The computer system for title deeds are The computer system for title deeds introduced in 5 departmental level already introduced in 5 departments (from departments baseline of zero) Capacities of villages to formulate their priority needs are strengthened 5. Formalization of Local Development Counsel 65 Local Development Councils in CNO 59 Local Development Councils in CNO formalized in CNO zone are formalized (from baseline of 45) 6.Ownership by rural towns/ communities of 65 rural communities already have a 65 rural communities with Emergency Investment Investment Plan Emergency Investment Plan Plan 7.Satisfactory management by the communities 60 % of micro-projects already established 25 % of micro-projects were managed in a of micro-projects already implemented are managed in a satisfactory manner satisfactory manner 8. Increase in rice yields in targeted perimeters. 5.0 MT/ha expected yield (from baseline of No impact 3.5) Coordination of components is assured and the monitoring of objectives are implemented and consolidated at the technical and financial levels 9. Contracts are signed in accordance with 75 % of envisaged contracts have issued Very low. Cannot be precisely estimated taking into procurement plans and provisions account the low disbursement of the community development component (25%) and the fact that many envisaged micro-projects never materialized. 10.The indicators are regularly collected 75 % indicators are updated quarterly All indicators were updated twice a year 23 Annex 3. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility Lending (as listed in Staff Appraisal Report) Giuseppe Topa Sr. NRM Specialist EASER TTL #1 Brigitte Kerby-Dia Program Assistant AFTA3 Team member Morin C. Senior Counsel LEGAF Team member Francois Rantrua M&E specialist AFTEI Team member Mohammed Bekhechi Environnental Legislation Specialist LEGEN Team member Nicaise Ehoué Sr. Agricultural Economist TTL #3 Cyprian Fisiy Sociologist AFTEI Team member Eric Yoboue Rural Infrastructure Development AFMCI Team member Abdoulaye Touré Agronomist AFMCI Team member Asha Ayoung Procurement Specialist AFMCI Team member Soulemane Fofana Disbursement Specialist AFMCI Team member Supervision Giuseppe Topa Sr. NRM Specialist EASER TTL #1 Mohammed Bekhechi Juriste LEGEN Team member Abdoulaye Touré Spécialiste des Services Agricoles AFTAR Team member Léandre Gbéli Agro-économiste Cons Team member Nicaise Ehoué Agro-économiste Principal AFTAR TTL #3 Cyprian Fisiy Spécialiste des sciences sociales SDV Team member Francois Rantrua M&E specialist AFTEI Team member Asha Ayoung Spécialiste en Passation de marchés OPCPR Team member Suzanne Piriou-Sall Rural Development Specialist AFTA3 TTL #2 Bella Lelouna Diallo Financial Managmeent Specialist AFTFM Team member Jean-Michel Pavy Spécialiste Principal en Environnement AFTEN Team member Luc Lecuit M&E Specialist EACTF Team member Korka Diallo Spécialiste en Décaissement EDS 13 Team member Siaka Bakayoko Spécialiste Financier Principal AFMGN Team member Arlette Sourou Assistante de Projets AFTP2 Team member Papa Aynina Diop Analyste Financier CTRDM Team member Ntampaka Charles Expert en Foncier Rural, FAO Extérieur Team member Marie-Claudine Fundi Assistante, Programme Linguistique AFTAR Team member Marie-France Anet Assistante, Passation de Marchés AFCF2 Team member Africa Olojoba Sr. Environmental Specialist AFTEN Team member Coulibaly Kignopron Assistant au Programme AFCF2 Team member Enestina Aboah N'Dow Assistante au Programme AFCW1 Team member Daniel Sellen Responsable sectoriel AFTAR TTL #4 Yao Haccandy Economiste Agricole AFTAR ICR leader Salamata Bal Spécialiste en Développement Social AFTCS Team member Maurice Adoni Spécialiste en Passation de marchés AFTPC Team member Saidou Diop Spécialiste en Gestion Financière AFTFM Team member Assiata Houedanou Soro Assistante en Décaissement AFCF2 Team member Mariame Bamba-Coulibaly Assistante d'Equipe AFCF2 Team member 24 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including Staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY98 n.a 502.16 Total: n.a12 502.16 Supervision/ICR FY98 n.a 70.76 FY99 n.a 54.15 FY00 47.33 117.08 FY01 32.92 70.88 FY02 29.66 159.16 FY03 17.44 94.63 FY04 28.48 45.71 FY05 30.96 53.30 FY06 33.03 92.52 FY07 22.48 37.45 FY08 8.88 73.26 FY09 23.33 124.37 FY10 25.06 125.16 FY11 11.84 49.39 Total: 311.41 1167.82 12 Staff weeks data not available before 1998. Previous costs are reported as lump sum for FY98. 25 Annex 4. Summary of Borrower's ICR A. English summary of key points in Borrower's ICR Policy context: the PNGTER was a fusion of the local development project (PNER) under the Planning Ministry, and the land reform project (PNAGER) under the Ministry of Agriculture Insitutional framework: At inception, the land reform component (ASFR) was to continue to be supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture. The local development component (AIMR) would be coordinated by the Ministry of Planning, and the component on decentralization (AD) would fall under that Ministry, but implemented by the National Coordination Unit. The Office of the Prime Minister would ensure harmonization of the various components. The global objective was to contribute to reduction of poverty through improving the rural conditions of life through local development and securing land tenure. At restructuring two additional activities were added, concerning emergency support to rice production and extending local development of communities around the Comoé Naitonal Park. The objective of the ASFR component was to set up regional and village-level committees on land reform, and implement the Land Reform Law (December 1998) to treat two million hectares. The objective of the AIMR component was to finance local development plans and build local capacity. Micro-projects were to be 45% for productive activities, 45% for social economic infrastructure, and 10% for non-agricultural or cultural activities. In the period 1998 ­ 2001, the ASFR component delimited village lands in 1.12 million hectares, delimited 44,029 parcels, and sensitized 708 villages on the Rural Land Law. In the period 2002-2007, the land information system was 55% implemented, and an operation tested for the delimitation of village lands in seven departments for the first time. The operation was to cover 280 "terroirs" but could only cover 150 in the south because of security considerations. In the end, only 103 terroirs were completed. The AIMR component, by 2005, had cover 985 villages and had produced 67 Local Development Plans, including 779 micro-projects. Between 2004 and 2008, 83 DAOs had been produced, permitting the implementation of 93 micro-projects, for a total of $2.4 million, of which 50 were finnced by the Bank. Communities contributed $140,000 in cash or in kind. The Decentralization Component was responsible for a variety of national and local- level conferences and workshops and results in legal texts and regulations relative to decentralization. The lack of legal status of the communes up until 2006 prevented the project from implementing this component fully. The component National Coordination Unit was responsible for producing technical and financial implementation manuesl, installation of a monitoring software system, preparation of strategic documents, and maintaining communication with partners. In the post-restructuring phase (2008 ­ 2010) the results from the ASFR component were modest. 