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Reclaiming their Voice: New Perspectives From Young Women and Men in Upper Egypt

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ACRONYMS AND CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

CDA	community development association
ELMPS	Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey
GDP	Gross domestic product
ICA	Investment Climate Assessment (survey)
ICT	information and communication technology
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
LFS	Labor Force Survey
ILO	International Labor Organization
LPG	liquid petroleum gas
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NCY	National Council for Youth
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OLF	outside the labor force
SFD	Social Fund for Development
SSI	State Security Investigations Service
SYPE	Survey of Young People in Egypt (2009)
WDR	World Development Report (World Bank)

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Exchange rate effective as of October 2011

Currency unit: Livres Egyptiennes (LE)/ Egyptian Pound

5.96 LE = US\$1

All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated.

MAP OF EGYPT



Source: www.mpcity.com (accessed March 2012).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Egypt is undergoing a demographic phase marked by a significant “youth bulge”: 28 percent of its population is between 15 to 29 years of age, and this proportion will increase over the next decade. With a high proportion of the population that can contribute to increased innovation, consumption, and productivity, this demographic presents an opportunity. However, it is clear from the high levels of unemployment- and under-employment that it is one from which the country has yet to benefit.

On the 25th of January 2011, Egyptians took to the streets calling for the removal of then President Hosni Mubarak and his government. These demonstrations were the result of years of mounting grievances and frustration over poverty, exclusion from social, political and economic opportunity, endemic corruption, and a widening gap between the rich minority and the poor majority. Youth played a leading role in this movement.

The January 25th Revolution challenged many assumptions about Egyptian youth, who played a central role in demanding political change. Youth all over Egypt took the initiative to organize and protect their communities. However, despite deep disillusion towards the former regime, the inclination among young Egyptians remains to look to their government to solve social and economic problems. Building the capabilities, motivations, and institutions to transcend this sense of dependency is one of the most important tasks facing Egypt today, particularly for the generation that has for so long been in waiting. Young people have clearly expressed their aspirations for new levels of engagement—it is for Egyptian society to respond.

This study focuses on the demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural circumstances of young men and young women (aged 15–29) of Upper Egypt. Upper Egypt is a largely rural area, lagging behind economically, and trapped in a vicious cycle of low education, high fertility, and severe poverty. The study also examines the engagement of young people in the January 25th uprising and their aspirations, in its aftermath, for the future. Finally, it offers recommendations for youth-inclusive policies to expand the scope of employment and participation opportunities for young people.

More than 64 percent of the population of Upper Egypt is under 29 years of age, and 29 percent is aged between 15 and 29. While in Egypt as a whole, wealth is fairly evenly distributed among young people across the lower four wealth quintiles, in Upper Egypt in contrast there are a high proportion (38 percent) of young people in the poorest wealth quintile, and a small percentage (just 5 percent) in the highest.

While Upper Egypt accounts for only 40 percent of the population of the country, it includes 60 percent of those living in poverty and 80 percent of those living in severe poverty. The region is predominantly rural, with about 75 percent of its young people residing in rural areas. Just three governorates of the Upper Egypt contain 82 percent of the country’s poorest 1,000 villages.

Upper Egypt is considered the most culturally conservative and traditional region of the country, where patriarchal values and tribal customs continue to inform local attitudes and behavior. Its traditions underscore the power of men over women, the authority of elders over youth, and the propensity for conflicts to take the form of tribal feuds. Cultural restrictions severely limit women’s mobility, employment, and education, although the degree varies by social class. Upper Egypt is home to

the largest concentrations of Coptic Orthodox Christians in the country, and both Muslims and Christian groups maintain highly conservative social norms relating to gender, age, and family honor.

Education towards Employment: A Missing Link

While the country as a whole has made great strides in achieving the Millennium Development Goal of universal basic education, Upper Egypt has a rate of illiteracy among the young that, at 17%, is higher than the national ratio, and female illiteracy rates almost twice those of males. This gender gap persists through most levels of schooling except university. Wealth is strongly associated with education completion, implying that family wealth may counterbalance the inhibiting effect of social norms on the education of girls in this socially conservative region.

Young people express quite negative assessments of their experience of education. In focus groups, they mentioned that they faced many obstacles, including deficient teaching, overcrowded classrooms, lack of (or poor-quality) equipment, lack of basic supplies and favoritism. The high costs of education (including school fees, books, and materials) often lead students – particularly girls – to drop out of school. Private tuition by publicly employed teachers (which, while illegal, is almost universal) is considered essential to successful school completion. Private tuition is the single largest expense faced by households with children in school. Neither young people nor their parents feel that they are allowed any role in improving the quality of teaching, and this lack of community involvement appears to be one of the main reasons for the deteriorating quality of public education.

Young people say that they see little or no connection between what they learn in school and the skills needed in the labor market, and described most technical and vocational training currently offered as ‘too theoretical’ and often not useful for securing employment. Since young women are unlikely to acquire job-relevant skills outside the context of formal education, they are thereby at a particular disadvantage. Young people in Upper Egypt were particularly keen to acquire life skills such as communication, leadership, preparing for interviews, and English proficiency, which are prerequisites for some kinds of employment.

Despite these expressed assessments, however, the returns on education in Upper Egypt are high, particularly for young women. Contrary to the situation at national level, tertiary graduates in Upper Egypt have higher rates of labor force participation than youth with lower education levels. Labor participation for female university graduates in Upper Egypt is as high as 58 percent, higher than the national average of 47 percent and higher than among the uneducated or those with less than secondary education.

The relationship between education and employment in Upper Egypt is quite complex, even seemingly contradictory. While **university education** is pursued to enhance employment prospects, having a degree in fact reduces the range of acceptable jobs. Hence there is a widely found perception that higher education does not necessarily facilitate employment. On the other hand, jobs open to those with **secondary education** (e.g. manual or skilled labor for boys and shop keeping for girls) are widely considered not to be socially acceptable. Such jobs pay low wages as well as bearing a social stigma. Further, secondary education is considered of little value if it prepares one only to work as a laborer.

Unemployment and Joblessness

The rate of unemployment used in labor force surveys refers only to people who are actively looking for work. This is not an ideal indicator, as it excludes discouraged workers who would like to work, but do not seek employment because of loss of faith in the job market. The **rate of joblessness**, on the other hand, provides a more informative measure of how youth are faring in the labor market because it includes all those who are either unemployed or inactive (neither in education nor employment), irrespective of their desire to participate in the labor force.

Unemployment and joblessness levels are high among youth in Upper Egypt (16 percent and 45 percent, respectively). Most young women (70 percent) are neither in school nor in the labor force: 96 percent of those with no education are jobless (indicating that they are not looking for jobs), compared to 59 percent of female university graduates. These joblessness rates stem from lack of opportunity and also cultural norms which perhaps inhibit greater engagement by women to the labor force market. Joblessness is inversely related to household wealth for both men and women in Upper Egypt, though the relation of joblessness to education is more complex. Few opportunities exist in the private sector.

Female unemployment rates in Upper Egypt increase with education, but only up to the postsecondary level. Graduate female unemployment is lower than that of women with basic and secondary education. While less than 4 percent of illiterate females are unemployed, compared to almost 40 percent of those with postsecondary education; this is a reflection of the low levels of active job seeking among illiterate women rather than an indication of a high rate of employment. **For young males, the trend is less visible: unemployment rates are in fact lowest among those with postsecondary (7 percent), university (8 percent), or basic (9 percent) education.** This contrasts with the national-level patterns for male unemployment, which affects 6 percent of those with no education, 19 percent of those with postsecondary education, and 19 percent of university graduates.

Certain findings of this study show a more complex and, at times positive picture of youth labor market outcomes in Upper Egypt. Male labor force participation is 72 percent for men with postsecondary education and is highest for university graduates (84 percent) in Upper Egypt. This trend differs from the national trend, in which young males with no education have higher labor force participation than tertiary graduates. Tertiary male and female graduates in Upper Egypt, however, have higher labor force participation than their peers with lower education levels.

Urban dwellers are more likely to be unemployed than their rural counterparts, because young people in rural areas are more likely than their urban counterparts to accept low-quality jobs. The kinds of jobs available in rural areas and the absence of formal job search institutions make it less likely that rural youth will actively engage in a job search. The rate of unemployment in Upper Egypt is 14 percent for urban males, compared to 12 percent for their rural counterparts. The gap is much wider for unemployed females, with rates of 35 percent for urban women and 24 percent for their rural counterparts.

In the Egyptian context, Assaad and Roushdy (2007) have argued that the unemployment rate really reflects the level of youth expectations of getting a formal job, rather than the availability of work. In Egypt in recent years, substantial numbers of young people have given up their aspirations for a

formal sector job and joined the informal economy, while many females have withdrawn from the labor force.

When asked about the reasons for the lack of job opportunities, young people point to many factors, including lack of a private sector in Upper Egypt, nepotism, corruption, the influence of the security services, and the level and quality of education. ‘Sons-of-employees’ hiring practices, for example, operate in many government ministries and factories and restrict opportunities for those without family connections. Lack of opportunity drives young people to migrate to other countries, even though most would prefer to work in Egypt.

Youth Employment and Job Quality

Government employment continues to be considered the only most socially acceptable form of employment for both men and women in Upper Egypt. The absence of a developed private sector in the region, the high esteem in which society holds government employees, and the low value accorded manual labor are all factors that continue to shape young people’s aspirations for the future and the occupations considered appropriate.

Cultural norms dictate that a woman should only work if her family approves of the job, and sometimes only if male family members are unable to support her. However, the acceptability of employment for a girl also depends on her level of education and the nature of the work. A woman with a university education is generally allowed to work by her father, husband, or brother if an appropriate job arises. Many youth consider government employment the only acceptable form of female employment. Although the government sector has been shrinking, women continue to be heavily overrepresented in government jobs. In 2006, about 54 percent of all female employment was in government jobs.

For both young men and young women in Upper Egypt, education and family wealth play significant roles in shaping the school-to-work transition, although in rather different ways. For young men, education is the more significant predictor of the ability to find ‘good-quality’ employment, whereas for young women, wealth appears to be the key factor in obtaining a good job (and encouraging ‘wait’ unemployment in anticipation), with education generally playing a secondary role. However, this is not the case for formal employment, the crucial determinant of which is having postsecondary or university-level qualifications.

Economic and class status are an impediments to employment for poor youth and youth from the lower-middle class. Irrespective of education and employment status, participants interviewed or surveyed for the study implied that favoritism and nepotism were more important than education in finding employment, and that bribery was often necessary to obtain government employment. Young people interviewed said that obtaining employment was easier for those from financially comfortable backgrounds, as the family could afford to pay the inducement necessary for their son or daughter to get a job or permanent contract.

Both young men and women are, for a variety of reasons, disinclined to work in agriculture or become entrepreneurs.

Young people in Upper Egypt are not well served by current programs for employment and social services. This is particularly so for those with little education, who in fact constitute the bulk of the jobless in the region. They consider the lack of employment offices, job counseling, and job referral services a major impediment to obtaining employment.

Young People as Active Citizens

Few young people engage in voluntary services in Egypt, although the proportion is slightly higher in Upper Egypt. Participation in such services is positively correlated with wealth, age, education level, and being male. Donations of money, rather than time, are the predominant form of voluntary participation, and economic hardship is perceived as one of the main impediments to civic engagement by youth.

Less than 5 percent of youth in Egypt, and only 3 percent in Upper Egypt, are members of a local, social, artistic, or political group. Understanding of the meaning of civic engagement, and of community participation in particular, is highly contingent on the local presence and activity of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community development associations.

Parental opinion, state policies, and harassment by the security forces (prior to the revolution) have all discouraged youth from active engagement in community initiatives. In addition, it is generally socially unacceptable for young people to contest positions of responsibility in their communities against more senior family or tribe members. Cultural factors also inhibit women from taking a more active role, even when they wish to do so. These issues have become particularly relevant, since the January 25th uprising, as many youth, especially young men in rural areas, are eager to establish new community organizations in their communities.

Access to Services

Services provided by both the public sector and NGOs are important in the lives of youth in Upper Egypt. However, young respondents seem to hold neither the government nor NGOs in high regard, alleging both to be corrupt and to provide poor services. The most critical form of public provision in Egypt is the distribution of subsidized bread and butane gas. The government regulates and administers the price of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders through official LPG distribution outlets. However, those outlets are limited and often not located in or near residential areas. As a result, a network of unregulated private distributors has emerged, and the neediest actually benefit from very little of the subsidy.

While some youth have access to youth centers, they were said to offer little in the way of cultural or educational activities. Young people alleged that the centers lacked equipment and their management could be corrupt. These centers are, moreover, seen as primarily serving boys; there are few activities for girls, and their use of such centers is restricted to certain hours. Some people consider youth centers ‘unsafe’ or inappropriate for girls or disparage girls who attend them.

While large loans are available to young people through the Social Fund for Development (SFD), youth said they found the requirements for accessing loans too onerous. SFD does provide support to borrowers in management and marketing; however, many young people believed (in fact erroneously)

that taking up an SFD loan required forfeiting their right to apply for government employment in future, and were unwilling to take this step for a project whose outcome was uncertain.

The quality of health care provided at local health units is considered inadequate, with doctors, pharmaceuticals, and specialized services often unavailable.

Youth Participation in the January 25th Revolution

Many young people from Upper Egypt were involved in the January 2011 uprising in some way: participating in demonstrations, organizing popular neighborhood committees, or engaging with social media. Active participation was largely limited to males, who demonstrated at national, district, and local levels. Women assisted by providing food and drink to demonstrators, or simply followed the news at home.

Most young people were favorably disposed toward the revolution. Despite concerns about security, there was enormous relief and satisfaction at the dismantling of the notorious state security apparatus. The revolution brought hope for a better future for the country, especially in the economic sphere, with the prospect of new job opportunities to which all could apply equitably.

Young people were quick to take on roles of responsibility after the revolution; they expressed the sense of recovering their rightful role and voice. New initiatives took the form of cleaning up streets (as had occurred in Tahrir Square), the establishment of new NGOs and alliances in their communities, and conducting awareness-raising seminars. Such initiatives would have been inconceivable before the revolution.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Discussions with young people often crossed topic areas and evidenced the inextricable relationships between education, employment, and civic engagement, on one hand, and poverty, equity, and gender, on the other. Poverty continues to be a vicious circle that affects young people's lives in Upper Egypt. Significantly, the absence of adequate economic opportunities has a direct impact on the level and quality of education attained (e.g., inability to pay for school fees and books).

The high rates of youth unemployment and joblessness in Upper Egypt are owed to the limited number of job opportunities in the region, and especially the limited development of the private sector. High rates of unemployment, especially among the young, inevitably have long term social and political, as well as economic consequences. Job creation and the promotion of greater economic opportunity would not only improve the situation of young people in the region, but also eliminate the economic hardship which is one of the key impediments to their active citizenship.

Four major considerations need to be kept in mind in developing job-creation interventions for youth in Upper Egypt:

- **The public sector will no longer be the prime source of jobs for graduates as it had in the past.** Young people will need to adjust their expectation of government employment. This can be encouraged through information campaigns and other awareness-raising schemes linked to training and education.

- **The private sector has a larger role to play in generating employment in Upper Egypt.** However, this should be done in a way that provides opportunities suitable for women in a form which is locally culturally appropriate; and which ensures that employment rights are upheld.
- **Education and employment interventions directed exclusively towards women will not work,** as social norms are such that community acceptance for these interventions is needed. Social norms point to men as the main bread winners whose acceptance and support need to be garnered to allow women to take part in such projects. In order **to reduce the gender gap in labor participation, it is advisable to provide entrepreneurship and/or skills training opportunities for both males and females through the same programs, with appropriate activities for each gender.**
- **An integrated approach should be adopted encompassing both female employment and education.** Policies addressing young women's education, skills development, and employment need to be designed to reinforce one another, rather than working through the traditionally separate sectors.

The following two sections lay out options for the promotion of income generation, and of citizenship among youth in Upper Egypt.

1. Transition to Employment

The limited number of job opportunities in the region (especially in the private sector) is clearly the main factor driving high rates of youth unemployment and joblessness in Upper Egypt. Job creation and the promotion of adequate economic opportunities would not only improve the situation of young people in the region, they would also eliminate one of the key impediments to their active citizenship, namely, economic hardship.

Promote income generation for youth in Upper Egypt

Based on previous findings and international experience of what does and does not work in promoting income generation for young people, **interventions in Upper Egypt should be evidence-based programs that directly address young people's needs and expectations.** For example, **the potential for labor-intensive public works programs as a mechanism for addressing youth unemployment is generally limited,** as young people in Upper Egypt feel it is the government's responsibility to deliver community infrastructure (most also view manual labor as undesirable.) In addition, international evidence on the impact of labor-intensive public works is inconclusive.

Given that Upper Egypt is a predominantly agricultural community, interventions to promote youth employment in agriculture are desirable in principle. However, such interventions face multiple challenges and are consequently not a high-priority. First, young people in the region emphatically do not want to work in the sector because they see no future in such employment, particularly those with secondary or university education. Second, traditional organization of the sector, government control, high costs, land fragmentation, and the decreased volume of arable land are all major constraints. To be sustainable, any employment intervention in the sector would need to be based on a careful understanding of these constraints and, hopefully, draw on successful models of youth engagement with community-based organizations and agricultural cooperatives.

Link skills development and training to employment, including that of young women

While the demand for labor is clearly an important issue, chapter 2 showed that **both employers and young people themselves in Upper Egypt have a low opinion of the quality and job-relevance of the education and training that they receive.** There is a particular need for integrated programs that bring together appropriate training and services designed in partnership with employers. In particular, programs are needed to:

- **Improve the quality of technical and vocational training and make it more accessible to youth** by enhancing its content, delivery, institutional arrangements, and geographic accessibility (for example, via public-private partnerships and NGOs for developing skills and providing placements).
- **Provide comprehensive services to unemployed and disadvantaged young men and young women.**
- **Promote job intermediation by NGOs and private sector agencies to match young people looking for work with available jobs.** Public-private initiatives could also be useful here. For example, Nahdet el Mahroussa's Career Development Office partners with Cairo University and several private companies to equip students with essential job skills and match them with potential employers; this scheme could be replicated in Upper Egypt by partnering with local universities. Technology could be used to connect jobseekers to employers in cost-effective ways and reach large numbers of young people. Options include mobile platforms such as *SoukTel's JobMatch* service, which enables young jobseekers to submit a basic resume through a mobile phone and match it with job advertisements.

Promote youth entrepreneurship

Young people have expressed an interest in entrepreneurship, but lack the information, awareness, and skill set necessary to engage in entrepreneurship schemes. Specific interventions could include programs that:

- **Improve the design of credit programs and their appropriateness for young people.** This means tailoring the size of loans and repayment arrangements to young people's needs and means, as well as providing training, mentoring, and peer group support.
- **Encourage youth access to Social Fund for Development credits** by raising awareness that there is in fact no condition forcing applicants to wave the right to apply for government employment; and introducing other tailored components.
- **Launch information schemes to raise awareness of existing credit and entrepreneurial support schemes.** Simultaneously, offer specific training for entrepreneurs in technical and small business skills, with accompanying mentoring and support.
- **Focus on reducing the gender gap in labor participation by providing entrepreneurship opportunities, including access to credit, for both males and females through the same program, but with appropriate activities for each gender.** In the near term, appropriate activities for women could include packaging or processing agricultural products and **cottage industries**, which can be

undertaken at the household or community level and are thus consistent with the constraints on women's mobility.

- Due to the isolation of women and young women in Upper Egypt, **facilitate the formation of female peer groups and link these groups to market opportunities**. Such groups would also provide a culturally appropriate context for other activities, including literacy classes.

2. Promote Civic Engagement among Youth

Young people in Upper Egypt have expressed interest in engaging in community service and voluntary work, but stress that they cannot initiate these activities alone; they require guidance, facilitation, and acknowledgment from their local governments. Initiatives such as garbage collecting, monitoring local government performance and awareness raising for local NGOs appeal to young people only if such initiatives are accepted in some measure by an official entity.

Given the relatively narrow engagement of youth and the keen interest in civic participation expressed by the young people interviewed for this study, the recommendations below aim to **strengthen youth engagement, building on their recent dedication to community service**. Active youth participation in civic life has a proven positive impact on young people's aspirations for broader institutional change and their acquisition of leadership and soft skills, such as negotiation, team work and problem solving—all valuable skills for employability. Young people have vast potential to contribute to their communities, yet there are few opportunities for youth leadership in Upper Egypt. Raising young people's awareness of the potential for civic action and exposing them to new ideas and possibilities of engagement would help create the space for such action.

A starting point would be to conduct a comprehensive mapping of youth involvement in community services and civil society organizations for possible replication and scaling up.

Strengthen youth centers and the services that they provide

Currently, Egypt's youth centers are poorly equipped and managed and provide few services of interest or relevance to young people, particularly young women. A number of improvements could be envisaged:

- **Use youth centers to deliver the types of skills training described above.**
- **Increase participation by youth in the management of youth centers**, for example, by establishing linkages to schools or forming youth committees.
- **Provide more access, facilities, and activities for girls.** This might include designating specific days or hours for girls' participation, thereby eliminating the fear of harassment and the mixing of girls and boys at these centers.

Establish youth service programs

Youth service programs represent another recommended area for investment in Upper Egypt, as they provide young people opportunities to acquire new skills while engaging in community development with their peers (e.g., through activities such as literacy tutoring, peer-to-peer mentoring, assisting the disabled, rehabilitating small-scale infrastructure or public spaces). Possible interventions could include:

- **Promote youth-led NGOs and youth engagement in the management of existing NGOs and community associations.**
- **Promote the engagement of youth in assuring the transparency and accountability of local governments.** Involving youth in monitoring the performance of these entities would yield several benefits, including helping ensure good performance, promoting a much-needed sense of youth engagement and empowerment, and building skills. Social accountability techniques for such monitoring are now well established and made more effective by information and communication technology.

Support the establishment of local youth platforms

In some countries, young people and their representative bodies are recognized as stakeholders and partners in decision making at local and national levels. Youth platforms or councils, representing a variety of youth-led organizations and initiatives, serve as key channels for expressing youth opinion and voice on various critical public policy issues. The establishment of such youth representative bodies could facilitate the interaction and coordination of youth services and other youth-related programs with national policy makers and/or local authorities.

These programs should be devised in conjunction with youth and use participatory methods, helping ensure that they effectively convey information and encourage youth to exercise their rights and fully engage in civil society. To be effective, these programs should consider the diversity of youth in Upper Egypt and offer activities that respond to the region's rural and urban, socioeconomic, religious, and cultural diversity.

Looking ahead, the future of young people in Upper Egypt is likely to be determined by how the issues of unemployment, joblessness, and voice are addressed. Resolving the unemployment issue is only part of the equation. Young people see a good job as the foundation not only of their livelihoods, but also of their social identities. It is difficult to envisage their playing an active role in their communities and the wider nation if the only jobs available to them are casual, irregular and poorly remunerated. Equally important, the role of young people needs to be institutionalized in local governance structures to ensure that their voice is included. The main slogan of the revolution—"***Bread (life), Freedom, Social Justice***"—shows the interrelationship of these various dimensions of young people's lives and the challenge for the next phase will be to empower them to achieve their vision.



Photo: The Arab Spring, Assiut. (Al Ahram)

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

On the 25th of January 2011, Egyptians took to the streets calling for the removal of then President Hosni Mubarak and his government. These demonstrations were the result of years of mounting grievances and frustration over poverty, exclusion from social, political and economic opportunity, endemic corruption, and a widening gap between the rich minority and the poor majority. Youth played a leading role in this movement.

The Egyptian Revolution resonated beyond Tahrir Square into the most isolated, conservative, and disenfranchised communities of Egypt.¹ As this study shows, the revolution caused young people in Upper Egypt to feel that they had a voice and a sense of hope, giving them a newfound awareness of their rights.

1.1 Objectives of the Study

This study examines the demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural circumstances of young men and young women (aged 15–29) in Upper Egypt. Where appropriate, comparison is made with the rest of the country. It explores the perceptions of young men and women regarding the challenges and opportunities they face as they attempt to gain access to education, employment, services, and civic engagement. More broadly, the study explores their views on the factors that facilitate or limit their inclusion in the society and economy of Upper Egypt.

This report focuses on two main transitions of young Upper Egyptians: the transition from school to work, and the transition to active citizenship and civic engagement.² These are the issues of most concern to youth themselves, who stress that employment and citizenship are their greatest concerns in the aftermath of the revolution. **The study also briefly considers young people’s engagement in the January 25th Revolution and their aspirations for the future in its aftermath. It concludes by offering recommendations for youth-inclusive policies that could expand the scope of employment and participation opportunities currently available to young people.** The study represents one of the most comprehensive analyses of youth issues in Upper Egypt to date; its depth and level of analysis are both timely and essential in providing a snapshot of the lives of young Egyptians, particularly those living in circumstances of poverty and deprivation.

The study is intended to inform government policy related to youth, contribute to the capacity of the Egyptian government to address youth issues, stimulate public debate, and inform the development community of issues related to youth in Upper Egypt. The focus of the study being on Upper Egypt, it does not examine comprehensively the implications of youth employment and participation for Egyptian society as a whole. In its analysis of gender, the study analyses the dimension of access to education, but does not attempt to explore the issue of gender segregation in educational specialization. These important issues must be left to future research.

¹ Jean-Pierre Filiu, 2011, *The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprisings* (London: Hurst).

² The five youth transitions to adulthood most frequently cited by the literature are the transitions from school, starting a productive work life, adopting a healthy lifestyle, forming a family, and exercising citizenship (World Bank, 2006, *WDR 2007*).

1.2 Background and Rationale


Egypt is undergoing a demographic phase marked by a significant ‘youth bulge’: 28 percent of its population is between 15 to 29 years of age, and this proportion will increase over the next decade. This age range, which in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region generally defines youth, is the focus of the present report.

Young people represent a significant asset for individual nation states and the global economy. They can contribute to increased innovation, consumption, and productivity to the extent that they are active participants in the economic process.³ A large and growing youth population is a productive asset—a “demographic gift”—

to countries in which the economy is growing and jobs are being generated to absorb new entrants into the labor force. However, this demographic bonus is not automatic; it depends on a country’s social and economic circumstances and its ability to comprehend and address the challenges facing young people and obstacles hindering their socioeconomic inclusion. With a combination of rising poverty and unemployment, unequal distribution of resources, a weak education system, and corruption—which together prevent young people from fulfilling their potential—Egypt has not yet capitalized on this demographic asset. However, the recent changes that have taken place in the country have created new particular spaces, which, while their form continues to emerge, have engendered hope that the young will assume a greater role in shaping Egypt’s future.

This study was undertaken in response to a request from the Government of Egypt, through the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, to conduct an analytical assessment of the “needs and conditions in which young people live in rural and peri-urban Egypt,” with a view to helping the government develop recommendations to ensure that youth benefit fully from the country’s economic growth. As defined at the time, the objectives of the study were to map the characteristics and life histories of young men and women in contemporary Upper Egypt. The study sought to identify and understand factors that facilitate or impede economic and social success among youth in rural, peri-urban, and urban settings, as well as the pathways and policies that lead to these outcomes. These objectives were supplemented after the January 25th Revolution to use the opportunity to examine how youth viewed the profound changes that had just occurred on the political scene, and their sense, at that point in history, of what they might mean for the future.

Figure 1. Population Pyramid of Egypt, 2009.




Source: SYPE 2009.

³ World Bank, 2006, *World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation* [hereafter *WDR 2007*] (Washington, DC: World Bank).

Compared to other regions of the country, Upper Egypt is considered a “lagging area” trapped in a vicious cycle of low education, high fertility, and poverty. It is also demographically the youngest region in the country, housing the poorest youth.

Upper Egypt extends from south of Cairo to encompass the entire Nile River Valley as far as Lake Nasser at the border with Sudan. Egypt’s five-year plan (2006/07–2010/11) envisaged an average annual growth rate of 8 percent. According to World Bank reports, these projected growth rates ambitiously aimed to halve the poverty rate.⁴ However, in its specific measures, the five year plan did not directly address the concentrated poverty rates in rural Upper Egypt, since most investments were targeted to the Metropolitan and Lower Egypt regions.⁵

Figure 2. Population Pyramid of Upper Egypt, 2009



Metropolitan cities such as Cairo and Alexandria remain the hubs of development in Egypt. Upper Egypt—especially some of its rural areas—is remote from these economic centers and hence from exposure to modern forms of education and technology. Distance from major ports and undeveloped markets also limit the attractiveness of investment in Upper Egypt.

