CONFLICT PREVENTION AND (basAl POT-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION WO RLD0 BAN K Sida December 2000| : ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A ,~~~~~~~~~~~7~ CONFLICT PREVENTION AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION Colombia Essays on Conflict, Peace, and Development Andres Solimano Editor President Andres Pastrana Foreword The World Bank Washington, D.C. ( 2000 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, USA All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printing December 2000 The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this book are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the coun- tries they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. 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THE AUTHORS Andres Pastrana President of Colombia Andres Solimano World Bank Caroline Moser Overseas Development Institute London, England Cecilia L6pez Montafno Former Planning Minister, Colombia Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean, United Nations Arturo Garcia Duran Consultant Nat Colletta World Bank Markus Kostner World Bank Patricia Cleves World Bank Johanna Mendelson World Bank iii CONTENTS The Authors ...................................... iii Foreword ...................................... ix Andris Pastrana, President of Colombia Acknowledgments ...................................... xi List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ...................................... xiii Chapter 1 Introduction and Synthesis .......................................1 Andres Solimano Economic and Social Policies for Peace ....................................................2 Financing Pro-Peace Policies .......3.....3 Institutions, Actors, and a New Social Contract .......4......4 Peace as a Global Public Good: The Role of the International Community .....................................................5 Plan of the Book ...................................6........... ........6 Conclusions ........... .....7 Chapter 2 Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital .....9 Caroline Moser Introduction .......9.......................................................... ........... ......9 A Conceptual Framework for Categorizing Violence in Colombia ... 11 A Threefold Categorization: Political, Economic, and Social Violence ................................................................................................... 11 Categorizing Violence Trends in Colombia ............... ............ 13 The Causes of Violence in Colombia .18 An Integrated Framework of Causality .... 18 The Causes of Violence in Colombia ................................................. 19 v vi COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Costs of Violence in Colombia: Capital and Associated Asset Erosion ............................................... 25 Macroeconomic Costs of Violence .............................................. 28 Violence and the Erosion of Physical Capital ................................... 29 Violence and the Erosion of Human Capital .................................... 31 Violence and the Erosion of Social Capital ....................................... 32 Violence and the Erosion of Natural Capital .................................... 35 Interventions to Reduce Violence ............................................... 36 An Integrated Framework for Intervention ...................................... 36 Interventions to Address Political Violence and Negotiate Peace in Colombia ............................................... 40 Interventions to Reduce Economic and Social Violence in Colombia .............................................. 45 Recommendations: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital ..................................... . 50 Introduction: President Pastrana's Mission ..................................... 50 Basic Principles for a National Strategy for Peace and Development ................................... 51 Components of a National Strategy for Peace and Development .................................. 52 Appendix 2.1 Various Disciplinary Perspectives on Violence Causality ....................... 62 Appendix 2.2 Summary: Main Social Agents Involved in Political Violence in Colombia, 1948-98 ..................... 64 Appendix 2.3 Interventions to Reduce Economic Violence in Colombia ............................. 66 Appendix 2.4 Interventions to Reduce Social Violence in Columbia ............................................. 68 References and Bibliography ............................................. 70 Chapter 3 The Hidden Costs of Peace in Colombia . ................................ 78 Cecilia L6pez MontaFio-Arturo Garcid Durdn Introduction .............................................. 78 Historical Background ............................................. 80 Central America's Experience ............................................. 80 Colombia's Experience ............................................. 81 Three Great Myths .............................................. 85 The Myth of a Political Democracy ............................................. 86 The Myth of a Sound Economy ............................................. 88 The Myth of Poverty as a Main Cause of Violence .......................... 90 Peace Policies ............................................. 91 About the Peace Process ............................................. 91 CONTENTS vii Crucial Stages in a Peace Process .................................................. 91 First Stage: Consensus Building .................................................. 92 Second Stage: Structural Changes .................................................. 98 Third Stage: Process Sustainability .................................................. 106 The Costs of War and Peace: Background and Perspectives ............ 107 The Costs of Armed Conflict .................................................. 108 The Costs of Peace .................................................. 109 Economic Background of Peace Accords in Central America and Colombia ........................ . 112 Possible Economic Consequences of a Peace Accord in Colombia .......................... 115 Final Reflections on War and Peace .......................... 117 Appendix 3.1 Peace Accords in Central America .............................. 120 Appendix 3.2 Peace Accords in Colombia .......................................... 135 Appendix 3.3 Proposals by the Actors in the Conflict in Colombia .................................................... 147 References and Bibliography .................................................... 155 Chapter 4 Toward an Architecture for Sustainable Peace and Development: Lessons from the World Bank's Experience ........................................... 159 Nat Colletta-Markus Kostner-Patricia Cleves-Johantia Mendelson Prologue: A Regional Perspective and a Conceptual Framework .................................................... 159 A Conceptual Framework .................................................... 161 Making Peace .................................................... 163 Before the Guns Fall Silent .................................................... 163 Peace as a Multifaceted Process .................................................... 165 International Support for National Processes ................................. 167 Economics of Peacemaking .................................................... 168 Appropriating Peace .................................................... 170 Participation of Civil Society .................................................... 170 The Empowerment of Civil Society and Decentralization ........... 172 Capacity Building .................................................... 173 Supporting Peace .................................................... 174 A Framework for Transition Interventions ..................................... 175 Principles for International Cooperation ......................................... 177 Financing Reconstruction .................................................... 178 Sustaining Peace .................................................... 179 Toward Inclusive Reconstruction and Development .................... 180 Private Sector Development and Employment Generation ......... 182 Reintegration of Displaced Persons ................................................. 186 Demining and Disarmament .................................................... 188 viii COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Soldiers ................. 189 Promoting Justice and Reconciliation ............................................ 190 Conclusions ........................................... 192 References and Bibliography ............................................ 193 FOREWORD Today there are few certainties about the best way to assure our people's progress. Ideologies offer no secure formulas for individual or collective welfare. Despite this crisis in ideologies, ideas have never been more urgently needed than today. A free, mature, and informed debate of ideas is essential for opening doors to new and creative paths into the future. On our journey into the twenty-first century, we cannot carry the heavy baggage of violence and social structures that perpetuate inequality, exclusion, injustice, and violations of human dignity. At the dawn of the new millennium, it is up to us to take on the chal- lenge of establishing democracy, social justice, human rights, environ- mental protection, and human security-all elements of authentic human development. They are also the political foundations for a lasting and sta- ble peace, bound to the ideal of respect for people as individuals, the beginning and end of all social action. This is the perspective I have stressed in Colombia's peace policy. The reconciliation process must be the stage for restoring material and spiri- tual well-being to all Colombians. We will not achieve this merely by silencing weapons but by transforming the economic, political, and social structures that delay our access to the benefits of development. Just as peace is much more than the absence of war, achieving peace is a job that must involve our entire society, not only the people directly involved in the process of resolving armed conflict. In our times, no one can assume the right to be "the voice of those who have no voice." Peace is also a commitment to democratic participation. We have to understand that there can be no peace without develop- ment-but also that there can be no development without democracy. We must incorporate this understanding in all our economic and social investment plans and programs, public and private, both as instruments for expanding opportunities for material progress and as a vehicle for social understanding through the collective and shared definition of the Nation's highest goals. This is, without a doubt, the most pressing demand of our times. ix x COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Colombia has taken, in the past, an active part in building peace in the Western Hemisphere. It has done so through its political support and backing for such significant Latin American peace initiatives as the Contadora Group for Central America and the Esquipulas II Accord, and as a supporter nation to the peace processes in El Salvador and Guatemala. These peace initiatives were recognized for having set ambi- tious goals, not only in economic matters by reclaiming a region battered by violence but also by democratizing and demilitarizing society, pro- tecting human rights, and reviving plans for regional economic integra- tion. The 1984 reform of the Charter of the Organization of American States also originated in those mechanisms. The charter, signed in the Colombian City of Cartagena de Indias, confirmed the American States' obligation to be representative democracies. These efforts also resulted in the Rio Group, which is unquestionably the most important political advisory mechanism in the Americas. The World Bank has collaborated continuously and decisively in all these processes with remarkable respect for national prerogatives and regional cooperative arrangements. As a technical and financial instru- ment of the international community, the World Bank deserves our thanks. It has been with us for momentous political decisions in the past as well as for the decisions we must soon make for our future success- in Colombia and throughout Latin America. ANDRS PASTRANA President of Colombia ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A purpose of this bookl is to present recent World Bank analytical work on the causes of violence and conflict in Colombia, highlighting pilot lending programs oriented to promote peace and development. The Bank's international experiences in post-conflict situations in different countries and their relevance for Colombia are also examined in this vol- ume. The identification of socioeconomic determinants of conflict, vio- lence, and reforms for peace came about as a key element of the World Bank's assistance strategy for Colombia, defined in conjunction with gov- ernment authorities and representatives of civil society. In the analytical field, emphasis has been placed on the need to com- bine knowledge about Colombia's reality with lessons stemming from situations of conflict and peace processes at international level. In the operational area of project design and implementation, the Bank has been working directly with the most vulnerable sectors and social orga- nizations in the areas of conflict under innovative projects that enable violence-torn communities to participate and benefit from productive projects. We would like to thank the United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA) for its financial contribution to the essay by Cecilia L6pez Montaino and Arturo Garcia Duran. The financial support provided by the Japanese government for some of the work conducive to this book and for the organization of seminars in Colombia and abroad, where these documents were discussed with representatives of civil society, academics, and government, was impor- tant in carrying out this effort. Wle also thank the representatives of the various social organizations that participated in lengthy discussions about these essays, especially the Permanent Assembly of the Civil Society for Peace, the Citizen Mandate for Peace, Redepaz, and the Network of Universities for Peace. We would also like to thank Carlos Alberto Garcia for his collaboration on the Spanish edition and Kathleen A. Lynch for her hard work editing the English version of this book. Felipe Saez's great support and knowledge of Colombia were invalu- able in making this publication possible. Mr. Saez represented the World Bank in Colombia in 1994-99, critical years of intensified conflict and This book is an English translation of the Spanish edition entitled <', 1999: World Bank, with some revisions and updating. Therefore, it may not fully coincide with the Spanish original text. xi xii COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT political tension. The generous editorial help and overall coordination given by Fiona Clark and Connie Luff, and other members of the Colombia Country Team, and the secretarial support given by Mirtyla Lane and Carolina Parodi at the World Bank are also greatly appreciated. We hope this book makes a useful contribution to the debate about strategies and programs that lead to lasting and sustainable peace in Colombia. LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADO Acci6n DemocrAtica Obrera [Democratic Workers Movementl ANUC Asociaci6n Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos [National Peasant Association] AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [United Self-Defense Organization of Colombia) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CEA Cese del Enfrentarniento Armado [End to the Armed Confrontation] CISALVA Centro de Investigaci6n, Salud y Violencia Copaz Comisi6n Nacional para la Consolidaci6n de la Paz [National Commission for Peace Consolidation] CONVIVIR Private Security Group CONPAPI Comisi6n Nacional de Politicas Indigenas [National Commission on Indigenous Policy] CRNV Centro de Referencia Nacional sobre Violencia CRS Corriente de Renovaci6n Socialista [Socialist Renovation Movement] DALYs disability-adjusted life years DANE Departamento de Administraci6n Nacional de Estadisticas [National Department for the Administration of Statistics] DESEPAZ Programa Desarrollo, Seguridad y Paz [Program for Development, Peace and Security] DGAI Direcci6n General de Asustos Indigenas [Office of Indigineous Affairs] DNP Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n [National Planning Department] ECLA Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ELN Ej6rcito de Liberaci6n Nacional [National Liberation Army] xiii xiv COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT EPL Ejercito Popular de Liberaci6n [Popular Liberation Army ] FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] FMLN Farabundo Martf National Liberation Front GDP gross domestic product GNP gross national product IFC International Finance Corporation M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril [Nineteenth of April Movement] MAQL Movimiento Armado Quintfn Lame [Quintfn Lame Armed Movement] MAS Muerte a los Secuestradores [Death to Kidnappers] MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Minugua Misi6n de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala [IJN Observers Mission in Guatemala] Miplan Ministry of Planning and Coordination of Economic and Social Development NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGOs nongovernmental organizations OAS Organization of American States Onusal Misi6n de Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador [UN Observers Mission in El Salvador] PNC Policfa Nacional Civil [Civil National Police] PNR Plan Nacional de Rehabilitaci6n [National Rehabilitation Plan] PRN Plan de Reconstrucci6n Nacional [National Reconstruction Plan] PRT Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores [Revolutionary Workers Party] Redepaz Red Nacional de Iniciativas por la Paz y contra la Guerra [National Initiative for Peace] UCPI Unidad Coordinadora de Prevenci6n Integral [Coordinating Office for Integral Prevention] UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees UP Uni6n Patri6tica [Patriotic Front] URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca [Guatemalan National Revolutionary Party] CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND SYNTHESIS Andres Solimano Achieving peace and promoting economic and social development are the two main challenges facing countries like Colombia, affected by a serious internal armed conflict. A variety of studies, including the analy- ses in this volume, indicate that Colombia's violence and armed conflict stem from a complex interaction of economic, social, historical, and polit- ical factors.1 Economic growth in Colombia, as in other Latin American countries, has not been enough to significantly reduce poverty and cor- rect inequality in the distribution of productive wealth (i.e., land). There is a need for fostering a more equal access to economic opportunities such as jobs, education, and credit, as well as to improve the capacity of low- income groups to influence public decisionmaking in democracy. Colombia also has a long history of armed conflict: confrontations between liberals and conservatives in the nineteenth century, the period of La Violencia in the mid-twentieth century, and the escalation of armed conflict since the 1980s and 1990s with the onset of drug-trafficking and paramilitary activity. Chronic armed conflict is indicative of the profound difficulties besetting Colombia's political institutions as they try to resolve their society's underlying conflicts by peaceful means. The strains of conflict in society are such thai a prosperous, peaceful, and democrat- ic Colombia will probably need a new social contract, founded on the principles of peace, economic growth, and social justice. Between 1950 and 1980, it was thought that the armed conflict did not significantly affect Colombia's economic growth and development. I The World Bank, in its current strategy of assistance to Colombia, has identified violence and armed conflict as the main obstacle to Colombia's full development of its potential for economic growth and social progress. Thus, the World Bank, in its analytical work, has focused on understanding the causes-particularly the socioeconomic ones-behind the violence and conflict in Colombia, in an attempt to identify policies to reduce the effects of violence and to promote economic development. The Bank has also financed pilot projects in conflict-affected areas (Magdalena Medio, Caqueta, and others), which attempt to rebuild the social fabric and capital affected by the war, financing small productive projects carried out by local institutions of civil society. 1 2 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Throughout that period, Colombia avoided significant macroeconomic imbalances, maintained a respectable record of economic growth, and made social progress. Interestingly, all this was accomplished despite an armed conflict (although less intense than today). This situation began to change in the 1990s. Colombia's macroeco- nomic imbalances, particularly fiscal deficits, started to build up and internal and external debt steadily increased. In turn, the armed conflict expanded and intensified as guerrilla forces' presence and influence in Colombian territory grew, challenging the State's capacity to enforce law and order. In the second half of the 1990s, economic growth slowed down and, toward the end of the decade, the economy was in a serious reces- sion with high unemployment. Around 3 million people are without jobs in Colombia as of mid-2000. If we add more than 1.5 million people inter- nally displaced by the war, it is apparent that Colombia is living a social crisis of unprecedented proportions. In addition to being a constant source of distress for the people, violence and armed conflict destroy dif- ferent types of capital (human, physical, social, and natural), impair the creation of wealth, and worsen citizens' quality of life. This vicious circle must be stopped. Achieving peace and tackling the structural causes of violence are goals that will also help to address the basic development problems of the country. The goals of achieving peace and securing economic develop- ment complement and reinforce each other. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES FOR PEACE Peace should encourage investment, entrepreneurial activity, job cre- ation, and economic growth. The largest obstacles to prosperity in Colombia today are its high level of violence, armed conflict, and the ensuing disorganization of society. The peace dividend that is expected to be gained in a scenario of peace should be oriented to reconstruct Colombian society, increase productive investment, and strengthen much needed social safety nets. The peace dividend will also free up public and private resources now allocated to the armed conflict for productive uses. However, some costs must also be subtracted from the economic divi- dend conferred by peace. These costs are associated with the reconstruc- tion of physical and institutional infrastructure damaged by the war. Institutions (formal and informal) need to be reshaped and adjusted to be functional for peace; all these tasks also entail costs. In addition, jobs are needed to absorb people that will be released from activities related to the war, as well as those in the unemployment pool. In Colombia, important segments of the population, especially young people in rural areas, are fighting or derive their income from occupations INTRODUCTION AND SYNTHESIS 3 associated with the armed conflict. Hence, along with the provision of jobs, there is need for a productive retraining process to prepare people for their reintegration to the working force, by teaching them new skills, along with discipline and civic responsibility. A requisite to generate jobs on a sustained basis, is of course, the recovery of economic growth; however, this may take time. Therefore, emergency jobs must be created through, for example, labor-intensive programs of public investments, employment subsidies, and other measures oriented to create employment. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries that emerged from armed conflict in the early 1990s, nonpolitical violence and urban crime, perhaps paradoxically, increased after peace agreements were signed. This phenomenon is connected to massive migrations from rural areas (where the armed conflict took place) to cities where only a few productive jobs were available in relation to the large number of people looking for jobs. The increase in nonpolitical violence after an armed conflict needs to be better understood; however, it is apparent that its causes stem from the difficulties of reintegrating large contingents of people-whose main "skills" and experience are related to violence and war-into a peaceful society. The transition from a culture based on violence to one based on peace requires a reform of the educational process and a change in values and habits. Preventing an escalation of crime after peace is achieved will require, besides job creation, an active social policy structured around social pro- tection networks to deal with people's new needs after the war. An effec- tive social protection program must (a) provide food security for chil- dren, vulnerable groups, the poor, and the refugees of war; (b) generate emergency jobs and productive opportunities for the unemployed; (c) implement job-training programs; and (d) provide medical and psycho- logical care to people physically and emotionally traumatized by the war. The social protection network just sketched should complement more "structural" social policies in education, health, credit, housing, and pen- sions. These policies are necessary to both increase the income-generating capacities of the people as well as equalize the access to opportunities and upward social mobility of all members of Colombian society, partic- ularly the poor. Since the armed conflict in Colombia is concentrated in rural areas, two issues will need special attention: the need to define a realistic agrarian reform process and a policy of access to and exploitation of natural resources that fosters sustainability. FINANCING PRO-PEACE POLICIES These pro-peace social policies need to be financed, so fiscal policy is a crucial element. The international experience of other countries in conflict 4 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT highlights that the definition of fiscal targets should take into account the financing needs associated with the launching of programs of war allevi- ation and post-conflict reconstruction. At the domestic level, efforts are needed to increase tax collection, control nonessential public expendi- tures, and give priority to investments that generate synergies with pro- peace programs. Priority must also be given to social spending aimed at reaching people affected by the war and other vulnerable groups. In addition, spending on infrastructure and housing must also receive pref- erential treatment because of their positive effects on employment and economic recovery. Colombia must redouble its efforts to secure multilateral foreign financing and bilateral cooperation to support and help finance the peace process. This effort has already started with the Madrid conference of the international support group for peace in Colombia, carried out in July 2000. It is now increasingly recognized that the Colombian conflict is also a security and solidarity concern for the Latin American region and the international community at large. Foreign donors are becoming increas- ingly aware of the conflict's various implications (on migration flows, security, etc.), particularly for the neighboring countries of Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Venezuela, as well as for the United States. INSTITUTIONS, ACTORS, AND A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT The international experience and history show that the existence of inter- nal armed confrontation is an indication of serious institutional failures in those societies affected by internal conflict. One of the main roles of social institutions is, precisely, to regulate by peaceful means society's latent conflicts. Social conflict (armed or otherwise) can have an econom- ic origin, associated with pressure from different groups and economic sectors seeking a larger share of real income and the stock of national wealth. Social conflict can also be a response to armed groups' appropri- ation of income derived from the exploitation of national resources or be related to illegal activities such as drug-trafficking. Moreover, social con- flict can also stem from differences in views about how society should be organized and from political ideologies not easily reconcilable within a society. The latter case would apparently seem less likely in the post-cold war era, but it is still relevant in Colombia, given the guerrillas' political agenda. To maintain social order, public institutions (political parties, the judi- ciary, parliament) must mediate these latent or open conflicts. In a demo- cratic system, public institutions must guarantee to all citizens the right to be heard and to participate in public decisionmaking. Of course, this INTRODUCTION AND SYNTHESIS 5 would require all citizens to have a genuine respect for the law and for the system's rules of the democratic game. This is typically a topic dealt with in peace accords, where new institutional structure and social agree- ment are defined, by assigning rights and responsibilities to rebel groups (guerrilla forces, paramilitary groups, the army) when they are reincor- porated into the democratic system, so that their political agendas can be pursued by peaceful, not armed, means. An important emerging player in the Colombian social process is "civil society," consisting of many heterogeneous groups and organizations such as labor unions, business associations, religious groups, human rights organizations, art and cultural groups, cooperatives, grassroots organizations, and the like. Many of these organizations have played a significant role in the peace process by helping build an internal consen- sus around peace and, to some extent, by influencing the formulation and implementation of peace-oriented policies. Nevertheless, differences of opinion have arisen between some civil society groups and authorities in regard to the peace process, particularly around human rights and for- eign intervention. PEACE AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Unlike the experience of countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, which achieved peace after the end of the cold war, the Colombian armed conflict has not only lasted, it has also sharply intensi- fied in the post-cold war era. 2 Today, the Colombian conflict is the longest and most geographically extended armed confrontation in Latin America; thus, achieving peace in Colombia would be a stabilizing ele- ment for the whole Andean region and the Latin American continent in general. In the era of globalization, national conflicts have stronger regional and global repercussions than ever. Therefore, at a conceptual level, peace can be understood as a global public good that tends to be "under-supplied" at the national level; hence, its adequate provision requires collective action at the international level. In the analytical framework of peace as a global public good, interna- tional organizations such as the United Nations, the Bretton Woods insti- tutions, and regional development banks can be important catalyzers of such international collective action. The challenge for these institutions is, 2 A plausible hypothesis for the persistence and intensification of Colombia's armed con- flict connects it with the enormous income that rebel groups receive from drug- trafficking "taxes." 