88284 State and Trends of Carbon Pricing Washington DC May 2014 2014 State and Trends of Carbon Pricing Washington DC May 2014 2014 Alexandre Kossoy led the World Bank team, also consisting of Klaus Oppermann, Alexandrina Platonova-­ Oquab, and Suphachol Suphachalasai, which conceptualized this report. An Ecofys team composed of Niklas Höhne, Noémie Klein, Alyssa Gilbert, Long Lam, Gemma Toop, Qian Wu, Markus Hagemann, Carlos Casanova-Allende, Lina Li, Bram Borkent, Carsten Warnecke, and Lindee Wong prepared the report in collaboration with the World Bank. © 2014 International Bank for Reconstruction Translations – If you create a translation of this work, please add and Development / The World Bank the following disclaimer along with the attribution: This translation 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433 was not created by The World Bank and should not be considered Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org an official World Bank translation. 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If you wish to re-use a component of the work, it is your Rights and Permissions responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for ­ that re-use and to obtain permission from the copyright owner. Examples of components can include, but are not limited to, ­ This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 ­ tables, figures, or images. IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO) http://creativecommons.org/licens- es/by/3.0/igo. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license, All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to the you are free to copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt this work, Publishing and Knowledge Division, The World Bank, 1818 H including for commercial purposes, under the following conditions: ­ Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. Attribution – Please cite the work as follows: World Bank. 2014. ISBN (electronic): 978-1-4648-0268-3 State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014. Washington, DC: DOI: 10.1596/978-1-4648-0268-3 World Bank. Doi: 10.1596/978-1-4648-0268-3 Photo credits: title, page 20, 76: thinkstock, License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 all others: shutterstock License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO Printing: Westland Printers 2 This report follows the evolution of carbon pricing around the world. Last year’s report mapped the main carbon pricing initiatives. This year, the report presents the status of each of these developing initiatives and explores the emerging trends of carbon pricing. The focus is on the recent highlights from around the world, and on key lessons that can be drawn from the growing experience. The report benefited greatly from the valuable written contributions and perspectives from our ­ ­ colleagues in the carbon market, ensuring the quality and Robert Stowe, clarity of this report: Gilbert E. Metcalf, Sarah Moyer, Ian Parry, ­ Massimo Tavoni, and David Weisbach. We wish to extend our gratitude to those who offered their cooperation and ­ insights during the ­development of this report: Jose Andreu, David ­ Antonioli, César Arreola, Ismael Aznar-Cano, ­ Richard Baron, Valentin Bellassen, ­ Pablo Cesar Benitez, Carter J. Brandon, British Columbia Ministry of ­ Finance, Jason Brown, Scott Cantor, Benjamin Coleman, Claude Côté, Nina Doetinchem, Jane Olga Ebinger, Pablo Fernandez de Mello e Souza, Rob Fowler, Pierre Guigon, Stephane ­ Hallegatte, Anthea Harris, Noriko Hase, Sabine ­ Henders, Takashi Hongo, Aya Hosono, Ted ­ ­ Jamieson, Sam Johnson-Hill, Frank Jotzo, Grant Kirkman, Benoît Leguet, Mike McKensey, Frank Melum, Megan Meyer, Craig ­ Milne, Eva Murray, John O’Brien, Grzegorz Peszko, Molly Peters-­Stanley, Gareth Philipps, Brice Jean Marie Quesnel, Lasse Ringius, Igor Shishlov, Nicole Spears, Lisbeth Strandmark, Gray Taylor, George Waldburg-Wolfegg, Xueman Wang, Simon Whitehouse and Shuang Zheng. ­ 3 List of abbreviations and acronyms °C Degrees Celsius A AAU Assigned Amount Unit ACCU Australian Carbon Credit Unit ACR American Carbon Registry ADB Asian Development Bank ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action ARB Air Resources Board ANREU Australian National Registry of Emissions Units B BAU Business as usual BOCM Bilateral Offset Credit Mechanism C CCB Climate, Community and Biodiversity CCER Chinese Certified Emissions Reduction CCR Cost Containment Reserve CCS Carbon Capture and Storage CDM Clean Development Mechanism CER Certified Emission Reduction CFI Carbon Farming Initiative CH4 Methane Ci-Dev Carbon Initiative for Development CITSS Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service CMP Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol CO2 Carbon dioxide CO2e Carbon dioxide equivalent COP Conference of the Parties CP1 First Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol CP2 Second Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol CPM Carbon Pricing Mechanism 4 D DNA Designated National Authority DOE Designated Operational Entity DRC Development and Reform Commission E EB Executive Board EBRD European Bank of Reconstruction and Development EC European Commission EEA European Economic Area EPC Emissions Performance Credits ERPA Emission Reductions Purchase Agreement ERU Emission Reduction Unit ETS Emissions Trading Scheme EU European Union EUA European Union Allowance EU ETS European Union Emissions Trading System F FCPF Forest Carbon Partnership Facility FVA Framework for Various Approaches G GCF Green Climate Fund GHG Greenhouse gas GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation Organization) GtCO2e Gigaton of carbon dioxide equivalent H HFC Hydrofluorocarbon HFC-23 Trifluoromethane hydrofluorocarbon 23 I IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICAP International Carbon Action Partnership ICE IntercontinentalExchange IEA International Energy Agency IET International Emissions Trading IETA International Emissions Trading Association IGES Institute for Global Environmental Strategies IMF International Monetary Fund IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ISO International Organization for Standardization ITL International Transaction Log 5 List of abbreviations and acronyms J J-CDM Japan Domestic Credit Scheme JCM Joint Crediting Mechanism JCOS Japan Carbon Offset Scheme JI Joint Implementation JISC Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee JNR Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+ J-VER Japan Verified Emission Reduction Scheme JVETS Japan Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme K KAZ ETS Kazakhstan Emissions Trading Scheme ktCO2e Kiloton of carbon dioxide equivalent L LAC Latin America and the Caribbean LDC Least Developed Country LEPID Liable Entities Public Information Database LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry M MOEJ Ministry of Environment Japan MOTCC Mineral Oil Tax: Carbon Charge MRP Market Readiness Proposal MRV Monitoring, Reporting and Verification MtCO2e Megaton of carbon dioxide equivalent Mt Megaton MW Megawatt N N2O Nitrous oxide NAM National Association of Manufacturers NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action NDRC China’s National Development and Reform Commission NGCT Natural Gas Carbon Tax NGER National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting NICFI Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative NIM National Implementation Measure NMM New Market-based Mechanism NZ ETS New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme NZ EUR New Zealand Emission Unit Register O OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OPR Offset Project Registry P PFC Perfluorocarbon PMR Partnership for Market Readiness PoA Program of Activities ppm Parts per million 6 R RBF Results-based Financing REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation REDD+ Extends REDD by including sustainable forest management, conservation of forests, and enhancement of carbon sinks RGGI Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative RMU Removal Unit S SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice sCER Secondary Certified Emission Reduction SF6 Sulfur hexafluoride SGER Specified Gas Emitters Regulation T t Ton (note that, unless specified otherwise, ton in this report refers to a metric ton = 1,000kg) tCO2 Ton of carbon dioxide tCO2e Ton of carbon dioxide equivalent U UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change US United States US EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency V VCS Verified Carbon Standard VCU Voluntary Carbon Units W WB World Bank WCI Western Climate Initiative Y y Year y/y Year-on-year 7 Contents List of abbreviations and acronyms 4 Executive summary 14 1 Introduction 20 2 Carbon pricing instruments: 24 overview, emerging trends and lessons learned 2.1 Global overview of carbon pricing instruments 25 2.2 Emerging trends in carbon pricing instruments 27 2.3 Policy design lessons from the existing experiences 33 3 International carbon pricing approaches 36 3.1 Status of the international climate negotiations 37 3.2 Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 38 3.2.1 Supply and demand outlook for Kyoto credits 38 3.2.2 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 38 3.2.3 Joint Implementation (JI) 40 3.2.4 International Emissions Trading (IET) 41 3.3 New approaches to market instruments under the UNFCCC: 41 the New Market-Based Mechanism (NMM) and the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) 8 3.4 Other international carbon pricing approaches 42 3.4.1 Results-based financing (RBF) 42 3.4.2 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation, Forest Degradation, 42 and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) 3.4.3 Private sector voluntary market 43 3.5 Looking back at international carbon pricing approaches: 44 international emissions trading and the CDM 3.5.1 International emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol 44 3.5.2 International offset mechanism: the CDM 44 4 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions 48 trading schemes and crediting approaches 4.1 Overview of regional, national, and sub-national emissions 49 trading schemes (ETS) and crediting approaches 4.2 Existing emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches 54 4.2.1 European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 54 4.2.2 Switzerland Emissions Trading Scheme 56 4.2.3 California Cap-and-Trade Program (US) 57 4.2.4 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 58 4.2.5 Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program (Canada) 58 4.2.6 Québec Cap-and-Trade System (Canada) 59 4.2.7 Kazakhstan Emissions Trading Scheme 59 4.2.8 Australia Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) 61 4.2.9 New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) 61 4.2.10 Japan (various schemes) 62 4.2.11 China Emissions Trading Schemes (Beijing, Guangdong, 64 Hubei, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Tianjin) 4.3 Emerging emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches 67 4.3.1 China Emissions Trading Schemes (national and Chongqing) 67 4.3.2 Republic of Korea Emissions Trading Scheme 68 4.3.3 Other potential schemes in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 69 Mexico, North American Pacific Coast, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Ukraine 4.4 Looking back at installation level emissions trading: 70 the EU ETS and the NZ ETS 4.4.1 The EU ETS 70 4.4.2 The New Zealand (uncapped) ETS 73 9 Contents 5 National and sub-national carbon taxes 76 5.1 Overview of carbon taxes 76 5.2 Existing carbon taxes 78 5.2.1 Australia 78 5.2.2 British Columbia 78 5.2.3 Denmark 79 5.2.4 Finland 79 5.2.5 France 80 5.2.6 Iceland 80 5.2.7 Ireland 80 5.2.8 Japan 80 5.2.9 Mexico 81 5.2.10 Norway 81 5.2.11 Sweden 82 5.2.12 Switzerland 82 5.2.13 United Kingdom 83 5.3 Emerging carbon taxes 83 5.3.1 South Africa 83 5.3.2 Other potential taxes in Brazil, Chile, Oregon 84 and Republic of Korea 5.4 Looking back at carbon taxes: the Danish and 84 British Columbia examples 5.4.1 The Danish carbon tax 84 5.4.2 The British Columbia revenue-neutral carbon tax 86 6 Carbon pricing in the international climate cooperation 88 Annex I – Facts and figures on international 98 carbon pricing approaches I Demand outlook for Kyoto credits 98 II CDM 99 III NMM and FVA 103 IV RBF 103 V REDD+ 104 VI Climate bonds 105 10 Annex II – Detailed update sheets on emissions 106 trading schemes VII EU ETS 106 VIII California Cap-and-Trade Program 114 IX RGGI 117 X Québec Cap-and-Trade System 117 XI Australia CPM 118 XII JCM 121 XIII China (existing and emerging) 122 Annex III – Conversion rates 128 Glossary 129 Tables 1 Snapshot of number of emissions trading schemes and carbon 25 taxes (existing and emerging) 2 Residual demand for and potential issuance of CERs and ERUs 38 (2014–2020) 3 Evolution of the CDM design 45 4 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes: 53 allocation approaches 5 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes: 54 areas of development in 2013 6 Carbon pricing instruments in Japan 63 7 Overview of the Chinese ETS pilots in operation 64 8 Emission reduction pledges to 2020 90 9 Global emission pathway until 2020 and 2050 92 10 CDM project and PoA registrations and CER issuances 100 11 Examples of initiatives to support the CDM 101 12 Summary of the main discussion points on the role and 103 technical design of the NMM and the FVA 11 Contents 13 Most relevant non-carbon pricing policies at the EU level 113 and their link to the EU ETS 14 Most relevant non-carbon pricing policies at the national 116 level in the US and their link to carbon pricing 15 Proposed cap for the CPM scenarios for the first five years 120 of the flexible-price period 16 Key characteristics of the Chinese ETS pilots 122 17 Allocation approaches for the Chinese ETS pilots in operation 124 18 Most relevant non-carbon pricing policies at the national level 127 in China and their link to carbon pricing 19 Currency conversion rates as of December 31, 2013 128 Figures 1 Summary map of existing, emerging, and potential regional, 16 national and sub-national carbon pricing schemes (ETS and tax) 2 Prices in existing carbon pricing schemes 17 3 Greenhouse gas emissions by country 19 4 Summary map of existing, emerging, and potential regional, 26 national and sub-national carbon pricing instruments (ETS and tax) 5 Prices in existing carbon pricing schemes 32 6 CER and ERU issuance (2005-2013) 39 7 Project and PoA registrations (2004–2013) 39 8 The CDM in numbers 45 9 Distribution of registered CDM projects by country and technology 46 10 Determinants for the country and technology distribution of CDM 47 projects 11 Map of existing, emerging, and potential emissions trading schemes 50 12 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes: 51 share of global emissions covered 13 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes: 52 scope 14 EU allowance price development labeled with key developments in 56 the backloading proposal process 15 Price of allowances auctioned and traded volumes in the primary 57 market in California Cap-and-Trade Program 16 Price of allowances auctioned and auction volumes in RGGI 58 17 Price of allowances auctioned and auction volumes in Québec 59 Cap-and-Trade System 12 18 Characteristics of the Chinese ETS pilots in operation 66 19 Prices to date in the Chinese ETS pilots 67 20 Development of the NZU price compared to the secondary CER 74 price in NZ$ labeled with events affecting international credit usage 21 Share of surrendered units for compliance in the NZ ETS per 75 compliance year 22 Emissions under the NZ ETS of the forestry, energy and industry, 75 and liquid fossil fuels sectors 23 Carbon taxes around the world and the estimated share of 78 GHG emissions covered in their jurisdiction 24 Regional trade flows of GHG emission permits in 2030 for two 96 effort sharing schemes and the 2°C global objective (positive=selling, negative=buying) 25 Market exodus 99 26 Monthly CER and ERU issuance, projects and PoA registrations, 100 and new submissions for validation in 2012 and 2013 27 Looking back at the CDM: expectations and results 102 28 Volumes traded on the spot market in Chinese ETS pilots 125 Boxes 1 Desirable design features for carbon pricing instruments 30 2 In brief: characteristics of the Chinese ETS pilots in operation 65 3 Linking heterogeneous regulatory systems 93 4 A carbon market for 2°C 95 5 Climate bonds 105 6 The EU ETS and international air transport 106 7 Europe’s climate ambitions: the EU ETS in context 113 8 US carbon pricing instruments in context 116 9 China’s climate ambitions: the ETS pilots in context 127 13 Executive summary Despite the difficult ongoing international At a time when the international market is uncertain, climate negotiations, there is an increased it is the continued traction at regional, national and focus on climate change policy and ­ several sub-national levels that shows some promise for the economies are planning, implementing ­ future (see Figure 1). The actions at domestic level have or refining domestic mitigation actions. the potential to collectively overcome the international These activities take careful note of past regulatory gap by fostering targeted low-carbon invest- experiences, mirroring successes and ments at regional and national level. Today, about 40 dealing with weaknesses. countries and over 20 sub-national jurisdictions are ­ putting a price on carbon. Together, these carbon pricing At the international level, the second commitment instruments cover almost 6 gigatons of carbon dioxide period of the Kyoto Protocol (CP2) covers only 12%1 equivalent (GtCO2e) or about 12% of the annual global of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. With only GHG emissions.3, 4 nine countries ratifying to date,2 all eyes are on the Unit- ed Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Carbon pricing comes in different guises (UNFCCC) 2015 Conference Of the Parties (COP) in Scaling up GHG emission reductions and lowering the Paris, which offers an opportunity for convergence on cost of mitigation is crucial to combating climate change. concerted international climate action. A consensual and Given the size and urgency imposed by the c ­limate robust international solution could revive private sector ­ challenge, a full range of carbon pricing approaches confidence to invest in carbon markets, as they remain will be required. Carbon pricing instruments such as reluctant to engage, having experienced significant losses carbon taxes, emissions trading schemes, and crediting within recent memory. ­ mechanisms are of fundamental relevance to internalize the external cost of climate change in the broadest possible 1 Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus included, although these countries have not yet decided whether or not they will ratify CP2. 2 As of May 1, 2014. Bangladesh, Barbados, Honduras, Kenya, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. At COP 18 CP2 was agreed in the form of the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. Ratification by 144 Parties is needed for the amendment to enter into force, but Parties agreed at COP 18 to apply it provisionally as of January 1, 2013 pending its entry into force. 3 Source for national emissions: Joint Research Centre of the European Commission/PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, EDGAR Version 4.2 FT2010, 2012, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.php. Rounded to two significant digits. 4 This calculation excludes the GHG emissions covered by the EU Effort Sharing Decision as well as the emissions covered by CP2. If these two mechanisms are considered, these numbers reach almost 9 GtCO2e or 17.5% of the global emissions (i.e., Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are still pending ratification of CP2 as of the cut-off time of this report, and their GHG emissions were not included in the calculation). 14 » About 40 national and over 20 sub-national jurisdictions are putting a price on carbon. Together these carbon pricing instruments cover almost 6 GtCO2e or about 12% of the annual global GHG emissions. « range of economic decision making and in setting China. Whilst overall progress at the national level in China economic incentives for clean development. In light of ­ and the US may take some time, it is notable that the the limited public resources available, carbon pricing world’s two largest emitters are now home to carbon p ­ ricing instruments are also needed to tackle the climate problem instruments. In addition, the increase in discussions at scale and for their ability to foster complementary between these two countries shows promise at global level. private sector investments and generate fiscal dividends. Considering different carbon pricing approaches, a carbon tax, on the one hand, guarantees the carbon » The world’s two largest price in the economic system. An emissions trading scheme, on the other hand, provides certainty about the emitters are now home to environmental impact, through the cap, but the price carbon pricing instruments. « remains flexible. Sudden and unexpected changes in eco- nomic parameters can be harmful, disrupting the basic functioning of the market, one of the issues currently ­ being tackled in the European Union Emissions Trading Progress across the globe is steady. A total of eight System (EU ETS). new carbon markets5 opened their doors in 2013 alone. With these new joiners, the world’s emissions trading In terms of stimulating mitigation activity, the choice schemes are worth about US$30 billion.6 China now between these instruments is less important than getting houses the second largest carbon market in the world, the design details right. Both instruments impact economic covering 1,115 megatons of carbon dioxide equivalent decision making through setting a price on carbon and (MtCO2e),7 after the EU ETS with its 2,084 MtCO2e both instruments raise revenues. In particular, taxes raise cap in 2013.8 Carbon taxation is also gaining ground. revenue directly, as do auctions in an emissions trading New carbon taxes were introduced in Mexico and France scheme. Careful use of the income stream can improve the this past year. In North America, Oregon and Washington effectiveness of the policy instrument. are searching for the right carbon pricing options, joining first-movers California, Québec and British C ­ olumbia in The reach of carbon pricing is steadily concerted efforts to tackle climate change. increasing Carbon pricing systems are now in operation in sub-national jurisdictions of the United States (US) and 5 California Cap-and-Trade Program, Québec Cap-and-Trade System, Kazakhstan Emissions Trading Scheme, and five Chinese pilot emissions trading schemes (Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, and Tianjin). 6 This is for the national, regional and sub-national emissions trading schemes where a cap has been defined. It does not include the Kyoto Protocol international emissions trading. Calculated as the 2013 cap multiplied by the allowance price on December 31, 2013, or the latest available data before this date. 7 Cap for the six Chinese pilot emissions trading schemes in operation as of May 1, 2014 (Beijing, Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Tianjin). 8 Excluding aviation. 15 Executive summary Figure 1 Summary map of existing, emerging, and potential regional, national and sub-national carbon pricing instruments (ETS and tax) Alberta Manitoba Norway Finland Sweden Ontario Iceland Eu Kazakhstan Rebublic British of Korea Columbia UK Denmark Ireland Ukraine Washington Québec Oregon France Japan California RGGI Turkey Switzerland China Mexico Thailand Brazil Rio de Janeiro Australia São Paulo New Chile South Africa Zealand Rebublic of Korea Beijing ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation Kyoto Tianjin Saitama Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementation Tokyo ETS or carbon tax under consideration Hubei Shanghai Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, ETS under consideration ETS and carbon tax implemented or scheduled Chong- qing Guangdong Shenzhen Two steps forward, one step back While some i ­nstitutions, private sector intermediaries and aggregators, nations are taking concrete steps forward on carbon and Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) have either pricing, recent developments in others are a setback. exited the market or substantially reduced their activities. The Australian government plans to repeal its Carbon No sign of a short-term recovery in demand for inter­ ­Pricing Mechanism legislation and three major emitters, national credits from the existing and emerging initiatives Japan, New Zealand and Russia,9 officially pulled out of led to an intensified exodus of private sector players in the ­second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. the last two years. Fears abound that the demobilization of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) market In addition, the infrastructure created by the market-­ infrastructure could substantially damage the institutional based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol continues memory that has been created, and delay the market to be dismantled as many players, including financial ­ recovery, if and when positive policy signals are given. 9 In addition, Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period. 16 Figure 2 Prices in existing carbon pricing schemes Confidence in the EU ETS has been hit hard as the mechanism design has been unable to cope with US$175/ major economic downturn. Prices in the EU ETS the ­ tCO2 remained in the depressed range of about US$5-9 (€4-7) ­ in the past year, contrasting with US$18 (€13) seen 168 Swedish carbon tax three years ago.10 Without the demand from EU ETS ­ installations, Kyoto credit prices also reached their historic lows in 2013 and 2014, with Certified Emission ­ … Reductions (CERs) worth just US$0.51 (€0.37).11 An imbalance ­ between little residual demand for Kyoto … US$100/ credits between now and 2020 and an existing portfolio tCO2 of projects that has the potential to generate significant 95 Tokyo Cap-and-Trade credits leaves no prospect for recovery. Price signals are diverse Besides temporal fluctua- tions, carbon prices between schemes occupy a significant range, from under US$1/tCO2 in the Mexican carbon tax up to US$168/tCO2 in the Swedish carbon tax. Figure 2 indicates that prices in emissions trading schemes tend to US$75/ tCO2 be lower, clustering under US$12/tCO2. The main reason for the lower prices currently seen in emissions trading 69 Norwegian carbon tax (upper) 68 Swiss carbon tax schemes seems to be that taxes often exempt industry and put the tax burden on private households thereby avoiding issues of competitiveness and carbon leakage. Increased ambition in these emissions trading schemes could lead to increased prices. The Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program is notable, with a much higher price signal at US$95/tCO2, US$50/ explained by an illiquid market where few reductions tCO2 48 Finnish carbon tax are traded. Therefore prices do not necessarily reflect the ­ economic fundamentals of a mature market. US$/tCO2 31 Danish carbon tax French carbon tax, Icelandic carbon tax, California CaT, 28 British Columbia carbon tax, Guangdong Pilot ETS, 11 Shenzhen Pilot ETS US$25/ Irish carbon tax Québec CaT 10 tCO2 22 Australia CPM 9 Beijing Pilot ETS / EU ETS 16 UK carbon price floor Mexican carbon tax (upper), South African carbon tax, 11 Tianjin Pilot ETS, 5 Shanghai Pilot ETS 10 Norwegian carbon tax (lower) 4 9 3 RGGI 5 Japanese carbon tax 2 4 3 2 1 Mexican carbon tax (lower), US$0/ 1 New Zealand ETS tCO2 10 Average price of EUAs in 2011. Source: IntercontinentalExchange, EUA Daily Futures, March 20, 2014. 11 Average price of secondary CERs in 2013. Record-low price of €0.03 observed in April 2013. Source: Ibid. 17 Executive summary In carbon taxation schemes the prices are set and At the international level, the design of the CDM therefore reflect a range of political realities and goals, ­ aking evolved over time to integrate the lessons learned, m explaining the variety between countries. However, the ­ it a dynamic, but also ever-changing, ­ mechanism. This majority of prices in existing systems are below $35/tCO2, had positive as well as negative impacts on transaction one recent estimate of an appropriate shadow price of costs under the mechanism, as elaborated further in this ­carbon.12 Prices shall in principle suffice to stimulate report. low-carbon investments at scale and maximize mitigation in support of the transformation required to address the Blending of carbon taxation and emissions trading climate challenge. ­pproaches is becoming more popular. Several juris­ a dictions are now experimenting with carbon pricing Established players innovate with new options that include elements of taxation, emissions and improved designs As experience with carbon trading schemes and offset crediting. In South Africa and pricing grows, scheme design is gaining in maturity and ­ Mexico, for ­ example, taxes are combined with the offset sophistication, introducing innovative features to tackle ­ credits. key challenges. The economic downturn, amongst others, has led to a significant surplus of allowances ­ New designs need to find a way to maximize the in the EU ETS, reducing scarcity and depressing ­ effectiveness of market instruments, building efficiently ­ prices. ­ Realizing there is slim chance of future recovery on the past, but also deploying more suitable tools. In under existing conditions, EU stakeholders, led by the ­ particular, different levers are needed to overturn the ­ European Commission (EC), have designed a plan to plethora of sectoral and regional investment barriers shore up the EU ETS. “Backloading”13 in the short faced by many low-carbon technologies located in term, and the proposed market stability reserve in the ­ business environments with high levels of perceived risk. long term, i­ntroduce some flexibility into the cap of this established system. This plan should enable the EU ETS Importantly, cooperation remains a key to better contend with unenvisaged changes in economic feature of success The international market has circumstances. In the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative been struggling for some time. However, the current (RGGI), participating states increased their level of am- spate of domestic action has been buoyed by growing bition by scaling back the overall cap by 45% in 2013 cooperation among regional, national and sub-national compared with the original plan, triggering a doubling stakeholders. Although unilateral political changes have of the price per allowance. challenged the EU-Australia link, showing that linking is not always straightforward, cooperation between ­ eductions The Danish carbon tax stimulated emission r ­ California and Québec demonstrates that carbon in the private sector, but with the additional revenues, markets can grow through linking. In the future a ­ ­ variety government subsidies reinforced the signal from the tax of ­cooperative approaches could strengthen carbon and broadened the distribution of mitigation actions. ­ pricing, and wider climate change policy, even further. Such complementary policy features help strengthen the effectiveness of a carbon tax. Figure 3 illustrates total GHG emissions for countries around the world. The substantial difference in countries’ domestic emissions  –  and consequently, in emission reduction opportunities  across the globe, underlines –  the need for some sort of international cooperation that takes into account the vast range of domestic realities, priorities, and possibilities. 12 Source: United States Inter-Agency Working Group, Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, 2013. 13 Backloading involves shifting the planned auctioning of 900 million EUAs from the originally planned auctions from 2014 onwards, to the end of Phase III, i.e., 2019 and 2020, as an initial step to redress the current supply-demand imbalance. 18 Figure 3 Greenhouse gas emissions by country14 Total GHG emissions per country: >1,000 MtCO2e/year 100–1,000 MtCO2e/year <100 MtCO2e/year Such cooperation can create the basis for ambition. through market-based mechanisms is an important first In turn, ambition itself can drive cooperation, as a tool step. The next challenge would be to create a product to control cost and provide flexibility in compliance. that is greater than the sum of its parts by converting Careful cooperation takes time, and may take several fragmented initiatives into internationally integrated forms. Piloting and scaling up carbon pricing on an carbon pricing approaches. ­ international level and increasing climate finance 14 Source for national emissions: Joint Research Centre of the European Commission/PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, EDGAR Version 4.2 FT2010, 2012, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.php. Rounded to two significant digits. 19 section 1 Introduction 1 Introduction ­ conomic development. Food, water, and human health e » Those who are already crises, as well as other catastrophic risks, will be inevitable if ­climate systems are pushed beyond their tipping points. ­ feeling the effects of climate change don’t have time Limiting the average global temperature rise to b ­ elow 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels is commonly to deny it – they’re busy ­ regarded as a prerequisite to avoid dangerous climate dealing with it. « ­ aper, change. Achieving the 2°C target is still feasible on p although the window of opportunity is narrowing. Barack Obama Global GHG emissions reached approximately 50 gigatons ­ of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) in 201018 and are projected to climb to 59 GtCO2e by 2020. The inter­ G  lobally, 2013 was the fourth warmest year on ­record.15 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirmed that continuing our current national community needs to slash GHG emissions by 15 GtCO2e to 44 GtCO2e19 to limit temperature rises to 2°C during the 21st century. Although this scale of change pattern of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would likely may seem beyond reach, it is technically possible. The lead to a rise in mean global temperatures of more than total technical emission reduction potential is ­ estimated 2 degrees Celsius (2°C) and could trigger warming that to be in the range of 14 to 20 GtCO2e in 2020.20 In exceeds 4°C by the end of the century.16 This scale of practice, this means that the emission reduction increase will pose unprecedented risks to peoples’ ­ potential in all countries needs to be mobilized to keep lives and well-being,17 potentially reversing decades of the 2°C target within reach. 15 Source: National Climate Data Center (NOAA), Global Analysis – Annual 2013, accessed March 24, 2014, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/2013/13. 16 Source: IPCC, Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2013. 17 Source: IPCC, Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012. 18 This figure is based on the EDGAR database, with 95% probability range of 45.6–54.6 GtCO2e in 2010. Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2013, 2013. 19 This is needed to have at least a 66% chance of achieving a 2°C limit, and is based on least-cost mitigation pathway developed in Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2013, 2013. To keep the prospect of a 2°C world alive in the longer term, global annual GHG emissions have to be curbed to 35 GtCO2e by 2030 and to 22 GtCO2e by 2050. 20 Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2013, March 12, 2013. 21 1   Introduction A transformation of the global economy will be ­ epresent only 12% of global GHG emissions.24 Current r ­necessary to fully exploit this potential. Looking forward, pledges,25 if fully implemented, are expected to help cut over 70% of the reductions possible are in developing 5 GtCO2e in 2020 on average, thus leaving a mitigation economies and economies in transition.21 Given the new gap of about 10 GtCO2e. This gap is roughly equivalent emissions scenarios, robust international cooperation to the annual GHG emissions from the European Union will be needed to work together towards the common (EU), Russia and India combined. target. Serious efforts are required through public and private investments in green technologies, and clear and Clearly and undeniably, the pledges put forward fall credible policies to correct market failures and to provide short of what is needed to achieve a 2°C world. Never- the right incentives. In the energy sector alone, the theless, they constitute an important initial step towards additional investment required consistent with a 2°C internationally shared efforts that have to be pursued scenario is estimated to be US$910 billion per annum continuously and more aggressively post-2020. In 2011, during 2010-2050.22 This represents three times the at the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United­ entire existing climate finance flow of US$337 billion Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change for mitigation purposes in 2012.23 (UNFCCC), Parties decided to complete negotiations on a new globally binding agreement by 2015, for implementation from 2020. Eyes will be on the ­ ­ outcomes of the 2015 COP in Paris, which will set the stage for the » The emission much needed international partnerships. reduction potential in Scaling up emission reductions and lowering their all countries needs to be cost is crucial to combating climate change. This requires, among other important aspects, the support mobilized to keep the 2°C of targeted policies, methodologies and regulatory target within reach. « frameworks. Given the size and urgency imposed by the climate challenge, a full plethora of policies will be ­required, and policy makers will have to ensure that these instruments can coexist in harmony and ­ complement Although countries are taking steps to address the each other effectively. Policies need to c ­ reate a business-­ problem, action to date is far from having the required enabling environment to support the deployment of low- impact at scale and covers a small fraction of the resources carbon technologies that are c ­urrently less financially needed. Furthermore, countries participating in the viable, and support the development of more e ­ fficient second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ­ ones. 21 Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012, 2012.. 22 Source: IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives, 2012. 23 Source: Climate Policy Initiative, The Global Landscape of Climate Finance, 2013. 24 Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus included, although these countries have not yet decided whether or not they will ratify CP2. 25 According to several sources, even if countries keep up with their existing pledges, the global mean temperature is expected to rise in the range of 3 to 4°C by 2100, relative to the pre-industrial level. Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2013, March 12, 2013; Climate Action Tracker, accessed March 17, 2014, www.climateactiontracker.org; World Bank, Mapping Carbon Pricing Initiatives 2013, Developments and Prospects, May 2013. 22 In recognition of the substantial incremental finance to draw lessons learned and evaluate effectiveness. required and the limited public resources available to ­ ections 4 and 5 focus, respectively, on emissions trading S tackle the problem at scale, carbon pricing instruments schemes and crediting approaches, and on carbon taxes. are of fundamental relevance. They have an inherent These three sections highlight key updates compared to capacity to foster the most-needed complementary ­ last year’s report; detailed information can be found in ­private sector investments. For the purpose of this report, Annexes I and II. The sign  ? indicates the page ­ carbon pricing refers to initiatives that put an e ­xplicit number in the annexes where further information can be price on GHG emissions. This includes emissions found. The main body of the report concludes in Section trading schemes, offset mechanisms, carbon taxes, and 6 on the importance of international cooperation and results-based financing. Such initiatives  ­ – which will be the potential role of market instruments in the effort to discussed at length in this report  – are being planned stay within the 2°C path. and implemented at international, regional, national, as well as sub-national levels. Other policies that implicitly price GHG emissions, such as the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, fuel taxation, support for renewable energy, ­ and energy efficiency certificate trading are also needed,26 but this report focuses solely on those policies that aim to put an explicit price on emissions. The objective of this report is to inform readers on existing and emerging carbon pricing initiatives world- wide, indicating key lessons learned from experiences so far and suggesting the possible role for carbon pricing in the context of the existing challenges. Section 2 first provides an overview of the carbon pricing approaches around the world, explores commonalities among the global initiatives and provides hints on how lessons from past experience are helping to shape new trends. Sections 3, 4 and 5 follow the same structure. Section 3 takes stock of the current state of international carbon pricing initiatives and analyses two existing initiatives, aiming 26 Source: IPCC WGIII, Summary for Policymakers, Final Draft, April 13, 2014; IPCC WGIII, Climate Change 2007, Mitigation of Climate Change, 2007. 23 section 2 Carbon pricing instruments: overview, emerging trends and lessons learned 2 Carbon pricing instruments: overview, emerging trends and lessons learned 2.1 These carbon pricing instruments can be diverse, incor- Global overview porating carbon taxes, emissions trading schemes, offsets and of carbon ­pricing results-based financing, amongst others. Table 1 ­ provides instruments a count of the national and sub-national jurisdictions engaging with the two most prominent carbon pricing policies: emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes.28 A  bout 40 national and over 20 sub-national juris- dictions are putting a price on carbon. The carbon pricing instruments specifically cover almost 6 GtCO2e Figure 4 shows which jurisdictions are developing these carbon pricing instruments. Some are choosing an emission or about 12% of the annual global GHG emissions.27 trading scheme or tax specifically; others combine the two approaches or keep their policy options open. Table 1 Snapshot of number of emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes (existing and emerging) Instrument Status Regional National Sub-national Total ETS Implemented 1 4 13 18 (31 countries) Implementation scheduled 1 1 2 Under consideration 8 3 11 Tax Implemented 11 1 12 Implementation scheduled 1 1 Under consideration 2 2 Yet to be chosen 11 3 14 27 This calculation excludes the GHG emissions covered by the EU Effort Sharing Decision as well as the emissions covered by CP2. If these two mechanisms are considered, these numbers reach almost 9 GtCO2e or 17.5% of the global emissions (i.e., Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are still pending ratification of CP2 as of the cut-off time of this report, and their GHG emissions were not included in the calculation). 28 ETS - implemented: Regional ETS: EU ETS; National ETS: Australia, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Switzerland; Sub-national ETS: Alberta, California, six Chinese pilots, three Japanese schemes, Quebec, RGGI. / ETS – implementation scheduled: National ETS: Republic of Korea; Sub-national ETS: Chongqing. / ETS – under consideration: National ETS: Brazil, Chile, China, Japan, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine; Sub-national ETS: Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Washington State. / Tax – implemented: National tax: Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK; Sub-national tax: British Columbia. / Tax – implementation scheduled: National tax: South Africa. / Tax – under consideration: Chile, Republic of Korea. / Carbon pricing instrument to be chosen: National: Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Peru, Russia, Tunisia, Vietnam. Sub-national: Manitoba, Ontario, Oregon. 25 2   Carbon pricing instruments: overview, emerging trends and lessons learned Figure 4 Summary map of existing, emerging, and potential regional, national and sub-national carbon pricing instruments (ETS and tax) Alberta Manitoba Norway Finland Sweden Ontario Iceland Eu Kazakhstan Rebublic British of Korea Columbia UK Denmark Ireland Ukraine Washington Québec Oregon France Japan California RGGI Turkey Switzerland China Mexico Thailand Brazil Rio de Janeiro Australia São Paulo New Chile South Africa Zealand Rebublic of Korea Beijing ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation Kyoto Tianjin Saitama Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementation Tokyo ETS or carbon tax under consideration Hubei Shanghai Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, ETS under consideration ETS and carbon tax implemented or scheduled Chong- qing Guangdong Shenzhen Note 1: The carbon pricing instruments under consideration (in orange) refer Note 2: For more information on emissions trading schemes, see Figure 11. to emissions trading schemes, except in the case of Oregon, where For more information on carbon taxes, see Figure 23. discussions on the type of initiative to be implemented are underway. 