Upper Egypt is largely rural, with about 75 percent of its young people residing in rural areas, less than 18 percent in urban areas, and 6.6 percent in informal urban areas. Egypt’s poor are generally concentrated in rural areas—this is particularly the case in Upper Egypt.⁶ *Poverty has a strong regional dimension.* Urban and rural Upper Egypt are the poorest regions in the country, with poverty rates of 19 and 39 percent, respectively. The equivalent figures for Lower Egypt are 9 and 17 percent, hence rural poverty is more than twice as high in Upper than in Lower Egypt. Metropolitan areas are the least poor (with less than 6 percent of residents living in poverty).⁷

The economic gap between rural and urban areas in Egypt has grown since 1995, with rural Upper Egypt increasingly lagging behind the country’s metropolitan and urban areas. Indeed, just three governorates of Upper Egypt contain 82 percent of the country’s poorest 1,000 villages.⁸ While Upper Egypt accounts for only 40 percent of the population of the country, it includes 60 percent of those living

⁴ World Bank, 2007, “Arab Republic of Egypt: Poverty Assessment Update” [hereafter, “Poverty Assessment Update”], Report No. 39885-EGT, Social and Economic Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ UNDP and Institute of National Planning of Egypt, 2010, *Egypt Human Development Report 2010; Youth in Egypt: Building our Future* (New York: UNDP), <http://www.undp.org/Portals/0/NHDR%202010%20english.pdf> (accessed October 2011).

⁷ World Bank, 2007, “Poverty Assessment Update,” 25.

⁸ Ibid.

in poverty and 80 percent of those living in severe poverty.⁹ Regions of Lower Egypt have made significant improvements in terms of closing the welfare gap with the more developed Cairo region, whereas the welfare gap between Upper Egypt and Cairo has remained constant—at around 64 percent—between 2000 and 2009. The greatest disparities between Lower and Upper Egypt are found in rural areas¹⁰.

As a result of its economic marginalization, migration from Upper Egypt has increased dramatically—both internally to the main cities of Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez, and internationally to Arab Gulf states. Migrant workers from Upper Egypt earn 8 percent less on average than their Lower Egyptian counterparts. Their per capita income levels are proportionally even lower, as their earnings are shared with a larger number of dependent family members.

Upper Egypt is considered the most culturally conservative and traditional region of the country, where patriarchal values and tribal customs continue to inform local attitudes and behavior. Upper Egyptians' traditions underscore the power of men over women, the authority of elders over youth, and the propensity for conflicts to take the form of tribal feuds.¹¹ Cultural restrictions severely limit women's mobility, employment, and education. Women, particularly young women, are traditionally discouraged from appearing in public and mixing with males, based on notions of family honor, which is held sacred. Women are thus less likely to work in the fields, either for family or pay, than their counterparts in Lower Egypt.¹² Girls in rural Upper Egypt are systematically disadvantaged in education and are particularly affected by social norms and the limitations of the education system, making female illiteracy in the region the highest in the country. Though it is declining, the incidence of early female marriage is also more prevalent in rural Upper Egypt.

It is important to note that Upper Egyptian culture and social norms are informed not only by Islamic traditions, but also by Coptic, ancient Egyptian, and other influences.¹³ Upper Egypt is home to the largest concentrations of Coptic Orthodox Christians in the country,¹⁴ and both Muslims and Christian groups maintain highly conservative social norms relating to gender, age, and family honor. While relatively little social research has been undertaken in Upper Egypt, it can be readily observed that social structure and norms are, for both faiths and for both men and women, centered on allegiance to family and tribe, rather than a sense of belonging to a wider community.¹⁵ The religious diversity of Upper Egypt has at times caused it to be a center of sectarian conflict.

⁹ World Bank, 2011, "Poor Places, Thriving People: How the Middle East and North Africa Can Rise Above Spatial Disparities," MENA Development Report 58997, World Bank, Washington, DC.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Nicolas Hopkins and Reem Saad, 2004, "The Region of Upper Egypt: Identity and Change," in *Upper Egypt: Identity and Change*, ed. Hopkins and Saad, 11-14 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press).

¹² Ragui Assaad and Ghada Barsoum, 2007, "Youth Exclusion in Egypt: In Search of 'Second Chances,'" Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper 2, Wolfenson Center for Development and Dubai School of Government, Washington, DC.

¹³ These observations draw on both the literature and data collected from respondents.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, 2010, "Egypt," in "International Religious Freedom Report," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148817.htm> (accessed October 2011).

¹⁵ About 96.4 percent of young people interviewed in SYPE 2009 were Muslims and 3.6 percent, non-Muslims; in Upper Egypt, the percentage of non-Muslims is almost 6 percent. Religion does not seem to have an effect on youth health or labor market performance (annex 2). The only significant effect of religion was observed on educational

Cultural norms in Upper Egypt also dictate what types of employment are considered acceptable. These norms differ (as discussed further below) for females and males, as well as by educational level. Manual labor is not regarded as a socially acceptable form of employment for university graduates, regardless of gender. Given very limited private sector opportunities in Upper Egypt, this means that government employment is the only socially acceptable form of employment for young people with any education.

In closing, it is important to point out that many of the issues raised in this study, although particular to Upper Egypt, can also be generalized to the entire country.

1.3 Scope of Work and Methodology

The study uses a mixed-methods approach, combining a quantitative household survey undertaken in 2009 (the Survey of Young People in Egypt) with in-depth qualitative research conducted during the period March through May 2011 soon after the Egyptian Revolution.

The quantitative analysis utilizes data from SYPE, which was conducted by the Population Council in collaboration with the Information and Decision Support Center of the Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers, and co-funded by the World Bank.¹⁶ SYPE was a nationally representative survey that collected data from 11,372 households, including interviews with 15,029 young people aged 10–29. The survey was undertaken in response to the dearth of information on youth and adolescents in Egypt. SYPE collected data on youth-related issues regarding education, work, migration, family formation, health and sexuality, and civic and political participation. The SYPE sample for Upper Egypt consisted of about 4,572 young people aged 10–29 from 3,325 households from the governorates of Beni Suef, Fayoum, Menia, Assiut, Sohag, , Aswan, and Luxor. (Annex 1 provides further details on quantitative methods.)

Box 1. SYPE 2009 Data Validation

1. Age Structure

As noted above, the age structure in the (weighted) SYPE 2009 sample survey is very close to that observed in the 2006 census. The simple correlations* between the age structure observable in the 2006 census (based on five-year age groups) and the SYPE 2009 sample are .99 for all pair-wise comparisons of males, females, and the total population for both Egypt as a whole and the eight Upper Egypt governorates focused on here. The substantial drop-off in the male population aged 25–29 observable in the sample, particularly in Upper Egypt, is likely primarily due to the substantial “temporary” work-based migration (both internal and external) observable in Egypt since the early 2000s. Note also that the distribution of the population by gender across governorates observable in the (weighted) SYPE sample also closely reflects that found in 2009 census-based estimates. A chi-squared test of the difference clearly does not reject the null hypotheses (of no difference in the gender/governorate population structure) with a p-value of 1 (up to 8 decimal places).

2. Employment and Unemployment

Comparison of data from SYPE 2009 with the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) suggests that the employment situation for both male and female youth deteriorated between 2006 and 2009, with young females

attainment. Non-Muslim young people living in Upper Egypt are more likely to have higher educational attainment than their Muslims counterparts. They are also more likely to belong to wealthier households.

¹⁶ This survey is cited throughout the paper as SYPE 2009; the final report was published in January 2011 by the above-named institutions.

particularly hard hit. In 2006, among 15–29-year-olds, 14.1 percent of females were employed, compared to 57 percent of males. In 2009, the employment rate had declined to 54 percent for men and 9 percent for women. This is in line with Labour Force Survey estimates for second quarter 2009, which reported unemployment rates for young women in Egypt in the 15–19 age group, 20–24 age group, and 25–29 age group of 62.0 percent, 59.2 percent, and 27.2 percent, respectively. The corresponding LFS-based unemployment rates for young men in the same age groups were 12 percent, 15.6 percent, and 9.1 percent. Curiously, the estimates of unemployment rates were (with the exception male teenagers) lower in SYPE 2009 than in the LFS for the same period. The SYPE-based estimates for women in these three age groups were 18.5 percent, 37.1 percent, and 29.6 percent, respectively; for men, they were 16.5 percent, 15.5 percent, and 8.1 percent.

Chi-squared tests show the differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level for both young men and young women; however, the source of these differences is not clear. Both samples are relatively small (although the LFS is on the order of three times larger than the SYPE sample), particularly for young women, given their low rates of labor force participation. Curiously, paragraph 3 below suggests that the estimated unemployment rates in SYPE 2009 are, if anything, overestimates of the ILO definition of unemployment. Notwithstanding this, it may be observed that the overall age structure of unemployment is rather similar in the two surveys; for young men, for example, the correlation between LFS and SYPE unemployment rates by age is .86.

3. Missing Job Search Questions for Young Men and Women Who Had Previously Worked

Because of a bad skip pattern in the SYPE 2009 questionnaire, of the 878 respondents who were ready and willing to work, only 712 were asked questions about their job search. The remaining 166 had worked previously, therefore the unemployment and resulting labor force participation numbers assume that only those survey participants who were asked about their job search and were not searching represented the total percentage of young people who were not searching for employment. The 166 previous workers who were currently not working and ready and wanting to work were assumed to both know how to search and be searching, given their previous experience.

Sources: ELMPS 2006; SYPE 2009;

N.B.: The application of a more formal test—for example, Pearson’s chi-squared test—is inappropriate in this case due to the difference in timing between the survey and the census.

The qualitative component of the study included 30 focus groups and 20 in-depth interviews with groups and individuals of various categories. Data was collected in Fayoum, Menia, and Quena. These governorates were selected in accordance with several criteria, including their large populations, high proportion of rural residents, and involvement in the January 25th uprisings. Although planned earlier, data collection was actually undertaken between March and May of 2011. The radical changes then underway in Egypt represented an opportunity to explore issues that young people may previously have been hesitant to discuss. This allowed the focus groups to cover issues such as corruption and nepotism in the job market, fear of harassment by state security agencies, and sectarian issues. It also, of course, allowed for discussion of the attitudes of youth and others towards the revolution itself. (Details on qualitative methods can be found in annex 2.)

The study also draws on two important earlier studies on Egypt supported by the World Bank, namely, the —Poverty Assessment Update” of 2007 and —Pathways to Shared Growth” of 2009. The findings of the present study reinforce key conclusions of these two reports and extend them to investigate key social, economic, and attitudinal dimensions of the lives of Upper Egypt’s youth.

1.4 Structure of the Report

The report is consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the transition from school to work, examining educational attainment, labor force participation, unemployment, joblessness, and gender issues. It also briefly considers youth entrepreneurship and involvement in agriculture. Civic engagement is the focus of chapter 3, which presents young people's understanding of civic engagement and constraints to community participation. Chapter 4 considers young people's involvement in the January 25th Revolution. Conclusions and policy recommendations reflecting young people's aspirations for the future are discussed in Chapter 5.



Youth Participation in Arab Spring: Egyptian Bloggers

CHAPTER 2. EDUCATION TOWARDS EMPLOYMENT: A MISSING LINK

—Children gave up on education because they know they won't find work after completing their studies.”

—*Mother, Urban Menia*

Quantitatively, Egypt has made great strides in achieving the Millennium Development Goal of universal basic education; the gross primary school enrollment ratio in 2007 was 100 percent.¹⁷

However, more than one-quarter (27 percent) of young people aged 18–29 had not completed basic education in that same year: 17 percent had dropped out before completing basic education and 10 percent had never enrolled in school.¹⁸ Some 82 percent of those who had never enrolled in school were female, and 80 percent lived in rural areas.¹⁹

Box 2. The Egyptian Education System

The Egyptian pre-university education system is one of the largest in the MENA region. It encompasses more than 43,000 schools, some 1.6 million personnel (teachers, administrators, and others), and over 16 million students.

Free primary and secondary education for all was introduced in Egypt in 1950. The Minister of Education Taha Hussein stated at the time that “education is a right for people, as is their right for air and water.” In 1962, universal free education was extended to higher education. Universal free education, together with President Nasser’s guarantee of employment in the public sector for all university graduates announced later that same year, contributed to a rapid increase in enrollment rates.

There are four main levels in the Egyptian education system: primary (*ibtida’i*), preparatory (*‘adadi*), secondary (*thanawi*), and tertiary education. Compulsory “basic education” consists of six years of primary and three years of preparatory school. After preparatory school, students proceed either to general secondary school (*thanawiyya ‘amma*), which lasts three years and prepares them for university, or, if their test scores are lower, into vocational secondary programs specializing either in commerce, industry, or agriculture. Vocational schools account for about 60 percent of secondary enrollment. Higher education institutions comprise two-year technical institutes, four-year technical institutes, and universities where programs vary between four and seven years, depending on the degree. In contrast to universities, “technical institutes” (*ma‘ahid*) accept students with lower *thanawiyya ‘amma* scores, as well as students from vocational secondary schools. However, degrees from these institutes are less valued by employers and unemployment among their graduates is higher than that among university graduates.

Sources: UNDP and Institute of National Planning of Egypt, 2010, *Egypt Human Development Report 2010*; and Ghada F. Barsoum, 2004, “The Employment Crisis of Female Graduates in Egypt: An Ethnographic Account,” *Cairo Papers in Social Science* [The American University in Cairo Press] 25 (3).

This chapter examines young people’s educational attainment and quality; labor force participation; unemployment, underemployment, and joblessness rates; and the nature and quality of their first jobs. It also looks at youth perceptions of the challenges and opportunities they face as they seek to move into the

¹⁷ World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, Washington, DC,

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR/countries/EG-XQ-XN> (accessed October 2011).

¹⁸ Arab Republic of Egypt, CAPMS, 2008, “2006 Census of Population, Housing, and Establishments,” rev. ed. (May 2008), CAPMS, Cairo, <http://www.msrintranet.capmas.gov.eg/pls/fdl/tst12e?action=&lname=> (accessed October 2011?).

¹⁹ SYPE 2009 (Population Council and Information and Decision Support Center of the Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers, 2011, “[2009] Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE): Final Report,” Rev. ed, Population Council, West Asia and Africa Office, Cairo.)


world of work. The chapter focuses in particular on the gender gap in Upper Egypt as manifested at different educational and socioeconomic levels.

2.1 Educational Attainment

Young people in Upper Egypt have a high rate of illiteracy: 17 percent. The percentage of illiterate females, at 24 percent, is almost twice that of men (the equivalent figures for Egypt as a whole are 11 and 14 percent respectively).²⁰ Only 8 percent of young Upper Egyptians have a university education, compared to 14 percent in the country as a whole.


The gender gap in education is significantly wider in Upper Egypt than in the country as a whole. In fact, 1 in 5 girls in Upper Egypt aged 6–15 is not enrolled in school, and the region accounts for 65 percent of Egyptian girls who drop out of school.²¹ Of females aged 15–29 in Upper Egypt currently not in school, 34 percent have no education at all—almost three times the proportion of males (12 percent, figure 3). The gender gap, which is highest among young people with no education, is a consequence of the high proportion of females who never enroll in school²² and persists through most levels of schooling. However, at the university level and above, the gender gap is very small (less than 1 percent).

Figure 3. Educational Attainment of Out-of-School Young People Aged 15–29, by Gender



Source: SYPE 2009

Figure 4. Educational Attainment of Out-of-School Young People Aged 15–29, by Residence, Upper Egypt



Source: SYPE 2009.

²⁰ Illiteracy is defined here as referring to a person with little or no education who is unable to either read or write. If only those people with no education were considered illiterate, the national percentage in Egypt would be 7 percent.


²¹ World Bank, 2009, "Pathways to Shared Growth," 18–21.

²² 18 per cent of young out-of-school women aged 15–29 have never been to school, whilst for young men, the corresponding figure is 5 percent.

Throughout Upper Egypt, rural youth, especially females, are particularly disadvantaged in educational attainment (figure 4). The percentage of young men with no more than basic education is larger in rural than urban areas of Upper Egypt. Slum-dwelling males fare much better than their rural peers: fewer have no education and more have secondary and higher levels of education.

The level of education completed by young people currently out-of-school is strongly associated with wealth.²³ Figure 5 shows this pattern for Upper Egypt, where the proportion of young people with no education declines, while that with tertiary education rises with each quintile for both men and women. The significance of wealth in determining educational attainment (in distinction to participation) is greater for young women than for young men, particularly in Upper Egypt. This suggests that family wealth plays a role in counteracting the conservative social norms that limit the education of girls in the region. These findings are also consistent with a World Bank analysis of children’s opportunity gaps in Egypt, which suggest that opportunity gaps in education are largely driven by parental income.²⁴

Figure 5. Educational Attainment of Non-Student Young People (aged 15–29) by Wealth, Upper Egypt



Source: SYPE 2009.

²³ Annex 1 (tables 13 and 14) report probit models of the probability of remaining in education and the level of education achieved by school-leavers. The estimations confirm the strong association between wealth and both educational participation and attainment, controlling for other factors.

²⁴ C.E. Velez, H. El-Laithy, and S. Al-Shawarby, 2011, “Equality of Opportunity for Children in Egypt, 2000–2009: Achievements and Challenges,” MNSD, World Bank, Washington, DC.

2.2 Perceptions of Education in Upper Egypt

—The education system is removed from the requirements of the market. We still learn through traditional means in schools; there are no resources in schools. Accordingly when we graduate, we are not prepared for good jobs.

—Unemployed young female, rural Menia

During interviews young people were critical of the quality of educational infrastructure and services, mentioning the poor quality of teachers, overcrowded classrooms, lack or poor quality of equipment, and lack of basic supplies as their main obstacles to learning.

Some respondents pointed to nepotism and favoritism in schools. A few criticized a system which they saw as giving priority to rote memorization and passing exams, rather than gaining real knowledge. Young people also mentioned the difficulty of accessing educational facilities, especially in rural areas. There is no systemic bias in the provision of primary schools, which are generally available in both poor and nonpoor communities. Half of rural Upper Egyptians can reach school in 15 minutes; 25 percent need half an hour. However, not all villages have access to primary and/or preparatory schools, and many others lack access to secondary schools.²⁵

“If you do not take private lessons, most teachers will give you absolutely no attention inside the classroom” —In school female, rural Fayoum

The main reason given for dropping out, or not continuing to secondary school, by both young men and women was the inability to cover school fees or the cost of private tuition. One in-school male participant from rural Fayoum explained that in reality, there is no such thing as free education, since students have to pay for books and private lessons. Unemployed males said that they were also likely to discourage female relatives from continuing their educations because of the lack of work opportunities for them.

The high cost of education means that the poor are less likely to enroll their children in school. Families consistently face two kinds of costs in educating their children. First, there are the “official” costs, such as uniforms, books, and tuition. In addition, parents are obliged to pay for private lessons, which cost between 50 LE and 100 LE, depending on the year and stage of education (primary, preparatory, or secondary).²⁶



Source: Young girls, Upper Egypt (UNICEF).

²⁵ World Bank, “Pathways to Shared Growth,” 24.

²⁶ Ibid., 49–50.

Box 3. Tutoring and the Household Cost of Education: Privatizing Public Goods

The most common form of tutoring in Egypt consists of ‘private lessons’, which are supplementary classes that take place in the homes of either students or teachers. These lessons are provided to individuals or small groups of students for a fee. ‘Sections’ (or study groups) are another form of tutoring, comprising classes for large groups of students offered at lower prices. Such group tutoring is becoming increasingly popular, especially among lower-income families, and is generally offered by commercial tutoring centers (*marakiz*, *sg. merkaz*). The form of instruction in group tutoring is much more teacher-centered and lecture-like than in private lessons and more closely resembles mainstream school classes. For those who cannot afford the more expensive options, tutoring is also offered through mosques, churches, and charitable organizations. An official, legal form of ‘sections’ tutoring by public service teachers (*magmu‘at*) has even been introduced by the government in reaction to widespread illegal²⁷ tutoring practices. This type of tutoring is offered by public school teachers for a small fee after regular classes have ended.

Source: Sarah Hartmann, 2008, “The Informal Market of Education in Egypt: Private Tutoring and Its Implications,” Department of Anthropology and African Studies, Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, Germany.

Private lessons are seen as essential to successfully completing public school, and families have little option but to pay for them. The custom of private tutoring by public service teachers, although against the law, has become entrenched in Egypt. Despite the introduction of a legal, less expensive alternative (*magmu‘at*), many young people find it less effective since the lower remuneration means teachers are not as motivated (box 3). In-school participants noted that private lessons were more important than school and that these were often offered during regular school hours. As one in-school girl from rural Fayoum explained, students cannot do without private lessons since teachers simply do not teach well inside schools.

Private lessons are by far the single largest household education expense for households with children in public and private schools, regardless of educational level. In 2002, the average monthly expenditure *per student* in households with children in basic education was LE 147 (\$25), and in secondary education LE 954 (\$160), while households with children in private higher education institutions spent LE 1,605 (\$101) per student per month. In aggregate, tutoring at the pre-university level amounts to the equivalent of 1.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). A further 0.6 percent of GDP was spent on tutoring in higher education (where tutoring becomes a household's largest education expense, exceeding even tuition and fees in private institutions).²⁸ In 1994, it was estimated that private lessons in Egypt amounted to 20 percent of household expenditures in urban areas and 15 percent in rural areas.²⁹ Young people consider it unjust to have to pay LE 100–150 (\$17–25) a month, on average, to public school teachers to teach them.³⁰

²⁷ Ministerial Decree no 592 of 1998

²⁸ World Bank, 2002, “Arab Republic of Egypt: Education Sector Review; Progress and Priorities for the Future,” Report 24905-EGT, Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

²⁹ Nader Fergany, 1994, “Survey of Access to Primary Education and Acquisition of Basic Literacy Skills in Three Governorates of Egypt,” UNICEF, Almishkat Center for Research and Training, Cairo, as cited in Mark Bray, 2007, *The Shadow Education System: Private Tutoring and Its Implications for Planners*, 2nd ed. (Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO, 2007); and Nader Fergany, 1994, “Urban Women, Work, and Poverty Alleviation in Egypt: Final Report on a Pilot Study in a District of Cairo (Algawaber),” Almishkat Center for Research and Training, Cairo.

³⁰ This sum is based on cost summaries provided by the young people interviewed during the field work. Other participants indicated that a single lesson can cost LE 2.5–LE 5. There is no way to know for certain how much is

This effective privatization of public education is very costly to families, who, in addition to tuition, have to pay for materials sold by teachers. *“The simplest lesson summary is for LE 10 [about \$2] per subject and we have 14 subjects,”* explained an in-school female in rural Fayoum. The high cost and low quality of education are, of course, felt particularly by the poor and contribute to a vicious cycle of low enrollment rates and a subsequent inability to break out of poverty.³¹

Although prohibited by law, some current government hiring schemes may in fact indirectly encourage the culture of private lessons. In an effort to increase employment opportunities, the Egyptian government introduced the hiring of new university graduates as teachers in their villages. The salary of these teachers is close to LE 105. To complement their small salaries, teachers make private lessons almost obligatory.³²

Most young people expressed the view that what they learn in school is irrelevant to their lives and does not prepare them well for employment. Neither employed nor unemployed youth saw much connection between what they were taught in school and the demands of the labor market. One unemployed male from urban Qena said that young people study only for exams, not to gain real knowledge, and that what they learn is of no use in the labor market. For another in-school girl from urban Menia, education was only *“theoretical.”*

Most participants considered that technical training, if effectively delivered, enhances employment opportunities in general, and prospects of employment abroad in particular. However, some out-of-school male participants underlined the lack of opportunities for vocational training; other male participants noted that it was impossible to obtain vocational training while at the same time pursuing one’s general education. In any case, many young people also saw the types of vocational education currently available to them as useless and theoretical. Many participants expressed the wish to acquire *“life skills”*, such as communication, leadership, preparing for interviews, and English proficiency, which are prerequisites for some employment opportunities. However, training in these skills is scarcely available given scarcity of specialized facilities in the districts (or, where available, their high cost). Overall, Egyptian women are less likely than men to acquire job-relevant skills outside the context of formal education. Only 5 percent of Egyptian women said that they had obtained training through informal training, compared to 46 percent of men. As a result, women have relatively less diversified and marketable skills than men, which limits the suitability of their skills to the private sector.³³

There is evidence that employers in Egypt as a whole share the reservations of youth about the relevance of the education and training received by the latter. Asked the question, *“Do graduates hired in the last year have the right skills?”*, only a minority of human resource managers in Egypt agreed (they compared poorly with other countries in the region in this respect). Table 1 distinguishes between hard and soft skills among university and vocational graduates in the country as a whole.³⁴

actually spent on private lessons; however, statistics dating back to 1994 put the amount at 15 percent of total household expenditures in rural areas.

³¹ World Bank, 2007, *“Poverty Assessment Update,”* 62.

³² World Bank, *“Pathways to Shared Growth,”* 49–50.

³³ World Bank, forthcoming, *“Capabilities, Opportunities, and Participation: Gender Equality and Development in the Middle East and North Africa Region; A Companion Report to the WDR 2012,”* World Bank, Washington, DC.

³⁴ IFC and IsDB, 2011, *“Education for Employment: Realizing Arab Youth Potential,”* IFC, Washington, DC, and IsDB, Cairo, 38.

Table 1. Do Graduates Hired in the Last Year have the Appropriate Skills? (Egypt)

	<i>Hard skills (%)</i>	<i>Soft skills (%)</i>
University graduates	29	26
Vocational graduates	16	12

Source: IFC and IsDB, 2011, “Education for Employment,” 38.

This evidence confirms that “soft skills” (see box 4)—such as the ability to communicate clearly, personal creativity, leadership skills, problem-solving skills, critical thinking, and the interpersonal skills necessary to interact successfully in the workplace—are **considered to be particularly lacking by employers in Egypt**. This finding is consistent with this report’s qualitative findings that youth want to gain these kinds of skills and that centers offering such training are limited in Upper Egypt.

Box 4. A Wider Skills Portfolio: Transversal and Life Skills

What are transversal and life skills?

As is increasingly recognized, young people entering the workforce, and indeed citizens in general, need not only job- and subject-specific competencies, but a wider portfolio of capacities to complement and underpin these technical skills. Such **“transversal” skills** take a variety of forms. The most important type is **“life skills,”** sometimes referred to interchangeably as **“soft”** (in comparison to **“hard,” i.e., subject-specific**) **skills**, which themselves can be thought of as consisting of three kinds of competencies: **emotional coping skills** (including managing feelings and stress, as well as self-monitoring); **cognitive skills** (such as decision making, problem solving, critical thinking, setting goals, prioritizing, and analyzing and organizing complex information); and **social or interpersonal skills** (including communication, negotiation, cooperation, leadership, conflict management, and workplace skills). Other skills that may be thought of as transversal because they are transferable across employment types include digital (also known as e-skills) and language skills.

Why are transversal and life skills important?

Employers are known to value employees who can, among other things, keep time, think creatively, relate constructively to fellow workers, and express themselves well in their own and perhaps other languages. Workers themselves gain confidence with and feel empowered by such skills, which are also applicable in other aspects of their personal, social, and civic lives (including, the evidence shows, averting high-risk behaviors). Entrepreneurship, too, requires qualities such as self-reliance and the ability to foresee and solve problems. Transversal competencies are by their nature readily adaptable to both employers’ and learners’ needs and thus transferable between jobs and sectors. Over the long term, learning *how* to think is thus more valuable than learning *what* to think.

What are the implications of the importance of these skills?

Traditional educational and vocational curricula in Egypt, as elsewhere, emphasize technical skills that may readily become (or already be) obsolete and have given insufficient attention to transversal and life skills. However, the evidence indicates that not only are such skills associated with better prospects of employment and higher incomes, but crucially, they are readily teachable. These skills are often best acquired through participatory and/or experiential training, which has implications not only for curricula content, but also for the methods and environments in which such training is delivered. Fortunately, considerable experience has now been accumulated globally regarding skills training for young people and how they can best acquire these skills.