6 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT thus, of integrating peace, particularly in its development dimension, into their operational activities and assistance strategies for countries in conflict. The country assistance strategy must be devised in a realistic manner, taking into account the realities of conflict or post-conflict recon- struction (physical and institutional), mobilizing knowledge, financing, and international best practices to make international assistance in con- flict-related situations more effective. PLAN OF THE BOOK This volume is composed of four chapters, including this introductory chapter, and a foreword written by Colombian President Andres Pastrana. The main highlights of each chapter are as follows: Chapter 2, entitled "Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital," written by Caroline Moser with the collaboration of a group of Colombian scholars, provides a conceptual framework for understanding a broad spectrum of political, economic, and social vio- lence issues. The framework seeks to understand the causes of violence and the mechanisms for its propagation. Four levels of causality are established for each type of violence: structural, institutional, interper- sonal, and individual. This chapter identifies the role played by both Colombia's turbulent political history and the unequal access to econom- ic and political power in the outbreak and resilience of political violence. Among the determinants of "socioeconomic" violence, poverty and inequality are identified as important factors, combined with other, fam- ily-related propagating factors. This chapter identifies as costs of violence its adverse impact on Colombia's physical, natural, human, and social capital. Finally, the chapter examines different policy initiatives that are in progress in Colombia to reduce violence, and proposes other areas of public policy to strengthen the links with civil society, grassroots organi- zations, the family, and municipalities. Chapter 3, "The Hidden Costs of Peace in Colombia" by Cecilia L6pez Montafno and Arturo Garcia Duran, focuses on the social and economic origins of Colombia's armed conflict. The authors emphasize in their analysis elements of political and economic exclusion surrounding the Colombian conflict and identify "three myths" present in many analyses of Colombian history and society, i.e., the existence of a well-functioning representative democracy, a solid economy, and poverty as a fundamen- tal cause of violence. The authors examine the costs of achieving peace and its fiscal implications and advance the hypothesis that Colombian problems are not so much due to a lack of economic resources, but a com- plex interplay of power relationships that make the achievement of peace so elusive. INTRODUCTION AND SYNTHESIS 7 Based on the hypotheses of the historian Marco Palacios, L6pez Montafno and Garcia Duran posit that violence, political patronage, and corruption have blocked effective democracy in Colombia, leaving poor urban groups and some regional constituencies out of the national deci- sionmaking process. In terms of the economy, the authors point out that inadequate levels of national savings and productive investment have led to only moderate long-term economic growth in Colombia. At the sec- toral level, they maintain that the agriculture and service sectors are underperforming and that the industrial sector is inefficient, with pro- ductivity in manufacturing growing at a slow pace. Next, the authors indicate that exclusion and inequality rather than poverty are, in their view, the main determinants of violence and armed conflict in Colombia. Last, this essay identifies the need to develop a national consensus for implementing a vast array of reforms (agrarian reform, a new social pol- icy, judicial reform, and others) that could transform political and eco- nomic institutions, for achieving peace in Colombia. In Chapter 4, "Toward an Architecture for Sustainable Peace and Development: Lessons from the World Bank Experience," Nat Coletta, Markus Kostner, Patricia Cleves, and Johanna Mendelson from the World Bank's Post-Conflict Unit review the Bank's recent experience in assisting countries that are experiencing, or have already overcome, domestic armed conflict. The authors examine several components of a strategy for a lasting peace, including (a) pacification by means of peace agreements and poli- cies to support them; (b) achieving domestic social consensus to consoli- date peace, including both civil society and government; (c) obtaining support for the peace process from the international community; and (d) enlarging the constituencies for peace by including former insurgent groups' support for policies leading to domestic security, human rights, and compliance with the law. In this chapter, a variety of conflict and peace experiences are evaluat- ed, both within Latin America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua) and outside the region (Northern Ireland, the Gaza Strip and Palestine, South Africa, and other cases). The authors use these cases to illustrate the rele- vance to Colombia of the different components, which they call "the architecture of sustainable peace and development." CONCLUSIONS The main conclusions of this book can be summarized as follows: 1. Achieving and consolidating peace is essential for Colombia. Without sustained peace, there will be no economic and social development. In 8 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT turn, without economic and social development and democracy, peace will be difficult to consolidate. 2. Violence in Colombia has political, economic, and social determinants. Its causes are many and complex. Violence has historical roots, as Colombia has had a long history of armed confrontations in the nine- teenth and twentieth centuries; moreover, violence is also associated with poverty, economic inequality, and social exclusion. Unfortunately, existing institutions in Colombia have faced formidable difficulties in managing its internal conflict by pacific means. Since the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, increased drug-trafficking, para- military, and guerrilla activity have exacerbated violence and the armed conflict. 3. Peace, once achieved, must be supported by a broad domestic consen- sus and by economic and public policies that promote economic growth, job creation, food security, equal opportunity, transparent institutions, and civic education regarding the values of work and peaceful coexistence. Understanding peace as a global public good gives to the international community a natural role for promoting peace in Colombia. That support may take several forms: the provision of technical and financial assistance for war alleviation and post-con- flict reconstruction as a vehicle to raise global and regional awareness about the need for peace, and economic development and advice on the proper public policies to advance both objectives. 4. International support for peace and development in Colombia requires a complementary domestic effort at strengthening national policies for physical and institutional reconstruction and pro-peace social programs. 5. Peace will require deep institutional reforms, possibly a new social contract. This social contract can be visualized in terms of two main components: an economic order leading to stability, growth, and social justice, and a democratic order with strong and transparent political institutions. Such a contract would allow conflicts in Colombian soci- ety to be channeled through peaceful and democratic means; in addi- tion, a new social contract must give important priority to replenish- ing social capital depleted during years of conflict and violence. 6. Colombia is a country with an enormous base of human and natural resources, a good geographic location for international trade and for- eign investment, and a valuable democratic and cultural tradition. Peace would allow Colombia, despite all its current problems, to mobi- lize these talents and assets to enable economic and social progress in the twenty-first century. CHAPTER 2 VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA: BUILDING SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SOCIAL CAPITAL Caroline Moser INTRODUCTION Colombia is one of South America's oldest and most enduring democ- racies, a middle-income country rich in natural and human resources. With sustained improvements in its social and economic indicators over the last decades, it has developed rapidly despite a 50-year "simmer- ing" civil war, growth of drug cartels, and increasing levels of urban and rural crime and violence. With the roots of contemporary political violence in the 1948 El Bogotazo urban insurrection, the 1940s-50s parti- san conflict between Liberals and Conservatives, known as La Violencia, expanded into left-wing guerrilla insurgency through the 1960-80 peri- od. Until the late 1980s, serious though it was, armed conflict had only a marginal capacity to disrupt Colombia's economic development process. It affected primarily the people involved in the conflict itself and marginal populations in remote rural areas. Urban crime and vio- lence affected mainly the lives of low-income barrio dwellers rather than society at large. In the 1990s, both the scale and intensity of violence have changed such that generalized violence now dominates the daily lives of most cit- izens, albeit in different ways. As remote guerrilla conflict has turned into countrywide "war," bringing in paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and further changes in the social actors involved, so too the causes of violence This report was prepared by Caroline Moser together with a team comprising Sarah Lister, Cathy McIlivaine, Elizabeth Slhrader, and Annika Tornqvist, with contributions from Patricia Cleves and Johanna Mendelson Forman. Background papers for the document were prepared by Pablo Emilio Angarita and Cesar Alejandro Osorio Moreno (Instituto Popular de Capacitacion, Medellin), Joanna Klevens (consultant, Bogotd), Alejandro Reyes (Universidad Nacional, Bogotd), Tim Ross (consul- tant, Bogotd), and Mauricio Rubio (Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotd). The peer reviewers were Robert Ayres, Nat Colletta, Norman Hicks, and Malcom Deas (St. Anthony's College, Oxford). This report was completed in October 1998. Consequently it does not refer to the recommendations that have been implemented by President Pastrana's administration as part of its prioritization of peace as the country's most critical concern. 9 10 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT have changed. These have included both external events such as the col- lapse of the cold war as well as internal changes relating to economic lib- eralization, coal and oil developments, and the impact of the global trade in illicit narcotics. For the past 30 years, violent6logos, commentators from within a uniquely Colombian academic discipline involving the study of violence, have analyzed changing patterns of political violence, while since 1982, successive governments have tried both military and political solutions to reach peace with different guerrilla groups, offering programs to address the root causes of the nation's violence and guerrilla warfare. At the same time, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private foundations have spent untold millions of pesos attempting to reduce urban crime, while military and police forces have endeavored to break drug cartels. Despite such efforts to reduce levels of violence, today government and civil society alike recognize that violence is the key development con- straint, affecting the country's macro- and microeconomic growth and productivity as well as reducing the government's capacity to alleviate the poverty, inequality, and exclusion experienced by the majority of its population in both urban and rural areas.1 The election of President Pastrana and the arrival of a new government in August 1998 provides an important impetus to further develop the critical peace and develop- ment initiative begun by previous governments. At the same time, it rais- es fiscal and financial questions in terms of paying for peace. This chapter is intended to contribute to Colombia's effort to more effectively address the country's fundamental problem of violence by introducing three critical issues of conceptual and operational relevance of particular importance today: 2 This is well illustrated by the World Bank's 1997 Colombian Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). The CAS was undertaken through a participatory approach that includ- ed consultations with civil society, which identified violence as the country's priority economic development constraint and the need for a comprehensive intersectoral policy on sustainable peace and development for the country. Violence reduction, and its coun- terside, peace and development, were therefore identified as one of six key areas of strategic importance where the World Bank could assist Colombia in its development process. 2 This chapter summarizes issues addressed in the World Bank Sector Study, Violence in Colombia: Toward Peace, Partnerships and Sustainable Development (1998). To prepare this sector study, key background papers were commissioned from experts, most of them Colombian, the foremost thinkers in their respective fields. These papers provided pri- mary sources for descriptive data, preliminary analyses, and case studies for the sector study. VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 11 * a conceptual framework that identifies a continuum of violence, includ- ing not only political violence, but also economic and social violence * an assessment of costs of violence that includes both economic and social costs, addressing, in particular, the way violence has eroded the social fabric and social capital of Colombian communities * an integrated future "package" of interventions that takes account of these issues to assist in the complex process of reducing overall levels of violence. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CATEGORIZING VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA A Threefold Categorization: Political, Economic, and Social Violence A conceptual framework that categorizes violence is a critical first stage for improving our understanding of violence systematically and for develop- ing sustainable peace initiatives. There are, however, a number of impor- tant constraints, including the following: first, violence is both highly com- plex and context specific; second, perceptions about violence affect citizen well-being even when they are not borne out by statistical evidence; third, community priorities regarding the importance of different categories of violence may differ from those of politicians or policymakers; finally, any categorization, by its very nature, is static. In reality, a continuum exists, with important reinforcing linkages between different types of violence. Building on the work of Colombian violent6logos and others, this chapter introduces a threefold categorization of political, economic, and social violence, identified in terms of the primary motivating factor, either conscious or unconscious, for gaining or maintaining political, eco- nomic, or social power through force or violence. Table 2.1 summarizes some of the common types of violence in Colombia according to this cat- egorization. These are deliberately broad and not necessarily mutually exclusive in terms of specific violent acts committed.3 A framework that distinguishes between political, economic, and social violence is critically important for a number of reasons. First is its capacity to provide an integrated approach, both conceptually and oper- 3 For example, a guerrilla group may kidnap a local official to make a political statement; the same group may kidnap a wealthy landowner to generate revenue. A youth gang mem- ber commits a robbery as an initiation rite with his peer group; another youth robs for money. Violence on an interpersonal level-a man beating his wife, neighbors in a hostile argument-can be an issue of social dominance. 12 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT TABLE 2.1 FRAMEWORK OF VIOLENCE Category of violence Definition Manifestation Political Commission of violent acts, Guerrilla conflict, paramilitary motivated hy desire, con- conflict, political assassinations, scious or unconscious, to armed conflict between political obtain or maintain political parties. power. Economic Commission of violent acts Street crime, carjacking; rob- motivated by desire, con- bery or theft, drug trafficking, scious or unconscious, for kidnapping, assaults during economic gain or to obtain economic crimes. or maintain economic power. Social Commission of violent acts Interpersonal violence such as motivated by desire, con- spouse and child abuse, sexual scious or unconscious, for assault of women and children, social gain or to obtain arguments that get out of or maintain social power. control Source: Moser (1999). ationally, that recognizes the connections between the dynamics of dif- ferent types of violence. Academics, policymakers, and project managers alike tend to focus separately on different types of violence and not view their impacts or causality holistically. In many contexts, urban violence is equated with delinquency, and rural violence with guerrilla warfare. Interpersonal violence is rarely incorporated in the public discourse of causality and impacts, and gender analysis is limited to domestic vio- lence and homicide victimization. This compartmentalization limits efforts to move from individual violence reduction interventions toward integrated strategies for sustainable peace. Second, this framework highlights the need for different approaches to violence reduction based on the perpetrators' differing motivations. Politically motivated violence will require a negotiated peace; however, the economic dimensions of belonging to a guerrilla group require job creation for demobilized combatants. The economic issues related to the drug trade have complicated the quest for peace, whereby guerrillas use revenue-generating tactics such as "taxation" of drug-traffickers, which allow them financial stability. However, efforts to eliminate cocaine pro- duction will not eliminate guerrilla forces, which will find other means to support their essentially politically motivated violence. Similarly, while VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 13 economic independence through job creation may aid some battered women, it does not address the root causes of this socially defined vio- lence, based on gender subordination. This disparity explains why many battered women are middle class, employed, and educated. Third, this framework helps explain why interventions to reduce one type of violence may not yield results in relation to other types of violence. Reductions in one sphere of violence can be accompanied by increases in another. For example, community policing programs have been credited with a 43 percent decline in New York City's economic crime rates, while reports of that city's police brutality have increased by 41 percent. In the wake of El Salvador's peace accords and reduction in political violence, post-conflict rates of homicide and economic crime increased. For instance, deaths by violence in 1994 stood at 9,135 (164.5 per 100 million) and, despite a decline to 8,047 (139 per 100 million) in 1996, this exceeded the annual average of 6,000 deaths during the civil war (Pearce 1998). Similarly, in South Africa, police data show that violent crimes have increased sub- stantially during the democratic transition from apartheid, especially since 1990, and particularly in relation to murder and rape (Louw 1997). Categorizing Violence Trends in Colombia Turning back to Colombia, it is important to highlight the most salient trends in violence, identifying as far as possible the different categories of violence to which these trends refer. At the outset, it should be empha- sized that examination of trends of different types of violence, especially those based on statistics, are subject to widespread underreporting. This is particularly marked in relation to social violence, especially intrafami- ly violence. Some Trends in Violence Have Worsened Using homicide rates as a proxy for violence levels, officially reported figures increased from 15 to 92 per 100,000 inhabitants between 1974 and 1995.4 Generally, the incidence of violence has grown dramatically in the post-1985 period, although more recently homicide rates in large 4 The homicide rate, expressed as the number of deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, is the most commonly used indicator for crime and violence both in Colombia and internationally. Although it is the most widely used indicator, its limitations require recognition; a society may manifest considerable criminal activity and nonlethal violence with relatively low homicide rates; similarly, social violence can be high and ongoing without being reflected in homicide rates. These numbers are based on government statistical sources; Centro de Investigaci6n, Salud y Violencia (CISALVA), a research NGO that collects its own data, reports rates of 50 per 100,000 in 1980, 219.3 per 100,000 in 1993, and 179.9 per 100,000 in 1995. 14 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT cities have begun to decline. Fewer than 20 percent of homicides are categorized as "political" in nature; recent evidence attributes 60 per- cent of these to paramilitary, 23.5 percent to guerrilla, and 7.5 percent to military armed attack by the military (Chernick 1997). The remaining 80 percent of "nonpolitical" homicides are the consequence of economic violence, both organized crime (relating to drug trafficking and orga- nized kidnapping) and unorganized delinquency (including robberies, car jacking, and kidnappings) as well as social (interpersonal) violence, particularly alcohol- and firearm-related deaths. While the types of vio- lence vary between urban and rural areas, homicide rates are roughly similar. The three major cities of Bogota, Cali, and Medellin account for between 40 percent and 60 percent of urban homicides. Rural violence is most keenly experienced along the agricultural and natural resource frontiers and where medium-size coffee farmers predominate. Insurgent Armed Conflict Is More Entrenched and Widespread than at Any Point in the Past Three Decades During the past five decades, the number of social actors involved in armed conflict has expanded from the guerrilla and armed forces to include drug cartels and right-wing armed paramilitary groups. This has been accompanied by increasing density-both spatially and in terms of interdependent reciprocal networks-between different actors. The most violent zones of the country are those in which two or more actors are in conflict, particularly those with simultaneous guerrilla and paramilitary presence. This has also created a huge diversity of types of violence, manifested in different ways in various parts of the country. Spatial Areas with An Active State Presence Have Declined Some areas experiencing an increase in various types of conflict have wit- nessed a decrease in the active presence of state institutions at local level, although there is no direct or linear relationship. Municipalities with some type of guerrilla presence increased from 17 percent in 1985 to 58 percent in 1995. If areas experiencing paramilitary, drug, and armed forces activity are added, approximately 75 percent of the country is experiencing some level of armed conflict. This has resulted in a growing number of displaced persons, estimated at around 1 million. Violence Increasingly Affects Some Groups Disproportionately Younger, lower-income, and less educated men are more likely to be both perpetrators and victims of homicide. National homicide rates between VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 15 1980 and 1995 for males aged 15 to 44 years increased from 29 to 394 homicides per 100,000; for females, the increase was from 23 to 30 per 100,000. The homicide rate for men thus multiplied by 13.5 between 1980 and 1995, with shifts throughout this period toward younger men reflect- ed both in lethal and nonlethal injuries. In the central city delinquency areas of Bogota, homicides reached the extraordinary level of 341 per 100,000 (Camacho and Guzman 1997). Extremely high proportions of perpetrators and victims of urban economic and social crime are minors. In 1997, 16 percent of murder victims in BogotA were under 18 years of age, and nearly 20,000 minors were charged with felony offenses, includ- ing 747 rapes and 3,445 other acts of social or economic violence leading to injury or death (Ross 1998). Conversely, women and their dependent children are the group most affected by displacement. Of Colombia's internally displaced population, 58 percent are female, and 75 percent are under 25 years old (Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana 1994). Indigenous communities have also been disproportionately affected by armed con- flict throughout the country. Tlhe Brutality of Recent Political Violence Obscures Other Types of Violence. The severity of mass politically motivated killings and human rights abuses means that economic and social violence receive less attention. Of these, economic violence, arguably the more severe, is overwhelm- ingly an urban problem. Reported 1996 figures from Bogota, for instance, list homicides (65 percent), traffic accidents (20 percent), and suicides (6 percent) as causes of death. However, over the past three years, the homicide rates have declined-in Bogota and Cali, reputedly by 30 percent, in Medellin, by 50 percent (R. Guerrero, personal commu- nication, 1998). Most reported violent deaths and injuries are attributed to common delinquency. National data indicate that 12 percent of households had been victims of violence during the past year. Of these, 10 percent were victims of robbery; 0.6 percent, victims of assault; 0.6 percent, victims of extortion; 0.5 percent, victims of homicide; and 0.02 percent, victims of kidnapping. Reported levels of social violence are relatively low, com- pared with other types of violence. The only national survey conducted on violence against women, for example, found that 19.3 percent had experienced some form of violence. Of these, only 27 percent reported physical and sexual assaults by their partners to the authorities. A nation- al survey on children reported 4.3 percent to be physically abused and 9.7 percent emotionally abused at some time, yet fewer than 2 percent of this number are reported to Medicina Legal in a given year. 16 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT The Drug Industry Exacerbates Levels of Violence Colombia's extensive illegal drug industry is one critical source of eco- nomic and political violence. As one of Latin America's three most important coca cultivation countries, a large processing center, and increasingly a consumer country, Colombia has different types of drug- related violence, varying both in significance and intensity. First, vio- lence is linked to organized crime associated with drug production and trafficking. This includes violent attacks to prevent aerial eradication, drug-distribution violence related to intergang killings, and assassina- tions of prominent political and judicial figures, widely associated with the MedellIn and Cali cartel and most frequent in 1989-93. Second, vio- lence is linked to the militarization of the fight against drugs, which has re-legitimized the domestic role of military forces and has blurred the distinction between the respective roles of military and police, and national boundaries as legal entities. Third, disorganized violence occurs around distribution and consumption when drug addicts need money for their habit or street dealers are challenged for their profits. Recent analysis suggests that the long-term sustainability of guerilla activity since the early 1980s is closely associated with their increasing involvement with the drug industry. Some People Consider "Social Cleansing" the Fastest and Most Effective Approach to Eliminating Delinquents and Other Undesirables Social cleansing is defined as the eradication of an identity type to main- tain neighborhood stability through either collective or individual homicide. To reduce criminal activity, particularly property crimes, social cleansing targets such groups as criminals, drug addicts, youth gangs, street children, garbage pickers, homosexuals, prostitutes, and homeless people. The objective is to reduce criminal activity, particular- ly property crimes, with killings a consequence of perpetrators' percep- tion that the victims are impossible to rehabilitate, the belief that state agencies are not equipped to address the problem judicially, and the high level of impunity of delinquency and homicide (Rojas 1996). Copied from Brazil and Uruguay, Colombian social cleansing was first reported in Pereira in 1979, where criminals, whose faces had been stained with an indelible red paint, soon turned up as corpses. In the 1980s, at least 500 street children were assassinated in Colombia, an esti- mated 300 in Medellin, and still more in Bogota and Pereira. During 1988-93, 183 victims of social cleansing were reported in BogotA. Of VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 17 these victims, 35 percent were alleged criminals; 21 percent, drug addicts; 17.5 percent homeless; 8 percent, street children; and 4 percent, bazuco5 users, homosexuals, and prostitutes. The single most important group was 16- to 20-year-old males (25 percent). At least 40 groups for social cleansing have been identified in Colombia, including Muerte a Gamines, Mano Negra, and Los Cucas. These organized groups report- edly account for 81 percent of social-cleansing homicide. The police account for the remaining 19 percent (Rojas 1996). The Number of Internally Displaced Persons Has Increased over the Last Decade and Is Still Growing Displaced persons fleeing from political violence-related to the guerr- illas, paramilitary groups, and the armed forces-are flooding into cities. Displacement occurs throughout the country, but outflows are highest from areas where conflict is most intense-such as Uraba, Magdalena Medio, and Ariari. According to a 1995 study, 600,000 per- sons were forced to leave rural areas during the previous decade (Meertens and Segura-Escobar 1996). According to other sources, since 1985, some 920,000 people have been displaced (Defensorfa del Pueblo 1996). The Presidential Council for Human Rights assesses that the cur- rent number of displaced has reached 1 million, about 2.5 percent of Colombia's population. Other sources estimate some 1,200,000 dis- placed persons in 1998 (Reyes 1998; CODHES 1998a). An estimated 35 percent of displacement is caused by persecution from illegal paramili- tary organizations, 17 percent by the armed forces and police, and 24 percent by armed opposition groups. In 24 percent of the cases, the internally displaced were not able to identify those responsible (Amnesty International 1997). Most of the displaced persons come from rural families. At least 31 of 100 displaced households are headed by women, 76 percent of them wid- ows or women abandoned during displacement. Each of these women is responsible for an average of four children (CODHES 1997). An estimat- ed seven out of 10 displaced households move to urban areas, most com- monly to the provincial capitals of the regions of expulsion: Medellin and Monteria for those from Uraba and the Atlantic coast, Barrancabermeja for those from Magdalena Medio, and Villavicencio for those from the eastern plains. 5 A type of cocaine, sometimes mixed with ground brick or broken glass. 