237 requests for land titles were registered. Forty percent of these requests were sent to the district authorities in Abengourou and process verbaux were 26 registered. All six Committees (CGFR) were established at regional levels. 308 of the village-level Committees (CVGFR) are functional. Training of Prefets, sous-prefets, and others were carried out. Sixty terroirs were delimited out of 120, due to payment problems with the operator. The Land Information System was implanted in all five departments. In the post-restructuring phase, the AIMR component formalized 59 of the 65 Local Development Committees. All 65 of the Emergency Investment Plans (in the north) were completed. All 45 of the Local Development Plans (in the south) were updated. 1168 of the community micro-projects were planned for the first year, of which 242 had community counterparts mobilized. 174 went as far as procurement. The impact and lessons of the ASFR component are the following. There is a need for application of the Land Reform Law. It established the need to support the regional and village-level institutions. It showed the need to liberalize the market for technical experts (géometres) to delimit lands. It accomplished the establishment of Land information systems. Showed the need for public sector to find financing to continue with land delimitation. The impact and lessons of the AIMR component are the following. The project pioneered the participatory approach not only in Côte d'Ivoire, but also in the sub- region. The Ministry of Planning adopted the local planning guide written by the project. The component managed to reinforce the capacity of rural communities in terms of planning and land management, and also income-generating activities. Some communities were connected by rural roads. The process of decentralization was reinforced. The World Bank insisted on a fusion of the two approaches (local development and land reform) within a single project, but with autonomy between the two components, which did not end up satisfactory. Supervision of the project was irregular because of the number of Task Managers (five over twelve years). This instability did not contribute to ownership of the project by the Bank headquarters and the Country Office. After the 2008 reformulation of the project, the objectives could not be reached. The ASFR component contributed to the establishment of a solid and sustainable national land reform policy. The logistical, human, and financial resources were effectively, if not reticently, mobilized to implement the law. However, the discontinuation of Bank funding leaves the population very disappointed. Several factors account for the slow implementation of the project, including delays in the treatment of non-objections by the Bank and the lengthy process in procurement. The end of the Bank financing at the moment with activities were taking off frustrated the population, and the Bank should give more time for the project to achieve its objectives and facilitated disbursement. The suspension of disbursement by the Bank for a total of six years was another reason. Another was the long period for replenishment of the Special Account in 2010. There was a lack of support for control of works on rural roads, judged to be unsatisfactory by the Bank. The situation of "neither peace nor war" prevented project implementation in the North. 27 The strong resistance of the Ivorian authorities with respect to financial administration prevented innovation with respect to financing communities. Perspectives and lessons for the future include the following. There is a continued and urgent need to clarify the land tenure situation and empower the rural population. There is a need to continue to reinforce the capacity of rural populations to capitalize on the achievements of PNGTER. B. Summary of French Version of Borrower's ICR13 Contexte politique Le Projet National de Gestion des Terroirs et d'Equipement Rural (PNGTER) résulte de la fusion du Projet National d'Equipement Rural (PNER) initié par le Ministère en charge du Plan, et du Projet National de Gestion de l'Espace Rural (PNAGER), placé sous la tutelle du Ministère de l'Agriculture. Il s'inscrit dans le cadre de la politique de décentralisation et d'aménagement du territoire du Gouvernement. L'idée de création du PNGTER est née des constats faits en milieu rural. En matière de foncier rural, les textes qui le régissaient connaissent des difficultés d'application. Il y a une coexistence du droit coutumier et du droit moderne. En matière d'investissement rural, les choix initiaux des investissements en milieu rural et leur programmation à travers des projets de développement et les FRAR ont souvent été faits sans implication directe ou totale des populations, entrainant l'abandon ou la faible exploitation d'une partie de ces investissements. Le PNGTER qui a bénéficié de la Banque Mondiale, principal bailleur de fonds, d'un crédit de 29,6 millions de DTS soit près de 22 milliards de francs CFA sous le N° N022IVC a été mis en vigueur en avril 1998 et le lancement officiel est intervenu en juin 1998 à Yamoussoukro. L'environnement du PNGTER a été marqué par une succession d'évènements regrettables qui ont profondément perturbé la réalisation des activités. A la faveur de la reprise de la coopération financière avec la Banque Mondiale, le portefeuille des projets cofinancés dont le PNGTER a été réactivé en septembre 2008 pour une période de deux (2) ans. Cadre institutionnel Trois (3) ministères techniques représentent la tutelle du PNGTER. Tous ces ministères sont placés sous la responsabilité administrative du Cabinet du Premier Ministre qui assure la coordination nationale. Il s'agit des ministères techniques suivants : Le MINAGRI dont la cellule de coordination MINAGRI-PNGTER a en charge la composante « Appui à la Sécurisation Foncière Rurale » ASFR. Cette composante apporte un appui à la mise en oeuvre de la loi relative au Domaine Foncier Rural. Pendant dix (10) ans, 13 This annex is abridged from a much longer document. 