Sources: EU, 2010, “New Skills for New Jobs: Action Now: A Report by the Expert Group on New Skills for New Jobs Prepared for the European Commission,” EU, Brussels; and James J. Heckman, Jora Stixrud, and Sergio Urzua, 2006, “The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior,” *Journal of Labor Economics* 24 (3).

Gender roles and education

Male family members play an important role in deciding how much education females receive. Fathers, husbands, and brothers frequently decide when a woman has received “enough” education. Some female participants said that they discontinued their educations because they disliked the presence of boys in school.

Females and males value education in differing ways. Young males evaluate education in terms of their future chances of finding employment. Several female out-of-school and unemployed participants said that they joined illiteracy classes to continue their educations and learn how to write in order to better take care of their families. Other unemployed female participants mentioned that they attended literacy classes to learn handicrafts. In contrast, many male out-of-school participants said that they did not want to attend literacy classes because they did not see the value of education and that even educated individuals could not find employment.


2.3 Labor Force Participation

Most young people aged 15–29 (62 percent in Egypt as a whole and 68 percent in Upper Egypt) are currently outside the labor force (OLF), because they are in school (about 46 percent in both cases) or for other reasons.³⁵ In addition, the labor force participation of females is particularly low, at just 13 percent for all of Egypt, compared to 62 percent for males.

Women often withdraw from the labor market when they marry and have children, as suggested by figures 6 and 7. For females in Upper Egypt, labor market participation rises up to ages 22–24 (15 percent) and then decreases among those aged 25–29. In contrast, male participation rises more or less steadily, reaching a peak of 96 percent by age 28.


³⁵ The SYPE 2009 questionnaire excluded all nonmarket activities, such as subsistence activities. It may thus underestimate female labor force participation (particularly in rural areas) as a significant share of women work in subsistence activities, such as primary production for household consumption. For a discussion of this issue, see R. Assaad and R. Roushdy, 2007. “Poverty and the Labor Market in Egypt: A Review of Developments in the 1998–2006 Period,” background paper prepared for the World Bank Egypt Poverty Assessment Update, World Bank, Cairo, Egypt.

Figure 6. Young People (Aged 15–29): Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender and Age, Upper Egypt




Source: SYPE 2009.

Figure 7. Young People (Aged 15–29): Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender and Age, All Egypt




Source: SYPE 2009.

Figure 8. Young People (Aged 15–29): Labor Force Participation Rates, by Gender and Residence, Upper Egypt



Source: SYPE 2009.

Figure 9. Young People (Aged 15–29): Labor Force Participation Rates, by Gender and Education, Upper Egypt




Source: SYPE 2009.

Rural youth carry a double burden due to their age group and location, facing lower rates of economic activity than their urban counterparts (figure 8). Notably, only 6 percent of rural females in Upper Egypt are economically active, compared to 12 percent of their urban counterparts and 11 percent of females in informal urban areas.



Photo: March 2011: Egyptian demonstrators, Assiut (Euro News video).

Excluding those still in education, **male labor force participation is 72 percent for those with postsecondary education and 84 percent—the highest rate—for university graduates** (figure 9). Contrary to national trends, tertiary male graduates in Upper Egypt have higher labor force participation than youth with lower education levels. In particular, female participation in Upper Egypt is much higher among tertiary graduates (at 58 percent) than among the uneducated (4 percent), those with less than secondary education (3 percent), or women with postsecondary education (23 percent).




Source: SYPE 2009.

Comparing these figures with those for Egypt as a whole (figure 10), it can be seen that **at the national level, male labor force participation is high among those with no education and almost equally high among university graduates**. For young women, national labor force participation rates are higher at all educational levels than those for Upper Egypt alone, with the exception of those for female university graduates, which are higher in Upper Egypt (58 percent versus 47 percent nationally). **Higher labor force**

participation of tertiary female graduates is, however, characteristic of both regional and national levels.

Labor force participation in Upper Egypt among out-of-school youth increases with family wealth for young men, and even more strongly for young women (figure 11). Some 39 percent of females in the highest wealth quintile are economically active, compared to less than 7 percent in the lowest two quintiles. Wealth is clearly an important determinant of participation in both education and the labor market for young women. Young women from the poorest families are most likely both to drop out of the educational system and to remain jobless.

Figure 11. Young People (Aged 15-29): Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender and Wealth, Upper Egypt



Source: SYPE 2009.

2.4 Unemployment and Joblessness

This section discusses both unemployment and joblessness among young people in Upper Egypt. The distinction between the two terms is important.

The definition of unemployment used in labor force surveys refers to people actively looking for work. While the unemployment rate has received a great deal of attention from policy makers and the media, it has been argued that it is, at least on its own, an inadequate indicator of youth labor market disadvantage since: (i) it disregards young discouraged workers and otherwise inactive workers (those who would like to work, but do not seek employment because they know or believe that no suitable work is available), and (ii) it does not measure the incidence of the ‘working poor’, that is, youth who cannot afford to be unemployed.³⁶

The rate of joblessness, on the other hand, provides a more useful picture of how youth are faring on the labor market as it captures the proportion of the youth population that is either unemployed or inactive, irrespective of an individual’s desire to participate in the labor force.³⁷ The jobless

³⁶ World Bank, 2006, *WDR 2007*.


³⁷ According to this definition, joblessness includes all forms of non-participation other than studying. Hence, it would include males who are in mandatory military service. For a thorough discussion of unemployment and joblessness rates in Egypt over the 1998–2009 period, see Ragui Assaad, 2010, ‘Human Development and Labor Markets,’ in UNDP and Institute of National Planning of Egypt, *Egypt Human Development Report 2010*, 146–162 (New York: UNDP).

include all people who are neither in education nor employment and its rate is defined as a ratio of the relevant age-specific population group.

Given current labor market conditions, many youth may choose to do something other than take up local employment. They may, for example, choose to have or look after children, enjoy more leisure, migrate—internally or internationally—in search of work, participate in further education, or stay at home. For most, the choice to engage in something other than work is unlikely to be independent of the availability and quality of employment. From a school-to-work transition perspective, restricting attention to those youth who are searching for work provides only a very partial picture of the key transition in young people’s lives.

In the Egyptian context, Assaad and Roushdy (2007) argue that the unemployment rate actually reflects the level of youth expectations of getting a formal job, rather than the availability of work. While the unemployment rate would decline if unemployed youth gave up the prospect of formal jobs and accepted informal jobs, or decided to drop out of the labor force altogether, such a decline would not reflect a real improvement in employment conditions in the labor market. In Egypt in recent years, substantial numbers of young people have given up their aspirations for a formal sector job and joined the informal economy, while many females have withdrawn from the labor force.³⁸ For example, figure 12 shows the large number of females who are both out of school and out of the labor force in Upper Egypt (about 70 percent) and in the country as a whole (over 60 percent), as well as the very few females engaged in wage employment (less than 5 percent).

Figure 12. Current Employment Status of Young People (Aged 15–29), by Gender, Upper Egypt




Source: SYPE 2009.


³⁸ R. Assaad and R. Roushdy, 2007, ‘Poverty and the Labor Market in Egypt.’ A review of developments in the 1998–2006 period,” *Background paper for Arab Republic of Egypt: Poverty assessment update*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

The difference between the unemployment rate of young Upper Egyptian males and that of their national counterparts—14 percent versus 16 percent—is small, but statistically significant.³⁹ The rate of unemployment for young women is more than twice that of males: for young men it is 12 percent in both Egypt and Upper Egypt, but for young females, it is 31 percent and 28 percent, respectively (figure 13). As already noted, this significant difference is attributed to the low levels of female participation in the labor force in Upper Egypt rather than higher rates of female unemployment in this region.

From a peak at 22 years old, male unemployment falls with age, fluctuating around 10 percent (figure 14). As their labor force participation is so low, sample sizes for females are too small to yield significant trends by age. However, the decline in unemployment observed with age from a peak at 20 is no doubt due in part to women dropping out of the labor market altogether as they marry and have families.





Source: SYPE 2009.




³⁹ The difference between the youth unemployment rate in Upper Egypt and the rest of Egypt is statistically significant at 5 percent using a one-tailed t-test.

In contrast to the unemployment rate, the youth joblessness rate in Upper Egypt is five percentage points higher than the national level (45 percent versus 40 percent).⁴⁰ As might be anticipated, the gender gap in the joblessness rate is much more pronounced than that in the unemployment rate, with the **female joblessness rate in both Egypt and Upper Egypt more than three times that of males** (figure 15). As regards age trends, joblessness for young men reaches a peak of 46 percent at age 21 and subsequently declines rapidly (figure 16). In contrast, for females, there is a continued marked rise in joblessness rates from around 21 percent at age 15 to well over 80 percent for those aged 20–29.



The joblessness rate for young rural women (75 percent) in Upper Egypt is higher than that of young urban women (53 percent), highlighting the difficulties encountered by rural female youth in the region in their transition from school to work. For young men, urban rates were somewhat higher (24 percent, compared to 19 percent in rural areas; figure 17).


⁴⁰ A t-test on the difference between youth joblessness rates in Upper Egypt and the remainder of the country is statistically significant at 1 percent.



Source: SYPE 2009.

There is no clear correlation between joblessness and education among young men and women in Upper Egypt. The relationship of joblessness to educational attainment is quite different from that of unemployment to educational attainment. In particular, 96 percent of young women with no education are jobless (indicating that they are not looking for work). Joblessness is also high among young females with secondary and postsecondary education (figure 18).


Figure 18. Young People (Aged 15-29): Joblessness Rate, by Gender and Education, Upper Egypt



Source: SYPE 2009.

Female unemployment rates in Upper Egypt, on the other hand, increase with education, but only up to the postsecondary level. Graduate female unemployment is lower than that of females with basic and secondary education. At the same time, less than 4 percent of illiterate females are unemployed, compared to almost 40 percent of those with postsecondary education (figure 19).


Figure 19. Young People (Aged 15–29): Unemployment Rate, by Gender and Education, Upper Egypt



Source: SYPE 2009.



However, for males, the pattern is less clear: unemployment rates are in fact lowest among those with postsecondary (7 percent), university (8 percent), or basic (9 percent) education. This contrasts with the national-level pattern for male unemployment, which affects 6 percent of those with no education, 19 percent of those with postsecondary education, and 19 percent of university graduates (figure 20). This divergence from the national pattern may well be attributable to factors already mentioned. The higher poverty levels observed in Upper Egypt, combined with the lower contribution of women to household income (assuming that the low female labor force participation is due to nonmarket factors, including social gender norms) are together likely to both reduce the reservation wage of educated males, drawing them into the labor market, and reduce the opportunities available for less-skilled youth.

Figure 20. Young People (Aged 15–29): Unemployment Rate by Gender and Education, All Egypt



Source: SYPE 2009.

There is a broadly positive association between unemployment and wealth in Upper Egypt, with the exception of women in the second wealth quintile (figure 21). Figure 22 shows a comparable pattern for Egypt as a whole. The lower unemployment rates among those in poorer households suggest that the better-off can afford to wait for a good job (and, given the correlation between wealth and educational attainment, that they have higher employment).




Unlike unemployment, which increases with wealth, **joblessness in Upper Egypt exhibits a clear negative relationship with household wealth for both males and females** (figure 23). This is a

reflection of the difficulties encountered by the poorest group (lowest quintile) in their transition from school to work. Once again, the gender gap in joblessness rates is prevalent among all wealth quintiles, although it narrows as wealth increases.



Urban dwellers in Upper Egypt—both male and female—are more likely to be unemployed than their rural counterparts (figure 24). This urban-rural pattern is probably due to two main factors: (i) young people in rural areas are more likely than their urban counterparts to accept low-quality jobs in light of their lower educational attainment and higher levels of poverty; and, (ii) the kinds of jobs available in rural areas and the absence of formal job search institutions make it less likely that they will actively engage in a job search (as required by the standard definition of unemployment).



2.5 Factors Determining Youth Employment and Job Quality

For both young men and young women in Upper Egypt, education and family wealth play significant roles in shaping the school-to-work transition, although in rather different ways.⁴¹ **For young men, education is the more significant predictor of the ability to find ‘good-quality’ employment, whereas for young women, wealth appears to be the key factor in obtaining a good job (and encouraging “wait” unemployment), with education generally playing a supporting role.** The exception to this generalization is that, for women, postsecondary or university-level qualifications are crucial determinants in obtaining formal employment.

For young men, higher education levels are associated with a lower likelihood of finding employment, but, once found, such employment tends to be of higher-quality, i.e. permanent and formal sector. This is consistent with the occurrence of “wait” unemployment among more highly educated young men.⁴² Family wealth has little association with employment per se, but is, again, a significant factor in determining the *quality* of employment once obtained.

For young women, obtaining a higher-level educational qualification markedly improves the chances of finding both employment in general, and formal employment in particular, especially in Upper Egypt. However, it has little correlation with finding permanent employment and, if anything, is associated with involuntary part-time employment. Family wealth, on the other hand, appears to be strongly positively associated with the quality of work—reducing the likelihood of involuntary part-time employment and increasing the chances of formal and/or permanent employment.

More specifically, **analysis of the determinants of employment among young people in Upper Egypt who have left education reveals the following:**

- Among young women, higher levels of education are associated with much higher chances of finding employment (above all for those with university-level education and, to a lesser extent, those with vocational education).
- The positive effect of a university education on the probability of young women finding employment is nearly twice as strong in Upper Egypt as in other parts of the country.
- In contrast, for young men, there is a negative relation between higher levels of education (i.e. secondary and postsecondary) and the probability of finding work, at least outside of the Upper Egypt region.

Transition from School to First Job

Sixty-two percent of young males Upper Egypt had obtained a job since leaving school, but only 8 percent of young females (Table 2). The percentage of young people (particularly females), who have

⁴¹ This section is based on the probit models reported in annex 2, tables 15–19. Note that there are issues of endogeneity with several of the “explanatory” variables, most particularly, wealth, so the positive association between, for example, household wealth and job quality should not be taken to necessarily imply a direct causal relationship between family wealth and job quality. However, the main interest here is the differences in the associations for young men and women and the differential associations between wealth and the respective phenomena under consideration. That the measured “effects” of wealth are not simply due to reverse causation—that is, richer families are richer because their children have (better) jobs—is amply illustrated by table 15, where the association between wealth and employment is negative and for women, statistically significant.

⁴² Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef, eds., 2009, *Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press).

completed the transition increases with age. This is a reflection of both the time taken to find a job and the likelihood that older respondents have more education than younger ones.

Table 2. Percent of Youth (Aged 15-29) Who Completed the Transition from School-to-Work, by Gender and Age Group, Upper Egypt

	<u>15-17</u>		<u>18-24</u>		<u>25-29</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
"Completed" the transition	58	3	58	6	70	12	62	8
Never held a job	42	97	44	94	30	88	38	92
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Sample size</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>133</i>	<i>373</i>	<i>593</i>	<i>197</i>	<i>405</i>	<i>618</i>	<i>1,131</i>

If we look specifically at the impact of schooling, **the percentage of both males and female youth who completed their transition increases with educational achievement.** The proportion of women who completed their transition rises sharply (from 2 percent among those with less than secondary education to 51 percent among university graduates; table 3). This is consistent with the earlier finding that university education has a much stronger effect on young women's employment in Upper Egypt than in the rest of the country.

Table 3. Percent of Youth (Aged 15-29) Who Completed the Transition from School to Work, by Gender and Educational Attainment, Upper Egypt

	<u>Less than secondary</u>		<u>Secondary</u>		<u>Post-secondary*</u>		<u>University and above</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
"Completed" the transition	60	2	62	11	48	16	70	51	62	8
Never held a job	40	97	38	89	52	84	30	49	38	92
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Sample size</i>	<i>228</i>	<i>694</i>	<i>314</i>	<i>354</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>618</i>	<i>1,131</i>

Source: SYPE 2009.

Note: *Due to small cell frequencies, the figures for postsecondary institute graduates are not reliable.

Duration of the transition from school to first job

On average, it takes young men in Upper Egypt 3.6 years after leaving school to obtain their first job, and young women 4.1 years. For Egypt as a whole, the transition is a little longer for males (3.4 years), but shorter for females (4.5 years; table 4).⁴³

Table 4. Average Duration of Youth (Aged 15-29) Transition from School to First Job, by Gender (years)

	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
Upper Egypt		

⁴³ The duration of the transition from education to work is estimated by the difference between the date of leaving (or dropping out of) school and the date of obtaining the first job. For individuals who have never been to school or who dropped out of school before the age of 15, the beginning of their transition is counted as age 15.

Average Duration	3.6	4.1
Sample size	433	110
All Egypt		
Average Duration	3.4	4.5
Sample size	2503	769

Source: SYPE 2009.

Forty-three percent of young men and 55 percent of young women had to wait four or more years to obtain their first job (table 5). While a quarter of young people (27 percent of males and 24 percent of females) who completed their transition from education to work found their first job within a year, most of these had already obtained a job before finishing school, had never been to school, or had dropped out of school and obtained a job before the age of 15.

Table 5. Distribution of the Duration of Youth (Aged 15–29) Transition from School to First Job, by Gender and Educational Level, Upper Egypt

Duration of transition	<i>Less than secondary</i>		<i>Secondary</i>		<i>Postsecondary*</i>		<i>University and above</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Before finishing school	48	54	4	11	0	0	0	0	21	22
0 year	12	8	3	0.0	0	0	0	0	6	2
1 year	4	0	9	7	15	0	0	0	7	2
2–3 years	14	15	35	35	14	33	2	0	23	19
4–5 years	8	8	21	19	57	33	15	26	15	18
More than 5 years	14	15	28	28	14	34	83	74	28	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sample size	172	37	213	41	6	3	42	29	433	110

Source: SYPE 2009.

Note: *Due to small cell frequencies, the figures for post-secondary institute graduates are not reliable.

It is notable that the duration of the transition *increases with education*: the less educated find work sooner than the more educated. Almost 60 percent of males and 62 percent of females with less than secondary education completed their transition in less than one year, while none of those with postsecondary or higher education had done so. This further substantiates the assessment that, while education improves the quality of employment obtained, it also entails a substantially longer period of ‘wait’ unemployment. For young women in particular, this wait unemployment is facilitated if the family is better-off, and is associated with obtaining substantially higher-quality employment.

Characteristics of first job

Six categories of first job were distinguished: public (governmental or in public enterprise), private formal, private informal regular, private informal irregular, unpaid family work, and self-employed/employer.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ First job is defined in this section as the first job that lasted at least six months consecutively. The sample size used in this section is thus slightly different from that used in the previous sections, since only those with such first

Informal employment (in both regular and irregular forms) accounts for almost three-quarters of first jobs for young men, compared to less than half (43 percent) for females (table 6). The share of public employment, in contrast, is more than four times higher among young women (45 percent) than among young men (10 percent).

Table 6. Distribution of First Six-Month Job among Youth (Aged 15–29), by Gender and Age Group, Upper Egypt

First Job	15–17 years		18–24 years		25–29 years		Total	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Public job	0	10	4	54	21	45	10	45
Private formal job	0	0	2	2	5	2	3	2
Private informal regular job	46	10	43	29	32	26	39	26
Private informal irregular job	37	70	37	13	29	12	34	18
Unpaid family work	17	10	11	2	6	5	10	4
Employer/Self-employed	0	0	3	0	7	10	4	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sample size	28	9	222	39	148	54	398	102

Source: SYPE 2009.

Note: Sample size limited to respondents with first jobs that lasted six consecutive months.

As expected, **the proportion of young people in formal employment (in either the public or private sector) increases with age**. No males aged 15–17 obtained formal jobs, compared to 26 percent of those aged 25–29. For females, the proportion rises from 10 percent to 47 percent for the same age groups. At the same time, the share of informal employment (regular and irregular informal wage work and unpaid family work) among males decreases from 100 percent among the 15–17 age group to 66 percent among the 25–29 year-olds, and from 90 percent to 43 percent among females. Unpaid family work declines steadily with age.

Table 7 shows the clear influence of educational attainment on the quality of the first job attained. As already noted, **formal employment (in both the public and private sector) is an attribute of the most educated youth**. Very few youth with less than secondary education have formal employment, compared to 63 percent of male and 89 percent of female university graduates. Most less-educated youth work in informal jobs.

Table 7. Distribution of First Six-Month Job among Youth (Aged 15–29), by Gender and Educational Level, Upper Egypt

First Job	Less than secondary		Secondary		Postsecondary*		University and above		Total	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Public job	2	3	7	42	14	100	48	84	10	45
Private formal job	1	0	3	0	0	0	15	5	3	2
Private informal regular job	46	18	39	48	28	0	15	11	39	26

jobs are included. Note that in the first job section, the SYPE 2009 questionnaire does not allow for the distinction between full-time and involuntary part-time employment.

Private informal irregular job	37	59	37	0	43	0	11	0	34	18
Unpaid family work	9	12	11	3	0	0	7	0	10	4
Employer/Self-employed	5	9	3	7.5	15	0	4	0	4	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Sample size</i>	<i>156</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>194</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>398</i>	<i>102</i>

Source: SYPE 2009.

Note: Sample size limited to respondents with first jobs that lasted six consecutive months.

*Due to small cell frequencies, the figures for postsecondary institute graduates are not reliable.

2.6 Youth Perceptions of Employment Challenges and Opportunities

The high joblessness rate of young people makes access to jobs—meaningful or otherwise—the most serious concern among youth in Upper Egypt. This section considers the job preferences expressed by young people, as well as their perceptions of impediments to employment. It also discusses the significance of higher education and gender in determining employment outcomes.

Employment preferences among young people in Upper Egypt

As already noted, government employment is the ideal to which youth aspire. In fact, the terms “*job*” and “*government job*” are often used synonymously. Government jobs are favored because they are secure, provide pensions, and generally have better working conditions compared to private sector jobs. While such factors, as well as financial benefits, influence the desirability of a job, prestige also determines preference for a non-manual job.⁴⁵ Some participants also mentioned personal satisfaction and the lower health and safety risks in government or office jobs compared to employment in, say, agriculture or quarries, where workers may be exposed to pesticides and other hazards. Girls see government jobs as “*acceptable*” for them—both from their own perspective and in the eyes of society. As with education, her father, husband, and brothers play a strong role in deciding what employment is appropriate for a girl.

Agricultural employment is widely considered socially unacceptable by young people. Despite Upper Egypt’s still being a predominantly agricultural society, youth do not want work in agriculture, which is seen as arduous—involving long hours with poor and unpredictable returns. Farming on one’s own account also requires financial investments in equipment and supplies that they cannot afford, in addition to exposing young people to ill-treatment by land owners. There is also considerable social stigma attached to agricultural labor, which is considered a low-status occupation suitable only for those with no education. Secondary or university education is seen as an entitlement to a non-manual job; for someone with such qualifications to “*end up*” in agriculture after years of study is considered “*unfair*.”

⁴⁵ Social appearances matter in job preferences for young people in Egypt. Most prefer government jobs due to the security and safety of these jobs. There is also a sense that manual labor is a “*bad*” form of employment. People who are engaged in manual labor are perceived as being of lower social status. University graduates feel that having a job that involves manual labor is unacceptable. For further discussion of why young people prefer government jobs, see Ghada Barsoum, 2011, “*Government Jobs: A Pursuit of a Chimera for Youth in Egypt*,” *thedailynewsEgypt.com*, February 20, <http://thedailynewsegypt.com/banking-a-finance/government-jobs-a-pursuit-of-a-chimera-for-youth-in-egypt.html> (accessed October 2011).

Parents discourage their children from working in agriculture in favor of pursuing an education and getting a “good” job, meaning a desk job. Female employment in agriculture is considered particularly shameful. While girls do work in agriculture, especially on their families’ land during harvesting season, the practice is not widespread, particularly due to the nature of the crops grown in Upper Egypt (predominantly sugar cane, which requires considerable physical effort during harvesting). It is also considered taboo in Upper Egypt for girls and women to work as daily laborers.

Even for those willing to consider agriculture, employment opportunities are limited because agricultural systems remain mostly traditional and the cost of agricultural inputs (e.g., seeds, pesticides, farm equipment) is high. Because housing is scarce and expensive, many build their houses on agricultural land—even though this practice is prohibited by law. This is one of the factors contributing to the scarcity of arable land that is diminishing and its price rising beyond the reach of potential young farmers. While the government advertises land reclamation schemes, their terms are considered unclear. Government price controls on strategic crops, such as cotton and sugar cane, are also said to erode incentives. Several youth mentioned that the only work available in agriculture was seasonal labor, primarily in sugar cane.⁴⁶ Others said that they did not have agricultural knowledge or skills.

Young people's views about employment in agriculture are consistent with findings about economic opportunities in agriculture in general. Although the sector continues to play an important role in the livelihood of poor people in Upper Egypt, it does not contribute significantly to increasing incomes because of the low productivity of the sector.⁴⁷

Young people see do not see entrepreneurship activities as a viable livelihood option, because credit is not available on suitable conditions and they lack technical and business skills. While small and microenterprise development for youth is often promoted by development agencies through microcredit and other programs, young people do not really see entrepreneurship as a feasible career path. They cite a number of reasons for this, the most important of which are that they do not have the resources to start their own projects; and that the members of their communities do not have the means to buy what they might produce.

⁴⁶ Apparently, such day-labor opportunities are available only five months out of the year (World Bank, 2009, “Pathways to Shared Growth,” 28).

⁴⁷ World Bank, 2007, “Poverty Assessment Update,” 70.

Entrepreneurship is generally considered too risky for young people

(ironically, some participants explained that only if they had the security of income from a regular job could they consider the risk of taking a loan for a small business). Interest rates available through existing credit schemes were also considered too high. In addition to demanding repayment requirements, participants considered the size of available loans inadequate to establish a profitable business. Loans offered by NGOs and business associations generally range from LE 500 to LE 3,000 (\$90 to \$535), with larger loans available from the Social Fund for Development (box 5). Yet young people considered loans of LE 10,000 to LE 30,000 (\$1,695 to \$5,085) more appropriate. There were also complaints about long waiting periods between application and approval and extended repayment periods. Some participants thought that most microcredit schemes were geared toward women.

Box 5. Social Fund for Development Loans

Large loans are available through the Social Fund for Development (SFD). The Fund was established in 1991, when the Egyptian government sought to widen the social safety net in the wake of an economic reform and structural adjustment program. SFD is managed by a semi-autonomous agency that reports to the office of the Prime Minister. It is considered one of the three main safety net programs in Egypt, along with a system of subsidies for basic foodstuffs and the Ministry of Social Solidarity's cash transfer program. The mandate of the SFD is to: (i) reduce poverty by supporting community-level initiatives, (ii) increase employment opportunities, and (iii) encourage small enterprise development. In pursuing this mandate, it is tasked with mobilizing national and international resources and cooperating with governmental bodies, NGOs, and community and private sector groups. As of the end of first quarter 2008, SFD had disbursed a total of LE 11.4 billion (equivalent to approximately \$2.5 billion).

Source: Hala Abu Ali, Hesham El-Azony, Heba El-Laithy, Jonathan Haughton, and Shahidur R. Khandker, 2009, —Evaluating the Impact of the Egyptian Social Fund for Development Programs,” Policy Research Working Paper 4993, Development Research Group, Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Significantly, most young people do not consider microcredit schemes and entrepreneurship to constitute “employment.” Rather, they consider such income-generating activities suitable for pursuing alongside a regular job. Some young people explained that although they were already employed, they would consider engaging in entrepreneurship because they would have a steady income to repay the microcredit loan in case their project failed.

While larger loans are available through the Social Fund for Development (box 5), the requirements for accessing these loans are considered too burdensome. In particular, government employees are not eligible. Young people believe that in order to apply, they have to sign a paper forfeiting their right to a government job, although this may not in fact be the case since the right to apply for such jobs is typically granted to every graduate in Egypt. Although SFD provides management and marketing support to borrowers, young people are generally not prepared to forfeit the possibility of future government employment for a project whose outcome is uncertain.⁴⁸

Beyond design and procedural aspects of credit programs, more fundamental concerns were expressed about the difficulty of establishing small and medium enterprises or becoming self-employed in Upper Egypt. Often villages simply do not provide a sufficiently large market for new entrepreneurs, especially given limited local purchasing power and the existence of competitors. Further,

⁴⁸ SFD officials explained that they do not require applicants to sign such a paper. However, the social insurance requirements of Egyptian law makes it impossible for a person who takes a loan from SFD to apply for a government job while he continues to repay the loan or while his business is operating.

food and other consumption items are frequently purchased locally on credit, which presents difficulties for an entrepreneur with loan repayments to meet. Youth also consider that they lack entrepreneurship skills and knowledge, as well as knowledge of the technical aspects of self-employment (as, say, a plumber or mechanic). In addition, lack of awareness of the meaning of entrepreneurship and loans was frequently mentioned. Taxes and corruption (e.g., nepotism; favoritism; and the predatory behavior of police, health inspectors, and other officials who constantly seek bribes) are also discouraging factors for potential entrepreneurs.