18 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA An Integrated Framework of Causality Violence in Colombia is highly complex not only because of the differ- ent categories that are present, but also because of its multiple causes. Empirical evidence indicates that all individuals are not equally vio- lent, that communities vary in their levels of conflict, and that tolerance for violence varies across societies. Circumstances relating to the indi- vidual, the family, the community, and the broader national context combine to play a role in violence perpetration or victimization. Despite the wealth of descriptive evidence on violence, theoretical analysis of the specific causes is both limited and fragmented. Theories of the determinants of causality reflect the professional discipline informing the debate, and therefore are often compartmentalized and disarticulated from each other, perpetuating a unidimensional under- standing of violence (appendix 2.1) In seeking to combine the disparate theories of causality, this chap- ter adopts an integrated framework that identifies four different levels of violence causality: structural, institutional, interpersonal, and indi- vidual. This framework, illustrated in figure 2.1, recognizes the mutu- ally reinforcing role played by factors at different levels of causality. Drawing on the so-called "ecological model,"6 it seeks to demonstrate that no one level or cause is singly deterministic or wholly explanato- ry but, when combined with one or more additional causal variables, may yield a situation where someone commits, or is victimized by, vio- lent acts. Applications of this framework are not necessarily confined to a single manifestation of violence, nor do they focus primarily on fomenting factors or risk factors for violence victimization or perpetra- tion. The integrated framework is sufficiently flexible to identify the predeterminants of political, economic, and social violence without reducing the analysis to an assessment of a sole cause of any single type of violence. 6 First used to explain human development (Bronfenbrenner 1977), the "ecological model" has been applied to elucidate the complexities of violence etiology. Used variously to explain child abuse (Belsky 1980), sexual coercion (Brown 1995), and domestic violence (Heise 1998), the ecological model is a multilevel framework that incorporates biophysical, psychological, and social factors at the individual level as well as external factors that act upon the individual. VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 19 FIGURE 2.1 AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR VIOLENCE CAUSALITY Structural Institutional g t < ~~~~~~~Interpersonal i ual Personal history and Macro-level Formal and informal Immediate context biophysical makeup; political, econo- institutions and in which the ontogenetic factors of mic, and social associated social violence takes an individual's structure and capital in both work place; interactions developmental policy environ- and local between indivi- experience or ment, which also community; the duals; situational personality that shape incorporates social networks and factors involving responses to inter- opinions, beliefs, identity groups in family, household, personal and and cultural which interpersonal intimate, or institutional stressors. norms that relations are acquaintance permeate society. embedded. relationships. The Causes of Violence in Colombia The causes of violence in Colombia are both multifaceted and complex. Not only are there three different types of violence, but each has different, yet intersecting, causes. In addition, these causal factors operate at differ- ent levels-structural, institutional, interpersonal, and individual. This section examines some of the causes of political, economic, and social vio- lence in Colombia and how these are manifested in different contexts. As a brief context, it is important to outline some of the conditions that underpin all three types of violence in Colombia. First is the mini- mal presence of the State throughout much of the national territory. Second, the State has arguably criminalized some forms of social and political protest, while simultaneously dealing inconsistently with vio- lence. Third, high levels of corruption and impunity exist within state institutions. Fourth, much of society accepts violence as a means of resolving disputes. Fifth, Colombian society is regionally focused, his- 20 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT torically and geographically, resulting in economic, political, and social fragmentation. Sixth, the State, even where its presence is limited, has delegated authority to local power holders even where there is limited state presence; and finally, the interplay between rural and urban vio- lence is complex. Causes of Political Violence As with all types of violence, the causes of political violence are mani- fold.7 However, they tend to revolve around the historical legacy of vio- lence, together with unequal access to economic power (especially land and natural resources), unequal access to political power, and the role of drug-related, guerrilla, and paramilitary violence. During the past five decades, as the number of social and political actors has multiplied and the interrelations among them have become more complex, so too the spatial and regional density of conflict has worsened. As a result, the con- straints associated with resolving conflict have increased (appendix 2.2). Historical Legacy of Violence Historically, the roots of Colombia's political conflict extend back to the nineteenth century, with the violent confrontations between the Conservative and Liberal Parties. However, the start of contemporary violence is closely identified with the famous 1948 El Bogotazo-the vio- lent response to the assassination of the Liberal politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. Between 1946 and 1964, La Violencia cost 200,000 lives (Ocquist 1978). However, its impact was much greater-more than 2 million peas- ants were forced from their land; business, institutional, and family net- works were destroyed; and the widespread proliferation of revenge killings plagued the population. Unequal Access to Econormic Resources At a broadly structural level, unequal access to land and natural resources is thought to be an important cause of political violence in Colombia. Despite numerous attempts to address these inequalities through agrarian reform in the last three decades, the State has often exacerbated the situation. Related to this has been the steady expansion of left-wing guerrilla activity, which took root in remote communities, often in areas lacking an active state presence. Among the first-generation I This section draws heavily on Reyes Posada (1998), Chernick (1997), and Deas (1998). VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 21 guerrilla groups-comprising a range of dissident Liberal factions, peas- ants, and radical students-were the pro-Soviet Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Maoist Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and the pro-Cuban National Liberation Army (ELN). To expand their area of operation, the guerrillas often capitalized on the discontent of peasants who lacked land, or where agrarian reform had failed. Guerrilla activity, extortion, and kidnapping have severely undermined the landowning class and contributed substantially to political violence in rural areas. However, it has not broken the domination of the landown- ers or brought about more equitable patterns of landholding. Unequal Access to Political Power Interrelated with agrarian issues at the structural level are perceived inequalities in access to political power resulting from, for instance, the Frente Nacional, (1958-74), which excluded nontraditional political groups. In the 1970s, second-generation guerrilla groups such as the Nineteenth of April Movement (M-19) were founded on an agenda to con- front traditional party control and prevent suspected presidential fraud. Other groups, including armed social movements such as the Quintin Lame Armed Movement (MAQL) in Cauca, organized indigenous com- munities into self-defense groups for land invasions and armed activities for indigenous people's rights. Although guerrilla groups still rally around inequalities in political participation, the government has negotiated numerous individual peace agreements with some smaller guerrilla move- ments such as the M-19 and has made significant efforts to widen political participation. These include various decentralizing measures and the 1991 constitutional reforms, which have been especially important in terms of granting and widening constitutional rights to indigenous groups and Afro-Colombians. Nevertheless, traditional guerrilla groups remain strong, augmented by urban militias based in poor neighborhoods. The Role of Druig-Related, Guierrilla, and Paramilitary Violence Also central to analysis of the causes of political violence at the institu- tional level is the debate over the relationship between guerrilla groups, the peasant coca producers, and the drug-traffickers. In the late 1970s, many Colombians argued that the FARC did not oppose coca production by camipesinos in the eastern plains and the Amazon basin because of the risk to their peasant power base. Instead, they regulated the illicit coca market by imposing obligations and taxes upon farmers and a range of intermediary production processes and shipping. This has since been extended to most productive commercial operations in the Colombian 22 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT countryside, earning millions of dollars annually for the FARC and the ELN from the coca and cocaine boom, kidnapping, and other types of extortion. Paramilitary forces have also grown, especially the civil defense groups funded by landowners, emerald magnates, and drug- traffickers, which have arguably increased as a result of successive gov- ernments' failure to reach a solution with the guerrilla groups. In the 1980s, the drug-traffickers also formed their own territorial security forces such as the MAS [Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers)] whose targets were guerrilla fighters and their families. In the 1990s, paramilitary activity became more diverse, with some groups falling under the rubric of rural security cooperatives-such as Samper's effort to create more civilian security through CONVIVIR (Private Security Group). All these developments highlight the violent struggle between all groups for control of coca as a financial resource for both the insur- gency and the counterinsurgency. In addition, they have had important implications for land ownership and internal displacement, with large holdings increasing between 1984 and 1997 from a third to half of the land area as they fell into the hands of drug-traffickers and guerrillas (Reyes Posada 1998). Causes of Economic and Social Violence in Colombia As highlighted earlier, the economic and social causes of violence in Colombia have received less attention than the political causes. The most important of these relatively neglected causes relate to poverty, inequali- ty, and rapid growth, together with high levels of impunity within the justice system, the lack of educational and employment opportunities, the role of the household and family in violence reproduction, and situa- tional precipitators such as easy access to alcohol, drugs, and firearms. Poverty, Inequality, and Rapid Growth At the structural level, poverty may act as a precursor to violence-par- ticularly economic violence, in which the poor resort to violent action for material gain. With poverty levels in Colombia rising between 1992 and 1995 (Oxford Analytica Brief 1997; World Bank 1994), this provides a context that encourages violence to occur. Being poor, however, is not a determinant of violent behavior. Some analysts argue that inequality, not poverty, is an underlying cause, suggesting that the most violent areas in Colombia are those of greatest wealth, especially in natural resources (Fajnzilber, Lederman, and Loayza 1998). Others argue that violence is associated with rapid economic growth; poverty and inequality are often associated with rates of violence only in the context VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 23 of population change, urbanization, and industrialization (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994). Depending on the theoretical perspective, violence is said to result from lack of adaptation of rural migrants to cities where educational or employment opportunities are scarce or as a form of resistance among economically and socially disadvantaged groups (Rogers 1989). At the interpersonal and individual levels, it is some- times argued that in situations of rapid change, societal disorganization may mean that people have fewer common bonds and thus are more likely to (re)act violently. High Levels of Impulnity anid Lack of Effective Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms within the Justice System At the institutional level, weaknesses in both formal and informal insti- tutions can contribute to social and economic violence. Especially signif- icant in Colombia are high levels of impunity in the justice system. When the system is weak, then deterrence fails to prevent violent crimes. Indeed, deterrence has been shown to have a significant inverse rela- tionship to Colombia's levels of violent crime at both the macro- and micro-levels (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 1998). Furthermore, corruption in one area often resonates in others, usually linking the mal- functioning of the judicial system with economic gains associated with the drug trade and guerrilla activity (Bejarano et al. 1997, Rubio 1997d). Therefore, as the judicial sector continues to be ineffectual in meting out justice, Colombians are increasingly taking justice into their own hands, with alarming numbers of revenge killings and social-cleansing mas- sacres (Klevens 1998). Reported figures for these types of killings have increased steadily in the last 10 years, with particularly high concentra- tions in urban areas in the departments of Valle (30 percent of the total), Antioquia, and the Central District (Human Rights Watch/Americas 1994; Rojas 1996). Lack of Educationial anid Emlployment Opportuniities At the institutional level, lack of access to education, coupled with lim- ited job opportunities, may have contributed to a burgeoning criminal market and violence, especially among youth, in Colombia. Underpinning this are limitations in availability and quality of primary and secondary education (World Bank 1994). Furthermore, improve- ments in education alone will not address the causes of economic and social violence without viable employment opportunities. In rural areas of Colombia, for example, underresourced schools offer few incentives for youth, many of whom rnay turn to the guerrillas as their sole 24 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT employment option. In urban areas, drug-traffickers shrewdly recruit the more successful secondary school students, who realize that area stigma, depressed wages, and a precarious investment climate limit their ability to secure employment, especially in poorer neighborhoods. In terms of secondary school enrollment, Colombia's national trends mir- ror international findings, where the population's average number of years of schooling appears to be positively (yet weakly) associated with higher homicide rates (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 1998; CISAL- VA 1997). Other studies suggest an increase in levels of human capital among the criminal population.8 Indeed, lack of economic opportunities tends to channel entrepreneurial spirit and human capital into better- remunerated illegal activities (Rubio 1998).9 Role of the Household and Fanily in Violence Reproduction At the interpersonal and individual levels, the family is the primary insti- tution for transmitting and reproducing social norms. The family's role in perpetuating violence may be a precursor to violent behavior, especially child and partner abuse. For example, leading Colombian experts on child abuse believe that abusive childrearing patterns are responsible for transmission of trauma and the growth of a subculture of violence through socialization processes and interpersonal relationships of indi- viduals living in similar conditions (Ross 1998). Although belonging to a violent household may negatively influence behavior in children, it is not deterministic. Therefore, although the relationship between physical punishment and abuse is not clear, it still conveys a message that violence is acceptable, normal, and necessary (Klevens 1998, CISALVA 1997). According to Colombian child abuse experts, many juvenile offenders are "charged with hate," originating from early abuse at home (Ross 1998). In terms of domestic and sexual violence in the home, a 1989 study in Cali found that partners and blood relatives were involved to a high degree in the practice of sexual violence against women (Mesquita da Rocha 1997). This not only leads to fragmentation of household structures but also to the loss of support functions, which may create a context in which chil- dren may be more likely to become involved in violent activities as adults (Moffit 1993). 8 For example, the proportion of university-educated persons among convicted criminals has quintupled in two decades, increasing from 1.2 percent in 1972 to 5.9 percent in 1993 (Rubio 1997c) 9 For example, estimated per capita income for guerrillas in 1995 amounted to US$70,000 per capita, compared with the national per capita income of US$1,800 and per capita mili- tary expenditure of US$900 (Granada and Rojas 1995). VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 25 Situational Precipitators: Alcohol, Drugs, and Firearms Again, dealing with individual and interpersonal levels, the role of situa- tional precipitators such as alcohol, drug consumption, and use of firearms may act as a catalyst in potentially violent situations. Among the most important in Colombia is alcohol consumption, which increased between 1993 and 1997. Though more common among men, alcohol abuse is increasing among women and the very young (Ross 1998). Alcohol abuse is linked with various types of social violence, especially interpersonal feuds, acquaintance violence, and partner abuse through "binge drinking" (CRNV 1995, Profamilia 1995). Early drinking is also associated with poly- drug dependency and juvenile violence (Ministerio de Salud 1997). Although the relation between drug consumption and aggression is incon- sistent, drug use doubles the chances of committing a violent crime (Harrison and Gfroerer 1992, Valdez et al. 1995). Outreach workers with street people in Bogota believe that delinquent youths are, virtually with- out exception, substance abusers, where the drug may offer the effects of intoxication but also bolster self-esteem. Despite the debate over the role of alcohol and drugs, evidence suggests that they do contribute to violence among individuals who have a tendency toward violent behavior (AMA Council on Scientific Affairs 1993). Finally, gun ownership or carrying a gun may lead to violence or to a fatal outcome in a violent situation. In Colorrmbia, 75 percent of all homicides are handgun fatalities (Klevens 1998). In one study, carrying a gun (or even pretending to carry one) was strongly associated with aggression (Duque, Klevens, and Ramirez 1997). The examples outlined here highlight the multidimensionality and complexity of the causes of political, economic, and social violence. While these types and their causes are presented as discrete categories, in reali- ty they are all interrelated. Given that violence permeates the core of Colombian society, economy, and culture, it is perhaps not surprising that the costs are so high, or that violence is seriously eroding the country's capital and associated assets. COSTS OF VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA: CAPITAL AND ASSOCIATED ASSET EROSION The economic and social costs of violence are a burden for all Colombians.10 Despite more than a decade of research by economist vio- lent6logos, these costs remain difficult to measure, with an extensive debate as to the accuracy of different cost estimates. In the context of 10 This sections draws heavily on Klevens (1998) and Rubio (1998). 26 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT macroeconomic deterioration, where inflation, unemployment, and fiscal deficits are growing and the relationship between economic insecurity and crime and violence has become a critical public concern, the direct and indirect consequences of violence have to be understood. While accurate measurements of the costs of violence are critical, assessments of the impacts of violence on the country's capital-its stocks of assets-can also further understanding of the situation. This chapter distinguishes between four types of capital: physical, human, social, and natural, each with associated assets (box 2.1).11 To identify the costs of sustained high levels of violence to Colombian society, highlighting the links between vulnerability and asset ownership is also useful. The more assets individuals, households, and communities can acquire and the bet- Box 2.1 FOUR KINDS OF CAPITAL AND THEIR ASSOCIATED ASSETS Physical capital (also known as produced or man-made capital) comprises a country's stock of plant, equipment, infrastructure, and other productive resources owned by individuals, businesses, or the country itself. Huiman capital includes investments in education, health, and the nutrition of individuals. Labor is one of the most critical assets linked to investments in human capital. Health status determines people's capacity to work. Skill and education determine their returns on their labor. Social capital is embedded in social institutions, both formal and informal, that are critical for a society to function. At the local level, it is consolidated through reciprocity within communities and households based on trust, and strengthened by both the density and heterogeneity of informal net- works and associations. Household relationships, for instance, are an important informal institution for pooling income and sharing consump- tion. Natural capital includes the stocks of environmentally provided assets such as soil, atmosphere, forests, minerals, water, and wetlands. In rural com- munities, land is a critical productive asset for the poor; in urban areas, land for shelter is also a critical productive asset. Soaurces: Serageldin (1996), Moser (1996, 1998). l This draws on recent work on sustainable economic, environmental, and social devel- opment (Serageldin and Steer 1994, Serageldin 1996) as well as on the asset vulnerability framework (Moser 1996, 1998). VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 27 ter they manage them, the less vulnerable they are. The more their assets are eroded, the greater their insecurity and poverty. Table 2.2 summarizes some of the main findings identified in terms of different kinds of capital. TABLE 2.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS OF DIFFERENT STUDIES ON THE COSTS OF VIOLENCE Costs of violence to different kinds of capital Sumrlmaryfindings Physical Over the past decade, attacks on infrastructure totaled about I capital percent of GNP (Trujillo Ciro and Badel Rueda 1998). Estimated expenditures on private security total 1.4 percent of GNP (Comisi6n de Racionalizaci6n del Gasto y de las Finanzas Publicas 1996, cited in Rubio 1998). From 1991 to 1996, net costs associated with urban violence and armed conflict totaled 18.5 percent of GDP, representing a yearly average of 3.1 percent if GDP (Trujillo Ciro and Badel Rueda 1998). With estimated values of up to US$5 billion to US$6 billion a year, Colombia's drug money represents half the value of all legitimate exports (Kalmanovitz 1990). Thirty-one percent of businesses and 10 percent of households reported victimization by robbery and, seeking protection from further losses due to stolen or damaged property, Colombia invests up to 15 percent of GNP on security (DANE 1997). Physical and Total costs associated with guerrilla conflict, including private human capital and public expenditures and human capital costs, averaged more than 4 percent of GDP from 1990 to 1994 (Granada and Rojas 1995). Human capital Colombia loses an estimated 4 percent of GNP annually as part of the human cost of homicides (Lodofio 1998). Colombia loses an estimated 1 percent of GNP annually as part of the human cost of homicides (Trujillo Ciro and Badel Rueda 1998). Twenty-five percent of the health burden (calculated in disability-adjusted life years [DALYs]) is attributable to intentional injuries, compared with a 3 percent average for all of Latin America (Ministerio de Salud 1995). Health care expenditures for victims of violence is an estimated 1 percent of the total cost of violence (Trujillo Ciro and Badel Rueda 1998). (Table continuies on tle followiug page.) 28 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT TABLE 2.2 (CONTINUED) Costs of violence to different kinds of capital Summaryfindings The total estimated costs for medical care associated with intentional lesions amount to US$61.1 million, equivalent to 0.76 percent of GDP (CISALVA 1997). In terms of equivalent employment, direct and indirect costs associated with crime amount to 85,000 jobs paying a minimum wage (CISALVA 1997). The costs to human capital represent 55 percent of the total cost of the armed conflict in Colombia (Granada and Rojas 1995). Social capital Public spending on security and judicial systems is around 5 percent of GNP, reflecting a rise of 2 percent of GNP during the 1990s (Comisi6n de Racionalizaci6n del Gasto y de las Finanzas P6blicas 1996, cited in Rubio 1998). Resources destined for the military and police, which grew 4.5 percent in real terms during the second half of the 1980s, grew a little less than 15 percent total in real terms in the last three years (Rubio 1998). Direct and indirect costs of crime-including costs related to judicial and penal sectors as well as the police and private security systems-amount to more than US$1 billion, 1.84 percent of GDP (CISALVA 1997). Natural capital Between 1986 and 1997, Ecopetrol registered 699 attacks on oil pipelines. For every 100 barrels of crude oil spilled as a consequence of guerrilla attack, only 25 to 30 barrels are recovered (Trujillo Ciro and Badel Rueda 1998). During the first third of 1995, almost 20,000 barrels of crude oil were poured into the Magdalena River, with significant impacts upon the ecosystem and fishing of the surrounding communities (Granada and Rojas 1995). Note: Data expressed as percentage of GNP or GDP cannot be numerically aggregated, given that different methodologies, indicators, and data sources were used in each calcu- lation. Macroeconomic Costs of Violence The growing body of literature on the costs of violence to Colombia clear- ly indicates that over the last two decades, Colombia has sustained signif- icant losses due to deaths, disabilities, and "transferals" resulting from VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 29 property crimes (CISALVA 1997; Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n 1998, Granada and Rojas 1995, Rubio 1998, Trujillo Ciro and Badel Rueda 1998). Violence, primarily homicide and kidnapping, also has a negative impact on investment. In particular, violence has a greater effect on invest- ment decisions than on production decisions (Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n 1998). When indicators for human capital and homicide rates are factored into the traditional equations for calculating inflation and the capital costs of investment, violence had a negative and significant impact on investment in Colombia. For example, if Colombia's violence could be reduced to levels comparable to those throughout Latin America, the rela- tionship between investment and GNP could reach levels now seen in countries with high (i.e., 30 percent) economic growth (Parra 1997). Nevertheless, because Colombia's civil war has been low-intensity rel- ative to other Latin American conflicts, it has been suggested that politi- cal violence has had comparatively little influence on Colombia's eco- nomic performance. While there are short-term correlations of war intensity with private investment and productivity, long-term growth may not be significantly affected. The coca boom of the 1980s and the oil boom of the early 1990s have been cited as reasons for covering the loss- es in growth due to increasing violence (Ahrend 1998). Variability among these and other findings is an overall indication that cost calculations are difficult to assess and methodological challenges remain (table 2.2) . While many results are expressed as percentages of GNP or GDP, they do not imply that had these losses not occurred, GNP would have increased by that percentage. Furthermore, these figures can- not be numerically aggregated, as different methodologies were employed to generate each analysis. Rather, these figures are useful for assessing the magnitude of loss in terms relative to total GNP and are not intended as expressions of exact financial costs. In many sectors detailed accounting and cost analyses are virtually nonexistent. Expenditure assessments of the police, judiciary, penal sys- tem, and armed forces are constrained by serious problems of access to information. Reliable cost figures for paramilitary groups are also unavailable. However, media sources estimate approximately US$500 per month. It is reasonable to assume that their numbers have grown alongside those of the guerrillas. Figures for 1995 estimate per capita income for the guerillas (FARC and ELN) as US$70,000, for the armed forces as US$900, and nationally as US$1,800 (Granada and Rojas 1995). Violence and the Erosion of Physical Capital Violence erodes physical capital (also known as man-made or produced capital) when it reduces the country's stock of plant, equipment, infra- 30 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT structure, and other productive resources owned by individuals, the business sectors or the country itself. Physical capital comprises the assets generally considered in financial and economic accounts. Both banking and taxation are affected, though indirectly, by illegal violence linked to the drug industry. Drug syndicates generate profits in enormous amounts of cash, which, to be useful, must pass through legit- imate international banking or commercial channels. With estimated val- ues of up to US$5 billion to $US6 billion a year, Colombia's drug money represents half the value of all legitimate exports (Kalmanovitz 1990). "Dirty" capital not only tends to displace "clean" capital in business and industry but also to precipitate a flight of clean capital abroad, thus increasing the relative importance and power of the drug entrepreneurs (Thoumi 1994). The very size of these transactions makes them difficult to conceal from vigilant banking systems. Drug money also affects the tax system, where the Colombian customs service estimates 88 percent of all whiskey consumed in Colombia enters the country illegally through a system run by drug-traffickers. Untaxed alcohol not only brings drug profits back unchecked but also cheats the state of income. In addition, by making cheaper spirits available, smuggling contributes to the country's already serious alcohol abuse problem. Costs associated with violent attacks on infrastructure-especially petroleum and electrical installations, roads, and airports-are mount- ing. In the last decade, guerrilla forces have launched approximately 700 attacks on the petroleum industry's installations and infrastructure. While the environmental impact includes the contamination of water supplies and damage to productive lands, cost analyses are limited to repair and replacement costs for property and materials, labor costs of clean-ups, and estimated costs of spilled petroleum. For the coal indus- try, the attacks have led to lost sales, high repair costs, and shipping delays. The electrical power industry has suffered more than 100 attacks against its infrastructure in the past five years, resulting in numerous direct power shortages to the productive sector in addition to extensive repair costs. As Colombia's police and judicial institutions weaken, the privatiza- tion of security is a growing phenomenon in both rural and urban areas, increasing production costs to the private sector. Information on legal and registered businesses alone shows that, since 1980, there has been a greater increase in personnel working in the private security sector than for the national police. In 1980, Colombia had 2.5 policemen for every pri- vate security agent; by 1995, this ratio had dropped to 1:1 (Ospina 1997). As private security and judicial services spread, private security opera- tives of one neighborhood often become the principal source of crime and violence in adjacent areas (Jaramillo 1993, Corporaci6n Regi6n 1997). This VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 31 situation is aggravated when private security groups have contacts with organized crime and when the notion is socially accepted that the pro- tectors of one neighborhood are allowed to wreak havoc in another. Violence and the Erosion of Human Capital Violence erodes human capital when it limits access to education or health care by both users and providers. Violence also affects individuals' capacity to use their human capital by entering the labor market. The costs of violence to both education and health are a critical prob- lem. Increasingly, violence negatively affects access to, and quality of, education. Killings and death threats to both rural teachers and health workers by guerrilla and paramilitary groups have led to the abandon- ment of many rural facilities across the country (Parra 1997). Recent stud- ies in Bogota show that conflict among neighbors-family conflicts or scandals, the presence of gangs, neighborhood drug use, and prostitution activities in the neighborhood-had a significant effect on school dropout rates (Knaul 1997). Elevated school dropout rates were also associated with domestic violence, abuse, or the presence of alcohol or drug use within the family (Knaul 1997). Further studies indicate that 14 percent of students had stopped attending night school for fear of street or public transportation crime victimization. Twenty-five percent of Colombians who used to work at night reportedly left these jobs for similar reasons of insecurity, and the number of youth working at night has dropped by a third (Cuellar de Martinez 1997). In some regions, doctors and nurses have problems maintaining a neu- tral position in relation to armed conflict. As with teachers, when health workers become targets of death threats and assassinations, the result is often the abandonment of health posts and clinics. Violence is creating an added burden for the health care sector, with trauma care consuming an important proportion of health resources. This includes not only physical injuries and disability caused by violence but also the psychological con- sequences of victimization or witnessing violence among adults, ranging in severity from emotional stress to post-traumatic stress disorder. The human capital of displaced populations can be seriously eroded. Many lose access to health and social services when they move to the big cities. Twenty-three percent of the campesinos arriving in Medellin, for example, have access to some sort of health care, but in the expulsion area of Uraba about 87 percent did (Angarita Cafias and Osorio Moreno 1998, Instituto de Estudios Regionales 1997). Their labor as an asset is eroded. A 1995 study of pre- and post-displacement unemployment rates showed male rates increasing from 6.2 percent (when most worked in rural agri- culture) to 34 percent (when they had relocated on the urban periphery). 