Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR2528 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-44950) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 2.8 MILLION (US$4.5 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA FOR A TRANSPORT SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT March 14, 2013 Transport Sector Country Department AFCF1 Africa Regional Office CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective September 30, 2012) Currency Unit = Mauritanian Ouguiya (MRO) MRO 301.50 = US$1 US$1.54 = SDR 1 FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ANAC Agence Nationale de l’Aviation Civile (National Civil Aviation Authority) APL Adaptative Program Lending ARTR Autorité de Régulation des Transports Routiers (Road transport Regulation Authority) ASECNA Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar (Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar) BAAC Bulletin d 'Analyse des Accidents de la Circulation (Road Traffic Accidents Analysis Report) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CECAM Cellule d'Etudes et de Coordination des Affaires Maritimes (Maritime Affairs Studies and Coordination Unit) CETUD Conseil Exécutif des Transports Urbain de Dakar (Dakar Urban Transport ExecutiveCouncil) CPS Country Partnership Strategy CUN Communauté Urbaine de Nouakchott (Nouakchott Metropolitan Area) DEPC Direction des Etudes, de la Programmation et de la Coopération (Directorate of Studies, Planning and Cooperation) DGTT Direction Générale des Transports Terrestres (General Directorate of Land Transport) DMM Direction de la Marine Marchande (Merchant Shipping Directorate) DSR Direction de la Sécurité Routière (Road Safety Directorate) EDF European Development Fund ESW Economic and Sector Work EU European Union FA Financing Agreement FMR Financial Management Report GDP Gross Domestic Product GIRM Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania GNI Gross National Income IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization IDA International Development Association IFR Interim Unaudited Financial Report IMO International Maritime Organization ISPS International Shipping and port facility Security KPI Key Performance Indicator LSP Letter of Sector Policy M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships ME Ministry of Education MET Ministry of Equipment and Transport MIO Maritime Investigation Office MRO Mauritanian Ouguiya MTR Mid-term Review NGO Nongovernmental Organization NRSS National Road Safety Strategy NTP National Transport Plan PAD Project Appraisal Document PAN Port Autonome de Nouadhibou (Port of Nouadhibou) PANPA Port Autonome de Nouakchott-Port de l’Amitié (Port of Nouakchott) PDO Project Development Objective PNDP Port of Nouakchott Development Project PPF Project Preparation Facility PRSP-3 Third Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté - CSLP-3) SAM Société des Aéroports de Mauritanie (Mauritanian Airports Company) STP Société des Transports Publics (Public Transport Company) TA Technical Assistance TAL Technical Assistance Loan TSIDTAP Transport Sector Institutional Development and Technical Assistance Project TSS Transport Sector Strategy TTL Task Team Leader WCAATSSP West and Central Africa Air Transport Safety and Security Project Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Vera Songwe Sector Director Jamal Saghir Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Project Team Leader: Ibou Diouf ICR Team Leader: Papa Mamadou Fall MAURITANIA TRANSPORT SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 4 3. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................ 8 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 14 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 15 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 17 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 18 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 19 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 20 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 22 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 23 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 25 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 26 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 27 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 31 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 32 MAP DATASHEET A. Basic Information MAURITANIA: TRANSPORT SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL Country: Mauritania Project Name: DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Project ID: P089672 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-44950 ICR Date: 01/23/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC Lending Instrument: TAL Borrower: OF MAURITANIA Original Total XDR 2.80M Disbursed Amount: XDR 2.28M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 2.80M Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: Directorate of Studies, Planning and Cooperation - Ministry of Transport Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Mauritania B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 11/27/2007 Effectiveness: 01/15/2010 12/29/2009 Appraisal: 04/14/2008 Restructuring(s): Approval: 07/31/2008 Mid-term Review: 06/05/2011 05/15/2011 Closing: 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory i C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Public administration- Transportation 100 100 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Infrastructure services for private sector development 50 50 Other public sector governance 50 50 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Vera Songwe Madani M. Tall Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Project Team Leader: Ibou Diouf Ibou Diouf ICR Team Leader: Papa Mamadou Fall ICR Primary Author: Papa Mamadou Fall F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project Development Objective is to: Improve land, maritime, and air transport sector management. ii Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The Project Development Objective was not revised. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Letter of sector policy. Value Preliminary study quantitative or Letter approved. Letter approved. completed. Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2008 05/15/2011 09/30/2012 Comments 100% achievement. The letter of sector policy was approved by the council of (incl. % ministers on September 13, 2012. achievement) Indicator 2 : Road safety strategy. Scattered responsibilities Value Strategy is defined among several agencies Strategy is defined quantitative or and adopted by the without a coordinated and adopted. Qualitative) Government. framework. Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments 100% achievement. The strategy has been defined by the Government further to (incl. % a broad consultation process. The strategy has been approved by the council of achievement) ministers on August 04, 2012. Road safety prevention curriculum implemented by the Ministry of Education in Indicator 3 : pilot schools. Road safety Value Lack of road safety Launch of prevention quantitative or sensitization in primary curriculum in pilot curriculum is Qualitative) education curriculum. schools. launched in pilot schools. Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments 100% achievement. As a result of a broad consultative process, a road safety (incl. % manual was developed and introduced in pilot schools for the 2012-13 school achievement) year. Indicator 4 : Merchant shipping code and regulations, including ISPS code provisions. Value quantitative or Code is outdated. Code is revised. Code is revised. Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 100% achievement. Revision is consistent with the IMO conventions ratified by Comments the Recipient, and the relevant IMO standards, including the provisions of the (incl. % ISPS Code. The code was approved by the council of ministers on September 27, achievement) 2012. Indicator 5 : Civil aviation code. iii Code is revised, Code is revised in Value Code outdated, compliant with compliance with quantitative or preliminary update ICAO standard, ICAO standard, and Qualitative) already carried out. and adopted by the adopted by the Government. Government. Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments (incl. % 100% achievement. The code is in force with highly satisfactory results. achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Database producing the number of accidents in Nouakchott per 100,000 Indicator 1 : inhabitants. Value Database (quantitative ToRs available. Achieved. available. or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments (incl. % 100% achievement. Database is available and functional. achievement) Indicator 2 : Action plan for road safety strategy in Nouakchott. Action plan Action plan drafted, Value drafted, adopted, adopted, and (quantitative Lack of plan. and implementation or Qualitative) implementation started. started. Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments (incl. % 100% achievement. Awareness campaign completed on June 30, 2012. achievement) Merchant Shipping Directorate (Direction de la Marine Marchande - DMM) Indicator 3 : staffing. Value Key high level Staff are in place (quantitative Recruitment of 16 staff. staff in place and and have been or Qualitative) trained. trained. Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments 100% achievement. Training received in Merchant marine operations, ISPS and (incl. % Port state control completed. Thanks to the project, two DMM staff received a achievement) master’s degree in Port Administration. Indicator 4 : ISPS and MARPOL conventions compliance monitoring by DMM. Value M&E system ISPS convention (quantitative available (yearly Achieved. monitoring started. or Qualitative) reports produced). iv Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments 100% achievement. DMM is monitoring ISPS on a regular basis. The project has (incl. % financed new equipment, including electronic navigational chart. achievement) Indicator 5 : Airport investment plan. Airport Investment Value Plan approved and (quantitative ToRs of the study drafted. Achieved. implementation or Qualitative) started. Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments (incl. % 100% achievement. achievement) Indicator 6 : Procurement schedule. Value Procurement plan Annual (quantitative Achieved. established adjustment. or Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments (incl. % 100% achievement. Procurement plan updated on a regular basis, as needed. achievement) Indicator 7 : Financial management reports (FMRs) and audits. Value FMR format agreed upon (quantitative between IDA and Annual audit. Achieved. or Qualitative) Government. Date achieved 06/30/2008 09/30/2012 09/30/2012 Comments 100% achievement. Annual audits were completed and FMR were submitted to (incl. % IDA on a quarterly basis. achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) Moderately Moderately 1 12/22/2008 0.00 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 2 05/21/2009 0.00 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately 3 10/27/2009 Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 Unsatisfactory 4 12/30/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 5 06/09/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.63 6 12/25/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.80 7 07/10/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.35 8 02/12/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.79 9 06/27/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.96 v 10 10/02/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.40 H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable I. Disbursement Profile vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Economic situation at appraisal. At the time of appraisal in 2008 Mauritania had a population of 3.2 million and a gross national income (GNI) per capita of US$840. Overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth decreased from 11.4 percent in 2006 to 1.0 percent in 2007. The country went through a period of political instability with the overthrow of elected governments twice, in 2005 and 2008. After three years of sustained dialogue between the government and development partners, the political crisis in the second half of 2008 led the international community to put most of its activities on hold, except humanitarian aid. The World Bank curtailed its operations in Mauritania from August 2008 until September 2009. 2. Transport sector. The road transport network consisted of 10,927 km of classified roads of which about 7,873 km were rural earth roads. Mauritania had three international airports (Nouakchott, Nouadhibou, and Atar), seven regional airfields and one national airline. Mauritania had two ports: the main port of Nouakchott and the secondary port of Nouadhibou. 3. Land transport sub-sector. The road sub-sector was characterized by a persistent imbalance between construction, rehabilitation and maintenance funds. As a result, more than half of the country’s core road network was in poor or bad condition. At the same time, the Ministry did not have a Transport Sector Strategy that indicated a clear roadmap for the development and more effective management of the sub-sector. 4. At the time of appraisal, the status of road safety was worrisome. Indeed, in 2007, National reports showed that an estimated 138 people a year were killed in accidents on national roads, including about 50 people a year in Nouakchott. Between 2002 and 2007, the occurrence of accidents mirrored the 15 to 20 percent annual growth of the transport fleet, while the number of casualties increased from 25 to 30 percent. 5. Maritime sub-sector. The maritime sector was characterized by fragmented ownership: management of the two main ports at Nouakchott and Nouadhibou were under different ministries, while operations at the mineral quay in Nouadhibou were overseen by a third ministry. Also, the agencies involved in the management and coordination of the maritime sector suffered significant capacity issues linked with the lack of training and adequate staffing. Furthermore, the legal and institutional frameworks of the maritime sub-sector were outdated and were not in compliance with International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards. 6. Air sub-sector. At the time of appraisal, the institutional framework of the air transport sub-sector was unclear and was characterized by weak administrative and financial capacity. The newly created Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) operated in an ambiguous legal environment and lacked the capacity to fulfill its mission of ensuring 1 operators’ compliance with international safety and security standards. Overall, security measures at all airports were inadequate with regard to the minimum requirements of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standard security measures (obsolete security equipment, lack of comprehensive training and security plan). Runways, taxiways, and apron surfaces at Nouakchott and Nouadhibou Airports were in a badly deteriorating state and required immediate intervention. A new airline company (Mauritania Airways) had emerged, in replacement of liquidated former carrier (Air Mauritanie). 7. Sector policies and plans. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (GIRM) with the support of the World Bank and the European Union (EU) undertook a comprehensive analytical review of the sector on the basis of the National Transport Plan (NTP) and the 2004 Bank financed economic and sector work 1 (ESW). As a result, the GIRM outlined a coherent roadmap which consisted of: (a) the liberalization of the road transport industry which was enacted by a 2005 decree; (b) the creation in 2004 of an autonomous Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) in replacement of the Civil Aviation Directorate; (c) the completion and adoption in 2007 of sectoral studies (road transport strategy and multimodal transport strategy); and (d) the creation in 2004 of a Directorate of Studies, Planning, and Cooperation (DEPC) within the Ministry of Equipment and Transport (MET), tasked with the coordination, formulation and implementation of sector policies and strategies. 8. The Project. The Transport Sector Institutional Development and Technical Assistance Project (TSIDTAP) was primarily designed to support the above-mentioned reforms by improving the management capacities of the GIRM in the land, maritime, and transport subsectors. It was also designed to improve overall sector coherence and coordination, and provide for a clear vision of the transport sector. The total estimated cost of the project at appraisal was about US$5.5 million of which US$4.5 million would be funded by IDA while the balance would be funded by GIRM. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 9. The PDO. The Project Development Objective as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was to improve land, maritime, and air transport sector management. The project also sought to strengthen the sector coordination capacity of the MET in order to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness of Mauritanian transport sector. 10. The PDO was consistent with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) dated June, 2007 (IDA/Report No. 39532), which identified governance and public sector capacity as key priorities. 11. Key Indicators of Performance. The key performance indicators are summarized in the table below. 1 Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Transport Sector Overview, Report No. 30039 dated September 2004. 2 Table 1: Key Performance Indicators Land transport sub-sector PDO Indicators: • The definition and adoption of road safety strategy; and • The introduction of a road safety curriculum in pilot primary schools. Intermediate Outcome Indicators: • Database producing number of accidents in Nouakchott per 100,000 inhabitants • Action plan for road safety strategy in Nouakchott. Maritime transport sub-sector PDO Indicator: • The update of the Merchant Shipping Code and Regulations, including International Shipping and Port facility Security (ISPS 2) code provisions. Intermediate Outcome Indicators: • Merchant Shipping Directorate (DMM) staffing; • ISPS and Marine Pollution (MARPOL) conventions compliance monitoring by DMM Air transport sub-sector PDO Indicator: • The update of the civil aviation code. Intermediate Outcome Indicators: • Airport investment plan Transport sector coordination PDO Indicator: • The adoption of a letter of sector policy (LSP) Intermediate Outcome Indicators: • Procurement schedule • Financial management reports and audits 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 12. The objectives of the project were not revised. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) did not explicitly identify project beneficiaries. However, it is clear that the population at large was expected to benefit from the outcome of institutional strengthening activities supported by the project. More specifically: (i) institutional strengthening under the project would result in the more efficient management of the sector; (ii) improvement in road safety management would have a benefit in terms of the costs of avoided accidents; (iii) the updated maritime code 2 ISPS Code is implemented through chapter XI-2 Special measures to enhance maritime security in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 and enforced since 2004. 