26 2.2 carbon markets29 opened their doors in 2013 alone, with Emerging trends in carbon additional market opening in Hubei in 2014. With an ­ pricing instruments these new joiners, the world’s emissions trading schemes are worth about US$30 billion.30 China now houses the ­ second-largest carbon market in the world, covering This report’s stock-take of recent developments in car- 1,115 MtCO2e,31 after the EU ETS with its 2,084 MtCO2e bon pricing demonstrates that although the inter­national cap in 2013.32 climate negotiations are under some strain, experience with carbon pricing is growing and price i ­nformation Countries and regions who already had plans have is becoming more widely available. ­ Innovative solutions been elaborating their individual policies further this based on lessons from the past are being incorporated year33 such as Brazil, Chile, Thailand, Indonesia and into the development of the new schemes, and into the ­ exico South Africa. The introduction of a carbon tax in M continuous improvements of existing ones. The key and the announcement of a possible ETS in its energy emerging trends are set out here. pricing sector mark a clear addition to the global carbon ­ picture. Other countries and regions have shown steps International regulatory environment forward in their level of interest in carbon pricing, ­remains uncertain It has been another year of slow for ­example Tunisia34 and Russia, the latter of which progress at the international level. Although dialogue published a Presidential decree that could take them ­ continues to focus on a robust and meaningful on a path to an ETS in the longer term. In addition to ­ international climate change agreement in 2015, the government initiatives, the International Civil Aviation pre-2020 ambition levels remain low, and there is Organization (ICAO) has discussed the potential of a ­ uncertainty about the future climate regime. market-based mechanism for aviation by 2020. This overarching context has fuelled further decline in the international carbon markets and without a sub- stantial increase in the demand for Kyoto credits, there » A total of eight new carbon is little incentive for new origination of credits at project level. This scenario also contributes to the trend toward markets opened their doors domestically-driven carbon pricing instruments. in 2013 alone. « In addition, the international context is one reason why the results-based financing (RBF) approach is Despite the steady and continuing trend towards the ing prominence. RBF has the potential to achieve introduction of carbon pricing, there have been some gain­ concrete results, whilst leaving all market and non-­ steps in the other direction. The proposal from the ­ market options open for the future. current Australian government to remove the Carbon ­ Pricing Mechanism (CPM), although foreseen last year, Ongoing progress at the national level, but is a significant setback, as are statements by Japan about at a cautious pace The trend towards increasing a reduced emission reduction target, and the official national or regional level carbon pricing schemes withdrawal from Japan, New Zealand, and Russia from continued at a steady pace in 2013. A total of eight new the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 29 California Cap-and-Trade Program, Québec Cap-and-Trade System, Kazakhstan Emissions Trading Scheme, and five Chinese pilot emissions trading schemes (Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, and Tianjin). 30 This is for the national, regional and sub-national emissions trading schemes where a cap has been defined. It does not include the Kyoto Protocol international emissions trading. Calculated as the 2013 cap multiplied by the allowance price on December 31, 2013, or the latest available data before this date. 31 Cap for the six Chinese pilot emissions trading schemes in operation (Beijing, Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Tianjin). 32 Excluding aviation. 33 Including many of the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) countries. 34 Tunisia joined the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) in March 2014. 27 2   Carbon pricing instruments: overview, emerging trends and lessons learned National circumstances continue to play an Governments in developing countries, such as important role Reasons behind the notable changes M ­ exico and China, are building on their experience observed, such as those in Australia, Japan and Mexico with the CDM to develop instruments that are adapted are diverse. Political statements and positioning are to their context. They may directly use existing projects ­important, but so are the attitudes of the local ­population or methodologies. At the same time, these countries can and broader political issues such as energy prices, try and combine climate considerations with develop- ­­economic growth and perceptions of competitiveness. ment priorities and constraints, e.g., through valuation Carbon pricing decisions are expected to remain specific of co-benefits and contribution to local development. to the national context and strategic priorities, as well as This proactive engagement will help address the limited to these other pressures. ability of the Kyoto mechanisms to capture and properly respond to the interactions between the climate and Importantly, the geographic spread of the existing ­development agendas. and planned carbon pricing initiatives remains wide, spanning from Thailand, China and Australia through Designs support economic growth There con- North and South America and into Europe. However, tinues to be a clear emphasis on creating schemes that the distribution of actual implementation is not even. offer advantages domestically as well as fitting into the Many countries are taking into account their experienc- global climate change goals. There has been an ­ increase es, often as hosts of the Clean Development Mechanism in competitiveness measures both in some taxation (CDM) or Joint Implementation (JI), and are reluctant countries, e.g., in Denmark and in the EU ETS, which to commit to a new initiative until they are certain it is this year introduced compensation mechanisms for the robust and will take hold. indirect impact of the scheme on electricity prices in electro-intensive industries. These types of measures, In some of the fast-emerging economies, eco- although important to the economy, have to be designed ­ nomic growth may speak to a faster development in a way that ensures they do not risk counteracting the of ­climate change policies than the institutions and main purpose of an instrument. Some analysts ­pos- existing ­ ­ legislative background is ready for. Countries it that the UK’s unilateral implementation of a carbon such as Morocco, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Tunisia are price floor, which on the one hand is deemed relevant benefitting from a range of donor-funded programs to ­ to enable the UK to remain on track to their ambitious help them develop their institutional and legal frame- 2050 emission reduction cuts, on the other hand, could work to enable the implementation of carbon pricing reduce GHG emissions in the UK, decreasing the over- instruments now, as in the case of Kazakhstan, and all demand for EUAs and ultimately bringing down the in the ­future. Through a range of programs run by European Union Allowance (EUA) price below trans- GIZ, ­ EuropeAid, the World Bank (WB), USAID and formational levels. This would potentially reduce UK NORAD, amongst others, carbon pricing instruments emissions at the cost of increasing emissions in other EU are increasingly integrated in such countries’ broader economies. climate change mitigation agendas through targets or voluntary emission reduction goals. In addition, many of the new carbon pricing ­nstruments, such as the Mexican tax, include domestic i offsetting programs, which channel resources back into the relevant jurisdiction. These offsetting schemes demonstrate a desire to support the national economy but also some learning from the CDM and voluntary markets. 28 A focus on preparatory no-lose measures is On the other hand, strong international ­ cooperation prevalent Concerns about the future of international continues to inform the development of carbon carbon markets and a preference for a cautious approach pricing instruments, with increasing dialogue about ­ are restricting activities in some countries to no-regret ­ developments both at the political and technical level measures. There is an emphasis on readiness and building and between private sector and public sector actors. basic infrastructures, such as data management and ­ Australia has signed a Memorandum of U ­ nderstanding monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV), as in the with China, the US and China have engaged in p ­ romising case of Turkey, to allow countries to be flexible and well discussions towards converging objectives, and the EU is prepared for whatever might come next. actively engaged in sharing experiences in C ­ hina as well. Donor programs provide an opportunity for South– This slow but steady approach is likely to fast-track South and South–North dialogue. In addition, many the design and operationalization of future national private sector practitioners previously engaged in CDM and sub-national schemes when the time is right. This activities are now bringing their know-how into new approach is particularly well suited to countries currently ­ carbon pricing instruments. This cooperation spreads relying on international demand for credits and that are the knowledge and experience on carbon pricing, which not yet ready to create schemes that generate domestic helps mitigate the risk of the “brain drain” currently demand. In parallel, the experience gained during this ­ experienced by the CDM and JI markets. preparatory stage will feed into the formulation of inter- national mechanisms. The carbon tax vs. ETS debate is defusing Carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes are among Cooperation continues but formal link- the most common carbon pricing options. As more ing moves more slowly The Québec–California countries tackle questions related to carbon pricing, the ­linkage was cemented in 2013, becoming a reality at the perceived choice between a carbon tax and an ETS is start of 2014. This is a significant further step towards becoming less acute. Box 1 outlines the core features integrating carbon markets, and demonstrates how required to ensure that these instruments achieve their aligning design at the outset can simplify the linkage goals. of schemes. However, no further linking activity was observed in 2013, and in a sense this is slower progress ­ A carbon tax, on the one hand, guarantees the c ­ arbon than seemed apparent in previous years. Furthermore, price in the system. An emissions trading scheme, on the the recent changes in Australia call into question the other hand, provides certainty about the environmental likelihood of the Australian–EU ETS link coming to impact, through the cap, but the price remains flexible. fruition and the Swiss linkage with the EU ETS is also Sudden and unexpected changes in economic p ­ ara­meters temporarily stalled. can be harmful, disrupting the basic functioning of the market. Linking between nascent domestic carbon markets appears to be rather difficult, from a political perspective, and is not currently the priority for most jurisdictions. However, linking is not necessarily the only or right solution for countries to create efficient carbon pricing instruments. 29 2   Carbon pricing instruments: overview, emerging trends and lessons learned Box 1 Desirable design features for carbon pricing instruments By Ian Parry, Principal Environmental Fiscal Policy Expert, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund (IMF) From the perspective of economic efficiency, desirable design features for carbon pricing schemes include:35 –– Comprehensive coverage of emissions, which can be achieved through implementing pricing in proportion to carbon content on the supply of petroleum products, coal, and natural gas. Alternatively, for some sectors (e.g., electricity) charges can be levied at the point of fuel combustion, though administration may be more involved (and small-scale emitters are often excluded). –– A uniform price applied to all emissions, which is appropriate as the damage per ton of emissions is the same, regardless of which fuel they come from or who is using the fuel. –– Stable and predictable emissions prices, which promote cost-effectiveness through equating incremental abatement costs at different points in time and help to establish the longer-term signals ­ needed to promote clean technology investments. Provisions to prevent prices declining are also needed to improve compatibility with other mitigation measures (e.g., incentives for renewables). –– Emissions prices aligned with environmental damages or climate stabilization goals. Estimates of future climate change damages suggest CO2 should be priced in the order of $35 per ton,36 though damage assessments are highly contentious. Alternatively, for example, a global CO2 price starting at about $30 per ton (in current dollars) in 2020 and rising at around 5% a year would be roughly in line ultimately containing mean projected warming to 2.5°C at least cost37 with ­ –– Maximizing the fiscal dividend, which means raising revenues and using the revenues productively, particularly lowering the burden of broader taxes that distort the economy or funding socially desirable (climate-related or other) spending. Failure to exploit the fiscal dividend can undermine the case for carbon pricing over regulatory approaches on cost-effectiveness grounds.38 ­ –– Carefully targeted compensation schemes for vulnerable households and firms. Excessive compensation has a high cost in terms of diverting funds from the public budget. With regard to trade-­ exposed firms, international price floor agreements (analogous to those applied to value added and excise taxes in the EU) provide some protection against losses in competitiveness while allowing individual ­ ­ countries the flexibility to price emissions more aggressively (e.g., due to fiscal and ancillary environmental benefits or green preferences).  35 Source: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Policy to Mitigate Climate Change: A Guide for Policymakers (Washington DC, 2012). 36 Source: United States Inter-Agency Working Group, Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, 2013. 37 Source: Nordhaus, W.D., The Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for a Warming World (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2013). 38 Source: Parry, I. and Williams, R.C., Moving US Climate Policy Forward: Are Carbon Tax Shifts the Only Good Alternative? (Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honor of Tom Schelling, Oxford University Press, 2012). 30 In principle, either carbon taxes or emissions trading schemes can meet the above criteria, and in this regard the choice between which type of instrument is less important than getting the design details right of the instrument that is implemented. For example, trading schemes can include allowance auctions to raise ­ revenue and price stability provisions (e.g., price floors where allowances are withdrawn from the market as ­ needed to prevent prices falling below a target level). On the other hand, a carbon tax can be a more natural extension of existing fuel excises, which are widely accepted and easily administered, without major exemptions (and charges for other environmental damages, most notably air pollution from coal, could be levied at the same time). Moreover, with finance ministries responsible for tax collection, the prospects might be better for using revenues to lower broader taxes on ­ work effort and capital accumulation. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. In terms of stimulating mitigation activity, the choice In the North American Pacific Northwest, several between these instruments is less important than getting states are considering carbon pricing, and are making the design details right. In particular, taxes raise revenue choices about the design of their instrument: tax-like directly, as do auctions in an emissions trading scheme. or ETS-like. In Brazil, the investigation of a potential The careful use of these revenues can help to ensure the ETS roadmap was accompanied by a thorough study effectiveness of the policy instrument. of carbon taxes. Furthermore, the government of Chile, which is considering an ETS, recently stated it was open The choice of instrument will be governed by a to considering a carbon tax. Several regions are applying ­ umber of priorities and circumstances. A carbon tax n hybrid approaches, such as South Africa, which includes can ­ often be easier and faster to implement, particularly offsets in its taxation system, California and Regional in sectors that might be less well suited to a market Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) which include a cost ­approach, e.g., sectors with few players, which would not containment element to their ETS making them some- allow for functional trading. An ETS may offer ­ different what more tax-like in character. The CPM in Australia advantages, including opening a dialogue with the private started as a tax, with plans to gradually develop into an sector, enabling flexibility in compliance approaches, and ETS later on. having a predetermined environmental outcome. More policy makers are using a mix of features from the two In this report, carbon pricing is investigated in the instruments to optimise their approach. separate categories of carbon tax and ETS, but this division is not black and white. ­ 31 2   Carbon pricing instruments: overview, emerging trends and lessons learned Figure 5 Prices in existing carbon pricing schemes Carbon pricing continues to become more sophisticated and is diversifying The ­ established players have moved forward with ­ ­ significant US$175/ changes, ­ including implementing the 45% cap r ­eduction tCO2 in RGGI and agreeing an approach to tackle an a ­ llowance surplus in the EU ETS through b ­ ackloading. ­ Further 168 Swedish carbon tax ­proposals relating to the ­introduction of a ­market ­stability reserve for the EU ETS demonstrate that l ­essons from the past are leading to action to i ­ mprove the ­ effectiveness … of these carbon markets. … US$100/ The newer schemes are also setting examples for others tCO2 and making iterations themselves. Kazakhstan, for 95 Tokyo Cap-and-Trade example, will go forward with improvements in MRV ­ and registry elements to help the market function better after its first year of operation. In some cases the ­ new ­national initiatives build on the CDM. Certified ­ Emission Reductions (CERs) from Mexican projects feature in Mexico’s plans, similar to the planned use of Chinese CERs (CCERs) in China. US$75/ tCO2 Besides these improvements in existing systems, 69 Norwegian carbon tax (upper) 68 Swiss carbon tax carbon pricing tools are increasing their reach. Carbon pricing approaches are increasingly being used as a results-based tool for the provision of international ­ financial support, for example for Reducing Emissions ­ from Deforestation, Forest Degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and US$50/ enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) where tCO2 48 Finnish carbon tax some carbon pricing elements are mainly using carbon as a metric to channel climate finance transfers. US$/tCO2 31 Danish carbon tax French carbon tax, Icelandic carbon tax, California CaT, 28 British Columbia carbon tax, Guangdong Pilot ETS, 11 Shenzhen Pilot ETS US$25/ Irish carbon tax Québec CaT 10 tCO2 22 Australia CPM 9 Beijing Pilot ETS / EU ETS 16 UK carbon price floor Mexican carbon tax (upper), South African carbon tax, 11 Tianjin Pilot ETS, 5 Shanghai Pilot ETS 10 Norwegian carbon tax (lower) 4 9 3 RGGI 5 Japanese carbon tax 2 4 3 2 1 Mexican carbon tax (lower), US$0/ 1 New Zealand ETS tCO2 32 The market is increasingly revealing new 2.3 price information The emissions trading schemes Policy design lessons in California, Québec, Kazakhstan and six of the seven from the existing Chinese regions entered into operation in 2013 and early experiences 2014, making it a significant period of time in terms of actual carbon market development and price discovery. Prices vary significantly from scheme to scheme, and in Looking in more detail at a selection of the longest-­ the Québec and California programs they are hovering running carbon pricing instruments provides further just above the minimum auction price. ­ insights on the outcomes, market operation, and policy design of such instruments. This report looks more Besides temporal fluctuations, carbon prices closely at several such instruments: international ­ between schemes occupy a significant range, from under­ emissions ­ ­ trading under the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM, US$1/tCO2 in the Mexican carbon tax up to the EU ETS, the NZ ETS, and the Danish and British US$168/tCO2 in the Swedish carbon tax. Figure 5 Columbian carbon taxes. The main findings are presented ­ ­ indicates that prices in existing emissions trading below. schemes tend to be lower than taxes, clustering under US$12/tCO2. The main reason for the lower prices Carbon pricing instruments work: but currently seen in emissions trading schemes seems to be ­ not always in the manner or to the extent that taxes often exempt industry and put the tax bur- ­expected All of the instruments listed above have den on private households thereby avoiding issues of stimulated emission reductions, and have gone some competitiveness and carbon leakage. ­ way towards climate change mitigation. However, not all of the results are of the scale expected, as was the Increased ambition in these systems could lead to case with the Danish carbon tax voluntary agreements, ­increased prices. The recent price rise in RGGI, ­following where the emission reductions achieved were lower than the tightening of the cap, illustrates the potential for ­initially estimated. prices to increase as schemes mature and are refined. Emission reductions are not always distributed in The Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program is notable, with the manner expected. The NZ ETS did not ­ stimulate a much higher price signal than most emissions ­trading ­ emission reductions domestically at the rate ­ envisaged schemes at US$95/tCO2, explained by an illiquid and the CDM experience showed an uneven ­distribution market where few reductions are traded. Therefore prices ­ between countries and technologies. Some ­ flexibility in do not necessarily reflect the economic fundamentals of acceptable, the distributional aspects of outcomes can be ­ a­mature market. depending on the original policy goals, and that ­ flexibility should be expected when introducing a carbon The prices are set in carbon taxation schemes and pricing instrument. therefore reflect a range of political realities and goals, explaining the variation between countries. The majority ­ of existing pricing instruments generate carbon prices ­below US$35/tCO2, one recent estimate of an ­appropriate shadow price of carbon.39 Getting the price right, as explained in Box 1, is a key principle of a carbon ­pricing instrument. 39 Source: United States Inter-Agency Working Group, Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, 2013. 33 2   Carbon pricing instruments: overview, emerging trends and lessons learned Often complementary measures are needed in Instruments can be designed to be more a ­ddition to a main carbon pricing instrument. For cost-effective and flexible Lower implementation example in the case of the Danish tax, additional ­ ­ policies costs could have helped maximize the cost-effectiveness of are still required to stimulate energy efficiency. In the each instrument. The transaction costs under the CDM, CDM, investments in projects need to be a ­ ccompanied including MRV and legal costs, further concentrated the by other design features or instruments to enable mechanism on low-risk investments in proven clean transformational change in an economy. The EU ETS technologies. This observation may help lend support tends to be implemented together with carbon taxes to more streamlined and simplified approaches in the in a ­complementary manner in the Nordic countries, future that, nevertheless, do not compromise integrity ­ showing that often more than just one instrument or significantly. policy-lever is required. The instruments with market elements were not The emissions trading schemes and offset systems d ­ esigned to adapt to changes in m ­ acro-economic investigated here had the power to create independently ­ conditions. This led to an oversupply of carbon functioning and sophisticated markets, which were ­ allowances and credits under a scenario of low demand. ­ attractive to the financial sector and resulted in the The EU ETS suffers from a surplus now because of this ­ engagement of a wide range of market participants. initial inflexibility which has consequently impacted The financial infrastructure related to the EU ETS and the CDM market. Furthermore, the overarching lack of the CDM in particular was able to respond quickly to demand in the international context has influenced the opportunities, sometimes providing important liquidity ­ CDM market, which has had a knock-on impact on the to the market, but at other times being forced to follow NZ ETS. short-term signals that eventually contradicted the goals of long-term mitigation. Increasingly, as in the EU ETS, more rules are being added to carbon pricing instruments to create stability In addition, and as was the intention, the emission and certainty. The design of these rules needs to be care- reductions achieved through market-based mechanisms fully tuned to avoid being too complex, whilst providing were mostly through least-cost abatement options, but sufficient predictability in the schemes. they therefore resulted in a narrow focus of reduction efforts on certain sectors, e.g. in the case of the CDM. Linking can influence market behavior­ In addition, although low prices could be perceived as with both positive and negative results These an indicator of good policy design, policy makers in experiences also show that linking between m ­ arkets, both the EU were criticised by some for designing a system directly and indirectly, is powerful and ­ effective. The that delivered prices that were too low to support a wide prices in the NZ ETS were eventually wholly d ­ etermined range of more expensive long-term investments, e.g., in by the CDM market, and the CER prices were heavily renewable power. dependent on the EU ETS. These l ­inkages have both ­ emand to get proved to be positive, in the case of strong d the CDM market up and running, and in lowering the potential high costs of mitigation in New Zealand, and negative as problems occurring in one ­ market are trans- ferred to every player in the chain. 34 Levers that work for the private sector do implementing These lessons should help policy makers ­ not always deliver at government level The carbon pricing instruments to predict more clearly Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) trading experience ­ under which policy overlaps are important from the outset. In the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates that the drivers to addition, the need to have mechanisms to review policies ­ engage sovereign governments and the private sector are and account for mismatches between expectations and different, and therefore a variety of policy approaches are delivery is an important way to achieve results and also needed to engage these different types of players. How- to keep all players engaged on both the government and ever, this experience also shows that the private and public private sector sides. sector entities can complement each other and play different roles, e.g., demonstration of projects, risk taker, Deeper investigations will help guide better arbiter, etc. policy choices The extent to which the economic theory which underpins carbon pricing approaches is The private sector role in achieving emission reduc- borne out in reality will help develop carbon pricing tions was powerful and welcome. This leverage of ­ private instruments that deliver mitigation in a given national finance, as well as skills, is important to the u ­ ltimate context. Further scrutiny of existing schemes would be ­ success of climate mitigation policy. However, the welcome and should guide these trends in the future. reliance on private sector led efforts – as is the case ­ ­ under the CDM  – can limit the integration of the emission reduction activities in the wider climate change strategies ­ of host countries. Policy designers need to take overlaps and interactions into account Importantly, all of these cases show that interaction with other policies is complex and difficult to predict fully. These interactions may be with domestic policies, as in the case of the EU ETS where the impacts of renewable energy and energy efficiency policies were not properly accounted for, or they may be with other international policies, as in the case of the NZ ETS where the full impact of the open link with the Kyoto flexible mechanisms was not anticipated. 35 section 3 International carbon pricing approaches 3 International carbon pricing approaches 3.1 the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol Status of the international (CP2)  – from 2013 to 2020  –  represent only 12% of climate negotiations ­ global emissions, and the Doha Amendment, which contains the emission reduction targets Parties put ­ forward for CP2, is not in force yet. The COP put ­ C  ­ OP 19 took place in Warsaw, Poland, in November­ 2013, marking the mid-point in the four-year negotiation window for the new post-2020 climate ­forward an ­invitation to Parties to promote the ­voluntary cancellation of CERs, without double counting, as a means of contributing to closing the pre-2020 ambition agreement. Sharp divisions between Parties remain to be gap. Under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban tackled before a new agreement can be concluded. The ­ Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), the COP urged large emitters, among emerging economies, have made Parties to broaden, enhance and implement their ­existing it clear that they will not agree to binding emission emission reduction pledges for 2020, and invited Parties ­ reduction targets post-2020 if developed countries which have not done so to submit their pledges.42 do not increase their level of ambition. The objective ­ following COP 20, due to take place in Lima, Peru, is Warsaw marked a milestone in the integration of to have a negotiating text ready by May 2015.40 Parties l ­ ocal and sub-national governments in the interna- are invited to submit their post-2020 national mitigation tional climate negotiations. The discussions focused on “contributions” by the first quarter of 2015, in advance urbanization, and specifically buildings and transport, ­ of COP 21. and on the role of local governments to enhance global mitigation efforts through action at the local level.43 The lack of mitigation ambition pre-2020 continued to slow down discussions on existing and new inter­national market-based mechanisms.41 Parties participating in 40 Source: UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.19, Further Advancing the Durban Platform, January 31, 2014. 41 Existing: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), see Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. New: New Market-based Mechanism (NMM) and Framwork for Various Approches (FVA), see Section 3.3. 42 Source: UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.19, Further Advancing the Durban Platform, January 31, 2014. 43 Source: Workshop on Pre-2020 Ambition: Urbanization and the Role of Governments in Facilitating Climate Action in Cities, November 14, 2013, http://unfccc. int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2.3_urbanization_workshop_agenda_.pdf. 37 3   International carbon pricing approaches 3.2 Addressing the supply–  demand imbalance Mechanisms under the Various initiatives underway might create additional Kyoto Protocol demand for international credits pre-2020. A few ­ governments recently launched tenders to purchase ­ 3.2.1 CERs (see Section 3.2.2), and some domestic schemes Supply and demand outlook like the new Mexican tax (see Section 5.2.9) and the for Kyoto credits Chinese emissions trading scheme pilots (see Section 4.3.1) allow the use of CERs issued by CDM projects 98  Demand With no increase in countries’ ambitions under located in the country. The impact of these initiatives is the UNFCCC the demand for Kyoto credits (CERs and uncertain at this stage, but it will not be enough to fill Emission Reduction Units  ERUs) remains low. M –  ­ ajor the ambition gap and revive the market. emitters pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol and Australia questioning its CPM further depress the already limited 3.2.2 demand. The maximum residual demand is estimated The Clean Development Mechanism at around 1,120 to 1,230 megatons of carbon dioxide (CDM) equivalent (MtCO2e), coming mostly from the EU ETS and the Effort Sharing Decision (See Table 2). This is Market update Since the second half of 2012 likely to be overestimated given the progress of EU there has been a growing feeling in the CDM market member states towards the targets under the Effort that ­ demand is saturated. With little prospect of a Sharing ­ ­ Decision. Market analysts estimate that EU significant recovery, the biggest players have begun to ­ ETS ­ installations are likely to use most of their Kyoto leave the market, along with their skills and expertise. A credit limit in the next couple of years, six years ahead first wave saw investment banks and trading houses exit. of the 2020 deadline, given the current low price and In parallel, project developers continued to ­consolidate, the spread with European Union Allowances (EUAs), reducing their carbon operations, and diversifying their and ­uncertainty on the eligibility of Kyoto credits post- activities. In February 2014, as a further sign of the 2020.44 That will leave Kyoto credits without their largest steady decline of the CDM, DNV GL, once the biggest historical buyers. Designated Operational Entity (DOE), announced its withdrawal from the validation and verification service  99 Supply The current CDM and JI portfolio is estimated business, followed by JCI in March. to have the potential to issue between 3,500 and 5,400 MtCO2e for 2014-2020, should the demand exist This exodus dilutes the knowledge and know-how (See Table 2). This is around three to five times the that have been built up over the past 15 years. It also ­ expected expected residual demand. This balance is not ­ undermines the trust of private sector players and the to tip until 2020. The actual supply of credits will public confidence in the CDM in particular and in ­ continue to head downwards towards demand. ­ carbon markets in general. After the severe losses faced Table 2 Residual demand for and potential issuance of CERs and ERUs (2014–2020) Residual demand for 2014–2020 Full potential for issuance for 2014–2020 (MtCO2e) (MtCO2e) Figure based on the registered portfolio, not considering the effect of the demand on the issuance levels CERs and ERUs EU ETS: 400–500 3,500–5,400 Effort Sharing Decision: < 700 NZ ETS: 20–30 Total: < 1,120–1,230 Source: Own calculations, Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, December 19, 2013 and CDC Climat, December 2013. 44 Under the current EU proposal for 2030 emission reduction targets, no demand for international credits post-2020 is planned. 38 by many private sector pioneers  – some estimates of developers had hoped would make the D ­ ecember 31, stranded CDM costs are as high as US$66 billion asset 2012 deadline for acceptance of CERs into Phase III value write-down45 – both trust and skills will have to be of the EU ETS. The number of ­ registrations in 2014 rebuilt for the market to recover. is therefore likely to be even lower. In parallel, the rate of renewal of crediting periods for existing projects is 100  The level of activity in CDM projects on the ground also decreasing. mirrors the market downturn, as shown in Figures 6 –– March 2014 bore the lowest monthly CER and 7. With a CER price that averaged €0.37 ($US0.51) issuance for the past three years: just ­ under in 201346 and no price recovery foreseen in the near 6 MtCO2e were issued in March 2014, more than 75% ­future, the whole CDM pipeline, from start of validation lower than the 28 MtCO2e issued on average e ­very to ­ issuance, has seen a considerable decrease in 2013: month in 2012. Issuances in 2013 dropped by 22% –– An 88% decrease in submissions for vali- compared to 2012 (see Figure 6). In total 265 MtCO2e dation observed in 2013 compared to 2012: was issued in 2013, of which 58%48 was before the 226 projects and programs of activities (PoAs) were sub- entry into force on April 30 of the ban on CERs mitted for validation, compared to 1,891 in 2012. In from some industrial gas projects in the EU ETS.49 2013 as a whole, 30% fewer projects started validation The current carbon price barely covers the costs of than in April 2012 alone, which witnessed the highest MRV, which are estimated to be from €0.20 to over €1 number of new validations in the CDM’s history.47 per tCO2e.50 More projects are likely to stop these MRV –– Ten times fewer projects and PoAs activities and some are at risk of stopping emission­ registered in 2013 compared to 2012: 338 ­ reductions altogether by venting their greenhouse gases. ­ registrations were made in 2013 compared to 3,428 About 161 MtCO2e is expected to be issued in 2014, in 2012 (see Figure 7). Furthermore, some of the 2013 which represents a 40% decrease compared to 2013.51 registrations were due to a backload of projects that Figure 6 CER and ERU issuance (2005-2013) Project and PoA registrations (2004–2013) Figure 7 1,600 Annual CER issuance Annual project and PoA registrations 9,000 Annual ERU issuance Cumulative project and PoA registrations 8,000 1,400 Cumulative CER issuance 7,000 1,200 Cumulative ERU issuance 6,000 1,000 Number of projects and PoAs 5,000 800 4,000 600 Volume (MtCO2e) 3,000 400 2,000 200 1,000 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2012 2013 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: UNFCCC Source: UNFCCC 45 Source: Philp, L., Stranded Costs from the Demise of the Clean Development Mechanism, May 2013, http://www.co2spain.com/strandedcostpaper.php. 46 Average price of secondary CERs in 2013. Source: IntercontinentalExchange, Daily Future sCERs. 47 Source: UNFCCC, Personal Communication, May 6, 2014. 48 Source: UNFCCC, Personal Communication, April 28, 2014; UNFCCC, Personal Communication, May 6, 2014. 49 CERs from projects involving the destruction of trifluoromethane hydrofluorocarbon 23 (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from adipic acid production. 50 Source: Ecofys, CDM Market Support Study, May 10, 2013; Warnecke, C., Can CDM Monitoring Requirements Be Reduced While Maintaining Environmental Integrity?, Climate Policy, 2014. 51 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, Carbon Market Outlook 2014–2016 … Steady Does It…, Carbon Market Analyst, February 26, 2014. 39 3   International carbon pricing approaches Analysts predict that around 125 MtCO2e will be At COP 19, the negotiations on CDM reform were traded on the primary CER market in 2014, a 38% drop encouraging given current market ­ circumstances and compared to 2013. Further decreases to 70 MtCO2e in ­ prospects. The areas for reform currently being ­considered 2015 and 30 MtCO2e in 2016 are forecast. In the ­secondary are the historical ones, namely governance, streamlining CER (sCER) market it is estimated that 527 MtCO2e of procedures and environmental ­ integrity.56 Revision was traded in 2013, down by 76% compared to 2012. of the CDM modalities and procedures was postponed, The sCER market value is expected to reach around with a recommendation on this expected at COP 20.57 €236 million in 2014.52 3.2.3 101  The CDM Executive Board (EB), the private sector Joint Implementation and public sector institutional investors are exploring (JI) financing and policy instruments to revive the carbon market. For example the establishment of a CER floor Market update JI faces a dual challenge of the price, cancellation of CERs, activation of new demand lack of ambition and the uncertainty over the future sources, purchase activities and results-based financing ­regulatory infrastructure to issue ERUs. In 2012 i ­ ssuance (RBF).53 It is unlikely that these initiatives will offset of ERUs was higher than that of CERs, reversing a trend the need for Parties to address the ambition gap. Large seen since the inception of the market in 2005 (see public sector institutional investors, active at the start ­ Figure 6). Russia and Ukraine issued 492 million of the of the CDM, are playing a more prominent role again total 526 million ERUs that year before the end of the first to slow infrastructure demobilization, enable the use of commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (CP1) and the CDM to deliver RBF, and to test new approaches to prior to the new eligibility rules for their largest b­ uyers market-based mechanisms. (the EU ETS installations). A significant issuance of 184 million ERUs was seen in 2013. Most of the ERUs Policy update Efforts to improve and streamline came out of Track 1 (97% in 2013 and 98% in 2012), the design of the CDM continue. These aim to ­ position without the supervision of the Joint Implementation the CDM as a functioning tool for when demand Supervisory Committee (JISC), triggering some specu- ­ increases and to make it attractive for non-compliance lation on the level of rigor applied. usage including through RBF. They, however, do not address the pressing issues of the lack of demand and the ­ In 2013, 26 new JI projects entered the UNFCCC weakening of the market infrastructure. pipeline compared to 229 in 2012, which represents a nine-fold reduction. Only five new projects were listed The first four standardized baselines under the in 2013, which is a 98% decrease compared to 2012,58 a CDM54 were approved in 2013. Work on s ­treamlining clear indication of the lack of ambition. procedures for PoAs and supporting the top-down ­ development of methodologies also continued. ­ Regional direct cooperation centers provided capacity building and ­ support for project development in regions currently ­under-represented in the CDM.55 52 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, Carbon Market Outlook 2014–2016 … Steady Does It…, Carbon Market Analyst, February 26, 2014. 53 Source: Ecofys, CDM Market Support Study, May 10, 2013. 54 Two grid emission factors (Southern African Power Pool and Republic of Uzbekistan), a baseline for charcoal production in Uganda and a baseline for technology switch in rice mills in Cambodia. Source: UNFCCC, Standardized Baselines, accessed February 17, 2014, https://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/standard_base/ new/sb7_index.html. 55 Particularly some countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. 56 Governance: membership and composition of the EB, role of the designated national authority (DNA), liability of DOEs. Streamlining of procedures: provisions for PoAs, length of crediting period, simplification of project cycle for certain project categories. Environmental integrity: additionality demonstration. 57 Source: UNFCCC, Decision -/CMP.9 Review of the Modalities and Procedures for the Clean Development Mechanism, 2013. 58 Source: UNEP Risoe, JI Pipeline, March 1, 2014, http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/JiPipeline.xlsx. 40 Policy update As ERUs for post-2012 reductions 3.3 cannot be created until Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) New approaches to market for CP2 are issued, 2013 ERU issuances correspond to instruments under the UNFCCC: pre-2012 emission reductions. To enable the issuance of the New Market-Based Mechanism ERUs for post-2012 emission reductions, the JISC asked (NMM) and the Framework for the COP to allow JI host Parties with a target to under- Various Approaches (FVA) take advance issuance of AAUs. With no decision made in Warsaw, the issue remains.59 Although JISC requested an urgent reform of the mechanism, the review of the The top-down new market-based mechanism  103 JI guidelines was deferred. Discussions will continue this (NMM) and the Framework for Various A ­ pproaches year and negotiators aim for a decision to be adopted at (FVA) have been under discussion for the last two COP 20. years. At COP 18 in Doha, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) was ­ 3.2.4 tasked to work on the role of these two mechanisms International Emissions Trading and their technical design.62, 63 However, an increasing (IET) number of ­ developing countries question the relevance of ­ discussing new instruments until developed ­ countries No further decisions have been made since Doha, have increased their level of ambition. As a result, 2012, on carry-over of AAUs from CP1 to CP2. P ­ arties negotiations around the NMM and the FVA moved at ­ are still buying and selling AAUs from CP1, as they have a slow pace in 2013, and the SBSTA did not reach any to surrender AAUs equivalent to their target in the first consensus. In Warsaw n ­ egotiations were curtailed by a half of 2015. The World Bank estimated ­ cumulative broader discussion on the use of markets as a mitigation ­ purchases of AAUs and Removal Units (RMUs) of tool and on the potential role of the FVA in laying the 277 MtCO2e by the end of 2011.60 Additional known basis for accounting rules in the 2015 agreement. Some AAU purchases in 2012 and 2013 amount to approxi- form of consensus emerged on the role of the FVA as mately 121.6 MtCO2e. Although trading is still permitted an information-sharing platform, but the negotiations throughout 2014, ­ little purchasing of AAUs is foreseen eventually broke down and no decision was made. Talks from this point, with potential further purchases from are to resume at the next SBSTA ­ meeting in June 2014. Spain and Luxembourg planned totalling 14 MtCO2e.61 In parallel to international negotiations, an increasing number of initiatives are underway to test new ­ approaches to market-based mechanisms and feed into the negotiations. 59 Source: UNFCCC, FCCC/KP/CMP/2013/4, Annual Report of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, October 21, 2013. 60 Source: Kossoy, A., Guigon, P., State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012, 2012. 61 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, Carbon Market Outlook 2014–2016 … Steady Does It…, February 26, 2014. 62 Source: UNFCCC, FCCC/TP/2013/6, Technical Synthesis on the New Market-Based Mechanism, October 22, 2013. Source: UNFCCC, FCCC/TP/2013/5, Technical Synthesis on the Framework for Various Approaches, October 22, 2013. 63 Recognizing that countries need a mix of market and non-market based approaches to tackle climate change, the SBSTA was mandated in Doha to initiate a third work program on non-market-based approaches (NMAs). Discussions are undwerway, but NMAs are not defined yet, and their relationship with the NMM and the FVA remains unclear. 41 3   International carbon pricing approaches 3.4 ­auctioning approach.66 As a result of the study group a Other international carbon dedicated pilot auction facility for methane and ­ climate pricing approaches mitigation is being designed to inform the scale-up of pay-for-performance climate finance approaches, 3.4.1 ­including through the Green Climate Fund. There is also Results-based financing increasing interest to deploy RBF for mitigation activities (RBF) with high development benefits, such as under the Ci-Dev initiative.  