32 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Comparable female rates show an increase from 6.5 percent to 19.2 per- cent (Meertens and Segura-Escobar 1996). Women use domestic work experience to find jobs as domestic servants or laundry women, or resort to street begging and occasionally to prostitution. Violence and the Erosion of Social Capital Violence erodes social capital when it reduces trust and cooperation with- in formal and informal social organizations and among their members. Social capital is the rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embed- ded in social relations, social structures, and societies' institutional arrangements, which enable its members to achieve their individual and community objectives (Narayan 1997).12 This broad definition subsumes both social capital at the microinstitutional level (e.g., communities and households) and refers to the rules and regulations governing formalized institutions in the marketplace, the political system, and civil society (North 1990, Olson 1982). The importance of social capital relates to its recognized contribution to sustainable development-and the evidence that the size and density of social networks and institutions, as well as the nature of interpersonal interactions, significantly affect the efficiency and sustainability of devel- opment processes (Putnam 1993). Among the factors that erode trust and reciprocity-the social capital-one of the most important is violence (Moser 1998, Moser and Holland 1997). Violence can occur as much in formal social institutions and informal community institutions as in households. Formal Social Institutions Violence has severely eroded faith in the relevance and effectiveness of many social institutions as a consequence of both human rights violations and a reported 98 percent impunity rate. The growing concern that judi- cial, educational, health, media, and security institutions are no longer viable is testing the institution of democracy. Of particular importance is the violence-linked drug industry that has sought to erode the State by corrupting institutions and dividing the population. The effect of drug trafficking on the judicial system is a primary exam- ple of the impact of violent crime on institutions, where narco-terrorism, 12 In this very new area of analytical research, definitions of social capital vary. Putnam (1993) defines it more narrowly as the informal and organized reciprocal networks of trusts and norms embedded in the social organization of communities, with social institutions both horizontal and hierarchical in structure. VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 33 threats, and acts of kidnapping and assassination have influenced the administration of justice and changes in the penal code to benefit them. Corruption of the judicial system has manifested itself, for instance, in the arbitrary dismissal of evidence against, or the release of, well-known drug-traffickers. The influence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups on the judicial system is less well documented, although some municipal- level studies indicate that the presence of armed organizations affects the workings of the judicial system (Pefiate 1991, 1998; Uribe 1992, cited in Rubio 1998). Continued violence in the form of death threats, kidnappings, and assassinations has created an understandable climate of fear, anxiety, and mutual distrust among civil society actors. In one survey, 22 percent of a representative sample of Colombians felt that they were personally in danger (DANE 1997). Fear of victimization modifies behavior patterns, such as avoiding dangerous places and times, participating in communi- ty activities, or not going out alone (Warr 1994). Violence affects the com- munications media, key actors in providing information to an informed, democratic civil society. Systematic threats and attacks against the media have been meant to alter media behavior and information content. In a broader context, this alarming trend effectively suppresses the "voice" of civil society institutions to participate effectively and peacefully in polit- ical decisions at community and national levels (Quintero and Jimeno 1993). Informal Community-Level Institutions and "Perverse" Social Capital The capacity for community-level organizations to function depends on their cohesiveness as well as personal safety and the ability to meet local- ly. In Colombian cities, epidemiological studies and police figures show that murder and violence are clustered in specific delinquency areas, led by Bogota's central barrio of Santa Fe-followed by Kennedy and Ciudad Bolivar-with its high concentrations of prostitution, street crime, and drug dealing, low-income housing, unemployment, single-parent fami- lies, and school dropouts. These indicators contribute to the creation of a cultural climate in which violence and delinquency are normative. In some instances, violence seems to contribute to the creation of "per- verse" social capital, in which networks, contacts, and associations are created in the service of illegal activities (Rubio 1997c). Gang involvement is a primary example where young people, bereft of strong family and community support, form mutually reinforcing groups. In many neigh- borhoods, gangs form the main pole of socialization for children, who join as young as 12 or 13 years of age. In Medellin, for instance, by 1990 there were 120 youth gangs, involving about 3,000 youths with an aver- 34 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT age age of 16 years (Rodgers 1998). Actively involved in robbery, theft, drug consumption (marijuana, bazuco, cocaine), and assaults, and at war with rival groups, gangs provide an ideal sicario [paid killer] training. In some neighborhoods, they protect their neighbors, committing crimes elsewhere; in others, they prey on their neighbors, creating a climate of fear (Human Rights Watch/Americas 1994). In some contexts, youth gangs have developed strong symbiotic relationships with the drug car- tels, who recruit them as sicarios to confront rival drug groups Household Relations and Social Capital Violence erodes household relations as an asset when it reduces house- holds' capacity to function effectively as a unit. In rural conflict zones, where many men have joined illegal groups (guerrilla or paramilitary), family life is seriously disrupted by high stress levels. In urban poor communities, many women have identified a direct link between male unemployment, alcohol abuse, and increased domestic violence. In the case of internally displaced populations, research shows that women are more vulnerable than men at the moment of eviction, when they are exposed to unexpected widowhood, threats, clandestine action, flight, and separation from their homes. Men, in contrast, seem better equipped to cope at such times, but the reverse is true when displaced households restructure their lives. Then the impact is greater for men who become unemployed and experience a loss of status as breadwin- ners and a rupture of their sense of masculine identity. Women seem better equipped to develop support networks to continue the routines of daily survival and find new ways of earning an income, and creating social capital not with other women originating from the same area, but with those sharing the same history of displacement. (Meertens and Segura-Escobar 1996). Finally, sustained conflict, arbitrary killings of suspected guerrilla sympathizers, and widespread death threats have systematically reduced trust between neighbors and communities across the country, further eroding social capital. Recent evidence shows higher levels of participa- tion in community action groups in less violent areas and lower levels in more violent areas. (Cuellar de Martinez 1997). In response to the state- ment that "the use of violence is never justifiable to achieve political goals," 62 percent of residents in the most peaceful zones of Colombia claimed to be "totally in agreement," compared with 37 percent in the most violent zones. In the most peaceful zones, 70 percent of residents said they would "definitely not want a neighbor who had committed a crime or murder," compared to 63 percent in more violent zones. The respective percentages, when questioned as to the desirability of having VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 35 a drug-trafficker as neighbor, are 45 percent and 35 percent (Cuellar de Martinez 1997). Other measures of social capital-specifically participa- tion in religious activities-rise in response to increased violence. Areas with high levels of violence report 30 percent of community members belong to some religious organization, while areas with less violence report 14 percent (Cuellar de MartInez 1997). Violence and the Erosion of Natural Capital Violence erodes natural capital when it destroys or damages a country's stocks of environmentally provided assets such as soil, forests, water, and wetlands. In rural areas, land is a critical productive asset for the poor; in urban areas, land is equally important for the provision of shelter. While historically Colombia is exceedingly rich in such assets, environmental degradation has only recently been recognized as a significant cost of vio- lence, particularly political violence. First, and most dramatic, is the environmental damage due to oil spills from terrorism. Colombia has had to devise technology to handle oil spills in nonmaritime environments, and the long-term impacts are incal- culable. In one tragedy in Catatumbo, near El Tama National Park, all vegetation and life forms have disappeared from 5,000 hectares as a result of oil pipeline attacks and oil spills (Granada and Rojas 1995). Second, additional contamination of soil and groundwater results from aerial spraying of illicit crops, rendering these lands unusable for many years. Third, deforestation rates increase when peasants, driven from their lands after the spraying, raze nearby forests for planting. Fourth, the destruction of the fragile paramo [highland desert] habitat has been accelerated by the drug cartels' recently increased diversification into heroin poppy cultivation. Finally, environmental degradation in and around urban areas is exacerbated by the influx of displaced populations, worsening "brown issues" such as solid waste disposal and water conta- mination. In Cartago, the estimated 150 people arriving daily thwart city planners' attempts to protect watersheds and biodiversity, as the recla- mation of land for precarious housing exceeds the ability to meet the demands of sustainable development (J. D. Quintero, personal commu- nication, July 1998). While the issue of equitable land distribution and agrarian reform has challenged Colombia for the past 30 years, land degradation and inappropriate land use have been exacerbated by political violence. Peasants have been forcibly evicted by the competing interests of guer- rillas, paramilitaries, and drug-traffickers or have voluntarily fled to escape death threats, joining the thousands of rootless displaced per- sons on the edges of cities. According to a recent study in Cali, for 36 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT instance, 53 percent of the rural displaced had land ownership rights that they relinquished upon migrating, and 83 percent of them were landowners (CODHES 1997, Angarita Cafias and Osorio Moreno 1998). Since many peasants do not hold legal title to their land, if they aban- don it, they lose their legal rights to ownership. Even those who have legal title to land do not necessarily have recourse to judicial processes to regain their land or claim compensation. The displacement process of rural peasants to claim valuable land, often sold at very low prices, has been identified as a deliberate and forced relocation of the population in affected territories. This has "cleansed" the civilian population from areas of guerrilla influence, concentrated property ownership, expand- ed the areas dedicated to large-scale cattle ranching, and subverted rural agriculture (Reyes Posada 1998). At the same time, in cities such as Medellin, displaced settlements are located on the outskirts of the city, in geologically unstable areas. The municipal government has evicted displaced persons from the city itself on the grounds that their presence could cause a natural disaster or a risk to public order (Angarita Cafias and Orsorio Moreno 1998). INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE VIOLENCE An Integrated Framework for Intervention Throughout Colombia, especially during the past decade, extensive, highly innovative interventions to address and reduce violence have been implemented. As in other countries, the analysis of violence and its related interventions have been dominated by a particular policy approach and its associated professional discipline (such as criminology or epidemiology). In addition, interventions have tended to prioritize a particular type of violence and focus on a particular level of causality. Even where initiatives successfully address more than one type of vio- lence or target multiple levels of causality, the lack of impact evaluation or cost-benefit analysis severely restricts the identification of "best prac- tices" and the possibility of replicating successful interventions. To provide an integrated framework for intervention, the dominant policy approaches in the field must be classified in terms of both the cat- egories of violence they address and the causal factors on which they focus. This framework is intended to help policymakers shift from menu- like checklists of interventions toward an interdisciplinary approach that recognizes a continuum of violence and addresses simultaneously the reduction of different categories of violence. Such innovative projects as do exist in Colombia are often small, with little coordination among them, and therefore lack sustainability on a national scale. VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 37 Changing Policy Approaches to Violence Intervention In identifying changing policy approaches, a broad shift can be delineat- ed from approaches focused on controlling violence to those concentrat- ed on preventing it, to more recent perspectives directed at rebuilding social capital. Consequently the framework of different policy approach- es should be viewed as "ideal types" (table 2.3). More than one approach can be adopted simultaneously, and established perspectives are often combined with more innovative ones. * Criminal justice is one of the most widely established approaches. It focuses on violence deterrence and control through higher rates of arrest, conviction, and punishment, facilitated by judicial, police, and penal reform. More successful in reducing economic crime, less so in reducing social and political violence, this top-down approach is pop- ular with politicians seeking short-term solutions to the symptoms of violence. * The public health approach also focuses on economic and social vio- lence at individual and interpersonal levels. This is another well-estab- lished approach, focused on preventing violence by reducing individ- ual risk factors. It draws on epidemiological surveillance, especially homicide rates as well as risk-factor identification to modify individ- ual behavior, the social and physical environment, or both. The conflict transformation approach is a less established perspective that aims to rebuild the fabric of societies. It was initially influenced by the role of international actors such as the United Nations and address- es both political and, to a lesser extent, social violence through nonvi- olent negotiation among conflictive actors using third-party media- tion. While negotiation may be through international organizations at the structural and institutional levels, it is also important at the inter- personal level through formal and informal arbitration and communi- ty-based training in communication skills. * The human rights approach is what is known as a "rights-based approach" to violence reduction. It deals with citizens' entitlements to be free from the threat or victimization of violence and focuses on the role of the State in protecting these rights. Drawing on the documen- tation of abuse in relation to international human rights conventions, this approach addresses political and social violence, mainly at the individual and structural levels. While early use of this perspective dealt with governments as primary violators, more recent formula- TABLE 2.3 DIFFERENT POLICY APPROACHES TO VIOLENCE INTERVENTION Category of Causal level(s) Policy/planninig Approach Objective violence addressed addressed intervention Lirmitations Criminal justice Violence deterrence Economic Individual Top-down Limited applicability and control through strengthening of to situations of higher arrest rates, Institutional judicial, penal, political and social conviction rates, and police systems violence; success and punishmcnt. and their associated highly dependent institutions. o01 enforcement. Public Violence prevention Economic Individual Top-down Almost exclusive health by reducing surveillance, risk focus on individual; individual risk Social Interpersonal factor identification, often imposed top- factors. associated behavior down; highly modification, scaling sensitive to quality of up of successful surveillance data; interventions. limitations in indicators. Conflict Achieving Political Interpersonal Negotiations to Often long-term in transformation nonviolent resolution ensure conflict impact; often of conflict through Social Institutional reduction between challenging to bring negotiated terms different social parties to table, then between conflictive Structural actors; key third- mediate conflict. parties. party mediation. May be top-down or bottom-up. Human rights Legal enforcement Political [ndividual Top-down legal Legalistic framework of human rights enforcement often difficult to and documentation Social Structural reinforced by enforce in a context of abuse by states bottom-up popular of lawlessness, and other social actors. participation and corruption, and NGO lobbying. impunity; documen- ting abuse can be dangerous. Social capital Building social Political Interpersonal Bottom-up Less well articulated capital to reduce participatory than other violence in both Economic Institutional appraisal of approaches; fewer informal and formal violence, institutional indicators have social institutions Social Structural mapping to address been developed. such as families, problems, community community participation in organizations, violence-reduction and the judiciary. measures. Sotirce: Moser (1999). 40 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT tions have included all social actors who deny or abuse rights. In par- ticular, this deals with excluded groups, such as indigenous people, women, and children, as well as with future generations in relation to the natural resource base. * The social capital approach is still being formulated. Of all perspectives, it focuses most directly on rebuilding social capital among informal and formal institutions such as families, community organizations, and the judiciary. Using bottom-up, participatory processes, this approach builds on community identification of needs to create trust and focuses on the strengths of communities affected by violence. It also provides the potential for community-based needs to be scaled up to public sector interventions. Interventions to Address Political Violence and Negotiate Peace in Colombia Attempts to address political violence in Colombia are closely interrelat- ed with government endeavors to establish peace accords.13 Since the renewed escalation of political violence in the 1980s, an end to political violence has been at the forefront of Colombian policymaking. Presidential Initiatives toward Peace Successive presidential administrations have shifted their strategies for dealing with political conflict. These have ranged from a partial military solution to negotiation of demobilization and reincorporation agendas. Along with shifts in emphasis, efforts have been broadly consolidated over time, often straddling different political administrations. For exam- ple, while the Betancur administration opened the door to negotiations with the guerrillas, and the M-19 in particular, it was under the Barco administration that a political accord was established. Yet it was the Gaviria administration that developed the Reinsertion Program for the M-19. Similarly, the groundwork for the 1991 constitutional reform and Constituent National Assembly was laid under Barco yet came into effect under Gaviria's administration (box 2.2) 13 This section draws heavily on Chernick (1997) and Cleves (1998). VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 41 Box 2.2 SOME OF THE MAIN GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES FOR PEACE IN COLOMBIA 1982-86: Betancur Administration * National Plan for Rehabilitation to redirect funds to areas most affected by political violence * Political reform, reintegration, and a democratic opening through negotiations with extra-institutional forums and Congress * Constitutional reform in Congress, including a constitutional amendment establishing direct election of mayors * "National dialogue" among diverse members of government and civil society * Negotiation of temporary cease-fire with the FARC, EPL, M-19, and Democratic Workers Movement (ADO) and "regional peace processes" established 1986-90: Barco Administration * Policy of Reconciliation, Normalization, and Rehabilitation, incorporating the National Plan for Rehabilitation and instituting local democratic forums to extend the State's authority over the civilian population * 1986: Creation of the Presidential Council for Peace * 1989: Political Pact for Peace and Democracy, which included commitment to unilateral cease-fire and recognition that the end results of negotiations would be disarmament and reincorpora- tion into the legal political system * 1990: Political Accord with the M-19, involving cease-fire, through assembly of groups in the demilitarized zone and formal surrender of arms; further accord with the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), EPL, and MAQL 1990-94: Gaviria Administration * 1991: Constituent National Assembly and constitutional reform involving constitutional reform in political, economic, social, and judicial sectors; recognizing community participation and minor- ity rights, including indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians; promotion of respect for human rights; and complying with agreements with guerrilla groups * 1991: Reinsertion Program for 6,500 demobilized guerrillas of the M-19 and other groups, cofinanced by government and munici- palities, offering housing, health care, skills training, and adult education as a preventive program to create "culture of peace" (Box continues on thefollouwing page.) 42 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Box 2.2 (CONTINUED) * 1991 and 1992: Negotiations in Caracas and Tlaxcala, Mexico, with Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon BolIvar, with preliminary accord * 1992: Creation of the National Commission on Indigenous Policy (CONPAPI) with Office of Indigenous Affairs (DGAI) and Special Commission for Black Communities * 1993: Further Pact to Consolidate Peace signed between govern- ment and guerrilla groups to make further advances for national reconciliation * 1994: "Special Electoral Boundaries for Peace" to provide prefer- ential treatment for ex-guerrillas in municipal council elections * Creation of civilian Minister of Defense * Creation of Office of High Commission for Peace * Creation of Office of Presidential Counselor for Medellin, a pres- idential-level effort to reduce violence in Medellin 1994-98: Samper Administration * 1994: Protocol II of the Geneva Convention signed, establishing a code of conduct for internal wars; creation of security coopera- tives in the form of CONVIVIR; establishment of Office of Black Communities and Ethnic Collectivities * 1995: National Program for Population Affected by Violence to deal with displaced populations * 1997: Established UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights; formal request to establish Office of High Commissioner for Refugees of the United Nations to deal with displaced populations * National Peace Council approved by Congress, initiative to guar- antee national commitment to search for peace * Law 418 approved by Congress, establishing parameters for negotiation with armed groups, norms for protecting minors from armed conflict, instruments for attention to victims of vio- lent conflict; amnesty for those convicted of political crimes * Laws passed to allow the government to seize some narco-invest- ment in land as a possible basis for major land reform; regional dialogue between governors and armed groups authorized by the government VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 43 Underpinning these peace initiatives has been the formulation of a wide range of policies informed by the approaches discussed above.14 Conflict transformation, social capital, and human rights perspectives have been important in influencing the peace initiatives. Although mili- tary solutions have been used as a last resort when negotiations or other methods failed-for example, when Gaviria's negotiations with Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar broke down, he turned to a mil- itary strategy-the nonmilitary approaches have revolved mainly around rebuilding the society's assets. Conflict transformation strategies have influenced negotiations with the guerrilla groups since the early 1980s. Instigated by Betancur, the first to recognize the severity of the guerrilla issue and to negotiate a tempo- rary cease-fire in 1984, each subsequent government has attempted some form of conflict transformation method. However, this dialogue has not been confined to negotiating solely with the guerrillas but has also included the intervention of other actors. For example, Betancur estab- lished a "national dialogue" among members of civil society and gov- ernment, although the armed forces were left out of the dialogue process. Also, the constitutional reform of 1991 was partly a response to propos- als from civil society and the guerrillas, and in 1997, Samper authorized regional dialogues between governors and armed groups. Rebuilding social and community institutions, social capital, also runs through peace endeavors since 1982. Betancur's National Plan for Rehabilitation, for example, directed funds to areas most affected by political violence in order to rebuild the social and economic fabric, which was reinforced by Barco's Policy of Reconciliation, Normalization, and Rehabilitation. Also important from this perspective was Sampers's 1995 policy for populations displaced by violence. In an effort to build capacity at the local level, various governments have instituted a range of constitutional decentralization measures. For example, Betancur intro- duced a constitutional amendment establishing the direct election of mayors. Perhaps most important were Barco and Gaviria's constitutional reforms, which firmly established the importance of decentralized state functions and community participation at the local level. Similarly, Gaviria's reinsertion program attempted to rebuild social capital among ex-combatants, in conjunction with creating human capital through the health and adult education components. 14 It is important to recognize that this analysis of government political interventions in terms of different policy approaches is undertaken with hindsight; governments themselves did not necessarily identify their interventions as falling within a particular approach. Such an analysis, however, provides important lessons from past practice. 