3 would improve security and safety of ports operations; and (iv) the updated civil aviation regulatory and legal framework would improve security and safety of airport operations. 1.5 Original Components 14. The project consisted of four components, which were clearly linked to the PDO and key indicators. These components were: 15. Component 1: Institutional Support and Capacity-Building for Land Transport Sub-sector. Support to the newly created Directorate General of Land Transport (DGTT) through: (i) institutional capacity-building (with support to road safety directorate); (ii) road safety situation assessment and implementation of a pilot monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system in Nouakchott; (iii) launch of a sensitization campaign; (iv) development of a “road safety introduction book� for primary education; (v) purchase of equipment for an experimental road safety education base; and (vi) definition of a national road safety strategy. 16. Component 2: Support to Institutional and Technical Capacity-Building for the Maritime Transport Sub-sector. Support to GIRM’s efforts in reorganizing the maritime sub-sector, through: (i) capacity building for the newly created Merchant Shipping Directorate (Direction de la Marine Marchande - DMM) and Maritime Affairs Studies and Coordination Unit (CECAM); (ii) development and implementation of an information system for the port of Nouadhibou (PAN); and (iii) improvement of the legal and regulatory framework of the sub-sector through the update of the Merchant Shipping Code and Regulations. 17. Component 3: Support to Air Transport System Reorganization and Technical Capacity-Building. (i) Support to GIRM’s efforts to set up a development program for Mauritanian airports by funding a master plan for the development of airports, including a detailed development plan and an investment plan for Nouakchott Airport; and (ii) support the update of the outdated civil aviation code. 18. Component 4: Support to the Ministry’s Coordination Role and Project Activities Coordination. (i) Support to the DEPC through staff training, technical assistance (fiduciary support, and monitoring and evaluation), and purchase of equipment and vehicles to ensure close coordination of the different sub-sector units involved in the project; and (ii) definition of a letter of sector policy (LSP) designed to address policy, institutional and legal issues for the efficient operation of the transport sector. 1.6 Revised Components 19. The components of the project were not revised. 4 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 20. The project was fully consistent with the CAS and supported the CAS objective of promoting economic governance and public sector capacity. The project design was based on sound dialogue supported by the 2004 World Bank-financed ESW, the 2007 EU-financed Road Sector Study and the 2007 World Bank-financed 3 Multimodal Transport Sector Study. 21. TSIDTAP was prepared in a collaborative manner and GIRM took the lead role. Information sharing and consultations also took place with the donor community. 22. Although not explicitly mentioned in the PAD, the project design adopted a number of relevant lessons learned from previous World Bank experience in the reform of the transport sector such as: (i) comprehensive sector-wide institutional reforms yield more sustainable benefits compared to a piecemeal approach of tackling reforms; (ii) the benefit of carrying out focused sub-sectoral analysis prior to engaging in comprehensive sector-wide reforms; and (iii) the importance of transport sector donor coordination and alignment in ensuring government’s commitment to the reform agenda. 23. At an early stage of preparation, the project sought to finance physical investments to improve Mauritanian transport infrastructures, as well as capacity strengthening activities. However, given the drop in the country’s IDA allocation, financing for the investment part of the project was no longer available. After discussing the matter with the World Bank, GIRM decided to scale down the project scope and maintain only the technical assistance activities. This strategic choice was sound in light of critical capacity building needs which remained substantial regardless of infrastructure needs. 24. At the time of appraisal, the second phase (APL 2-B) of the West and Central Africa Air transport Safety and Security Project (WCAATSSP) was under preparation with Mauritania as one of the three potential recipient countries. In light of limited available financing for the TSIDTAP, all proposed activities of the civil aviation component of TSIDTAP dealing with security and safety equipment and training were transferred to the then proposed Mauritanian component of WCAATSSP. 25. At project preparation, a risk analysis was carried out and the mitigation measures were correctly identified. The capacity of Directorates/public agencies to implement the project was allocated “high risk� rating and this was adequately mitigated through close supervision by the Bank, and through quarterly portfolio monitoring and review. The technical risk linked with the sensitive nature of the reforms which required a comprehensive understanding of sector issues, was managed through the provision of specialized training, especially in the maritime sector. The other risk stemming from the 3 Financed under the Urban Development Project (Credit. 3574-MAU). 5 option to mainstream project management within the MET was managed through agreeing on a series of key actions as follows: (i) appointment of a project coordinator who is familiar with Bank procurement guidelines; (ii) preparation of an adequate administrative, accounting, and financial management manual; and (iii) recruitment of an accountant and a procurement specialist prior to effectiveness. 26. The risk linked with the reversal in government commitment to reforms due to the limited funding offered by the project was mitigated by the fact that the GIRM had committed to the same reforms with the EU which offered substantial investment financing of the sector. Hence, through the project, the World Bank reinforced the joint EU/IDA dialogue with the GIRM. 27. The project is rated as satisfactory in terms of quality at entry. The rating is based on the following criteria: (i) consistency of the project’s objectives with GIRM priorities, and the CAS; (ii) the project design which was sound and simple; and (iii) the risk identification and mitigation which was candid, relevant and robust. 2.2 Implementation 28. Implementation was initially delayed by more than a year as a direct consequence of the August 6, 2008 coup after which the Bank curtailed its operations in Mauritania until September 2009. This meant that although the project was approved on July 31, 2008, it only became effective seventeen months later on December 29, 2009. However, in light of the good implementation performance, the project closing date was not extended to make up for the initial ‘force majeure’ delay in project implementation. 29. Shortly after the lifting of suspension of Bank operations in Mauritania, the project team carried out a reengagement mission, which allowed the signing of the project’s financing agreement (FA) and the subsequent declaration of project effectiveness on December 29, 2009. 30. The delay in the start of the project was partly mitigated by the fact that, during the long hiatus, the Directorate of Studies, Planning and Cooperation (Direction des Etudes, de la Programmation et de la Coopération - DEPC) made significant progress in the preparation of the procurement activities in anticipation of project effectiveness. 31. In 2008, shortly after TSIDTAP’s approval, Mauritania was dropped from Phase 2-B of WCAATSSP because of the suspension of World Bank activities in the country. Following the lifting of suspension of World Bank operations in September 2009, IDA resources from the Regional Integration Department were no longer available for Mauritania to join the WCAATSSP. As a result, the expected IDA parallel financing in equipment and training to benefit the country’s civil aviation (cf. paragraph 24) did not materialize. In light of this, the GIRM decided to take the lead and provide the funding given the importance of the activities in improving the ICAO compliance of the country’s civil aviation sub sector. 6 32. In 2010, the GIRM took the unexpected decision to create a new Public Transport Company (Société des Transports Publics - STP) and an Authority for the Regulation of Road Transport (Autorité de Régulation des Transports Routiers - ARTR). While the project implementation arrangements were not directly impacted by this decision, the World Bank and the EU undertook with the GIRM a thorough review of the mandates of the new institutions to ensure that sector policy and reforms agreed with the GIRM were not at risk and that there were no overlapping of mandates and backtracking regarding sector liberalization. 33. DMM which at the time of appraisal was housed within the MET was transferred for project effectiveness to the Ministry in charge of Fishing and Maritime Economy. This change had a negative impact on the coordination and follow-up of project activities. As a result, the preparation and validation process of the new maritime code was delayed by almost one year. 34. The World Bank conducted a Mid Term Review (MTR) of the project in May 2011. Implementation and progress toward achievement of PDOs were noted as satisfactory. By MTR, initial lag in project implementation had been substantially absorbed, and the disbursement rate stood at 49 percent. The project indicators were deemed fully achievable by project closing and no restructuring was envisaged. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 35. M&E Design and Implementation: The M&E design was simple and included five key performance indicators (KPIs) which were easy to measure and directly attributable to the achievements of the project. 36. M&E Utilization: DEPC has been equipped with a sector-wide M&E tool which is updated and utilized on a regular basis (cf. paragraph 66). The Directorate of Road Safety (DSR) is now staffed and equipped to monitor accidents and a pilot M&E system is available and functional for the city of Nouakchott (cf. paragraph 53). 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 37. Safeguard. As the project did not involve physical investments, it was rated category C. Therefore, no safeguard policy was triggered. 38. Financial Management. Financial management by the coordinating unit was efficient. The quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports (FMRs) were received regularly and were fully compliant with the agreed format. Audits were done annually and on-time and were unqualified. 39. Procurement. Procurement under the project was satisfactory. All procurement activities and post-reviews were satisfactory. Procurement Plans were updated on a regular basis (at least once a year) and all procurement activities were executed efficiently and in a timely manner. 7 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 40. The 2012 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) did not identify any operation in the transport sector. Nevertheless, consolidation of the project’s result is foreseen in the continued joint dialogue and coordination with the EU. The World Bank will continue to work with the GIRM through the donor coordination mechanism to ensure that the project outcomes are sustained and that sufficient funding is provided to the sector. 41. The proposed IBRD enclave for the Port of Nouakchott Development Project (PNDP) which builds on the achievements of the maritime transport component of TSIDTAP was finally dropped by the GIRM in December 2012, after two years of preparation. Nevertheless, the GIRM envisages pursuing the development of a container terminal for the port of Nouakchott, although it is not clear to what extent private sector participation in port operations will materialize in the near future, which was the initial plan. On the positive side, both the TSIDTAP and the aborted PNDP helped in providing a better assessment of the type and scope of activities, commercial risks, and all pre- requisite conditions that international operators usually require. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 42. The PDO remains relevant. The overall objective of improving management of land, maritime, and air transport sectors remains a priority for the GIRM. Indeed, the GIRM in its 2011-2015 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-3) emphasizes the need to promote the capacity strengthening and development of transport to foster economic growth and poverty reduction. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 43. The PDO rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 44. First, the PDO of improving the country’s management of the land, maritime, and air transport sub-sectors, has been largely achieved. 45. Secondly, the transfer of knowledge between the various consultants and concerned directorates, and agencies involved in project implementation has largely been achieved through good collaboration. 46. Thirdly, a number of institutional tools for more rational sector planning and management have been put in place. These include but are not limited to: (i) the transport letter of sector policy (LSP); (ii) the sector-wide monitoring and evaluation tool housed at DEPC; (iii) the National Road Safety Strategy; (iv) the revised maritime code; and (v) the revised civil aviation code. 8 47. Fourthly, the participatory process introduced by the project with regards to road safety, has created a dynamic collaboration between the MET, NGOs, and civil society that never existed in the past and a high-level political support with regards to road safety issues. 48. What follows is a detailed assessment of the project’s achievements against its specific objectives. (i) Objective 1: Strengthen institutional capacity and management of the land transport sub-sector. 49. The rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 50. First, the project helped set up a framework conducive to addressing road safety issues in a cohesive manner. A modern National Road Safety Strategy (NRSS), consistent with international standards and best practices 4 was further defined following broad consultations with all relevant stakeholders. The strategy was approved by the National transportation Commission on May 30, 2012 and adopted by the council of ministers on August 04, 2012. Implementation of the strategy’s action plan started with a road safety awareness campaign held in Nouakchott between April and June 2012, under the leadership of the Directorate of Road Safety (DSR) and with the support of an international consultant, and NGOs. 51. Secondly, thanks to the project, the mainstreaming of road safety in primary school curricula is likely to be achieved. An illustrated road safety manual for children was produced and 10,000 copies were printed. The manual has been introduced as a pilot initiative of the Ministry of Education (ME) in 8 primary schools in Nouakchott and 3 schools in Nouadhibou for the 2012-13 academic year. 52. Furthermore, in support of mainstreaming of road safety in primary education, the GIRM has invested US$526,000 in the construction of a Road Safety Education Track for primary school students in the Nouakchott area. It is expected that the facility will be operational by the upcoming academic year (2013-14). 53. Thirdly, the project has equipped DSR with a road accident database which is already producing statistics to feed into the existing Road Traffic Accidents Analysis Report (BAAC). Furthermore, the project exposed seven DSR staff to international best- practice in road safety through a training session held in Senegal with the participation of world class road safety experts from Senegal, France and Belgium. Finally, as a result of the information being generated by the road accident database, a monthly report on road safety statistics is presented during the council of ministers on a monthly basis, ensuring continued high-level ownership of road safety issues. 4 The strategy was reviewed by the Global Road Safety Partnership (GRSP). 9 Box 1. Introduction of a road safety curriculum in pilot primary schools. On November 19, 2012, the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Education jointly launched the introduction of a road safety manual in pilot elementary schools in Mauritania. This initiative is highly appreciated at the Government level. Indeed, the GIRM intends to gradually extend the manual to every school in the country the upcoming academic years. The Manual, which was jointly prepared by a group of experts from the two ministries, features a simplified illustrative explanation of road safety issues. It evokes in a simplified style, the issues of road safety, and raises awareness of the risks in the use of the telephone, the risks of driving when tired or sleepy, the importance of fastening seatbelts, etc. The manual teaches children how to cross a road in a safe manner, and puts an emphasis on the risks associated with children playing in the streets and public places. (ii) Objective 2: Strengthen institutional capacity and management of the maritime transport sub-sector. 54. The rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 55. Thanks to the project, the legal and regulatory framework of the maritime sub- sector was revised and is now consistent with the IMO conventions ratified by the GIRM and the relevant IMO standards, including the provisions of the International Shipping and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. The revised maritime code was adopted by the council of ministers on November 29, 2012. 10 56. Furthermore, the project has significantly contributed to the reorganization and strengthening of the DMM in the following manner:  the maritime investigation office (MIO) which is a key element of the institutional chain of the maritime sub-sector has been equipped and made functional by the project.  the project has financed the training of 16 DMM staff in key specialized areas such as the enforcement of IMO and ISPS codes and standards. 53. Thanks to the project, two DMM staff where awarded a master’s degree in Management of Maritime Affairs. Finally, the project has equipped DMM’s Accident Investigation Unit with state of the art technology. (iii) Objective 3: Strengthen institutional capacity and management of the aviation sub-sector. 57. The rating is highly satisfactory for the following reasons. 58. First, the project introduced modern best-practice legislation and regulation in the Mauritanian aviation sector with the revision of the outdated civil aviation code. The legislative part of the revised code was adopted on February 27, 2011 by law no 20-2011 while the regulatory part was adopted by the council of ministers on March 31, 2011 by decree no 092-2011. 