103 Results-based financing64 (RBF) is a financing approach increasingly employed to support ­ ­ development 3.4.2 objectives and domestic policy goals. The defining Reducing Emissions from ­ ­ element is that payments are made upon the d ­ elivery Deforestation, Forest Degradation, of pre-defined, verified results. RBF was pioneered in and the role of conservation, the health sector, but is increasingly being ­ considered sustainable management of forests and as a means to finance the adoption of low-carbon enhancement of forest carbon stocks ­development pathways and GHG emissions abatement, (REDD+) including through the Green Climate Fund (GCF).65 REDD+ became a major negotiating issue at the  104 In the climate finance context, payments for ­verified 2007 COP in Bali, which created an opportunity to results fit well with the requirements for MRV and ­ develop a formal mitigation mechanism linked to forests the objective to incentivize private sector mitigation as part of a post-2012 climate change agreement (annual activities. RBF can use different metrics as a basis for ­ emissions arising from forest loss amount to about­ payments ­ including emission reductions or avoided 3,000 MtCO2e globally).67 emissions. When using a carbon metric it becomes an instrument of direct carbon pricing and can build on At COP 19 in November 2013, important p ­ rogress the infrastructure of existing market instruments. This was made on REDD+ with the adoption of the ­ Warsaw ­ feature is recognized under the UNFCCC. To en- REDD+ framework,68 which includes seven decisions on hance pre-2020 ambition to ensure the highest possi- methodological finance, institutional arrangements and ­ mitigation efforts under the Convention, the COP ble ­ issues. Together with earlier COP d ­ecisions made invites Parties to promote the ­ voluntary cancellation of ­ between 2007 and 2012, these form the building blocks CERs (see Section 3.1). for REDD+. Specifically on financing of REDD+, it was reaffirmed in Warsaw that RBF for REDD+ may come Several climate finance initiatives are being considered from a variety of sources, including markets as well as with RBF and cancellation of emission reductions public sources. The GCF was recognized as ­ playing a in mind. For example, a study group on methane “key role” for REDD+ financing. finance, established in late 2012 on the request of the G8, recommended that RBF uses a carbon metric as The development of large emission reduction an instrument to achieve methane abatement. This p ­ rograms for REDD+ thus far occurs in the absence of a could be done by making use of the CDM infra­ structure compliance mechanism. The majority of the funding is and other carbon offset standards, and by using an coming from bilateral and multilateral funding such as 64 Many terms are currently used to describe funding approaches where payment is made upon the verified delivery of pre-defined results. This report uses RBF as an umbrella term to encompass the full range of funding instruments operating in this way. 65 “The Fund may employ results-based financing approaches, including, in particular for incentivizing mitigation actions, payment for verified results, where ­ appropriate.”, Source: Green Climate Fund, Governing Instrument for the Green Climate Fund, 2011. 66 Source: Methane Finance Study Group, Methane Finance Study Group Report, April 2013. 67 Source: Harris, N., Brown, S., Hagen, S. C., Baccini, A., Houghton, R., Progress toward a Consensus on Carbon Emission from Tropical Deforestation, November 2012. 68 Source: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Nineteenth Session, Held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013, Part One: Proceedings, Advance Version, Paragraph 44, January 31, 2014. 42 the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Following several years marked by only slight new BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable F ­ orest v suppliers ­ariations in voluntary offset demand, offset ­ Landscapes. The pricing approaches for the different ­ reported a decline in both market size and average initiatives are fragmented between the limited number ­ price in 2013. According to preliminary survey results of other REDD+ RBF schemes at program scale. One ­ published by Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace, ­ example is Norway’s International Climate and Forest suppliers transacted at least 67 MtCO2e in 2013, down Initiative, where a payment level of US$5/tCO2e has been from 101 MtCO2e in 2012. The global average used for both the Brazil Amazon Fund and the Guyana offset price also dropped by approximately 17% to REDD+ Investment Fund.69 Other emission r ­ eductions US$4.9/tCO2e. transacted in the forest carbon markets are ­generated by project-level activities, as opposed to REDD+ ­ programs influences, This development largely reflects policy ­ envisaged at national or jurisdictional level. In 2012, including California’s launch as a compliance offset the average price for forestry offsets fell slightly to market and stalled demand for Australia-based offsets ­ US$7.8/tCO2e.70 Prices have been declining due to limit- in the wake of the recent uncertainty around carbon ed demand and increasing supply. In early 2014, the aver- ­pricing.73 age bid and offer for issued credits was US$5–6/tCO2e.71 Almost all project-level REDD+ emission reductions are The market’s slightly lower price is reflective of currently transacted in the voluntary carbon market, but ­ i ncreasingly competitive pressures among offset they are characterized by heterogeneity of demand, high suppliers facing both depressed compliance offset ­ price variability, and lack of transparency. ­ prices and ­ oversupply, and the continued issuance of new offsets from purely voluntary offset projects in the generally Leveraging the private sector and markets is ­ forestry and clean cookstoves project sectors. Suppliers ­ considered essential to generate the level of REDD+ that ­successfully transacted offsets in 2013 described funding to cover a larger share of REDD+ emission ­ buyers’ ­continued focus on projects and methodologies reductions and to increase overall cost-efficiency of ­ that ­ deliver and measure the environmental and s ­ocial mitigation. However, these preconditions are difficult “co-benefits” of offset projects – above and beyond to achieve given the current lack of demand for carbon ­emissions reductions. credits at the international level. ­ arbon At the national level there are several voluntary c 3.4.3 markets in Japan (see Section 4.2.10). At the c ­ orporate Private sector level, there is further evidence of companies taking voluntary market72 carbon seriously even outside compliance regimes. In the ­ US 29 companies have introduced an internal carbon Demand for voluntary carbon offsetting is driven by price of some sort, ranging from US$6 to US$60/tCO2e. motivations other than regulatory compliance. None- This is prevalent in utility and energy companies whose theless, international policy events and signals  for –  core business is carbon intensive (e.g., BP and Exxon- better or worse  ­ – impact both voluntary offset supply Mobil), but carbon pricing is present across all sectors and demand. (e.g., as used by Google, Microsoft, Disney, Walmart, and Delta Airlines).74 69 Source: Norwegian Government, Calculating 2012 Performance Based Payments to Guyana Based on Interim Performance Indicators, 2012, http://www.regjerin- gen.no/upload/MD/2012/Nyheter/Technical_note_payments.pdf. 70 Source: Peters-Stanley, M. et al., Covering New Ground, State of the Forest Carbon Markets in 2013, 2013. 71 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, March 2014 REDD price report, April 16, 2014. 72 This section strongly benefited from the kind contributions from Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Market Place. Assertions here are supported by data gathered by Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Market Place and published in a similar timeframe to this report. 73 The transactions are thus no longer tracked in this Forest Trends’ Ecosystem Marketplace annual survey. Pre-compliance preparations for California’s program developments constituted approximately 10 MtCO2e/year transacted in previous years. 74 Examples include: Delphi Automotive Plc., Walt Disney Company, ConAgra Foods, Inc., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Apache Corporation, BP, Chevron Corporation, Cono- coPhillips, Devon Energy Corporation, Exxon Mobil Corporation, Hess Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, Wells Fargo & Company, Cummins Inc., Delta Air Lines, general Electric Company, Google Inc., Jabil Circuit Inc., Microsoft corporation, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company and various utilities. Source: Carbon Disclosure Project, Use of Internal Carbon Price by Companies as Incentive and Strategic Planning Tool: A Review of Findings from CDP 2013 Disclosure, December 2013. 43 3   International carbon pricing approaches 3.5 Ukrainian AAUs, and also introduced a reputational risk Looking back at international for purchasing countries. Any future construct may need carbon pricing approaches: to make transfers even more public. international emissions trading and the CDM Data on AAU purchases show a very limited range of buyers Most purchase activity is from 3.5.1 private sector purchasers in Japan, sovereign purchasers International emissions trading in Spain and Austria and the World Bank  – acting as a under the Kyoto Protocol trustee of carbon funds  many of whom are the same –  as referred to above.77 The countries that chose to trade The AAU trading experience provides some insights are those that may have anticipated the greatest shortfall into what can be expected from a carbon market. Some of AAUs, and therefore made provisions early on. From key lessons are provided below: the sellers’ perspective, the sale of allowances may have been held back over concerns that they might create a Making trading central to the i ­ nternational carbon constraint for themselves in the future by selling architecture might not improve cost- in advance, or by not having the correct complementary effective­ness The AAU market was set up with the rules in place, e.g., GIS. intention to allow the countries with obligations to achieve these at least cost. Some commentators observed It cannot be assumed that sovereign players will use early on that even with trading, the h ­ eterogeneity of a marketplace. The trading activity is primarily driven national policies would mean that AAU trading could ­ by private sector players. If a market, such as the AAU not achieve a least-cost outcome. Individual ­ countries market, is to be made effective there may need to be an would still make policy decisions related to other explicit role for the private sector. priorities, and their national context, and would not ­ necessarily ­ optimize on carbon price alone.75 3.5.2 International offset mechanism: The AAU system was hindered by a lack the CDM of clarity about environmental outcomes, impacting its attractiveness for sovereign The CDM has been operating for over ten years. It is buyers76 With the collapse of Eastern bloc coun- the market-based mechanism that has involved the largest tries shortly after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, a number of countries – developed and developing – in efforts supply of AAUs was immediately available without clear ­ to reduce GHG emissions. Looking back at key outcomes ­ evidence of their environmental merit. The development of the CDM, and how they compare to ­ expectations, offers of Green Investment Schemes (GIS) did not ensure the insights into the functioning of offset mechanisms. environmental integrity of AAU purchases as intended. Governments also did not appear to make purchases The CDM grew to a scale that enabled  102 in a way that minimized the cost of achieving targets, signi­ ­ ficant emission reductions and financial ­ focusing on other factors before choosing to adopt an flows to developing countries Despite successive early trading strategy. setbacks in the market the CDM is operating in, the ­ mechanism has performed as well as was forecast by In addition, lack of transparent procedures led to ­ analysts prior to 2001. By the end of 2011, 2,400 million ­ accusations of illicit activity, such as the uncertainty ­pre-2013 CERs had been contracted in the primary market, about the use of funds from Japanese purchases of and by the end of 2012, 1,155 billion CERs had been ­ issued. By 2012 US$28 billion worth of pre-2013 CERs 75 Source: Stavins, R., Hahn, R., What Has Kyoto Wrought? The Real Architecture of International Tradable Permit Markets, March 1999. 76 Source: Aldrich, E., Korner, C., Unveiling Assigned Amount Unit (AAU) Trades: Current Market Impacts and Prospects for the Future, March 2012. 77 Source: Ranson, M., Stavins, R., Linkage of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems: Learning from Experience, November 2013. 44 had been contracted forward and the CDM had prompted The learning-by-doing ability of the CDM is US$130 billion investment in GHG reducing activities.78 one of the key factors in its success, but also a factor that limited its growth The changes In 2012 alone  – the peak of the CDM in terms of to the CDM, summarized in Table 3, highlight one ­volumes of projects and issuance of CERs – 3,403 ­projects key strength of the mechanism, its capacity to learn-by- and PoAs were registered and 339 MtCO2e was issued doing. However this also contributes to its complexity (see Figure 8). Overall, 90% of the CERs ­ issued were and the associated high transaction costs. It further- generated at a cost below US$13, the ­ ­ average ­market more concentrates the experience of the mechanism into price in 2008-2012.79 This confirms that ­ crediting specialized organizations, such as consultancies focusing ­ ­ mechanisms have the capacity to mobilize capital on the CDM, limiting the accessibility to and reach of efficiently toward cost-effective low-carbon investments. ­ the mechanism. Figure 8 The CDM in numbers Overall 2012 snapshot (CDM peak) 1,400+ MtCO2e reduced annual emissions of Japan emissions of 7,700+ projects and PoAs registered in less 339 MtCO2e 790 million of average of over 2 projects per day than 10 years reduced barrels of oil consumed US$130 billion investment in GHG reducing total annual ODA flow in 2011 activities €4–20 billion (US$6–28 billion) saved by EU ETS installations from 2008 to 2012 through CER purchases 3,400+ average of Around 200 GW of installed renewable energy more than twice the total installed capacity of projects over 9 capacity the UK and PoAs projects registered per day 155 countries involved in the CDM over ¾ of the countries in the world Note 1: Sources for project and country figures: UNFCCC, Personal Communication, April 28, 2014, and own calculations. Note 2: Source for national emissions: Joint Research Centre of the European Commission/PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, EDGAR Version 4.2 FT2010, 2012. Note 3: Source for investment figure: Kossoy, A., Guigon, P., State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012, 2012. Total ODA flow: US$125 billion in 2011; source: OECD, OECD Factbook 2013: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, 2013. Note 4: Source for the savings by EU ETS installations: CDC Climat Research, Climate Report No. 43, January 2014. Note 5: Total installed capacity in the UK: 89 GW in 2012; source: Department of Energy & Climate Change, Electricity: chapter 5, Digest of United K energy ­ ingdom ­ ­ palding-Fecher, R., statistics (DUKES), July 2013. Total installed capacity under the CDM: 110 GW in 2012; source: Kirkman, G.A., Haites, E., Seres, S., S Benefits of the Clean Development Mechanism 2012, UNFCCC, 2012. Estimated to have approximately roughly doubled since then; source: UNFCCC, Personal Communication, April 28, 2014. Table 3 Evolution of the CDM design Issues identified Examples of reforms introduced or underway Complex procedures leading to high transaction costs –– Introduction of standardized baselines –– Consolidations of rules, e.g., Validation and Verification Standard Missed low-cost mitigation opportunities  –– Introduction of materiality concept Impact on cost-effectiveness of the CDM –– Use of positive lists –– Enhanced communication with market participants Non-additional projects being registered –– Constant revision of the tool for the demonstration of Gaming (e.g., HFC-23) ­ additionality –– Revision of methodologies Business-as-usual projects and emission reductions credited  –– Introduction of procedures for the demonstration of prior Impact on environmental integrity of the mechanism, too many ­ consideration of the CDM emission reductions being claimed –– External expert advice Benefits of the CDM concentrated in a set of star countries –– Introduction of PoAs –– Inclusion of the concept of suppressed demand Addresses the majority of non-Annex I emissions but questions  –– Creation of regional cooperation centers the relevance of the mechanism for least developed countries 78 Source: Kossoy, A., Guigon, P., State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012, 2012. 79 Source: CDC Climat Research, Moving from the CDM to “various Approaches,” 2014, http://www.cdcclimat.com/Climate-Brief-no34-Moving-from-the.html. 45 3   International carbon pricing approaches The private sector reacts quickly to The CDM has proved to be an efficient ­positive –  but also negative – signals from search engine for abatement opportunities the CDM market Through its project-based especially in a scenario of low investment ­ approach, the CDM has directly involved the private barriers80 CDM projects are concentrated in a set sector in projects. This enables significant financial flows of star countries and technologies, as highlighted in developing countries. However, private participants to ­ Figure 9. exit the market when conditions deteriorate, as discussed in Section 3.2.2. A balance is needed between relying on Examining some central characteristics of the CDM, private sector players, and ensuring a proactive role for such as the timing of revenues from the sale of CERs and host country governments to enable institutional capacity the level of certainty over the magnitude of these reve- building. Figure 9 Distribution of registered CDM projects by country and technology China 50% Wind Hydro India 20% Methane avoidance Brazil 4% Biomass energy The number of registered projects from Each of the other project types Other 3% the other host countries each individually Other individually has < 400 registrations. amounts to ≤ 3% of the total. 0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 % of registered projects by host country Number of projects registered by technology Source: UNFCCC, UNEP Risoe Centre 80 As highlighted in Source: Kossoy, A., Ambrosi, P., State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2010, 2010. 46 Figure 10 Determinants for the country and technology distribution of CDM projects Timing of the revenues: Favors projects with: ´´ Carbon finance mostly upon delivery of CERs ´´ Potential for large emission re­ duction/CER ´´ Little upfront payment volumes concentrated in a limited number of available installations ´´ ERPAs not accepted in ´´ Low capital investment and quick return ´´ Industrial gas project finance (e.g., short construction time, such as HFC) >> 61% ´´ Revenues other than CERs (e.g., renewable abatement projects, of the registered electricity) renewable CDM projects ´´ Ability to negotiate ERPAs energy projects >> 67% ´´ In China, of the CERs Certainty issued over the Brazil, India Favours countries where: magnitude of the revenues: ´´ Large potential for cheap reductions / ­ strong industrial activity ´´ Uncertainty on ´´ Favorable investment climate CER prices ´´ Institutional capacity ´´ Uncertainty on duration of carbon revenues nues, shows that the design of the CDM favors ­ certain Using the CDM example in a structured projects (Figure 10). Industrial gas abatement and way to prepare for the next generation of renewable energy projects in Brazil, China and India are ­ ­ instruments will help fast-track their de- particularly favoured, representing 61% of the registered ployment and maximize investment in low-­ CDM projects. carbon technologies Ten years of CDM experience can be tapped into for the new crediting mechanisms, This country distribution is consistent with general e.g., a reformed CDM, or NMM. Most new initiatives ­ nvestments in sustainable energy and with the ­distribution i address this by including concerted readiness activities of developing countries’ emissions, China, Brazil before the start of the instruments and/or at their out- and India being the top three emerging economies in set. There is a need to balance flexibility to allow for terms of investment in renewable energy in 201281 ­ improvements and maintain environmental integrity and the top three emitting developing countries. This with sufficient simplicity and stability for participants. suggests that the CDM has made relatively low-risk ­ This is being assessed as part of the review of the CDM ­ investments in proven technologies with marginal rates modalities and procedures (see Section 3.2.2), the of return more attractive and profitable, enhancing their definition of the NMM (see Section 3.3) and initiatives ­ chances of being developed and remaining operational.82 outside the UNFCCC negotiations such as the PMR. 81 Source: UNEP, Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2013, 2013. 82 As highlighted in Source: Kossoy, A., Ambrosi, P., State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2010, 2010. 47 section 4 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches 4 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches 4.1 national carbon market. This section first presents key Overview of regional, ­ characteristics of the main schemes (Figure 12 to Figure 14 national, and sub-national and Table 4) and then dives into the detail of notable emissions ­trading schemes (ETS) developments in each one over the past year.83 For ­ and ­crediting approaches some of the schemes (EU ETS, California’s Cap-and- Trade ­Program, RGGI, Québec, Australia and C ­ hina), additional information is provided in the relevant­ ­ R  egional, national, and sub-national emissions ­ trading schemes and crediting approaches c­ ontinue to develop at pace, despite the dire state of the inter­ detailed update sheet in Annex II. » Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches continue to develop at pace, despite the dire state of the international carbon market. « 83 From January 2013 to April 2014. 49 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches Figure 11 Map of existing, emerging, and potential emissions trading schemes EUROPEAN UNION QUÉBEC EUROPEAN UNION EUROPEAN KAZAKHSTAN REPUBLIC WCI* QUÉBEC UNION OF KOREA WASHINGTON QUÉBEC KAZAKHSTAN REPUBLIC WCI* OF KOREA WASHINGTON WCI* UKRAINE KAZAKHSTAN REPUBLIC OF KOREA JAPAN CHINA WASHINGTON UKRAINE EUROPEAN TURKEY UNION UKRAINE CHINA JAPAN SWITZER- QUÉBEC CALIFORNIA RGGI** LAND TURKEY CHINA JAPAN SWITZER- MEXICO LAND TURKEY KAZAKHSTAN REPUBLIC WCI* CALIFORNIA RGGI** SWITZER- OF KOREA ON THAILAND CALIFORNIAMEXICO RGGI** LAND MEXICO EUROPEAN UKRAINE EUROPEAN THAILAND UNION UNION CHINA JAPAN THAILAND QUÉBEC QUÉBEC BRAZIL TURKEY SWITZER- KAZAKHSTAN REPUBLIC BRAZIL LAND KAZAKHSTAN REPUBLIC I* RNIA WCI* RGGI** OF KOREA OF KOREA WASHINGTON MEXICO CHILE BRAZIL AUSTRALIA UKRAINE UKRAINE THAILAND CHILE AUSTRALIA CHINA JAPAN CHINA JAPAN CHILE AUSTRALIA TURKEY TURKEY SWITZER- SWITZER- RGGI** CALIFORNIA BRAZIL LAND RGGI** LAND NEW ZEALAND CO MEXICO THAILAND THAILAND NEW ZEALAND CHILE AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND Status of implementation Rebublic Implemented (in force with established rules) of Korea BRAZIL BRAZIL Implementation scheduled (mandate agreed, start date communicated, rules in preparation) BeijingNEW ZEALAND CHILE CHILE AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA Under consideration*** (government gave public signal towards the development of an ETS) Kyoto Saitama Tianjin Tokyo National China Sub-national or regional Hubei NEW ZEALAND Shanghai NEW ZEALAND Chong- qing Offsetting Linking Guangdong CDM and JI credits Planned link Bilateral offsets Link Shenzhen Domestic offsets * WCI – Western Climate Initiative. Participating jurisdictions are Note 1: The size of the circles is not representative of the size of the schemes. British Columbia, California, Manitoba, Ontario and Québec Note 2: In Alberta there is an emissions intensity based scheme in place ** RGGI – Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, see Section 4.2.5). *** Schemes under consideration are at different stages in the process. See Section 4.3.3 for more details. 50 Figure 12 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes: share of global emissions covered84 10% 9% Québec CaT: coverage increase from 30% to 85% in 2015 California CaT: coverage increase from 35% to 85% in 2015 8% EU ETS: coverage increase from 40% to 45% in 2013 7% 6% 5% 4% Share of global emissions 3% 2% 1% 0% 2011 2007 2017 2005 2014 2015 2012 2013 2009 2008 2006 2016 2010 Korea ETS Chongqing Pilot ETS Hubei Pilot ETS Kazakhstan ETS Guangdong Pilot ETS Shanghai Pilot ETS Tianjin Pilot ETS Beijing Pilot ETS Shenzhen Pilot ETS Québec CaT Australia CPM California CaT Kyoto ETS Saitama ETS Tokyo CaT RGGI New Zealand ETS Swiss ETS Alberta SGER EU ETS 84 Only the introduction or removal of an ETS is shown. Emissions are as a share of global emissions in 2010. Annual changes in global, regional, national, and sub-national GHG emissions are not shown in the graph. 51 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches Figure 13 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes: scope EU ETS 45% Korea ETS 60% Australia CPM 60% Guangdong Pilot ETS 42% California CaT 35% RGGI 20% Hubei Pilot ETS 35% Kazakhstan ETS 50% Shanghai Pilot ETS 50% Alberta SGER 50% Chongqing Pilot ETS 38% Tianjin Pilot ETS 60% Beijing Pilot ETS 50% Shenzhen Pilot ETS 38% Québec CaT 30% New Zealand ETS 50% Swiss ETS 10% Tokyo CaT 20% Saitama ETS 16% Kyoto ETS 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000 Emissions (MtCO2e) Emissions covered Industry Buildings by the ETS Forestry Waste Emissions Aviation Agriculture not covered Transport 42% Estimated coverage Power Note 1: Symbols stand for the sectors covered. Blue bars represent emissions. Orange bars indicate how much of the total emissions are covered by the ETS. Some schemes could cover more sectors than shown in the figure due to the way liable entities are defined. The total emissions covered by the Kyoto ETS are not provided as it is a voluntary ETS. 52 Table 4 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes: allocation approaches Jurisdiction Free allocation Purchase allowances Other mechanisms or comments fathering marking Auction Bench- Grand­ Fixed EU ETS Grandfathering for process emissions only (<1% of allowances) Rest is benchmarking Swiss ETS Grandfathering for process emissions only, rest is benchmarking California CaT Allowances must be resold at auction RGGI Alberta SGER Other mechanism: crediting (earning emission allowances after reductions made) ­ Québec CaT KAZ ETS Australia CPM NZ ETS Tokyo, Saitama and Kyoto Other mechanism: crediting (earning CaT emission allowances after reductions made) ­ Beijing Pilot ETS Chongqing Pilot ETS No information available at this moment Guangdong Pilot ETS Hubei Pilot ETS Shanghai Pilot ETS Shenzhen Pilot ETS Tianjin Pilot ETS Korea ETS Note: The table shows how the allowances are distributed in each ETS. trading This report investigates each of the emissions ­ e ­ffectiveness, MRV and registry, and linking to other schemes in relation to key topics: scope, allocation schemes. Table 5 shows for which topics developments ­ approaches, competitiveness concerns, use of off- took place in 2013. The following sections of the report sets, price stabilization mechanisms, performance and focus on these areas of development. 53 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches Table 5 Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes: areas of development in 2013 Considerations Linking to oth- Use of offsets effectiveness Performance Competitive- mechanisms stabilization approaches er schemes Allocation MRV and Areas of registry Scope Price development ness and in 2013 EU ETS Swiss ETS California CaT RGGI Alberta SGER Québec CaT KAZ ETS Australia CPM NZ ETS Japan (various) China pilots Korea ETS Note: Orange dots indicate that a notable development occurred in that area over the past year. Only these areas are covered in the following sections. Addi- tional background information can be found in the Mapping Carbon Pricing Initiatives, Developments and Prospects, 2013 report.85 4.2 on the future functioning of the scheme, including a Existing emissions formal endorsement of backloading. The scope of the trading schemes and crediting scheme is also expanded from Phase III to include ­Croatia approaches and new sectors and gases. In 2013, the new cap for stationary installations in the EU ETS was 2,084 ­ million 4.2.1 allowances, compared to the previous 1,977 million European Union Emissions Trading allowances in 2012.86 For aviation, the “Stop the Clock” System (EU ETS) amendment is extended until 2016, following a plenary vote in favour by the European Parliament in March 2014 The EU ETS is Europe’s mandatory cap-and-trade and endorsement by the European Council in April 2014. scheme and has been in place since 2005. Phase III of This will result in only flights within the European Eco- the scheme started in 2013. This was a year with many nomic Area (EEA) being covered and therefore a lower ­ uncertainties for the participants and important decisions aviation cap than the provisional 210 million allowances.87 85 Source: World Bank, Mapping Carbon Pricing Initiatives 2013, Developments and Prospects, May 2013. 86 One allowance equals one metric ton of CO2e. 87 The 210 million allowance cap had assumed that all flights to and from countries in the EEA would be included. Source: European Commission, Allowances and Caps, accessed January 28, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/index_en.htm. 54 106  The key developments in the EU ETS in 2013 are In 2013 EUA prices were dominated by evolving summarized below and further information can be ­xpectations leading up to backloading decisions and e found in the detailed update sheet in Annex II. announcements (see Figure 14). Scope Entry of Croatia in the EU ETS at the start of Performance and effectiveness Debate over Phase III. the so-called surplus has continued this year. NER300 Extension of the EU ETS amendment “Stop the Clock” fund established in Phase III, targeted at demonstration to enter into force on May 1, 2014. projects in innovative renewable energy technologies and carbon capture and storage, using revenues from the Allocation approaches Change in the allocation auction of 300 million earmarked EUAs from the New approaches at the start of Phase III: 100% auction for Entrants Reserve (NER). electricity production in utilities,88 some free allowances Auction of these EUAs completed in April 2014. for their heat production and for industrial participants through benchmarking. MRV and registry New legislation in the M ­ onitoring & Reporting Regulation (MRR) and Accreditation and Competitiveness considerations Direct emis- Verification Regulation (AVR) entered into force in sions: the list of sectors for 2015–2019 entitled to 2013. Registry regulations were amended in May 2013 ­ additional free allowances to mitigate carbon leakage to change the way international credits are surrendered risk is expected to be renewed in 2014. A draft list was for compliance in the EU ETS (see Use of offsets above). ­ published in May 2014.89 Indirect emissions: state aid compensation in Germany, Linking to other schemes Negotiations ongoing the UK, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium (Flanders) to link the Swiss scheme with the EU ETS. from 2013. Progress on linking with the Australian CPM currently on hold due to uncertainties about the future of the Use of offsets Around three quarters of the 2008– ­Australian scheme. 2020 entitlement for Kyoto credits used by EU ETS ­operators. Looking ahead European framework on climate and Given the current CER prices and the CER–EUA energy to 2030 published in January 2014. ­ Proposals spread, most of the remaining limit expected to be used ­ include: 40% GHG reduction target for the EU as a up in the next couple of years. whole below 1990 levels, increase in the linear annual In Phase III, Kyoto credits now need to be exchanged for ­ reduction of the EU ETS cap, all emission reductions EUAs before being surrendered, following a change in from 2020 onwards to be met within the EU, market registry regulations. stability reserve to be introduced under the EU ETS from Phase IV onwards. Price stabilization mechanism After several months of reiterations and uncertainties, backloading proposal put into legislation in February 2014. 88 Except some transitional free allowances for Eastern European member states to modernise their power plants. 89 Source: European Commission – DG Climate Action. Newsitem: Commission submits proposed carbon leakage list for 2015-2019. Accessed May 7, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2014050501_en.htm. 55 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches Figure 14 EU allowance price development labeled with key developments in the backloading proposal process 8 EU Parliament environment committee EU Parliament and Council Accelerated backloading votes in favor of backloading confirm support for backloading put in legislation 7 6 Negative vote against back- loading by EU Parliament 5 4 Positive vote on back- Dec-contract price (€) 3 loading by EU Parliament EU Parliament environment committee 2 EU Parliament industry committee EU Parliament environment committee initiates track to votes against backloading votes in favor of amended backloading accelerate backloading 1 0 4 4 3 3 3 3 Jan 1 Apr 1 Jan 1 Apr 1 Jul 1 Oct 1 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon 4.2.2 Allocation approaches Free allocation based on Switzerland Emissions industry benchmarks, similar to the EU ETS, during Trading Scheme the mandatory phase (2013-2020). Sectors at risk of carbon leakage receive 100% of the benchmark, o ­ ther The Swiss Emissions Trading Scheme covers 55 ­ industry sectors receive a linearly decreasing share of ­ ompanies from 25 categories of activities. Since 2013, c free ­allowances (80% free allocation in 2013, decreasing the scheme has been mandatory for large energy inten- to 30% in 2020). No free allocation for power sector. sive industries (>20MW thermal input and other spe- Correction factor applied if benchmarked allocation ­ cific thresholds). Medium-sized industries may choose ­ exceeds overall emissions cap. to opt in on a voluntary basis (>10MW).90 In the 5% of allowances set aside in the New Entrants Reserve.91 2013–2020 phase participants in the ETS are exempt from the CO2 tax. An overall reduction path of 1.74% Linking to other schemes Negotiations on linking compared to 2010 emissions is applied over the per year ­ with the EU ETS ongoing but slow (see Section 4.2.1). Swiss ETS. The agreement should cover aviation and stationary ­installations. 90 Source: Federal Office for the Environment, Switzerland, Participation in the Emissions Trading Scheme and Registration Deadlines, accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05545/12432/index.html?lang=en. 91 Source: Federal Office for the Environment, Switzerland, Emission Allowances Issued for Free (benchmark Approach), accessed January 22, 2014, http://www. bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05545/12434/index.html?lang=en. 56 4.2.3 Performance and effectiveness Stable prices California Cap-and-Trade Program in the primary allowance market. Figure 15 shows prices (US) of allowances in the California primary market to date.97 The California Cap-and-Trade Program started in Linking to other schemes Start of formal linking 2012 and entered into its first compliance period from with Québec in January 2014. January 1, 2013. The California Air Resources Board’s (ARB) Climate Change Scoping Plan Update summariz- Looking ahead Proposed amendments to the es developments over the past five years, and the outlook ­ overarching legislation include allocation rules, to 2020. The Program remains a central part of the state’s market program implementation, and offset program ­ climate change plans, both stimulating emission reduc- ­implementation.98 tions and raising revenues through auctions for other ­acific Ongoing collaborative initiatives include the P climate change related activities.92 ­ Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy and a ­ Memorandum of Understanding with China.99 114  The key developments in the California Cap-and- Trade Program in 2013 are summarized below and further information can be found in the detailed update ­ Price of allowances auctioned and traded volumes in the Figure 15 sheet in Annex II. primary market in California Cap-and-Trade Program100 Allocation approaches Investment plan approved 25 20 in May 201393 on use of proceeds from auctioning. 18 In August 2013 legal decisions94 rule in favor of ARB in 20 16 relation to use of auctioning in the Program. 14 Competitiveness considerations Carbon leakage 15 12 assessments are ongoing. 10 Traded volume (MtCO2e) ­ djustments ARB are considering the use of border carbon a 10 8 in the cement sector, a detailed proposal is expected in 6 July 2014.95 Price (US$) 5 4 Use of offsets Two new protocols are being prepared. 2 Over seven and a half million compliance and early 0 0 action offsets as of April 2014.96 ­ 4 2 3 13 13 3 Nov 1 Feb 1 Nov 1 Feb 1 May Aug 2013-4 vintage volume 2015-7 vintage volume 2013-4 vintage prices 2015-7 vintage prices 92 Source: California Air Resources Board, Climate Change Scoping Plan First Update, October 1, 2013. 93 Source:California Air Resources Board, Cap-and-Trade Auction Proceeds Investment Plan: Fiscal Years 2013–14 through 2015–16, May 14, 2013. 94 Source: Superior Court of California, County of Sacremento, Joint Ruling on Submitted Matters Case No: 34-2012-80001313 and Related Case No: 34-2013- 80001464, August 28, 2013. 95 Source: California Air Resources Board, California Cap-and-Trade Program: Potential Border Carbon Adjustment for the Cement Sector, February 5, 2014, http:// www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/020514/border-carbon-adjustment.pdf. 96 Source: California Air Resources Board, California’s Compliance Offset Programme, February 19, 2014. 97 Source: California Air Resources Board, California Air Resources Board Quarterly Auction 6 February 2014, Summary Results Report, February 24, 2014, http:// www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/february-2014/results.pdf. 98 Source: California Air Resources Board, Notice and Summary of Proposed Changes to the California Cap and Trade Programme, accessed February 25, 2014, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/071813/ctnotice0713.pdf. 99 Source: Pacific Coast Collaborative, accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.pacificcoastcollaborative.org/Pages/Welcome.aspx. 100 Source: California Air Resources Board, Auction Information, accessed March 21, 2014, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/auction.htm. 57 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches 4.2.4 Looking ahead RGGI states submitted comments to Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ­ mphasizing the US EPA in relation to the Clean Air Act, e (RGGI) a need to reward early actors, and allow flexibility to states on how to adhere to rules about carbon pollution, RGGI is a market-based GHG reduction program cov- with the option to use, amongst other mechanisms, a ering CO2 emissions from power plants in nine North- ­market-based approach.104 east and Mid-Atlantic states of the US. In January 2014, having completed revisions to their State CO2 Budget ­ 4.2.5 Trading Programmes, the RGGI cap was reduced. The new Alberta Greenhouse Gas 2014 cap is 91 million short tons of CO2, representing a Reduction Program 45% reduction from the previous cap.101 The RGGI cap (Canada) will ­decline by a further 2.5% each year from 2015 to 2020. Since July 1, 2007 facilities in Alberta that emit more 117  The key developments in RGGI in 2013 are than 0.1 MtCO2e per year are required by the Specified ­summarized below. Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) to reduce their emis- sions intensity (i.e. emissions per unit of production) Scope No scope changes in 2013, but in New Jersey some by 12% compared to the average emissions intensity stakeholders continue to push the state to rejoin RGGI. in 2003–2005.106 In 2012, 120 MtCO2e was covered by the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program of the Performance and effectiveness In Q3 2013 SGER, equivalent to approximately 50% of the t ­otal primary and secondary market prices were in line at around GHG emissions in Alberta. New facilities have a 107 US$3 (see Figure 16).102 RGGI’s cost containment reserve reduction target of 2% starting in the fourth year of (CCR) was triggered for the first time in March 2014.103 operation, which increases by 2% annually up to 12%.108 Figure 16 Price of allowances auctioned and auction volumes in RGGI105 45 5 Volume traded (current period) 40 35 4 Price (current period) 30 3 Volume traded Traded Volume (MtCO2e) 25 (future period) 20 Price 2 15 (future period) Price ($US) 10 1 5 0 0 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 9 9 8 0 0 Mar 1 Sep 1 Mar 1 Mar 1 Sep 1 Mar 1 Sep 1 Mar 0 Sep 0 Sep 0 Mar 1 Sep 1 101 Source: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc., RGGI States Make Major Cuts to Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Power Plants, January 13, 2014, http://www. rggi.org/docs/PressReleases/PR011314_AuctionNotice23.pdf. 102 Source: Potomac Economics, Report on the Secondary Market for RGGI CO2 Allowances: Fourth Quarter 2013, February 2014. 103 Source: RGGI Inc., Auction Results, http://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results/auction-23, Accessed April 25, 2014. 104 Source: Esty, D.C. et al., Letter to Administrator McCarthy, December 2, 2013, http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_States_111d_Letter_Comments.pdf. 105 Source: Potomac Economics, Report on the Secondary Market for RGGI CO2 Allowances: Third Quarter 2013, November 2013; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia- tive, Inc., Auction Results, accessed March 21, 2014, http://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results. 106 This intensity reduction applies to every compliance period, and remains stable at 12% of the baseline intensity, without a ratcheting effect. The percentage reduction required is different for installations deemed to be new. 107 Source: Alberta Government, Annual Summary of Specified Gas Emitters Regulation: 2009, February 29, 2012; Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development, Personal Communication, April 28, 2014. 108 Source: Alberta Government, Technical Guidance for Completing Specified Gas Baseline Emission Intensity Applications, Version 4.0, July 2012. 58 Scope, Use of offsets, Prize stabilization The key developments in the Québec System in 2013  117 mechanism Facilities can meet their obligations e­ ither are summarized below and further information can be by improving their GHG performance or by o ­ ffsetting found in the detailed update sheet in Annex II. their emissions via one of three options: Performance and effectiveness Information on –– Delivering to the Government Emission Performance the outcomes of the first auctions in the system provided Credits (EPC), which can be earned by going beyond in Figure 17. the 12% emissions intensity reduction. EPCs can either be banked for future compliance or sold to ­ Linking to other schemes Québec and California other facilities.109 cap-and-trade programs officially linked on January 1, –– Delivering to the Government Offset Credits that 2014.113 have been created in Alberta using protocols approved by the Alberta government.110 Currently 34 protocols Price of allowances auctioned and auction volumes Figure 17 have been approved with more under development. in Québec Cap-and-Trade System114 –– Contributing to the Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund at CAN$15/tCO2e (US$14/tCO2e) 2 12 beyond the mandatory target.111 Since there is no limit Traded volume (MtCO2e) 10 on how much can be contributed to the fund, this 8 acts as a price ceiling on EPCs and offsets. The fund 1 6 Price (CAN$) collected over CAN$398 million (US$374 million) 4 since inception, which is used to provide funding for 2 climate-friendly technologies and projects. 0 0 13 4 Mar 1 Looking ahead Alberta is in the process of ­ renewing Dec its Climate Change Strategy and the SGER, which e­ xpires September 2014. There has been some s ­peculation that 2013-4 vintage 2016-7 vintage Price the details of the current Greenhouse Gas Reduction allowances allowances Program may change. 4.2.6 4.2.7 Québec Cap-and-Trade System Kazakhstan Emissions (Canada) Trading Scheme The Québec Cap-and-Trade System started operation Kazakhstan Emissions Trading Scheme (KAZ ETS) in January 2013 and continues to be central to Québec’s started with a pilot phase in 2013 as a ­ mandatory climate change policy. The system is outlined as a key ­ scheme covering CO2 emissions. The scheme has the ­ element of the province’s 2013–2020 Climate Change basic ­technical aspects such as scope, coverage and cap ­ Action Plan, both in terms of delivering emission reduc- setting in place. Some issues remain to be resolved, tions and also as a source of revenue to fund other parts of ­ however, ­ primarily related to the collection of accurate the plan.112 verified emissions data at the installation level.115 109 Source: Alberta Government, Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, accessed January 31, 2014, http://environment.alberta.ca/01838.html. 110 Source: Alberta Government, Offset Credit System Protocols, accessed January 31, 2014, http://environment.alberta.ca/02275.html. 111 Source: Alberta Government, Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund, accessed January 31, 2014, http://environment.alberta.ca/02486.html. 112 Source: Government of Québec, 2013–2020 Climate Change Action Plan Phase 1, 2012. 113 Source: Government of Québec, Gazette Officielle Du Québec, Vol 145, No 49, December 4, 2013. 114 Source: Government of Québec, Auction of Québec Greenhouse Gas Emission Units on December 3, 2013, Summary Report Results, 2013; Government of Québec, Auction of Québec Greenhouse Gas Emission Units on March 4 2014, Summary Report Results, 2014. 115 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, Existing Emissions Trading Schemes – A Comparative Analysis, Prepared for the PETER Project, February 2013. 