44 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Finally, as mentioned earlier, a human rights perspective was signifi- cant during the Gaviria and Samper governments. As in other countries, Colombia has shifted in its approach to human rights from viewing the State as perpetrator to recognizing human rights abuses by other social actors. In addition, the issue of exclusion of minorities has also been addressed, especially through the 1991 constitutional reform and the sub- sequent CONPAPI, within the DGAI and the Special Commission for Black Communities. The most systematic use of the human rights approach has been by the Samper administration. Among other things, this has included the creation of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations in 1997 as well as the inclusion of a clause in Law 418 outlining norms for the protection of children from the effects of conflict. Role of Civil Society and the International Community in the Peace Process In the past decade, groups within civil society have become increasing- ly involved in reducing violence. Although most civil society initiatives have focused on reducing economic and social violence, some interest- ing interventions have addressed political violence reduction. Two examples of grassroots peace-building initiatives include the Network for Citizen Initiatives against War and Peace and MINGA (McDonald 1997). Other important civil society interventions have been the creation of the Comisi6n Nacional de Conciliaci6n-with the objective of identi- fying a solution to armed conflict-the "Vaccination Against Violence," and the national referendum on peace that collected "Ten Million Votes for Peace" in October 1997. The fact that 10 million Colombians expressed their disquiet over armed conflict, even if only through a sym- bolic vote, reportedly influenced the ELN's decision to reopen channels for peace negotiations. At the same time, the business sector has demon- strated its vested interest in violence reduction through a variety of sponsored initiatives. One of the best known examples is Fundaci6n Social, a nationwide social development program financed by private investments. At the international level, the role of the United Nations has been particularly important with respect to human rights interventions, especially during the Samper government. In addition, a number of national and international NGOs have established programs of emer- gency help and humanitarian assistance for displaced persons. However, these have not been able to keep up with the growing need for emergency assistance, nor have they provided a longer-term solu- tion to the problem. Nevertheless, groups such as the Popular Feminine VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 45 Organization are seeking to educate displaced persons on a number of issues. To conclude, government and civil society initiatives to address polit- ical violence and bring about peace have been innovative, extensive, and potentially far-reaching. While some interventions have been more suc- cessful than others, none has brought about peace (Chernick 1998). Of particular significance is the fact that governments have been beset by problems of implementation. These have revolved around lack of funds, the proliferation of groups involved in political conflict, the reduced con- trol of the State over large areas of the country, and the intransigence of the guerrilla groups. At the same time, none of the government or civil society initiatives to date have addressed political violence together with economic and social violence. Interventions to Reduce Economic and Social Violence in Colombia In Colombia, much less attention has been focused on economic and social violence than on political violence.15 Nevertheless, the Colombian government and NGOs have designed a wide range of innovative initia- tives. These have usually been implemented separately from those deal- ing with political violence. Some have focused independently on eco- nomic or social violence; others have addressed both types together. Interventions have drawn on all policy approaches, with particular emphasis on the criminal justice, public health, and social capital approaches. These interventions therefore span the different underlying aims of control, prevention, and rebuilding assets. Crininal Justice Approach Historically, efforts to reduce economic violence in Colombia have been based primarily on the criminal justice approach. In terms of judicial reform, the 1991 Constitution established various mechanisms to control economic violence. These included harsher sentencing for felons, a shift to accusatory evidentiary procedures, and training for judges, prosecu- tors, and police. Other initiatives have addressed widespread corruption and impunity. These include the Inter-American Development Bank's judges training program. Other examples are two community-based sur- veillance strategies implemented by the Bogota police department to con- trol economic violence. The first was designed to increase patrols in high crime areas; the second, to train community leaders as watchmen to mon- itor the number of crimes and victims per neighborhood. In terms of 15 This section draws heavily on Klevens (1998), Rodgers (1998), and Ross (1998). 46 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT social violence, a key criminal justice intervention in Colombia was a law passed in 1996 to criminalize domestic violence. This also included pun- ishment for failure to meet child support payments and other legal changes increasing punishment for rape and other sexual offenses, espe- cially against children. One of the most interesting interventions, focused primarily on social violence, is the Casas de Justicia (Houses of Justice) program. Since the program is implemented within low-income communities with high rates of violence, it also indirectly addresses economic violence. The Casas de Justicia are particularly important, as they provide different forms of conflict resolution. Instead of simply employing traditional judi- cial procedures, these are designed to improve poor communities' access to conciliation, legal, and human rights services. These are drawn pri- marily from a criminal justice perspective, yet are also influenced by other innovative approaches. For instance, various types of conflict trans- formation tools have been introduced, and manuals based on conciliation techniques developed. Educating low-income groups on human rights issues is also integral to the program (box 2.3). Box 2.3 ADDRESSING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VIOLENCE: CASAS DE JUSTICIA Colombia's Casas de Justicia program works within the criminal justice system to achieve binding resolutions, a first step in moving the judicial system toward a system that promotes conciliation rather than winners and losers. An additional objective of the Casas de Justicia is to facilitate access to the justice system in poverty-stricken communities with very high rates of violence. A typical Casa de Justicia is the one created in 1994 in Bogota's Ciudad Bolivar lower-income barrio. With support from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Foundation for Superior Education, and the Ministry of Justice, the Casa includes a lawyer for consultations, a Center for Conciliation, a Family Commissar, a police inspector, a forensic doctor, a defender of human rights, and a prosecutor (attorney general). Various manuals on conciliation techniques have been developed to sup- port the program. Based on an initial follow-up survey of cases attended, more than 60 percent of the people who used these services said they were satisfied with the result. Source: Klevens (1998). VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 47 Public Health Approach The public health approach has also been important in relation to eco- nomic and social violence. Initiatives usually focus on homicide reduc- tion, with little distinction between economically and socially motivated deaths. Particularly important from this perspective has been the use of the media, especially through campaigns to limit violence on television and to promote public awareness of the causes of violence. For example, the BogotA District Health Office has carried out mass media campaigns focusing on the relation between alcohol consumption and violence among adolescents. One campaign employed a multimedia strategy, using songs on radio, billboard messages, and booklets distributed with the popular newspapers. Other important public health initiatives in terms of economic vio- lence, and to a lesser extent, social violence, include controlling situa- tional precipitators such as drugs, alcohol, and firearms. In BogotA, attempts have been made to restrict the carrying of weapons and the sale of alcohol in an attempt to reduce crime. Dealing with drug and alcohol use, a campaign called "What You Should Know Before You Drink" was launched. Financed by the United Nations and developed by the Coordinating Office for Integral Prevention, it was designed to help youth analyze their attitudes and behavior toward alcohol and drugs, based on a set of card games that lead into group discussions. In terms of interventions focused specifically around social violence, the health and education sectors play a crucial role. To deal with domes- tic violence, a project in a Bogota hospital has been established to sys- tematically screen women with trauma for partner violence. This is being implemented with support from the House for Women, an NGO working for the defense of women. A number of education projects in Bogota have developed teaching guides to help children and adolescents improve their conflict-resolution skills. One of the most important showcase public health interventions is the Program for Development, Peace and Security (DESEPAZ) in Cali. This employs public health tools such as epidemiological surveillance, envi- ronmental manipulation, and behavioral modification to achieve mea- surable reductions in homicide. It identifies risk factors such as alcohol use and gun ownership and attempts to limit exposure to these risks. DESEPAZ is notable in that it focuses on economic violence, using a number of approaches to the problem. For instance, its emphasis on community-level solutions indicates that rebuilding community and social institutions is also important. In addition, some of its interven- tions have direct and indirect implications for reducing social violence (box 2.4). 48 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Box 2.4 COMBINING POLICY APPROACHES TO ADDRESS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VIOLENCE: CALI'S DESEPAZ DESEPAZ was established by the Mayor's Office of Cali in 1992 to address the high rates of crime and violence in the city. Grounded in a public health approach, it was based on an epidemiological analysis of violence- primarily homicide rates-to identify specific risk factors for urban vio- lence as well as community involvement in combating crime and violence. DESEPAZ and the Colombian Legal Medicine and Forensic Science Institute identified several key risk factors for homicide in Cali, which revolved around alcohol use, gun ownership, and leisure time. For exam- ple, 56 percent of homicides occurred during weekends and holidays, and at night. Thev therefore restricted alcohol sales in public areas and initiat- ed a disarmament program that appears to have had a beneficial effect on homicide reduction. A key principle of DESEPAZ is that the prevention of crime and violence requires a commitment from all citizens. Municipal Security Councils were created to educate government officials in the epidemiology of crime and violence, review progress, and chart future plans of action. In addition, the mayor held weekly meetings with community leaders in one of Cali's 20 dis- tricts, bringing together members of the mayor's staff and community lead- ers. In these meetings, which are open to the public, participants discuss all matters related to crime and public security and suggest and agree on con- crete solutions. This community-based process has led to the creation of law enforcement, public education, and social development programs. Source: Ayres (1998), Guerrero (1998), Vanderschueren (1996). Conflict Transformation Approach Interventions that draw on conflict transformation mechanisms such as mediation, arbitration, and nonviolent conflict resolution have been developed quite recently in Colombia. In terms of social violence, one example is the Family Commissar, created in 1989 and run by the District Department for Social Welfare. It is staffed by a family law judge, a psy- chologist, a physician, and a social worker who mainly attend to problems related to family violence or failure by parents and spouses to meet their economic or social obligations. They provide legal and psychological counseling, help in negotiating a solution, legal judgments, and therapy.16 16 During 1997, these commissaries attended 76,744 cases in Bogota, compared with 15,683 cases in the previous year. VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 49 Emphasizing economic violence, the Centers for Conciliation and Arbitration, created by the Office of Commerce 15 years ago, are con- cerned with disputes relating to economic control over resources. They mainly offer businesspeople mechanisms for resolving their conflicts. In 1997, for example, they reconciled 1,052 conflicts and refereed another 100 for a range of organizations, including the Mennonite Church, the Air Force, various law schools, and an association of truck drivers. In some cases, the centers also helped them set up their own conciliation and arbitration centers. In addition to businesses, they also address social violence issues, such as family conflicts, gender conflicts, and claims against the State. Another example of a project that addresses both social and econom- ic violence is a project to rehabilitate juvenile gang members. Developed by the Coordinating Office for Integral Prevention (UCPI) with the sup- port of the nonprofit organization Fundaci6n Social, this project focuses on conflict transformation. With support from UCPI, two mediators spend three to four years in local Bogota communities, working with gang members, especially drug users. After this period, the mediators were able to identify and sign pacts of nonaggression with 180 youths and encourage them to hand in their weapons. Human Rights Approach In a number of cases, initiatives informed by the human rights approach are relevant for the reduction of economic and social violence. A partic- ularly pertinent issue relating to economic violence is deterrence and rehabilitation in the penal system-which is also relevant to criminal jus- tice. Although juvenile justice has become a human rights issue in Colombia, to date interventions have been minimal. Minors held in detention centers before trial, or before getting a place at reform school, can experience human rights infringements. Conditions for adult pris- oners appear to be equally harsh. The issue of prisoners' rights was recently highlighted by prison riots in Bogota, where striking prisoners sewed their lips shut to protest against inhumane conditions. A human rights approach is also gaining recognition in terms of social violence, especially in relation to such issues as the right to security in the home and the right to food, gainful employment, and the natural resource patrimony. Colombia is a signatory to the Convention to Eradicate, Sanction, and Prevent All Forms of Violence against Women and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child. In addition, the 1991 Constitution embodied many of these tenets through legislation to pro- mote equality and democracy. 50 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Social Capital Approach Interventions aimed at building social capital often focus on youth. Interesting examples are the Youth Clubs and Youth Houses, which pro- vide alternative recreational opportunities and residential arrangements for at-risk youth. Both types of projects provide adolescents with a meet- ing place free from alcohol and drugs, where they are encouraged to engage in other activities such as sports or music. The Youth Houses are an initiative of the Ministry of Education, with the aim of building social and human capital among youth, especially drug users. They address both economic violence, by reducing crime rates, as well as social vio- lence, through issues of socialization, role models, and involvement in gang activity. Another interesting project that also attempts to build social capital from a public health perspective is a small maternal health project in BogotA. Focusing on social violence, it was initiated by a small nonprofit agency whose mission is to "humanize childbirth." In 1996, it expanded to include community health training workshops for caregivers in com- munity childcare homes, branching out into other areas of community development, including leadership training, recreational and sports activities for children and adolescents, a community newspaper, training in arts and crafts, and training in construction, plumbing, carpentry, and electrical installations. This brief summary of different interventions illustrates the wealth of experience Colombia already has to draw on. However, tremendous chal- lenges have yet to be overcome. Among these, the most important include lack of national coordination, the small scale of some projects, and limited evaluation of initiatives. Colombia has the potential to meet these challenges in a number of ways. RECOMMENDATIONS: BUILDING SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SOCIAL CAPITAL Introduction: President Pastrana's Mission The evidence presented here indicates the urgent need for the new gov- ernment to make peace and development its top priority. It should demonstrate this commitment by negotiating appropriate peace agree- ments and designing and implementing a comprehensive national strate- gy for peace and development. Experience to date suggests that resolving armed conflict is a precondition for sustained peace and development. However, to ensure sustainability, the causes of different types of violence and their context-specific nature in different parts of the country also need VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 51 to be addressed. Otherwise, any interventions, no matter how important and costly, can only be piecemeal and easily undermined. At the same time, it is critical that the government recognize that solving political vio- lence-through a negotiated peace-will not automatically solve other, more prevalent forms of violence. Recent post-conflict experience from El Salvador, for instance, demonstrates that a peace accord in itself may, in the short term, increase economic and social violence. Basic Principles for a National Strategy for Peace and Development Developing a national strategy for peace and development should be based on a number of important principles, which include the following: Develop a Fiscal Policy to Pay for Peace A peace strategy requires not only political will but also an adequate bud- get to implement it. Any sustainable peace initiative will bear a signifi- cant financial cost. How to pay for peace, therefore, is a fundamental challenge for the new government. In the current economic climate, this may create an important policy tension between, on one hand, making progress with fiscal austerity-essential for economic growth-and, on the other hand, funding social and economic policies-essential to sus- tain peace. This may involve the renegotiation of fiscal targets to take account of the peace components, especially those associated with the establishment of the peace accords. Among the potentially viable mea- sures to help Colombia realize this goal, peace bonds, taxation, and exter- nal donor assistance are important interventions to be considered. Create Partnerships for Sustainable Peace and Development The government has responsibility to provide the necessary security to ensure its citizens' safety, but it requires the collaboration of key social actors to fulfill this obligation. This becomes particularly important when the institutional capacity of the State itself is weak. In this light, private business, civil society, and the international community are already con- tributing to the process of facilitating sustainable peace and development. With current levels of armed conflict and disorganized violence now wide- ly perceived as a real threat to democracy, such actors are increasingly sig- nificant. The burgeoning culture of respect for human rights and citizen- ship and a growing conviction of the urgent need for political solutions-reached through a negotiated settlement, rather than military solutions-means that today a social movement around peace is develop- ing. It is the partnerships linking civil society with the business communi- 52 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT ty that increasingly articulate a nation's exasperation with high levels of insecurity and failure to resolve the civil war. The challenging road ahead, therefore, is twofold: first, to ensure a transition from individual civil soci- ety initiatives to a well-defined, integrated civil society policy agenda, and second, to promote flexible State-civil society partnerships to implement policies and programs for sustainable peace and development. Promote Participatory Debate about Local-Level Causes of Violence and Solutions Sustainable peace and development will not be achieved unless govern- ment promotes and facilitates open debate concerning the causes of vio- lence, as well as solutions, among all social actors. Participatory consul- tations are also necessary if agreement is to be reached on such key issues of national interest as agrarian reform, environmental policy, and the dis- tribution of profits from the country's natural resources, particularly oil, natural gas, and coal, and alternative development policy in drug-grow- ing areas. Such participatory processes can also identify local-level solu- tions to rebuild social capital and citizenship and focus on the perceived needs of priority target groups, including displaced populations, demo- bilized combatants, and excluded urban youth. Adopt a Coordinated Approach to Violence Reduction During the past decade, government, private, and nongovernmental sec- tors have implemented an impressive menu of initiatives that stand as testimony to the breadth of peace and development initiatives. Nevertheless, their impact has been limited by lack of cohesive policy that integrates different objectives and instruments for reducing violence, fragmented approaches to violence reduction with single-focused inde- pendent programs, a proliferation of interventions focusing on short- term gain rather than long-term structural change, and limited evalua- tion and cost analyses restricting informed policy decisions regarding the relative fiscal returns of different programs. To allocate resources effi- ciently, decisionmakers need basic information and tools to design appro- priate interventions, establish project benchmarks based on community needs, and assess project impact with accurate data. Components of a National Strategy for Peace and Development A national strategy for peace and development will involve not just mak- ing peace but also owning, supporting, and sustaining peace (Colletta et al. 1998). Drawing on the extensive initiatives already implemented by VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 53 Colombians, the strategy outlined below seeks to control the symptoms of violence as well as introduce preventive measures. It also aims to rebuild the fabric of society, with particular emphasis on strengthening social capital. In some cases, single interventions can address different types of violence simultaneously; in other cases, a number of interven- tions need to be combined to reduce violence. As outlined in Table 2.4, the strategy has three critical components, or building blocks, that address the continuum of violence at different lev- els of causality: . national level: peace program * sector level: mainstreaming violence reduction into priority sector policies and programs * municipal level: projects to rebuild social capital. National Level: Peace Program A peace program can contain many components, to be implemented at dif- ferent stages of the peace process. Before the actual peace agreement, for instance, one important component may be pre-accord innovative project support as a form of venture capital in support of building social capital in conflict zones-which provides incentives for peace as well as helping pre- empt "spoilers." During the actual peace process, the timing and sequenc- ing of other aspects of a peace program will require careful consideration at the local level. Some of the other important components of such a pro- gram may include demobilization and reincorporation of ex-combatants, reconstruction measures, and a program for displaced persons. Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants Demobilization should include bringing guerrilla and paramilitary pro- posals to the negotiating table. The specifics of demobilization must be addressed within the peace negotiations and detailed agreements, and should be acceptable to all parties. Lessons may be learned from the expe- riences of El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and other countries to ensure that ex-combatants cannot easily rearm (Spencer 1996). Reintegration of ex-combatants is also essential. This should include social programs for ex-combatants (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996) and initiatives to address human rights violations. In terms of human rights, the Consejeria Presidencial de Derechos Humanos and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights TABLE 2.4 SUMMARY OF PROPOSED NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT: EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT POTENTIAL INTERVENTIONS Type of Details of potential Main type of Priority group strategy interventions violence addressed addressed National level: Peace program * Pre-accord project support Political Guerrilla groups, communities affected by * Demobilization and reintegration violence, ex-combatants, displaced of ex-combatants persons * Reconstruction measures * Programs for displaced persons Sector level: Mainstreaming violence reduction into priority sector policies and programs Education * Curriculum review Economic Youth at risk, * Conflict resolution programs including gangs; future generations * Restructuring timetable Social * Referral of youth at risk * Teacher-security protection Judiciary * Community-based conflict Economic Poor rural and urban communities, people resolutio-n pTOgramS illegally detained, people affected by * Community-based tribunals Social impunity * Reduction in judicial congestion * Strengthening of managerial capacity to reduce corruption Environment * Measures to ensure adequate Political Peasants and indigenous groups living in protection of environmentally remote, environmentally sensitive areas fragile regions, especially those Economic with natural resources Livelihood and * Rural financial services for Political Peasants and indigenous groups with no job creation credit access to land or livelihood, poor urban * Microenterprise loans Economic populations * Private sector partnerships to generate jobs Social Municipal level: Social capital projects * Municipal-level strategic plans Political Urban and rural communities affected by for peace and reconstruction violence, especially in regions most * Community-level assessments Economic affected by conflict * Projects to build social capital * Mechanisms to upscale local Social solutions Souirce: Moser (1999). 56 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT should be consulted. Since extensive violations of human rights on the part of the military, the paramilitary, and the guerrillas have destabilized previous peace dialogue, this is a central part of any agreement. There should therefore be consensus over basic commitments from all actors to respect fundamental human rights and freedom of political association and expression, as well as the application of international humanitarian law. While these measures primarily address political violence, they must be combined with other initiatives that deal with economic and social violence through reconstruction measures. Reconstruction Measures These should focus on regions most adversely affected by armed conflict and address social, political, and economic causes of violence. While a first step is the negotiation of peace among guerrilla, paramilitary, and local populations, subsequent measures are essential. These may be inte- grated projects such as the Magdalena Medio project, a pre-accord expe- rience that deals with the continuum of violence at different levels and draws on different policy approaches (box 2.5). Programs for Internally Displaced Persons Even with a negotiated peace, the problem of displaced persons remains. Because it is not certain whether the displaced will return to their rural communities, services in their cities of arrival are likely to remain over- stretched in terms of housing, employment, and social welfare provision. The Colombian government has taken important steps to recognize vio- lence-related displacement as a structural problem by adopting in 1997 Law 387 as public policy for the reintegration of displaced persons. However, the law lacks measures for protecting the rights of the victims of displacement, nor does it contain tools for addressing future reloca- tions. To date, most displaced persons have refused to move, preferring to stay in resettlement communities, since any return home could prove fatal until conditions change in their home regions. The government therefore needs to define a clear policy agenda at two levels: first, to address the causes of displacement; second, to ensure the protection and well-being of internally displaced persons. Sector Level: Mainstreaming Violence Reduction into Priority Sector Policies and Programs Not only does violence affect the implementation and outcomes of a number of sector policies and programs not immediately associated with VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 57 Box 2.5 PROJECTS FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT: THE MAGDALENA MEDIO PROJECT The Project for Peace and Development in Magdalena Medio is designed to address the four causal levels of violence at the local level. Founded in the context of a growing movement to promote regional dialogues to end the violence, its objectives are to foster peace, community-based development, and civic education in the central Magdalena River Valley, one of Colombia's most violent areas. The project covers 29 municipalities, spread over 30,000 square kilometers. Twenty-six of the municipalities are "inter- nal colonization" zones-areas of immigration since La Violencia in the 1940s and 1950s. The three largely urban municipalities include a city of more than 200,000 inhabitants. The region contains great natural and pro- ductive wealth, including petroleum, gold mining, African palm, cattle, fishing, and coca. It is also characterized by great poverty and unequal land tenure, where more than 75 percent of the inhabitants live in precarious economic conditions, with inadequate housing, minimal education, and scarce health services. Armed conflict is entrenched with large landowners, local political bosses, paramilitaries, and guerrillas competing for political, social, and economic power. The region is under the political jurisdiction of four departmental capitals but is largely neglected and devoid of an active state presence. The Magdalena Medio project seeks to create community-based devel- opment programs and income-generating projects and to increase local par- ticipation in the region's natural and productive wealth. It also seeks to reduce violence directly by creating conditions for relationships to be forged among the armed actors, communities, NGOs, and government. In principle, all the major actors in the conflict have expressed a willingness to cooperate in such an endeavor at the local level, even before a national-level settlement to the armed conflict has been reached. By reducing poverty and violence, the project's objective is to transform the area into a pole for peace and development. To address this problem, the Magdalena Medio project is implementing a peace and civic education program, emphasizing human rights, peaceful conflict resolution, and the construction of democratic decisionmaking at the local level. This is a multilevel approach to violence reduction, conflict resolution, and social capital accumulation. At the structural level, the pro- ject seeks to confront poverty and political and economic inequality. At the institutional level, it strives to bring into the communities long absent state agencies and agents, including police, justice, and municipal governments. At the interpersonal and individual levels, it is creating strong educational programs for peaceful coexistence, democracy, and engaged and informed citizen participation. Source: World Bank (1998b, 1998c). 