59. The revised code has enabled ANAC to take corrective measures regarding the deficiencies identified in previous International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) safety audits. In terms of aviation security, the Government implemented a plan of action for the improvement of ICAO compliance which consisted in: the adoption of a National Security Plan, the acquisition of security equipment, and the capacity building of security actors. As a result, further to an ICAO audit held in April 2012, Mauritania civil aviation safety compliance rate improved from 33 percent in 2008 to 70 percent in 2012. Furthermore, thanks to the new code, ANAC was finally able to certify the national airline company, which was not feasible in the past because of the outdated civil aviation code. 60. As a result, Mauritania now ranks number seven among African countries and first in the African Air Navigation Safety Agency (ASECNA) group regarding civil aviation safety compliance. 61. Secondly, thanks to a study financed by the project, the MET has a Master plan for the development of Mauritanian Airports, including a detailed development plan for the Nouakchott international airport. These are key planning tools that are enabling the MET to better prioritize and sequence investments within the sub-sector. For instance, recent investments by GIRM in the regional airport in Atar were planned and designed as per the new Master plan. 11 (iv) Objective 4: Strengthen the sector coordination capacity of the Ministry of Equipment and Transport (MET). 62. The rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 63. Thanks to support from the project, the MET was able to prepare and endorse a Transport Sector Strategy (TSS) and a Letter of Sector Policy (LSP). The LSP was approved by the council of Ministers on September 13, 2012. The TSS and the LSP have set the stage for ensuring improvement and sustained efficiency in the provision of transport infrastructure and services. This is likely to help reinforce the sector’s impact on the national economy and its support to key growth enabling sectors. 64. MET’s overall knowledge of the transport sector has been improved thanks to key studies conducted under the project. MET is now cognizant of the externalities of urban transport in Nouakchott and the related costs to the economy (see box 2 for more details). Furthermore, the study on unit cost of civil works will help ensure better planning and appraisal of transport related works. Box 2. Externalities of Nouakchott Urban Transport Thanks to a study financed by the project, the GIRM and the Nouakchott Metropolitan Area (CUN) are now cognizant of the externalities costs of the city’s urban transport system in terms of economic cost of: traffic accidents; air pollution; noise pollution; traffic congestion; and internal dysfunctions of mass transport in Nouakchott. The study revealed that overall transport sector costs was MRO 167 billion in 2012 (US$560 million) and represented 17 percent of GDP, and that economic cost of externalities of Nouakchott urban transport was estimated at MRO 40 billion (US$130 million) which represents 4 percent of GDP. The most costly item was vehicle operating costs which accounted for about 56 percent of the total. This is mainly because of the ageing urban transport fleet (82 percent of the fleet has more than 10 years). The study has defined a detailed action plan to mitigate the identified externalities. 3.3 Efficiency 65. The project contributed to achieving efficiency gains in the following areas: (i) efficiency improvements in the legal and regulatory frameworks of civil aviation and maritime subsectors seen in modern civil aviation and maritime codes; (ii) improvement in the monitoring and evaluation of road safety with the availability of a computerized road accident database at DGTT; and (iii) improvement in overall knowledge of the sector: knowledge of the externalities of urban transport and its costs to the economy, and better grasp on costs of civil works thanks to a comprehensive study on unit prices of civil works. 66. Furthermore, with the capacity building of DEPC, efficiency increases have been achieved in the overall coordination of the transport sector. MET now has a 12 comprehensive sector-wide computer-based monitoring and evaluation framework which provides real time information on project status and thus facilitates decision-making. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 67. The rating is satisfactory for the following reasons 68. The project has laid a strong foundation for the management and sustainability of the transport sector. It has strengthened the capacity of the transport sector directorates and agencies, and improved prospects for greater accountability and transparency. The project outcome is still fully relevant to current World Bank and GIRM strategy and sector efficiency has been sustainably improved. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Not Applicable. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 69. The long-term capacity improvement of the transport directorates and structures strengthened under the project, particularly the recently created DEPC, is likely to be sustained. The legislative framework that has been created for the aviation and maritime subsectors is unlikely to change in the near future. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 70. First, the project helped prevent the blacklisting of Nouakchott International Airport by the EU in 2007, on the grounds of poor condition of its runway. Funds from the Project’s Preparation Advance (PPA) to the tune of US$200,000 were mobilized to finance preliminary and detailed engineering study for the rehabilitation of the runway of Nouakchott International Airport. This has allowed the GIRM to fund the civil works (estimated at US$8.5 million) for the rehabilitation of the runway and thus avoided blacklisting of its main airport. 71. Secondly, subsequent to the establishment of the STP by the GIRM in 2010, (cf. paragraph 32), the project facilitated a sharing of experience between the new company, and the existing public bus companies in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire. This has eased the operationalization of the newly created STP, positive impacts of which are already being felt by the public transport users in the cities of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou. 72. Finally, thanks to a study financed by the project, Nouadhibou Port has improved its information system. Furthermore, the ports of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou have now 13 harmonized their information systems for basic data, under the coordination and technical oversight of Maritime Affairs Studies and Coordination Unit (CECAM). 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 73. This is a core ICR which does not require a beneficiary survey/stakeholder workshop. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 66. The rating is moderate for the following reasons. 74. The project has put in place the right elements of reform: a relevant transport LSP coupled with a transport sector strategy, a National Road Safety Strategy, a modern civil aviation code, a road safety strategy at par with international standards, and a revised maritime code consistent with the latest IMO requirements. 75. The institutional reforms supported by the project have been enacted by decrees and are likely to be sustained. Improved working conditions at the transport agencies particularly the acquisition of computer equipment, modernized administration, and rehabilitated office facilities will help to retain the staff that has been trained under the project. 76. The GIRM is taking the appropriate measures towards the sustainability of institutional gains in the civil aviation sector. More specifically, the GIRM adopted a decree in 2011 to scale up the resources of ANAC which are now estimated at US$5.1 million compared to US$2.5 million in 2010. About 80 percent 5 of ANAC’s budget comes from aviation related taxes. The fact that 10 percent of that budget is earmarked for security will enable ANAC to maintain and renew airport security equipment in view of sustaining gains in ICAO compliance. 77. With regards to road safety, although a strong partnership was establish between the GIRM, NGOs and other actors of road safety, continuation of sensitization activities will not be sustainable unless its financing is borne by the private sector, in particular the insurance companies which have a vested interest in improved road safety. For instance, the monthly live road safety show on National Television funded for one year by DGTT (featuring all actors of road safety including police officers, drivers, etc.) will need to be sustained in order to maintain the public’s interest in road safety issues. 5 There is a 20 percent subsidy from the National budget which will gradually decrease. 14 78. The main risk to the sustainability of capacity gains in the maritime sub-sector is the diffused institutional setting with actors from two separate ministries. In such a context, effective coordination of maritime activities and full enforcement of the new maritime code will be difficult to maintain. 79. Finally, it would be unrealistic to assume that the new tools and ways of doing things, as brought about by the reforms, will be fully assimilated at once. Although the GIRM has expressed its firm commitment to sustaining such reforms, it will actually depend on the effective assimilation of sectoral planning tools by the DEPC, and the sub- sectoral agencies and directorates involved in transport. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry 80. Rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 81. As mentioned above, the project design was relevant, appropriate and responsive to the client’s needs. Furthermore, the World Bank was proactive in working with the GIRM to first prepare a Technical Assistance project with a specific focus on strengthening management capacity, reviewing sector priorities, and implementing policy and institutional reforms, which were critical prior to considering any major investment in the transport sector. (b) Quality of Supervision 82. Rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 83. First, despite the delay in making the project effective, all project activities were more or less completed by the scheduled project completion date. 84. Second, the World Bank allocated adequate resources to support the implementation of this technical assistance project. The proximity of task-team members (based in Senegal and Ivory Coast) allowed for the participation and input by the World Bank in the presentation of key studies and capacity building activities. Furthermore, the GIRM was appreciative of the continuous technical advice provided by the World Bank throughout project implementation in complex areas of reform in the transport sector. Finally, the World Bank’s ability to convene worldwide expertise on transport sector reform/institutional issues was key to ensure the implementation of all project activities. 85. Project implementation progress was adequately reported and legal covenants were monitored and enforced. Furthermore, key implementation issues were identified, assessed and resolved in a timely manner. The MTR was a positive milestone, as it gave a 15 new impulse to the project which by then had adopted an action plan aimed at recovering most of its initial implementation lag. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 86. Rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 87. Despite the major delays in project effectiveness due to ‘force majeure’ causes, all of the project activities were completed by the original closing date of the project. That is the combined result of good project design, proactive implementation support by the project team and strong ownership by GIRM. Furthermore, the project achieved its envisaged objective of improving the management of the transport sector. Finally, during preparation, the World Bank proactively advised the GIRM to tackle sector institutional issues in the form of dedicated TA prior to engaging in large investment operations. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance 88. Rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 89. The GIRM’s performance during the identification and preparation phases of the project was satisfactory. The sector diagnosis was extensive and the envisaged policies and reforms were adequate and consistent with international best-practice. 90. GIRM’s commitment to the implementation of the project was sustained and the coordination and partnership with stakeholders, donors and the World Bank was excellent. After the lifting of suspension, the GIRM was proactive in meeting the conditions of effectiveness of the FA within the 90-day effectiveness deadline. Furthermore, the GIRM complied with all the covenants/commitments of the FA. By project closing, all legal, regulatory, and technical documents were duly approved and enacted at the relevant level either by the council of ministries or by parliament. This is the direct result of the high-level follow up on the approval process of key reforms and codes by the GIRM. 91. The GIRM contributed significantly more funds to the project than was initially agreed in the FA. By project closing, GIRM’s actual counterpart funding that was estimated at US$4.1 million, largely exceeded 6 its initial commitment of US$1.0 million. Furthermore, the GIRM has expressed its commitment to pursue project activities beyond the closing date. 6 The equipment of Nouakchott’s main intersections in traffic signals and lights by the GIRM was an agreement in the FA of the project. GIRM has made an investment greater than what was agreed in the FA by equipping more intersections than expected on the basis of a partnership with an operator who is authorized to charge a small fee on car insurance bills. 16 (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance 92. Rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 93. As the project coordination unit, the DEPC worked closely with the Government and the Bank team to push the project forward and to resolve the issues that arose throughout the life of the project. It strived to maintain good relations with other agencies and exercised acceptable fiduciary management, as well as, sound reporting. 94. The other agencies involved in project implementation, such as DGTT, DMM, CECAM, and ANAC, after making use of the training, equipment and technical advisory services and studies provided by the project were able to take on and execute their mandates. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance 95. Rating is satisfactory for the following reasons. 96. The Borrower’s commitment to the reform agenda of the transport sector remained unchanged despite the interruption in project implementation. The dialogue between the GIRM and the World Bank was smooth and constructive throughout the implementation of the project. At the project level, the GIRM maintained an adequate staffing of DEPC and fostered ownership of the reform agenda by the MET and the executing agencies. 6. Lessons Learned 97. Early identification of reform champions within Government structures. Early involvement, since project preparation, and effective participation of staff from both central government and decentralized structures was essential to project ownership and an engine for success of project implementation. At the same time, it has laid the ground for sustainability of the projects achievements. 98. Realistic project objectives. The project objectives were realistic and based on sectoral objectives that were clearly identified through prior analytical sector work. This resulted in a good project design, including a clear results framework and ownership by the beneficiaries. In addition, the appropriate assessment of the project resulted in optimally defined components/activities within limited available resources. 99. Setting up adequate structures to ensure both momentum and sustainability of reform agenda. In order to ensure sustainability and consolidation of knowledge improvement and capacity strengthening in urban transport, the establishment of an 17 institution 7 tasked with the coordination of urban transport policies in Nouakchott should be considered. The new institution would feature representatives from central and local government, as well as, representatives of the private sector. 100. Strong government ownership of reform agenda in the transport sector. The fact that counterpart funds provided by GIRM exceeded by far what was initially agreed, largely contributed to the successful implementation of the project. This is a clear sign of GIRM’s strong ownership of the project and its commitment to sustaining the reforms of the transport sector. 101. Strong cooperation with EU/development partners to ensure alignment and synergies in the transport sector. Strong cooperation between the Bank and the EU, the two main development partners involved in the transport sector in Mauritania, have been important factors in achieving the intended outcome of TSIDTAP. The EU and the Bank remained jointly committed to the reform agenda that emerged from the sector diagnostic studies and strategies performed between 2004 and 2007 which framed the design of the project. Furthermore, through its support of the transport sector as a whole, the EU remained actively involved in the capacity strengthening of the sector in a way that is perfectly complementary with the interventions of TSIDTAP. 102. Adequate implementation time frame for all activities to absorb ‘force majeure’ events. The risk of ‘force majeure’ events must be taken into account while allocating the projects implementation time frame, especially in fragile areas. 103. When conditions are right, standalone TA loans should be considered to modernize/reform the transport sector before engaging in major investment lending. At the initial stage of a sector-wide reform, standalone TA operations are the best suited alternative compared to more complex projects combining reforms and investments. The complexity of sub-sector issues alone is a challenge to newly established/re-organized entities. Once the new approaches to their mandate have been assimilated, those entities are better poised to manage large projects. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies (b) Cofinanciers (c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society) 7 This approach has proved to be effective in neighboring Senegal where the Conseil Exécutif des Transport Urbains de Dakar (CETUD) was established to coordinate and regulate urban transport in the city of Dakar. 18 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions) Institutional Support and Capacity Building for the Land Transport 1.73 4.35 251 8 Sub-sector Support to Institutional and Technical Capacity Building for 1.12 0.91 81 the Maritime Transport Sub- sector Support to Air Transport System Reorganization and Technical 0.72 0.60 83 Capacity building Support to the Ministry's Coordination role and Project 1.58 1.80 114 9 Activities Coordination Total Baseline Cost 5.15 7.66 149 Price Contingencies 0.35 0.00 0 Total Project Costs 5.50 7.66 139 Front-end fee PPF - - - Total Financing Required 5.50 7.66 139 (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 1.00 4.10 410 International Development 4.50 3.56 79 Association (IDA) 8 GIRM’s actual counterpart funding for components 1 and 4 is estimated at US$4.1 million which largely exceeds its initial commitment of US$1.0. 