28 cette cellule a signé une convention avec l'ANADER pour la mise en oeuvre des Plans de développement Rural (PDL) ; Le Ministère en charge du Plan, à travers la coordination dénommée « Appui à l'Investissement en Milieu Rural (AIMR)» octroie des subventions destinées au financement des microprojets communautaires issus des PDL et procède au transfert progressif de la maîtrise d'ouvrage aux populations bénéficiaires ; Le Ministère en charge de la décentralisation. La composante « Appui à la Décentralisation (AD) » devait accompagner le processus de décentralisation. Cette composante a été mise en oeuvre par la Cellule Nationale de Coordination ; Le Cabinet du Premier Ministre a sous sa responsabilité une composante « Coordination Institutionnelle Technique et Financière (CITF) » qui assure l'harmonisation des différentes composantes et exécute les activités transversales. Un Comité interministériel et intersectoriel de Pilotage présidé par le Cabinet du Premier Ministre définit les grandes orientations et assure le suivi/évaluation des travaux. Objectifs du projet Objectif à long terme: Le PNGTER a pour objectif global de contribuer à la réduction de la pauvreté par une amélioration sensible et durable du cadre et des conditions de vie des populations rurales de la zone du projet à travers l'appui au développement local et à la sécurisation foncière rurale. Objectifs à court terme: Les objectifs visés s'articulent autour des axes suivants : l'appui à la mise en oeuvre d'une politique foncière en milieu rural destinée à sécuriser les droits des propriétaires fonciers, des exploitants agricoles, et à faciliter le règlement des litiges ; l'aménagement des terroirs des villages par la mise en oeuvre des investissements relatifs à la production agricole, à l'infrastructure rurale, à la préservation et à la gestion des ressources naturelles en tenant compte des potentialités locales et des besoins des populations ; la responsabilisation et la participation accrues des populations dans la planification, la programmation, la réalisation et la gestion des actions de développement. Par ailleurs, le champ d'intervention du PNGTER a été étendu à deux (2) nouvelles activités. Il s'agit de : (i) l'appui à la production rizicole inscrit dans le cadre du programme d'urgence riz piloté par le PNR en vue de contribuer à l'augmentation de la production rizicole des périmètres irrigués de six (6) départements de la zone du projet ; (ii) l'appui à la mise en oeuvre des mesures riveraines du Projet d'Appui à la Relance de la Conservation des Parcs et Réserves de la Côte d'Ivoire (PARC-CI), spécifiquement dans le cadre de la protection du parc national de la Comoé. Objectifs de la composante ASFR : A travers cette composante, le Gouvernement entendait sécuriser la tenure foncière, garantie permettant d'investir durablement et de manière productive dans le capital foncier tant au plan individuel que collectif. Le Gouvernement avait déjà entamé une clarification de la situation foncière avec les phases pilotes et de consolidation du Plan Foncier Rural démarrées depuis 1990. La phase d'extension se fera à travers le PNGTER. Le PFR devait traiter environ 2 millions d'hectares dans treize (13) départements. La composante devait permettre d'instaurer d'une part les bases d'un véritable cadastre rural et d'autre part, des procédures simples et moins onéreuses. Dans cette perspective, le Gouvernement a mis en chantier une réflexion d'ensemble sur le droit foncier, qui a abouti à la loi n°98-750 du 23 décembre 1998 relative au domaine foncier rural. 29 A la réactivation du PNGTER, en septembre 2008, la composante « ASFR » a recherché à atteindre les résultats ci-après : la fonctionnalité des CGFR (12), la fonctionnalité des CVGFR (124), le nombre de terroirs de village délimités (de103 à 223), le nombre de département ou le SIF est implanté (5). Objectifs de la composante AIMR : A l'origine, l'AIMR devait mener des actions ci-après: (i) cofinancer des programmes d'investissement en infrastructures et équipements collectifs issus d'un plan de développement local ; (ii) renforcer, innover et améliorer le système FRAR; (iii) améliorer le cadre et les conditions de vie dans la perspective de la réduction de la pauvreté des communautés rurales ; (iv) décentraliser les organes d'approbation et de décision de financement des investissements dans une perspective de gestion du développement local par les communautés elles-mêmes ; et (v) réduire les disparités de niveau de développement. Le PNGTER privilégiait au mieux le financement des paquets d'investissements regroupant à la fois des investissements productifs de l'ordre de 45% du montant de l'enveloppe allouée, des infrastructures sociales de l'ordre de 45% et des activités non agricoles ou culturelles de l'ordre de 10%. Objectifs et mission de la Cellule Nationale de Coordination : Une Cellule Nationale de Coordination dirigée par un Coordonnateur National. Cette Cellule assure la coordination technique des Ministères, les composantes et la réalisation des activités d'appui. Elle a été créée par Arrêté n°39 PM/CAB du 03 décembre 1996 puis l'Arrêté n°13 PM/ CAB du 22 mai 2002. Au niveau du montage institutionnel, chacune des cinq (5) composantes du Projet a un ancrage institutionnel au sein d'un ministère technique. Ce dispositif a eu pour avantage entre autres, d'assouplir la gestion des ressources. Cependant, l'absence de représentant de la cellule Nationale de Coordination au niveau départementale n'a pas facilité la coordination des activités sur le terrain après la reformulation 2008-2010 Structures impliquées dans la gestion du projet Le Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances a nommé un contrôleur financier et un agent comptable auprès du projet. Par ailleurs, un point focal DMP a été désigné pour le PNGTER. Aspect Plan Foncier Rural (avant l'avènement de la loi relative au domaine foncier rural) Démarré en 1989, le Plan Foncier Rural (PFR) a été poursuivi par la cellule projet du PNGTER au sein du Ministère de l'Agriculture sur la période 1998 - 2001 avec l'avènement de la Loi relative au Domaine Foncier Rural. Les résultats obtenus de 1989 ­ 2001 sont les suivants : 1,12 millions d'hectares levés sur 2 millions de prévus ; 44 209 parcelles villageoises délimitées ; 708 villages sensibilisés ; adhésion massive des populations ; atténuation des conflits fonciers dans les zones du Plan Foncier Rural ; appui à l'avènement de la Loi relative au Domaine Foncier Rural sur la base des démarches techniques et des expériences socio-démographiques du PFR. Appui à la gestion foncière rurale et à la mise en oeuvre de la Loi (2002-2007) Les organes prévus par la Loi ont été progressivement mis en place : 40 Comités de Gestion Foncière Rurale (CGFR); 1210 Comités Villageois de Gestion Foncière Rurale (CVGFR) sur 1427 villages sensibilisés. Le système informatisé de gestion des informations foncières et agricoles (SIF) avait été établi à 55%. Le renforcement des capacités des acteurs de la mise en oeuvre de la loi dans sept (7) départements de l'opération test de délimitation des terroirs 30 villageois (Préfets, Sous préfets, Directeurs Régionaux et Directeurs Départementaux du Ministère de l'Agriculture) a été réalisée pour la première fois. En relation avec le Bureau National d'Etudes Techniques et de Développement (BNETD), le projet a conduit une Opération Test de délimitation des terroirs des villages. Cette opération qui devait concerner 280 terroirs répartis sur