58 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT violence, but it also provides important opportunities to introduce mea- sures to control or prevent violence and to rebuild the fabric of society. Consequently, a national peace and development strategy needs to main- stream, or integrate, violence reduction measures into its sector policy. This involves setting priorities in sectors central to violence reduction- such as education, the judiciary, sectors concerned with livelihood and job creation, and the environment. Within these sectors, it requires the identification of the interventions that will most effectively reduce vio- lence. Simultaneously, far greater intersectoral coordination and collabo- ration is essential if the maximum synergy from sector-specific interven- tions is to be translated into sustainable peace strategies. Sector-level details of these types of interventions require local consultation and con- sensus. Consequently, the following comments are intended to provide only general observations of potentially relevant issues Education Weaknesses in the education sector contribute to violence, just as violence weakens the education sector. Overcrowding in schools, a principal rea- son for elevated dropout rates, double- and triple-turnos [shifts] for stu- dents, and limited access to secondary and higher education, all translate into lost opportunities for education, training, and jobs. The short- and long-term negative effects on educational achievement associated with loss of human resources when teachers have been injured or murdered, elevated truancy rates when students cannot pass through guerrilla-, paramilitary-, or gang-controlled areas, and property destruction have been widely documented. These indicate the importance of trying to address these problems. Strengthening the education sector provides youth with viable alter- natives to delinquency, criminal behavior, and guerrilla group member- ship. High-quality education and training must be provided for all age groups in both rural and urban areas, going beyond mandates for uni- versal enrollment or access to literacy skills. This requires infrastructure investment, curriculum review, and improved management. It entails building more schools, training more teachers and administrators, and designing materials that impart substantive knowledge about issues of violence and peace. Schools are therefore powerful socializing institutions for shaping val- ues and promoting citizen participation and democracy. Teaching the use of conflict resolution techniques in classrooms will provide examples that can be reinforced elsewhere in society. The education sector can work with security organizations and communities to reduce safety problems for teaching personnel. Finally, the education sector has a role to play in VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 59 the referral of children, youth, and families who are at risk from violence. In this way, schools can act as a first line of defense, with strong inter- institutional ties to allow for referral and follow-up. Judiciary Corruption, congestion, abuse, procedural delay, and administrative inef- ficiency have undermined public confidence in the judiciary's ability to penalize criminal behavior and provide effective conflict resolution mechanisms at community level. With a much cited 98 percent impunity rate, the viability of recent judicial reforms, such as sweeping constitu- tional changes, increases in judges' salaries, and training of jurists, have been questioned by civil society. The lack of an effective judicial dispute resolution mechanism generates perverse incentives for defaulting par- ties to take advantage of procedural delays. Recent recommendations include: * Increase community-based conflict resolution mechanisms. * Reduce congestion and processing delay through institutional and organizational changes, substantive investment in the training of judges, modernization of the judicial office, an emergency congestion reduction program, and an intense communications campaign of pub- lic education. * Strengthen managerial capacity and key organizational functions by improving institutional coordination with other branches of the gov- ernment and within the judicial sector and key human resource man- agement functions, including the selection of judges and administra- tive personnel, and performance evaluation.17 A key element of the Judicial Reform Program is to increase the supply of community-based conflict resolution mechanisms, as mandated in the 1991 Constitution. Currently, high costs, lengthy delays, and low confi- dence in the judiciary leave many Colombians without recourse to effec- tive resolution mechanisms. Benefits would include the introduction of procedures based on oral arguments with less formality and a reinforce- ment of the values and benefits of peaceful conflict resolution. To ensure greater access, measures should be developed for effective community 17 For a fuller discussion of the proposed Judicial Reform Program, see World Bank (1998c). 60 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT outreach, such as an "outreach worker" responsible for the dissemination of service information. Livelihood and job Creation Creating livelihoods for rural and urban people is central to peace build- ing. Violence affects the manner in which rural populations make a liveli- hood and urban people secure jobs. A number of different state sectors, with links to civil society and private businesses, have responsibility for the creation of jobs and livelihood opportunities. In rural areas, one potential initiative relates to the government's rec- ommendation for market-based agrarian reform through the implemen- tation of Law 160. This provides for government subsidies of up to 80 percent for peasant groups to purchase and subdivide large land hold- ings voluntarily sold by their private owners. However, peasant groups are unlikely to qualify for credit, except from the State-owned Caja Agraria, which is being scaled-down. Therefore, alternative options to provide sustainable livelihoods for rural dwellers need to be developed. In addition, the government should recognize that the "land issue" must be reexamined within the peace negotiations. Job creation in urban areas must target not only areas of high unemployment but also areas of high violence. In particular, vulnerable groups at increased risk from victim- ization, including women and the displaced, would benefit from the sta- bility and rewards associated with employment. Partnerships among government, business, and civil society should generate microenterprise loans at affordable rates. These would preferably be linked to education and training initiatives. Environment Given that Colombia has major reserves of oil, natural gas, and coal, the issue of protecting biodiversity in environmentally fragile areas is a par- ticular concern in regions rich in natural resources. The Ministry of the Environment, the private sector (both national and multinational), and civil society should participate in public debate to identify and reach agreement on future national policy concerning the country's natural resources. In addition, environmental policy monitoring should be strengthened. Of particular importance is the issue of indigenous peo- ples' land rights. Although the government has already made provision for such rights, they should be reinforced. In urban areas, attention should be paid to potable water and sanitation systems through infra- structure projects, especially in cities with high proportions of displaced persons. VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 61 Municipal Level: Social Capital Projects At a time when the erosion of social capital, resulting from high levels of violence, continues to fragment poor communities, the rebuilding of trust and cohesion is a critical priority. Therefore, large, "top-down," sector- level interventions should be complemented by small, "bottom-up," municipal-level projects. The objectives of such projects will vary depending on the context. Nevertheless, they may include the development of municipal-level strategic plans for peace and reconstruction. These would identify prior- ity objectives, resources, needs, and benchmarks to strengthen local insti- tutions, reaffirm citizenship, and provide mechanisms for the negotiation of conflict. Such decentralized plans would also allow the specific causes and manifestations of violence in different areas of Colombia to be taken into account. Such plans should be developed in an interactive and par- ticipatory process, to involve as many stakeholders as possible. Key activ- ities may include capacity building of municipal institutions and civil society for operationalizing plans and creation of steering committees to represent community interests. Such a project could include the following components: community- level assessments to identify perceptions of the causes of violence, its costs for the community, and the priorities for community-level solu- tions; a small number of focused pilot projects, designed to consolidate social capital and help youth and other vulnerable members of the com- munity feel less excluded; the incorporation of an appropriate evaluation component for all interventions to allow for more effective resource allo- cation and replication of best practices; and the creation of municipal- level task forces for peace and development to monitor the process, con- sult regularly with civil society, and facilitate the dissemination of information. 62 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT APPENDIX 2.1 VARIOUS DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON VIOLENCE CAUSALITY Biomedical sciences explore the role of biobehavioral factors such as endocrinological mechanisms, neurotransmitters and receptors, nutri- tion, and aging processes to explain, for example, the preponderance of men and youth as perpetrators of violence. Criminology focuses on deterrence as the principle means of controlling violent behavior. Punishments, including humiliation, incarceration, or execution, are primary control mechanisms, and the demonstration effects of increased conviction and incarceration rates are arguably as important as direct punishment of offenders. Economics relies on the theory of rational choice, where decisions to engage in criminal activity are based on considerations of costs (likeli- hood of punishment) and benefits (usually financial gain). A person com- mits an offense because the outcome appears more valuable than the out- come of other activities in which he or she could invest time and resources. People commit assaults not because their motivations are dif- ferent, but because their perceived benefits and costs differ. Epidemiology stresses violence prevention through the identification of individual risk factors and protective factors that indicate whether a per- son is more likely to become an aggressor or victim of violence. Underlying this approach is the assumption that behavior modification, environmental manipulation, or both can mitigate risk factors and enhance protective factors. Political science focuses on structural explanations that identify broad societal, political, or economic causes such as poverty or lack of opportu- nity, which operate independently of human cognition. Violence and other illegitimate behaviors arise when people are deprived of legitimate means and resources to realize culturally valued goals. Psychology emphasizes two principal explanations for violent behavior. The first is developmental theory, where key deterrents to violence are early parent-child ties of love, childhood experiences relatively free of punitive discipline or abuse, and experiences that reinforce child attach- ments, minimize frustrations, and encourage flexible inner controls. The second is social learning theory, where behavior, including violent behav- ior, is learned through imitation of role models and reinforced by rewards and punishments received in interaction with others. VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 63 Sociology analyzes sociological explanations of violent behavior. It inter- prets this learned behavior in terms of the norms and values transmitted across generations. Certain subgroups exhibit higher rates of violence because they are participants in a subculture that has more violent norms. Within this discipline, the interactionist approach looks at the sequence of actions that escalates conflict into violence and the process through which assaultive violence occurs. Source: Adapted from Rosenberg and Mercy (1991). APPENDIX 2.2 SUMMARY: MAIN SOCIAL AGENTS INVOLVED IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA, 1948-98 Social actors in violent armed conflict 1948-58 1958-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 1994-98 Traditional Urban Political peace Presidential President President State weakened by political insurrection of established elections of Betancur's Gaviria's allegations of establishment: El Bogotazo, with two-party 1970 widely Amnesty of constitutional President Liberals- followed by power sharing perceived as 1982; Peace reform intended Samper's electoral Conservatives La Violencia; in Frente fraudulent, process to decentralize financial support Liberal- Nacional resulting in attempts at and give local- from drug cartels Conservative M-19 guerrillas. political reform, level political rural civil war Turbay's direct elections representation National of mayors Security Statute Peasant Conflict for Peasant land Failed land reform: joined Peasant leaders targeted by movement land invasions under guerrillas to fight or grow paramilitary ANUC coca First-generation Communist National level guerrilla activities FARC founding Cold war Intensification of guerrilla self-defense in conflict; pro-Soviet FARC UP; fighting collapse armed forces movements groups active formed in 1950s, Maoist EPL with armed increases conflict with forces in coffee- in 1960s, pro-Cuban ELN in forces, providing economic participating in growing areas early 1960s protection to reliance on coca zones; and remote coca farmers; criminally expanding social mountains taxation of derived base of guerrillas; drug cartels; domestic conflict with kidnapping; resources from paramilitary extortion drugs (FARC) and oil (ELN) Second- Among the main guerrilla groups, generation M-19 pursued political armed guerrilla struggle for political movements representation, and MAQL fought for indigenous rights; 1989 Peace Accords made with various groups Marijuana and Conflicts associated with coca Protection of labs and drug opera- coca producers production with armed forces, tions by guerrillas means their sym- drug cartels, protected by pathizers are increasingly attacked by guerrillas by paramilitary and armed forces Drug Violent Establishment Violent penetration of agricultural intermediaries conflict of MAS and areas to acquire land for cattle and cartels relating to other AUCs to ranching and commercial coca control and kill guerrillas; production; trade routes for coca; organization of early collabo- increasing collaboration with drug crime ration with paramilitary armed forces Paramilitary forces Decree 3398 of 1968, giving the Privatization of security Establishment of military right to arm civilians forces through self-defense CONVIVIR self- groups defense groups; terrorization of population in guerrilla-held areas to control coca trade routes, untouched by military Note: ANUC-National Peasant Association; AUC-United Self-Defense Organization of Colombia; CONVIVIR-Private Security Group; FARC-Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; ELN-National Liberation Army; EPL-Popular Liberation Army, MAQL-Quintfn Lame Armed Movement; MAS-Death to Kidnappers; UP-Patriotic Front. APPENDIX 2.3 INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA Level of causality Policy Structural Institutional Interpersonal Individual approach level level level level Criminal Constitutional DESEPAZ in Cali: Casas de Justicia: Incarceration for offenders justice reforms that coordinated efforts by improve poor increase penalties forensic medicine, police communities' access for felonies, shift department, and mayor's to conciliation services evidentiary office to collect and and negotiated legal procedure, analyze information on outcomes strengthen judicial, street violence police, and penal services Police surveillance of high-crime areas Public Restrictions on gun Removal of street vendors Programs that teach Prenatal care, early infant health possession from high-crime areas parenting skills that care, and day care that pro- promote secure mote secure attachment Limits on violent DESEPAZ in Cali: attachment, television epidemiological case psychological Fostering development of surveillance of homicide; resiliency, and protective personal mayor, police, forensic nonviolent environ- attributes medicine, and community ment for children leaders coordinate efforts Que las Armas Descansen through bimonthly meetings en Paz: guns for vouchers, to discuss homicide patterns gun control laws Social Clubes de Jovenes Mujeres Creadoras de PROCREAR: Training capital and Casas de J6venes: Paz: community-based community leaders, running provide alternative activities for displaced community paper, recreational oppor- persons relocated recreation for adults and tunities and residential to urban areas children, training in arrangements for construction, plumbing, at-risk youth Community mediators carpentry negotiate pacts of Schools for sports nonaggression with Credited with more development, Ciudad Bolivar gang neighborhood support and community members unity, lower rates of crime development Conflict Campaign: "You think Casas de Justicia: transformation everything has to be improve poor solved with your fists?" communities' access to conciliation services and negotiated legal outcomes Human Prisoners' rights: rights demonstrations by prisoners protesting against conditions in overcrowded prisons Source: DESEPAZ; Centro Medico, APPENDIX 2.4 INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE SOCIAL VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA Level of ca usality Policy Structural Institutional Interpersonal Individual approaches level level level level Criminal New Constitution: Coordinated efforts by justice Criminalize domestic forensic medicine, violence, punish police department, failure to meet and mayor's office to child support collect and analyze payments,. information on violence; increase punishment Police surveillance of a71 for sexual offenses high-crime areas Public Restrict gun Remove street vendors; Improve drivers' and Prenatal and early infant health carrying, limit. Network for Prevention pedestrian's respect for day care, guns for violence on TV of Child Abuse; the crosswalks vouchers, "know before DESEPAZ, Cali you drink," developing protective personal attributes, promoting secure attachment, "immunization," screening for women victims of violence, treat child abusers and batterers Social Cultural, recreational, Empowering women capital and sports events for youth, victims of violence youth clubs or houses, schools for sports development, com- munity develop- ment, train and organize community guards Conflict Campaign: "You think Teaching conflict resolution transformation everything has to be skills, participatory solved with your fists?" development of a school guide for getting along, houses of justice, C, centers for arbitrage and conciliation, family commissaries Human As a signatory Empowering women rights country, applications of victims of violence * Universal Declaration of Human Rights * Convention to Sanction, Eradicate and Prevent Violence Against Women (Convenci6n de Belem do Pari) * Declaration of the ,________ Rights of Children Source: DESEPAZ. 70 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahrend, R. 1998. 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Processed. . 1997. "Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Colombia." World Bank, Washington, D.C. Processed . 1998a. "Violence in Colombia: Toward Peace, Partnerships and Sustainable Development." World Bank Sector Study. Washington, D.C.. Processed. . 1998b. "Project Appraisal Document: Magdalena Medio Project." World Bank, Washington, D.C. Processed . 1998c. "Economic and Social Development Issues for the Short and Medium Term." World Bank Policy Note. Washington, D.C. Processed. CHAPTER 3 THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA Cecilia Lopez Montanlo Arturo Garcia Durdn INTRODUCTION This essay on peace in Colombia is intended as a contribution to the most important debate facing the country at the beginning of the twenty-first century: how to end, once and for all, the violence besetting Colombian society for more than 50 years. Because the conflict, involving countless factors, has lasted so long, and because Colombia has been unable to stop it, this work is a response to the imperative of analyzing the Colombian reality in a new way. The Colombia of today is very different from the country of 50 years ago. The leading social and economic indicators show progress in recent decades, but not all Colombians have benefited from it. Some people enjoy standards of living comparable to those of developed countries, but at least half of the population is far removed from a similar quality of life. Because of this unequal distribution of the benefits of Colombian development, the diagnosis usually made about the country has not been entirely objective. Moreover, a review of current problems-such as drug- trafficking, corruption, and violence-discloses a common pattern: When problems start to appear, they are underestimated; when they escalate, they are ignored or considered remote because they do not affect society as a whole. Now, however, the Colombian crisis is so serious that it can- not be ignored. In the international arena, Colombia's situation is also complex. Alongside signs of foreign governments' concern toward the armed con- flict and offers to collaborate in a peace process, the international com- munity has highlighted such problems as drug-trafficking, human rights violations, and corruption. These expressions affect Colombia's reputa- Nelson Camelo collaborated to the developrment of this work by preparing the basic information. The authors would also like to thank Carlos Alberto Garciafor his taluable comments and contributions andfor his suggestions in thefinal edition. 78 THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 79 tion in the global arena at a time when foreign solidarity and cooperation are necessary to make peace policies a success. Achieving a lasting peace is thus more complex than any other task the Colombian people have undertaken. To accomplish this means resetting society's direction and defining new alternatives for the country in polit- ical, economic, and social affairs. Based on the findings of a series of recent studies on Colombia's eco- nomic development, this chapter presents a diagnosis of causes of Colombia's armed conflict and suggests ways to end it. It explores the country's fiscal space for financing both a peace process and the agree- ments that may come from political negotiations with armed rebel groups. The World Bank and the ECLA have supported the realization of this work. It is in this way that these organizations have wished to contribute to the process of analysis and reflection on the nature and solutions of Colombian peace and development problems. There is a noticeable lack of clarity and specificity about the national problems that have to be solved to end the confrontation. Thus we see, on one hand, the guerrilla pushing a vague and outdated discourse, and, on the other, a very simplistic perception from other sectors of society. This is why we have been unable to reach a deeper understanding of the roots of the conflict. On a positive note, many Colombians now want to take advantage of the peace process to tackle, once and for all, what they consider the coun- try's most basic economic, social, and political problems. But this desire, though widely shared, has not been made entirely explicit. In fact, little effort has been made to study, in depth, the nature and size of these prob- lems, or to give them the publicity and airing they deserve. Moreover, the parties involved in the conflict have made little effort to find a way to solve the problems as a group. Faced with this reality, the first part of this chapter proposes that the cause of Colombia's constant state of confrontation, and the resulting escalation of violence, is the insufficiently acknowledged political, eco- nomic, and social exclusion that has characterized its society. This rela- tionship between exclusion and violence, which is made explicit in this work and constitutes its main contribution, has not been thoroughly debated. This omission is made largely because past and current analyses of Colombian reality have had as a starting point the belief in three myths: first, that Colombia has a democratic political system; second, that the country's economy is solid; and third, that poverty is the fundamen- tal cause of the violence. These three myths must be critically examined. The second part of this chapter discusses three crucial issues for the country's past and future, S0 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT which includes achieving a consensus on the fundamental causes of the armed conflict. Once this is done, a political consensus must be reached on how to change the country's political organization into a true partici- pative democracy. Moreover, an economic and social consensus is need- ed to change the productive system and the social structure. These struc- tures must stop generating privileges for a few and should provide equal opportunities for all. This would require profound structural transforma- tions and a coherent policy strategy to initiate these changes. Since these economic and social measures take time, they should be started as soon as possible. The third part of this chapter relates to the fiscal space avail- able to finance the peace process, i.e., Colombia's fiscal limitations on (a) financing the search for peace, (b) the costs of achieving it, and most important, (c) making peace sustainable. To illustrate how the country's current economic constraints impose real limits on the investment requirements of a peace process, this work presents an "economistic" model that attempts to minimize the econom- ic costs of peace. Beyond the economic analysis, this section attempts to show that achieving peace in Colombia is more than a problem of financial resources. It entails transforming power relations. Although public funds will have to be allocated to carry out several programs to achieve peace and foster social change, given the already high level of social investment and current fiscal limitations, investment options need to meet two fun- damental criteria. First, social policy must be designed so that centralized spending not only meets social equality, but also helps to overcome social exclusion. Second, and according to the analytical framework used in this work, we must accept that the higher costs are associated with institu- tional changes affecting current power structures. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Before getting into the analysis of armed conflict in Colombia and the recent peace processes, a brief review of similar experiments in Latin America would allow us to extract some useful lessons for Colombia. A review of peace negotiations with rebel groups in Central America dur- ing the 1990s is particularly revealing. Of course, Colombia should also examine its own experience with the peace process to discover positive elements and avoid repeating past mistakes. Central America's Experience There were important differences in the peace negotiations in El Salvador and Guatemala, Central America's two main cases at hand. In both THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 81 instances, the intensity of armed conflict and the position agreed on mil- itary and political affairs were different. These differences extended also to society's ideas about the sources of conflict, the state of the economy, the negotiating abilities of the different parties, and the mechanisms agreed to by the parties involved. A complex sequence of peace negotiations and peace consolidation capped these two countries' political-military conflicts. In the end, they managed to arrange a series of agreements about reforms and programs corresponding to clear proposals made by the negotiating parties. A schedule of meetings was set, and, when possible, budgets for carrying out the consequent policies and programs were agreed upon. To extract lessons applicable to Colombia from the experiences of El Salvador and Guatemala, two profiles regarding the peace processes pur- sued in these two countries are presented in table 3.1. Appendix 3.1 describes the contents of their accords. Despite circumstances peculiar to each of the two countries, there are some common elements and useful lessons for the current Colombian peace process (1998-99) between the government and the two most important armed groups in the country: the FARC and the ELN. They can be summarized as follows: - These are complex peace processes, in which frequent interruptions are more the rule than the exception. - The processes are gradual in the evolution, definition, and signing of agreements (the first accords aim to create a favorable environment for negotiations-humanization of the conflict, for example; the final accords concern the cease-fire and economic and social reforms). * Talks were usually held in foreign countries (Mexico for El Salvador, European countries for Guatemala). * The facilitating role played by other countries' governments has been deci- sive (regional support for El Salvador, European countries for Guatemala). * The United Nations has fulfilled an important mission both in guiding the negotiating framework and in supporting the entire process (observation and verification). Colombia's Experience The major difference between the peace negotiations in El Salvador and Guatemala and past and more recent peace initiatives in Colombia is that 82 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT TABLE 3.1 COMPARISON OF THE PEACE PROCESSES IN EL SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA El Salvador Guatemala Military and * Important military * Equal strength between army political strengths: 14,000 and rebels positioning armed rebels * Troop reductions: 1,500 armed of the * Control of 20 percent of rebels rebellion the national territory * Rebel movement without * International recognition political voice * Technical parity with regular * Little territorial control by forces rebels * National political support * Ethnic and cultural (civil society and opposition) components in the conflict Negotiation * Long negotiation phase * Long negotiation process phase: (more than two years) (six years) features and * Influenced by international * Influenced by international mechanisms pressure pressure * International support * Significant participation of civil (Contadora Group, group society groups of friendly nations) *Seat of negotiations abroad * Seat of negotiations abroad * International support X UN participation * UN participation Phases, * Gradual negotiation process * Gradual negotiation process content, and (steps coincide with (12 accords between 1994 and features of agreements) 1996) the accords * Initial phases and * Cease-fire agreed to at the end agreements centered on of the accords issues favoring negotiations: * Contents of accords coincide humanization of war, with particularities of conflict. human rights, negotiating Agreements on human rights, agenda and schedule refugee resettlement; historical *Final accord (Chapultepec, clarification of human rights Mexico): commitments on violations, identity and rights economic and social issues of indigenous peoples, civil * Issues in final accord: power and duty of the army, armed forces, national cease-fire, social and policy, judicial system, economic issues, electoral electoral system, economic regime, reintegration of and social issues (stressing rebels, verification of peace agrarian issues and National accords, peace accord Reconstruction Plan) THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 83 efforts in the first two countries culminated in peace accords. This has not been the case in Colombia. Several analyses of this issue in Colombia have underscored the complexity of these negotiations. To establish a comparison with the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, let us briefly review Colombia's peace processes with different armed groups in the first half of the 1990s. The first one took place in March 1990 with the M-19. Additional accords followed in 1991 with the PRT, the EPL, and the MAQL. Accords resumed in 1994 with the Socialist Renovation Movement (CRS), the Francisco Garnica Guerrilla Coordinator Front, and finally with the Popular Militias of the People and for the People, the Independent Militias of Valle de Aburra, and the Metropolitan Militias of Ciudad de Medellin. (These accords are reviewed in Appendix 3.2, sec- tions I through 7.) Several relevant elements emerge from the analysis of these accords. In one way or another, all include the need to reform the National Constitution either because of a desire to participate in the 1991 Constituent National Assembly or because of a recognized need to