A few participants expressed the view that credit contravenes the prohibition against usury in Sharia law. The idea that debt is a shameful condition also persists in parts of Upper Egypt. **Other participants were unclear about the appropriate uses of loans.** Some, for example, believed that such loans could be used to fund consumption, rather than investment. Indeed, focus groups conducted with mothers of young people in rural areas (notably in Fayoum) alleged that some families take loans from NGOs to buy medicine or marry off their children, rather than starting businesses. Girls considered that barriers existed to their establishing any enterprise beyond traditional cottage industries or home-based literacy classes. Given these attitudes, parents do not encourage their children, especially their daughters—who they see primarily as destined for marriage—to take chances with credit and entrepreneurship. Better, they think, to get “proper employment” than take the risk of ending up in debt.

Constraints to youth employment

Young people trace the absence of job opportunities to many factors, including lack of a private sector in Upper Egypt, nepotism, corruption, the actions of the security services, and the level and quality of education. Nepotism in the workplace, for example, includes “sons-of-employees” hiring schemes (box 6) that restrict access to jobs. Unemployment drives young people to migrate to other countries, even though they would prefer to work in Egypt. Many participants stressed the need for local opportunities in, for example, factories, bakeries, and (specifically for girls) cottage industries to enable young people to remain in their communities. In general, **employment opportunities in Upper Egypt remain sporadic and temporary.**

Young people in Upper Egypt also believe that they lack the skills necessary to access quality jobs. Job requirements are seen as very demanding, often including such requirements as years of experience, English-language proficiency, or computer literacy. As the report earlier documented, relevant skills training is not readily available to young people in Upper Egypt. Those with secondary school education or less are particularly limited to jobs such as manual or skilled labor for boys and shop keeping for girls. Young people with secondary school education (whether

Box 6. “Sons-of-Employees” Hiring Scheme

Egyptian labor law stipulates that all citizens have a right to access jobs based on merit in an equal and equitable manner. However, in some public professions, such as university professors, the police force, and lower levels of the judiciary, sons of employees are given preference. In other cases, the son of a person about to retire, or who has reached 55 years of age, is hired.

This practice is practically nonexistent in the private sector and is formally discouraged by the Egyptian government, which has issued regulations to curtail the hiring of sons of existing employees in government factories and other public offices. Nevertheless, the practice persists. Indeed, there are documented complaints to government ministries from aggrieved family members who have not been hired, even though their mother or father had served in a ministry for many years. Such petitioners consider that their parents’ employment in the office gives them the right to a job themselves.

Source: Authors.

general, technical, or vocational) consider their education of little value if their schooling prepares them to work only as laborers. For them, literacy seems to offer little benefit if one does not complete university.

Available private sector jobs are considered by the young to pay insufficient wages, lack security, and offer scant protection of workers' rights. The alternative to the temporary, mainly agricultural, labor available locally, is to work as a laborer in Cairo. This entails travelling and living away from home, long working hours, low pay, and a high urban cost of living. Workers' rights were said to be lacking or unenforced. Many employed and unemployed young people, including out-of-school males, recounted their experiences of long working hours for minimal pay, being cheated out of fair wages, or not being paid at all—infringements of their employment rights for which they had no recourse. Private employment opportunities for young women were said to be even scarcer than those for men.

Economic and class status is also an impediment to employment for poor youth and youth from the lower-middle class. Irrespective of education and employment status, participants interviewed or surveyed for the study suggested that favoritism and nepotism were more important than education in finding employment, and that bribes were often necessary to obtain government employment. Young people believed that coming from a financially comfortable background facilitates access to employment, as the family is in a position to make the informal payments necessary assure a job or permanent contract for a son or daughter. According to informants, the level of bribes solicited ranged from LE 20,000 to LE 50,000 (\$3,400 to \$5,700), depending on the nature of the job concerned. Several quotes from focus group members illustrate the situation:

“The biggest problem in finding work is lack of wasta (form of connection).”

— In-school male, urban

“You have to pay bribes. You pay LE 20,000 [\$3,400] to a manager, he gets you a job in the government.”

—In-school male, urban

“People who are comfortable economically get employed. They have money to pay bribes. We can't and we don't have money.”

—Unemployed female, rural Fayoum

Lack of employment offices, job counseling, and referral services are seen as further impediments to obtaining employment. Information about jobs, even when published in newspapers, can be incorrect, out of date, or misleading, which naturally hampers and discourages jobseekers. Employment offices do, in fact, exist at the governorate level to match job vacancies in the private and public sectors to a database of registered jobseekers. However, most young people—irrespective of gender, education, or employment status—had never even heard of these offices; those who were aware of them believed them to be corrupt.

Checks by police and security services were cited as impediments to employment prior to the revolution. Even for young people with the means to pay bribes, it was said that the necessary approval by the state security service for government or public sector work was difficult to obtain. In rural Fayoum, focus groups participants alleged that association with religious groups—even having a relative suspected of such links—was sufficient ground for being refused employment clearance by the security service.

The Egyptian government in recent years has promoted various temporary hiring schemes to address the problem of youth unemployment. These schemes offer work opportunities to young people on a temporary basis. For example, recent university graduates may be hired as teachers for a year and paid either according to the number of classes taught or through a lump sum at the end of the school year. Some manage to obtain temporary contracts with a monthly salary, a pension scheme, medical insurance, and paid vacation, like permanent employees. If they are able to sustain these contracts for three consecutive years, they can apply for a permanent contract. For the most part, though, such schemes, have limited or no social benefits and offer extremely low pay (in the range of LE 105 to LE 360 (\$19 to \$65) a month. Other schemes include hiring a temporary worker to replace a government employee who has taken leave without pay.⁴⁹ These positions provide full government benefits except pension rights. However, such opportunities were said to be very rare of late, and, like other opportunities, subject to nepotism, bribery, and favoritism. Moreover, such schemes generally favor university graduates.

Higher education and employment

The relationship between education and employment is quite complex and sometimes contradictory. While higher education is pursued to enhance employment prospects, it also reduces the field of appropriate jobs. A university degree naturally raises expectations of employment, but jobs considered suitable for graduates are difficult to find. Males and females in school who were interviewed believed it unfair to spend so many years and resources to obtain higher education only to work as laborers or in vocational jobs. On the other hand, unemployed and out-of-school youth expressed the view that while university degrees are necessary for some kinds of work, in reality there are virtually no jobs available, regardless of one's educational attainment or training. It was also said that a university degree was obtained more for the sake of appearance than for its practical value in finding a job. Consistent with this, mothers considered vocational training more useful than a degree when it came to finding work. While some participants considered the prospects better for those with university degrees, most thought that more opportunities were available to those with lower levels of education. However, such unskilled jobs are of low quality and carry social stigma. Laboring or other casual work is, of course, also insecure and does not provide a steady income or benefits. As one young woman described the predicament:

“Education will not help us find employment. Many university graduates can't find work. They are exactly like those with primary education or like farmers. At least farmers have land. But university graduates have nothing.”
—In-school female, rural Menia

For these reasons, **there is a perception that higher education does not necessarily facilitate employment: university graduates do not accept vocational jobs because they are considered socially unacceptable for someone with a degree.** Many, especially in-school males and females, said that they would rather not work at all if they could not find a socially acceptable job, although a few participants stated that they would be willing to work in any job that offered a decent salary. Employment is also highly dependent on location. As noted earlier, higher education facilitates employment in large cities, while secondary education is suitable for jobs in tourist areas. Several females from urban areas

⁴⁹ Egyptian labor law allows a government employee to take up to 10 years of leave without pay during the term of his or her service, provided that the employee continues to pay his or her contribution to the government pension fund. Many Egyptians have used this permit to seek work in Gulf States. Many of those working in the Gulf are thus considered to be on *ia'ara* (literally “on loan”) to another state.

stated that having a middle-level education permitted employment in shops and pharmacies, but that little suitable employment was available to university graduates. Irrespective of education and employment status, participants interviewed or surveyed for the study alluded to the fact that favoritism and nepotism were more important than education in finding employment, and that bribery was often necessary to obtain government employment.

Gender roles and employment

“Females don't work in Upper Egypt. They will make fun of her brothers and say, “Can't you support your sister—you send her out to work?” —Out-of-school female, rural

As noted earlier in this chapter, improvements in access to education for girls have not translated into higher female labor force participation, especially in Upper Egypt. Although the proportion of Egyptian women aged 15–29 with university education rose from 6 to 12 percent between 1998 and 2006, the proportion that participated in the labor force remained static at 24 percent. Over the same period, male labor force participation rose from 55 percent to 64 percent.⁵⁰ This finding could be explained by the job preferences of females, who prefer to wait for government employment rather than search for jobs in the private sector. The latter jobs are, in any case, scarce due to the absence of a developed private sector in Upper Egypt and may be considered less consistent with the social norms for women's employment in the region.

Government employment is considered the most suitable for girls, and women continue to be disproportionately overrepresented in government jobs. In 2006, about 54 percent of all female employment in Egypt was in government jobs. The formal private sector, in contrast, accounted for less than 10 percent. Even within the private sector, the distribution of female employment across firms is markedly uneven: the total workforce of more than 60 percent of manufacturing firms is less than 10 percent female according to the 2006 Egypt Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) survey. Female employees form the majority in only a small proportion of manufacturing firms (about 12 percent) concentrated in the textile, garment, and food sectors.⁵¹ There are even less opportunities for young women in the private sector in Upper Egypt than in the country as a whole.

Cultural norms dictate that a woman should only work if her male family members are unable to support her. The approval of the father or husband is necessary for a woman to work; male participants in focus groups and in-depth interviews explained that for a woman to work could be considered shameful for a family, and especially her husband. Thus women often stop working after marriage.

A girl's level of education and the nature of employment have a bearing on the acceptability of her employment. A woman with a university education is generally allowed to work by her father, husband, or brother if an appropriate job arises. Indeed, if a young woman has achieved a university degree, it may be considered unfair not to allow her to work. However, this is not always the case, especially if the husband himself is not working. Either way, **work opportunities for females are limited.**

⁵⁰ World Bank, 2010, “Arab Republic of Egypt: Gender Assessment 2010; Narrowing the Gap: Improving Labor Market Opportunities for Women in Egypt,” World Bank Report 54698-EG, Social and Economic Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Some girls with secondary school education may find employment in shops and factories, although these occupations are not acceptable to all residents of Upper Egypt. Uneducated and out-of-school females have more difficulty finding employment than those with education. In fact, this group of females is highly unlikely to find work at all. Many rural informants believed that a girl should not be allowed to work, since this would be shameful and reflect negatively on her male relatives. They explained that even were the immediate male family members to agree, they may be subject to ridicule by the wider community for allowing her to work. While mothers interviewed in rural Menia believed that girls with university degrees could work and others should not, mothers in urban Menia (most of whom themselves were working) were generally unfavorable towards girls' employment, regardless of the level of education attained. Some mothers said that girls' employment changes the balance of power within a family, giving women more voice in economic decisions that affect the household, and feared that this could create problems for girls and lead to divorce.⁵² However, such attitudes towards female employment seem at variance with the World Values Surveys, in which 80 percent of women in Egypt and Jordan disagreed with the statements: —A woman with a full-time job cannot be a good mother” and —Having a full-time job interferes with a woman's ability to have a good life with her husband.”

A few respondents expressed the opinion that girls are more likely to find employment than boys, their reasoning being that girls are prepared to accept unfavorable working conditions and usually work only until marriage. Girls may accept employment in the professions open to them (e.g., seamstress, shopkeeper, worker in a cottage industry), tolerating longer hours and lower wages than would boys. Such jobs are considered suitable for girls in order to save for the items needed to establish a household after marriage.

Distance from the home is another important factor determining the social acceptability of female employment. In rural areas, it is unlikely that a girl would be allowed to work outside her village, unless as a teacher or other government employee (since government employees work shorter hours). In urban areas, female survey participants said that male relatives would generally not allow girls to travel out of the governorate for employment (except in rare cases where they could reside with relatives in that governorate). Boys were said to be allowed to travel more freely, since there is less fear for their safety, while girls could be harassed, and their family's honor compromised.


Disability and its impact on schooling and youth employment

About 1.6 percent of young people in Upper Egypt reported having a disability. Reported disability among males (2 percent) was higher than among females (1.2 percent), it was also slightly higher in informal (2 percent) than in rural (1.6 percent) areas. The frequency of reported disability increased slightly with age (see annex 1). In the country as a whole, the disability rate was lower: only a little over 1 percent of respondents in Egypt reported having any kind of disability. Yet 40 percent of this disabled group lives in Upper Egypt. The following disabilities were reported: learning disability (40 percent), physical disability (47 percent), visual impairment (6 percent), and hearing disability (7 percent).⁵³

⁵² World Bank, forthcoming, —Capabilities, Opportunities, and Participation.”

⁵³ The findings cited in this section should be interpreted with caution, due to the low number of youth who reported having a disability or chronic illness.

Figure 25. Percent of Youth (Aged 10-29) Reporting Disability, by Wealth Quintile, Upper Egypt



Disability was inversely associated with household wealth (figure 25). A relatively small percentage (4.8 percent) of young respondents reported suffering from a chronic disease. Overall, only 5.8 percent of SYPE respondents reported having a chronic disease or a disability.⁵⁴ Some 60 percent of this group felt that this prevented them from performing their regular responsibilities at school or work. Those incapacitated by their disabilities tended to be from lower wealth quintiles and female, had only basic education, and lived in rural areas.⁵⁵—a finding may be due to limited access to facilities and services. **Thus, coming from a poorer background not only increases the likelihood of having a disability, it also increases the impacts of a disability.** In Egypt, specifically Upper Egypt, there is little accommodation to the needs of the disabled in terms of schooling and work opportunities.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Prevalence of certain chronic diseases was lower in SYPE 2009 than in the 2008 Egypt Demographic and Health Survey. This discrepancy may be related to the self-reported nature of the SYPE data and the different age structure of the two survey samples (see Fatma El-Zanaty and Ann Way, 2011, “Egypt: Demographic and Health Survey 2008,” 231–2; Population Council and Information and Decision Support Center, 2011, “SYPE,” rev. ed.

⁵⁵ Again, caution is advised in using these results, as the sample of survey respondents whose school attendance was affected by their health status was considerably small (172 respondents from all of Egypt and 59 respondents from Upper Egypt).

⁵⁶ Note that because of the likely endogeneity of ill-health and disability vis-à-vis education and, above all, employment, these factors were not included as explanatory factors in estimates of employment determinants.

CHAPTER 3: YOUNG PEOPLE AS ACTIVE CITIZENS

“If I don't know about civic engagement, society needs to teach me. They need to give us a chance so we can participate with our opinion[s] and have a chance. Some decisions are taken without consulting us or listening to us.” —In-school male, rural Fayoum

“I have priorities in my life. First I graduate, then I find work and have enough money, then I can see about volunteering or participating. How can I be involved in the community when I can hardly find enough money to eat?” —Employed male, urban Menia

3.1 Voluntary Services


Few young people engage in voluntary work in Egypt. However, despite its poverty and social indicators, Upper Egypt shows a higher level of participation than the country as a whole (4.3 percent versus 2.8 percent). This is likely related to the higher number of NGOs working in the region. In all of Egypt, around 97 percent of young people aged 15–29 did not participate in any voluntary service activities in 2009.

In Upper Egypt, participation in voluntary work is positively correlated with wealth: a young person in the highest wealth quintile is more than three times more likely to undertake voluntary work than one in the lowest wealth quintile. Young men are markedly more likely to be involved in voluntary services than their female counterparts (5.1 percent compared to 1.4 percent), and urban dwellers more likely than those living in rural or informal areas (5.8 percent versus 2.7 and 2.2 percent, respectively). Participation in voluntary services substantially increases with both age and education level. More than 5 percent of older youth (aged 25–29 years) participates in voluntary services, compared to 0.5 percent of the youngest (aged 10–14). With respect to education, less than 0.4 percent of those with no education participate in voluntary services, compared to 26 percent of those with postsecondary education; however, the proportion of participants with university education is less (11 percent; see annex 1).

The customary kinds of voluntary service in which young people participate in Upper Egypt include assisting the poor (in cash or in kind—81 percent of those engaged in voluntary services), assisting the poor specifically with marriage costs (6 percent), looking after poor families (10 percent), caring for people with special needs (8 percent), and providing education or information technology services (6 percent).

The forms of voluntary service reported by youth predominantly involve donating money rather than time. This in part explains the association of voluntary activity with wealth. Generally, donations are channeled through religious-based organizations: almost three-quarters of those who gave assistance to the poor did so through a mosque or church, with only 10 percent donating through an NGO (figure 26). Donation through religious institutions was about equally common among Muslims (2.6 percent) and non-Muslims (2.8 percent).⁵⁷ When young respondents were specifically asked about alms money (*zakat/oshour*), almost 45 percent said that they donated through such an institution (the proportion was same for both Muslims as non-Muslims). Of these, more than 62 percent gave their alms money through a mosque or a church.

Figure 26. Distribution of Young People (Aged 15–29) Who Gave Assistance to the Poor, by Recipient Organization



Source: SYPE 2009.

Note: Assistance defined as in cash or in kind.

3.2 Group Membership

Informants were also asked about group membership, including youth centers, scout groups, sports clubs, children’s (under the age of 14) sports clubs, study groups, dancing/singing/music groups, religious choirs, political parties, workers’ unions, student unions, environmental organizations, professional associations and syndicates, humanitarian or charitable organizations, faith-based politically oriented groups, homeowner’s boards, and parents’ school boards. **The share of young people who are members of at least one of these groups is less than 5 percent in Egypt as a whole and only 3 percent in Upper Egypt.** In Upper Egypt, the groups for which membership was reported most frequently were: youth centers (50 percent), children’s sports clubs (47 percent), political parties (12 percent), and student unions (12 percent). None of the young people surveyed in Upper Egypt reported participating in environmental organizations, faith-based politically oriented groups, homeowner’s boards, or parent school boards.

Group membership (like voluntary service) is correlated with wealth in Upper Egypt. More than 11 percent of young people from the highest wealth quintiles are members of at least one of the above-listed groups, compared to less than 3 percent from the lowest three wealth quintiles (see annex 1, table A6). Further, **young males are twice as likely to be members of groups as young females (3.9 percent compared to 2 percent).** Young people living in urban areas tend to be more civically engaged than those living in rural or informal areas. Younger youth and those with higher education are also more likely to be members of civic groups. The highest levels of engagement are among young people with a university education (6.7 percent), followed by those with a basic education (4 percent). The lowest level

of participation is observed among those with no education (1.4 percent). Males have a significantly higher probability of both doing voluntary work and belonging to a group. Voluntarism increases with age, while group membership declines. Notably, religious affiliation does not have a significant association with youth civic engagement (annex 3).

3.3 Young People’s Ideas about Active Civic Participation

Young people in Upper Egypt are in agreement that active civic participation is important, although they express a variety of views about what it means in practice.⁵⁸ Most identified civic participation with charitable donations for the poor, some referred to participation in NGOs and other community organizations, and a small number cited political participation.

“Prior to the revolution we knew nothing about politics, we were ignorant. So how would we participate in something we know nothing about?” —Employed female, urban

While views about education and employment were found to be broadly similar across the youth population, in contrast, attitudes toward and understanding of civic engagement varied considerably by place of residence, education, employment, status, and gender. The predominant understanding of civic engagement was in terms of charitable donations for the poor and disadvantaged, including the religious observance of *zakat*.⁵⁹ This understanding may in part explain why youth, who tend to lack the means to give, seem to feel that they have little contribution to make to civic engagement. Examples of participation in community affairs cited by youth tended to be associated with social service: giving to charity, distributing food during religious festivals, and contributing money for the construction of mosques or churches. It is notable that little reference was made to student council activities in schools and universities or to labor unions as forms of civic engagement.

Economic hardship is one of the main impediments to youth civic engagement, according to young people and their parents. Civic engagement and community participation was seen as something for just the elite and those with financial resources. Unemployed young people explained that their economic situation meant that they were continually concerned with just getting by, and that this inhibited their ability to play a more active role in their communities. The two main reasons cited in the SYPE 2009 survey for not being active in the community were lack of time and the need to earn money. This was especially the case with unemployed males, who said they spent most of their time looking for jobs or engaged in casual labor. As a result, they feel that they do not have the time to be actively involved in their communities; in fact, unemployed males are less actively involved in their communities than those with jobs.

Christians showed more familiarity with certain kinds of community participation, no doubt because of their distinct traditions of engagement in social service. While Christians in Upper Egypt generally engage in social services through their churches, Muslims tie a portion of their income to *zakat*, which is transferred in various ways to charitable organizations, although they may also engage in social services through a variety of mechanisms not necessarily related to a mosque.

⁵⁸ This section draws entirely on findings from the qualitative study, reference is made to SYPE 2009 as appropriate, however, the findings cited here were obtained from focus group discussions and/or in-depth interviews.

⁵⁹ The Islamic obligation to assist the poor.

In general, rural areas show higher levels of awareness of social service. In-school youth focused on volunteering and donations to charity, while out-of-school youth seemed to have less awareness of civic engagement. In general, the focus of rural young people (aged 15–19) was on community-level activities (e.g., providing literacy classes, donating blood, volunteering for building mosques and churches) rather than becoming engaged in matters of governance or accountability. However, awareness was not always associated with actual participation. While rural youth may be aware of problems in their communities (for example, relating to bread and gas cylinder distribution), they may not see themselves as having a role in identifying solutions to them. Moreover, **in comparison to urban youth, rural youth are more aware of social welfare issues but not of wider civic and governance issues. This may be because issues such as problems with bread quality or distribution affect them more than urban youth.**

Employed youth (males and females, urban and rural) showed a broader understanding of civic engagement, including participation in NGOs and politics, and stressed the importance of participating in elections and giving a wider role to community associations and NGOs. Among the unemployed, the awareness of males tended to be higher than that of females. Unemployed rural males tended to associate civic engagement with volunteering to build mosques, though for some it could extend to involvement in local governance.

Only a few young people mentioned that they were members of political parties. A small number of young people said that they had joined the National Democratic Party (NDP),⁶⁰ although they apparently had not participated in party activities. Obtaining an NDP membership card was often mainly a strategy for avoiding police harassment. A few participants commented skeptically that local council politicians paid attention to them only at election time. Participation in local governance among youth is low. At the time of the research for this study, the law defined the minimum age for nomination to local councils and national representative councils as 30. However, the age of eligibility for candidates to the new parliament was recently reduced to 25 years.

Parental attitudes also influence the degree of involvement of young people in their communities. Parents tend to take the view that youth should focus on their studies and then on finding a proper job, becoming financially independent, and establishing their own households. They do not encourage young people's engagement in community or civic matters.

The political and security situation in Upper Egypt has also discouraged civic engagement by young people. The discouragement documented in the last chapter over economic conditions and employment prospects was underpinned (prior to the January 25th Revolution) by apathy, or even despair (expressed by both male and female participants) about political conditions in their communities and the country at large. Parents of youth and NGO representatives who were interviewed confirmed that the state discouraged youth activism, whether in the social or political sphere.

The pervasive threat of harassment by the security forces was an ever-present factor deterring youth engagement in local affairs and associations before the revolution. Many young people said

⁶⁰ The National Democratic Party (NDP) was the ruling party in Egypt prior to the January 25th Revolution of 2011. The party was dissolved and banned by court order following the ousting of former President Mubarak on February 11, 2011.

that they avoided involvement in local initiatives for fear of being labeled politically active or followers of religious groups, which would make them vulnerable to harassment by security agents. Many young people and NGO representatives described an atmosphere of fear perpetuated by state security agents in the era before January 25th. Security services were a major impediment to the work of NGOs, whose work was closely monitored, even if their activities were predominantly social and service oriented, and whose representatives could be summoned to state security offices at any time. As one NGO representative put it, the state did not want NGOs to be visible within communities, especially if some of their members were thought to be affiliated with banned religious groups. One government official indicated that that he had at times in the past been instructed to cancel youth events in the governorates under his purview pending security checks on the participants.

“The Emergency law forbade the meeting of more than six people together. We could not organize ourselves. SSI [State Security Investigations Service] informants were everywhere, so we could not really have a role in our communities.”

—Unemployed male, urban

“They used to say you have a right to an opinion and I have a right to put you in jail. People kept a low profile for fear of arrest.”

—Employed male, rural Fayoum

“We wanted to start a Quran study group. The SSI kept coming to us and arresting us and asking us questions about funding and affiliations. It was not easy to take part in community prior to the revolution.”

—Employed male, rural Fayoum

“The SSI took me in for investigation and asked me why I was sitting with this man in the mosque. They told me that he belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood. There was no freedom before the revolution. We could not participate in anything.”

—In-school male, rural Fayoum

“We are not allowed to work in the government. First, they tell you have to get a literacy certificate. You manage to get one. They fail you on the writing and reading test. And if you pass, they tell you that your brother, father, or any relative is associated with a religious group.”

—Out-of-school male, rural Fayoum

Social norms affecting young people's civic engagement

In addition to the wider economic, social and political constraints outlined above, some aspects of the organization, management, and culture of local organizations themselves appear to militate against more active involvement of young people in their communities. This situation contributes to their sense that they have little role to play in existing NGOs and community development associations (CDAs).

Younger youth (aged 15–19 years) especially felt that their opinions and aspirations were unlikely to be accepted by older generations. Although some said they were eager to participate in their communities in some way, they did not seem to know how or where to do so. Young rural women were especially keen to become more actively involved in their communities, but felt their age and gender worked against them, as did the attitudes of their parents and their sense that they did not know where and

how to participate. Older youth (20–29 years), while they showed greater understanding of civic participation than their juniors, were also minimally engaged.

The understanding of civic engagement, particularly community participation, among older youth (20–29 years) is highly contingent on the local presence and activity of NGOs and CDAs. Nevertheless, youth report being largely excluded from decision making in the NGOs or CDAs for which they volunteer. None of the youth interviewed was a board member of an NGO or CDA. Those CDAs that have better-established roles for young people tend to be those that successfully implement donor-funded projects.

“Wealthy, influential families take over the boards of NGOs and the rest of the people don't have a chance to participate and have no role.” —Unemployed male, rural Fayoum

Many young people, particularly males in rural areas, voiced a wish to establish new NGOs in their communities in the aftermath of the January 25th Revolution. Existing NGOs were regarded as ineffective, subject to factionalism, run along traditional lines, often corrupt, and having limited impact in communities. These organizations are managed by the elders of a community, that is, usually its richest and most influential members, who do not encourage participation by the young or elicit their vision for the future. Elders, it was said, see the young as —childish and inexperienced,” which discourages them from expressing their opinions, becoming engaged, or even joining existing organizations. Coming from a poor family is also believed to be a disadvantage, as can being a relative of another youth already involved in an NGO.

In some NGOs, board membership may be divided among a number of the community's extended families, each of which has the right to nominate one of its members to the seat considered its preserve. A similar principle frequently operates in government structures, with certain extended families controlling seats on the village local council, the people's assembly, the *shura* council, and the office of mayor, respectively. If the head of a family dies, it is accepted that another member of the same family will run for the seat, which is regarded by the elders and the community as its entitlement. Hence, if a member of a certain family is already a board member, it was said that family elders would not permit, say, a cousin to run against him in a board election or nomination. This established practice reinforces the control of older generations in the social and political arena and limits young people's ability to take positions of responsibility for which they might be well qualified.

Young people also had negative perceptions of local councils and other local governance entities, both at the village and district level.⁶¹ Most participants had little awareness of the role of their local councils or the way in which their members were appointed.⁶² As in NGOs, nepotism was considered rife within local councils, leaving little room for the participation of young people in local structures of governance. The qualitative surveys conducted for this study preceded the dissolution of local councils,

⁶¹ Local councils are elected in principle; however, due to widespread mismanagement and charges of corruption, youth assume that members of these councils are appointed from within the NDP and that no one else can join them.