l'ensemble du territoire, n'a pu en cette période se réaliser que dans la partie sud du pays du fait de la crise. L'opération test de délimitation des 150 terroirs villageois de la zone sous contrôle gouvernemental, initialement prévue pour une durée de six (6) mois, a été arrêtée après 22 mois, sur préfinancement du BNETD. Pendant cette phase, 103 terroirs ont été entièrement délimités. L'opération devrait être conduite dès que possible dans la zone Nord où 130 terroirs ont été ciblés. Les enseignements tirés de ces expériences ont été capitalisées au cours d'un atelier de restitution (en 2004) et serviront à l'amélioration des démarches en vue d'une généralisation à l'ensemble du territoire national. Composante « Appui à la Planification Participative Locale » La composante APPL a obtenu au 31 Décembre 2005 les résultats suivants : 985 villages informés sur 985 prévus ; 24 Comités Villageois de Développement (CVD) mis en place ; 45 Conseils de Développement Local (CDL) formalisés ; 323 Diagnostics Globaux Participatifs (DGP) réalisés ; 67 Plans de Développement Local (PDL) élaborés comprenant 779 microprojets communautaires planifiés; 57 comités VIH/SIDA mis en place à partir de la « carte à risque » qui est un outil de mobilisation communautaire conçu et réalisé par la composante. Composante « Appui à l'Investissement en Milieu Rural » Cette composante a élaboré des supports techniques et méthodologiques suivants : la grille des équipements éligibles au financement PNGTER ; les canevas d'élaboration des statuts et règlements intérieurs des organes CSPA et CDP ; l'accord-cadre de cofinancement Etat- population bénéficiaire ; les dossiers d'appel d'offres types (équipements, travaux) ; les contrats d'exécution des travaux et de fourniture des équipements ; le guide d'intervention de la composante ; les fiches techniques de programmation et de suivi des microprojets ; la matrice de répartition de l'enveloppe d'investissement ; l'établissement de la situation de référence dans les 13 départements d'intervention sur la base des données historiques FRAR de 1975 à 1998 ; le manuel de passation des marchés communautaires ; La convention PNGTER/SGBCI. Un circuit de financement des microprojets communautaires consensuel. En outre, l'APIMR a apporté un appui à la mise en place, la formalisation et la formation des organes communautaires d'approbation des PDL, de passation des marchés, de gestion des fonds et de suivi des travaux. 13 Comités Sous-préfectoraux d'Agrément (CSPA) chargés de la validation des programmes d'investissement proposés par les CDL à travers les PDL; 20 CDL formalisées c'est-à-dire reconnus par l'Autorité comme des entités juridiques ayant une personnalité morale ; 20 Commissions Locales de Passation des Marchés (CLPM) chargées de la préparation des dossiers d'appel d'offres, de l'adjudication et de la notification des marchés des microprojets communautaires ; 20 Comités de gestion des fonds chargés de la gestion des comptes et du règlement des factures des entrepreneurs ; 31 40 Comités de Suivi et d'Entretien des chantiers (CSE) qui veillent à la bonne exécution des travaux. Au niveau du financement des microprojets communautaires, de 2004 à 2008, 83 DAO ont été élaborés et ont permis de mettre en exécution 93 microprojets pour un montant global de 1,2 milliard F CFA dont 50 financés par la Banque (693 millions de F CFA) et 43 microprojets financés par le FISDES (573 millions F CFA). Quant aux communautés rurales bénéficiaires, elles ont contribué au financement en nature ou en espèces pour environ 70 millions F CFA. Tous ces microprojets sont à ce jour en service. Composante « Appui à la décentralisation » Cette composante a apporté son appui à : la réalisation et la coordination de l'Atelier National sur les organes de mise en oeuvre de la décentralisation et la planification nationale ascendante (du 05 au 09 juin 2001 à Yamoussoukro) ; la réalisation et la coordination de l'Atelier National sur le transfert des compétences dans le cadre de la décentralisation (du 26 au 29 novembre 2001 à Yamoussoukro). ; la contribution à l'élaboration des textes légaux et réglementaires relatifs à la décentralisation à partir des deux ateliers précités ; la contribution à la prise en compte de la spécificité du milieu rural dans la charte de mise en place et d'organisation des communes, et l'appui à la structuration spatiale du milieu rural ayant permis la création de 520 communes en milieu rural. Le projet devait appuyer 110 communes (en milieu rural) en finançant l'acquisition de leurs premiers équipements et des actions de renforcement des capacités au bénéfice des élus locaux et des populations desdites communes. Le manque de statut juridique et la non ouverture de ces communes jusqu'en 2006, a empêché le projet de réaliser son programme. Composante « Cellule Nationale de Coordination » Les acquis sont les suivants : élaboration des manuels technique d'exécution et de gestion financière et comptable , paramétrage et codification du système de S&E et installation d'un logiciel de suivi technique ; conduite des réflexions et préparation des documents stratégiques de réorientation ; audits financiers et comptables ; maintien du dialogue avec les partenaires nationaux ; organisation d'un atelier sur le circuit de financement des microprojets communautaires ; stratégie de mise en oeuvre de la composante AD (consultant) ; atelier sur la structuration du milieu et des organes de mise en oeuvre de la politique nationale de décentralisation ; atelier sur le schéma de préparation du plan de développement national participatif à partir de la planification locale. Les résultats acquis par le projet sur la période 2008-2010 se présentent comme suit : Composante « Appui à la Sécurisation Foncière Rurale » Pourcentage des demandes de certificats Fonciers qui ont été traités Le projet n'a pas enregistré de résultats à ce niveau. Cependant, les indicateurs ci-dessous permettent de se rendre compte de l'importance des activités qui ont été menées : confection de 1000 liasses foncières dont 400 mises à la disposition des Directions Départementales de l'Agriculture. Il s'agit des supports sur lesquels les populations effectueront leurs demandes de certificats fonciers ; 237 demandes de certificats fonciers ont été enregistrées ; 32 40% des demandes de certificat foncier ont été mis à la disposition des DDA et les procès- verbaux de recensement des droits ont été établis à Abengourou ; des ouvertures de layons des parcelles foncières ont été réalisées ; 6 CGFR sur 6 prévus ont été mis en place et rendus fonctionnels dès la première année; 308 CVGFR mis en place et fonctionnels sur un total de 120 prévus ; la formation de 23 Préfets, 34 sous-préfets, 28 DR et DD du MINAGRI, 19 Agents fonciers, 3 coordonnateurs d'ULC, 49 commissaires-Enquêteurs, 37 membres techniques de CGFR, 570 présidents et secrétaires de CVGFR, 25 formateurs en DR et DD et 10 formateurs au niveau central. 