9 Idem. 19 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1: Institutional Support and Outputs Capacity-Building for Land Transport Sub- sector (i) Update of the National Road Safety Strategy. (i) A modern Road Safety Strategy (RSS), consistent with international standards and best practices was defined further to broad consultations with all relevant stakeholders. The strategy was approved by the National transportation Commission on May 30, 2012 and adopted by the council of ministers on August 04, 2012. (ii) Organization of a Road Safety awareness campaign (ii) A Road Safety awareness campaign was held in in Nouakchott. Nouakchott between April and June 2012, under the leadership of the Directorate of Road Safety (DSR) with the support of an international consultant, and NGOs. (iii) Situation assessment and implementation of a road (iii) Study completed. A road accident database is safety management system, including a pilot M&E available and the road accident analysis system is system for accidents in Nouakchott. functional. (iv) Preparation and printing of a Road Safety Manual (iv) An illustrated road safety manual for children for the introduction of Road Prevention in Schools. has been produced and 10,000 copies printed. The manual has been introduced as a pilot initiative of the Ministry of Education (ME) in 8 primary schools in Nouakchott and 3 schools in Nouadhibou for the 2012-13 academic year. (v) Construction of a road education track for (v) Works are financed by the GIRM and are elementary school students. ongoing. (vi) Installation of road signs and traffic signals for main (vi) Completed. All main intersections have been intersections in the city of Nouakchott. equipped with signage and traffic light which are functional. (vii) Editing and dissemination of the updated highway (vii) Highway code updated for the first time in 40 code. years. It has been edited and disseminated. This has resulted in significant improvement of drivers’ license and vehicle registration operations. (viii) Study on the cost of externalities of Nouakchott (viii) Study is satisfactorily completed. The main Urban Transport. externalities of the Urban Transport System have been evaluated. Component 2: Support to Institutional and Outputs Technical Capacity-Building for the Maritime Transport Sub-sector (i) Update of the Merchant Shipping Code and (i) The revised maritime code as per IMO Regulations. standards was adopted by the council of 20 ministers on November 29, 2012. (ii) Support to the reorganization and capacity building of DMM (a) Capacity building for the enforcement of (a) The project has financed the training of 16 international conventions. DMM staff in key specialized areas such as the enforcement of IMO and ISPS codes and standards. (b) Master’s degree in the area of management of (b) Two DMM staff were awarded a Master’s maritime affairs for two DMM staff. degree in Management of Maritime Affairs. They are currently working at DMM. (c) Capacity building on maritime areas and seafarers. (c) Not completed due to a lack of responses to the tender. (iii) Development of an information system for the Port (iii) Study completed. of Nouadhibou. (iv) Support to the Maritime Investigation Office (MIO) (iv) Office has been rehabilitated by GIRM. within DMM. Computer and technical equipment (electronic navigational chart) purchased by the project and functional. Component 3: Support to Air Transport System Outputs Reorganization and Technical Capacity- Building (i) Support to the revision of the outdated civil aviation (i) Study Completed. The legislative part of the code. revised code was adopted on February 27, 2011 by law no 20-2011 while the regulatory part was adopted by the council of ministers on March 31, 2011 by decree no 092-2011. (ii) Study on Nouakchott Airport Development (ii) Master plan for the development of Mauritanian perspectives and master plan for Mauritanian airports. Airports completed, including a detailed development plan for the Nouakchott international airport. Component 4: Support to the Ministry’s Outputs Coordination Role and Project Activities Coordination (i) Support for the preparation of a Transport Sector (i) Study completed. TSS and LSP finalized. The Strategy and a Letter of Sector Policy. LSP was approved by the council of Ministers on September 13, 2012. (ii) Development of price indexes and series to provide (ii) Study completed. references for price revision in road construction. (iii) Technical Assistance for the design and (iii) DEPC has been equipped with a sector-wide implementation of a results-monitoring framework. M&E tool which is updated and utilized on a regular basis. (iv) Financial audits. (iv) Completed. 21 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (NA) 22 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Ibou Diouf Sr Transport. Spec. AFTTR TTL Jean-Francois Marteau Sr Transport. Spec. ECSS5 Brahim Ould Abdelwedoud Sr Urban Spec. AFTU2 Demba Balde Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS L. Rodrigue Djahlin Operations Officer CAFSB Felly Akiiki Kaboyo Operations Analyst AFTTR Alain L. Labeau Consultant SASFP Francois Lavoue Temporary AFTTR Jean-Francois Marteau Sr Transport. Spec. ECSS5 Moustapha Ould El Bechir Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPE Pierre A. Pozzo di Borgo Principal Investment Officer CN2SI Seynabou Thiaw Seye Program Assistant AFCF1 Ntombie Z. Siwale Senior Program Assistant AFTTR Maimouna Toure Team Assistant AFMMR Supervision/ICR Ibou Diouf Sr Transport. Spec. AFTTR TTL Papa Mamadou Fall Transport Specialist AFTTR ICR TL/Author Brahim Ould Abdelwedoud Sr Urban Spec. AFTU2 Saidou Diop Sr Financial Management Spec. AFTMW Maimouna Mbow Fam Sr Financial Management Spec. AFTMW Maimouna Toure Team Assistant AFMMR Felly Akiiki Kaboyo Operations Analyst AFTTR Alain L. Labeau Consultant SASFP Jean-Francois Marteau Sr Transport. Spec. ECSS5 Moustapha Ould El Bechir Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPE Mohamed El H. Hendah Procurement Specialist AFTPE Ntombie Z. Siwale Senior Program Assistant AFTTR (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY05 53.17 FY06 19.83 FY07 62.20 FY08 126.35 Total: 261.55 23 Supervision/ICR FY09 16.16 FY10 35.59 FY11 71.99 FY12 47.75 FY13 14.61 Total: 186.10 24 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (NA) 25 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (NA) 26 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Project execution 1. The Financing Agreement was signed one year after project approval on October 1, 2009. It became effective on December 29, 2009. This slippage is explained by the fact that the country was passing through a transition period following the institutional change of August, 6 2008. Hence, the initial implementation timeframe was shortened from 3.5 to 2.9 years. The main factors that positively influenced the implementation of the project were: • The realization of the different conditions required in the Loan Agreement in the stipulated time frame for its implementation, • The participative approach during the preparation of the Project that enabled the Executing Agencies to own their components, • The improvement of the sector knowledge, thanks to the reviews realized under WB and EU financing, • The training of 31 executives from road, air and sea sub-sectors, • The establishment of an M&E framework of the sector at DEPC level, • The clarity and accuracy of indicators to measure project performance. 2. The weaknesses identified relate to: • The one year delay in the implementation of the project due to the country’s specific context, • The delays in the procurement process, • Delays in the treatment of reports by the Executing Agencies, • The institutional instability of the maritime sub-sector, • The lack of experience of the structures responsible for the physical execution of the project. Results and performances 3. The most significant impacts of the Project are given below: 4. Declaration of sector policy. The objective of the LSP was to promote a suitable environment for the improvement of infrastructures and services quality and to reinforce the support the sector brings to the rest of the economy. 5. Road safety strategy. Besides the elaboration of the National Road Safety Strategy, the project has: (i) carried out education, prevention and awareness campaign for road users, (ii) put in place a system for road accidents data collection and processing, (iii) integrated road prevention program in the school curriculum thanks to the elaboration of school manual edited and printed in 10,000 copies and (iv) defined the arrangement and equipment works of an education track. 27 6. Moreover, the Project has printed the Road Code in 5,000 copies which were distributed in driving schools. It is important that the drivers be sensitized on the Code and mostly trained adequately so that they develop safe and respectful driving attitude towards other road users. 7. Urban transport strategy. The rapid spatial extension of Nouakchott and the growth of its population create mobility problems which are more and more acute. The creation of the Public Transports Company (mixed Economy Company) has brought a great relief to the inhabitants of the city of Nouakchott. The setup of this company is an anticipation of the urban transport strategy which will encourage private sector involvement in an area which is perceived as risky. 8. Sea transport Code and regulations. Until recently, the activities related to Merchant Marine were governed by law n° 95 - 009 of January 31st, 1995. For the enforcement of this law, many decrees were taken by different departments in charge of the sub-sector; hence a dispersion prejudicial to a good enforcement of maritime regulation. The revised Merchant Marine Code has resolved this situation by adopting a modern legal and regulatory framework. 