⁶² For discussions of the local council elections of 2008, see UNDP, n.d., —Local Government,” Program on Governance in the Arab Region, UNDP, Beirut, Lebanon, <http://www.pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?t=6&cid=5>; and Mohammed Herzallah and Amr Hamzawy, 2008, —Egypt's Local Elections Farce: Causes and Consequences,” *Policy Outlook* 40 (April), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt's_local_elections_final2.pdf (both URLs accessed October 2011).

which took place by the order of the Supreme Administrative Court on June 28, 2011. The dissolution of local councils and dismissal of all governors was among the main demands of the revolution (box 7).⁶³

“I never knew that local councils were elected! We have never seen elections. All elections were fraudulent one way or the other.”
—Employed male, rural Fayoum

Box 7. Administrative Units and Elections in Egypt

Governorates in Egypt are headed by a governor and an executive council, consisting of a representative of each line ministry appointed by the president. At the next administrative level are Egypt’s 126 **districts**. While there are elected People’s Councils at both the governorate and district level, these bodies have very limited powers relative to the executive councils. At the local level there are 4,496 **village municipalities** and 199 **town municipalities**. Municipalities are also administered by an executive council appointed by the central government, with their elected councils having relatively little power. The new regulation on local councils promulgated in 2009–10 strengthened the powers of local councils.

The most recent local elections held in Egypt took place on April 8, 2008. Some 35 million eligible voters were able to vote for 70,000 candidates, who contested 52,000 local council seats. The ruling National Democratic Party fielded 55,000 candidates. Four other political parties participated: Al-Wafd, the Rally Party, the Nasserite Party, and the Al-Jeel Party. However, the Muslim Brothers Group the largest opposition party and the main rival to the National Party, withdrew from the elections a few hours prior to voting, citing electoral irregularities by the government.

At the beginning of the 2008 voting process, the National Party announced that it had won 83 percent of all local council seats uncontested. The final result showed that the National Party had garnered more than 95 percent of all local council seats. The Ministry of Interior did not announce voter turnout; however, human rights organizations monitoring the elections estimated that only 5 to 7 percent of those eligible actually voted. These local elections had particular significance, as they were the first to follow the constitutional amendments of 2007, which required any presidential candidate to receive the support of 150 local members in 10 provinces.

There was no judicial supervision of the 2008 elections. The Studies Center for Justice, Democracy, and Human Rights in Egypt, which monitored the electoral process in Cairo and Alexandria, reported that there were no elections at all. The National Center for Human Rights reported some violations, including the fact that some observers were prevented from entering voting centers and that more than 80 percent of observers who represented human rights organizations were expelled from the observation process.

In March 2011, a Cairo Administrative Court ordered the dissolution of the local municipal councils elected under former President Hosni Mubarak. Dismantling the local councils was one of the major demands of the January 25th Revolution, particularly on the part of the Revolution Youth Coalition.

Source: Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, 2011, “Egyptian Court Dissolves Local Councils,” CNN, June 28, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-28/world/egypt.councils.dissolved_1_local-councils-parliamentary-elections-ruling-party?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed October 2011); and UNDP, n.d., “Local Government.”

Social norms and expectations regarding the role of women continue to restrict young women’s participation in broader society. Several factors reinforce each other in this area. The role of women is considered to be primarily in the domestic sphere. Young women lack voice in the community and awareness of their potential role and may even express a lack of interest in community and political matters. For their part, some young men say that they are reluctant to add to the burdens of women by asking them to participate in community affairs in addition to their domestic duties. Social norms also inhibit the mobility of women in Upper Egypt (as discussed earlier with respect to employment), and parents tend not to approve of their involvement in community matters for this reason (participants cited the physical proximity of NGOs or CDAs as a factor determining girls’ participation).

⁶³ For further details on the decision to dissolve the 1,760 local councils, see Reem Leila, “Big Demand Met,” *Al Ahram Weekly Online*, 30 June–6 July, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1054/eg3.htm> (accessed October 2011).

Unemployed rural female participants interviewed were for the most part married and did not see a role for themselves beyond the traditional role of caring for their households and children. Even though they were well aware of community problems and motivated to help seek solutions for them, they lacked the support of their husbands, which they felt they needed to get involved. At times, too, other women in their communities may not be encouraging; some women were wary of speaking out about community problems for fear of being ridiculed. Discussing their roles in their children's education, participants said that they —would not want to create problems for their children in schools” by trying to join school boards of trustees. This illustrates how public attitudes deter the contribution of women, notwithstanding that the research on education documents the positive impact of parental involvement on educational outcomes.⁶⁴

Youth perceptions of available public and NGO services

Services provided by the public sector and NGOs are important in the lives of youth in Upper Egypt, given the limited development of the private sector in the region. The government manages health facilities and public schools, operates basic infrastructure and utilities (electricity, water, and sanitation), and provides other services, such as licensing and public records. NGOs provide support for the poor, literacy education, youth activities, microcredit, physical infrastructure, and other services for individuals and communities.

However, young respondents hold neither the government nor NGOs in high regard. For the most part, youth have a negative assessment of government-operated services, which are seen as scarcely available, of poor quality, and often fraught with corruption. At the same time, notwithstanding the services that they provide, NGOs are not considered a panacea. In some focus groups, participants were unaware of any NGOs in their community or of any services provided by such organizations. Some NGOs were perceived as engaging in favoritism or nepotism when providing services; the management of others was seen as corrupt.

⁶⁴ See, for example, W.H. Jeynes, 2005, “Parental Involvement and Student Achievement: A Meta-Analysis,” *Family Involvement Research Digest*, Harvard Family Research Project, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, http://www.gse.harvard.edu/hfrp/publications_resources/publications_series/family_involvement_research_digests/parental_involvement_and_student_achievement_a_meta_analysis (accessed August 15, 2011).

3.4 Social Welfare Services

As noted earlier, the social welfare services most visible in the daily life of Egyptians are the distribution of subsidized bread and butane gas cylinders (box 8). Evidence suggests that **energy subsidies in particular are crowding out budget allocations that could otherwise be made available for investment and social expenditures.**⁶⁵ **Subsidies of *baladi* bread dominate food subsidies** (accounting for almost 70 percent of expenditures), followed by subsidies on cooking oil and sugar.⁶⁶ While government subsidies may be at variance with orthodox macroeconomic policies espoused by international bodies, **food subsidies—which are perceived by Egyptians as an entitlement—have been regarded by all Egyptian regimes as necessary for ensuring political stability.**⁶⁷

Box 8. Bread and Gas Cylinders: Lifelines of Egypt

The importance of subsidized food and energy for Upper Egypt's extremely poor residents can hardly be overstated. Some 43 percent of the Egyptian population lives on less than \$2 a day. Bread and butane gas cylinders (used for domestic cooking and heating) have historically been subsidized in Egypt to help reduce living costs.

Nearly two-thirds (60 percent) of Egyptian families depend on subsidized local bread; 90 percent of this group consumes it daily. Some LE 10.1 billion (\$1.7 billion) was allocated for bread subsidies in the 2009–2010 budget. During that period, subsidies for bread accounted for 17 percent of all government subsidies, another 73 percent were for supply goods. According to government sources, there were 23,600 bakeries in Egypt in April 2010. The government has started initiatives to separate bread production from distribution in order to combat corruption. (It used to sell subsidized flour to bakeries, which instead of producing and selling bread, reportedly sold the subsidized flour, which resulted in bread shortages.) There are three systems of subsidized bread distribution in the country: selling through distribution points (24 governorates); home delivery (17 governorates); and through bakeries (14 governorates). Some governorates use more than one system.

Bread prices rose 37 percent between February 2007 and February 2008, and increasing numbers of Egyptians became dependent on subsidized bread. This resulted in longer bread lines. By March 2008, about a dozen people had died in Egypt's bread lines—some in fights, others from the sheer exhaustion of standing for hours to get bread. The public was outraged over these "bread martyrs." Mubarak ordered the army to take over the baking and distribution of subsidized bread to the public, effectively militarizing bread production. The government had earlier allowed NGOs to be involved in bread distribution, with a fee levied on individual families. The fee depended on the number of loaves allocated to a family, according to food provision cards. According to many beneficiaries, this system operated without corruption. However, when it was cancelled and bread distribution was placed once again in the hands of bakeries or government distribution points, people continued to pay the subscription to the government without receiving home delivery of bread.

The government has not developed equivalent schemes to address gas cylinder shortages. In 2005, it paid LE 8.5 billion (\$1.5 billion, or 1.5 percent of GDP) in subsidies for liquefied petroleum gas (used in gas cylinders) on the domestic market. The government regulates and administers the domestic cylinder price (LE 2.5, or \$0.43, per 12.5-kg cylinder), distributing them through official liquid petroleum gas (LPG) outlets. However, these outlets are limited in number and often not located close to where people live. As a result, a network of unregulated private distributors has emerged. These distributors sell LPG cylinders to end-users for about LE 7 (\$ 1.21) each. Hence, for every cylinder sold, the private distributors earn revenues of about LE 4.5 (\$0.78). In early 2010, 2,700 queues

⁶⁵ World Bank, 2007, "Poverty Assessment Update," 79.

⁶⁶ World Bank, 2010, "Egypt's Food Subsidies: Benefit Incidence and Leakages," Report 57466, Social and Economic Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

formed daily outside gas cylinder distribution outlets as citizens sought subsidized cylinders. For its part, the Ministry of Social Solidarity announced that it was seeking to break a black market in which cylinders were changing hands for as much as LE 70 (\$12) in some areas of Cairo and Giza.

Sources: Arab Republic of Egypt, Council of Ministers, n.d., “Media” page on 23rd Council of Governors Meeting, Council of Ministers, Cairo, <http://www.egyptiancabinet.gov.eg/Media/CabinetMeetingsDetails.aspx?id=188> (accessed October 2011); Annia Cizeldo, 2011, “Let them Eat Bread, How Food Subsidies Prevent (and Provoke) Revolutions in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs Snapshot, March 23, Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67672/annia-ciezadlo/let-them-eat-bread?page=show> (accessed October 2011) ; Franz Gerner and Scott Sinclair, 2006, “Connecting Residential Households to Natural Gas: An Economic and Financial Analysis,” OBA Working Paper 7 (April), Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid, World Bank, Washington, DC.

According to focus groups, the bread distribution system was erratic and the bread costly and of poor quality. Some survey participants spoke of corrupt or unfair distribution, others said there was no distribution at all in their communities. Several youth respondents suggested that bakeries be constructed in their villages to make bread cheaper and more accessible, as well as to create jobs. The same situation applied to **the distribution of subsidized gas, which was also said to be characterized by inequity and corruption.**

“We were scared of the police. If you complain, you can get arrested and get in trouble, so we accepted our situation. No one had rights. So we continued to pay the bread distribution subscription, although the bread was not delivered to our houses.”

—Unemployed female, rural Menia

In terms of other social welfare services, some organizations distribute food rations, but were also insufficient and subject to corruption. Many NGOs—primarily, but not exclusively, those related to religious institutions—offer charity to the poor, either in cash or kind, such as food and clothes. Other social services mentioned included support for widows and arranging marriages for orphans and handicapped girls. Some NGOs also provide assistance to residents of local communities in filling out complex government documents (e.g., applications for agricultural services, identification cards, and birth and death certificates). The majority of these documents require a government stamp, which is usually only available at an agricultural association because it is a quasi-governmental body. This service is critical in communities where literacy is low and community members find it difficult to process their own papers.

3.5 Youth Perception of Health Services

Although health units were said to be present in many communities, or at least in a nearby village, the quality of care that they provided was considered inadequate, with doctors, pharmaceuticals, and specialized services often unavailable. For those with no health unit in their community, transportation could be difficult, costly, and especially problematic during an emergency. Many mentioned that a private physician was available in their village—some considered these expensive, though others found them affordable. Family planning services were also mentioned positively, in particular by young, unemployed women. In fact, many commented that gynecological and family planning services were the only services available in their communities, while general primary care (e.g., for other health needs or routine physical examinations) were hardly to be found.

Underlying and compounding the poor quality of clinical care, were what participants described as poor management of health facilities; negative or disinterested attitudes on the part of staff (including clinicians); long wait times; and lack of equipment, drugs, and other supplies. Although pharmaceuticals are supposed to be available at government health units at little to no cost, they were said to be often unavailable or only available for a fee. Where care was obtainable, young respondents reported that generally little or no follow-up was provided. For all of these reasons, private health facilities are generally preferred to government clinics, despite their cost.

3.6 Essential Infrastructure Services

Focus group discussions centered on the lack, or poor quality of, essential public services. The most frequently mentioned inadequacies were the lack of potable water and the absence or inadequacy of sewage and garbage collection systems. Some participants complained that, although they paid fees for garbage collection to the local council, the service was not actually carried out. Others complained that the electricity supply was unreliable and that residents had to pay to replace streetlights. In some communities, NGOs provided or facilitated access to water supplies and sewage systems, as well as helped restore homes in disrepair.

3.7 Youth Services

Youth centers did not seem to have a particularly high profile with youth. In Fayoum, the majority of young people interviewed did not spontaneously mention such centers as providing services, even though most focus groups and in-depth interviews actually took place within the walls of such centers. Those who did discuss services for youth most frequently referred to sports activities—for some, youth centers are the primary means of recreation—or accessing computers and the Internet. Some also mentioned libraries and nominal job-finding services. Centers operated by NGOs were often considered of higher quality than those operated by the government, although some of these organizations charge fees that young people can scarcely afford.

Young people said that only a few cultural and educational activities took place at their local youth centers, noting that equipment was lacking and management of the centers was poor. Some participants suggested that youth centers should provide services that are more tailored to their needs. However, they were aware that these centers had minimal budgets and were hence limited in the activities and resources that they could extend. Other young people said that even if more activities were available, they would have no time for them. Youth centers were seen as primarily serving boys; there are few activities for girls and their use of the centers is restricted to certain hours. Some participants considered youth centers “unsafe” for girls or attached a stigma to girls who participate in their activities.

The low level of youth participation in the management of centers was mentioned in several focus groups. It was also alleged that centers operated by both the government and NGOs were liable to corruption—for example, bribes might be solicited to facilitate participation in activities in government centers. There was no mechanism to complain about such abuses or to make constructive suggestions about the operation and activities of the centers. In any case, social norms militated against such actions, as it is considered simply inappropriate to complain about managers.



Photo: El Menia Center for Women.

CHAPTER 4. THE JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION: PARTICIPATION AND EXPECTATIONS

“I was dead before. Now I am alive.” —Unemployed male, urban

The Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011, was a turning point in Egyptian history. This was particularly so for youth, whose activism—irrespective of gender, education, social status, or political orientation—took many by surprise. The general view that Egyptian youth were apathetic about their country and politics was forever shattered. Drawing on focus group discussions and other interviews, this chapter briefly considers the involvement of young people in Upper Egypt in the events of the revolution, their responses to subsequent developments, and their assessment of its prospects.

4.1 Young People’s Participation in the January 25th Revolution

Many of the young people interviewed for this study had been involved, in one way or other, in the events of revolution. Some had only watched the events on television; others had participated through social media. Active participation was largely limited to males, who demonstrated at national, district, and local levels. Some young men had actually gone to Tahrir Square and Maspero in Cairo to participate in the demonstrations,⁶⁸ or played a role in convening local gatherings in support of change. In Upper Egypt, urban youth were generally more engaged in early calls for social justice and a change of regime, while rural youth later demonstrated to advance more specific demands for better educational quality and improved school infrastructure. Girls said that, while they had wanted to participate, they did not have a way to do so, due both to fears about security and parental or community disapproval (although one educated girl working as a journalist had participated in two demonstrations at the district level).

Another important role played by young men was organizing popular committees to protect their neighborhoods. A security vacuum followed the events of January 28th and young people exercised considerable responsibility in stepping forward to protect their communities from “—tugs and thieves,” as well as to guard mosques and churches in order to diffuse sectarian strife (attacks on churches in Upper Egypt took place in March 2011, two weeks after President Mubarak stepped down). Some young women in Upper Egypt assisted by providing food and drink to those guarding their communities.

There is evidence that previous engagement in NGO-supported activities was associated with a more active role on the part of youth in the events. For example, one of the relatively few locations in which young people took an active role in the revolution, including taking steps to organize their communities, was a locality in which youth had earlier been engaged in implementing a major community

⁶⁸ Demonstrations in Maspero started after Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011. Sectarian events in Atfih Village in Helwan, Cairo, resulted in the burning down of a church in this area. This led many Christians to demonstrate in front of Maspero (where the national television and radio building is located) to demand rights for Christians. For further details on Maspero and Coptic demonstrations in Egypt, see “—Attack on Coptic Protest at Maspero: Early Details and Context,” 2011, personal website (“—A Sense of Belonging: The Caspers Learn of Life in Egypt”), May, <http://asenseofbelonging.wordpress.com/2011/05/15/attack-on-coptic-protest-at-maspero-early-details-and-context/>, and “—Flames of Strife,” 2011, *Egypt Today Magazine*, April 3, <http://www.egypttoday.com/news/display/article/artId:260> (both URLs accessed October 2011)

sewage project. A similar situation was observed in two communities in Fayoum, one community in Qena, and at least one in Menia. This observation however, applies only to male youth.

4.2 Perceptions of the Revolution

“We have more freedom now. People could not speak. People after the revolution now respect each other and treat each other properly and listen to one another. No one is scared anymore.”
—Unemployed female, rural Fayoum

“Everyday we used to salute the flag in the school. I felt that my soul was broken. I did not know why I was saluting the flag and what it meant. After the revolution I found myself saluting the flag and singing the national anthem from the depth of my heart. I felt that this small act is for the good of the country.”
—Father, rural Fayoum

Supporters of the revolution among youth and their parents who were interviewed saw the recent tumultuous political changes as a positive indicator of the country’s future. Young people believed that they already enjoyed greater freedom of expression and were able to participate in community affairs and demand their rights. Recent events had given them a sense of dignity and pride and they had enormous optimism for the future. Most believed that corruption at all state levels would decrease in the aftermath of the revolution, paving the way for greater equity, equality, citizen rights, and social justice.

The most positive expectations of the revolution were in the economic sphere: in particular, the prospect of new job opportunities to which all could apply equitably. Many said that there had already been an increase in opportunities since January 25th, with many temporary government employees receiving permanent contracts as a direct result of the revolution. More generally, it was anticipated that a more open political climate would yield greater economic prosperity, including not only equitable access to employment (i.e., based on merit rather than favoritism or nepotism), but also improved pay, job security, price reductions, and higher-quality education. These developments, they said, were the reasons that they had supported the revolution.

It was also widely believed that, once the assets stolen by the previous regime were recovered, the government would be in a position to employ most youth, pay acceptable salaries, and reduce commodity prices.

Despite concerns about security (see below), there was enormous relief and satisfaction at the dismantling of the notorious state security apparatus, which had targeted people with affiliations to religious groups, among others. Many young people had experienced police corruption and abuse of power firsthand and believed that in the wake of the revolution, brutality and corruption by the security forces would subside, young people would no longer be afraid to assert their rights, and there would be greater respect for the rule of law.

“I went to renew my ID card in the police station after the revolution. The officer asked me to sit down. I turned around and thought he was talking to someone else. They treat us with respect now. I could not believe it.”
—Employed male, urban Menia

The majority of young people were in favor of the revolution.⁶⁹ The most positive views were expressed in Fayoum, where research was conducted for this study in mid-March 2011. In the Menia and governorates, fieldwork was undertaken in April 2011, subsequent to the constitutional referendum, when some people felt a lack of clarity about the process of change and its likely outcome, given the highly fluid political climate. After fieldwork was concluded in Quena, the governorate saw the disruption of road and rail traffic by massive demonstrations against the governor appointed in April. The Menia governorate witnessed some of the most violent sectarian strife and governorate-level demonstrations in the aftermath of the revolution. There, reactions were the most ambivalent of all areas surveyed: out of ten focus groups undertaken in Menia, three were quite strongly against the events of the revolution and two more were of mixed opinion. Significantly, across all focus groups in the three governorates, the groups to unanimously express negative perceptions of the revolution consisted of parents,⁷⁰ and young Christian Copts—no doubt the result of the outbreak of sectarian strife.⁷¹

Some Christian female participants believed that the revolution was not advocating for the rights of all Egyptians equally. Employed females in urban believed that the Maspero demonstrations, which followed the burning down of a church in the aftermath of the revolution, was the only forum where people demanded equality among all citizens. They explained that their negative view of the revolution was based on their perception that Tahrir Square demonstrators focused on political and civil rights and liberties and failed to demand rights for Copts. This view was not shared by all Christians interviewed; an NGO representative in rural Menia, who participated in the Maspero demonstrations, said that to his surprise he found many Muslim supporters demonstrating with him. This contributed to changing his views about the revolution. He now believes that the events in Tahrir and Maspero would together advance the rights of Copts.

A minority of participants were less convinced by the heady rhetoric of the revolution or simply remained undecided. In large part, their perception was due to the uncertainty of the transition and the security vacuum left by the dissolution of the regime. After the departure of the president, many perceived a lack of clarity about the future of the country and its form of government. Others adopted a “wait-and-see” approach, while still others said that they could not see how abstract debates on, for example, parliamentary or presidential forms of government, would impact their own lives, making them skeptical about prospects for the future.

*“I am not for the revolution. This is not a revolution. This is a revolution ‘by accident.’
They went out for a demonstration and got lucky. Corruption will continue and nothing
will change.”*
—Employed male, urban Menia

On the economic front, some argued that the economy was being harmed by continuing chaotic demonstrations and disruption, particularly the closing of factories and the demand for greater rights by workers. Others claimed that, in fact, none of the promises of the government have been

⁶⁹ In most of the 32 focus groups with young people and parents of young people, positive views of the revolution were expressed. In just two groups did participants unanimously express negative perceptions and the views of three more groups views were predominantly negative. Time, place, generation, and affiliation all appear to have been factors in these groups.

⁷⁰ These were mothers of youth in rural Menia and fathers of youth in urban .

⁷¹ These three focus groups consisted of in-school females in urban Menia, employed males in urban Menia, and employed females in urban , respectively.

achieved: no work opportunities have been created and commodity prices have remained high. According to them, the revolution has benefited only those with formerly temporary government contracts that were made permanent, while the unemployed and casual laborers have been negatively affected by most events of the revolution. As regards corruption, the skeptics held that corruption was ingrained in the culture of Egypt and was unlikely to disappear, at least in the short term.

However, the main negative concern of young people and their parents about the revolution was the lack of safety and security on the streets. The absence of police to protect public safety, widespread looting and theft, the opening of prisons, and the vacuum in public order which developed as the security apparatus retreated and regrouped in the days following January 25, 2011, created a widespread sense of insecurity that strongly colored perceptions of the revolution. Women said that they felt particularly vulnerable. In addition, sectarian violence made minority groups feel vulnerable, and others, in the light of the emerging competing ideologies, to be concerned about the status of human rights in the new era.

4.3 After the Revolution: Young People's Initiatives

Young people were quick to take on responsibility after the revolution; there is a sense that they are recovering their rightful roles and voice. However, years of repression and apathy towards public and community affairs are not surmounted overnight. So far there have been only limited initiatives in local communities since the revolution. In the early days, most youth focused on cleaning up the streets (this behavior, modeled in Tahrir Square, where demonstrators cleaned the streets before leaving, was followed by most communities in Upper Egypt). Again, participation was mainly by male youth. Other initiatives included the establishment of new NGOs and CDAs in their communities, creating and joining youth alliances, organizing awareness-raising seminars prior to the referendum vote, and using social media such as Facebook to create virtual groups to exchange ideas on how to move communities forward. In some rural and urban communities, in-school males formed committees to address community problems (mainly those associated with bread and gas cylinder distribution).

Although such actions may seem modest in comparison to events elsewhere in the nation, participants stressed that even modest initiatives of this kind would have been quite inconceivable before the revolution. Young people previously feared arrest, stigmatization, being associated with religious groups, and harassment by police if they attempted to engage in any activity, even of a social nature, in their communities. While females once again expressed interest in taking an active role in these new initiatives, they did not yet see opportunities to do so. Some youth did not feel enfranchised by the revolution; out-of-school males in rural Menia, for example, did not think that they had any role to play after the revolution. Clearly, change in the attitudes and motivation of both the young and the old will be a gradual process.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The January 25th Revolution shook many assumptions about Egyptian youth, who played an important and active role in pressing for political change and took the initiative to organize and protect their own communities in Upper Egypt during the vacuum in public order. Nevertheless, habits of thought and action do not change overnight; the reflex remains to look to the government (rather than to the individual, community, civil society, or private initiative) to solve both social and economic problems. Building the capabilities, motivations, and institutions to transcend this sense of dependency may well be the most important task facing Egypt today. Young people have clearly shown an appetite for new levels of engagement—it is for Egyptian society to enable the realization of these aspirations.

This study has explored the situation of young people in Upper Egypt in terms of demography, education, employment, and civic engagement, occasionally making comparisons with the situation of young people in Egypt as a whole. It also considered certain social and cultural factors that impinge on young people’s transition to work and active citizenship. The timing of the qualitative research for the study allowed it to explore respondents’ perceptions and the impact of the January 25 Revolution, as those tumultuous events were still underway.

Discussions with young people often crossed topic areas and evidenced the inextricable relationships between education, employment, and civic engagement, on one hand, and poverty, equity, and gender, on the other. Poverty continues to be a vicious circle that affects young people's lives in Upper Egypt. Significantly, the absence of adequate economic opportunities has a direct impact on the level and quality of education attained (e.g., inability to pay for school fees and books).

The high cost of private tutoring and class materials and the poor quality of teachers and curricula are some of the main impediments to young people’s acquisition of a good education. Neither young people nor their parents in Upper Egypt feel that they have a role to play in improving access to or the quality of schools, nor do they feel that they can attempt to change the curricula so students are prepared for the demands of the labor market. The lack of community involvement, combined with weak vocational education and limited employment opportunities, leads to the perpetuation of a vicious cycle of poverty and exclusion.

Levels of unemployment, and, more particularly, joblessness, among youth in Upper Egypt are high (16 percent and 45 percent, respectively). In particular, the majority of young women (70 percent) are both out of school and out of the labor force. Some 96 percent of young women with no education in the region are jobless (indicating that they are not looking for jobs), compared to 59 percent of female university graduates. This situation is not only due to lack of opportunity, but also to cultural norms regarding gender roles (to which even some educated mothers subscribe). Joblessness is inversely related to household wealth for both men and women, though the relation of joblessness to education is more complex. Few opportunities exist in the private sector and young men and women are, for a variety of reasons, disinclined to work in agriculture or to become entrepreneurs.

Government employment continues to be the only “acceptable” form of employment for both males and females in Upper Egypt. The absence of a private sector in Upper Egypt and the high esteem with which society holds government employment continues to shape young people’s aspirations for the future. Social norms concerning types of employment, a dislike of manual labour, limited of understanding of entrepreneurship, and a of lack employment offices or career counseling all represent serious challenges for young people, irrespective of gender.

The lessons learned from organizations that have promoted the importance of girls’ education in Egypt can guide the World Bank in developing policies and programs to promote the importance of women’s participation in the labor market. Certain social norms are important to consider, such as the distance from home to work, working conditions, and the nature of employment (e.g., manual versus non-manual). As mentioned previously, it is unlikely that families will refuse to allow university-educated females to work. For this category of young women, the problem is the absence of appropriate work opportunities. For females with less than university education, it is a combination of both a lack of job opportunities and required skills. Again, resolution of these challenges requires a holistic approach that addresses education, employment opportunities, and job training—and the linkages among them.

In Upper Egypt, civic engagement is generally understood in terms of traditional donations for the poor and disadvantaged in line with religious precepts; accordingly, it is mostly considered a matter for the better off. Young people see their social role as limited to studying, finding a job (if they can), and working. For many women, their vision is still more constrained—limited to the domestic realm and care of the family. However, the revolution has opened a new window of opportunity for youth participation at the community level, ranging from street cleaning and policing neighborhoods, to forming committees to improve bread and gas cylinder distribution. Some youth even express the desire to establish their own NGOs. Currently, age, gender, and employment status often exclude young men and women from participating meaningfully in local, regional, and national social and political institutions. Experiences with public advocacy campaigns that sought to change people’s views on such issues as girls’ schooling and family planning would be interesting to consider in this respect.