59 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches Scope Covers CO2 emissions in 2013, only ­monitoring Price stabilization mechanism Price corridor methane (CH4) and N2O. CH4 included in offset managed through the exchange, exact price levels to be ­projects.116 determined. The reserve includes both allowances and The point of compliance is set at the operator level due to money to purchase them. the lack of detailed installation level data: 166 operators emitting more than 20,000 tCO2e/y.117 Performance and effectiveness Data challenges Energy, mining and metallurgy, chemicals, cement and existed in the first phase of the KAZ ETS. Changes to the the power sector included.118 Initially, legislation included ­ llocation legislative package, including the details of the a agriculture and transport, but now unlikely. plan are foreseen. The first compliance point in May for companies to submit a verified GHG report was Allocation approaches Free allocation based on enforced. The second compliance point, the surrender of ­ grandfathering of historical emissions for the first three allowances, was not enforced because of data and r ­ egistry years (2013–2015). Baseline for 2013: unverified emis- issues. Full enforcement will be in place in 2014–15. sions from 2010. For 2014 and 2015: verified emissions from 2011 and 2012 respectively. MRV and registry The Kazakh registry is in place, Allocation for 2014 is the same as the baseline, and for but requires some security improvements, and is the 2015 it is reduced by 1.5%.119 Auctioning and bench- ­ focus of current work. Allowances can only be bought marks based on verified emissions data gathered during or sold through the exchange. The MRV system is being the pilot phase may be used in from 2016 onwards.120, 121 upgraded including the legislation, reporting formats, the provision of detailed methodology templates and Use of offsets Preferred sectors for domestic monitoring plans, and clearer requirements for verifiers.124 ­ offsetting projects: mining and metallurgy; agriculture; housing and communal services; forestry; prevention of Linking to other schemes No formal studies, land degradation; renewables; processing of municipal however linking is expected in the future. The KAZ ETS waste; transport; and energy efficient construction. No has to a large extent aligned its MRV and allocation rules formal limit on the use of credits from other sectors.122 with those of the EU ETS. The use of international credits (CERs, ERUs) is Looking ahead The Kazakh government is looking ­ heoretically possible but requires linking of the registry t at changes in the national legislation, the potential to to the International Transaction Log (ITL).123 There is develop sectoral benchmarks for future allocation plans no clear price signal for the KAZ ETS and therefore it is and the need for more verifiers, amongst other detailed not possible to assess demand for international credits. technical issues. A wide variety of donors are funding activities on the KAZ ETS.125, 126, 127 116 Source: Sergazina, G. and Khakimzhanova, B., Kazakhstan’s National Emission Trading Scheme, October 23, 2013, http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/docu- ments/Kazakhstan_Update_October%202013.pdf. 117 Source: Government of Kazakhstan, National Allocation Plan for 2014–2015. Decree Nr. 1536 of the Government of Kazakhstan, December 31, 2013, http:// www.eco.gov.kz/files/pprk-20-01-2014-1-rus.htm. 118 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, Existing Emissions Trading Schemes – A Comparative Analysis, Prepared for the PETER Project, February 2013. 119 Source: Government of Kazakhstan, National Allocation Plan for 2014-2015. Decree Nr. 1536 of the Government of Kazakhstan, December 31, 2013, http:// www.eco.gov.kz/files/pprk-20-01-2014-1-rus.htm. 120 Source: Sergazina, G. and Khakimzhanova, B., Kazakhstan’s National Emission Trading Scheme, October 23, 2013, http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/docu- ments/Kazakhstan_Update_October%202013.pdf. 121 Source: Sergazina, G., Tanayev, E. and Baigunakova, D., Kazakhstan’s National Emission Trading Scheme, May 27, 2013, https://www.thepmr.org/system/files/ documents/PA6_Info_Sharing_Kazakhstan_May_22.pdf. 122 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, Existing Emissions Trading Schemes – A Comparative Analysis, Prepared for the PETER Project, February 2013. 123 Source: Sergazina, G. and Khakimzhanova, B., Kazakhstan’s National Emission Trading Scheme, October 23, 2013, http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/docu- ments/Kazakhstan_Update_October%202013.pdf. 124 Source: Sergazina, G. and Khakimzhanova, B., Kazakhstan’s National Emission Trading Scheme, October 23, 2013, http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/docu- ments/Kazakhstan_Update_October%202013.pdf. 125 Source: Project PETER, PETER Preparedness for Emissions Trading in the EBRD Region, accessed February 18, 2014, http://www.ebrdpeter.info/EngNews.html. 126 Source: Sergazina, G. and Khakimzhanova, B., Kazakhstan’s National Emission Trading Scheme, October 23, 2013, http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/docu- ments/Kazakhstan_Update_October%202013.pdf. 127 Source: Vassilyev, S., Kazakhstan’s Proposal for PMR Targeted Technical Support, March 4, 2014, https://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/Kazakh- stan%27s%20Proposal%20for%20Targeted%20Technical%20Support_0.pdf. 60 4.2.8 (ACCUs) have been surrendered. International credits Australia Carbon Pricing are not eligible for compliance in the fixed price period. Mechanism (CPM) Performance and effectiveness GHG emis- sions from the sectors covered by the CPM fell by The Australia Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) 1.5% in the first year, mostly through reductions in the came into operation in July 2012. It takes place in two electricity production sector. ­ steps, a fixed price period from 2012 to 2015 and a flexible price period planned to start in 2015. Change ­ Linking to other schemes Linking with the EU of government in Australia in 2013 has had a significant ETS is on hold while the future of the CPM is uncertain. impact on these policies and the status of the CPM is in flux. The current administration proposes to abolish Looking ahead The centerpiece of the Direct ­ Action the CPM and implement the Direct Action Plan.128 Plan is the Emissions Reduction Fund.132 ­Government To­ ­ gether with the Renewable Energy Target, the Direct ­ offers financial incentives for low cost emission Action Plan is intended to support Australia in meeting ­ reductions through reverse auctions. The fund is set its existing minimum emission reduction target of 5% to run from July 1, 2014 until 2020 with an initial below 2000 emissions by 2020.129 A$2.55 billion (US$2.3 billion).133 Under the Emissions Reduction Fund, firms will be encouraged to reduce The main elements of the CPM, if it is to continue their emissions, equal to historical BAU emissions. A as planned, are included below and further details about ­emain ‘safeguard’ mechanism will incentivize firms to r the possible changes in Australia are included in the below baseline emissions. The recent White P ­aper detailed update sheet in Annex II. 118  ­ ­ provides more detail on the approach.134 Scope In the 2012–2013 year the CPM covered at least 4.2.9 285 MtCO2e, over 348 entities. The Climate Change New Zealand Emissions Authority recommended Australia’s 2020 target from Trading Scheme 5% to a minimum of 15% below 2000 emissions, and (NZ ETS) proposed new CPM caps accordingly. The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) Competitiveness considerations The first started in 2008, with legislated amendments made in 104 million units issued were issued in relation to 2009 and 2012. The scheme is mandatory and includes ­competitiveness compensation;130 84 million units have some voluntary opt-ins. Allowances are called New been issued so far for the second year.131 ­ Zealand Units (NZUs). Use of offsets For the first year 281 million carbon Scope Compliance obligation of biological emissions units and 2.6 million Australian Carbon Credit Units in agriculture is delayed indefinitely.135 128 Source: Clean Energy Regulator, Australian Government, Carbon Pricing Mechanism, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Pages/default.aspx. 129 A conditional target range of 5–25% remains. 130 Source: Clean Energy Regulator, Australian Government, Units Issued in the 2012-13 Financial Year, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cleanenergyregu- lator.gov.au/Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Industry-Assistance/jobs-and-competitiveness-program/free-carbon-units/Pages/units-issued-in-2012-13.aspx. 131 Source: Clean Energy Regulator, Australian Government, Issue of Free Carbon Units, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Industry-Assistance/jobs-and-competitiveness-program/free-carbon-units/Pages/default.aspx. 132 Source: Department of the Environment, Australian Government, Emissions Reduction Fund, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.environment.gov.au/topics/ cleaner-environment/clean-air/emissions-reduction-fund. 133 Source: Australian Government, Emission Reduction Fund White Paper, April 2014. 134 Source: Australian Government, Emission Reduction Fund White Paper, April 2014. 135 Source: Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand, Legislative Changes to the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS), accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/ets-amendments/index.html. 61 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches Allocation approaches Existing transitional net surplus 90 million unit for CP1 compliance in April ­ measures extended; i.e., surrendering one emission unit 2014, with minimal purchasing by the government.139 for two tons of CO2 in the non-forestry sectors, and fixed price option to meet obligations by paying the In January 2014 the price of one NZU was around government NZ$25/tCO2e (US$21/tCO2e). NZ$3.50 (US$3),140 up from NZ$2 (US$1.5) a year Free allowances provisions for pre-1990 forest landowners demand ­earlier.141 The expectation is that after 2015 the ­ completed, and offset provision for pre-1990 forestry for NZUs will increase with CP1 credits no longer converted to other land-use remains. ­ ­ eligible and access to CP2 credits restricted as New Government enabled to increase the supply of NZUs Zealand has not taken any target under CP2. ­ through auctioning within an overall cap. Looking ahead In August 2013 the government Use of offsets Currently no quantitative limit on set an unconditional emission reduction target for New international credits that can be used for compliance in ­ Zealand of 5% below 1990 levels by 2020, on top of the NZ ETS. A freeze is in place preventing New ­Zealand their conditional target of 10–20% below 1990 by entities from participating in new CDM ­ projects that 2020 announced in 2009.142 A review of the NZ ETS is generate CP2 credits.135 ­ expected in 2015. International credits from CP1 can be used for compliance up to May 31, 2015.136 After that date ­ 4.2.10 ­ participants need to surrender NZUs or banked New Japan (various schemes) Zealand-­ originated AAUs from CP1 for compliance. ­Pre-1990 forestry ­owners also have the option to ­offset by During COP 19 in Warsaw Japan announced that directly planting an emissions equivalent ­forest ­elsewhere they will lower their 2020 emission reduction target in New Zealand. Apart from NZ-AAUs, all international to 3.8% below 2005 fiscal year levels, which is equiv- credits in non-crown accounts will be ­ cancelled when alent to an increase of 3.1% relative to 1990.143 The inter­national carry-over is imposed by the U ­ NFCCC.137 main ­ reason given is the shutdown of nuclear energy in ­ Japan ­ following the Fukushima incident in 2011. This Performance and effectiveness The NZ ETS approach may be revised after Japan reviews its energy plays a pivotal role in New Zealand achieving its CP1 com- policy.144 This target is expected to be achieved through mitment. 27 million units surrendered for compliance in domestic reduction, including forest conservation and 2012; 95% international units.138 NZU prices fell from offsets generated under the Joint Crediting Mechanism NZ$8 to NZ$2.5 (US$6.5 to US$2) in 2012, following (JCM). the prevailing price of international credits. No partici- pants used the fixed price option of NZ$25 (US$21) per Despite the target revision, Japan continues its exper- emission unit. These international credits combined with imentation with a wide array of trading and crediting the NZ ETS disincentivizing deforestation resulted in a schemes, at both the sub-national and international levels (see Table 6). 136 Source: New Zealand Government, Decisions on Kyoto Protocol Emission Units, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/decisions-kyo- to-protocol-emission-units. 137 Source: New Zealand Government, Announcement of Carry-over and Access to Kyoto Markets Post-2015, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.eur.govt.nz/ how-to/guides-hmtl/guides-pdf/Post%202015%20announcement%20factsheet.pdf. 138 Source: Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand, ETS 2012 – Facts and Figures, September 2013. 139 Source: Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand, New Zealand’s Net Position under the Kyoto Protocol, accessed May 2, 2014, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/ climate/greenhouse-gas-emissions/net-position/index.html. 140 Source: Carbon Match, Carbon Match, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.carbonmatch.co.nz/. 141 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, Carbon Market Australia-New Zealand Vol 6 Issue 8, August 16, 2013. 142 Source: Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/ policies-initiatives/. 143 Source: Ecofys, Climate Analytics, and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Japan: From Frontrunner to Laggard, November 15, 2013, http://climate- actiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing_papers/CAT_Policy_brief_Japan-Nov15-2011.pdf. 144 Source: Ishihara, N., Statement by Nobuteru Ishihara, Japanese Minister of the Environment, at COP19/CMP9, accessed January 22, 2014, http://unfccc.int/ files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/statements/application/pdf/cop19_hls_japan.pdf. 62 Table 6 Carbon pricing instruments in Japan Level Type of instrument Name Sub-national (Tokyo) ETS Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program Sub-national (Saitama) ETS Target-Setting Emissions Trading Program in Saitama Sub-national (Kyoto) Voluntary ETS Kyoto ETS Sub-national (various prefectures) Offset schemes Various offsetting schemes National (under consideration)145 ETS Under consideration National (ended in 2012) Voluntary ETS Japan Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme (JVETS) National Voluntary crediting J-Credit Scheme (previously Japan Domestic Credit Scheme (J-CDM) and Offset Credit (J-VER) Scheme) National (ended in 2013) Voluntary agreement with offsetting Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan National Voluntary agreement with offsetting Keidanren’s Commitment to a Low Carbon Society National Carbon tax Tax for Climate Change Mitigation International Voluntary crediting Joint crediting mechanism (JCM) Sub-national levels (Tokyo, Saitama and In November 2013 the price in the Tokyo scheme was Kyoto) These schemes continue to play a small but estimated at ¥8,000-10,000/tCO2e (US$76-95/tCO2e).148 important role in carbon pricing in Japan and cover 8% In 2012 only six trades were conducted and 11 trades of total GHG emissions in Japan.146 in 2013.149 The relatively high price compared to the All schemes operate in the same way: facilities that have rest of the world may be attributed to the hesitation to overachieved their emission reduction target for a given sell excess reduction credits until the second compliance year can either use the excess reductions for the following period.150 In the second compliance period, trading of years or apply to be issued with excess reduction credits to credits from the first compliance period will be possible sell to other facilities.147 The Tokyo and Saitama schemes between the Saitama and Tokyo schemes. are compulsory, and the Kyoto one is voluntary with non-binding targets. The first compliance periods of the three schemes run to the end of fiscal year 2014. 145 The Ministry of Environment has been investigating the challenges of introducing a national ETS, but no new announcements have been made since March 2012 on the progress. Source: Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, Domestic Emissions Trading Scheme (Cap-and-Trade), accessed March 12, 2014, https://www.env.go.jp/earth/ondanka/det/capandtrade.html. 146 Own calculations. Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Bureau of Environment, Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Tokyo, accessed January 30, 2014, http://www.kankyo.met- ro.tokyo.jp/climate/other/emissions_tokyo.html; Saitama Prefecture, Situation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Saitama Prefecture, May 22, 2013, http://www. pref.saitama.lg.jp/page/ontaico2.html; Kyoto Prefecture Website, Kyoto Greenhouse Gas Emissions (for Fiscal 2011 Preliminary Figures), July 23, 2013, http:// www.pref.kyoto.jp/tikyu/news/press/2013/haishuturyou.html; Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, Japan’s National Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Fiscal Year 2011 (Final Figures), April 12, 2013, http://www.env.go.jp/en/headline/headline.php?serial=1935. 147 Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Total Reduction Obligations in the Emissions Trading Scheme – Emissions Trading Operational Guidelines, April 30, 2013; Saitama Prefecture Government, Various Credits in the Saitama Prefecture System, accessed January 30, 2014, http://www.pref.saitama.lg.jp/page/saita- macredit.html; Kyoto Environmental Action Promotion Council, Kyoto’s Version of the CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme, accessed January 30, 2014, http://www. kyoto-ets.com/kyoto_co2_toha.html. 148 Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Total Reduction Obligations in the Emissions Trading Scheme – Assessment Result for the Transaction Price, December 2013, http://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/climate/large_scale/attachement/kakakusatei_201312.pdf. 149 Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Information Related to Emissions Trading (fiscal Year 2012), accessed March 31, 2014, http://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo. jp/climate/large_scale/attachement/torihiki_kouhyou_201303.pdf; Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Information Related to Emissions Trading (February 2014), accessed March 31, 2014, http://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/climate/large_scale/attachement/torihiki_kouhyou_201402.pdf. 150 Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Questionnaire on the Emissions Trading Scheme in Tokyo – Key Findings, December 25, 2013, http://www.kankyo. metro.tokyo.jp/climate/large_scale/%E3%82%A2%E3%83%B3%E3%82%B1%E3%83%BC%E3%83%88_131224.pdf. 63 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches National level (J-Credit Scheme) In 2013 the 4.2.11 two national domestic voluntary crediting schemes, the China Emissions Trading Schemes Japan Domestic Credit Scheme (J-CDM)151 and the (Beijing, Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai, Offset Credit (J-VER) Scheme152 were merged into the Shenzhen, and Tianjin) new J-Credit Scheme managed by the central govern- ment.153 The credits generated can be used for various The National Development and Reform Commission purposes (fulfilling the obligation under the Keidanren’s (NDRC) announced its plan to develop seven official ETS Commitment to a Low Carbon Society,154 ­voluntary ­ pilot programs (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, ­ carbon offsetting). The Scheme is scheduled to be Guangdong, Hubei and Shenzhen) in 2011.158 This plan ­ terminated on March 31, 2021. No plans after this date ­ even began to deliver from 2013. By April 2014, six of the s have been provided so far. pilot schemes159 started trading (see Table 7), with the remaining one  ­ – Chongqing  due to start in 2014. See –  121  International level (JCM) The Japanese govern- Section 4.3.1 for more information on the Chongqing ment intends to allow JCM credits as offsets from fiscal ETS pilot program and on the plans for a national ETS. year 2014 onwards and is currently working on setting up the necessary registry infrastructure. Carbon markets are now officially open for business Japan has signed a bilateral agreement under the JCM in China. The total 2013 allocations of these six pilots with 11 countries: Mongolia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, combined amounts to 1,115 MtCO2e, making China Kenya, Maldives, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Indonesia and ­ the second largest carbon market in the world, after the Costa Rica, which all joined in 2013, and Palau and EU ETS. Guangdong ETS, the largest of the Chinese Cambodia in 2014.155 In December 2013 ten projects ETS pilots, itself covers 388 MtCO2e in 2013,160 similar were selected for financing156 under the JCM Promotion to the size of France’s emissions in 2012.161 Scheme: five projects in Indonesia, two in Vietnam, one in Cambodia, one in Mongolia and one in Bangladesh.157 Table 7 Overview of the Chinese ETS pilots pilots in operation Shenzhen Shanghai Beijing Guangdong Tianjin Hubei Starting date June 18, November 26, November 28, December 18, December 26, April 2, 2013162 2013163 2013164 2013165 2013166 2014167 Traded volumes168 0.250 0.239 0.096 0.126 0.140 1.608 (ktCO2e) Average price169 (CNY) 75.2 31.4 52.6 61.8 34.7 24.7 [$US] [12.4] [5.2] [8.7] [10.2] [5.7] [4.1] 151 Managed by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). 152 Managed by MOE. 153 Source: J-Credit Scheme, November 2013, http://japancredit.go.jp/pdf/english/credit_english_001_2.pdf. 154 The Keidanren’s Commitment to a Low Carbon Society is a “pledge and review” system and the successor of the Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan that ended in fiscal year 2012. More information on the Keidanren’s Commitment to a Low Carbon Society can be found at Keidanren’s Commitment to a Low Carbon Society, January 17, 2013, http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/policy/2013/003_commitment.pdf. 155 Source: Government of Japan, Recent Development of The Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM), January 2014, http://www.mmechanisms.org/docu- ment/20140122_JCM_goj.pdf. 156 Includes offset purchase and investment finance. 157 The JCM Promotion Scheme finances up to half of the investment costs of a project and in return half of the JCM credits issued are to be delivered to the Government of Japan. Source: Bannai, O., JCM Financing Programme and Study Programme, November 12, 2013, http://www.mmechanisms.org/document/ cop19_sideevents/unfccc/6_GEC.pdf. 158 Source: National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China, Notice on Carbon Emissions Trading System Pilots, October 29, 2011. 159 Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, Tianjin and Hubei 160 Source: SinoCarbon, 2013 Carbon Markets Annual Report, January 2014. 161 Source: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Are Global CO2 Emissions Still Rising?, n.d., http://infographics.pbl.nl/website/globalco2/. 64 Each of the pilots has unique characteristics; the way context. Box 2 and Figure 18 paint a picture of some of in which the carbon markets play out will help policy the notable features. makers learn lessons that can be applied in the national Box 2 In brief: characteristics of the Chinese ETS pilots in operation Shenzhen was the first of the Chinese ETS pilots to start operating and therefore has the longest price history (see Figure 19). Shenzhen’s industrial base includes light manufacturing, e.g., semiconductor and car-part production. Therefore, to create a market with enough emissions to enable liquidity, Shenzhen has to cover 635 enterprises. As the only pilot with Special Economic Zone (SEZ) status, Shenzhen had the legislative ability to pass a bill to support ETS implementation. Shanghai is China’s financial center and, as such, the region has announced plans to explore i ­nnovative financial tools that boost liquidity in the scheme. Shanghai is a city with some heavy industry and light ­ industry, and so the scheme covers a broad array of sectors, including aviation and ports. Shanghai hosts a ­ large number of multinational companies, many of which have already experienced ETS compliance in other parts of the world, which may help engagement with industrial participants. Beijing is the capital, with a high profile. As such, many of the lessons learned in this pilot will feed directly into the national scheme. Prior to the 2008 Olympic Games, heavy industries including power, steel and cement were forced to move out of Beijing, increasing the energy use and the emissions of the neighbouring regions (Tianjin and Hebei). Therefore, Beijing’s ETS covers a reduced power sector, and not all those that service the city. Guangdong is one of the industrial powerhouses in southern China and has the ETS with the largest v ­ olume of emissions covered. Guangdong is also the first pilot to incorporate auctioning into the design of their scheme. Current rules mandate participants to purchase a minimum of 3% of their total allocation in the p­ rimary markets at a reserve price of CNY60 (US$10) before the remaining 97% of allowances can be traded. Tianjin is a port city with a strong industrial base. Tianjin is part of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area experiencing severe air pollution. To cut emissisons, Tianjin’s ETS covers a number of key industries (power and heat, iron and steel, chemical, petrochemicals and oil and gas exploration), raising serious concerns over competitiveness. Hubei is located at the heart of central China, a transport hub with a faster than average economic growth rate. Iron and steel production accounts for a significant proportion of emissions. Hubei’s ETS covers 12 sectors, including pharmaceutical and food and beverage, which other pilots do not cover. Hubei includes some innovations in auctioning and allocation. Note: the schemes are presented in order of entry into force. 162 Source: China Shenzhen Emission Exchange, Shenzhen Emission Trading Pilot Launch Official Press Release, accessed March 10, 2014, http://www.cerx.cn/cn/ trade_details.aspx?ArticleID=274. 163 Source: Shanghai Energy and Environment Exchange, Shanghai Pilot Kick-off Official Press Release, November 26, 2013, http://www.cneeex.com/xwdt/ tpxw/383432.shtml. 164 Source: China News, Launch of the Beijing Pilot, More Launches Expected during the Course of the Year, November 28, 2013, http://finance.chinanews.com/ ny/2013/11-28/5559428.shtml. 165 Source: China Climate Change Info-Net, Guangdong Emissions Trading Launched, December 20, 2013, http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/Detail.aspx?newsId=42530&TId=57. 166 Source: Tianjin Climate Exchange, Tianjin Pilot Launch Press Release, December 27, 2013, http://www.chinatcx.com.cn/tcxweb/pages/news/news_info.jsp?ar- ticle_id=2136. 167 Source: Hubei Emission Exchange, Hubei ETS Launched, April 8, 2014, http://www.hbets.cn/html/zxdtXwzx/1079_1.shtml. 168 Volume traded in the secondary market from the start of the scheme until April 18, 2014. Analysis on source from Chinese emission exchanges in Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin and Hubei. 169 Ibid. 65 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches Figure 18 Characteristics of the Chinese ETS pilots in operation Advanced legislation and Broad array of 4 sectors add up China’s second largest the pilot with the largest sectors including to 388 MtCO2, the ETS with innovation in number of participants aviation and ports biggest Chinese ETS auctions and allocation Shenzhen Shanghai Guangdong Hubei 18 June 13 26 Nov 13 18 Dec 13 2 Apr 14 33 Mt 160 Mt 50 Mt 388 Mt 160 Mt 324 Mt Beijing Tianjin 28 Nov 13 26 Dec 13 China’s capital with A city with all major energy supply mainly heavy industries from outside the city Notable progress on scheme design has been made Allocation approaches Most pilots use histori- since the start of 2013. All pilots have published their cal intensity or emissions-based free allocation. Guang- ETS Implementation Plans, the key document defining dong is the first pilot to use auctioning.170 Dynamic the specific design aspects. Some pilots have released ­ allocation is included in the ETS Implementation Plans Carbon Emission Allowance Allocation Plans and ETS ­ for ­Shenzhen,171 Tianjin,172 and Shanghai.173 Pilot Management Methods. However many of the Allocation for the power sector is similar across pilots, details remain to be further clarified or are not p ­ ­ ublicly based on benchmarks of different generation technolo- available, and it is expected that this will take place gies and installation capacities.174 during the coming year. Use of offsets By April 2014, 178 CCER Key developments are described below, and further ­ methodologies based on CDM methodologies ­ information can be found in the detailed update sheet ­published. About 200 projects have been approved by 122  in Annex II. the NDRC.175 Scope Most pilots have an absolute cap, Shenzhen Price stabilization mechanism Shenzhen, has an intensity-based cap. Overall, therefore, the pilots Guangdong and Hubei have set aside reserve allowances have a growing cap, in line with China’s 40–45% carbon to manage price fluctuations. intensity reduction target by 2020. ­ 170 Source: Guangdong Development and Reform Commission, Guangdong ETS Allocation and Auctioning Announcement, December 10, 2013, http://www.gddpc. gov.cn/xxgk/tztg/201312/t20131210_232286.htm. 171 Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen ETS Implementation Plan (Draft), October 29, 2013, http://fzj.sz.gov.cn:8080/cms/fzbDetails.action?- siteName=fzb&pageId=4443. 172 Source: Tianjin Government, Tianjin Municipal People’s Government Office Interim Measures on Carbon Emissions Trading in Tianjin, December 20, 2013, http:// www.tj.gov.cn/zwgk/wjgz/szfbgtwj/201312/t20131224_227448.htm. 173 Source: Shanghai Municipal Government, Shanghai Carbon Market Implementation Plan, November 18, 2013, http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/ node2319/node12344/u26ai37414.html. 174 Source: Ecofys, Suggestions for the Design of Tianjin’s ETS, November 8, 2013. 175 Source: China Certified Emission Reduction Exchange Info-Platform, n.d., http://203.207.195.145:92/zylist.aspx?clmId=162. 66 Performance and effectiveness Carbon prices 4.3 in the pilots to date range from approximately Emerging emissions CNY120/tCO2e (US$20) in Shenzhen,176 to trading schemes and crediting CNY22/tCO2e (US$3.6) in Hubei (see Figure 19).177 approaches MRV and registry GHG accounting methodologies 4.3.1 released for 10 sectors.178 Guidance also provided for China Emissions Trading Schemes monitoring of emissions in smaller installations. (national and Chongqing) Linking to other schemes Potential to link Hubei The national China ETS is expected to start during with Guangdong but no official progress or details. the 13th Five Year Plan (2016–2020). Some preparation has already begun, with more details expected by the Looking ahead The first pilot phase is planned to end end of 2014.180 In the meantime, the seventh ETS pilot in June 2016 and should provide lessons for the ­national program  ­ – Chongqing  is expected to start in 2014. See –  ETS. No clarity yet on how the pilots and ­national ETS Section 4.2.11 for details of the six ETS pilot programs will relate to each other.179 currently in force.181 See Section 4.3.1 for more information on the national ETS. Figure 19 Prices to date in the Chinese ETS pilots 140 120 100 80 60 Shenzhen Price (RMB /tCO2e) Tianjin 40 Beijing 20 Shanghai Guangdong 0 Hubei 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 Jan 1 Feb 1 Mar 1 Apr 1 May 1 Sep 1 Oct 1 Nov 1 Dec 1 Source: combined information Crystal carbon, website of Chinese emissions exchanges, as of April 18, 2014. 176 Shenzhen Climate Exchange updates its pricing data on a daily basis through the China Emissions Exchange Website. Source: China Emissions Exchange, China Emissions Exchange, accessed January 24, 2014, http://www.szets.com/Portal/home.seam. 177 Source: China Hubei Emission Exchange, Allowance Trading Daily Report, April 2, 2014, http://www.hbets.cn/html/zxggXxpl/1075_1.shtml. 178 Source: National Development and Reform Commission, GHG Accounting Methodologies and Reporting Guidance for 10 Industries, 2013, http://www.ndrc.gov. cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2013tz/t20131101_565313.htm. 179 Source: Bo, K. and Freeman, C., Making Sense of Carbon Market Development in China, Carbon and Climate Law Review, Issue 3, 2013. 180 Source: China Energy Newspaper, National Carbon Allowances Will Be Issued by the Government, April 20, 2014, http://energy.people.com.cn/n/2014/0420/ c71661-24918882.html. 181 In addition, Taiwan, China set-up in 2013 rules for an early action crediting and offset program. The first early action credits were issued in 2013, and by March 2013 16 MtCO2 had been issued. This is a first step towards developing a domestic carbon market, which might include an ETS at a later stage. Source: Taiwan GHG Reduction Management Office Environmental Protection Administration, Taiwan’s MRVSystem and Carbon Market Development, April 18, 2014. 67 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches 4.3.2 Price stabilization mechanism Stabilization Republic of Korea Emissions measures will be triggered when the trading price or Trading Scheme volume fluctuate severely. The Korea Exchange will host trading under the ETS.190 The ETS is due to start from January 2015 with three phases running up to 2025. The Republic of Korea (Korea) Performance and effectiveness During the remains on course to meet its target of a 30% cut first and second phases, only ETS participants, the (233 MtCO2e) in GHG emissions by 2020 and the ­ Industrial Bank of Korea, the Export-Import Bank Korean Ministry of Environment published the new of Korea, and the Korea Finance Corporation will be National GHG Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020 in ­ allowed to trade. early 2014.182, 183 A penalty of three times the average allowance price during the compliance year will be applied for Scope The basis for the overarching and sectoral emis- failure to surrender allowances, to a maximum of sions cap for the ETS sectors is now available.184 The KRW100,000/tCO2e (US$90/tCO2e).191 ­ industry, power and building sectors will share over 80% (190 MtCO2e) of Korea’s emission reductions by 2020.185 MRV and registry The National Institute of ­ Environmental Research has developed 25 new methods Allocation approaches Free allocation via grand­ for GHG and energy emissions verification for use in fathering for existing facilities and benchmarking used for the ETS.192 new entrants.186 Free allocation will decrease from 2018.187 Looking ahead The National Allocation Plan Competitiveness considerations Industry with specific allocation rules and criteria is expected eligible for 100% free allocation if “Production Cost ­ to be published by June 2014, after consultation with Occurrence Rate”188 is greater than 5% or if Trade ­ controlled entities and voluntary participants. A list of ­Intensity189 exceeds 10%, or if either of these two ratios entities covered by the scheme will follow. The idea of is greater than 30% as a result of ETS implementation. an ETS ­ trading simulation has been proposed to build operational experience. The coordination of the ETS ­ Use of offsets Offsets permitted up to a limit of policy with the target management system needs some 10% of total allowances. International offsets will only further work. be ­allowed after the first and second phases (2015–2020) and volume must not exceed the number of domestic offsets used for each compliance year. 182 Source: Responding to Climate Change, South Korea Confirms 30% Carbon Reduction Target by 2020, January 31, 2014, http://www.rtcc.org/2014/01/31/ south-korea-confirms-30-carbon-reduction-target-by-2020/. 183 Source: Ministry of Environment, Korea, National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020, January 28, 2014, http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/board/ read.do?menuId=21&boardMasterId=522&boardId=339283. 184 Source: Ministry of Environment, Korea, National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020, January 28, 2014, http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/board/ read.do?menuId=21&boardMasterId=522&boardId=339283. 185 Source: Ministry of Environment, Korea, National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020, January 28, 2014, http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/board/ read.do?menuId=21&boardMasterId=522&boardId=339283. 186 Source: Ministry of Environment, Korea, Enforcement Decree of Emissions Trading Scheme Article 15, November 15, 2012. 187 Source: Ministry of Environment, Korea, Enforcement Decree of Emissions Trading Scheme Article 13, 14, November 15, 2012. 188 Production Cost Occurrence Rate: (Average total GHG emission of applicable industry’s baseline period x Average allowance price of baseline period) / Average total generated value added of applicable industry’s baseline period. 189 Trade Intensity: Average annual trade amount of applicable industry’s baseline period / (Average annual sales of applicable industry’s baseline period + Average annual income of applicable industry’s baseline period). 190 Source: Ministry of Environment, Korea, Designate Korea Exchange Inc. as Emission Permits Exchange, January 15, 2014, http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/ board/read.do?pagerOffset=10&maxPageItems=10&maxIndexPages=10&searchKey=&searchValue=&menuId=21&orgCd=&boardId=338102&boardMas- terId=522&boardCategoryId=&decorator=. 191 6 months prior to the start of the next implementation year. 192 Source: Ministry of Environment, Korea, Raise Greenhouse Gas Emissions Verification to a Higher Level, December 31, 2013, http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/ board/read.do?pagerOffset=10&maxPageItems=10&maxIndexPages=10&searchKey=&searchValue=&menuId=21&orgCd=&boardId=336822&boardMas- terId=522&boardCategoryId=&decorator=. 68 4.3.3 Chile is preparing for a possible ETS in the energy sector. Other potential schemes in Brazil, Chile, The PMR is supporting these efforts by funding regulatory, Costa Rica, Mexico, North American economic and institutional analyses, as well as the design Pacific Coast, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and implementation of MRV and registry systems.197 and Ukraine Costa Rica In September 2013 Costa Rica’s President Several other countries are making headway with signed a decree for the regulation and operation of the carbon pricing instruments. While some are explicitly domestic carbon market. In October 2013, BANCO2 options working toward an ETS, others are leaving their ­ was created, the carbon exchange for the domestic open, assessing various instruments and the ­ potential carbon units, Costa Rican Carbon Units.198 The PMR is implications of their implementation. This section supporting Costa Rica to set up and operate their ­domestic ­ summarizes progress in countries which have expressed carbon market.199 In December 2013, Costa Rica signed an interest in an ETS. a bilateral agreement to join the Japanese JCM, bringing the number of countries participating in the JCM to nine Brazil No notable progress has been made on Brazil’s (see Section 4.2.9 for more details on the JCM).200 national ETS plans. At the regional level, opposition from industry for the launch of a Rio de Janeiro ETS Mexico In February 2014 the Ministry of E ­ nergy continues,193 and no progress has been made on the ETS m ­ entioned the development of a potential ETS in plans for São Paulo. However, some companies have the energy sector.201 The recently introduced Mexican shown interest in gaining practical experience in an ETS ­ carbon tax is discussed in Section 5.2.9. to form their own perspective. This led to the launch of the Emissions Trading Scheme of the Businesses for North American Pacific Coast202 On October Climate Platform (SCE EPC) and the first auction of 28, 2013, the states of California, Washington, Oregon allowances in March 2014. The SCE EPC is a simulated and British Columbia signed a regional agreement, the ETS with 22 major companies,194 emitting a total of Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy, to 22 MtCO2e in 2012, and it is set to run until the end align policies to reduce GHG emissions. C ­ ooperation of November 2014.195 Allowances can be traded through will include activities around carbon pricing and GHG the exchange platform BVTrade. On March 21, 2014 reduction targets. The pact commits Oregon and allowances were offered at R$35.00 (US$14.83) and Washington to take action on carbon pricing. ­ ­ Oregon requested at R$24.15 (US$10.24), with the last trade is exploring options to setting a price on emissions taking place at R$25.00 (US$10.60).196 including an ETS and a carbon tax (see section 5.3.2 for the tax) and Washington is considering a cap-and- trade scheme.203 British Colombia and California will 193 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, Brazilian Minister Slams Industry for Blocking Local Carbon Market, August 28, 2013, http://www.pointcarbon.com/ news/1.2540889?date=20130828&sdtc=1. 194 Companies participating in the simulation include Banco do Brasil, CCR, Braskem, Camargo Corrêa, Anglo American, Citibank, Duratex, EDP, Furnas, Grupo Abril, Klabin, Raízen and TAM. 195 Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon, Vale, Braskem to Enter Cap-and-Trade Simulation in Brazil - RTRS, March 13, 2014, http://www.bvrio.org/site/images/pressre- leases/katerva-reuters.pdf. 196 Source: BV Trade, BV Trading Platform, accessed March 21, 2014, http://www.bvtrade.org/login/homepage.do?notices=carbono.somente.habilitados. 197 Source: Fernandez, I., Chile Update on MRP Implementation Phase, October 2013, http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/PA%26_Chile%20MRP%20 update%20PMR%20Marrakech%20Oct%202013.pdf. Chile was part of the first group of countries to receive implementation funding from the PMR in March 2013 for the implementation of their Market Readiness Proposal. 198 Source: BanCO2, BanCO2, accessed March 17, 2014, http://www.banco2.com/BCO2_WEB/; Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, New Bank To Handle Costa Rica’s Carbon Credits Trading, October 23, 2013, http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.2675033?date=20131023&sdtc=1. 199 Source: Costa Rica PMR Update, October 2013, http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/Costa%20Rica_MRP%20Implementation%20Update%20 Oct%2013.pdf. Costa Rica is also part of the first group of countries to receive implementation funding in March 2013 from the PMR. 200 Source: Memorandum of Cooperation on the Low Carbon Growth between the Japanese Side and the Costa Rican Side, accessed February 12, 2014, http:// www.mmechanisms.org/document/JCM/costarica/JCM_CR_bilateral_document.pdf., Accessed February 12, 2014. 201 Source: Mexican Ministry of Energy, The Energy Reform Will Boost Clean Energy, February 26, 2014, http://energia.gob.mx/portal/Default.aspx?id=2762. 202 Source: Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown Joins Oregon, Washington, British Columbia Leaders to Combat Climate Change, October 28, 2013, http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18284. 203 Source: State of Washington, Office of the governor, Executive Order 14-04, Washington carbon pollution reduction and clear energy action, April 29, 2014. http://governor.wa.gov/office/execorders/documents/14-04.pdf. 69 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches ­ aintain their existing carbon pricing programs. The m Turkey adopted MRV legislation in 2012. ­Installations pact states that linking between schemes should be ­ inistry covered have to submit monitoring plans to the M ­ considered whenever possible. of Environment and Urbanization by June 2014. The PMR is supporting the implementation of the Russia In 2011 Russia announced that it would existing legislation, including the analysis and choice ­ not participate in CP2 of the Kyoto Protocol, but did appropriate market-based mechanisms, including a of ­ commit to the Durban Action Plan. In April 2014, the possible ETS in the electricity sector.206 ­ Russian government established an emission reduction target of 25% compared to 1990 levels by 2020.204 The Ukraine The United Nations Environment P ­ rogramme government has developed an action plan to achieve (UNEP) is working on the potential to develop a carbon these targets, which includes the development of a na- market approach in Ukraine, whilst EBRD is s ­ upporting tional registry and MRV framework in 2014 and the de- Ukraine in a complementary ­ approach that might velopment of sector-level emission reduction indicators involve carbon taxes and other levers. The PMR will ­ in 2015. Initially companies may face obligatory MRV support Ukraine to develop a GHG MRV ­ system as a requirements. As a next step government funds may be first step toward a potential ETS. These initiatives should deployed to provide JI-like results-based payments for help Ukraine converge on an appropriate approach on emission reductions. The draft action plan includes the carbon pricing. potential for the development of other policy measures to reduce GHG emissions before 2020, and looking Colombia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, M ­ orocco, ahead to 2030. These policy measures might include Peru, Tunisia and the Socialist Republic of market-based mechanisms but the final choice is still ­Vietnam (Vietnam) are also exploring carbon pricing open. The plan also envisages the potential for linking instruments under the PMR and Iran is carrying out ­ with regulatory emission reduction systems in other studies for a potential ETS.207 countries and cooperation with international financial institutions. The Russian government is developing these policy ideas in close consultation with Russian business 4.4 and industry. Looking back at installation level emissions trading: Thailand is designing a domestic market-based the EU ETS and the NZ ETS mechanism to reduce energy consumption and GHG emissions in the energy sector with a view to transforming 4.4.1 it into an ETS. In March 2014, Thailand was ­ allocated The EU ETS US$3 million from the PMR to assist with this work. Phase one of the work will focus on designing an Energy The EU ETS was established in 2005 following e ­ xtensive Performance Certificate Scheme (EPC) and p ­ reparing the negotiations between the European member states of the infrastructure for a data collection and MRV system.205 A time. Several years on, it is possible to compare expected study on a possible legal framework for a potential ETS outcomes with the results in relation to the fundamental will also be done. Phase two of the work will focus on determinants of carbon price, the use and role of Kyoto implementation of the EPC. credits and the way in which the market itself operated. 204 Source: Government of the Russian Federation, Presidential Decree 504p, April 2, 2014; Government of the Russian Federation, Presidential Decree 752, September 20, 2013. 