60 terroirs délimités sur 120 prévus. L'opérateur BNETD était confronté à des difficultés de trésorerie ; Le Système d'Information Foncière (SIF) est implanté dans cinq (5) départements et cinq (5) régions et le personnel en charge de son exploitation (les agents fonciers) est en place, et a été formé à son utilisation. Composante « Appui à la Planification et à l'Investissement en Milieu Rural » 59 CDL ont été formalisés sur les 65 qui étaient prévus ; les dossiers en vue de la formalisation de 6 CDL restants ont été introduits au niveau des sous-préfectures ; 65 PIU réalisés sur 65 prévus au cours du 1er trimestre 2010 ; 45 PDL sur 45 prévus ont été actualisés ; 1168 microprojets communautaires planifiés en 1ère année, dont 242 pour lesquels les populations ont mobilisé leur quote-part ; 174 microprojets ont fait l'objet de marchés soit un taux de 72% ; mise en service de la totalité des cinquante (50) microprojets du programme 2004. Résultats de la Composante « Cellule nationale de coordination » Dans le cadre de la coordination technique et l'harmonisation des différents volets du projet entre les Ministères techniques concernés, la Coordination nationale a eu de nombreuses rencontres et séances de travail avec les Directeurs de Cabinet du Ministère d'Etat, Ministère du Plan et du développement ainsi que le Ministère de l'Agriculture afin de s'assurer de la mise en cohérence des programmes de travail des différentes composantes. Dans le cadre de leur fonctionnement, les composantes ont reçu l'appui de la coordination Nationale pour les activités suivantes : négociation avec la Banque mondiale dès la fin novembre 2009, en vue de l'obtention d'un avis de non objection pour un contrat d'entente directe avec l'opérateur technique agrée, le BNETD-CCT. Du fait de la clôture des activités du PNGTER à la date du 31 août 2010, la Banque mondiale n'a pas souhaité donné son accord de principe ; appui à la composante APIMR dans le cadre des activités de relance de la production de riz du PNR ; appui à l'organisation des formations transversales du Projet ; appui à la passation des marchés communautaires ; suivi thématique externe du Projet. organisation des missions de consultance sur les sujets transversaux du Projet ainsi que celles des missions de supervision ; supervision de l'élaboration et la finalisation des états financiers, et la supervision des missions d'audits financiers et techniques ; 33 présentation du projet auprès des autorités administratives, des bailleurs de fonds, des institutions nationales et internationales d'appui au projet ; suivi et la consolidation des comptes du projet ; consolidation des rapports des différentes composantes en rapport technique et global du projet ; approbation et la supervision des budgets des composantes opérationnelles et des autres structures intervenant sous la convention au PNGTER ; ordonnancement des dépenses conformément aux procédures du bailleur de fonds et aux procédures des finances publiques dans le cas des projets cofinancés ; passation des marchés pour les acquisitions des travaux, de fournitures, de biens et services par le SPM (113 marchés pour un montant de 5,5 milliards de francs CFA). IMPACT DU PROJET DANS LA MISE EN OEUVRE DES DIFFERENTES POLITIQUES NATIONALES Impact de la composante « Plan Foncier Rural (PFR) » Le projet a contribué à la Réduction des conflits fonciers, particulièrement dans les anciennes zones PFR où des comités de gestion foncière du terroir (CGFT) mis en place par le BNETD disposent d'outils de gestion tels que la carte et le listing du terroir ; Institution de comités de gestion foncière du terroir villageois pour impliquer les populations dans la prise de décision ; Adhésion des populations à la sécurisation foncière ; Implication des populations dans l'indication contradictoire des limites des parcelles ; Développement d'une technique de cartographie parcellaire à moindre coût (environ 7000 F CFA/ha), supportable par les populations rurales ; Primauté de la délimitation des terroirs villageois (mission de service public) par rapport à la parcellisation ; Reconnaissance des droits fonciers coutumiers, et nécessité de leur formalisation (certificat foncier) ; Nécessité de traiter, archiver, et sécuriser les informations foncières générées, par des outils de pointe (SIF). Impact de la composante « Appui à la Sécurisation Foncière Rurale (ASFR) » L'application en cours de la loi n° 98- 750 du 23 décembre 1998, relative au DFR, révèle déjà de nombreux enseignements : Nécessité de faire connaître la loi par une grande frange de la population nationale ; Disponibilité des archives du PFR pour consultation ; Nécessité de pourvoir aux besoins de fonctionnement des organes de gestion foncière rurale (CVGFR, CGFR, voire CFR), Importance des CVGFR dans le dispositif d'application de la loi relative au domaine foncier rural, L'Autorité administrative doit être le dernier recours dans la gestion des litiges fonciers. Elle doit s'appuyer sur le conseil du village et le CVGFR, Nécessité de libéraliser l'opération de délimitation des biens fonciers ruraux. Mettant ainsi fin au monopole des Géomètres-Experts, La création d'un corps d'agents spécialisés pour effectuer les enquêtes foncières; 34 Les pouvoirs publics sont encouragés à rechercher des financements pour délimiter les terroirs villageois. C'est un processus long et difficile, mais il règle définitivement les conflits fonciers inter-villageois. Il en sera de même des conflits entre paysans, lors des parcellaires; Les populations, surtout les jeunes découvrent l'histoire de la constitution de leur terroir et connaissent l'étendue de leurs terres; La mise en place du SIF en tant qu'outil de gestion foncière rurale et agricole. L'élaboration de la procédure de délimitation des terroirs villageois.; La réalisation d'une opération-test dans le but de vérifier la faisabilité de la procédure. Des acteurs des départements ne faisant pas partie de la zone du projet ont bénéficié de formation; Le projet a financé l'équipement des services centraux, régionaux et départementaux du MINAGRI. Impact des composantes « Appui à la Planification Participative Locale (APPL) » et « Appui à la Planification et à l'Investissement en Milieu Rural (APIMR) » L'introduction de l'approche participative est novatrice, non seulement en Côte d'Ivoire, mais aussi dans la sous-région; L'adoption par le Ministère du Plan et du Développement de la Planification Participative, comme outil de planification du développement local (guide et manuel de planification participative locale); Le renforcement des capacités des communautés rurales en matière de planifications, programmation et gestion de leurs terroirs ; La promotion des activités génératrices de revenus et la valorisation des potentialités locales ; L'amélioration de l'accès aux services sociaux de base (école primaire, dispensaire, maternité) ; Le désenclavement de certaines localités (pistes rurales, etc.); Le renforcement du processus de décentralisation (CDL). L'implication des communautés rurales dans la gestion de leur