As the evidence in this report has shown, young people are not well served by current programs for employment and social services, particularly those with little education, who in fact constitute the bulk of the jobless in Upper Egypt. Given the region’s social and economic character, specific youth-tailored interventions are needed. Further, youth should not be considered a homogenous group: given the different circumstances that young men and women face, including different levels of education and urban and rural residence, policies will need to be tailored to specific gender, educational, and social groups.

The National Council of Youth in Egypt has produced a five-year Strategic Plan for 2011-2015, that focuses on developing youth-friendly institutions; raising the political awareness of young people; and promoting economic, social, and cultural empowerment.⁷² This plan could be achieved through a

⁷² To view a summary of the plan in Arabic, see National Council for Youth, “Egypt’s Youth Portal,” n.d., NCY, Giza, <http://www.alshabab.gov.eg/NCY/StaticContent/View.aspx?ID=8> (accessed October 2011). Note that while the plan is available on this website, there is no indication of when it was drafted or whether it will be adopted by the new government.

number of initiatives, including the building and equipping of youth centers, training in civic education and civic participation, various kinds of skills training, and support for entrepreneurship. More specifically, the plan could provide a foundation for the social and economic inclusion of youth in Upper Egypt.

The recommendations below focus on the two transitions that have been the main focus of the report: young people’s transition from school to work and their transition to active citizenship (and the interconnection between the two), with special attention to gender dynamics. A number of recommendations are made in each area, some of which refer to international good practices. The examples discussed below are intended to show that other countries have faced and addressed similar problems; lessons can be learned from their experience and adapted to the specific environment of Upper Egypt. These youth-focused measures should complement longer-term systemic education, labor market, and private sector development reforms aimed at creating a more enabling environment for youth inclusion.

Four major considerations should be kept uppermost in mind when developing job-creation interventions for youth in Upper Egypt:

- **The public sector simply cannot assimilate old and new graduates in the near future.** Awareness-raising schemes that manage young peoples’ expectation of government employment, whether through information campaigns and/or education, should be developed to address this expectation.
- **The private sector needs to play a larger role in Upper Egypt.** Policies to promote the expansion of the private sector must, however, pay special attention to regulating its role and ensuring that worker’s rights are preserved. They also need to provide opportunities suitable for women, in light of existing cultural restrictions.
- **Education and employment schemes that target girls alone will not work,** given the need for male social acceptance of women’s activities. In order **to reduce the gender gap in labor participation, it is advisable to provide entrepreneurship and/or skills training opportunities for both males and females through the same programs, with appropriate activities for each gender.**
- **A holistic approach that links female employment to education deserves special attention.** Policies that address young women’s education, skills development, and employment need to be designed to reinforce one another, rather than being created in separate silos.

5.1 Transition to Employment

The limited number of job opportunities in the region (especially in the private sector) is clearly the main factor driving high rates of youth unemployment and joblessness in Upper Egypt. Job creation and the promotion of adequate economic opportunities would not only improve the situation of young people in the region, they would also eliminate one of the key impediments to their active citizenship, namely, economic hardship.

Promote income generation for youth in Upper Egypt

Based on previous findings and international experience of what does and does not work in promoting income generation for young people, **interventions in Upper Egypt should be evidence-based programs that directly address young people's needs and expectations.** For example, **the potential for labor-intensive public works programs as a mechanism for addressing youth unemployment is generally limited**, as young people in Upper Egypt feel it is the government's responsibility to deliver community infrastructure (most also view manual labor as undesirable.) In addition, international evidence on the impact of labor-intensive public works is inconclusive (see box 9).

Box 9. What Can and Cannot Work in Upper Egypt

Labor-intensive public works programs are an increasingly popular mechanism for addressing youth unemployment. They generally aim to provide a cash transfer to young people in exchange for the construction or rehabilitation of public infrastructure. However, the larger literature finds evidence on the impact of public works programs (i.e., their ability to increase employment beyond program duration) to be inconclusive. If the opportunity costs of youth participants in Upper Egypt are fully considered, however, alternative policies may be more cost effective in reaching the short-term objective of poverty alleviation.

Youth service programs, formal or informal, provide an opportunity for youth to play an active role in both their communities and national development while learning new skills, increasing their employability, and enhancing their overall personal development. Services offered by such programs can include basic health services provided through public health clinics, literacy tutoring and other learning services, and youth NGO-led community development initiatives (an option that was explicitly requested by young people surveyed in Upper Egypt). Moreover, the evidence on youth service programs is more positive on the post-program employment, as well as civic engagement, of young people.

Source: Wendy Cunningham, Maria Laura Sanchez-Puerta, and Alice Wuerlmi, 2010, "Active Labor Market Programs for Youth: A Framework to Guide Youth Employment Interventions," *World Bank Employment Policy Primer*, no. 16 (November).

Given that Upper Egypt is a predominantly agricultural community, interventions to promote youth employment in agriculture are desirable in principle. However, such interventions face multiple challenges and are consequently not a high-priority. First, young people in the region emphatically do not want to work in the sector because they see no future in such employment, particularly those with secondary or university education. Second, traditional organization of the sector, government control, high costs, land fragmentation, and the decreased volume of arable land are all major constraints. Moreover, as a previous World Bank report pointed out, "the coordination of the activities of millions of micro-farmers into modern production chains, [would pose] major coordination and collective action problems."⁷³ To be sustainable, any employment intervention in the sector would need to be based on a careful understanding of these constraints and, hopefully, draw on successful models of youth engagement with community-based organizations and agricultural cooperatives.

Link skills development and training to employment, including that of young women

While the demand for labor is clearly an important issue, chapter 2 showed that **both employers and young people themselves in Upper Egypt have a low opinion of the quality and job-relevance of the education and training that they receive.** There is a particular need for integrated programs that bring together appropriate training and services designed in partnership with employers. In particular, programs are needed to:

⁷³ World Bank, 2009, "Pathways to Shared Growth," 30.

- **Improve the quality of technical and vocational training and make it more accessible to youth** by enhancing its content, delivery, institutional arrangements, and geographic accessibility (for example, via public-private partnerships and NGOs for developing skills and providing placements).
- **Provide comprehensive services to unemployed and disadvantaged young men and young women** (see boxes 10 and 11 for examples of international good practice in this area). In particular, the Jordan intervention may provide positive outcomes for young women in Upper Egypt, if adapted and piloted in the largest urban areas. The same idea could be replicated for young men, perhaps in sugar cane or brick factories, both of which have been mentioned by young people as appealing and potentially lucrative industries.
- **Promote job intermediation by NGOs and private sector agencies to match young people looking for work with available jobs.** Public-private initiatives could also be useful here. For example, Nahdet el Mahroussa’s Career Development Office partners with Cairo University and several private companies to equip students with essential job skills and match them with potential employers;⁷⁴ this scheme could be replicated in Upper Egypt by partnering with local universities. With respect to the government, the Five Year Plan of the National Council of Youth (2011–2015) calls for holding regular “employment fairs” for youth. Even in the absence of physical offices, technology could be used to connect jobseekers to employers in cost-effective ways and reach large numbers of young people.⁷⁵ Options include mobile platforms such as *SoukTel’s JobMatch* service, which enables young jobseekers to submit a basic resume through a mobile phone and match it with job advertisements.⁷⁶

Box 10. Jovenes Employment Programs for Disadvantaged Youth in Eight Latin American Countries

The Jovenes programs offer comprehensive training to unemployed and economically disadvantaged youth aged 16 to 29 years of age, aiming to improve their human and social capital and employability. The demand-driven model has been customized throughout Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Technical training and internship experiences with employers are combined with training in basic life skills and other support services to ensure beneficiaries’ social integration and job readiness. Private and public institutions—contracted through public bidding mechanisms—provide the training and organize the internships. The programs target poor 16–24-year-olds, with more than 60 percent of participants coming from low-income families. Other targeting criteria, such as employment, gender, and age, are also applied. Most beneficiaries had precarious employment conditions before their participation in a given program. Rigorous evaluation of the programs has shown them to have had significant impacts on both the employment and earnings of young people. In Argentina, the program increased the probability of employment for young adult women by about 10 percentage points; in Chile, it increased the probability of employment of participants by 21 percent. In Argentina, the program increased monthly wages by about 10 percent.

Sources: World Bank, 2006, WDR 2007, 117; C. Aedo and S. Nuñez, 2001, “The Impact of Training Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Case of Program Joven,” ILADES-Georgetown University Working Paper, School of Economics and Business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

⁷⁴ See the website of Nahdet El Marousa, n.d., “Career Development Office,” Nahdet El Marousa, Cairo, <http://www.nahdetmasr.org/cdo> (accessed October 2011).

⁷⁵ See G. La Cava, G. Rossotto, and C. Paradi-Guilford, 2011, “ICT for Youth in the Middle East and North Africa Region: Policies to Promote Employment and Social Inclusion,” *Arab Brief*, no. 1 (February), World Bank, Washington, DC.

⁷⁶ Cunningham, Sanchez-Puerta, and Wuermli, 2010, “Active Labor Market Programs for Youth.”

- **Focus on reducing the gender gap in labor participation by providing entrepreneurship opportunities for both males and females through the same program, but with appropriate activities for each gender. Education and employment schemes that target girls alone will not work**, given the need for male social acceptance of women’s activities and possible adverse consequences, such as men forcing their wives to acquire credit that they do not need. In the near term, appropriate activities for women could include packaging or processing agricultural products and **cottage industries**, which can be undertaken at the household or community level and are thus consistent with the constraints on women’s mobility.

Box 11. Jordan New Work Opportunities for Women

Jordan New Work Opportunities for Women (Now Jordan), currently under implementation, is a pilot program for young women that addresses the large gender gaps in employment rates in the country. The pilot has randomly assigned 1,347 recent female community college graduates to one of three labor market interventions (a three-week soft skills training course for 300 young women, a six-month job voucher offer for 300 young women, a dual training and job voucher offer for 300 young women) or a control group (499 women). The job voucher offers a firm a six-month wage subsidy conditional on hiring a graduate. Early results from the mid-line survey indicate that employers respond to clear financial incentives. Job vouchers induced a 39 percent rise in female employment. Some 57 percent of young women expect to keep their jobs after their vouchers expire. Although the training program received extremely positive feedback from trainees, it had no significant effects on their employment. In order to identify additional effective alternatives that facilitate the school-to-work transition for young women, an extension to the pilot will involve an employee screening and matching project that develops signaling mechanisms for jobseekers, reduces employee search costs for employers, and connects jobseekers with employers.

Source: Tara Vishwanath, 2012, “Opening Doors: Gender Equality in the Middle East and North Africa,” *MENA Knowledge and Learning Quick Note*, no. 60 (March), Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank.

Promote youth entrepreneurship

Young people have expressed an interest in entrepreneurship, but lack the information, awareness, and skill set necessary to engage in entrepreneurship schemes. Specific interventions could include programs that:

Box 12. Qualification Program for Young Micro entrepreneurs in Peru

The Programa de Calificación de Jóvenes Creadores de Microempresas is implemented by the Peruvian NGO Colectivo Integral de Desarrollo. The program began in 1999 as an initiative to address the significant lack of entrepreneurial skills among low-income young people. Its objective is to improve the earnings and quality of life of beneficiaries by providing assistance and training in developing business plans and creating profitable businesses. The target population consists of economically disadvantaged young people 15 to 25 years old who have entrepreneurial skills or own a small and/or informal business (in operation for less than a year) and reside in targeted localities. The program offers mentorship, training, and internship services. Program beneficiaries can also access microcredit. An evaluation has shown significant increases in average incomes and the probability of having an operating business, as well as the creation of new jobs by the enterprises themselves.

Source: S. Puerto, 2007, “Interventions to Support Young Workers in Latin America and the Caribbean: Regional Report for the Youth Employment Inventory,” World Bank, Washington, DC.

- **Improve the design of credit programs and their appropriateness for young people.** This means tailoring the size of loans and repayment arrangements to young people’s needs and means, as well as providing training, mentoring, and peer group support.

- **Encourage youth access to Social Fund for Development credits** by raising awareness that there is in fact no condition forcing applicants to wave the right to apply for government employment; and introducing other tailored components.
- **Launch information schemes to raise awareness of existing credit and entrepreneurial support schemes.** Simultaneously, offer specific training for entrepreneurs in technical and small business skills, with accompanying mentoring and support (box 12 provides an example of good international practice in this sphere).
- **Introduce credit schemes that do not target women alone**, given that such schemes could lead to the kind of negative consequences mentioned above. As noted at the outset of this chapter, **reducing the gender gap in labor participation may require providing entrepreneurship opportunities for both males and females through the same program.** Such a program could offer specialized, tailored training to women while increasing awareness of the value of female employment outside the domestic sphere.
- Due to the isolation of women and young women in Upper Egypt, **facilitate the formation of female peer groups and link these groups to market opportunities.** Such groups would also provide a culturally appropriate context for other activities, including literacy classes.

5.2 Promote Civic Engagement among Youth

Young people in Upper Egypt have expressed interest in engaging in community service and voluntary work, but stress that they cannot initiate these activities alone; they require guidance, facilitation, and acknowledgment from their local governments. Initiatives such as garbage collecting, monitoring local government performance and awareness raising for local NGOs appeal to young people only if such initiatives are accepted in some measure by an official entity.

Given the relatively narrow engagement of youth and the keen interest in civic participation expressed by the young people interviewed for this study, the recommendations below aim to **strengthen youth engagement, building on their recent dedication to community service.** Active youth participation in civic life has a proven positive impact on young people’s aspirations for broader institutional change and their acquisition of leadership and soft skills, such as negotiation, team work and problem solving—all valuable skills for employability. Young people have vast potential to contribute to their communities, yet there are few opportunities for youth leadership in Upper Egypt. Raising young people’s awareness of the potential for civic action and exposing them to new ideas and possibilities of engagement would help create the space for such action.

A starting point would be to conduct a comprehensive mapping of youth involvement in community services and civil society organizations for possible replication and scaling up.

Strengthen youth centers and the services that they provide

Currently, Egypt’s youth centers are poorly equipped and managed and provide few services of interest or relevance to young people, particularly young women. A number of improvements could be envisaged:

- **Use youth centers to deliver the types of skills training described above.**

- **Increase participation by youth in the management of youth centers**, for example, by establishing linkages to schools or forming youth committees.
- **Provide more access, facilities, and activities for girls.** This might include designating specific days or hours for girls' participation, thereby eliminating the fear of harassment and the mixing of girls and boys at these centers.

Establish youth service programs

Youth service programs represent another recommended area for investment in Upper Egypt, as they provide young people opportunities to acquire new skills while engaging in community development with their peers (e.g., through activities such as literacy tutoring, peer-to-peer mentoring, assisting the disabled, rehabilitating small-scale infrastructure or public spaces). A World Bank project that is in the process of being implemented in Tunisia's interior governorates (which have some of the highest poverty and youth unemployment rates in the country) will provide young people cash for voluntary-type work in various rural communities, including farm and off-farm subprojects and services. The innovative feature of the project is that it finances youth-led initiatives—giving young people a decisive voice in the selection, management, and execution of proposed activities. This model, with some adaptations, could be relevant to young people in Upper Egypt. Possible interventions along these lines could:

- **Promote youth-led NGOs and youth engagement in the management of existing NGOs and community associations.**
- **Promote the engagement of youth in assuring the transparency and accountability of local governments.** Involving youth in monitoring the performance of these entities would yield several benefits, including helping ensure good performance, promoting a much-needed sense of youth engagement and empowerment, and building skills. Social accountability techniques for such monitoring are now well established and made more effective by information and communication technology.

Support the establishment of local youth platforms

In some countries, young people and their representative bodies are recognized as stakeholders and partners in decision making at local and national levels. Youth platforms or councils, representing a variety of youth-led organizations and initiatives, serve as key channels for expressing youth opinion and voice on various critical public policy issues. The establishment of such youth representative bodies could facilitate the interaction and coordination of youth services and other youth-related programs with national policy makers and/or local authorities.

These programs should be devised in conjunction with youth and use participatory methods, helping ensure that they effectively convey information and encourage youth to exercise their rights and fully engage in civil society. To be effective, these programs should consider the diversity of youth in Upper Egypt and offer activities that respond to the region's rural and urban, socioeconomic, religious, and cultural diversity.

Looking ahead, the future of young people in Upper Egypt is likely to be determined by how the issues of unemployment, joblessness, and voice are addressed in the near future. This report demonstrates that resolving the unemployment issue for young people is only part of the equation. Young people believe that employment is the cornerstone of their lives, and rightly so. But it is difficult to envisage an active role for them in their communities and the country at large if they are busy trying to make ends meet in casual or irregular employment. Equally important, the role of young people needs to be institutionalized in local governance structures to ensure their voice is included. The main slogan of the revolution—"*Bread (life), Freedom, Social Justice*"—shows the interrelationship of these various dimensions of young people's lives and the challenge for the next phase will be to empower them to achieve their vision.



Photos: Demonstration in Egypt, February 2011. (Gazette Upper Egypt)

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Annex 1: Quantitative Methodology

Quantitative Research Methodology

The quantitative analysis in this study uses data from the 2009 Survey of Young people in Egypt (SYPE09). SYPE was conducted by the Population Council in collaboration with the Information and Decision Support Center of the Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers in May 2009 with co-financing from the World Bank under the present ESW.

The SYPE sample is nationally representative sample of young people in Egypt covering all governorates in Egypt, including the border governorates. Moreover, the SYPE sample is considered an innovative sample design, as it allows for a priori inclusion of slum areas among the urban sample. The SYPE sample consisted of 11,372 households, from which 15,029 young people aged 10-29 were actually interviewed. The survey updates advances knowledge about this important demographic group. Specifically, the survey provides information on youth-related issues in education, work, migration, family formation, health and sexuality, and civic and political participation (see Population Council 2010 for more details on the sample design and survey implementation).

Egypt is divided into six regions: Urban Governorates, urban Lower Egypt, rural Lower Egypt, urban Upper Egypt, rural Upper Egypt, and Frontier Governorates. This report investigates how youth are faring in the Southern part of the country, the region of Upper Egypt. The SYPE sample from Upper Egypt consists of about 4,572 young people aged 10-29 from 3,325 households. Table 8 presents the distribution of the interviewed sample of young men and women by age and gender.

Annex 2: Select SYPE findings and Probit Models

Table 8 Distribution of SYPE sample of Young People (10-29) by Age Group and Gender

	Upper Egypt		All Egypt	
	Weighted percent	Sample size	Weighted percent	Sample size
Gender				
Males	50.49	1999	51.07	6,949
Females	49.51	2,573	48.93	8,080
Age				
(10-14)	29.77	1,315	28.57	4,053
(15-17)	17.9	843	16.1	2,487
(18-21)	21.01	873	20.88	2,949
(22-24)	14.9	714	15.16	2,386
(25-29)	16.42	827	19.3	3,154
Total	100	4,572	100	15,029

Table 9 Percent distribution of Young People (10-29) by Background Characteristics

	Upper Egypt		All Egypt	
	Weighted percent	Sample size	Weighted percent	Sample size
Gender				
Males	50.5	1,800	51.1	6,949
Females	49.5	2,335	48.9	8,080
Age				
(10-14)	29.9	1,201	28.6	4,053
(15-17)	18.2	775	16.1	2,487
(18-24)	36.1	1440	36.1	5335
(25-29)	15.8	719	19.3	3,154
Wealth index quintile				
Lowest	37.7	1,536	19.9	2,819
Second	24.0	996	20.6	2,987
Middle	22.2	893	21.9	3,184
Fourth	10.8	468	19.9	3,170
Highest	5.3	242	17.7	2,869
Urban-rural residence				
Urban	18.0	789	31.6	5,337
Rural	75.4	3,090	58.9	8,342
Informal urban	6.6	256	9.6	1,350
Region				
Urban Governorates			21.4	3,379
Lower Egypt			42.6	5875
Urban			11.1	1,565
Rural			31.5	4,310

Upper Egypt			34.3	4572
Urban			7.7	1,045
Rural			26.6	3,527
Frontier Governorates			1.8	1,203
Governorate				
Beni Suef	10.4	429		
Fayoum	10.2	429		
Menia	19.7	820		
Assiut	14.4	598		
Sohag	16.2	651		
	15.1	628		
Aswan	6.5	269		
Luxor	7.5	311		
Total	100	4,135	100	15,029

**Table 10 Youth (15-29) Labor Market Indicators by Governorate*,
Upper Egypt (in percent)**

	Labor Force Participation			Joblessness Rate			Unemployment Rate			Total Youth (15-29)
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	
Beni Suef	47	13.2	28.1	20.5	67.6	46.9	19.59	33.16	23.16	293
Fayoum	63.9	7.6	37	14.6	69.2	40.6	11.72	14.34	11.98	281
Menia	54.8	7	30.7	18.0	70.1	44.3	9.17	6.75	8.89	594
Assiut	46.8	5	25.6	20.2	60.3	40.5	11.02	6.69	10.59	430
Sohag	44	7.4	24.5	34.5	73.4	55.2	21.15	44.46	24.85	449
	62.3	4.4	37	17.4	72.6	41.5	8.79	33.17	10.05	450
Aswan	54.5	7.8	30.4	30.8	76.8	54.5	21.16	54.81	25.62	201
Luxor	78.4	10.9	49	10.5	73.6	38.0	7.32	35.2	10.18	236
All	55.7	7.5	31.8	20.6	69.9	45.1	12.28	27.46	14.07	2934

*Throughout this report, one should be careful when interpreting the governorate-level results, as with most surveys, the SYPE sample was designed to provide reliable estimates on the national and regional levels only. Except in very few occasions, when a phenomenon is widespread, the governorate-level estimates would provide reliable results.

Table 11 Impact of Health on Schooling and Work in Upper Egypt

Variables	% School attendance affected (age 10-29)	% Ability to work affected (age 15-29)
Sex		
Males	29.8	41.8
Females	32.9	52.7
Age		
(10-14)	56.24	-
(15-17)	42.43	74.68
(18-24)	19.16	29.57
(25-29)	8.3	69.78
Urban-rural residence		
Urban	27.27	56.64
Rural	32.87	39.68
Slum	34.01	58.03
Education Level		
None	51.6	27.58
Basic Education	37.56	55.22
Secondary Education	11.38	48.36
Post-secondary	0	-
University & above	0	59.44
Wealth Quintiles		
lowest	38.78	70.87
second	25.67	22.52
middle	31.01	51.64
fourth	29.3	39.28
highest	23.2	-
Governorates		
Beni Suef	37	58.37
Fayoum	43.76	0
Menia	46.92	59.1
Assiut	43.24	20.79
Suhag	21.09	41
	7.89	36.34
Aswan	33.9	-
Luxor	29.1	53.49
Total affected	211	42

Table 12 Percent of Young People (10-29) Voluntarism and Group Membership in Upper Egypt

Variables	Voluntary Service	Group Membership Engagement
Sex		
Males	5.05	3.92
Females	1.36	2.03
Age		
(10-14)	0.54	3.69
(15-17)	2.49	3.79
(18-24)	4.81	2.63
(25-29)	5.53	1.54
Urban-Rural Residence		
Urban	5.75	4.67
Rural	2.71	2.67
Informal	2.23	2.04
Education Level		
None	0.33	1.44
Basic Education	2.35	4.00
Secondary Education	6.29	2.89
Post Secondary	25.89	2.91
University & Above	11.2	6.68
Wealth Quintiles		
Lowest	2.75	1.53
Second	2.53	2.55
Middle	2.70	2.45
Fourth	4.25	5.82
Highest	9.79	11.69
Governorates		
Beni Suef	1.36	4.94
Fayoum	0.93	1.75
Menia	0.81	1.18
Assiut	2.40	7.33
Suhag	8.10	2.48
	2.04	1.32
Aswan	6.74	1.65
Luxor	5.76	3.95
Total	3.22	2.98

The following are the Probit models utilized in the report.

Table 13: Probit model of the probability of remaining in education; 15-29 year olds.

	All Egypt				Excluding Upper Egypt				Upper Egypt			
	males		females		males		females		males		females	
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.
Aged 18-21	<i>-1.33</i>	0.05	<i>-1.31</i>	0.06	<i>-1.38</i>	0.07	<i>-1.27</i>	0.07	<i>-1.46</i>	0.10	<i>-1.20</i>	0.09
Aged 22-24	<i>-2.46</i>	0.07	<i>-2.66</i>	0.08	<i>-2.73</i>	0.10	<i>-2.50</i>	0.09	<i>-2.39</i>	0.12	<i>-2.54</i>	0.16
Aged 25-29	<i>-3.48</i>	0.11	<i>-3.60</i>	0.12	<i>-3.67</i>	0.14	<i>-3.57</i>	0.13	<i>-3.25</i>	0.20	<i>-3.45</i>	0.29
Wealth Quintile 2	<i>0.23</i>	0.08	0.12	0.08	0.04	0.12	<i>0.22</i>	0.11	<i>0.30</i>	0.11	<i>0.21</i>	0.12
Wealth Quintile 3	<i>0.49</i>	0.08	<i>0.53</i>	0.08	<i>0.55</i>	0.11	<i>0.59</i>	0.11	<i>0.35</i>	0.11	<i>0.44</i>	0.12
Wealth Quintile 4	<i>0.87</i>	0.08	<i>0.84</i>	0.09	<i>0.86</i>	0.11	<i>0.84</i>	0.11	<i>1.09</i>	0.15	<i>0.73</i>	0.16
Top Wealth Quintile	<i>1.67</i>	0.09	<i>1.45</i>	0.10	<i>1.47</i>	0.12	<i>1.70</i>	0.12	<i>1.49</i>	0.22	<i>1.48</i>	0.21
Rural residence	0.11	0.07	<i>-0.31</i>	0.07	<i>-0.22</i>	0.09	-0.03	0.09	<i>0.31</i>	0.12	<i>-0.40</i>	0.13
Slum residence	-0.08	0.10	<i>-0.26</i>	0.10	<i>-0.27</i>	0.11	-0.11	0.11	-0.12	0.21	-0.05	0.21
Alexandria	-0.01	0.12	0.03	0.12	0.04	0.12	0.00	0.12				
Port-said	-0.23	0.33	0.24	0.30	0.25	0.30	-0.23	0.33				
Suez	<i>-0.41</i>	0.24	0.26	0.24	0.26	0.24	<i>-0.42</i>	0.24				
Damietta	<i>-0.39</i>	0.20	0.05	0.23	-0.01	0.23	<i>-0.33</i>	0.21				
Dakahlia	-0.15	0.13	<i>0.30</i>	0.14	0.25	0.15	-0.07	0.14				
Sharkia	<i>0.25</i>	0.12	<i>0.31</i>	0.13	0.25	0.14	<i>0.35</i>	0.13				
Kalyoubia	-0.11	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.07	0.15	-0.01	0.15				
Kafr-elsheikh	0.01	0.14	<i>0.48</i>	0.16	<i>0.43</i>	0.17	0.09	0.15				
Gharbia	-0.02	0.13	<i>0.59</i>	0.14	<i>0.54</i>	0.15	0.08	0.13				
Menoufia	0.05	0.14	<i>0.46</i>	0.14	<i>0.39</i>	0.15	0.15	0.15				
Behera	<i>0.24</i>	0.13	0.28	0.14	0.23	0.15	<i>0.33</i>	0.14				
Ismailia	-0.04	0.22	<i>0.33</i>	0.20	0.28	0.20	0.03	0.22				
Giza	0.02	0.16	0.24	0.15	0.25	0.16	0.02	0.16				
Beni Suef	<i>0.35</i>	0.15	0.27	0.16								
Fayoum	-0.07	0.16	0.02	0.18					<i>-0.41</i>	0.18	-0.23	0.20
Menia	<i>0.32</i>	0.13	<i>0.35</i>	0.14					-0.03	0.15	0.05	0.16
Assiut	0.32	0.13	<i>0.57</i>	0.14					-0.04	0.16	<i>0.31</i>	0.17
Suhag	<i>0.26</i>	0.13	<i>0.38</i>	0.14					-0.11	0.16	0.12	0.17
	0.18	0.14	0.23	0.15					-0.18	0.17	-0.01	0.18
Aswan	-0.09	0.18	-0.01	0.19					<i>-0.43</i>	0.21	-0.26	0.22
Luxor	-0.12	0.18	-0.20	0.20					<i>-0.47</i>	0.21	<i>-0.49</i>	0.23
Red sea	-0.01	0.24	-0.16	0.23	-0.19	0.24	0.02	0.25				
El-wadi El-gidid	-0.13	0.25	0.22	0.24	0.17	0.24	-0.05	0.25				
Matrouh	-0.08	0.17	<i>-0.42</i>	0.17	<i>-0.45</i>	0.17	-0.04	0.17				
North Sinai	-0.05	0.18	<i>-0.41</i>	0.21	<i>-0.47</i>	0.21	0.02	0.18				
South Sinai	0.02	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.09	0.28				
Helwan	-0.06	0.20	-0.10	0.23	-0.14	0.23	-0.01	0.20				
6 of October	0.08	0.15	-0.23	0.18	-0.28	0.18	0.16	0.16				
Intercept	<i>0.20</i>	0.10	0.15	0.11	0.18	0.13	0.17	0.12	<i>0.44</i>	0.20	<i>0.42</i>	0.20
N	5772		6175		4373		4054		1718		1802	
LR test	<i>3125.7</i>		<i>3298.7</i>		<i>2459.9</i>		<i>2293.5</i>		<i>856.1</i>		<i>845.9</i>	
Pseudo-R-Squared	0.440		0.478		0.497		0.455		0.415		0.434	

Notes: 1) Statistical significance of coefficients and other tests indicated where relevant as follows: plain text for $p > .10$; *italics for* $.10 > p > .05$. **bold text for** $.05 > p > .01$; and **bold and italics for** $p < .01$.