205 Source: Partnership for Market Readiness, Allocation of Implementation Phase Funding to Thailand, March 2014, https://www.thepmr.org/system/files/docu- ments/PMR%20Resolution%20PA%202014_2_Allocation_Implementation%20Funding_Thailand.pdf. 206 Source: Ozkal, S. and Ecer, M., Turkey Final Market Readiness Proposal, May 27, 2013, http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/Final-MRP-Presenta- tion_Turkey_v3.pdf. Turkey received US$3 million from the PMR in May 2013. 207 See www.thepmr.org for more information on countries activies under the PMR. For Iran, see: Shana, Carbon Bourse Envisaged, February 16, 2014. 70 » An inflexible, predefined supply of allowances does not address unforeseen macro-economic changes, while the demand adjusts itself. « The carbon price and its determinants The The reduced emissions in the system have led to a European Commission’s (EC) expectation in 2008  at –  supply-demand imbalance, resulting in a build-up of the start of Phase II of the scheme  – was that it would so-called surplus allowances that have been issued but ­ allow international credits “up to a level which would are not yet needed. The main lesson of the EU ETS has ­ ensure that the carbon price in the EU is not higher been made explicit in the proposal for a market ­ stability than €30/tCO2e” (US$41/tCO2e).208 Other scenarios reserve. The mechanism learned from experience that showed prices mostly in the range of €30 to €40/tCO2e an inflexible, predefined supply of allowances does not (US$41 to US$55/tCO2e). A carbon price of €4/tCO2e address unforeseen macro-economic changes, while (US$5.5/tCO2e) was mentioned in the EC’s original the demand adjusts itself. The proposed reserve should modeling scenario with unlimited access to international both tackle current surplus and make future supply of credits. While the impact of a renewables target and allowances more flexible against changing economic the use of international credits were both assessed, the conditions. From a purely economic point of view, ­ economic crisis was not anticipated in any of the models. the question would be whether the proposed market ­ stability reserve will drive up the EU carbon price: the In reality the carbon price has been well below total supply of allowances is not reduced, but a ­ llowances €30/tCO2e (US$41/tCO2e) since 2009, dropping to are “parked” in the reserve temporarily and will be €4/tCO2e (US$5.5/tCO2e) in 2013. Significant made available later, i.e., a reflection of the idea behind reductions in the emissions within the EU ETS scope backloading. However, the current market experience have led to a higher supply of allowances than predicted witnessed through the backloading negotiations does ­ and therefore a lower price than originally foreseen. suggest that the carbon price responds to some degree to The EC cites the international economic crisis as the any news related to the topic. This response may indicate main cause of the emission reductions achieved in the that current prices do, to a certain extent, reflect shorter- EU ETS.209 According to some analysts the low term priorities, and may reflect an expectation that these carbon price is caused primarily by the large uptake of allowances might eventually be cancelled. renewables: compared to business as usual, renewables contribute to around 60% of the emission reductions, while the recession accounts for only around 30%.210 On the contrary, others note that the recent and projected growth path for renewables matches quite well with the assumptions used to set the EU ETS cap. They therefore conclude, in line with the EC, that the recession is the primary cause of the supply-demand imbalance.211 208 Source: Commission of the European Communities, Annex to the Impact Assessment, Document Accompanying the Package of Implementation Measures for the EU’s Objectives on Climate Change and Renewable Energy for 2020, SEC (2008) 85, Vol. II, February 27, 2008. 209 Source: European Commission, The State of the European Carbon Market in 2012, COM (2012) 652 Final, November 14, 2012. 210 Source: CDC Climat Research, Climate Brief No. 32, October 2013. 211 Source: Öko-Institut, Strengthening the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and Raising Climate Ambition, June 2012. 71 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches The use of Kyoto credits Installations in the renewable energy targets, although such data are not EU ETS are allowed to surrender up to around 1,600 ­ urrent readily available. It is important to note that the c to 1,700 million Kyoto credits (CERs and ERUs) in estimate of the so-called surplus in the EU ETS, almost addition to EUAs in the period 2008–2020. The EC’s ­ 2 billion allowances, is significantly higher than the 2008 impact a ­ssessment212 anticipated that access to ­ international allowances used so far, and so even in the international ­ ­ credits in Phases II and III of the EU ETS absence of international credits, there would be some would ­ decrease direct costs at the EU level from 0.61% surplus.215 to 0.45% of EU GDP in 2020, equal to a cost ­ advantage of around €25 billion.213 In turn the carbon price was Current proposals put forward by the EU suggest expected to be reduced from €43/tCO2e to €30/tCO2e a much reduced role for international credits in the (US$59/tCO2e to US$41/tCO2e) in the scenario with EU ETS post-2020 (see Section 4.2.1). the use of international credits. A lower carbon price leads to reduced revenues from auctions for member EUA market sophistication The sections above states and therefore increased support necessary to meet outline the fundamental policy issues that determine the the renewable energy targets, although no quantitative carbon price; however, day to day prices are determined impact is estimated. With the use of international cred- by the actors in the market. The EUA market quickly its, domestic CO2 ­ reductions are estimated to decrease developed a very high level of sophistication, something from a 20% saving to a 14% saving by 2020 compared that was not explicitly anticipated at the outset. Private to 1990. sector market players were swift to react to stimuli and put in place complex financial infrastructures. In the period 2008–2012 (Phase II), operators already used 1,059 million international credits (64% CERs and In 2009, during the economic downturn, cash- 36% ERUs). The use of CERs and ERUs in 2008–2012 strapped industrial participants in the EU ETS were led to estimated cost savings for EU ETS installations ­ selling carbon assets at a very low price to raise cash at a of between €4 billion and €20 billion (US$6 billion to time of limited access to credit. At the same time, with US$28 billion).214 These savings were achieved both due the end of Phase II of the EU ETS in sight, many ­entities, to the price difference between international credits and in particular utilities, sought to buy EUA ­vintages under EUAs, and the lower price of EUAs. The very low price of the assumption that they would no longer receive free international credits led to 70% of EU ETS installations ­ allocations after 2012, and that they would therefore making use of the opportunity to surrender such ­ credits need to hedge their exposure to Phase III. As a result, the instead of EUAs, including those installations that had a EUA price curve steepened significantly in a c ­ ontango surplus of EUAs, to minimize their compliance cost. The shape, contrary to the CDM price curve that skewed low carbon prices should have led to additional costs for ­ towards a backwardation curve.216 member states to support renewable e ­nergy and reach 212 Source: Commission of the European Communities, Annex to the Impact Assessment, Document Accompanying the Package of Implementation Measures for the EU’s Objectives on Climate Change and Renewable Energy for 2020, SEC (2008) 85, Vol. II, February 27, 2008. 213 The reference case is the cost-efficient reference option + distributed non-ETS targets. 214 Source: CDC Climat Research, Climate Report No. 43, January 2014. 215 Analysis based on Source: European Environment Agency, EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) data viewer, accessed May 2, 2014, http://www.eea.europa.eu/ data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/emissions-trading-viewer. 216 Contango: a forward sloping curve i.e. the price of the future is greater than the spot price of the underlying commodity. Backwardation: future price lower than spot price responding to specific market circumstances where underdelivery leads sellers to pay a premium over spot CERs in the market to honor pre-existing sale commitments. 72 Taken together, these two factors created an oppor- 4.4.2 tunity for the financial sector to profit from engagement The New Zealand in this business. Some were already involved in relation (uncapped) ETS to trading strategies for the energy sector, but this new arbitrage role was an additional involvement. The curve The NZ ETS is identifiable by its soft emissions began to flatten out only during the second half of cap, which is linked to New Zealand’s international 2009, when liquidity increased and the cost of funding ­commitment. As such, the NZ ETS provides insights into ­declined.217 a mechanism which allows unlimited use of offsets. In ­August 2013 the government announced the adoption of The EU ETS had an influence on wider Kyoto an unconditional target of 5% net below 1990 levels by m ­ arkets too. Data on the purchases of Kyoto credits in 2020.219 Current policies and measures are not sufficient the ­primary markets show that the predominant source of to achieve this target domestically.220 The unlimited use demand in the system was always Europe, mainly d ­ riven of international credits in the NZ ETS, combined with by the EU ETS. Private sector participants in the 218 the record low price for these international credits, has EU ETS boosted market liquidity with 24,061 million resulted in insufficient domestic reductions, although allowances transacted over the period 2008–2011 this outcome is in line with an ETS designed to recognize inclusive, compared to a cumulative cap of 7,437 million ­ domestic and international emission reductions equally. allowances over the same period. This boost came b ­ ecause On the other hand, the NZ ETS had a positive impact annual compliance targets stimulated quick a ­ ctions, in on forestry removals and deincentivized deforestation, contrast to the targets in the Kyoto Protocol, which were although less than expected due to the low NZU price, over the whole period. with New Zealand meeting its CP1 commitment even without CERs or ERUs.221 Forestry removals are As much as AAU trading illustrates that govern- projected to decrease and New Zealand would have to ­ ments are not as well equipped as market participants, rely on international carbon markets and recognition of the sophistication of the EUA and CER markets its CP1 surplus to meet the 2020 target.222 shows the ability that the private sector has to react quickly to market circumstances. These opportunistic The impact of the unlimited link to inter­ ­ behaviors are unstable and prone to reversion, should national offsets on the carbon price The the ­context change. Although the private sector is the purpose of allowing the unlimited use of offsets was key enabling agent in a market-based mechanism, these to support market liquidity and reduce volatility in an short-term strategies are in contradiction to the long- otherwise small market and to align the market with ­ term ­perspective needed to tackle climate change. Some international prices.223 New Zealand firms could then measures are increasingly implemented to mitigate these achieve environmental goals at a lower cost. risks (e.g., price stabilization mechanisms) but the very flexibility and sophistication of the financial sector makes it difficult to anticipate how the market might react to such changes. 217 As highlighted in Source: Kossoy, A., Ambrosi, P., State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2010, 2010. 218 Source: Kossoy, A., Guigon, P., State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012, 2012. 219 Source: Groser, T., Letter to Ms Christiana Figueres, August 29, 2013, http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/application/pdf/13- 1620.pdf. 220 Source: Climate Action Tracker, New Zealand, accessed February 13, 2014, http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/newzealand. 221 Source: Ministry of the Environment, New Zealand, New Zealand’s Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2012, accessed May 2, 2014, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/ publications/climate/greenhouse-gas-inventory-2014/index.html. 222 Source: Ministry of the Environment, New Zealand, New Zealand’s Sixth National Communication under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, December 2013. 223 Source: Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand, Liquidity and Prices in the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme - The Role of Government, accessed February 13, 2014, https://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/liquidity-prices-nz-ets-role-government-dec07/liquidity-prices-nz-ets-role-government-dec07.html. 73 4   Regional, national, and sub-national emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches Figure 20 Development of the NZU price compared to the secondary CER price in NZ$ labeled with events affecting international credit usage224 30 Crash of the international Unsuccessful attempt New Zealand’s refusal Submission of bill to credits price and coupling to limit use of international to sign up for CP2, full limit use of inter­ national 25 of NZU price credits to 50% in decoupling of NZU price credits to 50% 2012 ETS amendment bill 20 15 10 5 NZ$/unit 0 1 1 1 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 Feb 1 Jun 1 Oct 1 Feb 1 Feb 1 Jun 1 Oct 1 Feb 1 Jun 1 Oct 1 NZU Secondary CER Source: Westpac Institutional Bank for NZU prices, Thomson Reuters Point Carbon for secondary CER prices As the prices of international credits began to reduce Emissions from the energy, industry and liquid ­ fossil significantly participants in the NZ ETS started to fuels sectors have not decreased in the three years that buy CERs and ERUs instead of NZUs. CER and ERU they have participated in the NZ ETS (Figure 22). prices began to dictate the NZU price, which then fell The emission increase in the energy and industry sector (Figure 20). Risks that international credits could not largely relate to the inclusion of new sectors from 2012, be used from 2015 resulted in a full decoupling of while emissions from the other sectors remained stable. the NZU price in later years, although NZU prices The unlimited access to international credits did lower ­remained low. the carbon price and provided a very limited financial incentive for NZ participants to reduce emissions, invest The NZ ETS and domestic mitigation action in clean technology and renewable power generation, As a result of the significant price difference between and plant trees.225 NZUs and international credits, NZ ETS participants almost exclusively bought and surrendered international credits, rather than NZUs, for the compliance year 2012 (Figure 21). 224 In August 2013 a bill was proposed again to limit the use of international credits to 50%, but it has not yet been debated in parliament. Prices are shown until start of March 2014. Source: New Zealand Parliament, Climate Change Response (Restriction of International Units) Amendment Bill, August 5, 2013, http:// www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/legislation/proposed-bills/50HOH_MEMBILL223_1/climate-change-response-restriction-of-international-units. 225 Source: Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand, Why We Have the NZ ETS, accessed February 13, 2014, https://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trad- ing-scheme/about/why.html. 74 Emissions from deforestation and harvesting show a this may also partly explain the increase in emissions. The significant increase from 2011 to 2012. When harvesting other reason for the increase in emissions is a loophole in the ­forests, landowners have to surrender NZUs or ­international NZ ETS which allows post-1989 forestry landowners to credits. Forestry landowners receive NZUs under the earn windfall profits.227 NZ ETS, which can be used to fulfill this obligation. The low prices for NZUs and international credits may have A lesson on linking The experience in New ­ Zealand made it more attractive for forestry owners to convert demonstrates that a soft cap can compromise the ­financial their forest to other land-uses and surrender the cheaper incentive to reduce emissions domestically, and that international credits to meet their obligation.226 The NZUs ­ links to larger markets can have a significant ­ influence already received are banked for later use or sold on. Since on a smaller market. This experience ­emphasizes the care forestry owners can decide report their emissions annually that needs to be taken by linking, in assessing clearly the or at the end of the compliance period 2008–2012 in 2012, potential outcomes for both players. Figure 21 Share of surrendered units for compliance in Emissions under the NZ ETS of the forestry, Figure 22 the NZ ETS per compliance year energy and industry, and liquid fossil fuels sectors 100% 50 90% 45 80% 40 70% 35 60% 30 50% 25 40% 20 Emissions (MtCO2) 30% 15 20% 10 10% 5 0% 0 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 NZ$25 Fixed Forestry NZUs RMUs Forestry (deforestation, harvesting Energy and Industry Price Option Other NZUs ERUs and removal from ETS) Liquid fossil fuels NZ AAUs CERs Source: Government of New Zealand Source: Government of New Zealand 226 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, Carbon Market Australia–New Zealand Vol 6 Issue 8, August 16, 2013. 227 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, NZ Foresters Reap Windfall Profits as CO2 Prices Crash, February 8, 2013, http://www.pointcarbon.com/ news/1.2175692. 75 section 5 National and sub-national carbon taxes 5 National and sub-national carbon taxes 5.1 tax was lowered to maintain the overall tax burden.229 Overview of carbon taxes With the introduction of the EU ETS, exemptions on the carbon tax were gradually granted to entities that would otherwise experience a double carbon pricing b ­ urden, F  ­ efined or the purpose of this report, carbon taxes are d as taxes explicitly stating a price on carbon or using a metric directly based on carbon (i.e. price per tCO2e). which could result in a loss of competitiveness. Carbon taxes introduced alongside an existing carbon Some jurisdictions have energy taxes partly based on the pricing instrument aim to cover the emissions not already carbon content of the fuel and some have implemented under the carbon pricing instrument, such as in Ireland taxes stating GHG emission reduction as a goal: neither and France. An exception is the UK where the carbon of these are included in this report. The taxes covered in tax was introduced because the existing instrument was the report are shown in Figure 23. deemed to be too weak. South Africa has decided to pursue a carbon tax instead of an ETS given the l ­imited This section presents key characteristics of the main number of emitters that would fall under a trading taxes and dives into the detail of notable developments scheme. This, however, does not take away the possibility in each one over the past year.228 This report investigates that South Africa may choose to introduce an ETS in each of the taxes in relation to its rate and other interesting the future. features, including revenue recycling and competitiveness considerations. The designs of carbon taxes have evolved to allow more flexibility to reduce emissions. Entities could be Carbon taxes have all been introduced on environ- (partially) exempt from the carbon tax through, for ­ mental grounds with the main purpose to reduce GHG ­example, voluntary agreements to improve energy efficiency­ emissions, but in very different contexts. In the Nordic (Denmark) or the adoption of an emission reduction countries carbon taxes have been implemented since the target (Switzerland). In the newer schemes in South nineties and have evolved as environmental targets have Africa and Mexico, entities will be allowed to use offsets to ­ changed. In some countries (e.g., Sweden) the carbon tax meet their liability under a carbon tax. In Mexico, where was introduced on top of an existing energy tax, while in only credits from domestic CDM projects are allowed, others (e.g., Denmark and Finland) the energy or income this should result in a boost for the local offset market. 228 From January 2013 to April 2014. 229 Source: Speck, S. et al., The Use of Economic Instruments in Nordic and Baltic Environmental Policy 2001–2005, 2006. 77 5   National and sub-national carbon taxes Figure 23 Carbon taxes around the world and the estimated share of GHG emissions covered in their jurisdiction 50% 50% 25% 15% ICELAND NORWAY SWEDEN FINLAND 70% BRITISH COLUMBIA 40% 45% 70% IRELAND DENMARK JAPAN 40% 25% 35% 30% MEXICO UNITED KINGDOM FRANCE SWITZERLAND 80% 60% SOUTH AFRICA AUSTRALIA Reduction of the carbon tax/price rate possible Note 1: The carbon tax in South Africa is scheduled to into effect in through the use of offsets January 2016. Note 2: Australia’s CPM is not a carbon tax, but during the fixed-price period it can be considered similar to a carbon tax. 5.2 Existing carbon taxes 5.2.1 Australia Australia’s CPM started in July 2012 covering all large Tax rate A$24.15/tCO2e (US$21.54/tCO2e). Tax rate emitters from the industrial sectors, large gas ­consumers from July 1, 2013230 and landfill facilities, equivalent to 60% of the total GHG emissions. The CPM is technically an ETS, but Interesting features See Section 4.2.8 for the latest currently operates with a fixed price, effectively acting as developments a carbon tax. 230 Source: Clean Energy Regulator, Australian Government, Fixed Price 2012–2015, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Car- bon-Pricing-Mechanism/About-the-Mechanism/Fixed-Price-2012-15/Pages/default.aspx. 78 5.2.2 exempt from the CO2 tax on fuels for process and power British Columbia generation. However, fuels for the production of district heating are subject to a CO2 tax, even though the district The British Columbia renevue-neutral carbon tax heating plants are in the EU ETS. Energy-­ intensive was introduced in 2008, covering all consumers of ­ fuels sectors not in the EU ETS are given carbon tax ­ and of peat and tires combusted for heat or energy, exemptions similar to free allowances in the EU ETS. ­ which amounts to approximately 70% of all the GHG From 2013 waste incineration plants are included in the ­emissions.228 Exported fuels and fuel consumption by EU ETS and thus also double regulated. aviation and shipping also travelling outside British Columbia are not covered by the carbon tax. Non-­ Tax rate Dkr.167/tCO2 (US$31/tCO2). Tax rate from combustion GHG emissions such as industrial process 2014. Between 2008 and 2015 1.8% annual increase. emissions, venting and fugitive emissions are not covered either. Revenue neutrality is achieved through various Interesting features Before 2014, energy-inten- income tax reductions and tax credits. sive sectors, which are already covered under the EU ETS, could be exempted from the energy saving tax on Tax rate CAN$30/tCO2e232 (US$28/tCO2e). Tax rate ­ sage) electricity (formerly the CO2 tax for electricity u ­ frozen since 2012. 80% exemption to the carbon tax on via a voluntary agreement. In 2013 the government natural gas and propane for heating and CO2 ­production abolished the latter tax for these users and terminated ­ for greenhouse growers, and exemption for colored the voluntary agreement scheme.234 ­ gasoline and colored diesel purchased by farmers from January 2014. 5.2.4 Finland Interesting features The carbon tax has been even revenue-negative since its introduction, with the tax cut In 1990 Finland introduced the Hiilidioksidivero and credits exceeding the revenue. The forecasts of the ­ arbon (CO2 tax), making it the first country to introduce a c budgets up to 2016/17 show that this will remain the tax. The carbon tax covers all consumers of fossil fuels, case. except for fuels for electricity production, c ­ommercial aviation and commercial yachting. ­ Approximately 15% 5.2.3 of the ­ total GHG emissions are covered.235 Denmark Tax rate Increase of the rate for heating fuels in Denmark introduced the CO2-afgiftsloven (CO2 tax 2013 from €30/tCO2 (US$41/tCO2) to €35/tCO2 ­ lectricity, act) in 1992, which applies to oil, gas, coal and e (US$48/tCO2).236 Rate for liquid traffic fuels remains covering approximately 45% of the total GHG unchanged at €60/tCO2 (US$83/tCO2).237 ­emissions.233 Industries subject to EU ETS are generally 231 Source: British Columbia Ministry of Finance, Myths and Facts about the Carbon Tax, April 28, 2013, http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/climate/A6.htm. 232 Source: British Columbia Government, Carbon Tax Review, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/climate/Carbon_Tax_Review_Topic_Box.pdf. 233 Source: Authors’ calculations and IEEP, Evaluation of Environmental Tax Reforms: International Experiences - Annexes to Final Report, June 2013, http://www. ieep.eu/assets/1282/ETR_study_by_IEEP_for_the_Swiss_Government_-_Annexes_-_21_June_2013.pdf. 234 Source: Government of Denmark, Law Amending the Waste and Raw Materials Tax Act, the Carbon Dioxide Tax on Certain En-Ergy Products, the Tax on Electrici- ty, VAT Act and Various Other Acts, accessed January 21, 2014, https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/r0710.aspx?id=152727. 235 Source: Authors’ calculations and IEEP, Evaluation of Environmental Tax Reforms: International Experiences - Annexes to Final Report, June 2013, http://www. ieep.eu/assets/1282/ETR_study_by_IEEP_for_the_Swiss_Government_-_Annexes_-_21_June_2013.pdf. 236 Source: Finland Ministry of Justice, Government Bill on the Law on Liquid Fuels and the Law on Electricity and Certain Fuels, January 21, 2014, http://www.finlex. fi/fi/esitykset/he/2012/20120091. 237 Source: Government of Finland, State Budget Proposals, accessed January 21, 2014, http://budjetti.vm.fi/indox/sisalto.jsp?year=2014&lang=fi&main- doc=/2014/tae/hallituksenEsitys/hallituksenEsitys.xml&id=/2014/tae/hallituksenEsitys/YksityiskohtaisetPerustelut/11/08/07/07.html. 79 5   National and sub-national carbon taxes 5.2.5 Tax rate Íkr1120/tCO2 (US$10/tCO2) from 2014. France Rate based on an EU ETS reference price of Íkr4000 per tonne of carbon or Íkr1090/tCO2.242 The carbon tax In December 2013 the French parliament approved in 2010 was calculated as 50% of the EU ETS reference the introduction of a CO2 component in the Taxe price, rising to 75% in 2011 and 100% in 2012. In 2013 ­intérieure de consommation sur les produits énergétiques it was decided that the carbon tax would increase by 3% (Domestic consumption tax on energy products). This or in line with inflation in 2014.243 tax, in effect from April 1, 2014, is on the use of natural gas, heavy fuel oil and coal not covered by the EU ETS, 5.2.7 and covers approximately 35% of all GHG emissions.238 Ireland From 2015 onwards the carbon tax will be extended to transport fuels and heating oil.239 A carbon tax in the Republic of Ireland was ­mplemented in 2010 for all consumers of natural gas i Tax rate €7/tCO2 (US$10/tCO2) set to increase to under the Natural Gas Carbon Tax and of mineral oil €14.5/tCO2 (US$20/tCO2) in 2015 and €22/tCO2 under the Mineral Oil Tax. The carbon charge covers (US$30/tCO2) in 2016.240 approximately 40% of all GHG emissions.244 In 2013 a carbon tax was also put on solid fossil fuels under the 5.2.6 Solid Fuel Carbon tax. Operators under the EU ETS are Iceland exempted from these taxes. In 2010 Iceland introduced the Kolefnisgjald á ­ kolefni Tax rate €20/tCO2 (US$28/tCO2) for all fossil fuels af jarðefnauppruna (Carbon tax on carbon of fossil from May 2014. Tax rate on natural gas and mineral origin). The carbon tax covers the use of gas oil, diesel, ­ oil remains unchanged from 2012,245 and on solid fuel gasoline, heavy fuel oil, petroleum gas and other g ­ aseous increased from €10/tCO2 (US$14/tCO2) to €20/tCO2 hydrocarbons, amounting to approximately 50% of the (US$28/tCO2) from May 1, 2014.246 total GHG emissions.241 The carbon tax applies to all imported and domestically produced or processed f ­uels, 5.2.8 but vehicles with a foreign destination can have the Japan ­ carbon tax refunded. Initially the tax was only applicable to liquid fossil fuels and set to expire at the end of 2012, In Japan the Tax for Climate Change Mitigation and was later extended indefinitely. Firms included in a ­pplies from 2012 and covers the use of all fossil fuels the EU ETS are exempted from the tax. except for certain parts of the agriculture, transport, industry and electricity production sectors. The coverage ­ of the carbon tax is approximately 70% of the total GHG emissions.247 238 Source: Authors’ calculation Government of France, Finance Bill 2014, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/projets/pl1395.asp. 239 Source: Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, France, Taxation of Energy Products Applicable in 2014, accessed January 21, 2014, http:// www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/La-fiscalite-des-produits,11221.html. 240 Source: Ministry of the Economy and Finance, France, Clarification on Energy and Environmental Taxation under the Financial Legislation 2014, March 12, 2014, http://circulaire.legifrance.gouv.fr/pdf/2014/03/cir_38051.pdf; Government of France, Law No. 2013-1278 of December 29, 2013 on Finance for 2014, December 30, 2013, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=C112ACA602EF0580353CFCAEDCFFDE56.tpdjo09v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEX- T000028399511&categorieLien=id. 241 Source: Authors’ calculation and Iceland Government, Act on Various Grounds Draft Budget for 2014 (Price Etc.), accessed January 21, 2014, http://www. althingi.is/altext/143/s/0471.html. 242 Source: Iceland Government, Bill of Environmental and Resource Taxes, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.althingi.is/altext/138/s/0293.html. 243 Source: Iceland Government, Act on Various Grounds Draft Budget for 2014 (Price Etc.), accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.althingi.is/altext/143/s/0471.html. 244 Does not include the GHG emissions covered by the carbon tax on solid fuels. Source: Convery, F.J., Dunne, L., Joyce, D., Ireland’s Carbon Tax and the Fiscal Crisis. Issues in Fiscal Adjustment, Environmental Effectiveness, Competitiveness, Leakage and Equity Implications, OECD Environment Working Papers, October 3, 2013. 245 Source: Revenue Irish Tax and Customs, Guide to Natural Gas Carbon Tax, November 2013. 246 Source: Revenue Irish Tax and Customs, Guidance Note on Solid Fuel Carbon Tax, December 2013. 247 Source: Authors’ calculations, Ministry of the Environment, Japan, Details on the Carbon Tax (Tax for Climate Change Mitigation), accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/tax/env-tax/20121001a_dct.pdf. 80 Tax rate ¥192/tCO2 (US$2/tCO2) from April 1, Interesting features Companies liable to pay the 2014 set to increase to ¥289/tCO2 (US$3/tCO2) step- carbon tax may choose to pay with credits from CDM wise over 3.5 years.248 When the tax was introduced in projects developed in Mexico, equivalent to the market October 2012 a third of the full tax rate was enforced. value of the credits at the time of paying the tax.251 The In April 2014 this doubled, and the full tax rate will be exact details for using CERs to pay the carbon tax will be enforced from April 2016. specified by the Ministry of Finance. Interesting features The revenues from the ­ carbon 5.2.10 tax will be used for measures to reduce energy-­ related Norway CO2 emissions such as innovation in low-carbon technology, promotion of energy-saving equipment in ­ Norway introduced the CO2 avgift (CO2 tax) in small and medium-sized businesses and promotion of 1991. The tax applies to all consumption of mineral oil, renewable energy.249 gasoline and natural gas. Approximately 50% of the total GHG emissions are covered by the carbon tax.252 Oper- 5.2.9 ators included in the EU ETS are (partially) exempted Mexico from the carbon tax, except for the offshore petroleum industry. Under the Ley del impuesto especial sobre producción y servicios (Special tax on production and services), the Tax rate Nkr.25–419/tCO2 (US$4–69/tCO2) from government introduced a carbon tax on fossil fuel sales 2014. Depends on the fuel type and usage. Increased and import by manufacturers, producers and importers. in 2013 for mineral oil and natural gas as well as fuel This tax, in effect from 2014, covers approximately 40% use in domestic aviation.253 The purpose of the carbon of the total GHG emissions.250 It is not a tax on the full tax increase for domestic aviation is to balance out the carbon content of fuels, but rather on the additional reduction of the EUA price. ­ emissions compared to natural gas. Natural gas therefore is not subject to the carbon tax, though it could be in Interesting features The offshore petroleum ­ sector a future iteration. For now, excluding gas also serves to is paying the highest tax rates while it is also covered support fuel switching where possible. under the EU ETS. This is to encourage the use of electricity generated onshore, which is almost entirely ­ Tax rate Mex$10–50/tCO2 (US$1–4/tCO2) from from ­ hydropower, instead of electricity generated on 2014. Depends on type of fuel. Capped at 3% of the ­petroleum platforms.253 sales price of the fuel. 248 Source: Ministry of the Environment, Japan, Details on the Carbon Tax (Tax for Climate Change Mitigation), accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.env.go.jp/en/ policy/tax/env-tax/20121001a_dct.pdf. 249 Source: Ministry of the Environment, Japan, Introduction of the Tax for Climate Change Mitigation, April 28, 2014, http://www.env.go.jp/policy/tax/about.html. 250 Includes natural gas that was initially covered under the carbon tax as well, but exempted in the final bill. Source: Authors’ calculations; Federal Government of Mexico, Initiative for a Law on Federal Revenues for the 2014 Fiscal Year, January 1, 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/PEF2014/ingresos/01_lif_2014.pdf; Federal Government of Mexico, Initiative for a Decree Reforming, Adding and Amending Several of the Dispositions of the Law on Value Added, the Law on the Special Tax on Production and Services, and the Fiscal Code of the Federation, January 1, 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/PEF2014/ingresos/03_liva.pdf. 251 Source: Special Tax Law and Production Services, December 11, 2013, http://www.normateca.gob.mx/Archivos/66_D_3629_13-01-2014.pdf. 252 Source: Authors’ calculations and IEEP, Evaluation of Environmental Tax Reforms: International Experiences - Annexes to Final Report, June 2013, http://www. ieep.eu/assets/1282/ETR_study_by_IEEP_for_the_Swiss_Government_-_Annexes_-_21_June_2013.pdf. 253 Source: Department of Finance, Norway, Taxes and Customs 2014, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/dok/regpubl/ prop/2013-2014/prop-1-ls-20132014/7.html?id=741130. 81 5   National and sub-national carbon taxes 5.2.11 5.2.12 Sweden Switzerland In 1991 Sweden introduced the Koldioxidskatt (CO2 From 2008 Switzerland imposes a CO2 levy on fossil tax), which covers all fossil fuels used for heating and fuels used for heating and lighting purposes, electricity motor fuels, around 25% of the GHG ­ ­ emissions.254 production in thermal plants and operation of combined Households and services are fully covered by the ­ carbon heat and power plants. Motor fuels are not included. tax, whereas non-ETS industry and ­ agriculture are The coverage of the carbon tax is approximately 30% of ­ partially exempted. Fossil fuel use by EU ETS i ­ nstallations the total GHG emissions.258 Swiss ETS installations are ­ anufacturing purposes is fully exempted if it is used for m ­ exempted from the tax. and partially exempted for other purposes. Tax rate SFr.60/tCO2 (US$68/tCO2) from 2014. Tax rate Skr.1076/tCO2 (US$168/tCO2) from Can be increased up to SFr.120/tCO2 (US$135/tCO2) ­ January 1, 2014. Slight decrease or no change in 2013 if certain emission reduction targets are not achieved. and 2014 for most fuels.255 In July 2013, the rate was raised from SFr.36/tCO2 to SFr.60/tCO2 (US$41/tCO2 to US$68/tCO2) after it be- Interesting features Instead of directly providing came clear that Switzerland would miss its CO2 emission exemptions to all GHG emissions covered under the reduction target for 2012.259 The Swiss government in- EU ETS, carbon tax exemptions have gradually increased dicated that further adjustments to the carbon tax are over the years.256 District heating plants participating in possible in 2016 and 2018.260 the EU ETS and heat from EU ETS plants not used for manufacturing purposes now have to pay 80% of the tax Interesting features Energy-intensive companies rate compared to 94% before 2014.257 not in the Swiss ETS from industrial sectors with a relatively high carbon tax burden and competitiveness risks can be exempted from the carbon tax. In return they have to take on an emission reduction target.261 The targets are set individually according to economically viable GHG emission reduction measures and decrease annually from 2013 until 2020. The achievements are evaluated at the end of the commitment period in 2021 and non-compliance results in a penalty. 254 Source: IEEP, Evaluation of Environmental Tax Reforms: International Experiences - Annexes to Final Report, June 2013, http://www.ieep.eu/assets/1282/ ETR_study_by_IEEP_for_the_Swiss_Government_-_Annexes_-_21_June_2013.pdf. 255 Source: Swedish Tax Agency, Energy, Carbon Dioxide and Sulfur Taxes, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.skatteverket.se/foretagorganisationer/skatter/ punktskatter/energiskatter.4.18e1b10334ebe8bc8000843.html. 256 Source: Swedish Tax Agency, Reduced Carbon Tax on Fuels Used in the Installation Covered by the ETS, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.skatteverket. se/foretagorganisationer/skatter/punktskatter/energiskatter/utslappsratter.4.121b82f011a74172e5880006846.html. 257 Source: Swedish Tax Agency, Reduced Carbon Tax for Certain Heat, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.skatteverket.se/foretagorganisationer/skatter/ punktskatter/energiskatter/sanktkoldioxidskattforvissvarmeproduktion.4.8dcbbe4142d38302d71373.html. 258 Source: Authors’ calculations and IEEP, Evaluation of Environmental Tax Reforms: International Experiences - Annexes to Final Report, June 2013, http://www. ieep.eu/assets/1282/ETR_study_by_IEEP_for_the_Swiss_Government_-_Annexes_-_21_June_2013.pdf. 259 Source: Federal Office for the Environment, Switzerland, 2012 CO2 Target Is Not Reached: CO2 Tax on Fuels Will Be Increased in 2014, July 3, 2013, http:// www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformation/00962/index.html?lang=de&msg-id=49576. 260 Source: Federal Office for the Environment, Switzerland, CO2 Tax Levied on Fuels, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.bafu.admin.ch/co2-abgabe/12357/ index.html?lang=de. 261 Source: Federal Office for the Environment, Switzerland, CO2 Tax Levied on Fuels, accessed April 29, 2014, http://www.bafu.admin.ch/co2-abgabe/12357/ index.html?lang=de. 82 5.2.13 5.3 United Kingdom Emerging carbon taxes The United Kingdom implemented the Carbon Price 5.3.1 Floor from 2013, which applies to fossil fuels used for South Africa electricity generation. The geographical coverage is limited to Great Britain (i.e. Northern Ireland is not included), On February 26, 2014 the Treasury announced bringing the coverage of the carbon tax to approximately a year’s delay in the introduction of the carbon tax to 25% of the total GHG emissions.262 The goal of the tax 2016 to allow time for technical analysis of the tax is to provide a stable carbon price signal in light of the ­ design and assessment of its potential impact. The tax is volatile EUA prices, targeting the electricity generation expected to have a near neutral impact on GDP over the sector covered by the EU ETS on purpose. ­medium term.265 The government published a paper on the carbon tax in May 2013,266 proposing a fuel input Tax rate £9.55/tCO2 (US$15.75/tCO2) from April tax based on the carbon content of the fuel. The carbon 1, 2014. Updated annually and calculated as the differ- tax will cover all stationary direct GHG emissions from ence between the EUA price and annual Carbon Price both fuel combustion and non-energy industrial process Floor target, which is starting at £16/tCO2 in 2013, emissions, amounting to approximately 80% of the total linearly increasing to £30/tCO2 by 2020. On March ­ GHG emissions.267 19, 2014 the government announced a cap of £18/tCO2 (US$30/tCO2) on the tax rate from April 1, 2016 until Tax rate Intended to be R120/tCO2 (US$12/tCO2) March 31, 2020, essentially freezing the tax rate around from 2016, increasing by 10% per year until the end the 2015–2016 levels of £18.08/tCO2 (US$29.93/tCO2).263 of 2019, after which the annual increase is subject to a review. In the transitional period of 2016–2019, a basic Interesting features The government is planning tax-free threshold will be introduced for all sectors, to introduce from April 1, 2015 an exemption from bringing the maximum effective tax rate to R48/tCO2 the tax for fossil fuels used in combined heat and power (US$5/tCO2). plants that generate good quality electricity used on-site. The specifications will be published after a stakeholder Interesting features A complementary offset consultation around the time of the Autumn Statement ­ scheme is also proposed, though its parameters have not 2014.264 been finalized. As in Mexico, entities would be able to meet some of their tax liability (currently the proposal is 5–10%) with carbon offsets. To address competitive- ness concerns for trade-exposed sectors, South Africa is ­ considering several measures, including phasing in the tax over a 10–15-year period, and tax allowances. 262 Source: Authors’ calculations and Aether & Ricardo-AEA, Greenhouse Gas Inventories for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland: 1990–2011, May 31, 2013. 263 Source: HM Revenue & Customs, Carbon Price Floor: Reform and Other Technical Amendments, accessed March 24, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/293849/TIIN_6002_7047_carbon_price_floor_and_other_technical_amendments.pdf. 264 Source: HM Revenue & Customs, Carbon Price Floor, accessed April 29, 2014, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/climate-change-levy/carbon-pf.htm. 265 Source: Gordhan, P., Budget Speech, February 26, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2014/speech/speech.pdf. 266 Source: National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, Updated Carbon Tax Policy Paper: Request for Public Comments, May 2, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov.za/ public%20comments/Press%20Release%20-%20Carbon%20Tax%20Policy%20Paper%202013.pdf. 267 Authors’ calculations using most recent GHG emissions divided per sector for the year 2000. 83 5   National and sub-national carbon taxes 5.3.2 5.4 Other potential taxes Looking back at carbon taxes: in Brazil, Chile, Oregon and the Danish and British Columbia Republic of Korea examples Brazil The government is looking into various carbon 5.4.1 pricing instruments, including a carbon tax.268 In 2013 The Danish carbon tax Brazil conducted an economic evaluation on the impact of various instruments and a study on the international More than 20 years of experience The ­Nordic experience with carbon taxes under the PMR. countries first introduced carbon taxes in the nineties, with Finland imposing a carbon tax in 1990, Sweden and Chile The newly elected government of Chile plans to Norway in 1991 and Denmark in 1992. ­ Performance of introduce a carbon tax, which will have a large impact on these tax schemes has been mixed. All countries show a power sector that is heavily reliant on coal. Should the an improvement in energy intensity b ­ etween 1990 and bill pass congress, operators with boilers or turbines with 2006, with the strongest decline exhibited by D ­ enmark a rated thermal capacity equal to or above 50 MW will and a very limited decrease in energy intensity in be subject to a carbon tax of US$5/tCO2.269 The carbon ­Norway.272 However, it is not clear to what degree this tax is part of the tax reform that will see an increase in can be attributed to the carbon taxes. green taxes. The purpose of the Danish carbon tax was to increase Oregon The state of Oregon is investigating the the profile of climate change and provide an economic f ­ conomy and ­ easibility and impact of a carbon tax on the e incentive to consume less energy from carbon-­ intensive GHG emissions. The study is expected to be ­ concluded sources.273 It was introduced gradually as part of a larger before November 15, 2014. Design options include a 270 environmental tax package, which includes energy taxes carbon tax with revenue recycling, similar to the carbon and a sulfur tax, as well as subsidies for green investments. tax in British Columbia. The purpose was not to increase the overall tax burden, so the energy tax was lowered with the ­ introduction of Republic of Korea Korea is considering intro­ ducing the carbon tax. 274 a carbon tax on vehicles from January 2015.271 The government is working on coordination of the potential ­ The Danish carbon tax covers all consumption of carbon tax with the Korea ETS, the target management fossil fuels (natural gas, oil, coal and non-biodegradable system and the 6th Basic Plan for the power sector. waste used as fuel), with (partial) exemption and refund provisions for sectors covered by the EU ETS (see section 5.2.3).275 268 Source: Ministry of Finance, Brazil, Tax and Financial Mechanisms for a Low Carbon Economy, August 2013, http://www19.senado.gov.br/sdleg-getter/public/ getDocument?docverid=2f586209-8d54-4ba3-ad16-cdea14fca104;1.1. 269 Source: Government of Chile, Tax Reform – Presidential Message No. 24-362, April 1, 2014, http://reformatributaria.gob.cl/Proyecto.pdf. 270 Source: Government of Oregon, Senate Bill 306, accessed May 1, 2014, http://gov.oregonlive.com/bill/2013/SB306/. 271 Source: Ministry of Environment Republic of Korea, Review of the Carbon Tax. Discrimination against Domestic Cars Will Not Be Reversed, accessed April 30, 2014, http://www.me.go.kr/home/web/board/read.do?boardMasterId=1&boardId=342566&menuId=286. 272 Source: Prasad, M., Taxation as a Regulatory Tool: Lessons from Environmental Taxes in Europe, 2009. 273 Source: Speck, S. et al., The Use of Economic Instruments in Nordic and Baltic Environmental Policy 2001–2005, 2006. 274 Source: The Working Group on Environment and Economics, The Use of Economic Instruments in Nordic Environmental Policy 1999–2001, 2002. 275 Source: SKAT, History of the CO2 Tax, Legal Guidance 2014-1, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.skat.dk/SKAT.aspx?oID=2060515&chk=209219. 