terroir ; La prise en main par les populations des actions d développement de leur terroir. Analyse critique de l'action de la banque mondiale et du gouvernement Performance de la Banque mondiale Performance de la Banque dans la conception du projet La conception du projet fut basée sur l'hypothèse stratégique que l'appui au processus de sécurisation du foncier rural ainsi qu'à l'investissement en milieu rural est possible à travers une approche innovante pour l'époque (les années 90) : la méthode d'approche participative. Toutefois, dans son exécution, le projet est issu de la fusion de deux (2) projets financés par la Banque mondiale. Une autonomie totale (administrative, technique et financière) a été donnée aux différentes composantes du projet. Par ailleurs, dans la mise en oeuvre, la complémentarité et la synergie entre les deux (2) projets n'a pas donné entière satisfaction. Qualité de supervision du projet En moyenne, la supervision du projet a été irrégulière si l'on tient compte du nombre de Tasks managers qui se sont succédés (au nombre de cinq en douze ans). Cette instabilité conjuguée à la complexité du PNGTER n'ont pas facilité l'appropriation du projet par les différents responsables au siège de la mission résidente de la Banque mondiale à Abidjan. Ces changements fréquents tendent à fragiliser les fondements du PNGTER et à perturber sa mise en oeuvre. Toutefois après 35 la reformulation du projet (septembre 2008), malgré les dispositions prises pour assurer une meilleure prise en main des activités du projet, les objectifs de développement assignés au projet n'ont pas pu être atteints. Concernant la composante ASFR Implication salutaire pour contribuer véritablement à l'instauration d'une politique nationale de développement harmonieux et durable ; Moyens logistiques, financiers et humains ont permis d'assister les populations bénéficiaires qui, bien que réticentes au départ, ont effectivement apporté leur adhésion. Malheureusement, l'arrêt de l'appui financier de la Banque mondiale laisse les populations très déçues ; Mise à disposition des fonds en vue de la réalisation des activités de terrain. Concernant la composante APIMR Le réaménagement de la stratégie d'intervention de l'ANADER décidé lors de la mission de supervision (octobre-novembre 2009) ; L'accès des gestionnaires du projet au système « client connexion » ; La poursuite des engagements des paiements directs ; Le financement à 100% des dépenses éligibles ; Le suivi d'exécution des diligences et recommandations arrêtées au terme de la mission de supervision ; La mise à disposition de moyens logistiques. Principales décisions ayant freiné l'exécution du projet Concernant la composante ASFR: Le changement perpétuel des Tasks managers qui impriment des visions différentes ; La lenteur dans le traitement des avis de non objections ; L'acquisition de certains marchés ont pris beaucoup de temps (entretien des engins et matériels de bureau) ; Les procédures sont parfois longues et pénalisent la réalisation de certaines activités ; l'arrêt de l'appui financier de la Banque Mondiale au moment où les activités décollent sur le terrain entraine la frustration des populations. La Banque doit donner beaucoup plus de temps au projet pour réaliser ses objectifs au profit de la population. Elle doit également faciliter sa procédure de décaissement. Concernant la composante APIMR Le remplacement fréquent des Task-Manager (5 Task Team Leader) et les fréquentes réorientations impulsées par la Banque Mondiale ; Les suspensions de décaissements avec notamment trois (3) suspensions d'une durée totale d'environ six (6) ans ; L'inconstance de la Banque Mondiale relative à l'adoption du circuit financier qui n'est intervenue que cinq (5) ans après la mise en oeuvre du PNGTER (1998-2003) ; La faible prise en compte de l'environnement (insécurité dans les zones CNO, faible redéploiement de l'Administration dans les zones CNO, etc) ; 36 L'arrimage de nouvelles activités pour lesquelles le PNGTER n'était pas a priori outillé : Programme d'Urgence Riz (1,2 milliards FCFA) et du Projet d'Appui aux mesures riveraines du parc national de la Comoé (482 millions de FCFA) ; Le délai de traitement des demandes d'avis de non objection : au niveau de la Banque mondiale, le traitement des demandes d'avis de non objection n'a pas toujours été systématique ; Les procédures et les délais d'approbation des conventions et des marchés (engorgement des dossiers de marchés au niveau du Spécialiste en Passation des Marchés) ; Le recouvrement du compte spécial de la composante APIMR qui a pris effet à compter d'avril 2010 ; au cours de la phase d'achèvement, cette disposition a entrainé un ralentissement du processus de liquidation des dépenses engagées ; Le manque d'appui pour le contrôle des travaux de pistes rurales : les dispositions prises par rapport au recrutement de l'AGEROUTE pour la maîtrise d'oeuvre n'a pas été jugée satisfaisante par la Banque mondiale qui a proposé un autre mode de sélection difficilement exploitable compte tenu de la date de clôture du projet ; Le sous-effectif en matière de personnel spécialisé en passation des marchés : la mise en place d'une cellule composée d'un SPM junior, d'un assistant en passation des marchés et d'une secrétaire à temps plein n'a pas été entérinée par la Banque Mondiale. Principales décisions ayant favorisé l'exécution du projet Le maintien du projet malgré la longue période de suspension des décaissements ; L'Instruction 192 du Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances relatives et procédures et les modalités d'exécution des dépenses de projets d'investissements cofinancés par la Banque Mondiale ; La suppression des clefs de répartition et un allègement des procédures de gestion (voir Instruction n° 192 relative aux procédures et modalités d'exécution des projets cofinancés instruction 192) ; Les budgets ont été notifiés dans les délais ; La lettre d'orientation du Gouvernement de janvier 1997 ; L'Arrêté n°011 du 26 janvier 2004 portant procédure de financement et de gestion des microprojets communautaires du PNGTER ; L'Arrêté n°05 du 22 avril 2004 portant création de la Cellule AIMR du PNGTER ; La lettre circulaire portant mise en place des instances décisionnelles de la composante AIMR (mars 2004) ; L'Arrêté n°04/MPD/DGDAT/DAT portant délégation de signature et d'approbation des marchés passés dans le cadre des projets d'appui au programme d'urgence post-conflit ; L'Arrêté n°03 du 5 février 2003 fixant le seuil et les procédures de passation des marchés des microprojets communautaires financés par le PNGTER ; La mise en place du Comité de mobilisation des ressources extérieures. Principales décisions ou absence de prise de décisions ayant freiné l'exécution du Projet Deux (2) suspensions des décaissements cumulées de trente (30) mois en sept (7) ans d'activités, marquées par trois (3) ans de crise politico-militaire, ne permettent pas l'évolution du programme, Forte résistance des Autorités de l'Administration financière ivoirienne face à l'innovation (l'orthodoxie des finances publiques). 