2) Excluded categories: Aged 15-17. lowest wealth quintile, Urban residence, Cairo (for All Egypt. and 'excluding Upper Egypt' estimations) and Beni Suef (for upper Egypt estimations).

Table 14: Ordered Probit model of the level of education achieved; 15-29 year olds who have left education.

	All Egypt				Excluding Upper Egypt				Upper Egypt			
	males		females		males		females		males		females	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Aged 18-21	<i>0.59</i>	0.07	<i>0.34</i>	0.07	<i>0.50</i>	0.09	<i>0.32</i>	0.09	<i>0.78</i>	0.13	<i>0.41</i>	0.11
Aged 22-24	<i>0.93</i>	0.08	<i>0.58</i>	0.07	<i>0.89</i>	0.09	<i>0.59</i>	0.09	<i>1.03</i>	0.13	<i>0.56</i>	0.11
Aged 25-29	<i>0.85</i>	0.07	<i>0.26</i>	0.07	<i>0.80</i>	0.09	<i>0.29</i>	0.08	<i>0.97</i>	0.13	0.19	0.11
Wealth Quintile 2	<i>0.22</i>	0.05	<i>0.46</i>	0.05	<i>0.16</i>	0.07	<i>0.40</i>	0.07	<i>0.30</i>	0.08	<i>0.50</i>	0.08
Wealth Quintile 3	<i>0.47</i>	0.05	<i>0.77</i>	0.05	<i>0.39</i>	0.07	<i>0.67</i>	0.07	<i>0.60</i>	0.09	<i>0.88</i>	0.09
Wealth Quintile 4	<i>0.88</i>	0.06	<i>1.25</i>	0.06	<i>0.80</i>	0.07	<i>1.13</i>	0.07	<i>1.08</i>	0.12	<i>1.53</i>	0.11
Top Wealth Quintile	<i>1.88</i>	0.08	<i>2.14</i>	0.07	<i>1.79</i>	0.09	<i>2.03</i>	0.08	<i>1.89</i>	0.22	<i>2.44</i>	0.19
Rural residence	<i>0.11</i>	0.05	<i>-0.17</i>	0.05	0.01	0.07	<i>-0.17</i>	0.06	<i>0.30</i>	0.09	-0.10	0.09
Slum residence	-0.04	0.07	-0.03	0.07	-0.12	0.08	-0.07	0.07	0.16	0.15	0.20	0.15
Alexandria	<i>-0.28</i>	0.10	<i>-0.28</i>	0.09	<i>-0.29</i>	0.10	<i>-0.28</i>	0.09				
Port-said	0.28	0.26	<i>0.61</i>	0.23	0.24	0.26	<i>0.58</i>	0.23				
Suez	0.01	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.02	0.18	0.16	0.19				
Damietta	0.19	0.15	<i>0.57</i>	0.15	<i>0.27</i>	0.15	<i>0.57</i>	0.15				
Dakahlia	-0.10	0.10	<i>0.27</i>	0.10	-0.01	0.11	<i>0.28</i>	0.10				
Sharkia	0.06	0.10	<i>0.40</i>	0.09	0.14	0.10	<i>0.38</i>	0.10				
Kalyoubia	-0.17	0.10	-0.13	0.10	-0.09	0.11	-0.13	0.10				
Kafr-elsheikh	<i>0.34</i>	0.11	<i>0.46</i>	0.11	<i>0.42</i>	0.12	<i>0.44</i>	0.12				
Gharbia	<i>0.20</i>	0.10	<i>0.33</i>	0.10	<i>0.27</i>	0.11	<i>0.32</i>	0.10				
Menoufia	0.01	0.11	<i>0.33</i>	0.10	0.10	0.11	<i>0.32</i>	0.10				
Behera	0.10	0.11	<i>0.17</i>	0.10	<i>0.18</i>	0.11	0.16	0.10				
Ismailia	0.18	0.19	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.19	0.22	0.16				
Giza	-0.14	0.13	<i>-0.39</i>	0.12	-0.13	0.13	<i>-0.37</i>	0.12				
Beni Suef	0.09	0.12	0.01	0.11								
Fayoum	-0.08	0.12	<i>-0.24</i>	0.12					-0.14	0.14	<i>-0.22</i>	0.14
Menia	<i>0.22</i>	0.10	-0.07	0.10					0.14	0.12	-0.05	0.11
Assiut	<i>0.25</i>	0.11	<i>0.17</i>	0.11					<i>0.21</i>	0.13	<i>0.21</i>	0.13
Suhag	<i>0.25</i>	0.10	-0.04	0.10					0.21	0.13	0.00	0.12
	<i>0.28</i>	0.11	-0.02	0.11					<i>0.21</i>	0.13	0.02	0.12
Aswan	0.10	0.13	<i>0.40</i>	0.12					0.07	0.16	<i>0.44</i>	0.14
Luxor	0.00	0.13	0.10	0.13					-0.03	0.16	0.08	0.15
Red sea	0.24	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.28	0.19	0.20	0.18				
El-wadi El-gidid	0.15	0.17	<i>0.30</i>	0.16	0.21	0.17	<i>0.30</i>	0.16				
Matrouh	<i>-0.39</i>	0.12	<i>-0.68</i>	0.12	-0.38	0.13	-0.71	0.12				
North Sinai	-0.16	0.13	-0.19	0.12	-0.13	0.13	<i>-0.21</i>	0.12				
South Sinai	-0.13	0.24	<i>-0.44</i>	0.21	-0.09	0.24	<i>-0.45</i>	0.21				
Helwan	0.04	0.15	0.13	0.14	0.06	0.15	0.12	0.14				
6 of October	-0.12	0.12	-0.04	0.11	-0.07	0.12	-0.06	0.11				
n	3986		4579		2773		3236		1213		1343	
LR test	<i>1175.1</i>		<i>1934.2</i>		<i>921.4</i>		<i>1264.1</i>		<i>229.4</i>		<i>463.1</i>	
Pseudo-R-Squared	0.092		0.128		0.102		0.117		0.064		0.114	

Notes: 1) Statistical significance of coefficients and other tests indicated where relevant as follows: plain text for $p > .10$; *italics for* $.10 > p > .05$. **bold text for** $.05 > p > .01$; and ***bold and italics for*** $p < .01$.

2) Excluded categories: Aged 15-17. lowest wealth quintile. Urban residence. Cairo (for All Egypt. and _excluding Upper Egypt' estimations) and Beni Suef (for upper Egypt estimations).

Table 15: Probit model of the probability of being in employment; 15-29 year olds who have left education.

	All Egypt				Excluding Upper Egypt				Upper Egypt			
	males		females		males		females		males		females	
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.
Aged 18-21	-0.23	0.09	-0.18	0.12	-0.21	0.12	-0.12	0.14	-0.26	0.16	-0.37	0.23
Aged 22-24	0.12	0.10	-0.21	0.12	0.21	0.12	-0.17	0.14	-0.04	0.16	-0.42	0.23
Aged 25-29	0.44	0.09	-0.11	0.11	0.58	0.12	-0.11	0.14	0.17	0.16	-0.12	0.21
Can read Only	0.41	0.30	-0.06	0.27	0.57	0.41	-0.02	0.29	0.06	0.50		
Primary	-0.04	0.11	0.01	0.15	-0.09	0.13	0.08	0.16	-0.01	0.21		
Preparatory	-0.02	0.08	-0.01	0.11	-0.09	0.11	0.02	0.12	0.06	0.13	-0.24	0.25
Vocational	-0.13	0.07	0.31	0.08	-0.18	0.09	0.28	0.10	-0.09	0.11	0.36	0.16
General Secondary	-0.33	0.17	-0.23	0.27	-0.29	0.20	-0.17	0.28	-0.61	0.34		
Intermediate	-0.36	0.13	0.77	0.15	-0.41	0.16	0.75	0.16	-0.39	0.28	0.68	0.43
University	-0.44	0.09	1.01	0.10	-0.62	0.11	0.88	0.12	0.00	0.17	1.55	0.23
Wealth Quintile 2	0.04	0.07	-0.22	0.09	-0.10	0.09	-0.28	0.11	0.15	0.10	-0.18	0.17
Wealth Quintile 3	0.01	0.07	-0.18	0.09	-0.16	0.09	-0.27	0.11	0.17	0.10	-0.11	0.18
Wealth Quintile 4	0.07	0.08	-0.32	0.10	-0.06	0.10	-0.41	0.11	0.20	0.15	-0.15	0.23
Top Wealth Quintile	0.06	0.10	-0.27	0.11	-0.02	0.12	-0.32	0.13	0.06	0.27	-0.08	0.30
Rural residence	0.07	0.07	-0.30	0.08	0.18	0.09	-0.35	0.10	-0.05	0.11	-0.11	0.18
Slum residence	0.13	0.09	-0.41	0.11	0.24	0.11	-0.45	0.12	-0.07	0.18	-0.24	0.27
Alexandria	0.01	0.13	-0.11	0.12	0.01	0.13	-0.13	0.12				
Port-said	-0.45	0.29	-0.08	0.28	-0.48	0.29	-0.08	0.28				
Suez	-0.18	0.22	-0.33	0.26	-0.17	0.22	-0.32	0.26				
Damietta	-0.33	0.18	-0.23	0.22	-0.40	0.19	-0.19	0.22				
Dakahlia	-0.49	0.13	0.03	0.14	-0.60	0.13	0.05	0.15				
Sharkia	-0.36	0.12	-0.12	0.13	-0.48	0.13	-0.11	0.14				
Kalyoubia	-0.52	0.13	0.17	0.14	-0.62	0.14	0.17	0.14				
Kafr-elsheikh	-0.89	0.14	0.36	0.15	-1.00	0.15	0.37	0.16				
Gharbia	-0.28	0.13	0.23	0.14	-0.36	0.13	0.23	0.14				
Menoufia	0.17	0.15	-0.17	0.15	0.08	0.15	-0.14	0.15				
Behera	-0.15	0.14	-0.26	0.16	-0.26	0.15	-0.26	0.16				
Ismailia	-0.19	0.23	-0.51	0.27	-0.23	0.24	-0.51	0.28				
Giza	-0.18	0.17	-0.50	0.21	-0.21	0.17	-0.50	0.20				
Beni Suef	-1.31	0.15	-0.12	0.18								
Fayoum	-0.68	0.15	-0.28	0.19					0.57	0.17	-0.13	0.23
Menia	-0.97	0.12	-0.24	0.15					0.33	0.15	-0.11	0.19
Assiut	-1.07	0.13	-0.44	0.18					0.21	0.16	-0.31	0.22
Suhag	-1.42	0.13	-0.71	0.19					-0.11	0.16	-0.53	0.23
	-0.41	0.14	-0.59	0.20					0.86	0.16	-0.46	0.25
Aswan	-1.05	0.16	-0.76	0.25					0.19	0.19	-0.54	0.29
Luxor	0.15	0.18	-0.36	0.21					1.35	0.21	-0.20	0.27
Red sea	-0.26	0.23	-0.60	0.29	-0.30	0.23	-0.59	0.29				
El-wadi El-gidid	-1.04	0.20	-0.03	0.23	-1.11	0.21	-0.02	0.23				
Matrouh	0.51	0.19	-0.59	0.22	0.45	0.19	-0.63	0.22				
North Sinai	0.04	0.18	-0.68	0.25	-0.05	0.19	-0.70	0.25				
South Sinai	-0.13	0.30	-0.05	0.31	-0.17	0.31	-0.06	0.31				
Helwan	-0.13	0.20	0.06	0.20	-0.16	0.20	0.03	0.20				
6 of October	0.00	0.15	-0.59	0.19	-0.08	0.16	-0.58	0.19				
Intercept	0.73	0.13	-0.83	0.15	0.83	0.16	-0.74	0.17	-0.45	0.23	-1.14	0.31
n	3986		4579		2773		3236		1213		1250	
LR test	667.5		369.3		310.8		232.5		153.4		103.9	
Pseudo-R-Squared	0.127		0.112		0.093		0.090		0.092		0.163	

Notes: 1) Statistical significance of coefficients and other tests indicated where relevant as follows: plain text for $p > .10$; *italics* for $.10 > p > .05$. **bold text** for $.05 > p > .01$; and ***bold and italics*** for $p < .01$.
2) Excluded categories: Aged 15-17, illiterate, lowest wealth quintile, Urban residence, Cairo (for All Egypt. and excluding Upper Egypt' estimations) and Beni Suef (for upper Egypt estimations).

Table 16: Probit model of the probability of being in permanent employment; employed 15-29 year olds who have left education.

	All Egypt				Excluding Upper Egypt				Upper Egypt			
	males		females		males		females		males		females	
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.
Aged 18-21	0.10	0.12	0.60	0.34	0.12	0.14	0.50	0.37	0.12	0.25	6.64	1.48
Aged 22-24	0.18	0.12	0.67	0.33	0.17	0.14	0.50	0.37	0.22	0.25	7.98	1.39
Aged 25-29	0.46	0.12	1.17	0.33	0.45	0.13	1.00	0.36	0.49	0.24	8.64	1.39
Can read Only	-0.58	0.29	0.27	0.64	-0.48	0.30	0.18	0.66	n.i.		n.i.	
Primary	0.08	0.13	0.07	0.38	0.17	0.14	-0.02	0.39	-0.52	0.36	n.i.	
Preparatory	-0.05	0.10	0.14	0.30	-0.01	0.11	0.01	0.32	-0.14	0.20	n.i.	
Vocational	0.12	0.08	0.07	0.23	0.18	0.10	-0.01	0.25	-0.07	0.17	0.39	0.75
General Secondary	0.03	0.22	0.41	0.85	0.01	0.23	0.35	0.85	0.34	0.65	n.i.	
Intermediate	0.36	0.17	0.22	0.35	0.40	0.18	0.21	0.37	0.30	0.46	n.i.	
University	0.30	0.12	0.19	0.27	0.33	0.13	0.37	0.31	0.21	0.25	-1.58	0.90
Wealth Quintile 2	0.21	0.08	0.55	0.24	0.15	0.10	0.35	0.26	0.36	0.15	2.04	0.87
Wealth Quintile 3	0.21	0.09	0.61	0.23	0.17	0.10	0.46	0.26	0.29	0.16	1.99	0.83
Wealth Quintile 4	0.28	0.09	0.47	0.26	0.21	0.11	0.33	0.28	0.58	0.22	2.04	0.97
Top Wealth Quintile	0.47	0.12	0.58	0.29	0.40	0.13	0.28	0.32	0.97	0.42	2.76	1.00
Rural residence	-0.21	0.08	-0.33	0.22	-0.22	0.10	-0.46	0.25	-0.10	0.16	0.18	0.63
Slum residence	0.07	0.11	-0.31	0.24	0.02	0.12	-0.50	0.26	0.41	0.28	1.11	0.85
Alexandria	-0.05	0.13	-0.73	0.25	-0.06	0.13	-0.68	0.25				
Port-said	-0.73	0.38	-0.24	0.52	-0.76	0.38	-0.29	0.52				
Suez	-0.45	0.25	-1.69	0.66	-0.45	0.25	-1.69	0.66				
Damietta	-0.04	0.21	-0.12	0.54	-0.04	0.22	0.08	0.55				
Dakahlia	0.05	0.15	-0.23	0.32	0.05	0.15	-0.07	0.33				
Sharkia	0.24	0.14	-0.47	0.29	0.23	0.15	-0.38	0.30				
Kalyoubia	0.04	0.15	-0.01	0.29	0.03	0.16	0.09	0.30				
Kafr-elsheikh	-0.06	0.18	-0.36	0.33	-0.07	0.19	-0.25	0.35				
Gharbia	-0.02	0.14	-0.05	0.30	-0.03	0.15	0.03	0.31				
Menoufia	0.30	0.15	-0.13	0.34	0.29	0.15	-0.04	0.35				
Behera	1.07	0.17	0.07	0.39	1.05	0.18	0.22	0.40				
Ismailia	n.i.		-0.12	0.72	n.i.		-0.03	0.71				
Giza	-0.44	0.18	0.25	0.52	-0.43	0.18	0.21	0.52				
Beni Suef	-0.15	0.23	0.21	0.43								
Fayoum	-0.75	0.20	0.24	0.48					-0.62	0.28	-0.26	0.72
Menia	-0.10	0.16	-0.40	0.37					0.06	0.25	-0.91	0.56
Assiut	-0.48	0.19	0.01	0.44					-0.29	0.27	-0.50	0.71
Suhag	-0.11	0.20	-1.06	0.53					0.08	0.28	-1.87	0.94
	-0.38	0.17	-0.57	0.48					-0.20	0.26	-0.88	0.73
Aswan	-0.52	0.25	n.i.						-0.26	0.33	n.i.	
Luxor	0.10	0.18	0.53	0.58					0.27	0.27	0.17	0.91
Red sea	-0.08	0.27	-0.77	0.66	-0.09	0.27	-0.73	0.66				
El-wadi El-gidid	-0.45	0.30	n.i.		-0.47	0.31	n.i.					
Matrouh	-0.43	0.16	n.i.		-0.44	0.16	n.i.					
North Sinai	-0.29	0.18	0.02	0.73	-0.31	0.18	0.06	0.72				
South Sinai	-0.64	0.36	0.45	0.85	-0.64	0.36	0.46	0.85				
Helwan	0.71	0.24	0.37	0.50	0.70	0.24	0.40	0.49				
6 of October	0.04	0.16	0.12	0.50	0.03	0.16	0.16	0.50				
Intercept	-0.36	0.16	-0.87	0.40	-0.34	0.17	-0.54	0.44	-0.64	0.37	-8.57	1.52
n	2487		515		1940		431		544		83	
LR test	346.4		97.0		219.4		76.0		72.7		42.3	
Pseudo-R-Squared	0.101		0.138		0.083		0.130		0.100		0.368	

Notes: 1) Statistical significance of coefficients and other tests indicated where relevant as follows: plain text for $p > .10$; *italics* for $.10 > p > .05$. **bold text** for $.05 > p > .01$; and ***bold and italics*** for $p < .01$.
2) Excluded categories: Aged 15-17, illiterate, lowest wealth quintile, Urban residence, Cairo (for All Egypt. and excluding Upper Egypt' estimations) and Beni Suef (for upper Egypt estimations).

Table 17: Probit model of the probability of being in involuntary part-time employment; employed 15-29 year olds who have left education.

	All Egypt				Excluding Upper Egypt				Upper Egypt			
	males		females		males		females		males		females	
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.
Aged 18-21	-0.05	0.13	0.14	0.33	0.09	0.16	-0.01	0.39	-0.37	0.23	0.90	0.68
Aged 22-24	-0.09	0.13	0.45	0.32	0.07	0.16	0.43	0.38	-0.44	0.23	0.61	0.63
Aged 25-29	-0.15	0.12	0.76	0.31	0.06	0.15	0.80	0.37	-0.63	0.23	0.53	0.62
Can read Only	0.59	0.28	0.14	0.72	0.37	0.30	0.03	0.74	n.i.			
Primary	-0.07	0.14	0.14	0.40	-0.11	0.15	0.03	0.43	-0.12	0.34		
Preparatory	-0.01	0.11	0.42	0.32	-0.08	0.13	0.32	0.35	0.14	0.19	1.05	0.99
Vocational	-0.16	0.09	-0.16	0.23	-0.29	0.11	-0.20	0.26	0.12	0.17	-0.31	0.60
General Secondary	-0.27	0.27	0.80	0.82	-0.51	0.31	0.82	0.84	0.75	0.69		
Intermediate	-0.19	0.19	0.76	0.36	-0.25	0.20	0.68	0.39	-0.45	0.52		
University	-0.14	0.13	0.71	0.27	-0.27	0.15	0.65	0.31	0.17	0.25	0.92	0.71
Wealth Quintile 2	-0.10	0.09	-0.27	0.24	-0.07	0.12	-0.27	0.27	-0.18	0.15	-0.44	0.61
Wealth Quintile 3	-0.04	0.09	-0.68	0.24	-0.11	0.12	-0.84	0.28	0.11	0.16	-0.28	0.62
Wealth Quintile 4	-0.04	0.10	-0.39	0.27	-0.05	0.12	-0.48	0.30	-0.06	0.22	0.03	0.75
Top Wealth Quintile	-0.17	0.14	-0.77	0.30	-0.19	0.16	-0.86	0.33	0.00	0.39	-0.71	0.81
Rural residence	0.28	0.09	-0.06	0.22	0.21	0.12	0.00	0.26	0.41	0.16	-0.02	0.54
Slum residence	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.25	0.08	0.14	0.20	0.28	0.30	0.28	-0.53	0.76
Alexandria	0.15	0.17	<i>0.45</i>	0.28	0.13	0.17	<i>0.47</i>	0.28				
Port-said	0.24	0.45	n.i.		0.25	0.45	n.i.					
Suez	0.87	0.26	1.70	0.57	0.88	0.26	1.74	0.58				
Damietta	0.06	0.26	0.66	0.54	0.12	0.27	0.60	0.55				
Dakahlia	<i>0.31</i>	0.17	1.96	0.35	0.36	0.18	1.92	0.36				
Sharkia	-0.24	0.18	0.98	0.30	-0.21	0.19	0.93	0.31				
Kalyoubia	0.11	0.19	0.75	0.32	0.15	0.19	0.71	0.33				
Kafr-elsheikh	0.57	0.20	1.45	0.35	0.64	0.21	1.40	0.36				
Gharbia	-0.20	0.19	<i>0.54</i>	0.32	-0.14	0.19	0.48	0.33				
Menoufia	0.26	0.17	1.04	0.33	<i>0.31</i>	0.18	0.98	0.34				
Behera	-0.27	0.20	0.81	0.40	-0.21	0.21	<i>0.76</i>	0.41				
Ismailia	-0.38	0.38	0.67	0.74	-0.31	0.38	0.68	0.73				
Giza	0.58	0.21	-0.43	0.63	0.59	0.21	-0.43	0.63				
Beni Suef	0.83	0.24	1.18	0.42								
Fayoum	0.78	0.20	0.31	0.49					-0.05	0.27	1.99	1.15
Menia	0.58	0.18	1.56	0.38					-0.25	0.25	0.49	1.11
Assiut	0.94	0.20	1.40	0.45					0.14	0.27	1.31	1.10
Suhag	1.35	0.21	0.39	0.58					<i>0.52</i>	0.27	1.37	1.18
	0.95	0.18	1.51	0.48					0.11	0.25	0.85	1.15
Aswan	0.62	0.26	<i>1.15</i>	0.72					-0.24	0.32	-0.74	1.11
Luxor	0.63	0.20	0.53	0.52					-0.19	0.27	-0.80	1.17
Red sea	0.83	0.28	0.30	0.74	0.88	0.28	0.30	0.74				
El-wadi El-gidid	0.96	0.31	1.99	0.54	1.00	0.31	1.97	0.54				
Matrouh	-0.05	0.21	0.49	0.58	-0.06	0.21	0.42	0.59				
North Sinai	0.18	0.22	<i>1.31</i>	0.76	0.20	0.22	<i>1.34</i>	0.78				
South Sinai	0.82	0.35	<i>1.37</i>	0.71	0.82	0.35	<i>1.30</i>	0.72				
Helwan	<i>0.42</i>	0.25	<i>0.85</i>	0.44	<i>0.44</i>	0.25	<i>0.87</i>	0.45				
6 of October	0.57	0.18	1.70	0.51	0.57	0.19	1.70	0.53				
Intercept	-1.05	0.18	-1.48	0.39	-1.09	0.21	-1.35	0.46	-0.19	0.35	-1.20	1.27
n	2515		527		1968		439		544		86	
LR test	268.0		145.6		110.6		125.6		42.4		22.7	
Pseudo-R-Squared	0.102		0.208		0.063		0.218		0.058		0.190	

Notes: 1) Statistical significance of coefficients and other tests indicated where relevant as follows: plain text for $p > .10$; *italics for* $.10 > p > .05$. **bold text for** $.05 > p > .01$; and ***bold and italics for*** $p < .01$.
2) Excluded categories: Aged 15-17, illiterate, lowest wealth quintile, Urban residence, Cairo (for All Egypt. and _excluding Upper Egypt' estimations) and Beni Suf (for upper Egypt estimations).

Table 18: Probit model of the probability of being in formal employment; employed 15-29 year olds who have left education.

	All Egypt				Excluding Upper Egypt				Upper Egypt			
	males		females		males		females		males		females	
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.
Aged 18-21	-0.33	0.21	-0.62	0.38	-0.33	0.23	-0.78	0.42	-0.41	0.57	-0.45	1.02
Aged 22-24	0.19	0.19	-0.25	0.37	0.14	0.21	-0.38	0.41	0.45	0.51	-0.17	0.95
Aged 25-29	0.57	0.19	0.15	0.36	0.48	0.21	0.11	0.40	1.02	0.49	-0.27	0.94
Can read Only	0.65	0.37			0.66	0.38						
Primary	0.32	0.20	-0.05	0.60	0.35	0.21	-0.20	0.63				
Preparatory	0.36	0.17	0.52	0.39	0.29	0.19	0.51	0.43	0.66	0.41		
Vocational	0.84	0.15	1.29	0.29	0.85	0.16	1.16	0.33	0.83	0.37	1.90	0.78
General Secondary	0.34	0.35	2.09	1.06	0.37	0.36	2.00	1.12				
Intermediate	1.43	0.20	1.88	0.41	1.42	0.22	1.75	0.45	1.58	0.55		
University	1.58	0.17	2.20	0.34	1.46	0.18	2.08	0.38	2.17	0.41	2.82	0.87
Wealth Quintile 2	0.30	0.13	0.28	0.28	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.33	0.55	0.24	0.63	0.72
Wealth Quintile 3	0.39	0.13	0.84	0.28	0.35	0.15	0.87	0.32	0.39	0.25	0.39	0.66
Wealth Quintile 4	0.56	0.13	0.95	0.30	0.49	0.15	1.06	0.34	0.63	0.31	0.19	0.81
Top Wealth Quintile	0.67	0.15	1.05	0.34	0.66	0.17	1.11	0.37	0.73	0.47	0.57	0.93
Rural residence	0.06	0.10	0.41	0.25	0.10	0.12	0.45	0.29	-0.05	0.22	0.46	0.59
Slum residence	-0.20	0.13	0.11	0.29	-0.18	0.14	0.02	0.31	-0.16	0.40	0.64	0.92
Alexandria	-0.29	0.16	0.16	0.28	-0.29	0.16	0.16	0.28				
Port-said	-0.33	0.49	-0.15	0.59	-0.33	0.48	-0.17	0.59				
Suez	0.82	0.27	0.30	0.58	0.79	0.27	0.31	0.58				
Damietta	-1.12	0.42	1.53	0.72	-1.15	0.41	1.69	0.76				
Dakahlia	-0.40	0.19	0.04	0.36	-0.44	0.20	0.07	0.38				
Sharkia	-0.23	0.17	0.37	0.34	-0.26	0.18	0.39	0.35				
Kalyoubia	0.27	0.17	0.24	0.33	0.22	0.18	0.24	0.34				
Kafr-elsheikh	-0.11	0.22	-0.44	0.40	-0.17	0.23	-0.40	0.42				
Gharbia	-0.14	0.17	0.55	0.33	-0.18	0.18	0.58	0.35				
Menoufia	0.05	0.17	0.92	0.38	0.00	0.17	0.91	0.40				
Behera	-0.17	0.19	0.59	0.45	-0.24	0.20	0.65	0.47				
Ismailia	-0.39	0.38	0.50	0.73	-0.44	0.38	0.54	0.73				
Giza	-0.38	0.22	0.64	0.60	-0.38	0.22	0.64	0.61				
Beni Suf	-0.75	0.37	0.19	0.49								
Fayoum	-0.31	0.28	0.35	0.54					0.56	0.46	0.49	0.78
Menia	-0.28	0.22	0.71	0.45					0.55	0.41	0.44	0.72
Assiut	0.47	0.21	0.99	0.52					1.42	0.40	0.92	0.81
Suhag	0.06	0.25	0.91	0.65					1.00	0.43	1.20	0.89
	-0.30	0.21	0.56	0.62					0.60	0.40	0.60	0.91
Aswan	-0.45	0.35	0.63	0.73					0.47	0.54	0.44	1.19
Luxor	0.01	0.21	-0.19	0.47					0.97	0.41	-0.09	0.82
Red sea	-0.18	0.28	0.33	0.80	-0.20	0.28	0.33	0.80				
El-wadi El-gidid	-0.09	0.35			-0.13	0.34						
Matrouh	0.23	0.20	-0.14	0.70	0.19	0.20	-0.10	0.70				
North Sinai	-0.11	0.22	0.65	0.85	-0.17	0.22	0.66	0.87				
South Sinai	0.35	0.40	1.37	0.88	0.33	0.40	1.37	0.87				
Helwan	0.37	0.24	0.26	0.46	0.34	0.24	0.23	0.47				
6 of October	-0.06	0.19	0.48	0.57	-0.09	0.19	0.54	0.59				

Intercept	-2.32	0.26	-2.38	0.47	-2.17	0.28	-2.23	0.55	-3.24	0.73	-2.04	1.19
n	2515		521		1968		433		521		82	
LR test	<i>613.1</i>		<i>255.4</i>		<i>452.5</i>		<i>209.6</i>		<i>165.3</i>		<i>48.7</i>	
Pseudo-R-Squared	0.243		0.355		0.221		0.350		0.357		0.435	

Notes: 1) Statistical significance of coefficients and other tests indicated where relevant as follows: plain text for $p > .10$; *italics for* $.10 > p > .05$. **bold text for** $.05 > p > .01$; and ***bold and italics for*** $p < .01$.
2) Excluded categories: Aged 15-17, illiterate, lowest wealth quintile, Urban residence, Cairo (for All Egypt. and _excluding Upper Egypt' estimations) and Beni Suef (for upper Egypt estimations).