84 A combination of effective design and an generally positive about the initiative but highlighted enabling environment Primary energy intensity the difficulty of continuous energy efficiency improve- declined by 26% from 1990 to 2010 and CO2 emissions ments. This implies that meeting the initially estimated reduced by 25% per produced unit from 1993 to 2000. emission reductions would have been very challenging. ­ This is largely due to the combination of environmental taxes, including the carbon tax, with subsidies for energy In 2010 the Danish voluntary agreement was changed efficiency and wind energy.276 It is suggested that the to exempt emissions covered under the EU ETS from strong reliance on coal and the limited development of the carbon tax, and to limit the agreement to electricity renewable energy in the 1990s left significant potential consumption and space heating for heavy industry. From for emission reductions and contributed to the success of 2014 the voluntary agreement is terminated as part of the carbon tax.277 The impact on GDP and employment the electricity tax reform, which abolishes the carbon tax was evaluated as generally positive as several measures on electricity (energy saving tax) as this is already covered that had an impact on, amongst others, income tax were by the EU ETS.280 introduced alongside the carbon tax. Carbon tax and the EU ETS: avoiding Furthermore, the Danish carbon tax was designed ­“double taxation” Denmark participates in the to minimize effects on the competitiveness of ­ industry. EU ETS. To avoid double “taxation” on CO2 emissions, The tax was implemented gradually and d ­ ifferentiated a large part of the industry is exempt from the carbon between energy uses. When introduced in 1992, tax. Only fuels used by companies that do not ­participate companies could obtain full refunds on the carbon ­ in the EU ETS are subject to the tax. However, district tax. The refund was lowered to 50% from 1993, with heating and, from 2013, waste incineration are included ­ additional provisions for manufacturing companies in EU ETS and thus double-regulated. Since the EUA that ­ experienced a loss of competitiveness. From 1996, price is much lower than the carbon tax rate, this could only energy­-intensive companies, for whom the tax create an incentive to voluntarily participate in the had a large impact on their value added, could receive EU ETS. Nevertheless, firms cannot just decide to opt in carbon tax refunds by entering into a voluntary agree- ­ to the EU ETS; any inclusion of additional sectors has ment with the Danish Energy Agency. The agreement to be proposed by the member state and approved by the committed participants to implement energy efficiency ­ EC. Furthermore, energy intensive industries not in the and ­management measures.278 EU ETS receive a reduction on the carbon tax, matching the free allowances for EU ETS sectors. By ­ design the ­ oluntary The Danish government expected that these v relatively low carbon price in the EU ETS will t­ herefore agreements would save a total of 400 ktCO2. It is have a limited impact on the future operation of the estimated that they actually saved 230 ktCO2 between ­ ­carbon tax. 1996 and 2003.279 Participants in the agreement were 276 Source: IRENA, Denmark: Market Overview, accessed March 28, 2014, https://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/GWEC_Denmark.pdf. 277 Source: Institute for European Environmental Policy, Evaluation of Environmental Tax Reforms: International Experiences, Annexes to Final Report, June 21, 2013, http://www.ieep.eu/assets/1282/ETR_study_by_IEEP_for_the_Swiss_Government_-_Annexes_-_21_June_2013.pdf. 278 Source: Danish Energy Agency, Voluntary Agreements Industry on Energy Efficiency, accessed February 19, 2014, http://www.ens.dk/en/consumption-savings/ energy-consumption-production-industries/voluntary-agreements-industry-energy. 279 Source: Ericsson, K., Evaluation of the Danish Voluntary Agreements on Energy Efficiency in Trade and Industry, April 13, 2006, http://www.ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/ files/forbrug-besparelser/indsats-virksomheder-0/tilskud-energispareafgift-aftale-energieffektivisering/evaluation%20of%20the%20danish%20voluntary%20 agreements%20april%202006.pdf. 280 Source: Denmark Ministry of Taxation, Overview of the Fiscal Elements of the Danish Growth Plan, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.skm.dk/me- dia/11864/faktaark_vaekst.pdf. 85 5   National and sub-national carbon taxes 5.4.2 –– All carbon tax revenue is recycled through tax The British Columbia ­reductions. Every year the Minister of Finance is revenue-neutral carbon tax required by law to prepare a plan for the coming three ­ ­ nnual budget and fiscal plan, outlining years in the a The British Columbia revenue-neutral carbon tax (BC how the ­ carbon tax revenues will be recycled to tax- carbon tax) was introduced in 2008 as the first ­ carbon payers through tax reductions. The Minister’s salary pricing instrument with a significant carbon price in will be cut by 15% if insufficient measures are taken North America. The BC carbon tax is one of the key to ensure revenue neutrality. instruments in the Climate Action Plan to r­ educe British Columbia’s GHG emissions by 33% below 2007 levels –– Low-income individuals and families are protected. by 2020.281 In 2012 a large review of the BC carbon tax The revenue recycling mechanism includes various was held, but the key features remain largely unchanged tax cuts and credits for low-income households to since its introduction. offset their carbon tax liabilities. A set of core design principles The primary –– The tax will be integrated with other measures. The goal of the BC carbon tax is to encourage low-carbon British Columbia government has committed to develop­ment without increasing the overall tax burden. integrating the carbon tax with other instruments, ­ The BC carbon tax adheres to the following principles:282 such as a cap-and-trade program, when these have been designed and implemented in British Columbia. –– The tax has the broadest possible base. The same BC carbon tax has to be paid by all consumers of fuels The BC carbon tax was designed with contributions and of peat and tires combusted for heat or energy,283 from academic experts through confidential exchanges, which amounts to approximately 70% of total GHG but there was no lobbying or open debate in the m­ edia.284 emissions (see Section 5.2.2). The carbon tax is collected in the same way as motor fuel taxes, including using the same administrative infra­ –– The tax rate started low and increased gradually. The structure, except for natural gas that is collected at the initial carbon tax rate was CAN$10/tCO2e, gradu- retail level.285 These factors contributed to the swift ally increasing by an annual rate of CAN$5/tCO2e ­ introduction of the tax. to CAN$30/tCO2e in 2012. The British Columbia ­ government has committed to freezing the tax rate Debate on the impact of the tax d ­ espite for five years, but may be revised if other ­jurisdictions, a ­ focus on revenue-neutrality The ­ British ­ especially in North America, introduce similar ­ carbon Columbia government strongly emphasises the ­ pricing instruments. revenue-neutral ­ ­ aspect of the tax. The revenue is returned through tax cuts in personal and corporate ­ income tax and tax credits.286 The BC carbon tax has ­ in fact been revenue-negative as the tax cuts and credits have ­exceeded the revenue from the tax and are expected to remain this way.287 281 Other initiatives in the 2008 Plan included the Greenhouse Gas Reductions Targets Act, the Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Cap and Trade) Act enabling the establishment of an ETS, vehicle emissions standards, emission standards to regulate landfill gas, incentives for low-carbon energy generation projects, renewable and low-carbon fuel requirements and development of green communities. See http://www.gov.bc.ca/premier/attachments/climate_action_plan.pdf for more details. 282 Source: British Columbia Ministry of Finance, What Is a Carbon Tax?, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/climate/A1.htm. 283 Source: British Columbia Ministry of Finance, Tax Rates on Fuels, June 2013, http://www.sbr.gov.bc.ca/documents_library/bulletins/mft-ct_005.pdf. 284 Source: Jaccard, M., The Political Acceptability of Carbon Taxes: Lessons from British Columbia, Handbook of Research on Environmental Taxation (Edgar Elgar Publishing, December 2012). 285 British Columbia Ministry of Finance, How the Carbon Tax Works, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/climate/A4.htm 286 Source: IEEP, Evaluation of Environmental Tax Reforms: International Experiences - Annexes to Final Report, June 2013, http://www.ieep.eu/assets/1282/ETR_study_ by_IEEP_for_the_Swiss_Government_-_Annexes_-_21_June_2013.pdf. 287 Source: British Columbia Ministry of Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan – 2014/15 to 2016/17 Carbon Tax Report and Plan, February 2014. 86 The public responded in a broadly positive manner The economic impact of the tax was central to the to the introduction of the BC carbon tax in 2008.288 2012 review and indicated a small negative impact on The revenue-neutrality feature was key to securing the gross domestic product in the province.291 It has been public support and even the business community was estimated that economic growth in British Columbia has mildly supportive of the tax. However, soon after the been on par with the rest of Canada whilst the tax has introduction of the tax fuel prices spiked, resulting in ­ been in force.292 The BC carbon tax had a significant criticism of the tax. It is estimated, however, that the tax ­ environmental impact. From 2008, when the tax was was only responsible for 6% of the price hike.289 In 2009 introduced, to 2011 British Columbia reduced its GHG there were campaigns to get rid of the tax and replace emissions per capita from sources subject to the carbon tax it with a cap-and-trade scheme. However, following the by a total of 10%, while the rest of Canada only ­ reduced provincial election the tax remained in place. their emissions from the same source types by 1% over the same period.292 The reduction in fuel c ­ onsumption was even stronger. The per capita consumption of ­ fuels subject to the BC carbon tax declined by almost 19% » From 2008, when the compared to the rest of Canada in this four-year pe- riod. This is equivalent to a 5% per year decrease in tax was introduced, consumption compared to the rest of the country, break- ­ to 2011 British Columbia ing away from the historical trend of fuel consumption which was in line with the rest of Canada. Approximately reduced its GHG emissions 80% of the reduction was due to the stronger than per capita from sources ­ normal demand impact of the carbon tax compared to a regular price spike.293 Abundant access to hydro­ subject to the carbon tax electricity also contributed to GHG reductions in British by a total of 10%. « ­Columbia.289 The BC carbon tax has become an integral part of the A wide range of interest groups continues to express British Columbia fiscal policy and the budget has become their concerns about the carbon tax, some arguing that increasingly reliant on the carbon tax revenues, making it low-income households are being increasingly hit harder­ politically easier to keep than abolish the existing ­ carbon than high-income households.290 Over the years the tax. While the BC carbon tax has been successful since 289 ­ government has made several concessions to various its introduction and generally supported by the public interest groups through grants and exemptions, with the ­ through effective communication and feedback, the latest being partial grants for greenhouse growers and ­ question is whether it will remain succesful in ­ future. exemptions for colored gasoline and diesel for ­ ­ farmers, While other North American jurisdictions have following the 2012 carbon tax review. ­Contrary 291 implemented or are looking to implement carbon p ­ ­ ricing to ­ other carbon pricing instruments, no ­ specific instruments, the political pressure to extend concessions ­ concessions have been made to the energy-­ intensive in light of competitiveness concerns is expected to keep ­industry. increasing as long as British Columbia has by far the highest carbon price in North America. 288 Source: Harrison, K., A Tale of Two Taxes: The Fate of Environmental Tax Reform in Canada, Review of Policy Research, Vol. 29 (3), Pp. 93-114., 2012. 289 Source: Harrison, K., The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 63 (OECD Publishing, 2013). 290 Source: Lee, M., Fair and Effective Carbon Pricing – Lessons from BC, February 2011. 291 Source: British Columbia Ministry of Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan – 2013/14 to 2015/16 Carbon Tax Report and Plan, June 2013 Update, 2013. 292 Source: Elgie, S. and McClay, J., BC’s Carbon Tax Shift after Five Years: Results – An Environmental (and Economic) Success Story, July 2013. 293 Source: Rivers, N. and Schaufele, B., Carbon Tax Salience and Gasoline Demand, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics Working Paper 1211E, August 2012. 87 section 6 Carbon pricing in the international climate cooperation 6 Carbon pricing in the international climate cooperation C  ­ limate policy developments at the national level,­ including carbon pricing, support countries in implementing their 2020 emission reduction ­ pledges emissions on a pathway that is consistent with ­ ­ limiting temperature increase to 2°C.295 The gap between the pledges and a 2°C pathway is estimated to be 10 GtCO2e (see Table 8). However, with the initiatives currently (see Table 9). implemented, only three (India, the EU and Brazil) out ­ of the 22 major emitters that submitted an ­ international There is no doubt that increased action is needed. A pledge are likely to meet it.294 Even if all 22 were on central question is the role that carbon pricing can play track, the current pledges are insufficient to keep global in making this step-change. » The gap between the pledges and a 2°C pathway is estimated to be 10 GtCO2e. There is no doubt that increased action is needed. A central question is the role that carbon pricing can play in making this step-change. « 294 Source: Vieweg, M. et al, Analysis of Current Greenhouse Gas Emission Trends, 2013, http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/publications/CAT_ Trend_Report.pdf. 295 Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2013, March 12, 2013; Rogelj, J. et al., Copenhagen Accord Pledges Are Paltry. Nature, 464, 2010. 89 6   Carbon pricing in the international climate cooperation Table 8 Emission reduction pledges to 2020 2010 Pledge emission Current trajec- emissions level for 2020 tory for 2020 Pledge Commitments Country (MtCO2e)296 (MtCO2e)297 (MtCO2e)298 description299 beyond 2020300 China 11,182 13,445–13,561 12,770–14,765 40-45% reduction in None CO2e emissions per GDP, relative to 2005 levels 15% share of non fossil energy Increase forest cover to 23% of total landmass US 6,715 5,974 6,041–6,465 17% below 2005 levels 83% below 2005 levels by 2050 EU 5,023 3,935–4,479 4,500 20% below 1990 levels 80–95% below 1990 (unconditional) levels in 2050 30% below 1990 levels (conditional) India 2,692 3,751–3,834 2,655–4,016 20–25% reduction in None CO2e emissions per GDP, relative to 2005 levels Russian 2,510 2,515–2,763 2,085–2,750 15–25% below 1990 50% below 1990 Federation levels levels in 2050 Indonesia 1,946 1,603–1,820 N/A 26–41% below BAU None levels Brazil 1,621 1,973–2,068 1,500–2,630 36–39% below BAU None levels Japan 1,379 Data outdated Data outdated 3.8% below financial 60–80% below 2005 year 2005 levels – current levels in 2050 pledge301 Congo (the 1,113 No pledge Democratic Republic of the) Germany 979 Part of EU pledge Canada 728 614 730–780 17% below 2005 levels 60–70% below 2006 levels in 2050 Mexico 661 672 800–845 30% below BAU levels 50% below 2000 levels in 2050 Korea, 647 543 630–675 30% below BAU level None Republic of 296 Total CO2e emissions excluding short-cycle biomass burning in 2010. Source: European Commission, EDGAR – Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research, accessed March 17, 2013, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. 297 Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2013, March 12, 2013. 298 Independent and official estimates are provided. Official estimates are indicated in brackets. Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2013, March 12, 2013. 299 Source: Climate Action Tracker, Climate Action Tracker, accessed December 18, 2013, www.climateactiontracker.org. 300 Source: Climate Action Tracker, Climate Action Tracker, accessed December 18, 2013, www.climateactiontracker.org. 301 Copenhagen pledge was 25% below 1990 levels but has been revised at COP 19 in Warsaw (2013) to 3.8%. 90 2010 Pledge emission Current trajec- emissions level for 2020 tory for 2020 Pledge Commitments Country (MtCO2e)296 (MtCO2e)297 (MtCO2e)298 description299 beyond 2020300 Australia 629 427–541 475–645 5% below 2000 levels 80% below 2000 (unconditional) levels in 2050 15–25% below 2000 levels (conditional) United 620 Part of EU pledge 80% below 1990 ­ Kingdom levels in 2050 (UK climate change Act) France 538 Part of EU pledge Iran, Islamic 528 No pledge Republic of Central African 512 No pledge Republic Saudi Arabia 495 No pledge Italy 491 Part of EU pledge Poland 450 Part of EU pledge South 422 400–600 560–690 34% below BAU level 40% below BAU Africa level in 2025 Stabilization at this level, decrease after 2035 Turkey 420 No pledge Thailand 413 No pledge Ukraine 397 20% below 1990 levels 50% below 1990 (0.7 GtCO2e) levels by 2050 14% below base year emissions (conditional) Myanmar 362 No pledge Spain 354 Part of EU pledge Pakistan 340 No pledge Malaysia 330 No pledge Kazakhstan 318 10% below 1990 levels 25% below 1992 (conditional) - Kyoto Protocol levels in 2050 15% below 1990 emissions - Copenhagen pledge 91 6   Carbon pricing in the international climate cooperation Table 9 Global emission pathway until 2020 and 2050302 Value for 2020 in GtCO2e Value for 2050 in GtCO2e Business as usual 59 Emission level for current pledges (median)303 52–56 Emission level consistent with 2°C (median)304 44 22 Gap to stay within 2°C limit compared to business as usual 15 Remaining gap to stay within 2°C limit considering pledges 10 (range: 8–12) Making different policies work more To ensure that carbon pricing can have a wider ­effectively together Given the c ­ haracteristics of the a ­ pplication, some issues need to be properly addressed, ­climate change problem, carbon pricing ­instruments can including the impact of carbon pricing on international­ be a cost-effective means of mitigating ­ emissions. They competition, and the limited ability of market design can enable a comprehensive c ­ overage across all GHG, approaches so far to provide a robust price signal. The sectors, sources and technologies, ­ taking ­ advantage of interactions of carbon pricing with other energy and least-cost mitigation opportunities at a global scale, economic policies also needs to be tackled. Support and can support integrated decision making over time. within countries for renewable energy is expanding – all ­ Existing emissions trading schemes cover key s ­ectors major emitters have renewable energy targets of some of the economy including industry (14 ETS ) and 305 sort – widespread efficiency standards are in place for electricity (12 ETS), and, to a lesser extent, ­ transport appliances and building codes, and new car efficiency (5 ETS ) and buildings (5 ETS ). ­ 306 307 However, at standards are being implemented.308 Some suggest that the current level of ambition and in a context of linking of policies could help optimize the variety of uncertainty over the international regime, the ­ ­ political international policies in place (see Box 3). ­ and ­ institutional complexity of designing, linking and ­regulating the multilateral use of carbon pricing instruments creates a challenge. ­ 302 Source: UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2013, 2013. 303 Compared to median estimate of emission level consistent with 2°C. 304 Likely range (≥66%) for limiting global temperature increase to 2°C. 305 Including Chongqing. 306 Including transport fuel opt-in for Australia. 307 Four Chinese pilots and Tokyo. 308 Source: Ecofys, Climate Analytics, and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Analysis of Current Greenhouse Gas Emission Trends, November 30, 2013. 92 Box 3 Linking heterogeneous regulatory systems By Gilbert E. Metcalf, Associate Scholar, Harvard Environmental Economics Program, Harvard Kennedy School of Government; and Professor of Economics, Tufts University A new international climate agreement is to be completed by December 2015, at the Twenty-First Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in Paris. This agreement will become effective in 2020. Countries that are party to the Convention will likely offer commitments of emission reductions that vary widely, with regard to level of ambition and type of contribution (e.g., absolute economy-wide emission reductions, intensity targets, policies with potentially quantifiable outcomes). Countries are also likely to be free to choose how they might fulfill their commitments (possibly subject to some as-yet unspecified review process), and domestic policies will include both market-based mechanisms and non- market regulation. Given the volume of emission reductions that climate science and integrated assessment modeling suggest will be needed after 2020, it is reasonable to explore potential synergies and economies of scale among disparate national efforts. One such approach may involve linkage, which typically refers to the mutual recognition of permits (emissions allowances) between cap-and-trade systems. The central purpose of a ­ cap-and-trade system is to enable emitters, through (explicit, in this case) price signals to identify and pursue their lowest-cost abatement options, thereby allowing system-wide marginal abatement costs to converge and the system as a whole to achieve its emissions-reduction target in a cost-effective manner. Linkage between cap-and-trade systems enhances cost-effectiveness across the linked systems by creating a larger pool of abatement opportunities – hence advancing price harmonization, reducing leakage (migration carbon-intensive production due to cost disparities), increasing market liquidity, and decreasing price of ­ volatility and the potential for market concentration. ­ Is it possible to capture the benefits of linkage on the larger scale that will be required post-2020 by linking heterogeneous systems – cap-and-trade, carbon tax, and non-market regulatory systems? Linking cap-and- ­ ystem trade and carbon tax systems would be relatively easy, as the price in each is explicit. (A carbon tax s may also be considered a market-based system, in which the carbon price, rather than the quantity of emission reductions, is constrained.) Consider country A with a cap-and-trade system and country B with a carbon tax. A firm in country B could purchase country A permits and remit them in lieu of tax payments at the country B tax rate. Conversely, a firm in country B could remit carbon tax payments to its government in excess of its emissions and receive emissions-tax-payment credits (ETPCs) for the excess tax payment, which could be sold to firms in country A for use in place of permits.  93 6   Carbon pricing in the international climate cooperation Linking a cap-and-trade or tax system, in which prices are explicit, with a non-market system, in which they are not, is more difficult. Non-market systems are themselves diverse, but consider one case of country A with a quantity standard (e.g., in this case a fixed emission cap at the level of an individual industrial facility or power plant) and country B with a cap-and-trade system or tax. A linked system would allow firms in country A to produce emissions above the standard if those firms submitted permits or ETPCs purchased from firms in country B. If the country with a quantity standard also allows firms to receive credits for emission reductions in excess of their required reduction, then those credits could be sold to firms in country B. Similar linkages could be designed for countries subject to intensity standards (e.g., a quantity emissions standard per unit GDP). Linkage with countries using a technology standard (e.g., power plants of a particular type must use “best available technology”) would be more difficult, largely due to the difficulty in specifying the emissions level in the absence of the standard. Assuming this “additionality” problem is adequately addressed or is determined to be of insufficient importance (a very significant assumption), the remainder of the exercise would proceed in a manner similar to other non-market systems. Linking heterogeneous systems is not without its administrative and political challenges. But it does increase the likelihood of achieving – in a cost-effective and hence politically feasible manner – what will be significantly more ambitious emission reduction requirements after 2020. More research, analysis, and experimentation are required, however, before heterogeneous linkage might be implemented on a significant scale. For a more detailed analysis, see: Gilbert E. Metcalf and David Weisbach (2010). Linking Policies When Tastes Differ: Global Climate Policy in a Heterogeneous World. Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20264 In the short term, despite a proliferation of carbon to move ­ toward coordination of the many separate pricing initiatives at the national and sub-­ national carbon ­ ­ pricing initiatives (see Box 4). In the absence of a level and the increasing variety of forms and tools ­ ­ global treaty, this could become a pragmatic strategy for of ­carbon pricing that can be used by international ­ achieving more effective cooperation, even if it comes at ­ cooperation, the prospects for coordination are climate ­ the expense of some of the cost-effectiveness gains that a limited. Never­ ­ theless, considerable potential remains broader regime could offer. 94 Box 4 A carbon market for 2°C By Massimo Tavoni, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC) Maintaining global temperature increase below 2°C with reasonable probability will require broad and ­ ambitious action on global emission reductions. Given the slow process of international climate negotiations over the past 20 years, such a transition is likely to happen – if at all – in progressive stages. However, such a fragmented policy action has been shown to significantly increase the costs and feasibility of climate policies, further jeopardizing the chances of seeing policies legislated and implemented.309 The fundamental reasons for the policy impasse reside in the natural tension between responsibility and need for action, which is widely differentiated across regions: countries which will be contributing mostly to additional GHG emissions in the next decades are the ones which have contributed less in the past. Carbon markets offer the opportunity for reconciling equity and efficiency considerations. By distinguishing those who commit to emission reductions from those who pay for such reductions, carbon markets have the potential to ensure that climate policy is attained at the lowest (or close to lowest) cost, while at the same time allowing for different equity principles. Though such mechanisms are well understood in theory and have played a role in the Kyoto process via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), it remains to be seen whether they can also be used in the context of ambitious climate stabilization policies such as 2°C. A recently completed research project (LIMITS) has explored these issues by employing a set of state of the art integrated assessment models to run a series of climate policy scenarios consistent with 2°C. The models assume that efficiency and equity can be managed simultaneously by endowing countries with carbon permits and allowing free trade of them, and have simulated the resulting carbon market which would emerge by a global post-2020 agreement to reach 2°C for different burden sharing schemes. In p ­ articular, a­resource-sharing scheme based on the equalization of per capita emission rights by mid-century was compared to an effort sharing one in which policy costs (expressed in % points of GDP losses) would be ­ equalized across regions. The main results for the policy relevant year of 2030 are summarized in Figure 24. The chart shows that, notwithstanding the expected differences across models and the type of burden sharing scheme, the financial flows associated with the 2030 carbon market trading would be significant, with OECD countries like Europe and North America buying roughly US$50 billion worth of CO2 permits each. This is due to the large trading volumes and the sustained carbon prices needed to attain policies compatible with 2°C. In both burden sharing schemes, OECD countries would be net buyers of permits. The majority of permits would be sold by India and Africa in the per capita allocation scheme, given their low per capita emissions and fast growing population, and by China and the Middle East in the equal effort one. This suggests that developing economies characterized by high emission intensity (like China) or heavily involved in fossil trading (like the Middle East) would be adversely hit by a climate policy without carbon trading vis à vis the other regions, and would need to be compensated with emission rights.310  309 Source: Clarke, L. et al., International Climate Policy Architectures: Overview of the EMF 22 International Scenarios, Energy Economics Vol 31, Vol Supplement 2, Issue 0, December 2009; Kriegler, E. et al., Making or Breaking Climate Targets: The AMPERE Study on Staged Accession Scenarios for Climate Policy, Accepted for Publication in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2014. 310 Source: Stern, D.I. et al., Where in the World Is It Cheapest to Cut Carbon Emissions? Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Vol 56, Issue 3, 2012; Tavoni, M. et al., The Distribution of the Major Economies’ Effort in the Durban Platform Scenarios, accepted for publication in Climate Change Economics, 2014. 95 6   Carbon pricing in the international climate cooperation Figure 24 Regional trade flows of GHG emission permits in 2030 for two effort sharing schemes and the 2°C global objective (positive=selling, negative=buying) Per Capita Equal Effort 200 200 150 150 100 100 50 50 0 0 Trade in CO2 permits in 2030 (US$ billion) -50 -50 -100 -100 -150 -150 -200 -200 e rica D rica e rica Asia D + rica + a N Asia st + + a N st Afric Afric Europ Europ OEC OEC ECO ECO China India China India le Ea le Ea Ame Ame Ame Ame Rest Rest Midd Midd PAC PAC REF REF North Latin North Latin GCAM MESSAGE TIAM-ECN Median IMAGE REMIND WITCH Source: Tavoni et al. 2014, also for the regional definition  96 This analysis indicates that a 2°C carbon market would be a major up-scaling from the current e ­ xperience with CDM credits (CERs), requiring significant development in terms of institutions, monitoring and v ­ erification, property rights, etc. Moreover, the trading positions of the various regions would be highly d ­ ependent on the burden sharing scheme chosen, and it is doubtful whether there is one scheme which fits the needs of current trends of all. Yet, the alternatives are much gloomier: they would either lead to a continuation on the ­ ­ limited climate change control action, or to a fragmentation in terms of policies which would do little for the climate and for the economy. The possibility to develop a common platform for making emission reductions where it is most convenient to do so, remains our most important opportunity for tackling climate change. Linking the experiences and markets developed in specific countries (like the EU, California, etc), and extending those to the major emitting economies, is the right place to start. ­ Full deployment of available instruments of Piloting carbon pricing at an international level international cooperation is needed In the and providing climate finance through market-based longer run, independent of an observed emission path- ­ mechanisms such as RBF might help to bridge the way and of a given scenario of mitigation action, the l ­ evel gap in time between having broadly separate n ­ ational of cooperative engagement would need to ­ significantly and ­ national carbon pricing approaches and sub-­ increase to maintain the overall mitigation costs at the ­ internationally integrated carbon pricing approaches. lowest possible level. As highlighted above, closing the Non-market based forms of cooperation (e.g., direct emission gap to the 2°C target will require a substantial monetary transfers via climate finance, technology lift in the scope and scale of the mitigation effort, c ­ alling transfers and technical ­ ­ assistance)312 are also gaining for fuller deployment of all available instruments of prominence as a way to support development of n ­ ational international cooperation. IPCC’s most recent ­ ­ analysis carbon pricing initiatives and to stimulate exchange of concludes that climate change is addressed in a ­ growing emerging good practices. number of fora and institutions and across a wider range of scales, from international to sub-national and non- More importantly, the growing urgency and p ­ ressing state levels. It also highlights that some regimes that costs of global climate change mitigation and a ­ daptation previously focused on other issues, e.g., trade, e ­ nergy, efforts has the potential to rank carbon pricing biodiversity, and human rights, have begun to address ­instruments alongside other fundamental components of climate change.311 a well-functioning economy. This may change the dynamics of carbon pricing interactions with other policies and The growing experience around carbon markets, at ­ reduce barriers to political acceptability and deployment all levels, will help design more robust and more ­ flexible of market instruments. There may be a point at which ­ instruments and take advantage of opportunities for increasing ambition will need to be accommodated by ­ cooperation and coordination. One key lesson from international carbon pricing approaches. Although it is ­existing carbon pricing instruments is that building efficient not possible to predict when this moment might occur, carbon markets takes time. Both policy makers and market action needs to start early to enable preparation and to players need to go through a learning curve. deliver timely mitigation. 311 Source: IPCC, Working Group III, Chapter 13 International Cooperation: Agreements and Instruments, Final Draft, December 17, 2013. 312 Innovative financial tools that bring together the private sector and institutional investors are gaining in importance, such as climate bonds. See Box 5 in Annex I. 97 Annex I Facts and figures on international carbon pricing approaches I Demand outlook This residual demand for Kyoto credits (CERs and Emission Reduction Units – for Kyoto credits ERUs) is coming mostly from the EU ETS and the Effort Sharing Decision.313 Under the EU ETS, the total demand for Kyoto credits for 2008–2020 is estimated to be about 1,600 to 1,700 MtCO2e, including aviation. Out of this, 1,192 MtCO2e has already been used up to the end of 2013 by compliance installations.314 A further 400 to 500 MtCO2e is therefore available for use until 2020. Market analysts estimate that EU ETS installations are likely to use most of their Kyoto ­ credits limit in the next couple of years, six years ahead of the 2020 deadline, given the current low price and the spread with EUAs and uncertainty on the eligibility of Kyoto credits post-2020.315 ­ The maximum demand under the Decision is about 700 MtCO2e. However, most EU member states are on track to meet their emission reduction target, or the majority of it, and they will therefore not need to use Kyoto credits. Demand is also coming from the NZ ETS, where it is estimated that about 60–70 MtCO2e have been used for compliance by the end of 2013, and around 20–30 MtCO2e are expected to be used in 2014. International credits are currently not allowed from 2015. With Japan pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS demand being met, the demand from Japan, which was coming mainly from the government and trading companies, is estimated to be minimal, if any. Other residual demand from private sector players in voluntary schemes is also estimated to be minimal. 313 For more details on the Effort Sharing Decision, see the EU ETS detailed update sheet. 314 1,059 MtCO2e were used up to the end of 2012 and 132.8 MtCO2e were swapped for EUAs up to end of 2013. The 2013 swapping figure is lower than what most analysts expected. This may be due to the delays in launching the new swapping mechanism, which became operational only six weeks before the swapping deadline. Source: European Commission, Number of international credits exchanged totals 132.8 million, May 2, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/ articles/news_2014050201_en.htm. 315 Under the current EU proposal for 2030 emission reduction targets, no demand for international credits post-2020 is planned. 98 The demand for international credits in Australia is currently uncertain. It will depend on whether the CPM is repealed or not and whether the government’s Direct Action Plan will entail any role for international credits. It will also be influenced by the government’s position on targets, i.e. whether or not the ­ ­ government sticks with its minimum target to reduce emissions by 5% ­ compared to 2000 levels by 2020, or whether it chooses to adopt a stronger target as recommended recently by the Climate Change Authority. ­ Taken together, this suggests a maximum residual demand of around 1,120 to 1,230 MtCO2e, coming from the EU ETS, the Effort Sharing Decision and NZ ETS.316 However, this is likely to be overestimated given the progress of EU member states towards the targets under the Effort Sharing Decision. II CDM Figure 25 Market exodus JP Morgan sold EcoSecurities & closed its carbon trading operation Barclays sold Tricorona back Deutsche Bank and Mabanaft to the company’s management closed their carbon trading operations Sindicatum announced the South Pole bought Perenia diversification of its activities DNV GL and JCI announced their and relocated a large part of Camco announced they would withdrawal from the validation and its staff to Asia stop their CDM activities verification service business 2012 2013 2014 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon 316 In California, CERs and ERUs are not allowed. The California Cap-and-Trade Regulations allow 2% in REDD credits in the first and second compliance period, and 4% in the third compliance period, amounting to a maximum demand of about 90 MtCO2e. 99 Annex I  – Facts and figures on international carbon pricing approaches Table 10 CDM project and PoA registrations and CER issuances Monthly CER and ERU issuance, projects and PoA registrations, Figure 26 and new submissions for validation in 2012 and 2013 Registrations Issuances 1,200 (number of projects and PoAs) (MtCO2e) 1,000 Total to date 7,740 1,451 In 2013 338 265 800 Number of projects and PoAs In 2012 3,428 339 600 registered per month In 2011 1,119 320 400 In 2010 812 132 200 In 2009 686 123 0 In 2008 431 138 2 2 12 2 2 2 3 3 13 3 3 3 Jan 1 Mar 1 Jul 1 Sep 1 Nov 1 Jan 1 Mar 1 Jul 1 Sep 1 Nov 1 May May In 2007 426 77 70 In 2006 409 26 60 In 2005 62 0.1 50 In 2004 1 - 40 Source: UNFCCC, Personal Communication, April 28, 2014. CERs issued (millions) 30 Note 1: The numbers are as of April 25, 2014. Note 2: The number of registrations witnessed in 2013 does not include projects submitted for registration in 2013 but not yet completely ­ 20 processed. Some of these projects might have a retroactive registration date in 2013. ­ 10 0 2 3 2 2 12 2 2 3 13 3 3 3 Jul 1 Sep 1 Nov 1 Jan 1 Mar 1 Mar 1 Jul 1 Sep 1 Nov 1 Jan 1 May May 400 350 300 submitted for validation per month 250 Number of projects and PoAs 200 150 100 50 0 2 12 2 2 2 3 3 13 3 3 3 2 Mar 1 Jul 1 Sep 1 Nov 1 Jan 1 Mar 1 Jul 1 Sep 1 Nov 1 Jan 1 May May Source: UNFCCC, Personal Communication, May 7, 2014. 100 Table 11 Examples of initiatives to support the CDM Instruments In place Examples of (potential) initiatives For more information see Establishment of Suggested Establishment of a CER floor price by Parties UNFCCC, Draft Text on CMP Agenda Item 4 a CER floor price suggested by the EB (a), Issues Relating to the Clean Development Mechanism, Version 2 of 18 November 2013 at 09:30 Hrs, November 18, 2013 Cancellation Yes Voluntary cancellation of CERs by Parties and UNFCCC, Executive Board of the Clean of CERs the private sector, facilitated by rules adopted ­ Development Mechanism Sixty-Ninth Meeting by the EB in September 2012. Since then Report, September 13, 2012. 790,815 CERs have been voluntarily cancelled in the CDM Registry UNFCCC, List of Attestations of Voluntary Cancellations, accessed April 30, 2014, http:// ­ Encouragement for the promotion of voluntary cdm.unfccc.int/Registry/vc_attest/index.html. cancellation of CERs by Parties as a means of closing the pre-2020 ambition gap included in UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.19, Further Advancing the Warsaw ADP decision the Durban Platform, January 31, 2014. Activation of new Yes Acceptance of CERs as offsets under demand sources non-Kyoto Protocol schemes, carbon pricing schemes such as, e.g. under the Mexican carbon tax, the pilot schemes in China, and the ETS in the Republic of Korea Purchase Yes Continuation or stepping-up of CER purchase Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, ­ activities funds, e.g.: NEFCO Norwegian Carbon Procurement ­ –– The Norwegian government, through its Facility (NorCaP) - Call for Proposals, accessed Norwegian Carbon Procurement Facility March 17, 2014, http://www.nefco.org/financ- (NorCaP), launched a call for proposals in ing/norcap_call_for_proposals November 2013 to buy up to 30 million CERs from vulnerable projects by 2020 –– The Swedish government launched a Swedish Energy Agency, Call for CDM similar call for proposals in December 2013 ­ Proposals, December 20, 2013, https://www. to buy up to 10 million CERs from renew- energimyndigheten.se/en/Cooperation/For-a- able energy, energy efficiency and waste better-climate/Flexible-mechanisms-for-mon- management projects that have not yet itoring-green-house-gas-emissions/Swed- been commissioned, and from projects that ish-CDM-and-JI-climate-programmes-/ are at risk of being discontinued and/or are Call-for-CDM-proposals-/ located in Least Developed Countries RBF Yes Use of CERs in RBF schemes, e.g.: Ci-Dev: –– The existing Carbon Initiative for Development (Ci-Dev) which earmarked ­  103 US$95 million to purchase CERs (see Section 3.4.1 for more details) –– Possibly, the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility in the future –– The African Group suggested substantial reforms to improve access to the CDM for projects in low income countries to facilitate its use to deliver RBF 101 Annex I  – Facts and figures on international carbon pricing approaches Figure 27 Looking back at the CDM: expectations and results Expectations Results Pre 2001 End of CP1 (2012) Top-down Contribution estimates based on Early 2000s: of the CDM potential demand Bottom-up –– Withdrawal of the 23-48 % estimates based on US from the of pre-2001 to the overall 10-58 % potential supply Kyoto Protocol expected reductions KP reductions of pre-2001 –– Inclusion of expected reductions crediting for sinks –– Revision of Russian energy projections From mid-2012 onwards: Top-down –– Demand for CERs US$28 billion estimates based on saturated, very low over CP1 potential demand Bottom-up prices, market decline through CER purchases Financial flows estimates based on –– Little prospect of under the CDM 100 billion US$12 –  potential supply rising international US$130 billion over CP1 mitigation ambition investment in through CER purchases CDM projects Note 1: Before 2001, annual demand for emission reductions under Note 3: By the end of 2011, 2,400 million pre-2013 CERs the Kyoto Protocol was estimated at around 1,000 MtCO2e had been contracted in the primary market, and by over CP1, i.e. 5,000 MtCO2e over CP1. The CDM was the end of 2012, 1,155 billion CERs had been issued, expected to contribute between 10 and 58% of these ­ comfortably in the range of the pre-2001 estimates reductions according to top-down estimates, based on ­ ­ (respectively representing 48% and 23% of the marginal abate­ ­ ment cost curves. ­ emission reductions expected under CP1). Note 2: Analysts highlighted more than once that in initial pre-2001 Note 4: Financial flows to developing countries are mostly ­­ predictions, top-down estimates of CDM use were probably through direct investment in CDM projects and over-estimated, and their bottom-up estimates of the emission pur­ ­ chase of primary CERs. By 2012, US$28 billion reduction potential of the CDM were generally toward the pre-2013 CERs had been contracted forward. worth of ­ lower end of the scale. This was due mostly to the political Note 5: The US$130 billion investment figure assumes that all limitations, institutional challenges in developing countries, underlying projects are implemented. Source: Kossoy, transaction costs and huge efforts needed to set up the A., Guigon, P., State and Trends of the Carbon Market operational infrastructure of the mechanism. 2012, 2012. Sources: Grubb, M., The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol, World Economics, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2003; Kossoy, A., Guigon, P., State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012, 2012; Michaelowa, A. and Dutschke, M., Integration of Climate and Development Policies through the Clean Development Mechanism, Europe and the South in the 21st Century. Challenges for Renewed Cooperation, CD-Rom, 2002; Vrolijk, C., The Potential Size of the Clean Development Mechanism, April 1999; Zhang, Z.X., An Economic Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol Using a Global Model Based on the Marginal Abatement Costs of 12 Regions, November 2001. 102 III NMM and FVA Table 12 Summary of the main discussion points on the role and technical design of the NMM and the FVA NMM FVA Role Role –– Role of the NMM in the design of the 2015 agreement, –– Role of the FVA in the design of the 2015 agreement, especially with regards to raising Parties’ ambition in terms of especially with regards to raising Parties’ ambition in terms mitigation and financial support, pre and post-2020 of mitigation and financial support, pre and post-2020. –– Relationship with other mechanisms such as the FVA, the CDM, –– Purpose of the FVA: three main options emerged: 1) a set JI and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) of common rules, 2) a set of minimum criteria and review, and 3) a platform for the sharing of information, reporting Technical design and assessment –– Role of the COP in the NMM –– Scope of the FVA: only carbon units from market-based –– Participation in the NMM: restriction to developing countries approaches or also outcomes from non-market based or possible participation of developed countries approaches; only UNFCCC approaches or also regional, –– Types of standard to ensure environmental integrity, e.g., national, and sub-national and bilateral approaches; only standards which will be defined under the FVA, International mitigation mechanisms or also adaptation related ones. Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards, standards Possible approaches to be covered include CDM and JI, based on the practices under the CDM and JI NMM, regional, national and sub-national ETS, bilateral offset –– Determination of baselines schemes, REDD+, NAMAs, domestic regulations/policies/ –– Modalities for net mitigation: discounting at the point of use targets/taxes, etc. or issuance, conservative crediting thresholds, set-aside of credits by the host country Technical design –– MRV rules: what standards to learn from, how to best use the –– The technical design will depend on the purpose and scope CDM experience of the FVA. The aspects to be covered include ­ accounting –– Design: sectoral trading and crediting vs. broader scope of standards, MRV standards, reporting requirements, approaches independent verification, core characteristics of units, ­ –– Definition of broad segments of the economy tracking infrastructure, contribution to sustainable –– Options for recording and tracking NMM units ­ development in host country, approach to net mitigation IV RBF Ci-Dev initiative The Ci-Dev will use the CDM to support energy access ­ projects in low income countries with a focus on Africa. Most of the purchased CERs will be cancelled and not used against mitigation obligations of the fund participants. One of the key objectives of Ci-Dev is to improve and extend the scope of the CDM, especially for PoAs in the context of applicability of standardized base- lines and establishment of suppressed demand accounting standards. Ci-Dev particularly focus on areas that benefit community and households such as will ­ rural electrification, household energy access and energy efficiency. It also aims to demonstrate that RBF through CER purchases can lead to successful and viable business models that will attract private sector participation. 103 Annex I  – Facts and figures on international carbon pricing approaches V REDD+ Warsaw REDD+ decisions At COP 19 in November 2013, important progress was made on REDD+ with the adoption of the Warsaw REDD+ framework,317 which includes seven decisions on finance, institutional arrangements and ­ methodological issues. Together with earlier COP decisions made between 2007 and 2012, these form the building blocks for REDD+. Specifically on financing of REDD+, it was reaffirmed in Warsaw that RBF for REDD+ may come from a variety of sources, including markets as well as public sources. The GCF was recognized as playing a “key role” for REDD+ financing. In Warsaw, it was also agreed that a UNFCCC information hub for REDD+ ­ activities would be established, thus paving the way for tracking RBF for REDD+ prior to an agreement on a post-2020 climate framework. Building on the ­ Cancun decision on safeguards, Parties agreed that receipt of RBF should be contingent on reporting on safeguards following the same reporting schedule as applicable to national communications. On methodological aspects,318 guidelines and procedures for the review and ­ technical assessment of forest reference emission levels and forest reference levels were agreed. Monitoring and reporting on REDD+ activities should be based on a national forest monitoring system and is expected to build upon existing systems. Monitoring should further reflect the phased approach for ­ REDD+, i.e., scaling from an initial sub-national level up to the national level. REDD+ funds By and large, the adoption of the Warsaw REDD+ framework provided renewed momentum for the REDD+ agenda. Formerly, the principal source of funding for REDD+ had been directed towards readiness activities. The progress in Warsaw leveraged substantial new pledges from donors for multilateral initiatives that are piloting RBF for emission reductions from land-use ­ programs at scale, e.g., the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the new BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes. –– The FCPF is a multilateral global initiative created in 2008 to promote REDD+ capacity building and implementation. An important contribution of the FCPF has been the development of an operational framework for readiness ­ ­ preparation activities consistent with the phased policy framework under the UNFCCC. The Carbon Fund of the FCPF, operational since 2011, is a­multilateral funding mechanism to pilot REDD+ RBF at scale. With a current capitalization of approximately $465 million, the Carbon Fund is set up to pay for emission reductions delivered by a few (indicatively six) large programs at a jurisdictional (e.g., provincial) or national scale. For illustration, a hypothetical price of US$5–10/tCO2e could cover about 2% of current emissions from deforestation, i.e., 60 MtCO2e of total annual emissions of 3,000 MtCO2e. ­ 317 Source: UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Nineteenth Session, Held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013, Part One: Proceedings, Advance Version, Paragraph 44, January 31, 2014. 318 Source: UNFCCC, Decisions 9 to 15/CP.19, January 31, 2014. 104 –– The BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (ISFL) is a new multilateral facility, supported by donor governments and managed by the World Bank. Launched in November 2013, ISFL seeks to promote emission reductions from the land sector, REDD+ and sustainable agriculture, as well as smarter land-use planning, policies and practices. With the current level of funding ($309 million), the BioCF ISFL will create a portfolio of about 4–6 jurisdictional programs. VI Climate bonds Box 5 Climate bonds The growing risks brought on by climate change are raising development costs for the world’s fast-growing cities and developing countries. Government funds alone will never be enough to build resilience to extreme weather and deal with the threats to energy, water and food supplies. The private sector and institutional investors must be involved. Green bonds are an example of an innovation that gives investors an entry point ­ to supporting renewable energy, energy efficiency and other low-carbon projects. This can help countries adapt to and mitigate climate change through a liquid, tradeable instrument in the currency and maturity of their choice, regardless of the lifetime of the supported projects. Bonds represent the largest single pool of capital (US$80 trillion versus US$53 trillion in equities) and the mobilization of the bond market is key to meeting climate finance targets.319 While bonds have been issued to raise finance for low-carbon infrastructure for decades, particularly for rail, they have rarely been labeled as “green” or “climate”. The Climate Bonds Initiative estimates that this unlabeled market linked to climate change stood at US$346 billion in 2013.320 Recently, bonds have been ­ issued specifically as “green” or “climate”. Those financial instruments have been successful in developing a green bond market that helps to mobilize private sector funding for environmental projects and, ultimately, to raise awareness about climate finance opportunities in the capital markets. In 2013, issuers raised in aggregate more than US$11 billion through bonds explicitly tagged as “green bonds”.321 ­ As this new market grows, it expands to more issuers and types of products across the risk spectrum. It can provide much-needed additional financing to build a climate-resilient economy and increase engage- ment between investors and issuers. It also demonstrates that fixed income investors can achieve a positive environmental impact from their investments as well as financial returns. ­ 319 Source: Climate Bonds Initiative, 2013 Overview: The Dawn of an Age of Green Bonds?, February 6, 2014, http://www.climatebonds.net/2014/02/2013-overview/. 320 Source: Climate Bonds Initiative, Bonds and Climate Change – The State of the Market in 2013, June 2013. 321 To date, the World Bank Group has issued a total of US$8.7 billion equivalent (US$5.3 billion equivalent from IBRD through over 60 green bond transactions in 17 currencies and US$3.4 billion from International Finance Corporation). 105 Annex II Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes The following sections provide further detail on the developments in several of the emissions trading schemes and crediting approaches, complementing the summary information in Section 4. VII EU ETS Scope The biggest stationary emitters in Croatia joined the EU ETS from the start of Phase III, six months ahead of the official accession of Croatia to the EU. From January 1, 2014 the aviation sector in Croatia is also fully covered under the EU ETS. Emissions from flights within Croatia and between Croatia and non-EEA countries already had to be monitored and reported from July 1, 2013, when Croatia officially joined the EU.322 Box 6 The EU ETS and international air transport All flights from and to EU-28 airports and Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland (European Economic Area; EEA) were to be covered under the EU ETS from January 2012. However, there was fierce opposition from other countries on the inclusion of their flights, so in November 2012 the EC issued the “Stop the Clock” amendment. This action exempts international flights from and to all EEA countries from the EU ETS for one year to allow time for a decision to develop a global market-based mechanism during the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) General Assembly in October 2013.  322 Source: European Commission, Integration of Croatia into the Aviation Part of the EU ETS, accessed January 28, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/trans- port/aviation/croatia/index_en.htm. 106 On October 3, 2013 the 38th ICAO General Assembly agreed to develop a global market-based mechanism by the next ICAO General Assembly in 2016, with the prospect of implementing the scheme by 2020.323 The goals are for international aviation to reach carbon neutrality in their emissions growth starting in 2020. The work to design a global market-based mechanism for international aviation emissions has already started in 2014 within the ICAO framework. Developing countries included an amendment in the ICAO resolution stating that a mutual agreement must be reached between countries for them to be included in a new or existing market-based mechanism.324 The EU presented a formal reservation to this resolution.325 In response to the outcome of the ICAO General Assembly and to create momentum towards the success- ful establishment of a global market-based mechanism for aviation, the EC proposed to limit the emissions covered from aviation under the EU ETS to the airspace of the EEA from 2014 to 2020.326 In line with the decision at the ICAO General Assembly, flights from and to developing countries with less than 1% of the global transport volume (in revenue ton kilometres) in international civil aviation activities would be exempt from the EU ETS.327 The EC also proposes that aircraft operators do not have the option to participate voluntarily in the full scope of the EU ETS (and receive free allowances for it). The obligations under the EU ETS for flights between airports in the EEA remain unchanged and will be fully enforced. After negotiations the European Council and Parliament reached agreement in March 2014 to extend “Stop to Clock” until 2016, limiting the aviation emissions covered in the EU ETS to flights within the EEA for the period from 2013 to 2016. The European Parliament voted in favor of the extension on April 3, 2014 and it is expected to enter into force on May 1, 2014. Aircraft operators do not have the option to participate in the EU ETS if they are not included, or not fully included. In 2016, in light of the ICAO Assembly that year, a new legislative proposal could be presented by the Commission. Allocation approaches Allocation in Phase III of the EU ETS is different for utilities and industry sectors. Utilities need to buy all of the allowances that they require at auction or from other sources, whilst there are still some free allowances available to industrial participants on the basis of benchmarks. 323 Source: ICAO, Resolution A38-18, Provisional Edition, Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices Related to Environmental Protection – Climate Change, Paragraph 19, November 2013, 19. 324 Source: ICAO, Resolution A38-18, Provisional Edition, Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices Related to Environmental Protection – Climate Change, Paragraph 16a, November 2013. 325 Source: ICAO, Summary Listing of Reservations to Resolution A38-18, November 2013. 326 Source: European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community, in View of the Implementation by 2020 of an International Agreement Applying a Single Global Market-Based Measure to International Aviation Emissions, October 16, 2013. 327 Source: ICAO, Resolution A38-18, Provisional Edition, Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and Practices Related to Environmental Protection – Climate Change, Paragraph 16b, November 2013. 107 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes In 2013 the member states submitted their preliminary allocation plans for these free allowances (National Implementation Measures – NIMs) to the EC. The EC determined in September 2013 that a cross-sectoral correction factor was necessary to limit the amount of free allowances to industry to a specific amount, ­ which reduces year on year.328, 329 In principle the reduction trajectory is fixed for the whole of Phase III. Utilities were already subject to a reduction factor for their non-electricity emissions, which increases annually by 1.74% in a linear fashion. In September 2013 the rules on the cross-sectoral correction factor were published.330 Since then member states have started allocating free allowances ­ to installations for 2013. Free allocation can still vary in the case of significant capacity changes and partial cessation. The allocation of 2013 allowances was ­ completed on February 27, 2014.331 One day later, the window opened for the allocation of 2014 allowances and member states could start handing out 2014 allowances. In 2013 the free allowances for industry and heat production totaled 848 million EUAs332 for the EU-28 and transitional free allowances for electricity generators totaled 152 million EUAs.333 Competitiveness considerations Sectors vulnerable to a risk of carbon leak- age are entitled to more free allowances. The list of eligible sectors expires in 2014 and will be renewed in the course of the year. The EC’s proposal is to use the same criteria and assumptions that have been used for the current sector list, including a reference carbon price of €30/tCO2.334 Additional free allowances for sectors at risk of carbon leakage are given only to cover their direct emissions. To mitigate the potential impact of carbon leakage of sectors due to indirect emissions costs from electricity consumption, the EC allows electricity intensive sectors to be given financial compensation in the form of state aid.335 Whether sectors will receive financial compensation is subject to the discretion of member states. At the moment Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, 328 Source: DG Climate Action, European Commission, Calculations for the Determination of the Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor in the EU ETS in 2013 to 2020, October 22, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/docs/cross_sectoral_correction_factor_en.pdf. 329 This means that the total preliminary free allowances of all industrial installations will be reduced from 100% in 2012 to 94.3% in 2013 and 92.6% in 2014, decreasing to 82.4% in 2020. Source: European Commission, Commission Decision (2013/448/EU) of 5 September 2013 Concerning National Implementation Measures for the Transitional Free Allocation of Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances in Accordance with Article 11 (3) of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ L240/27, 2013. 330 This was the last rule required for member states to determine the final amount of free allowances to each installation. 331 Source: European Commission, Status Table on Free Allocation to Industry and Heat Production for 2013, Final Update, February 26, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/ clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/docs/process_overview_nat_en.pdf. 332 Source: European Commission, Status table on free allocation to industry and heat production for Phase 3, Final update for 2013 and 2014 allocations, May 5, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/docs/process_overview_nat_2014_en.pdf. 333 Source: European Commission, Status Table on Transitional Free Allocation to Power Generators for 2013, January 28, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ ets/cap/auctioning/docs/process_overview_10c_en.pdf. 334 Source: European Commission, Commission Decision determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage, for the period 2015 to 2019 (draft), 2014. 335 Source: European Commission, Guidelines on Certain State Aid Masures in the Context of the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme Post-2012, 2012/C 158/04, 2012. 108 Spain and Belgium (Flanders) have decided to provide financial compensation, which has been approved by the EC.336 Norway is also providing financial com- pensation for electricity intensive sectors.337 Use of offsets Under the EU ETS operators are allowed to use eligible international credits to cover part of their emissions.338 The minimum ­ ­ entitlement to use international credits is specified in Article 11a of the EU ETS Directive for 2008–2020. In November 2013 the EC set the maximum permitted use of ­ international credits equal to the minimum level that the legislation allows,339 which is estimated around 1,600 to 1,700 million international credits for 2008–2020. In total operators used 1,059 million Kyoto credits in Phase II, and swapped 133 million Kyoto credits in 2013, leaving room for the use of 400–500 million international credits to meet their compliance obligations up to 2020.340 Given the current CER prices and the CER–EUA spread, most of the limit for international credits is expected to be used up in the next couple of years. In Phase II international credits could be directly surrendered for compliance. credits Starting from Phase III, under the new registry regulations, international ­ cannot be used directly for compliance and operators need to convert them to EUAs before being able to surrender them. International credits that are ­ eligible for compliance in the EU ETS will be marked “eligible International Credit Holdings” (ICH) and only eligible ICHs can be exchanged for EUAs.341 The final ­ deadlines for converting international credits are the end of March 2015 and December 2020, depending on project specifications backing the credits.342 Price stabilization mechanism In 2012 the EC proposed a one-off “backloading” proposal, to postpone the auctioning of 900 million EUAs from the ­ beginning to the end of Phase III. For the proposal to be implemented it faced scrutiny from the European Parliament and Council and the approval of the EU Climate Change Committee. Over the course of 2013 the backloading proposal faced several delays and amendments as opinion is divided in the Parliament and Council. Some are ­ technology concerned that the EUA price is too low to stimulate any low-carbon ­ investment and prevent lock-in of carbon-intensive technologies due to the large surplus of allowances. See below under “Performance and effectiveness”. Others worry that the backloading proposal will have a negative impact on the 336 Source: European Commission, State Aids Cases by Date - Last 3 Months, accessed January 28, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index. cfm?fuseaction=dsp_sa_by_date. 337 Source: EFTA Surveillance Authority, State Aid: Norwegian CO2 Compensation Scheme Approved, accessed January 28, 2014, http://www.eftasurv.int/ press--publications/press-releases/state-aid/nr/2082. 338 For a list of eligible international credits in the EU ETS, see 2013 report and http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/faq_en.htm 339 Source: European Commission, Commission Regulation (EU) on Determining International Credit Entitlements pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Draft Legislation), 2013. 340 Source: World Bank, Mapping Carbon Pricing Initiatives 2013, Developments and Prospects, May 2013; European Commission, International Carbon Market, accessed January 28, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/index_en.htm. 341 Source: European Commission, Questions & Answers on Implementation of Rules Regarding the Eligibility of International Credits in the EU ETS (07/2013), accessed January 28, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/faq_en.htm. 342 Source: European Commission, Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of 2 May 2013 establishing a Union Registry pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Decisions No 280/2004/EC and No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Commission Regulations (EU) No 920/2010 and No 1193/2011, 2013. 109 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes ­ ompetitiveness of the EU and may set a ­ c precedent for political intervention in the EU ETS in the future. The expectations and announcements by various ­ member states and EU committees regarding the backloading proposal largely dominated the EUA price development (see Figure 14). The backloading proposal went through several parliament committee votes before going to the European Parliament plenary vote. The Parliament’s ­ ­ industry committee (ITRE) voted against the proposal in January 2013. However, the ­ environment committee (ENVI) leads on this dossier so the ITRE vote only had an advisory role. In February ENVI voted in favor of the proposal, but they were not able to agree whether the discussions could already move to the European Council or wait until after the full Parliament vote. This resulted in a relatively weak positive impact on the EUA price. In April 2013 the Parliament rejected the backloading draft amendment, sending the EUA price tumbling by over 40% to a record low of €2.60343 and forcing the amendment to be sent back for revision. In June ENVI voted in favor of the revised backloading amendment and the bill was presented to the Parliament ­ again in July with two key amendments, this time passing the vote. A precondition was added that it should not result in the loss of competitiveness for industry and emphasizing that the amendment was a “one-off” measure. After several months of uncertainty due to national elections in different member states, in December 2013 the European Council also agreed to the backloading amendment and the Parliament reaffirmed its support. In January 2014 backloading was approved by the EU Climate Change Committee.344 After several months of reiterations and uncertainties, the backloading proposal was finally put into legislation in February 2014.345 This paves the way for 400 million EUAs to be held back from auctions in 2014, 300 million in 2015 and another 200 million in 2016. The allowances will be gradually released for sale in auctions in 2019 (300 million EUAs) and 2020 (600 million EUAs). A more permanent price stabilization mechanism is planned for Phase IV of the scheme (see below under “Looking ahead”). Part of the proposal is essentially to spread out the re-introduction of the 600 million EUAs in 2020 over 2021 and 2022. Performance and effectiveness Demand outstripped emissions in Phase II of the EU ETS, resulting in low carbon prices and a so-called surplus of nearly 2 billion allowances. The most appropriate way to treat this surplus has been the subject of intense debate in 2013. The “NER300” fund is established in Phase III, targeted at demonstration projects in innovative renewable energy technologies and carbon capture and storage. The fund is so-called as the mon- 343 Source: Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, EU Parliament Rejects Carbon Market Rescue Fix, April 16, 2013, http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.2282756?- date=20130416&sdtc=1. 344 Source: European Commission, Structural Reform of the European Carbon Market, accessed January 28, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/ index_en.htm. 345 Source: European Commission, Back-Loading: 2014 Auction Volume Reduced by 400 Million Allowances, February 27, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/ articles/news_2014022701_en.htm. 110 ey comes from the revenue from the sale of the 300 million EUAs from the New Reserve (NER). At the end of 2012, 200 million EUAs had already been Entrants ­ auctioned, and the remaining 100 million are in the process of being auctioned. ­ MRV and registry In 2013 two new legally binding regulations came into force: the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation and Accreditation and ­ Verification Regulation, which should further harmonise MRV across European member ­ states. The registry regulations were amended in May 2013 to change the way international credits are surrendered for compliance in the EU ETS.346 (See under “Use of offsets” above.) Linking to other schemes Negotiations are ongoing to link the Swiss scheme with the EU ETS. The fourth and fifth rounds of negotiations were held in July and December 2013 respectively. Linking with the Australian CPM had been planned; however, with uncertainties about the future of the Australian scheme, discussions are on hold for the moment. Looking ahead On January 22, 2014 the EC announced their intentions for a European framework on climate and energy to 2030. The framework is the first proposal for 2030 and will be heavily debated in the coming years by the European Parliament and the Council before being set in law. Nonetheless, the proposal provides a concrete indication of the future the EC is working towards. The 2030 framework contains a proposed GHG reduction target for the European Union as a whole of 40% below 1990 levels by 2030.347 As part of this, the EC proposes to increase the linear annual reduction of the EU ETS cap from 1.74% to 2.2%, starting from the beginning of Phase IV in 2021. In the proposal, all emission reductions from 2020 onwards will need to be met within the EU. Allowances carried over from Phase III of the EU ETS can be used after 2020, but emission reduction obligations for the EU as a whole cannot be met through international credits. If a global agreement on climate change is reached in 2015 the emission reduction target for the EU will be increased and the use of international credits may be revised. As part of the ongoing reform of the EU ETS, the 2030 framework includes a proposal for a market stability reserve under the EU ETS from Phase IV ­ ­ onwards.348 The purpose of the reserve is to address the surplus of ­ allowances that has built up and improve the system’s resilience against major demand shocks in the ­future. This is done by adjusting the amount of allowances to be auctioned adjustments by according to clear predefined rules that prevent any discretionary ­ the EC or member states. 346 Source: European Commission, Questions & Answers on Implementation of Rules Regarding the Eligibility of International Credits in the EU ETS (07/2013), accessed January 28, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/faq_en.htm. 347 Source: European Commission, Commission Launches Second Step to Reform the EU ETS, January 22, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/ news_2014012201_en.htm. 348 Source: European Commission, Structural Reform of the European Carbon Market, accessed January 28, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/ index_en.htm. 111 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes The market stability reserve proposed by the EC will start in 2021 and is triggered when the market surplus of allowances (termed “emission allowances ­ in ­ circulation” by the EC) is not within a predefined range:349 –– If the market surplus recorded two years back is larger than 833 million EUAs (or approximately 42% of the total annual allocation cap of 2,084 million tons), 12% of the surplus allowances will be withheld from the auction volumes and added into the reserve. –– If the market surplus is smaller than 400 million EUAs, a predefined volume of 100 million EUAs per year will be released. The market surplus350 is the amount of allowances left from previous years, which can be used for compliance in future years, and is published by the EC annually in May. In addition, if the total surplus is above 400 million EUAs the release of allowances from the reserve can also be triggered by Article 29a of the EU ETS Directive. This means that if the actual EUA price is more than three times the average EUA price during the two preceding years for six consecutive months, 100 million EUAs will be added to future auction volumes (or all EUAs if there are less than 100 million in the reserve). A review of the market stability reserve will take place by December 31, 2026, with a focus on the level of the triggers and the amount of surplus to withhold and release. The market stability reserve of the EU ETS will be the first of its kind in the world as it is triggered by the total surplus of allowances. The schemes in California, Québec and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) also have a market stability reserve, but these use the allowance price as a trigger to regulate auctioning volumes instead of a quantity-based indicator such as the surplus of allowances. Carbon pricing in context Carbon pricing instruments often coexist with other heterogeneous policies that may directly or indirectly contribute to reducing GHG emissions by addressing areas such energy or infrastructure. Thus, they have to be planned to interact and complement other strategic priorities at regional and national levels. The EU ETS remains the backbone of EU climate policy. Other related policies at the EU level are illustrated in Box 7 below. 349 Source: European Commission, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Establishment and Operation of a Market Stability Reserve for the Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme and Amending Directive 2003/87/EC, 2014. 350 The market surplus is calculated by adding the total amount of international credits used from 2008 to the previous year to the total amount of EUAs issued in the same period, followed by subtracting the total emissions from 2008 to the previous year and the number of allowances in the market stability reserve in the previous year. 112 Box 7 Europe’s climate ambitions: the EU ETS in context The EU ETS is the major carbon pricing mechanism in Europe and has been operational since January 2005, covering the power sector, selected industry sectors and aviation. This is complemented by the Effort Sharing Decision, which covers sectors outside the ETS. In addition, Directives are in place for renewable energy and energy efficiency development. An overview of the most important policies is given in Table 13. Table 13 Most relevant non-carbon pricing policies at the EU level and their link to the EU ETS351 Policy Implications for GHG emissions Linkage to and overlap with the EU ETS Effort Sharing Decision National GHG reduction targets for non- No overlap as it explicitly covers the non-ETS ETS sectors for 2013–2020, taking full sectors. Restricted use of flexible mechanisms account of the flexibility provisions such possible but no trading link to ETS as transfers between member states Renewable Energy National targets to increase the share Overlap as contributes to achievement of ETS Directive of renewable energy in overall energy target in power sector consumption to reach the 20% EU wide target by 2020 Energy Efficiency Expected to influence energy efficiency Overlap as energy efficiency achieved on the Directive in different sectors demand side contributes to achievement of ETS target in power sector Recast of the Energy New building requirements are Overlap if electricity or district heating is reduced, Performance of Build- e ­ xpected to positively affect thermal however this is likely only to a limited extent ings Directive integrity of buildings and requirements for new buildings after 2020 Ecodesign and Energy The Directive sets energy performance Overlap as energy efficiency achieved on the Labelling Framework standards for a wide range of products. demand side contributes to achievement of ETS Directives As requirements and labeling concern target in power sector only new products, the effect will be gradual (marginal in 2010; rather small in 2015 up to full effect by 2030) Comprehensiveness of climate action The EU has set climate and energy targets for 2020 as part of the climate and energy package. The so-called “20-20-20” targets are as follows: a 20% reduction in GHG from 1990 levels, an increase in energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20%, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency. However, the targets are not internally consistent – if the renewable energy and energy efficiency targets are achieved the GHG target will be overachieved.352 To 2030 a proposal by the EC sets a vision for a 40% GHG reduction target (compared to 1990) and a renewable energy target of at least 27%.353 The vision is still to be agreed and details to be clarified. 351 Source: Roelfsema, M. et al., Are Major Economies on Track to Achieve their Pledges for 2020? An Assessment of Domestic Climate and Energy Policies, Energy Policy, 2013. 352 Source: Höhne, N. et al., Consistency of Policy Instruments. How the EU Could Move to a -30% Greenhouse Gas Reduction Target, 2011. 353 Source: European Commission, 2030 Climate and Energy Goals for a Competitive, Secure and Low-Carbon EU Economy, January 22, 2014, http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_IP-14-54_en.htm. 113 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes VIII California Allocation approaches Allocation is based on a combination of auctioning and Cap-and-Trade free allocation according to dynamic product-based benchmarking. An investment Program plan was approved in May 2013,354 which sets out how the proceeds from auctioning allowances from the Program will be used and recommends funding priorities. The Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund receives the full proceeds from auctioning, both of allowances and from the central reserve. Funding is recommended to be ­ prioritized into three key areas: sustainable communities and clean transportation; energy ­ efficiency and clean energy; and natural resources and waste diversion. Eligibility for funding includes all types of activities from the initial idea through to implementation. Public sector agencies applying for funding must adhere to the requirements of the legislation regarding the processes to follow and the use of the money. In August 2013 there were rulings355 in favor of the ARB in two similar lawsuits related to auctioning. Both the California Chamber of Commerce and the Morning ­ Star Packing Company claimed that allowance auctions under the Californian Pro- gram are tantamount to a tax and therefore the development of the regulation had not been approved through the appropriate bodies. The judge ruled that this is not the case and that the auctions are akin to a regulatory fee, and therefore permissible. Competitiveness considerations Carbon leakage assessments are ongoing, in particular considering the ability of the agricultural sector and food producers to pass on carbon costs to their consumers. Any changes to the regulations in relation to carbon leakage determinants and allocation approaches need to be in place by November 2014. In February 2014 ARB held a public meeting to discuss the possibility of a border carbon adjustment to address carbon leakage in the cement sector, as ­ an ­ alternative to the free allocation approach currently used to address carbon leakage in all sectors. A detailed proposal is expected in July 2014.356 Use of offsets California offset protocols are only valid in the lower 48 states.357 Offsets from Canada are also acceptable if issued by Québec. California-issued offsets must adhere to an approved offset protocol. Protocols are available for projects relating to: forests, urban forests, livestock and ozone depleting substances. Two new protocols are currently being discussed – mine methane capture and rice cultivation – with decisions expected in Spring and Fall 2014 respectively. ARB regularly lists early-action offset projects, transforming voluntary credits into compliance offsets, and compliance offset projects developed under ARB’s offset protocols. ARB had issued over 7.5 million compliance and early action offsets as of April 2014.358 354 Source: California Air Resources Board, Cap-and-Trade Auction Proceeds Investment Plan: Fiscal Years 2013–14 through 2015–16, May 14, 2013. 355 Source: Superior Court of California, County of Sacremento, Joint Ruling on Submitted Matters Case No: 34-2012-80001313 and Related Case No: 34-2013- 80001464, August 28, 2013. 356 Source: California Air Resources Board, California Cap-and-Trade Program: Potential Border Carbon Adjustment for the Cement Sector, February 5, 2014, http:// www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/020514/border-carbon-adjustment.pdf. 357 Lower 48 states excludes Alaska and Hawaii. 358 Source: California Air Resources Board, California’s Compliance Offset Programme, February 19, 2014. 114 International offsets from eligible sector-based systems can be used up to a compliance limit of 2% of the total compliance obligation in the first and second ­ periods (or 25% of the total 8% limit for offsets usage), and up to 4% in the ­ third period. The framework is constructed in a way that should enable the ­ participation of relevant international programs of sufficient quality and at a sector level in a region. This framework particularly refers to REDD+, but needs ­ further ­development. It could be used more broadly than REDD+ eventually.359 Performance and effectiveness Allowance prices at auction are stable and in the range indicated at the start of the Program. Reserve auctions have not been triggered to date as allowance prices have been significantly below the trigger price of US$40.360 Linking to other schemes In October 2013, ARB and the Government of ­ uébec confirmed that linking of the two cap-and-trade programs would go Q ahead. A clear agreement defining the process for working together to ­harmonize and integrate the two programs was at the heart of this announcement.361 ­Formal linking began in January 2014. The first joint auctions should take place in Fall 2014.362 A linkage readiness report outlines some areas where further work will be needed, including coordinating future development of the programs and working towards a joint auctioning platform.363 Linking these two programs was a result of the common development route of the two programs, which both use the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) templates. In addition, the California and Québec Programs already have pre-defined criteria to assess another scheme as appropriate for linking. The programs will use a common registry, the Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (CITSS). Looking ahead Areas of proposed amendments to the overarching legislation include allocation rules, market program implementation, and offset program implementation.364 Within allocation rules, ARB is considering allocation for new ­ sectors and changes to transition assistance for existing sectors. To further ­ support GHG reduction investments, there is a proposal to delay the reduction in 359 Source: California Air Resources Board, ARB Emissions Trading Program Overview, January 21, 2011, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/emissions_trad- ing_program.pdf. 360 Source: California Air Resources Board, California Air Resources Board Quarterly Auction 6 February 2014, Summary Results Report, February 24, 2014, http:// www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/february-2014/results.pdf. 361 Source: California Air Resources Board, Linkage, accessed January 6, 2014, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm. 362 Source: California Air Resources Board, Letter to Governor Brown, November 1, 2013, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/readiness_report_trans- mittal_final.pdf. 363 Source: California Air Resources Board, Linkage Readiness Report, November 1, 2013. 364 Further specific changes include: the addition of lead acid batter recyclers; clarification on inclusion thresholds and modification on the treatment of waste-to-en- ergy facilities; adding a placeholder to decide how to treat closures where allocation has taken place, but the compliance period has not ended; clarifications about opt-in entities to prevent allocation being given and then entities rescinding their interest to opt in; market protection clauses to ensure that individuals that will participate as voluntarily associated entities or registered participants do not have conflicts of interest; clarity provided on resource shuffling; removal of a sunset clause on exemption of military facilities; limited use of borrowing allowed; allocation date changed to October 15 from November 1 to facilitate limited borrowing; leakage assistance factor shifted so that it will be kept at 100% for the second compliance period. In the third compliance period it will be 100% for high, 75% for medium and 50% for low leakage classifications. In the third compliance period assessment of the leakage classifications is anticipated; revised or modified product benchmarks for a number of sectors including upstream oil and gas, refining, glass manufacturing and several others; new proposal for alloca- tion to natural gas suppliers (the approach will start with 100% free allocation and then phasing in consignment and use of related funds); provisions to enable the linking with Québec to function appropriately; modifications and clarifications to MRV rules relating to offset projects. 115 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes allowance allocation assistance factors365 by one compliance period to give industry greater advanced warning about their number of allowances.366 ­ Ongoing collaborative initiatives include the Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate ­ and ­Energy, building on agreements between West Coast US states and British Columbia in 2008, and a Memorandum of Understanding with China.367 Carbon pricing efforts at the state level coexist with other state and federal level policies that may directly or indirectly contribute to reduce GHG emissions. ­ Examples of such policies are given in Box 8. ­ Box 8 US carbon pricing instruments in context Major GHG emission policies A variety of activities are taking place in the US, at both the state and federal level, and in all sectors. State level activities have a large influence on activities at the local level. Table 14 highlights potential linkages between federal level policies and state level carbon pricing instruments. Table 14 Most relevant non-carbon pricing policies at the national level in the US and their link to carbon pricing Policy Implications on GHG emissions Linkage to and overlap with carbon pricing Light duty vehicle Mainly long-term impact (after 2020) Overlap with state level carbon pricing, e.g., ­ tandard, phase II s in California, where transport is included, no explicit link New Source Hardly any deviation from business Overlap with state level carbon pricing ­ erformance Standard P as usual (BAU) due to low gas prices ­ mechanism (e.g., California) The President’s Targets set would lead to achieving No carbon pricing explicitly included but ­ limate Action Plan C the international pledge of reducing various elements of the plan could overlap (CAP) national emissions by 17% below 2005 with the Californian program in 2020, but not fully implemented yet Comprehensiveness of climate action The US pledge under the Copenhagen Accord is a 17% emission reduction relative to 2005 levels in 2020, as well as a long-term target to 2050. Obama’s “Climate Action Plan” is a relatively comprehensive list of additional activities, most of which still need to be implemented. It describes mitigation actions and includes instructions for the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate GHG emissions. However currently it includes no discussion of carbon pricing, emissions trading or carbon taxes. The EPA is exploring the use of the Clean Air Act to regulate GHG emissions, and this could include allowing the flexibility for states to adhere to new rules using a range of policies, including carbon pricing mechanisms. 365 These factors relate to carbon leakage risk and are used, in conjunction with the allocation benchmark methodology, to calculate allocation of free allowances. 366 Source: California Air Resources Board, Notice and Summary of Proposed Changes to the California Cap and Trade Programme, accessed February 25, 2014, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/071813/ctnotice0713.pdf. 367 Source: Pacific Coast Collaborative, accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.pacificcoastcollaborative.org/Pages/Welcome.aspx. 116 IX RGGI Scope Following the withdrawal of New Jersey in 2011, the program now covers power sector CO2 emissions in nine states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. In New Jersey some stakeholders continue to push the state to rejoin RGGI. On December 14, 2013 the Senate’s Environment and Solid Waste Committee voted in favor of a resolution to ask voters if the state should participate in the initiative. This state resolution vote is not planned yet, and may not take place for several years.368 In March 2014, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court ruled that the New Jersey administration did not follow proper procedures when it pulled out of RGGI in 2011, but this ruling does not mean that the state will need to rejoin.369 Performance and effectiveness In the third quarter of 2013 auction prices stood at US$3, in line with average prices in the secondary market of just over US$3 in the same period.370 Volumes being traded in the primary market are increasing. RGGI’s cost containment reserve (CCR) was triggered for the first ­ time in the March 2014 auction, when the trigger price of US$4 was reached, and an extra 5 million allowances released and sold at this price.371 Looking ahead The RGGI states submitted comments to the US EPA on what they would like to see happen in relation to proposed GHG targets for ­ existing power plants under the Clean Air Act. These comments emphasized a need to reward early actors, and allow flexibility to states on how to adhere to rules about carbon pollution, with the option to use, amongst other mechanisms, a market-based approach.372 X Québec Cap- Performance and effectiveness All of the proceeds from auction sales are and-Trade System devoted to implementing the 2013–2020 climate change action plan which (Canada) ­ includes programs encouraging energy efficiency, the use of renewable ­ energies, public transportation and the electrification of transport. By 2020, the govern- ment expects to collect at least CAN$3 billion that will be entirely invested in GHG mitigation and climate change adaptation initiatives. Already, 98% of ­ Québec’s electricity production and 50% of its energy use come from renewable sources, mostly hydro and wind.373 368 Source: Friedman, M., Senate Panel Seeks to Go around Chris Christie to Rejoin RGGI, December 12, 2013, http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/12/sen- ate_panel_seeks_to_go_around_chris_christie_to_re-join_rggi.html; Environmental Finance, RGGI: A Revived Greenhouse Gas Initiative, March 12, 2014, http:// www.environmental-finance.com/content/analysis/rggi-a-revived-greenhouse-gas-initiative.html. 369 Source: Sheppard, K., Court: Christie Administration Didn’t Follow Rules in Exit From Emissions Program, March 25, 2014. 