37 Mise en place tardive du budget malgré les demandes de transfert pour cause de fermeture du SIGFIP (courant Mars 2010) ; Absence de suivi régulier (faible intervention ou inactivité du comité de pilotage) ; Montage institutionnel non fonctionnel avec problèmes de cohérence des interventions au sein du projet ; La situation de "ni guerre, ni paix" dans les zones CNO (départements concernés Bangolo, Béoumi et Korhogo) ; Ce contexte a engendré un climat d'insécurité et un environnement social délétère dans ces zones, marqué par une insécurité dans les zones Centre-Nord-Ouest et un faible redéploiement de l'Administration ; Le cumul de fonctions de l'ex-Coordonnateur National ; Le délai d'approbation des marchés par les autorités compétentes ; Le manque de promptitude dans le traitement des dossiers (recouvrement du compte désigné et prorogation du projet) ; Principales leçons à tirer Difficultés de mobilisation des ressources pour le financement des prestations en cours ; Nécessité de mettre un accent sur le suivi régulier et le montage institutionnel des projets. Evaluation de l'efficacité et de la qualité des relations entre la banque mondiale et le gouvernement durant l'exécution du projet Le Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances demeure le principal interlocuteur avec la Banque Mondiale, dans le cadre de l'exécution du PNGTER et des projets cofinancés : comité de mobilisation des fonds, instruction 192, pour simplifier les procédures de décaissements, transfert en capital etc. suivi de l'état d'avancement des projets. Valeur et niveau de recouvrement de la contrepartie du Gouvernement Les prévisions de départ en termes de contribution de la contrepartie nationale ont été estimées à 4 755 859 000FCFA toute composante confondues. Malgré les difficultés de trésorerie la partie ivoirienne a pu soutenir les actions du projet en injectant effectivement environ 3 680 941 589 FCFA (source : Rapport de suivi financier au 30 juin 2010). Coûts récurrents engendrés par le projet et ayant un impact sur le budget de l'ETAT Les coûts récurrents engendrés par le projet et ayant un impact sur le budget de l'ETAT sont évalués pour l'ensemble des trois composantes à 1 462 749 794 FCFA (voir annexe ci-joint) et s'analysent comme suit : Composante APIMR Les engagements pris par la composante pendant la mise en oeuvre du projet notamment en ce qui concerne la réalisation des microprojets communautaires, n'ont pu être honorés par l'IDA, du fait de la clôture du projet le 31 août 2010. Notons que l'IDA a pris en compte les activités avant cette date, celles en cours de réalisation et non achevées au 31 août 2010 ainsi que certaines dépenses déclarées non éligibles sur le financement de l'IDA estimées à 1 415 860 360 FCFA. Composante ASFR Les prestations non éligibles sur le financement de l'IDA au 31 août 2010 sont évaluées à 12 348 249 FCFA et concernent celle de la compagnie d'assurance La Loyale au cours du premier trimestre 2010. Cellule Nationale de Coordination 38 Des engagements pris par la Cellule Nationale de Coordination non éligibles sur les fonds de l'IDA sont estimés à la date de clôture à 34 541 185 FCFA. Parmi ces charges, figurent les frais afférents à l'audit technique de validation des travaux de reprofilage lourd et traitement de points critiques (2 012 800 FCFA). Cet audit a été recommandé par la Banque Mondiale avant la prise en compte des travaux suscités sur le financement de l'IDA. Conséquences prévisibles de la fin du projet sur les Structures institutionnelles mises en place dans le cadre du projet Les conséquences prévisibles de la fin du projet sur les structures institutionnelles mises en place dans le cadre du projet sont les suivantes : Destruction des organes communautaires ; Démobilisation des membres ; Manque d'appui conseil ; Difficultés de prise en compte de l'entretien des réalisations ; Risque de malversation ; Complexité de la recherche et de la mobilisation des financements ; Non capitalisation des acquis ; Perte de crédibilité de l'Etat ; Méfiance des populations à l'égard du développement local. PERSPECTIVES POUR LE FUTUR POUR LA PERENNISATION DES ACQUIS Le PNGTER a largement développé une expertise et des outils qui se sont avérés être adaptés pour le développement participatif. Ce projet après douze (12) ans d'expérience contribuera à n'en point douter, à la dynamique de reconstruction et de réhabilitation : contribution à l'identification des besoins prioritaires des populations et à la planification des actions de développement au plan local appui à la réalisation des infrastructures de manière consensuelle en y associant les Autorités administratives déconcentrées, les ministères techniques et les Elus locaux. Au delà des acquis du PNGTER, il y aura un goût d'inachevé à un moment où toutes les parties prenantes sont plus que jamais sensibilisées et impliquées dans la mise en oeuvre de la politique de décentralisation. Il y a nécessité de maintenir les activités dans le domaine social en milieu rural et de pouvoir mesure l'impact sur toutes les activités et analyser les opportunités. Aussi, importe-t-il de trouver un mécanisme permettant d'une part, la poursuite et la finalisation les activités en cours et d'autre part de garantir une pérennisation des actions conduites auprès des populations rurales dans le cadre de la politique de décentralisation. appui à l'information et à la sensibilisation des populations sur la loi relative au domaine Foncier Rural doit se poursuivre tout comme l'appui à la délimitation des terroirs villageois et la promotion de la délivrance des certificats fonciers, Ces actions sont d'une grande portée puisqu'elles contribuent à la paix sociale. Par ailleurs, la mise en place du système d'Information Foncière (SIF) marque le début de la modernisation du processus de gestion du foncier rural. Il serait souhaitable que l'on puisse procéder au déploiement du SIF sur l'ensemble du territoire national et qu'il fonctionne. De plus, si ce système n'est pas régulièrement mis à jour, il deviendra très vite obsolète. L'administration centrale doit pourvoir avec le concours financier de l'Etat et des bailleurs de fonds, donner les moyens de maintenir cet outil et de l'entretenir. Dans la perspective d'une reformulation, il s'agirait, à partir de la clarification de la situation foncière, de mieux responsabiliser les populations rurales en matière de planification, de choix 39 et de réalisation des investissements relatifs à la production agricole, à l'infrastructure rurale, à la préservation et à la gestion des ressources naturelles sur la base de programmes de renforcement des capacités divers et variés. Renforcement des capacités des acteurs du monde rural : il s'agit de favoriser la capitalisation des acquis du PNGTER par un renforcement des capacités des acteurs du monde rural en matière de politique de décentralisation, de gestion des OPA, de capacité à la mobilisation des