Table 19: Returns to education; employed 15-29 year olds corrected for selection into employment.

	All Egypt				Excluding Upper Egypt				Upper Egypt			
	males		females		males		females		males		females	
	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.	Coeff.	Std. Err.
Potential Experience/100	<i>0.29</i>	0.09	<i>0.80</i>	0.23	<i>0.30</i>	0.10	<i>1.05</i>	0.26	0.33	0.21	-0.25	0.49
Potential Experience squared/10000	<i>-0.09</i>	0.04	<i>-0.28</i>	0.15	<i>-0.09</i>	0.05	<i>-0.40</i>	0.18	-0.12	0.11	0.14	0.29
Can read Only	0.14	0.17	1.19	0.80	0.26	0.19	0.95	0.82	-0.50	0.41	n.i.	
Primary	0.09	0.07	<i>0.72</i>	0.26	0.10	0.08	<i>0.61</i>	0.29	0.03	0.20	n.i.	
Preparatory	0.09	0.06	0.17	0.23	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.25	0.15	0.13	<i>1.81</i>	0.75
Vocational	<i>0.09</i>	0.05	<i>0.49</i>	0.18	0.08	0.06	<i>0.45</i>	0.21	0.11	0.12	-0.14	0.35
General Secondary	0.20	0.14	-0.25	0.80	0.08	0.15	-0.48	0.81	<i>0.88</i>	0.36	n.i.	
Intermediate	0.13	0.10	<i>1.11</i>	0.27	0.14	0.11	<i>1.01</i>	0.30	-0.06	0.27	0.77	0.53
University	<i>0.24</i>	0.07	<i>1.55</i>	0.23	<i>0.26</i>	0.08	<i>1.47</i>	0.25	0.10	0.16	0.23	0.39
Wealth Quintile 2	0.05	0.05	-0.08	0.17	0.10	0.06	<i>-0.34</i>	0.20	-0.07	0.10	0.21	0.35
Wealth Quintile 3	0.05	0.05	-0.21	0.17	0.04	0.06	<i>-0.47</i>	0.20	0.11	0.11	-0.04	0.34
Wealth Quintile 4	0.06	0.06	-0.18	0.18	<i>0.10</i>	0.06	<i>-0.45</i>	0.21	-0.12	0.14	-0.09	0.37
Top wealth Quintile	<i>0.18</i>	0.07	0.25	0.20	<i>0.18</i>	0.08	-0.02	0.23	<i>0.40</i>	0.23	0.28	0.38
Rural residence	-0.05	0.04	<i>-0.25</i>	0.11	<i>-0.11</i>	0.04	<i>-0.28</i>	0.13	<i>0.25</i>	0.09	0.27	0.23
Informal/Slum residence	<i>-0.11</i>	0.05	<i>-0.27</i>	0.16	<i>-0.16</i>	0.06	<i>-0.37</i>	0.18	<i>0.31</i>	0.15	0.16	0.31
Intercept	<i>0.59</i>	0.08	<i>-2.20</i>	0.27	<i>0.58</i>	0.10	<i>-2.00</i>	0.28	<i>0.65</i>	0.22	0.46	0.34
n	1985		452		1591		382		394		70	
Wald test of joint significance of coefficients	<i>57.2</i>		<i>181.4</i>		<i>64.7</i>		<i>171.0</i>		<i>28.4</i>		18.5	
Rho	-0.01		<i>0.90</i>		0.05		<i>0.92</i>		-0.39		-0.37	
LR test of independence	0.02		<i>35.6</i>		0.10		49.8		3.22		0.40	

Notes: 1) Statistical significance of coefficients and other tests indicated where relevant as follows: plain text for $p > .10$; *italics for* $.10 > p > .05$. **bold text for** $.05 > p > .01$; and *bold and italics for* $p < .01$.

2) Excluded categories: Aged 15-17, illiterate, lowest wealth quintile, Urban residence, (no governorate fixed effects).

3) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wages.

Table 20: Ordered Probit Model of Duration of Transition, Upper Egypt

Variables	Duration of Transition
Age groups <i>Reference: 15-17</i>	
18-21	0.5761*** (0.1896)
22-24	1.5219*** (0.1950)
25-29	1.7029*** (0.1948)
Education <i>Reference: No education</i>	
Basic education	0.1555 (0.1990)
Secondary education	0.7657*** (0.1619)
Post-secondary education	0.5051** (0.2458)
University and above education	1.7320*** (0.2382)
Governorate <i>Reference: Beni Suef</i>	
Fayoum	0.5548** (0.2352)
Menia	0.0847 (0.1968)
Assiut	0.3612* (0.2192)
Sohag	0.1243 (0.2261)
	0.4411** (0.2004)
Wealth <i>Reference: first quintile</i>	
Second quintile	-0.1748 (0.1447)
Third quintile	-0.1553 (0.1425)
Fourth quintile	0.0167 (0.1946)
Highest quintile	0.1584 (0.3082)
Sex <i>Reference: Female</i>	
Males	0.0613 (0.1422)
Urban/Rural residency <i>Reference: Rural</i>	
Urban	-0.0855 (0.1226)
Constant 1	0.9139*** (0.2908)
Constant 2	1.1465*** (0.2840)
Constant 3	1.9309*** (0.2829)
Constant 4	2.5003*** (0.2879)
Observations	611

Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 21 Multinomial Logit of Type of Employment – Males and Females, Rural Upper Egypt

Explanatory variables	Males			Females		
	Paid non-agricultural Employment	Paid agricultural employment	Unpaid Family Work	Paid non-agricultural Employment	Paid agricultural employment	Unpaid Family Work
Age groups <i>Reference: 15-17</i>						
18-21	1.8956*** (0.3691)	0.9318** (0.4447)	0.0911 (0.5337)	-0.9061 (0.9044)	-1.7950** (0.8414)	-38.9906*** (0.8611)
22-24	2.7381*** (0.4181)	1.7033*** (0.4800)	1.1643* (0.5959)	-0.2673 (0.8250)	-0.4566 (0.7189)	-38.1165*** (1.3440)
25-29	3.6842*** (0.4148)	2.2453*** (0.5005)	1.3330** (0.6089)	1.1188 (0.7310)	-2.0022** (0.8618)	1.2598 (1.1832)
Education <i>Reference: no education</i>						
Basic education	-0.8045** (0.3935)	-1.6376*** (0.4700)	0.0580 (0.7861)	-1.1107 (1.0003)	-1.9799** (0.8326)	1.6032 (1.1914)
Secondary education	-0.8045** (0.3840)	-0.9071** (0.3797)	0.3273 (0.8590)	1.8745*** (0.5301)	-39.2306*** (0.5004)	-37.5511*** (1.0438)
Post-secondary education	0.0424 (0.6902)	-1.1638 (1.2932)	-30.4087*** (1.1497)	2.6538** (1.2531)	2.2097* (1.2556)	-38.9872*** (1.5283)
University and above education	-0.1957 (0.5621)	-2.1039** (0.9190)	1.4557 (1.1578)	5.0529*** (0.7457)	-42.4010 (0.0000)	-39.8017 (0.0000)
Governorate <i>Reference: Beni Suef</i>						
Fayoum	0.6678 (0.4734)	0.2258 (0.6111)	2.0426** (0.8569)	-0.1450 (0.7136)	-0.8059 (0.8097)	-40.6942*** (0.8479)
Menia	0.4476 (0.4080)	1.0867** (0.5145)	0.4010 (0.9830)	0.0186 (0.6934)	-0.7030 (0.6845)	-0.2803 (1.0403)
Assiut	0.7023 (0.4309)	-0.2944 (0.6262)	-0.0056 (1.0414)	0.0030 (0.6996)	-40.7313*** (0.6028)	-40.5777*** (0.9090)
Sohag	-0.9354** (0.4768)	-0.3053 (0.5899)	0.5772 (0.9641)	-2.7251* (1.5040)	-1.3336 (0.9325)	-40.6366*** (0.8536)
Aswan	1.0587** (0.4117)	0.3853 (0.5329)	2.8674*** (0.7632)	-1.2694 (0.7724)	-40.7016*** (0.5810)	-41.2981*** (0.8411)
Luxor	-0.5314 (0.5632)	0.9384 (0.6059)	0.7298 (1.0045)	-1.4354 (0.9923)	-39.9905*** (0.7441)	-40.9976*** (0.9036)
Wealth <i>reference: first quintile</i>						
Second quintile	0.0695 (0.2621)	-0.3119 (0.3002)	0.1662 (0.4357)	-0.2601 (0.5578)	-2.2379** (1.0703)	22.4087 (0.0000)
Third quintile	0.1406 (0.2716)	-0.8429** (0.3417)	-0.3222 (0.4845)	-0.2560 (0.6150)	-40.2225*** (0.4824)	-18.1579*** (0.6375)
Fourth quintile	-0.7386 (0.4576)	-2.4641*** (0.8008)	0.2574 (0.6656)	-0.7941 (0.7243)	-40.8592*** (0.9308)	-18.2309*** (0.7696)
Highest quintile	0.5909 (0.7537)	-31.4276*** (0.6307)	0.7537 (1.3007)	-1.2093 (0.9801)	-38.8868*** (1.3037)	-18.9292*** (1.3034)
Constant	-2.5094*** (0.5783)	-1.4921** (0.6778)	-4.5591*** (1.0603)	-4.4581*** (0.9576)	-0.9618 (0.7013)	-26.1818*** (1.3798)
Observations	860	860	860	1,291	1,291	1,291

Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 22: Determinants of Staying Healthy, involvement in Voluntary Services and Civic Participation

Variables	Health Status Perception (1)	Voluntary Service (2)	Civic Participation (3)
Gender <i>Reference: Female</i>			
Males	0.2960*** -0.0442	0.6214*** -0.1104	0.3445*** -0.0931
Age groups <i>Reference: 10-14</i>			
15-17	0.0675 -0.0675	0.4493** -0.203	-0.1722 -0.1315
18-21	-0.1033 -0.071	0.5351** -0.2142	-0.3611** -0.1812
22-24	-0.1785** -0.0806	0.7067*** -0.2361	-0.4350* -0.2258
25-29	-0.1138 -0.0724	0.6571*** -0.2134	-0.7603*** -0.2163
Education <i>Reference: No Education</i>			
Basic education	0.1034* -0.0572	0.6907*** -0.2337	0.3411** -0.1382
Secondary education	0.0605 -0.0686	0.8837*** -0.26	0.4648** -0.2214
Post-secondary education	0.3585 -0.2642	1.8851*** -0.4113	0.3588 -0.5007
University and above education	0.1938 -0.1284	1.0351*** -0.2994	0.7564*** -0.2881
Disability <i>Reference: Not Disabled</i>			
Disabled	-1.6840*** -0.2328		
Urban/Rural residency <i>Reference: Rural</i>			
Urban	0.0696 -0.0567	-0.0174 -0.1349	0.1835 -0.1239
Governorate <i>Reference: Beni Suef</i>			
Fayoum	-0.1174 -0.0929	-0.233 -0.2937	-0.4760** -0.1918
Menia	0.1037 -0.0821	-0.3586 -0.2831	-0.6218*** -0.1821
Assiut	0.2198** -0.0911	0.107 -0.2449	0.2017 -0.1531
Suhag	0.2256** -0.0885	0.8000*** -0.2173	-0.2358 -0.1701
	0.3421*** -0.0857	0.0021 -0.2406	-0.6027*** -0.1852
Aswan	0.1459 -0.1035	0.6460*** -0.2385	-0.4793* -0.2617
Luxor	0.2772*** -0.1059	0.3647 -0.2458	-0.225 -0.2082
Wealth <i>Reference: First Quintile</i>			
Second quintile	0.0559 -0.0575	-0.0209 -0.1544	0.2944** -0.1448
Third quintile	0.0768 -0.0607	-0.1483 -0.1531	0.2533* -0.1475
Fourth quintile	0.1452* -0.0828	0.0593 -0.1844	0.6679*** -0.1551
Highest quintile	0.2428** -0.1154	0.7528*** -0.2164	1.1042*** -0.1892
Constant 1	-1.9278*** -0.1148	-3.7483*** -0.3513	-2.3836*** -0.2175
Constant 2	0.9305*** -0.1049		
Observations	4,135	4,135	4135

Annex 3: Qualitative Research Methodology

The qualitative element of the study comprised focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with different groups and individuals. Given that Upper Egypt is a fairly homogenous region in terms of culture, ethnicity and language, the study was conducted in the governorates of Menia and , selected to represent the region.

A. The transitions of young men and women residing in Upper Egypt

The focus groups and in-depth interviews were designed to explore the perspectives of the different categories of the population residing in communities of Upper Egypt. Individuals invited to take part in the research were a representative sample members of these groups of populations.

Sample Selection

Data collection was undertaken by a team of two consultants to ensure timely, accurate note taking and transcription of interviews. The consultants were assisted by facilitators affiliated with local NGO's that has previously collaborated with the Population Council, and enjoy strong ties to the community.

The consultants and facilitators were be responsible for:

- Identifying, selecting and recruiting participants for the focus group discussions and interviews according to the selection criteria.
- Explaining the objectives and structure of the study to the participants and other members of the community involved in the research.
- Selecting and arranging locations where the focus groups and interviews were conducted. These locations were selected so as to be easily accessible for participants, in a calm environment and to allow for participants' freedom of expression.
- Consultants were responsible for transcribing the data promptly following every discussion or interview. A copy of the transcribed data was shared with the World Bank at the end of the data collection process.

Locations:

The two governorates selected as representative of the region were and Menia. This selection was based on the following variables:

a. Size of Population

Menia and are among the most populated governorates of Upper Egypt with populations reaching 4,308,400 and 3,209,982 respectively.

b. Engagement of young people and the general population during the uprisings in Egypt

Both Menia and saw thousands of demonstrators going out during the uprising in Egypt to express their demands. Strikes and demonstrations were still taking place till the end of February) with protesters demanding higher salaries and better living conditions.

c. Percentage of population residing in rural areas

The two governorates house the second highest percentages of rural population at 78.6% of the total population for both

d. Ranking of governorate on HDI scale

Both governorates are ranked among the lowest performers with Menia ranked at number 21 and at 18 out of 22 governorates ranked. The governorate in which the pilot testing was carried out ranked 22 on the HDI scale.

e. Net Rate of Migration

Both governorates are among the highest sources of internal migration to urban centers.

Population

Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were held with three categories of participants:

- Youth aged 15-29, including young people of both genders, different educational levels and employment situation and including mainstream and marginalized groups
- Parents of young people in this age range (not parents of the young people participating in our research)
- Service providers engaged with youth in this age range from both government and non government institutions.

a. Focus Group Discussions:

The total number of focus groups was 33 (including pilot testing and data collection). Each group included with 6 to 10 participants each, 8 being the ideal number of participants. Each focus group should last for 90-120 minutes. A total of 4 focus groups with parents of youth aged 15-29 will take place. To ensure privacy and freedom of expression, these will not be parents of young people that have participated in our study.

b. In-depth Interviews:

The total number of in-depth interviews was 18 (including pilot testing and data collection). Each interview lasted for 60-90 minutes. In-depth interviews were also conducted with service providers working in these communities. Providers are affiliated with government institutions as well as non-government organizations. Four interviews were conducted with NGO representatives from local NGOs working and closely interacting with the local community. Two interviews were conducted with government officials from government institutions targeting youth (e.g. Youth councils). One official was interviewed in each governorate.

Pilot testing of the research tools:

Prior to the data collection, tools were tested in Fayoum in order to assess, and revise if necessary, the questionnaires and guides. Fayoum was selected for the following reasons:

- it is representative of the region as it displays similar characteristics and indicators.
- Fayoum is in close proximity to Cairo, making the testing and revising process more time efficient.
- Fayoum ranked 22 on the HDI scale.
- The Population Council enjoys a strong presence in and connection to the community there which served to ease the first stage of the research.

Break Down of conducted FGDs and In-depth Interviews by location

	Category		Gender	R/U	Location	Place	Particip ants
1	In School	FGD	Female	Rural	Menia (Abu Gorgas)	Risalet Al- Nour NGO	9
2	In School	FGD	Female	Urban	Menia (Bani Mazar)	Al-Ragaa Coptic NGO	7
3	Unemployed	FGD	Female	Rural	Balansoura Village/Abu Gorgas/ Menia	Illiteracy class balansoura	8
4	Unemployed	FGD	Female	Urban	Menia/ Abu Gorgas	Risalet Nour NGO	7
5	Employed	FGD	Male	Rural	Itsa village/Samalou d/Menia	Islamic NGO for Development and Enviro.	8
6	Employed	FGD	Male	Urban	Menia (bani Mazar)	Al-Ragaa Coptic NGO	6
7	Out of school	FGD	Male	Rural	Al-Awam Satelite/ Menia	House of a teacher	8
8	Out of school	FGD	Male	Urban	Matay/Menia	Women Social Development NGO	7
9	Mothers	FGD		Rural	Itsa village/Samalou d/Menia	Islamic NGO for Development and Enviro.	9
10	Mothers	FGD		Urban	Matay/Menia	Women Social Development NGO	8

11	Female	IDI		Rural	Bani Ebeid Village/Menia	Jesuits NGO	1
12	Female	IDI		Urban	Bani Mazar/Menia	Al-Ragaa Coptic NGO	1
13	Male	IDI		Rural	Nazlet Amoudein Village/Samalout/Menia	Jesuits NGO	1
14	Male	IDI		Urban	Menia	Jesuits NGO	1
15	NGO Rep	IDI	Male	Rural	Al-Raeii For Community Development NGO	Jesuits NGO	1
16	NGO Rep.	IDI	Male	Urban	Women Social Development NGO	Women Social Development NGO	1
17	Gov. Official	IDI	Male		Employee in Youth Management Unit/Menia	Jesuits NGO	1
18	In-School	FGD	Female	Rural	Abou Seer Village-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Abou Seer Youth Center	7
19	In-School	FGD	Male	Rural	Abou Seer Village-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Abou Seer Youth Center	9
20	In-School (University)	FGD	Male	Rural	Kahk Kably-Youssef Al Sedek-Al Fayoum	Kahk Kably Services Center	7
21	Out-of School	FGD	Female	Rural	Gaafara-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Gaafara Youth Center	8

22	Out-of School	FGD	Male	Rural	Gaafara-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Gaafara Youth Center	9
23	Employed	FGD	Female	Rural	Kalamshah Village-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Kalamshah Youth Center	7
24	Employed	FGD	Male	Rural	Kalamshah Village-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Kalamshah Youth Center	8
25	Unemployed	FGD	Female	Rural	Maasaratt Arafa Village-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Maasaratt Arafa Youth Center	11
26	Unemployed	FGD	Male	Rural	Maasaratt Arafa Village-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Maasaratt Arafa Youth Center	7
27	Mothers	FGD		Rural	Abou Seer Village-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Abou Seer Youth Center	6
28	Fathers	FGD		Rural	Kahk Kably-Youssef Al Sedek-Al Fayoum	Kahk Kably Services Center	7
29	Male	IDI	Male	Rural	Kalamshah Village-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Kalamshah Youth Center	1
30	Female	IDI	Female	Rural	Gaafara-Etsa-Al Fayoum	Gaafara Youth Center	1
31	NGO Rep.	IDI	Male	Rural	Al-Awni NGO, Youssef Sedik, Fayoum	Kahk Kably Services Center	1
32	Gov. Official	IDI	Male		Employee in Youth Centers Management Unit/Fayoum	Gaafara Youth Center	1
33	In-School	FGD	Rural	Male	Kom El-Dab'a	Kom El-Dab'a	7

					Village/Nagada/	NGO	
34	In- School	FGD	urban	Male	Naga Hamadi/	Cultural Palace Naga Hamadi	8
35	Out-of School	FGD	Rural	Female	Various Villages/ Naga Hamadi/	Cultural Palace Naga Hamadi	8
36	Out of School	FGD	Urban	Female	El-Shoun/	House of one participant	6
37	Employed	FGD	Rural	Female	Hagaza Village/Qous/	Women Development Association	11
38	Employed	FGD	Rural	Female	Hagaza Kibli Village/Qous/	Abu El-Kassem School	9
39	Employed	FGD	Urban	Female	Nagada/	A private school in Nagada	11
40	Unemployed	FGD	Rural	Male	Abu Tisht Village/Abu Tisht/	Abu Tisht Development NGO	7
41	Unemployed	FGD	Urban	Male	Qous/	City Council Hall	7
42	Fathers	FGD	Rural	Male	City	Together for Developing Egypt NGO (TDE NGO), City	8
43	Fathers	FGD	Urban		Kom El-Dab'a Village/Nagada/	Kom El-Dab'a NGO	8
44	Male	IDI	Rural		Abu Tisht village/Abu Tishti/	Health Unit	1
45	Male	IDI	Urban		City	Together for Developing	1

						Egypt NGO	
46	Female	IDI	Rural		AlQinawiya Village/		1
47	Female	IDI	Urban		Naga Hamadi/	Cultural Palace Naga Hamadi	1
48	NGO rep	IDI	Rural	Male	Sheikh Eissa Development NGO/	TDE NGO	1
49	NGO Rep	IDI	Urban	Male	Youth Population and Development NGO/	TDE NGO	1
50	Gov. Official	IDI		Male	Director Youth Directorate, Governorate	TDE NGO	1

Questionnaire Guide

1. How would you rate the quality of the education you have received to date? In what way has it prepared you for the work market? How can it be improved?
2. What are the problems you have face as you have finished or left school and sought work? (gender, parents, marriage, disability..)
 - a. What are the problems that youth face when they seek employment?
 - b. What do you think are the problems you will face as you finish school and seek employment?
 - c. Why wouldn't/didn't you continue your education after Secondary school
3. If not working: Have you tried searching for work? Where? What happened? What were the difficulties?
4. What types of work opportunities are available in your community, district, governorate, general? What kind of skills do these jobs require?
5. Is it easier for girls to find jobs or is it easier for boys? In which fields? Why/how come? What are some obstacles to girls getting employment? (marriage, distance...etc.)
 - a. Does the type of employment affect a husband/father decision to allow his wife/daughter to continue working? Which types are OK and which are not?
6. Can Education Be an obstacle to employment? Having a higher education makes it harder to finding employment? (Yes/No) Why?
 - a. Who finds work easier highly educated or middle education?

- b. Do girls who obtain Secondary and/or vocational secondary education suffer from specific problems?
 - c. Can you continue high education after the vocational secondary level?
7. Is your community involved in agriculture? If yes, how? What support do farmers need in your opinion? (Probe for different types of services and support. Do young people want to be involved in Agri?)
 - a. Do youth want to work in agriculture? Yes/no? why? How can the situation be improved?
 - b. Why do youth want to work in government?
8. What sort of training programs are offered? How useful are they? What other training programs do u think are important to help you in the job market? And what are those jobs? Are they available?
9. What is the best way of finding a job and which method(s) did (or will) you use (e.g. family connections & friends, employment offices, newspapers). Does coming from a wealthy family affect job opportunities?
 - a. What are the problems with employment offices?
 - b. Do you do (or think you will be able to do) a job that you would like to do or do you have to accept what you can get? What are the constraints (e.g. family, lack of employment opportunities in the area etc..)?
10. In the absence of employment opportunities and lack of interest in agriculture, why aren't youth thinking about starting their own businesses/projects? What are the obstacles?
11. There is an idea that education with vocational training can be a good way to finding employment? How do you feel about this? (Asked in Fayoum)
12. Question: if we were to start a project here would you rather it be micro-credit, volunteer against a financial reward, or vocational training against a fee paid to you (Asked in Fayoum)?
13. In Comparison to your mothers/fathers situation when they were your age who is in a better position? (in comparasion to your sons and daughters for mothers and fathers)
14. What services are available in your community? (probing: schools, bread distribution, health care, social services, for women gynecological and pre-natal care also important paperwork, ID's) and who provides these (probe on organization that provides necessities replacing government role)? What services are available to youth in particular if any?
15. Which of those services do you have access to and use? Why/why not? What is the main problem with these services? Ask about quality of services provided by the gvmt vs. services provided by other organizations. How can they be improved
16. Are there community service associations in your community (formal NGOs, CDAs, Church or mosque groups, volunteer efforts)? What kind of services do they provide? Do you use these services? Why/why not?
17. What services are necessary but are lacking in your community? Who should be providing them?
18. WHAT is a civic organization? What is community participation? is Are you or anyone you know a member in a civic organization (NGO, CDA, school board of trustees, parents councils at schools, local council, political party) Why/why not? What is your (or their role in this organization)? organization (NGO, CDA, school board of trustees,

- parents councils at schools, local council, political party) Why/why not? What is your (or their role in this organization)?
19. Would you like to play a role in your community? Why? Why not? What are the Obstacles? What are the things that help you to participate in civil society? [Probe, if necessary: community participation, governance at any level.] What are the obstacles to participation?
 20. Who participates more boys or girls? Why what are the obstacles to girls participation in community?
 21. Do you feel that after 25th January your voice will be heard more? Will you participate more? What are the obstacles 15 (Asked to Fayoum Girls)?
 22. What do you think about the January 25th Events? Are they good/bad? Why? Why not? (do they provide opportunities or threats what are they)
 23. Did you or someone you know took part/participated in any way? How? What did they tell you? Why didn't we participate?
 24. What is needed to continue participating in the community?
 25. What is your vision for your community in 2015? [Probe, if necessary: economics, social life generally, including family, health of the people, involvement of the people in their community and in governance. Is this vision easy or difficult to achieve? Why? How come? What is required?
 26. Whose role is it to achieve this vision? Which are the government responsibility? Which are the communities?
 27. What is your personal responsibility towards achieving this vision?
 28. How can we overcome the obstacles in this vision?
 29. Who finds employment easier Muslims or Christians? Or does it make a difference? Why? How come? What do you think about that?