370 Source: Potomac Economics, Report on the Secondary Market for RGGI CO2 Allowances: Fourth Quarter 2013, February 2014. 371 Source: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc., Auction Results, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results/auction-23. 372 Source: Esty, D.C. et al., Letter to Administrator McCarthy, December 2, 2013, http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_States_111d_Letter_Comments.pdf. 373 Source: Ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement, de la Faune et des Parcs, Direct Communication, March 31, 2014. 117 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes Linking to other schemes The Québec and California cap-and-trade programs were officially linked on January 1, 2014.374 Detailed preparations ­ took place during 2013 (see Section 4.2.3 on California). As part of the agree- ment a ­consultation committee is established to monitor and coordinate the link. Québec is represented on this committee by the Assistant Deputy Minister of ­ the Ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement, de la Faune et des Parcs, and California by an ARB Executive Officer. Regular consultation takes place to ensure continued harmonization of the systems. Québec and California are the only WCI members to have put in place a cap- and-trade system. However, the Board meetings have also been attended by the Canadian Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia.375 Engagement of other provinces and states wishing to set up similar schemes that could be linked to Québec and California’s systems are welcome. XI Australia CPM The Australia CPM came into operation in July 2012. It takes place in two steps, a fixed price period from 2012 to 2015 and a flexible price period planned to start in 2015. The status of the CPM is in flux. The current administration ­ proposes to abolish the CPM and implement the Direct Action Plan. Together with the 376 Renewable Energy Target, the Direct Action Plan is intended to support Australia in meeting its existing minimum emission reduction target of 5% below 2000 emissions by 2020.377 The purpose of the Direct Action Plan is to incentivize abatement activities across the whole economy. The centerpiece of the Direct Action Plan is the Emissions Reduction Fund.378 The government plans to “buy” abatement through the fund by offering financial incentives for low cost emission reductions in the form of reverse auctions. The fund is set to run from July 1, 2014 until 2020 and will receive an initial allocation of A$2.55 billion (US$2.3 billion).379 The fund will be based on the existing Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI). Emission reductions made in light of the Direct Action Plan will receive the same ACCUs as under the CFI. The Government is consulting on the length of contracts to be offered under the Emissions Reduction Fund.380 Under the Emissions Reduction Fund, firms will be encouraged to reduce their mechanism emissions, equal to historical BAU emissions. An additional ‘safeguard’ ­ will be developed to incentivize firms to remain below baseline ­ emissions. The recent White Paper provides more detail on the approach.381 ­ 374 Source: Government of Québec, Gazette Officielle Du Québec, Vol 145, No 49, December 4, 2013. 375 Source: WCI, Inc., http://www.wci-inc.org/docs/2013-09-19_WCI%20Inc%20Board%20Minutes.pdf, Minutes of Board of Directors, September 19, 2013. 376 Source: Clean Energy Regulator, Australian Government, Carbon Pricing Mechanism, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Pages/default.aspx. 377 A conditional target range of 5–25% remains. 378 Source: Department of the Environment, Australian Government, Emissions Reduction Fund, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.environment.gov.au/topics/ cleaner-environment/clean-air/emissions-reduction-fund. 379 Source: Australian Government, Emission Reduction Fund White Paper, April 2014. 380 Source: Department of the Environment, Australian Government, Emissions Reduction Fund Green Paper, 2013. 381 Source: Australian Government, Emission Reduction Fund White Paper, April 2014. 118 The government started the process to abolish the CPM in November 2013 by introducing the Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Bill 2013 and a package of other bills, which would repeal the Clean Energy Act 2011, the legislative basis for the CPM.382 In the bill the CPM is set to end on June 30, ­ 2014, even if the bill does not pass before that date. In the latter case retrospec- tive changes would apply.383 To repeal the CPM, the bill needs to be passed in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The government holds a majority in the House ­ of ­Representatives, which passed the bill on November 21, 2013.384 However, the government does not have a majority in the Senate385 and they rejected the bill on March 20, 2014.386 From July 2014 the composition of the Senate will change, which may lead to the bill being passed later in 2014. In the meantime Australia’s CPM continues its operations and completed its first year of operation on June 30, 2013. The first three years of the scheme have a fixed carbon price: A$23 (US$20.52) in the first year, rising to A$24.15 (US$21.54) for the second year.387 Scope In the first trading year of the CPM, 348 entities were included in the mechanism, as published in the Liable Entities Public Information Database (LEPID).388 As of March 14, 2014 the total annual emissions reported by these entities was 285 MtCO2e. In February 2014 the Climate Change Authority, tasked with the review of ­ Australia’s emission reduction target, recommended increasing the 2020 target from 5% to a minimum of 15% below 2000 emissions. Taking Australia’s carry- over of unused allowances under CP1 of the Kyoto Protocol into account, the Climate Change Authority recommends an effective target of 19% below 2000 emissions by 2020. The cap in the flexible-price period of the CPM under the recommended target is provided in Table 15.389 382 Source: Department of the Environment, Australian Government, Repealing the Carbon Tax, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.environment.gov.au/topics/ cleaner-environment/clean-air/repealing-carbon-tax. 383 Source: Parliament of Australia, Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Bill 2013, accessed January 21, 2014, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/ display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbills%2Fr5137_first-reps%2F0000%22. 384 Source: Parliament of Australia, Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Bill 2013, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamenta- ry_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r5137. 385 Source: Parliament of Australia, Senate Composition, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Senators/Senate_composition. 386 Source: Parliament of Australia, Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Bill 2013, accessed January 21, 2014, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/ display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbillhome%2Fr5137%22. 387 Source: Clean Energy Regulator, Australian Government, Fixed Price 2012–2015, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Car- bon-Pricing-Mechanism/About-the-Mechanism/Fixed-Price-2012-15/Pages/default.aspx. 388 Source: Clean Energy Regulator, Australian Government, LEPID for 2012–13 Financial Year, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov. au/Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Liable-Entities-Public-Information-Database/LEPID-for-2012-13-Financial-year/Pages/default.aspx. 389 Source: Climate Change Authority, Australian Government, Reducing Australia’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions – Targets and Progress Review, Final Report, Feb- ruary 2014, http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/sites/climatechangeauthority.gov.au/files/files/Target-Progress-Review/Targets%20and%20Progress%20 Review%20Final%20Report.pdf. 119 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes Table 15 Proposed cap for the CPM scenarios for the first five years of the flexible-price period Year Cap under a 2020 target of 15% below 2000 levels (MtCO2e) 2015–16 234 2016–17 229 2017–18 222 2018–19 215 2019–20 209 Competitiveness considerations Under the Jobs and Competitiveness Program, in the first year a total of 129 applications for free carbon units were approved and 104 million units issued.390 As of March 11, 2014, 111 ­ ­ applications have been approved for the second trading year and 84 million units have been issued.391 Use of offsets For the first year of the fixed price period 281 million carbon units and 2.6 million ACCUs have been surrendered. International credits are not eligible for compliance in the fixed price period. Performance and effectiveness Australia’s total emissions dropped by only 0.1% in the first CPM year, below the previous year.392 However, GHG ­ emissions Emissions from the sectors covered by the CPM fell by 1.5% over the same period. ­ reduced by 6% in the electricity production sector, covering over 50% of total CPM emissions. Fugitive emissions increased by 11%, but represent less than 15% of the emissions covered.393 It is important to note that the annual caps of the CPM have been designed to ensure that there is a very high likelihood that Australia would achieve its emission reduction target for 2012–2020. Linking to other schemes With the potential repeal of the CPM, the ­ negotiations with the EU over the future two-way linking by 2018 have ceased. In the event that the CPM is abolished, there will be no call for a one-way linking between the EU ETS and Australia’s CPM from 2015 either. 390 Source: Clean Energy Regulator, Australian Government, Units Issued in the 2012–13 Financial Year, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cleanenergyregu- lator.gov.au/Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Industry-Assistance/jobs-and-competitiveness-program/free-carbon-units/Pages/units-issued-in-2012-13.aspx. 391 Source: Clean Energy Regulator, Australian Government, Issue of Free Carbon Units, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Industry-Assistance/jobs-and-competitiveness-program/free-carbon-units/Pages/default.aspx. 392 Source: Hunt, G., No Change in Domestic Emissions under the Carbon Tax, October 24, 2013, http://www.environment.gov.au/minister/hunt/2013/ mr20131024.html?utm_source=mins&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=feed. 393 Source: Climate Change Authority, Australian Government, Reducing Australia’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions – Targets and Progress Review, Final Report, February 2014. 120 Comparing the Carbon Pricing Mechanism and the Direct Action Plan Several reports find that under the funds proposed for the Direct Action Plan, Australia will not only fall short of its emission reduction target, but emissions ­ will even increase by 8 to 18% above 2000 levels by 2020.394 However, these studies had to use assumptions in the absence of the precise design details of the proposed funds. XII JCM The JCM, developed by the Japanese government, supports the transfer of low-carbon technologies, products, systems, services and infrastructure to developing countries.395 Japan seeks international recognition of the JCM under ­ the UNFCCC FVA to allow for the use of JCM credits towards Japan’s emission reduction target. The government sees the JCM as supplementary to CDM, but since Japan is not signing up for CP2, the future access to CERs will be limited to CERs generated from CDM projects with direct participation of Japanese entities.396 The demand for JCM credits pre-2020 may therefore come from the government or parts of the Japanese private sector who are participating in domestic schemes, although the level of demand remains a large uncertainty. The JCM was designed to tackle challenges the Japanese government perceived in implementing the CDM. Therefore the JCM structure is similar to the CDM with some differences.397 For example, instead of assessing the additionality of each project against hypothetical scenarios, the JCM proposes, among others, the use of positive lists and benchmarks, and standardized baselines to ensure a net reduction of GHG emissions.398 This aims to enable a broad coverage of projects ­ under the JCM. Also, MRV rules, which are being defined, will aim to be simple and transparent. More entities are allowed to validate and verify projects under the JCM, i.e., ISO 140565 accredited organizations additional to DOEs. The JCM governance is partly decentralized: there is some flexibility in the definition of rules and guidelines for a project in a given host country, although consistency with other host countries must be ensured. One of the challenges of the JCM will be to combine environmental integrity and streamlined rules. It is currently uncertain how the JCM will fit under the international framework and what impact this will have on compliance costs overall. This will become clearer as JCM projects are implemented and negotiations around the FVA progress. 394 Source: The Climate Institute, Coalition Climate Policy and the National Climate Interest, August 2013; RepuTex, Behind the Numbers: Adding up to the Direct Action Plan, September 12, 2013, http://www.reputex.com/publications/behind-the-numbers-adding-up-to-the-direct-action-plan/. 395 Source: Government of Japan, Recent Development of The Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM), December 2013, http://www.mmechanisms.org/docu- ment/20131226_JCM_goj.pdf. 396 Source: Hongo, T., Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute, International Emissions Trading Association, Greenhouse Gas Market 2013, 2013. 397 Source: Sterk, W., Kachi, A., and Taenzler, D., The CDM as Glue for the International Carbon Market?, February 2013, http://www.dehst.de/SharedDocs/Down- loads/EN/Publications/discussion_paper_glue_CDM.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 398 More information on how emission reductions are calculated to ensure net GHG mitigation can be found at Government of Japan, Recent Development of The Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM), December 2013, http://www.mmechanisms.org/document/20131226_JCM_goj.pdf. 121 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes XIII China (existing Table 16 below shows some of the key characteristics of the Chinese ETS pilots. and emerging) More descriptive detail follows the table. Table 16 Key characteristics of the Chinese ETS pilots Shenzhen Shanghai Beijing Hubei Guangdong Tianjin Chongqing Carbon Intensity -21% -21% -18% -17% -19.5% -19% -17% ­ Target (2011–2015) Total emissions 83.4 230 110 306 541 155 131 of the region in 2010399 MtCO2e Threshold >20,000 >20,000 >10,000 >60,000 >20,000 >20,000 >20,000 tCO2e tCO2e tCO2e tSCE tCO2e tCO2e tCO2e Entities covered 635 191 490 138 242 114 N/A in 2013400 Initial year 33 Mt 160 Mt 50 Mt 324 Mt402 388 Mt 160 Mt N/A ­ allowances401 Emissions 38% 50% 50% 35% 42% 60% 35%–40% covered % Allocation Bench­ Historical Historical Historical Historical Historical Historical (main approaches) marking emissions emissions emissions emissions emissions emissions + bench­ + historical + bench­ + bench­ + historical marking intensity marking marking intensity (power) + bench­ + bench­ marking marking (power) Penalties 3x market 10K–100K 3–5x market 3x market 3x market N/A 2x market price CNY price price price price Offsets 10% 5% 5% 10% 10% 10% N/A Scope Unlike many other emissions trading schemes, the Chinese ETS pilots have a growing cap. The cap is in line with China’s overall 40–45% carbon intensity reduction target by 2020, compared to 2005 (or 11.7%–19% carbon ­ intensity reduction by 2020 compared to 2015).403 399 Source: Quemin, S. and Wang, W., Overview of Climate Change Policies and Development of Emissions Trading in China, March 20, 2014, http://www.postcar- bonpathways.net.au/2014/03/21/overview-of-climate-change-policies-and-development-of-emissions-trading-in-china/#.U13Qw_mSzVU. 400 Source: SinoCarbon, 2013 Carbon Markets Annual Report, January 2014. 401 Source: 21 Century Business Herald, China Carbon Market Prospect: Liquidity, Cap and Reduction Potential, January 21, 2014, http://epaper.21cbh.com/ html/2014-01/21/content_89329.htm?div=-1. 402 Source: SinoCarbon, Hubei to Trade, Allocation Plan to Annouce, March 31, 2014, http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5NjgzM- jQ2NA==&mid=200162138&idx=1&sn=ce2f4c04c48d298aa1b8d8387be22fe1. 403 Source: World Resources Institute, China’s State Council Unveils 40-45% Carbon Intensity Target, November 26, 2009, http://www.wri.org/blog/chi- na%E2%80%99s-state-council-unveils-40-45-carbon-intensity-target. 122 Whereas the majority of pilots in China have set absolute GHG emission caps, Shenzhen has a mandatory intensity cap. This is calculated on the basis of tCO2e for every CNY10,000 (US$1,650) of industrial output. The ETS sectors have a bigger share of emission reductions, since the carbon intensity target is a 32% reduction from 2011 to 2015, compared to the average target of Shenzhen which is 21% reduction (from 0.812 tCO2e/CNY10,000 to 0.641 tCO2e/CNY10,000).404 Allocation approaches All operating pilots except Shenzhen feature free allocation based on historical intensity or historical emissions, sometimes with ­ additional factors relating to sector growth or efficiency. Guangdong was the first pilot to use auctioning.405 After four auctions, 10.7 million allowances were sold at a reserve price of CNY60 (US$10).406 Hubei sold 2 million allowances at its first auction on March 31, 2014 at a price of CNY20 (US$3.3)407 and it plans to auction up to 8 million allowances of 2014.408 Corrections to the allocation during the pilot based on actual production, so-called dynamic allocation, are included in the ETS Implementation Plans for ­ Shenzhen,409 Tianjin,410 and Shanghai.411 Allocation for the power sector is similar across pilots. It is based on benchmarks of different generation technologies and installation capacities,412 except for Beijing and Tianjin, where historical intensity (tCO2/kWh) is used. Grandfathering ­ is the main approach for other sectors. Table 17 summarizes allocation approaches for the pilots already in operation.413 404 Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen ETS Conference Press Release, May 21, 2013, http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/xxgk/xwfyr/wqhg/20130521/. 405 Source: Guangdong Development and Reform Commission, Guangdong ETS Allocation and Auctioning Announcement, December 10, 2013, http://www.gddpc. gov.cn/xxgk/tztg/201312/t20131210_232286.htm. 406 Source: Guangdong Emissions Exchange, Auction Reports, accessed April 20, 2014, http://www.cnemission.com/article/news/jysgg/. 407 Source: Hubei Emission Exchange, First Auction Report, April 1, 2014, http://www.hbets.cn/html/zxggXxpl/1074_1.shtml. 408 Source: Sino Carbon, Hubei to Trade, Allocation Plan to Annouce, March 31, 2014 http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5NjgzM- jQ2NA==&mid=200162138&idx=1&sn=ce2f4c04c48d298aa1b8d8387be22fe1 409 Source: Shenzhen Municipal Government, Shenzhen ETS Implementation Plan (Draft), October 29, 2013, http://fzj.sz.gov.cn:8080/cms/fzbDetails.action?- siteName=fzb&pageId=4443. 410 Source: Tianjin Government, Tianjin Municipal People’s Government Office Interim Measures on Carbon Emissions Trading in Tianjin, December 20, 2013, http:// www.tj.gov.cn/zwgk/wjgz/szfbgtwj/201312/t20131224_227448.htm. 411 Source: Shanghai Municipal Government, Shanghai Carbon Market Implementation Plan, November 18, 2013, http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/ node2319/node12344/u26ai37414.html. 412 Source: Ecofys, Suggestions for the Design of Tianjin’s ETS, November 8, 2013. 413 Source: SinoCarbon, 2013 Carbon Markets Annual Report, January 2014. 123 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes Table 17 Allocation approaches for the Chinese ETS pilots in operation Pilot Historical emissions Historical intensity Benchmarking Shenzhen No Power (minority) Power (majority), water utilities buildings and industrial sectors Shanghai Industrial sector except power, public buildings No Power, aviation, airports and ports Beijing industrial sectors Cement, chemicals, other ­ Power and heat New entrants and expanded existing capacity capacity Guangdong Cogeneration, mining in cement, petrochemicals, iron No Power, cement, long process iron and steel scap processing and steel making Tianjin Steel, chemicals, petrochemicals, refining Power and heat New entrants and expanded existing capacity capacity Hubei414 Steel, cement, petrochemical, chemical, automobile No Power (50% preallocated based on and other manufacturing, nonferrous and other historical emissions, the rest based ­ struction materials, synthetic metals, glass and con­ on benchmarks) fibre, paper, pharmaceutical, food and beverage Use of offsets In June 2012 the NDRC published “Tentative Measures for the Administration of Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emissions Trading” to ­ encourage conducted voluntary trading via CCERs and to ensure that trading activities are ­ in an appropriate manner.415 The document also includes strict personnel and ­capital requirements to qualify CDM DOEs for the assessment of CCER generating projects. ­ By April 2014, NDRC had published four rounds, 178 CCER methodologies based on CDM methodologies.416 About 200 projects have been approved by the NDRC, waiting for official CCER registration, expected by mid-2014.417 Price stabilization mechanism There has been some discussion that national scheme will feature some form of price stabilization mechanism, the ­ although details remain to be confirmed.418 Shenzhen, Guangdong and Hubei ­ have set aside reserve allowances to manage price fluctuations. Performance and effectiveness Diverging prices may pose a challenge for the development of a national ETS for China. Carbon prices in the pilots to date range from approximately CNY120/tCO2e (US$20) in Shenzhen,419 to CNY22/tCO2e (US$3.6) in Hubei.420 414 Source: Hubei Emission Exchange, Hubei ETS Launched, accessed April 8, 2014, http://www.hbets.cn/html/zxdtXwzx/1079_1.shtml. 415 Source: National Development and Reform Commission, Tentative Measures for the Administration of Voluntary Greenhouse Gasses Emissions Trading, accessed March 5, 2014, http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/t20120621_487133.htm. 416 Source: China Certified Emission Reduction Exchange Info-Platform, n.d., http://203.207.195.145:92/ccer.aspx. 417 Source: Reuters, China’s State Utilities Move on Preferential Rules in Carbon Offset Market, January 8, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/01/08/chi- na-carbon-idINL3N0KI2E820140108. 418 Source: International Emission Trading Association, A User’s Guide to Emissions Trading in China, September 2013. 419 Shenzhen Climate Exchange updates its pricing data on a daily basis through the China Emissions Exchange Website. Source: China Emissions Exchange, China Emissions Exchange, accessed January 24, 2014, http://www.szets.com/Portal/home.seam. 420 Source: Hubei Emission Exchange, Allowance Trading Daily Report, April 2014, http://www.hbets.cn/html/zxggXxpl/1075_1.shtml. 124 Compared to the size of the markets, the volume of transactions in the operational pilots is not large (Figure 28). One of the main reasons is that only spot trading is allowed in the Chinese ETS pilots, which hinders the formation of liquidity in the secondary market. Chinese ETS pilots are searching for ways to activate trading. The Shanghai ­ Energy and Environment Exchange, for example, is actively exploring financial tools and products to increase liquidity in the scheme. Guangdong requires companies to purchase allowances from the primary market before they are ­ allowed to participate in the secondary market. ­ Figure 28 Volumes traded on the spot market in Chinese ETS pilots Hubei 1.608 Tianjin 0.140 Guangdong 0.126 Beijing 0.096 Shanghai 0.239 Shenzhen 0.250 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 Traded volume (MtCO2e) Source: data collected from various Chinese emissions exchanges, as of April 18, 2014 MRV and registry On October 15, 2013, the NDRC announced GHG ­ accounting methodologies and Reporting Guidance for ten sectors: power generation, power distribution, cement, steel, chemicals, aluminum electrolyte, ­ magnesium smelting, ceramics and aviation.421 These guidelines plate glass, ­ were ­developed using funds from the Norwegian government through the United ­Nations ­Development Programme (UNDP) in China.422 The Australian government signed an MoU with the NDRC on April 10, 2013 to work on the ­ development of the MRV Guidelines for three more sectors: coal, refining, oil and gas exploration.423 421 Source: National Development and Reform Commission, GHG Accounting Methodologies and Reporting Guidance for 10 Industries, 2013, http://www.ndrc.gov. cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/2013tz/t20131101_565313.htm. 422 Source: Ecofys, Suggestions for the Design of Tianjin’s ETS, November 8, 2013. 423 Source: Australian Embassy in Beijing, Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s Visit to China, April 10, 2013, http://www.china.embassy.gov.au/files/bjng/China%20 Visit%20-%20Overview%20of%20Annoucements-EN.docx. 125 Annex II  – Detailed update sheets on emissions trading schemes In January 2014, the NDRC issued a note on its website that all companies that emitted more than 13,000 tCO2e in 2010 must report their future annual emissions of all six major GHGs.424 ­ Linking to other schemes There were discussions in 2011 about linking Hubei with Guangdong. This link was meant to test the potential for linking between China’s industrial powerhouses (in the Pearl River Delta and coastal regions) with the Western and Central regions, and would provide valuable lessons for the establishment of a national market post-2015. The NDRC would like to see ­ ­ linking endorsed between these two schemes, but it has not yet officially confirmed or ­ linking. Details remain to be confirmed. Looking ahead According to the 12th Five Year Plan, the national ETS is intended to build upon the lessons learned from the seven pilots. ­ ­ Originally announced to be developed by 2015, the implementation of the national ­ scheme is now expected to start in later years during the 13th Five Year Plan (2016–2020). Some preparation at national level has already started, primarily on the work ­ related to the national registry, GHG inventory, MRV guidelines for a number of industries and CCER methodologies. A preliminary national allocation plan will be developed in due course according to senior NDRC officals.425 Work on the legal framework is yet to be done. The NDRC has not specified how the pilots should feed into a national scheme. This lack of a clear signal for the period after 2015 (only Guangdong has drafted plans that go up to 2020) creates some uncertainty about the future of the carbon market in China. Whether the national scheme develops in a more top- ­ down or bottom-up approach remains to be seen.426 The first compliance cycle will finish by June 30, 2014, and the first pilot phase is continue currently planned to last until the end of June 2016. Until then, China will ­ to find out what design features are appropriate for the flourishing of ETS pilots and which need to be tweaked in view of the emerging national scheme. Carbon pricing is one instrument used to tackle climate change in China. Box 9 gives examples of other policies that help, directly or indirectly, reduce emissions in China. 424 Source: National Development and Reform Commission, China, Notice on Organising Major Companies to Report GHG Emissions, January 13, 2014, http://www. sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201403/t20140314_602463.html. 425 Source: China Energy Newspaper, National Carbon Allowances Will Be Issued by the Government, April 20, 2014, http://energy.people.com.cn/n/2014/0420/ c71661-24918882.html. 426 Source: Bo, K. and Freeman, C., Making Sense of Carbon Market Development in China, Carbon and Climate Law Review, Issue 3, 2013. 126 Box 9 China’s climate ambitions: the ETS pilots in context China committed to developing a national-level ETS pilot during its 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) as a policy tool to reduce its carbon intensity by 40%–45% from 2005 to 2020. The ETS is expected to start during the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020). China has other national targets to meet related to GHG emissions. These include: reducing energy intensity by 16% from 2011 to 2015; increasing the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020; and increasing forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from 2005 levels. The table below provdes examples of some of the important broader mitigation policies in China and their link to ETS. Table 18 Most relevant non-carbon pricing policies at the national level in China and their link to carbon pricing427 Policy Implications on GHG emissions Linkage to and overlap with carbon pricing Renewable energy Targeted share of non-fossil energy Overlap with sub-national ETS schemes: c ­ apacity plans in under international pledge will be Renewable energy policies likely to contribute ­ updated 12th Five surpassed, target: 700 GW capacity to achievement of ETS target in power sector Year Plan in 2020 in regions TOP 10,000 enterprises Implementation expected to be in Overlap with sub-national ETS schemes: ­ line with Five Year Plan Energy efficiency achieved through TOP 10,000 e ­ nterprises program likely to contribute to achievement of ETS target in ­ power sector in regions 427 Source: Roelfsema, M. et al., Are Major Economies on Track to Achieve their Pledges for 2020? An Assessment of Domestic Climate and Energy Policies, Energy Policy. 127 Annex III Conversion rates Table 19 Currency conversion rates Currency Symbol US$ equivalent as of December 31, 2013 Australian Dollar A$ 1.12 Brazilian Real R$ 2.36 British Pound £ 0.61 Canadian Dollar CAN$ 1.06 Chinese Yuan CNY 6.05 Danish Krone Dkr 5.40 Euro € 0.72 Iceland Krona Íkr 115.27 Japanese Yen ¥ 104.93 Mexican Peso Mex$ 13.06 New Zealand Dollar NZ$ 1.22 Norwegian Krone Nkr 6.07 South African Rand R 10.42 Swedish Krona Skr 6.41 Swiss Franc SFr 0.89 Source: Yahoo! Finance, Currency Converter, accessed April 3, 2014, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-converter/#from=USD;to=EUR;amt=1. 128 Glossary Additionality A project activity is additional if anthropogenic GHG emissions are lower than those that would have occurred in the absence of the project activity. Annex I (Parties) The industrialized countries listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC were committed to return their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. They currently include Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union. Assigned Amount Annex I Parties are issued AAUs up to the level of their assigned amount, Unit (AAU) corresponding to the quantity of GHG they can release in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol (Article 3), during the first commitment period of that protocol (2008–2012). One AAU represents the right to emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. Backloading To rebalance supply and demand of emission allowances in the EU ETS in the short term the European Commission proposed to temporarily postpone the auctioning of 900 million allowances from the beginning to the end of Phase III. ­ This measure will affect the distribution of auctions over the period but it would not reduce the overall number of allowances to be auctioned during Phase III. After several months of reiterations and uncertainties, the backloading proposal was put into legislation in February 2014. 129 Glossary Banking or Carry-over Compliance units under the various schemes to manage GHG emissions in existence may or may not be carried over from one commitment period to the next. ­ Banking may encourage early action by mandated entities depending on their current situation and their anticipations of future carbon constraints. In addition, banking brings market continuity. Banking between Phase I and Phase II of the EU ETS is not allowed; it is allowed between Phase II and further phases. Some restrictions on the amount of units that can be carried over may apply; for instance, EUAs may be banked with no restriction, while the amount of CERs that can be carried over by a Kyoto Party is limited to 2.5% of the assigned amount of each Party. Baseline The emission of GHG that would occur without the policy intervention or project activity under consideration. Benchmarking Benchmarking is used to compare operations of a company with those of others, to industry average, or to best practice, to determine whether they have opportunities to improve energy efficiency or reduce GHG emissions. In the ­ EU ETS, for example, free allocation is carried out on the basis of ambitious benchmarks of GHG emissions performance. These benchmarks reward best practice in low-emission production. Cap-and-Trade Cap-and-trade schemes set a desired maximum ceiling for emissions (or cap) and let the market determine the price for keeping emissions within that cap. To comply with their emission targets at least cost, regulated entities can either opt for internal abatement measures or acquire allowances or emission reductions in the carbon market, depending on the relative costs of these options. Carbon Asset The potential of GHG emission reductions that a project is able to generate and sell. Carbon Dioxide The universal unit of measurement used to indicate the global warming potential Equivalent (CO2e) of each of the six GHG regulated under the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon dioxide – a naturally occurring gas that is a by-product of burning fossil fuels and biomass, land-use changes, and other industrial processes – is the reference gas against which the other GHG are measured, using their global warming potential. Carbon Finance Resources provided to activities generating (or expected to generate) GHG emission reductions through the transaction of such emission reductions. Carbon Leakage Shift in CO2 emissions from countries taking stringent mitigation actions to countries taking less stringent mitigation actions. 130 Certified Emission A unit of GHG emission reductions issued pursuant to the Clean Development Reduction (CER) Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol and measured in metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. One CER represents a reduction in GHG emissions of one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. Chinese Certified The NDRC issued rules to regulate the voluntary emission reduction credits Emission Reduction market in China, in the form of CCERs, in June 2012. These will be issued in unit (CCER) of tCO2e, and will include CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6. Clean Development The mechanism provided by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, designed to assist Mechanism (CDM) developing countries in achieving sustainable development by allowing entities from Annex I Parties to participate in low-carbon projects and obtain CERs in return. Conference of the The supreme body of the UNFCCC. It currently meets once a year to review the Parties (COP) UNFCCC‘s progress. The word “conference” is not used here in the sense of “meeting” but rather of “association”, which explains the seemingly redundant expression “fourth session of the Conference of the Parties”. Conference of the The UNFCCC’s supreme body is the COP, which serves as the meeting of the Parties Serving as the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. The sessions of the COP and the CMP are held Meeting of the Parties during the same period to reduce costs and improve coordination between the (CMP) UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Colored fuel Fuels such as gasoline and diesel dyed with a specific color to indicate the ­ appropriate level of tax that should be levied on the fuel. This generally depends on the purpose of the fuel. In British Columbia, for example, fuels used for ­ farming purposes are colored. Designated A designated operational entity is an independent auditor who assesses whether Operational Entity a potential project meets all the eligibility requirements of the CDM (validation) (DOE) and whether the project has achieved GHG emission reductions (verification and certification). Effort Sharing The Effort Sharing Decision establishes binding annual GHG emission targets Decision for EU Member States for the period 2013–2020. These targets concern emis- sions from most sectors not included in the EU ETS, such as transport (except aviation), buildings, agriculture and waste. Emission Reduction The measurable reduction of release of GHG into the atmosphere from a ­ pecified activity, and a specified period. s 131 Glossary Emission Reductions Agreement that governs the transaction of emission reductions. Purchase Agreement (ERPA) Emission Reduction A unit of emission reductions issued pursuant to Joint Implementation. One ERU Unit (ERU) represents the right to emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. Emissions Trading See cap-and-trade. Scheme (ETS) European Union The allowances in use under the EU ETS. An EUA unit is equal to one metric ton Allowance (EUA) of carbon dioxide equivalent. First Commitment The five-year period, from 2008 to 2012, during which industrialized countries Period under the committed to collectively reduce their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2% Kyoto Protocol (CP1) compared with 1990 emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. Framework for Defined at COP 17 in Durban, general framework at the UNFCCC level that Various Approaches enhance allows various approaches, including opportunities for using markets, to ­ (FVA) the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and developing countries, that must meet standards that deliver real, permanent, additional and verified mitigation outcomes, avoid double counting of effort, and achieve a net decrease and/or ­­ avoidance of GHG emissions. Greenhouse Gas Both natural and anthropogenic, GHGs trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere, causing (GHG) the greenhouse effect. Water vapor (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), and ozone (O3) are the primary GHGs. The emission of GHG through human activities (such as fossil fuel combustion or deforestation) and their accumulation in the atmosphere is responsible for an additional forcing, contributing to climate change. Joint Implementation Mechanism provided by Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol whereby entities from (JI) Annex I Parties may participate in low-carbon projects hosted in Annex I countries and obtain Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) in return. Kyoto GHGs The Kyoto Protocol regulates six GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). Kyoto Mechanisms The three flexibility mechanisms that may be used by Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to fulfill their commitments. These are the Joint Implementation International (JI, Article 6), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, Article 12), and ­ Emissions Trading (Article 17). 132 Kyoto Protocol Adopted at the third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol commits industrialized country signatories to collectively reduce their GHG emissions by at least 5.2% below 1990 levels on average over 2008–2012 while developing countries can take no-regret actions and participate voluntarily in emission reductions and removal activities through the CDM. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005. Monitoring Plan A set of requirements for monitoring and verification of emission reductions achieved by a project. National Allocation A document which details the quantity of allowances and how they will be Plan (NAP) allocated. The document includes, for example, the list of installations in the ETS, ­ allocation, the the allocation rules, the emissions cap, the criteria for determining ­ quantity of emission allowances each installation is allocated and any ­international credits that may be used by these installations in each specific year, as well as other features, such as the size of the new entrants reserve, the treatment of exiting installations, and the process of allocation (free allocation or auctioning). NAPs were published by each member state in preparation for Phases I and II of the EU ETS and are used in many new schemes such as the KAZ ETS, the Chinese pilot schemes and the Korea ETS. Nationally Appropriate Refers to a set of mitigation policies and/or actions a developing country ­ undertakes Mitigation Action aiming at reducing its GHG emissions and reports to UNFCCC on a ­ voluntary (NAMA) basis. The concept of NAMAs was defined in 2007 under the UNFCCC Bali Action Plan, as “Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions by developing ­ country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.” New Entrants Reserve A reserve of allowances designated for new installations that enter the ETS or (NER) capacity expansions by existing installations. These allowances can be allocated for free or auctioned. New Market-based Defined at COP 17 in Durban, new market-based mechanism operating under Mechanism (NMM) the guidance and authority of the COP to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and developing countries, as guided by decision 1/CP.18, paragraph ­ 51. It may assist developed countries to meet part of their mitigation targets under the UNFCCC but should consider the principle of supplementarity. ­ Offset An offset designates the emission reductions from project-based activities that can be used to meet compliance or corporate citizenship objectives vis-à-vis GHG mitigation. 133 Glossary Primary Transaction A transaction between the original owner (or issuer) of the carbon asset and a buyer. REDD Plus (REDD+) All activities that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and contribute to conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhance­ ment of forest carbon stocks. Registration The formal acceptance by the CDM Executive Board of a validated project as a CDM project activity. Removal Unit (RMU) RMUs are issued by Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in respect of net removals by sinks from activities covered by Article 3(3) and Article 3(4) of the Kyoto Protocol. Second Commitment The eight-year period, from 2013 to 2020, in which Annex I Parties to the Period under the Kyoto Protocol committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18% percent Kyoto Protocol (CP2) below 1990 levels. The composition of Parties in the second commitment period is different from that in the first. Secondary Transaction A transaction where the seller is not the original owner (or issuer) of the carbon asset. Shadow Price The social cost of carbon given a stabilization goal for the atmospheric of Carbon concentration of GHG emissions. ­ Supplementarity Following the Marrakesh Accords, the use of the Kyoto mechanisms shall be ­ supplemental to domestic action, which shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party to meet its commitment under the ­ Kyoto ­ Protocol. There is no quantitative limit, however, to the utilization of such mechanisms. Supplementarity also needs to be considered in the development of modalities and procedures for the UNFCCC NMM (Draft decision -/CP.18, para 51, February 28, 2013). Union Registry An online database that holds accounts for stationary installations which have been transferred from national registries, as well as accounts for aircraft operators, which have been included in the EU ETS since January 2012. The ­ Union registry replaces EU member states’ national registries. United Nations The international legal framework adopted in June 1992 at the Rio Earth Framework Convention Summit to address climate change. It commits the Parties to the ­ UNFCCC on Climate Change to ­ human-induced GHG emissions at levels that would prevent stabilize ­ (UNFCCC) ­ dangerous ­ manmade interference with the climate system, following “common differentiated r but ­ ­ esponsibilities” based on “respective capabilities”. 134 Validation Validation is the process of independent evaluation of a project activity by a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) against the requirements of the CDM. The CDM requirements include the CDM modalities and procedures and subsequent decisions by the CMP and documents released by the CDM Executive Board. Verification Verification is the review and ex post determination by an independent third party of the monitored reductions in emissions generated by a registered CDM project or a determined JI project (or a project approved under another standard) during the verification period. Verified Emission A unit of GHG emission reductions that has been verified by an independent Reduction (VER) auditor. Most often, this designates emission reductions units that are traded on the voluntary market. Voluntary Carbon The voluntary carbon market caters to the needs of those entities that voluntarily Market decide to reduce their carbon footprint using offsets. The regulatory vacuum in some countries and the anticipation of imminent legislation on GHG emissions also motivates some pre-compliance activity. Western Climate The Western Climate Initiative is a collaboration among states and provinces to Initiative (WCI) tackle climate change at a regional level. Currently British Columbia, California, Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba are working together through the WCI to develop and harmonize their emissions trading scheme policies. 135 Notes 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 USA www.carbonfinance.org