9. Civil Aviation Code. The new Civil Aviation Code is consistent with the provisions of the Chicago Convention and its Appendices. It has allowed to correct the numerous defaults revealed by ICAO audits carried out in Mauritania. Moreover, this Code allowed the certification of the Mauritania Airlines Company. Sustainability of Results 10. The participative approach implemented by TSIDTAP represents in itself a sustainability factor. It encouraged involvement of beneficiaries in the implementation of the project and ensured alignment of project objectives with the needs of the beneficiaries in terms of institutional support. 11. The best guarantee for the sustainability of the project’s results is the highest priority given by the Government to promote the transport sector as an instrument for economic growth and for poverty alleviation. This is fully reflected in the various medium and long terms strategies and particularly the CSLP for the period 2011 - 2015. Performances of the Bank, the Borrower and the Executing Agencies Performances of the Bank 12. Since the normalization of the institutional life with the election of the President on 18th July 2009, a multidisciplinary mission of the Bank visited Mauritania from 27th September to 02nd October 2009, to reengage the dialogue with the Government and to agree on a time table for signing the Loan Agreement of TSIDTAP. 28 13. The financing of the project by the Bank is timely, for it supported the Government in its strategy for the sector, through institutional capacities building of the structures responsible for road, sea and air transport. 14. The support of the Bank is globally satisfactory. The time frames for non- objection notices were about one week. At least 10 supervision missions were organized, that is an average of at least 3 missions per year, throughout the life of the project. Considering the multidisciplinary character of the project, the composition of the supervision missions in terms of profiles was adequate. 15. According to the Executing Agencies, the constructive recommendations and counsels given by the Bank’s supervision missions allowed the reformulation of some activities in order to ensure a successful implementation of the project. 16. The constructive recommendations of the missions and the permanent contact between the project team and the bank enabled to improve notably the project performance. 17. In conclusion, the performance of the Bank is considered satisfactory. Performances of the Borrower 18. The Borrower met the conditions of effectiveness within the 90 days limit at the satisfaction of the bank: (i) the adoption of the Project Execution Manual, (ii) the recruitment of the Project Coordinating Team, and (iii) the opening of an account for the project and the payment into said account of the initial deposit of an amount equal to the exchange value of US$100,000. 19. In accordance with appendix 2 «project execution» of the Loan Agreement, within the MET, the Permanent Secretary took charge of the strategic orientation and the supervision of the whole project. To this effect, the Permanent Secretary met with the Project Coordinating Team and the Executing Agencies at least once per semester to review the progress of the project execution. 20. During the execution of the project, there was a good stability at the level of the Project Coordinator. However, the presence of enough personnel was not fully respected since three months after the enforcement of the Loan Agreement, the position of Administration and Finance Officer remained vacant until September 2011. 21. The relationship between the Bank and the Borrower was fruitful and without clashes. The Borrower paid special attention to all project components and activities which were globally executed despite the delays incurred. Performances of Executing Agencies 29 22. The DEPC played its role of monitoring and coordination of the project activities without interfering in the tasks of the Executing Agencies despite the reduced number of staff. Generally, one can assert that DEPC and the Executing Agencies played their role in a satisfactory way in the management of the various components of the project. ANAC’s performance was especially satisfactory. Lessons derived 23. The objectives of the project were realistic and based upon clearly identified global sector objectives. This resulted in an optimal formulation of the project which was results oriented, and was owned by the beneficiaries. In addition, the project benefitted from a pertinent assessment that enabled to define the project components and activities in an optimal way. The major lessons derived are the following: • The effective and pro-active participation of central and decentralized structures of the sector in project implementation is the driving force for the project success and durability, • The availability of a manual of procedures and the strengthening of the capacities of project management staff at the startup of a project speeds up the implementation of the project activities and facilitates the audit of accounts, • Slowness of administrative procedures for appropriating legislative and regulatory laws. 30 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Results and performances 1. The project was pertinent and the indicators have been achieved. The inter-donor dialogue is continuous and has proven effective in the past in pushing the Government towards reform; the respective projects of the World Bank and the EU in the transport sector are complementary and synergistic. Sustainability of Results 2. In view of the current situation in the administration, the impact and the durability of the project could be compromised. To illustrate this point, here's a few examples: - Letter of sector policy: the document is very well drafted and has been approved; it addresses the key issues that the administration must focus on to develop the sector. However, to this day, it seems that the Ministry of transportation has not used it as a strategic document to plan their activity, and significant problems with short deadlines have yet to be tackled with. For instance, the road maintenance resources will be reduced by half by 2015 (end of SYSMIN funding) and no realistic alternative has been set up as of January 2013. Other actions have been taken that were not included in the letter of sector policy, such as the creation of the regulation authority, and a national public transportation company. - Merchant shipping code: the code has been approved by the Council of Ministers and has yet to be approved by the Parliament to be applied. It is uncertain to what extent the government has the capacity to enforce its application, and there's a clear window of opportunity to take advantage of the legal void that has been used- in Nouadhibou, 17 new wrecks have appeared in June 2012. - Capacity building in the administration: the changes of human resources in management positions and the lack of a strong middle management generation, weakens the durability of these interventions. 3. The EU has one project that is in its implementation phase and another one in the pipeline, and these address some of the durability issues. For instance, a few activities follow on the work done on road safety, and will use the statistics set up by the PATRIST. However, the technical partnership of the WB-EU in the sectoral dialogue must be continued and strengthened to allow true appropriation of these results. A continued involvement of the WB in the sector would be welcomed by the EU. 31 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents 1. Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, FY08-11), Report No. 39532-MR, June 14, 2007 2. Financing Agreement (TSIDTAP), May 13, 2009 3. Mid-Term Review Report 4. Harmonized Evaluation Criteria for ICR and OED Evaluations 5. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit for Mauritania for a Transport Sector Institutional Development and Technical Assistance Project, July 08, 2008 6. PATRIST: Rapport d’achèvement du Gouvernement, Septembre 2012 7. Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté-seconde version (CSLP-2) (Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) 8. Mauritania Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-2, 2006-10) 9. Multimodal Transport Strategy study report (February 2007) 10. National Road Safety Strategy and Action Plan for 2006-10 (Ministry of Equipment and Road Transport Strategy Study report (February 2007) 11. Aide-memoires and Progress Reports 32 IBRD 33445R M A U R I TA N I A SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS MAIN ROADS REGION CAPITALS RAILROADS NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION BOUNDARIES RIVERS INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 15W 10W This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. MO RO CCO 0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers o To indout Tindout 0 50 100 150 Miles MAURITANIA ALGERIA Aïn Aïn i t t Tili Ben Tili To o e Bu Craa Y Moghreï Bir Moghreïn Moghreïn 25N 25N WESTERN TIRIS SAHARA AT LAN T IC ZEMMOUR OC E AN i a m o To aoudenni Taoudenni m m H a S a h a r a Zouérat Zoué Zouérat Fderik Kediet Ijill D e s e r t (915 m) f To o u Bir Gandús Gand El Moue Moueï Moueïla ïla j o D l MALI i Choum E tou Nouadhibou n e A Oudâ Oudâne Oudâne Khatt DAKHLET Atar u r aA D RAR Chinguetti O NOUADHIBOU Châmi Châ Châmi E l 20N 20N INCHIRI M r Akjoujt e y y é Bôu B Rje Rjeïmât ïmât ôu Rjeï TA G A N T HODH ECH Tidjikdja Tidjikdja Tichit Tichit a r z CHARGUI NOUAKCHOTT a TRARZA r Moudj Moudjé éria Moudjéria T Boutilimit Tiguent BRAKNA Tamchaket Tamchaket Qualâta Qualâta Qualâ Aleg Ayo yoû Ayoûnûn o To Rosso ASSABA el ’Atroûs Atroû ’Atroûs ombouctou Tombouctou Bogué Bogué Kiffa Kiffa Nema HODH EL To o Kaedi Mbout Timbédra imbé Timb édra Dakar GHARBI Kankossa u Bassikounou do GORGOL a Maghama Ou Sélibaby Sélibaby Sé To o o To o To o To r a k ora né al Kayes Nara Nampala 15N SENEGAL Nioro du Sahel 15N g GUIDIMAKA To o Nayé Nay Ka MALI 15W 10W 5W AUGUST 2012