ressources financières, de suivi et d'entretien des infrastructures réalisées ainsi que de susciter la création d'emplois directs et indirects dans le milieu rural (agriculture et transformation des produits agricoles, travaux publics et bâtiments, transport, etc.). Au plan organisationnel, la conception d'un projet unique permettrait de garantir un meilleur management du personnel. La coordination technique et l'harmonisation des différentes activités du Projet avec les Ministères techniques concernés sera assurée par une Cellule de Coordination du Projet. Elle sera chargée de la gestion administrative, technique et financière du projet dans son entièreté. L'appui institutionnel sera défini en fonction de la conduite des activités à la fois transversales et sectorielles. Le Projet pourrait se définir comme une agence d'exécution des activités déjà programmées dans le PDL des populations bénéficiaires. Ces activités pourraient être exécutées sur des financements de différents bailleurs conformément à leurs procédures administratives, comptables, financières et la période de passation des marchés. 40 Annex 5. Comments of other Partners (Ministry of Agriculture) MINISTERE DE L'AGRICULTURE REPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D'IVOIRE -------------- Union ­ Discipline -Travail DIRECTION GENERALE ------------ DU DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL ------------- DIRECTION DU FONCIER RURAL ET DU CADASTRE RURAL -------------- OBSERVATIONS SUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DU PNGTER 1. Sur le plan du montage du projet Le fait que plusieurs ministères administrent le projet et que ce projet soit présidé par un Coordonnateur national qui dépend du Cabinet du Premier Ministre, a alourdi la gestion du projet et a posé un problème d'ancrage institutionnel. 2. Sur le plan de l'organisation L'organisation de la composante Appui à la Sécurisation Foncière Rurale (ASFR) paraissait faible en ce qu'il y avait très peu de personnes pour exécuter un budget élevé dont le montant n'était pas toujours communiqué au Ministère de l'Agriculture. L'existence à un moment des Cellules Régionales d'Appui à la Gestion Foncière Rurale (CRAGFR) mettait en parallèle une structure projet qui concurrençait l'Administration publique. Les Cellules projet avaient les moyens alors que l'Administration publique en était dépourvue. Cette situation a été corrigée vers la fin du projet par la suppression des CRAGFR et l'appui direct à l'Administration publique. Bien que le projet contienne le mot « national », il était limité dans sa zone d'intervention à treize (13) départements. Une faible relation entre la composante ASFR et la Direction chargée de la mise en oeuvre de la loi relative au domaine foncier rural a été constatée. 3. Sur le plan du fonctionnement Les plans annuels d'activités, s'ils étaient élaborés, n'étaient pas communiqués à la Direction du Foncier Rural et du Cadastre Rural (DFRCR). II en est de même du rapport annuel d'activités. En conséquence, la programmation et la planification des activités n'étaient pas élaborées en coordination avec la Direction du Foncier Rural et du Cadastre Rural. La composante ASFR se comportait comme une administration chargée de gérer le foncier rural. Les appuis prévus dans les documents du projet pour être apportés à la Direction du Foncier Rural et du Cadastre Rural, n'ont pas été toujours mobilisés. 4. Sur le plan de la formation Les équipements prévus ont été mobilisés mais tardivement. Les formations programmées ont été réalisées. 5. Sur le plan des activités de terrain Les activités de terrain n'étaient pas menées en coordination avec l'Administration publique. Conclusion 41 Compte tenu des objectifs nationaux, les appuis financiers doivent être prévus pour couvrir l'ensemble du territoire national et renforcer les capacités de l'Administration publique, des opérateurs publics et privés, et aider aux bénéficiaires de la loi. La mise en oeuvre de cette opération par l'administration chargée de la gestion du foncier rural permet d'assurer une meilleure programmation et planification des activités et un meilleur suivi de leur exécution et de leur impact. Cela doit en outre s'inscrire dans une durée plus longue. 42 Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents Staff Appraisal Report, April 28, 1997 (Report No. 16378-IVC) Proposed Portfolio Restructuring in a Post-Crisis Environment (Project Paper), July 29, 2008 (Report No. P7710-CI) Review of PNGTER land tenure component, FAO's land tenure report (Charles Ntampaka, FAO consultant), September 2010 Évaluation Environnementale, Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales, République de Côte d'Ivoire, September 1994 Etude D'Impact Environmental, PNAGER, Bertrand de la Farge (consultant), December 2001. Evaluation du Projet FAC, "Appui au Développement Communal en Côte d'Ivoire" Alain Rochegude (consultant), December 2001. Environmental and Social Management Framework, PNGTER, June 2008 Pest Management Plan, PNGTER, September 2008 Resettlement Policy Framework ("Cadre de Politique de Reinstallation"), PNGTER, Dr. Kouassi Clement (consultant), June 2008. Evaluation des Activités Relatives au Développement de la Riziculture Financées par la Banque Mondiale a Travers le PNGTER, Amani Bérah Cyrille (consultant), July 2010. 43 8ºW To 7ºW 6ºW 5ºW 4ºW 3ºW Bamako To M ALI Tengrel Sikasso BURKINA CÔT E D'IV OIRE To Bobo Dioulasso FA SO To Kampti CITIES AND TOWNS 10ºN 10ºN é REGION CAPITALS Bag o DENGUÉLÉ To NATIONAL CAPITAL SAVANES Batie Boundiali Ferkessedougou RIVERS Odienne Odienné Korhogo MAIN ROADS Kom Bouna o o o To RAILROADS B B Bo u Beyla To é c a Blan Bole 9ºN 9ºN REGION BOUNDARIES m INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES Banda G U IN E A Sass Nzi WORODOUGOU ZANZAN s sand Dabakala i i M M Mara ra a a Touba BAFING VALLÉE DU BANDAMA o ué ué ué Séguéla Séguéla gué Katiola 8ºN Mankono Bondoukou 8ºN To To Wenchi Nzerekore Tanda Biankouma Béoumi Bouaké DIX-HUIT Lac de Mont Nimba MONTAGNES Kossou Sakassou M'Bahiakro (1,752 m) Vavoua Zuenoula Man To N'ZI-COMOÉ Danane HAUT- Sunyani bo Tiebissou Bocanda Agnibilékrou Lo 7ºN Bangolo SASSANDRA Bouaflé Bouaflé LACS Daoukro 7ºN Daloa YAMOUSSOUKRO MOYEN- Duekoue MARAHOUÉ COMOÉ GHAN A Lobo Sinfra Dimbokro Abengourou Guiglo Bongouanou Toulepleu Toumodi MOYEN-CAVALLY Issia To Oumé Monrovia FROMAGER CÔTE D'IVOIRE Gagnoa AGNÉBY Adzope 6ºN 6ºN Tiassale Agboville Lakota Divo Soubré SUD- é mo L IB E RIA SUD- Ko Alepe COMOÉ Sa s s ssa Nzi BANDAMA LAGUNES Aboisso z z nd BAS- Dabou ra Grand-Lahou Abidjan SASSANDRA Adiake Jacqueville Grand- To 5ºN Bassam Prestea 5ºN Sassandra San-Pédro 0 40 80 120 Kilometers IBRD 33393R To This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. Monrovia Gulf of Guinea The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information APRIL 2008 shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Tabou 0 20 40 60 80 Miles Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 8ºW 7ºW 6ºW 5ºW 4ºW 3ºW