intro- duce important changes in the Colombian legal code. However, they do not identify commitments to tackle the country's structural problems in depth. They sought mainly to incorporate guerrilla groups into legality by promoting their political projects, with every possible guarantee pos- sible, from the government. Surprisingly little reference is made in the various accords to drug- trafficking, despite its frequent association with some armed groups' activities, at least from the financial standpoint. The only direct mention of this problem appears in the document signed with the M-19, which, for many observers, is the most successful agreement with a Latin American guerrilla group, but also the one most squandered by its parties (Bejarano 1995). The most important item revealed by this comparison is that while El Salvador and Guatemala negotiated the conflict, Colombia has so far nego- tiated only the demobilization of some guerrilla groups. It has not reached significant agreements with the two major groups, the FARC and the ELN. Only now that nearly 5,000 armed forces have been demobilized, with- out any definite steps toward peace, is this phase beginning. In Colombia, these partial and somewhat isolated arrangements have "parcel-up" the peace process (Bejarano 1995) and turned the FARC and the ELN into the sole interlocutors. A second conclusion flows from the previous one: While in El Salvador and Guatemala the negotiations were furthered with a united guerrilla front, in Colombia, negotiations have come close, but have not reached what Bejarano calls a "homogenous negotiating space." The level and content of demands also differ. While in El Salvador and Guatemala the guerrilla movement sought certain gains in social, 84 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT economic, and political organization, in Colombia, state policies have gradually made many of these advances independently of peace negoti- ations. In Colombia's current peace process, there are several surprising aspects in the economic and social proposals from parties involved in the conflict: the State, guerrilla forces, self-defense groups, and civil society (Appendix 3.3). The most important one is the vagueness of the different proposals, which are more like lists of irrefutably good intentions than specific proposals to tackle structural problems in Colombia's political system, economic organization, and social welfare. For instance, the FARC's proposals contain a discussion of the economy without reference to the current global context. And although several of the FARC militants call for changes in the current development model, the proposed change is basically a return to protectionism, with no new elements and no criti- cal analysis of protectionism's effects on the economy. Nor does Colombian civil society get off free for its proposals to fur- ther the peace process. Nonetheless, throughout the country's main eco- nomic sectors there is a deep and generalized recognition that it is high time to invest in peace. Along these lines, the National Union Council, the most important private sector organization representing several sec- tors of the national economy, has said that in a serious negotiation with the guerrilla forces, it would be willing to study joint financing plans with the government, especially the creation of a co-financing fund com- bining private sector and international contributions for peace-related activities. Colombia's most important rancher's union, Fedegan, also presented a proposal that stated, "A true commitment from the group of Colombians that generates wealth would be to turn over part of the wealth to embark on a crusade against poverty." These monies, which would make up a "social fund for equality and justice," would be used to leverage international commitment for rebuilding the country. This quick review of the most recent peace processes in Latin America shows that the complex march toward peace has begun in Colombia. Compared to the successful processes in El Salvador and Guatemala, however, many substantial steps still have to be taken to reach a satisfac- tory result. These countries' experience shows, first, that interruptions, but not failures, can occur on the long, grueling road to peace. Second, unlike what happened in El Salvador and Guatemala, the international com- munity's participation in the Colombian peace process is unclear. To ensure the continuity of the peace process in Central America when obstacles arose, friendly nations and the United Nations played a prominent role in the peace process. Finally, regarding economic THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 85 resources, proposals presented so far have ignored the high fiscal cost of any peace process and Colombia's limited space to generate those resources. THREE GREAT MYTHS During the past century, Colombia has been building its nationhood on two pillars: a political democracy, considered to be one of the oldest in Latin America, and an economy characterized by stability, good manage- ment, and continuous, although not very high, growth over the last 60 years (up to the mid-1990s).1 These virtues have long been the Colombian nation's distinctive emblems within the region. Now, however, as the country confronts the enormous challenge of wresting peace from historic upheaval, reality-based analyses have demon- strated that Colombia's political democracy and economic soundness can be considered as "myths." That violence is a phenomenon fundamentally associated with poverty has likewise been unmasked as another myth. Colombian authors, writing about the country's current problems, address these mistaken beliefs. Marco Palacios (1997) states: "Colombia's problem is not finding peace, but building democracy Armed conflict is the result of an absence of democratic institutionality. The problem lies in the political context in its broadest sense and not in confrontations between guerrilla forces and the State." Luis Jorge Garay (1998a) com- ments, "Colombia is the only country in the region that has not suffered abrupt recessions [up to 1998] or seen serious exchange or fiscal crises in the last three decades." However, this pace has not been enough to mas- sively incorporate large sectors of the Colombian population efficiently and productively (Garay 1998b). Since chronic violence can be linked to the myths mentioned above and, since peace is related to recognizing and overcoming them, the tasks for Colombia imply much more than furthering peace negotiations and making fiscal adjustments to the economy. We must accept that peace, not war, has been the exception in Colombia in the 20th century. Specialized literature on the issue recog- nizes that the success of a peace process hinges largely on the inclusion of substantive economic and social issues in the negotiating agenda-the peace experiences of El Salvador and Guatemala seem to bear this out. Colombia has devoted great attention to studying the political vio- lence of the 1950s but has only recently understood that today's war is I This section is based on the works of Garay (1998a 1998b), Palacios (1997), and the National Planning Deparment (DNP) (1998). 86 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT multifaceted and much more complex. Colombian society has also over- simplified the search for causes of the current armed confrontation to the point of underestimating elements basic to understanding it and finding true solutions. Therefore, for example, despite drug-trafficking's ability to destroy the social fabric and its supposed connections to guerrilla activities, this phenomenon has been studied only superficially, without identifying its specific influence on the present portrayal of the armed fighting in Colombia. Nevertheless, the abundance of expert research on Colombia's politi- cal and economic situation allows us to begin to analyze the causes of armed conflict and violence with some confidence. This research should also help in the preparation of proposals for solutions. The Myth of a Political Democracy The ability of democracy in Colombia to endure is legendary among Latin American countries and throughout the world. The brief interrup- tions in popularly elected governments in the twentieth century contrast strongly with the frequent outbreaks of de facto governments in other countries in the Latin American region. This longstanding tradition has led to an overly positive perception of the political system. Though based on allegedly free popular expression through elections, this system has been tainted by deeply rooted habits, political schemes, and trickery that on the pretext of preserving the country's institutions, have accomplished their mission of excluding large segments of national opinion from the political game. Repeated praise of "Colombian democracy" has con- tributed to the myth that Colombia is a country where political democra- cy rules. For the well-known Colombian historian Marco Palacios (1997): . . . the historical sense of conflict comes from the ideal of liberal democracy which has been systematically blocked in the last half of the century: first, due to violence and the state of siege, and then by the state of siege, clientelism and political corruption. This blockade means political, cultural and civil exclusion of the peasantry, includ- ing in this category, perhaps a bit arbitrarily, the poor living on the outskirts of urban areas. However, Colombia's recent efforts to expand its democracy must be recognized. The enactment of the 1991 Constitution is a clear expression of the country's democratic vocation in its recognition of the social duty of the State, its deeper treatment of decentralization, its statement of indi- vidual and collective rights, and its creation of institutions to ensure THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 87 social inclusion of historically unprotected people such as the indigenous and black communities. On a positive note, the Assembly for the National Constitution, which was in charge of preparing the new political charter, symbolized an opportunity for pluralism rarely experienced in Colombia in the twenti- eth century. For this reason, some ideas that had not had a political venue were expressed there. Although the new Constitution took a step toward modernization of the institutional order, it has not brought about the anticipated social equality, partly because it does not address the roots of the country's social and economic organization. In other words, it superimposed on an exclusionary and quasi-feudal type of social organization rules and insti- tutions that make Colombia look like a truly democratic society, although really it is not such a society. One need only evaluate Colombia's unfolding decentralization process to confirm these allegations. If any mechanism promotes partici- patory democracy, or at least expands opportunities for citizen participa- tion, it is the delegation of responsibilities and allocation of resources to territorial organizations. This is thought to be the best way of bringing the people closer to the exercise of power, thereby increasing true partic- ipation. However, while decentralization has succeeded in financing autonomous municipalities and fostering a new style of political leader- ship more sensitive to local interests, transferring the nation's wealth to territorial entities has also put a heavy burden on the state's finances and has improved participatory dynamics only a little. It can be said that the 1991 Constitution focused mainly on institutions. Thus, the people's opportunities for self-expression at the polls have mul- tiplied: popular elections of mayors and governors, plebiscites, referenda, open municipal councils, consultations, and annulment of mandates, among others. However, no similar progress has been seen in opportuni- ties for social control, participatory planning, and administration of such basic services as education and health care at community level. Heads of households have little input in decisions regarding their children's schools, nor do community leaders have the tools to supervise public works in their vicinity. The precariousness of participation at the local or even regional level suggests that advances in social equality (through the redistribution of resources of power to the poorest), which decentraliza- tion assumes, are still far from being realized. Despite these limitations, the proliferation of popular elections under the National Political Constitution has persuaded some social segments that Colombia's problems are due to too much democracy, not too little. Nonetheless, as long as Colombia remains uncommitted to achieving equal opportunity for each and every person, any social organization cre- 88 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT ated will apply rules and laws to the benefit of some individuals and the exclusion of others. Thus, it can be said that only after an agreement has been reached on the fundamentals of equality, will society stop sustain- ing a formalistic democracy, protecting a few and excluding from public decisionmaking wide segments of the population. The Myth of a Sound Economy In Latin America, the notion that Colombia has managed to reconcile macroeconomic stability with sustained growth is no longer believed. Colombia was one of the few exceptions in avoiding the debt crisis of the 1980s. However, since the mid-1990s, Colombia has started to experience a steady process of economic decline. Studies have shown that industry and agriculture have been left out of the international arena, and they have identified economic reasons that prevented more rapid economic growth and better distribution of the benefits of economic growth and stability (Garay 1998b, Echeverry 1998). The first thing these analyses reveal is that Colombia has been gov- erned by a culture of low capital formation. For the last 30 years, savings and private investment have been stuck at very moderate rates. Over the same period, other countries, chiefly in East Asia, have had to at least double their savings levels in relation to gross domestic product (GDP) to further their development (Garay 1998b). A second important finding of these studies is that Colombia has also been unable to modify its productive structure in a creative and func- tional way for economic development (Garay 1998b, Echeverry 1998). Most noticeably, Colombia has deindustrialized and "deagricultural- ized," and turned to tertiary activities during the last part of the century. This is why, unlike the industrial sector in more developed economies, Colombian industry contributes, gradually, less to GDP, lacks strength to diversify, and it is not in good shape to compete in an open economy. In the case of agriculture, production has not switched to products with great export potential. Moreover, the traditional products (those more typical of a rural economy) are declining in importance, in turn decreas- ing earning potential for many of the rural poor. Moreover, Colombia's service sector is failing to stimulate the economy, becoming passive and unproductive. Simultaneous deagriculturalization and deindustrialization are affect- ing the growth capacity and the accumulation of wealth, encouraging the rural population to migrate into cities. In turn, cities have been unable to put these people to work. Therefore, as Garay points out, this has led to stagnation of production. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 89 Consequently, and in spite of the global economy's ups and downs, Colombia's production model is inadequate because it is based primarily on generating rents. Part of Colombia's past economic growth has been due to foreign-based prosperity, not necessarily the innovative effort of domestic production. Its economic dynamics have resided in exploitation of natural resources such as oil and coal or in illegal businesses such as drug production. A third finding from recent analyses of the Colombian economy con- cerns the evolution of industry over the last 40 years. Compared with Latin America as a whole, Colombia began to deindustrialize much ear- lier. Manufacturing did not reach a significant share in national product. Moreover, at the end of the 1970s, national industry had not diversified sufficiently to generate a dynamic that would have allowed it not only to respond to domestic demand, as it has done so far, but also to compete successfully in international markets. In addition, the opening of trade and the ensuing economic interna- tionalization that began at the end of the 1980s have brought to light Colombian industry's weaknesses and other serious political, economic, and social mistakes made by the national leadership in the recent past. In the first place, we have learned that Colombia is now paying the price of having encouraged import substitution in the agricultural sector during the protectionist era, instead of promoting new agricultural production that would have a comparative advantage on the global market, as Chile, Argentina, and other countries did. Later exposed to international compe- tition, these highly protected products could not survive in international competition. lime and economic resources were thus lost. To make matters worse, great swathes of Colombia's rural community were left without any viable production alternatives. "The end of the 20th century and the new realities in the world's political and economic environment find Colombia's rural sector floundering in a profound crisis whose nature and magnitude have not been properly recognized" (Echeverry 1998). Second, the restructuring of Colombia's financial sector becomes more imperative. The sector is considered oligopolistic, thin, and prone to high rates of interest, high margin of intermediation, and volatile profitability. Its growth is also disproportionate to growth of other sectors in the econ- omy. In summary, these studies reveal that Colombia's financial policy has been out of sync with such new realities as globalization. It remains highly fragmented, and it has fed consumerism by concentrating on financing consumption instead of investments to increase the country's productive capacity (Garay 1998a, 1998b). Another problem closely associated with the modest performance of the productive structure is the backwardness of the education system and its implications for training the country's human resources base. 90 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Considering the importance of this topic for its purely economic conse- quences and its social and political repercussions, it will be analyzed in detail later in this chapter. Thus, the seeds of social exclusion have been planted and nurtured in the political arena, and the organization of the economy has further seg- mented the rewards of moderate economic growth. Colombia has failed to establish a sustainable basis for strong medium- and long-term growth. Foreign savings have financed, in part, consumption rather than investment and innovation needed to compete successfully in interna- tional trade, and for failing to distribute equitably or save the benefits of foreign windfalls. Consequently, Colombia's economic future is seriously jeopardized. The Myth of Poverty as a Main Cause of Violence Many studies have analyzed the causes of Colombia's armed conflict and violence. Recently, a study by the National Planning Department (DNP) documented several of their findings and went on to present some new results. Concerning the determinants of violence, this work suggests that, contrary to traditional interpretations, poverty per se cannot be consid- ered the fundamental cause of violence. Inequality is a more important explanation. Thus, inequality under a weak State that cannot assume its basic duties of enforcing legality, mediating conflicts, providing for col- lective welfare, and educating citizens is much more likely than poverty to motivate social (even armed) conflict (DNP 1998). The DNP study also found that the lower citizen participation, the higher are the indicators of violence. Moreover, sufficient evidence sup- ports the hypothesis that political and economic exclusion, which has characterized the evolution of Colombian society, gives rise to a dynam- ic of violence. In other words, the current problem of Colombian society resides in the roots of the political system and economic organization, and, therefore, it is in that area where the search for a solution of the cur- rent conflict should start. A hypothesis could be made that Colombians, individually, are demo- cratic but, faced with a political, economic, and social order that includes and benefits only the few, those left out tend to react and express their disagreement with violence. Social exclusion, understood as a phenomenon affecting the political system and the country's economic and social organization, seems to be the root cause of violence. Attacking exclusion means, first, going beyond economic efficiency, tackling also the issue of asset redistribution, and, second, guaranteeing a State that protects the common good. Both actions imply redesigning the terms on which the country is socially and institu- THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 91 tionally organized. This leads to the conclusion that the power structure needs to be changed. PEACE POLICIES Today, Colombia is not only aware of the imperative of achieving peace, but the idea has also gained ground that explanations for the different forms of violence are structural in nature. About the Peace Process Entering into a peace process does not necessarily imply immediate ces- sation of armed conflict. Neither party is likely to win over the other, at least not for a long time (Rangel 1998). Even if this did happen, it would not solve the structural problems that caused the rebellion and, sooner or later, the problem could resurface. The bipartisan agreement, reflected in the National Front as an alter- native to the political violence Colombia experienced throughout the 1950s, is an example of an untenable solution. This type of political arrangement allows the problems, though diminished, to remain dor- mant, and when conflict breaks out again, it is much stronger. The per- sistence of confrontation also constrains economic development. Colombia's great challenge in its search for peace is seen clearly in two realities. The first is the enormousness of the task of uncovering the myths on which Colombian society has historically resided. The second is the persistence of the guerrilla phenomenon, which has withstood sud- den military attacks like the Anori operations, ideological setbacks at the end of the cold war, and the loss of public support. This means that the process has to be thought of as a lengthy one, and like almost every other peace process in the region, one that works in stages and progressively lays the foundations for a new society. Lessons from international experiences must be used in the peace process. The peace process should avoid missing the opportunity for an in-depth change in institutions, and to create a solid basis for medium- and long-term sustained growth. This statement should not be interpret- ed as an invitation to prolong the process unnecessarily, because the soon- er peace arrives, the better for Colombia-but it must be lasting peace. Crucial Stages in a Peace Process Given the complexity of the problem of violence in Colombia and the experience of other countries that have solved their armed conflicts polit- ically, this chapter identifies three crucial stages in a peace process. 92 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT The firsti the prenegotiation phase, entails building consensus among the different sectors of society on its fundamental problems. For Colombia, this moment would imply primarily consolidating national opinion on economic and institutional issues, and on the need to extend the practice of democracy to everyone and build a more just and inclu- sive economic system. This is an enormous challenge because reaching this consensus will require changes in Colombia's historical power struc- tures. But this is the scope of the challenge. The second stage entails defining the proposals for structural changes that must result from negotiations between the State and the armed groups. The third stage involves implementing the agreed changes and developing mechanisms to ensure their sustainability. Although these stages may occur in parallel, the process, as a whole, will not end until each step has been successfully completed. A review of the Colombian experience shows that the country's efforts of the last 16 years have been focused on the second stage of the process: discussing specific reforms. Unfortunately, this exercise stands little chance of success without consensus on a vast array of fundamental problems of Colombian society. First Stage: Consensus Building Colombia has made progress in laying the groundwork for negotiations with armed groups. However, considered as a whole, the peace process requires intense planning by the actors involved in the conflict and by the rest of Colombian society. A projection exercise carried out in 1997-98 called "Agenda Colombia" called together a group of leaders from different areas to construct sce- narios about the country's future. Afterward, Fedesarrollo-a well- known Colombian research center-quantified the results of this experi- ment to identify thieir implications for the country's immediate future. The first scenario assumed that Colombia's current conflict would con- tinue. The second assumed that the parties to the conflict would sit down at the negotiating table and establish a national coalition government. In the third, strong rules would be proposed to restore order. Finally, the fourth scenario identified the need to organize citizens to reject violence and exercise control over general management of public affairs by the authorities (Fedesarrollo 1998, Sept.-Oct.). The results of this experiment are interesting. In economic and social terms, the scenario of continued conflict shows the worst performance. The annual growth of GDP does not exceed 3 percent initially, falling to 2 percent at the beginning of this century; demand for labor first rises to 4 percent, then decreases to 2 percent; the consolidated fiscal deficit THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 93 reaches 3.5 percent, and capital outflows represent 5.5 percent of GDP in 1998 and 3.5 percent of GDP in consecutive years. If violence persists, investment will remain depressed, leading to low productivity growth. This situation is aggravated by neglect of education and health care due to budget constraints and ever changing priorities. These figures reveal that the relative balance Colombian society main- tained during recent decades is unsustainable and, more important, that this is the worst possible scenario for the economy and society because it penalizes growth and benefits only a few (Fedesarrollo 1998, Sept.-Oct.). In the other three scenarios, the domestic war ended, but in different ways and with different impacts in the economic and social sectors. To the surprise of many, the study reveals that the best scenario is not imme- diate peace negotiations with a coalition government, but the participa- tion of all citizens in the search for peace that makes a peace agreement a lasting result. The climate of harmony and trust shown in peace with rec- onciliation under this last scenario ensures a favorable economic climate for investment, growth, employment, and productivity. In addition, the agreements reached in peace negotiations allow social spending to increase, which, together with reduced violence, translates into improved well-being for the people. GDP will grow more than 3 percent until 2010, reaching 5 percent in 2014; demand for labor grows 4 percent a year; the consolidated fiscal deficit remains below 2.5 percent of GDP; and capital inflows reach 5 percent of GDP. The results of this recent study confirm that achieving domestic con- sensus is an important requisite to lasting peace and effective negotia- tions. This means that it is not the "national leaders," sitting around a table with the various armies' leaders, who will put the country on the desired road. Colombia's problems are so deep and so extensive that only an effective mobilization of citizens for peace and reform can produce effective change. Consensus on the Causes of the Conflict The first element of consensus to be constructed concerns the nature of the conflict and its root causes. Studies have now given us important information on the analytics of reforms for peace. In addition, the State, civil society, and the armed groups have made more explicit their inter- ests and positions. Again, we stress that all society must share, "own," and develop a common diagnosis in a participatory process. This common diagnosis must also be widely publicized to different stakeholders throughout the country This process would help to attain the necessary consensus on the sources of the Colombian armed conflict. Based on this consensus, the fol- 94 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT lowing steps identified in this work must be developed to bring a peace process to a successful conclusion. Achieving consensus on the diagnosis is a decidedly complex endeav- or. To do it, the actors involved in the process (representatives of the State, politicians, economic unions, military units, civil society, and guerrilla forces) will often have to relinquish their particular views about the prob- lem. And what is even more drastic, some groups must be willing, from that moment on, to give up part of the economic or political power they have today. If this broad consensus on the conflict's causes is not reached, when the moment arrives for reaching specific agreements on structural problems, negotiations will break down. Consensus on Political Issues Based on the shared diagnosis, the other broad agreement that must be reached concerns political issues. While acknowledging the magnitude of the urgently needed political reforms, a minimum agreement should include three broad objectives: expand democratic venues, give democ- racy a substantive content, and reform the political parties. Expand democratic venues. To modernize the Colombian political sys- tem, the transition from a formal democracy to a true democracy is essential. Restricted democracy is one of the country's basic problems, and it is often not identified as such. But this does not mean merely holding more elections or improving voter turnout in existing electoral processes. It means providing more space for effective participation by each and every member of Colombian society. Participation must be expanded in the venues nearest the people, where citizens interact daily: neighborhoods, towns, streets, and municipalities. Being able to choose their children's teacher is more important to parents than choosing the town mayor or provincial gov- ernor through elections. The concept of democracy is not associated only with an increase in the number of popularly elected government leaders, but also goes far beyond merely electing them. Citizen participation must be active between elections, and voters must be able to hold accountable the person they elect. They therefore need the proper information, mecha- nisms, and tools to exercise this responsibility. Although accountabili- ty systems can be improved, in an effort to reduce the economic and political costs of using them, a priority task is developing information systems that make it easier for voters to exercise control over the rep- resentatives they elect. Information exists, but it is not widely accessi- ble to the public and is expensive to process. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 95 * Give democracy a substanitive content. Plurality in debates and political campaigns must be achieved, but there are also widely shared national objectives that should direct individual group actions. It means that each political movement should be based on democratic principles, including liberty, equality, human rights, tolerance, respect, and civic responsibility. It also requires eliminating negative elements such as clientelism, exploitation of indigenous peoples, and buying votes. * Reform political parties. Colombia's Congress has been considering political party reform. Among the goals of reform are political parties that operate on the basis of ideological positions of a group, not as tem- porary alliances for electoral purposes, and a new party-financing plan that prevents interference by private interests. In Colombia, this reform is particularly important, not only to eradicate financing from illegal activities, but also to eliminate some of the country's worst problems: the confusion of public and private interests; an adequate statute for the opposition, absolutely essential in a true democracy; and avenues of participation for minority groups. All of these efforts should be directed toward renewal of leadership as well as transforming political practices whereby leaders relate both to their electorate and to the State. Leadership renewal should begin with the new local and regional leaders that have been emerging as decentralization progresses, moti- vated by collective interests, development proposals, and genuine com- mitments to their communities. New leaders should be recruited among representatives of academia, the sciences, cultural life, professional organizations, labor unions, NGOs, and any group that can, through its activities, nurture a democracy governed by the principles of trans- parency and dedication to collective service. The new political class the country needs should replace groups that have made a business out of public life and have corrupted the State's operations with private-and sometimes illegal-interests. This should be the highest goal of political consensus, since a true democracy is inconceivable if it is founded on corrupt notions of public administra- tion. Corruption is identified as one of the biggest threats to democracy's survival. Political consensus, not only in Colombia but also throughout the world, must therefore fight this practice, which is deeply rooted in so many aspects of national life. Colombian society's tolerance of illegal activities must give way to an unswerving commitment to ethics in all public and private activities. A culture based on easy wealth must be 96 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT replaced by one based on merit, personal effort, respect for honest work, and commitment to collective goals that advance the country's economic progress and social well-being. Consensus on Economic and Social Issues Windfalls, as we have seen, have not been enough to create a productive structure capable of laying the foundation for sustained development and a more equitable distribution of income. Two objectives-sustained growth and decreased inequality-must therefore be the cornerstone of consensus on economic and social issues. Generating income from primary products is exclusionary by defin- ition. Colombia should replace rent-seeking activities as a main source of growth with a productive dynamic and international competitive- ness. Only a competitive economy that creates productive employment can ensure a growth process whose benefits are distributed more equally. Today, problems abound in Colombia's traditional leading indus- tries-coffee, oil, manufacturing, and agriculture. Although new indus- tries that may eventually strengthen the economy are sprouting- telecommunications, infrastructure, flower and fruit growing, and aquaculture-Colonmlbia's productivity and international competitive- ness have declined. Looking for improvements in economic dynamics through consensus alone, however, will not work, because even with economic growth, Colombian society cannot generate equality, and, during crises, it pass- es on the costs to the population at large. The solution to a deep-rooted problem should not be limited to improved handling of sociopolitical instruments. Overcoming persistent inequality and social injustice, acknowledged as the prime cause of Colombia's armed struggle, requires drastic action right at the source of wealth and income genera- tion. This means that inequality cannot be eliminated without restruc- turing the way the most important productive assets are allocated and costs are distributed when the most powerful segments of society incur losses. The notion that equality can be achieved only by using sociopolitical instruments is misguided. Colombia still needs substantial reforms in education and human resource development; socioeconomic policy as a mechanism for redistributing wealth seems to be losing its effectiveness. We must begin to concentrate on the mechanics of production and on the redistribution of productive capacities. This means digging down to the foundations of power distribution in Colombian society-economic as well as political power. Only after the entire country has made a commit- THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 97 ment to achieving a society free from inexcusable inequalities will Colombia be on the road to peace.2 There may be more acceptance to expand citizen participation as a pro- posed solution than to accept a true redistribution of economic opportu- nities and, even less likely, political power. However, the intensification of the armed confrontation in recent years, and its serious implications for economic activity, in a way sensitized the privileged; therefore, they are expected to be more positive about this radical change in the coun- try's life. Many countries, including some in Latin America, have managed to include segments of the population that have historically lacked oppor- tunities to participate in the development process. This means that par- ticipation is not an impossible goal. The necessary transformations in this area are the ones that have his- torically been postponed in Colombia. Among them are reforms in access to rural and urban property, the democratization of capital, and tax reform to distribute the burden according to the taxpayer's real econom- ic capabilities. During a peace-building process, the issue of economic growth becomes even more important. Within the context of globalization, Colombia's integration into the international economy must continue. The discussions of the Washington Consensus have opened up a great opportunity for a second phase of globalization. The situation should be kept in mind in countries like Colombia that need to restore accelerated growth. For this, Colombian society must transform its economy's very foundations. Productive sectors, particularly industry and agriculture, must adapt to the new realities and seriously begin to compete. Paradoxically, regarding foreign aid possibilities, this moment offers Colombia a great opportunity. Right now eradicating povertv and striv- ing for equality are assuming pride of place on the world's development agenda (L6pez Montafio 1998). Proposals to overcome exclusion, partic- ularly when formulated in the context of a quest for peace, will be greet- ed with understanding and support by agencies for multilateral devel- opment and bilateral cooperation, whose objectives will be quite similar to national goals. Thus, broad collaboration for the peace process will be obtainable, and Colombia will be able to begin to recover its good repu- tation by joining the group of developing countries that are committed to the new global priorities (UNDP 1998). 2 The case of Uruguay should be mentioned in this connection. Basic education in Uruguay is public, obligatory, and less likely to be politicized since it is not run by the Ministry of Education. Education, conceived in this manner, has been identified as the way to build a society where equal opportunity is a reality. 98 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT There will also be possibilities for foreign aid outside the social sector. If Colombia has any valid reason for asking the global community for preferential treatment in trade and in development financing, it is because of its commitment to a peace process directed toward solving the basic cause of the confrontation: political, economic, and social exclusion. Second Stage: Structural Changes As problems of political and economic exclusion are related to the State's inability to preserve the common good, then institutional issues are a reform priority. An efficient State pursuing the common good is funda- mental in creating new conditions for development. However, institutional transformation is not the only issue at hand. Agrarian reform, competitiveness, democratization of capital, reform of the judiciary, and social programs are issues that will be on the agenda for negotiations with guerrilla forces. Following are some proposals on these crucial issues, on which peace policies could be built. Institutional Transformation Achieving peace requires a new institutional setting--one based on the reorganization of the relationship between public and private. The Colombian State must recover its natural role of protecting the common good. A social process of national reconstruction must begin with this prin- ciple, in which the public and private sectors maintain relative autonomy (Garay 1998a, 1998b). To bring about this new type of relationship, a high level of coordination has to be achieved among productive agents and the State. This means that not only will the State have to relinquish some func- tions and limit its role to performing duties of a public nature, but also that private agents will have to play a role in developing, financing, and man- aging activities that generate externalities and economies of scale. Concerning the privatization of state responsibilities, the first thing to take on is Colombia's experience with self-managed protection, known as paramilitarism. Human rights violations, genocide, and forced exile are among the harmful and unacceptable results of this practice, which com- plicates the analysis of violence. Handling this problem may become a stumbling block for the peace process. But clearly, if there is any field in which the Colombian State cannot delegate its responsibility, it is in the maintenance of order and the administration of justice. The large void that exists in this respect has led to what many call a dirty war, whose main victims are low-income civilians. The use of state entities to satisfy private interests has become one of Colombian society's great ills and is the cause of the most rampant cor- THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 99 ruption. And although the signs of corruption usually point to the public sector, corruption is not foreign to private activity. The country's private sector not only is characterized by its limited solidarity, but it has also, with government support, grown used to socializing its losses but not its profits. In dealing with the issue of institutional reform, some strategic areas of intervention need to be considered: generating systems of information directed at social control, strengthening superintendencies and regulatory commissions, stimulating new institutional development for regions within the country's productive frontier, and forming strategic alliances between the State and civil society. Each of these areas will be subsequently analyzed. Information Systems for Social Control Social control exerts pressure for efficiency in public organizations, and users of state services can play a role in monitoring and holding the State accountable for delivering those services. Reaching this goal requires work on two fronts. Users must become involved in the organization and participation processes connected with the services they receive, and the State must develop information systems for social control so that any user, without special training, can easily access information when exercising the monitoring right. Strengthening Superintendencies and Regulatory Commissions Superintendencies and regulatory commissions in Colombia have assumed a growing role, but today they are still a long way from what they should be, as entities responsible for supervising collective affairs. Except for the Banking Superintendency, which has a longer develop- ment history, it is difficult for other superintendencies and regulatory commissions, in practice, to protect the interests of society as a whole when important power groups hold center stage. To strengthen these entities, medium- and long-term strategies must be developed for investigating sectors within their jurisdiction, training, and consolidating information systems and international exchanges among regulatory bodies of other countries. Strategic Alliances between the State and Civil Society Institutional transformation cannot be limited to the apparatus of the State. It must also encompass the role of such important groups as pro- fessional organizations, labor unions, and NGOs, opening the way for new private-collective-public relationship. 100 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT In creating conditions for the development of a new society, efforts must be devoted to creating strategic alliances between civil society and the State, although certain fundamental responsibilities of the State can- not be delegated or transferred. In turn, civil society organizations cannot replace the State in the eco- nomic duties under its supervision. The State has important responsibil- ities in overcoming poverty and achieving equality. Development of Regional Programs Several reasons justify the development of regional programs. First, citi- zen participation takes place at the regional and local levels, and that is where the main social actors interact. Programs to develop new institu- tional plans must therefore be designed at these levels. Second, regionally based strategies allow local communities to become involved with the decisionmaking process in designing, planning, and managing programs and projects, thereby strengthening the process of democratic participation. However, probably one of the most important aspects of a regionally based strategy is the possibility it opens up for the emergence of new political leadership. These leaders would be commit- ted to the genuine interests of the communities that elect them and would therefore be less likely to fall into such old and deeply rooted habits as clientelism and corruption. In this field of regional programs, Colombia has already had valuable experience. Examples of this are the Medellin municipal programs, the Uraba plans, and the Magdalena Medio Peace and Development project. Agrarian reform. Agrarian reform is a recurrent theme in analyzing vio- lence in Colombia and dealing with important points on the agenda for negotiations with armed groups. Redistribution of rural property remains one of the guerrilla groups' main demands. In addition, special- ized literature recognizes as a priority the need to distribute assets as a strategy to reduce poverty and to improve equality. Land access is iden- tified as a fundamental element in achieving these objectives. While this has been a recurrent issue, so too has society's failure to make progress in this area. Colombia, unlike many developing countries, did not carry out a process of agrarian reform in time. Perhaps there is no more represen- tative example of postponed reform. The legal development of land issues-from Law 200 of 1936, superseded by Law 135 of 1961, through Law 160 of 1994-is a long and unfortunate history of the way special interests under various scenarios came into play to make the laws inop- erable and reduce their effectiveness. Therefore, it should come as no THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 101 surprise that now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Colombia has to spend time, effort, and resources on the issue of agrar- ian reform. Many other countries have already closed this chapter in their development. The rural sector has undergone several changes. First, in addition to farming and animal husbandry, off-farm activities are increasingly important: agroindustry, trade, and services. Second, today access to land is acknowledged as more important than ownership, and rural land redistribution policies must specify strategies such as the land market and new types of leases. Third, globalization requires competitive pro- duction, for which land is a necessary, but not the only factor of produc- tion. Thus, for producers who do not have obvious competitive potential, merely allocating lands does not solve the problem. Despite these observations, the context in which efforts have taken place to transform rural property in the country must be understood bet- ter. Agrarian reform has not failed solely because of inadequate institu- tions or lack of resources. Rather, these real limitations are simply mani- festations of deeper problems. While market-oriented agrarian reform has been successful in South Africa and to a certain extent in Brazil, it has not worked in Colombia for several reasons, among them the pervasive violence in the rural areas that penalizes a market for land. In this same vein, the prevailing institutional agreement defends spe- cial interests to the detriment of the common good. Consequently, the logical conclusion is that unless existing power structures are changed, no agrarian reform or program put forward will solve the fundamental problems or create conditions for long-term rural development. The main point of this discussion is that productive use of land has to be required to prevent land speculation. Today, access to this resource poses problems of both efficiency and social justice (Echeverry 1998). Modifying the structure of taxes on rural property to penalize nonculti- vation and facilitating processes to allocate properties resulting from the expiry of their ownership should be basic components in a general land policy. Agrarian reform must be dealt with in association with land use poli- cy. In Colombia, many municipalities and provinces are not viable in terms of production. However, the phenomenon of expansion of land occupation, through which the agricultural areas tend to displace areas under environmental protection, requires an effort at regulation and con- trol for environmental preservation. Thus, land use poses a problem. Because of current regulatory and institutional conditions (rules on land use, tax structure, public service programs, and the like), the property located near centers of consumption is subject to speculation. This process make productive units face 102 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT increased land prices, higher cost of public services, and the cost of valu- ation taxes. This expansion of the agricultural frontier puts additional charges on the State and decreases producers' ability to compete. Economies of con- solidation and scale are lost in delivering services, which takes more time and effort to meet the population's basic needs. Clientelism further aggravates this situation. Politicians frequently lobby for the creation of new territorial entities (provinces and munici- palities), which perpetuates traditional political habits. Each new territo- rial entity means more bureaucracy and more budget.3 In this context, merely having a land purchase policy, even for the agri- cultural sector, does not solve the problems of the sector that needs com- plementary programs such as property adjustment, technical assistance, and productive projects. Otherwise, speculation will displace productive activities and drive small landowners onto lower quality land where pro- duction is less competitive. These arguments reinforce the idea that the important thing is to tax inappropriate land use to raise the opportunity cost of keeping land idle and encourage its productive exploitation so that anyone who really wants to work it efficiently can acquire it.4 To this end, the first step is to define the true purpose of land use in land use plans. First, a national reg- ulation plan should be prepared, with the participation of the different regions. Then, regional plans, and finally municipal plans, should be devised. Another option would be to promote voluntary teamwork among neighboring municipalities that have potential for integrated work within the region. Once land use has been defined, the State must use its intervention instruments (e.g., taxes, investment in physical infrastruc- ture, social programs) to consolidate and reinforce new arrangements. Competitiveness and democratization of property. Regarding competitive- ness, we saw in the preceding section how intensive and inefficient use of resources, particularly natural resources, spawns a system of production that impairs development and harms the environment. Overexploitation of resources favors rent seeking, which gives rent earners a dominant position for appropriating as much of the value added as possible. 3 This situation comes about because of a design flaw in the Nation's current distribution of public revenues. The budgets of former and segregated municipalities tum out to be higher than the budgets the original municipalities had available before their division. This is a result of the quota established by the formula in Law 60. 4 The tax levied must raise the opportunity cost for owners of unproductive lands to the point where waiting for it to appreciate becomes unprofitable. Formally, the present net value expected after appreciation must be less than the present net value of the cost of own- ing the land. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 103 In this context, competitiveness must be given priority in the debate about solutions to armed struggle in Colombia for two basic reasons. First, economic growth rates must be maintained at least within histori- cal ranges. This is a necessary, but insufficient, condition to improve eco- nomic well-being. Second, a sustainable growth model, one less depen- dent on rents, is needed to achieve more equitable goals for the distribution of income and wealth. Globalization puts many restrictions on national governments' use of traditional economic policy instruments to address competitiveness. Therefore, science and technology are among the strategic issues to be tackled. Spokespeople for Colombia's armed groups give this area signif- icant importance, so much so that it is not only one of the fundamental points on their discussion agenda, but they also specifically demand that 10 percent of the national budget be allocated to it. In any case, to improve productivity, the components of innovation and technological development must be strengthened. This line of work becomes strategic under the current circumstances. First, it allows for quick increases in production under more competitive conditions. Second, greater productivity maximizes the use of existing resources before seeking new investments. This is fundamental, given Colombia's lack of saving and productive investment. Third, it creates a climate in which the capital and labor factors of production can comple- ment each other in a win-win situation. Increased productivity will allow companies to improve their profits, which, in turn, opens up the possi- bility of improving worker remuneration. To ensure that capital does not appropriate a very large share of the value added generated by increased productivity, businesspeople must be persuaded, as members of a society seeking peaceful coexistence, to accept value-added distribution plans in which equality is one of the basic criteria for determining factor remuneration. For this distribution, three alternatives can be explored: adopting new, more equitable salary remuneration plans; introducing employee stock options; or initiating worker profit sharing.5 Taking up these options would be a historic turn- ing point in Colombia's employee-employer relationship and a signifi- cant step toward a more just and peaceful society. Two specific instruments may be considered for working with the pro- ductive sector: business management programs that improve efficient use of current resources and consolidation and incorporation of produc- tive development centers that encourage productive development and technological change. 5 The formula chosen must not deflect investments. 104 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT Social investment policies. Colombia has confronted poverty mainly by increasing the State's investment in the most important social sectors (e.g., health care, education, sanitation). Today, Colombia is one of Latin America's countries with higher social investments as a percentage of GDP. This spending has achieved positive results in that the percentage of Colombians with unsatisfied basic needs has constantly fallen. However, little progress has been made in reducing poverty as measured by income and compared with the poverty line indicators.6 Concern about alleviating poverty, as always, extends only to the point where it does not alter income distribution. Inequality is not tackled. Regarding social policy, education warrants special attention because Colombia is undeniably behind other countries in modernizing educa- tion. The many partial reforms to date have brought some benefits, but Colombian society and the State have been slow to propose in-depth reforms both in educational goals and in the system's operation. As men- tioned above, in Uruguay, it was decided that basic, obligatory, public, and depoliticized education helps build an egalitarian society. In Colombia, by contrast, large differences in quality have helped perpetu- ate inequality: the poor receive a poor education, and the rich receive a good education. Despite significant increases in the volume of fiscal resources allocated to education and large increases in teachers' salaries, the quality of public education, even the quality of private education, remains low. To the extent that education is considered to be one of the most pow- erful instruments for achieving more equal access to development oppor- tunities, a true educational reform should be used to achieve an egalitar- ian society. Among the items that would help education play the leading role in building a new Colombian society are technological changes test- ed in other countries, curriculum reforms to impart the new values soci- ety needs, teacher evaluation, and the autonomy of schools and influence of parents associations over their administration. However, Colombia cannot afford to fall into the simplistic position of thinking that a new educational system would eliminate, per se, exclu- sion. We have stressed that education policy is not the State's only instru- ment for approaching equality and that alternatives have to be contem- plated, such as redistribution of wealth and changes in the way value added is distributed among factors of production. Regarding the potential of social policy, welfare programs will remain important for low-income groups, and spending should be focused on them. Colombia still has serious difficulties in delivering some basic ser- 6 Unsatisfied basic needs indicate the availability of essential services. Poverty line mea- surements by income indicate the possibility of acquiring basic goods and services. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 105 vices, especially on the outskirts of cities and in rural areas. But even where a large proportion of the population is served, the variable quality of public services reflects social inequality, as we have seen in the case of education. Despite these shortcomings, Colombia has pursued an active social policy. In fact, internationally it is cited as an example of a country with much creative and successful experience in social policy: the New School, the Family Welfare Policy, the National Rehabilitation Plan, and the Social Solidarity Network. In addition, Colombia's social spending for 1997 was among the highest in Latin America (15 percent of the GDP). In another positive element, the Colombian State has successfully com- bined the operation of social networks with the application of a tradi- tional social policy. Its results in social health care and safety are well known. This is an asset on which work needs to continue. In summary, educational reform is the main social policy reform pend- ing in Colombia. Social safety nets must continue to operate, but they cannot replace a comprehensive social policy. As the State's political and administrative power decentralizes and its commitment to the new val- ues of society develops, social policy will gain in efficiency and will there- by reach the poorest citizens. However, the country needs much more than this to reverse the unfair processes that have characterized its eco- nomic and political development. Judicial reform. The administration of and access to justice is one of the fields where a country's level of equality can be better measured.7 When all citizens are guaranteed equality before the law, a society is founded on equality (at least before the law). Only at the beginning of the 1990s did Colombia start to recognize its deficiencies in the administration of jus- tice and decide to act, emphasizing its sanctioning role expanding the judiciary. It did not, however, include alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution. Currently, Colombia's judiciary is a good example of how increased spending does not always bring about improvements either in the effec- tiveness of the judicial system or in the population's well-being. Spending in this sector went from 0.61 percent of GDP in 1990 to 1.15 per- cent of GDP in 1995. This increase was significant. However, the persis- tence of high levels of impunity means that the population still considers the administration of justice rather dysfunctional. 7 This section is based on the results of the April 1998 workshop on Diagnosing and Formulating Strategic Objectives of Justice in Colombia, organized by the Judicial Branch, the Ministry of Justice, the National Department of Planning, and the World Bank. 106 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT The urge to contain violence and the high number of crimes that go unpunished explain why the Colombian State has frequently given pri- ority to the penal system. It has done so while neglecting basic problems of civilian coexistence. Until mechanisms are devised for solving basic problems of coexistence-disputes among neighbors, commercial law- suits, and the like-conflict and discontent will persist, translating through intolerance into more violence. Progress toward a better climate for civilian coexistence in a country like Colombia requires adopting a comprehensive focus encompassing: * working with the community to create a civilian culture that values peaceful resolution of conflicts. To this end, offering alternative services of justice is basic-for example, Casas de Justicia, conciliation proce- dures, justices of the peace. * introducing improvements in the administration of the judicial branch- for example, strengthening institutions, training personnel, systematiz- ing judicial orders, and improving internal management procedures * developing a detailed program with measures to reduce backlogs in civil courts, as distinguished from criminal courts. Third Stage: Process Sustainability After completion of the stage for structural reforms proposals involved in the negotiation phase, next comes ensuring the sustainability of peace in the post-negotiation phase. This delicate phase requires special attention from the State. If com- mitments in the accords signed with armed groups are not implemented on the terms established during negotiations, anyone who feels slighted by breach of the agreements will react negatively and will delay rebuild- ing a climate of confidence. Then, peace may break down again. The most extreme reaction in this situation will be a renewal of vio- lence that would jettison any progress made to that point. In light of this prospect, the importance of this sustainability stage is clear. Because this stage entails working down from broad proposals to effective implemen- tation of agreements on very specific issues, it may require more complex management of this phase. To prevent failure during this stage, once the peace process begins, the entire society must take on the quest for peace as a national project in such a way that each individual owns a part of it. By definition, no one should be left out. The State must make this project a priority and the ref- erence point for its every activity. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 107 Upon entering the peace sustainability stage, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants from every rebel group into civilian life is critical. Other countries' experience with peace processes show that following demobilization, a significant increase in common delin- quency can take place. When ex-combatants do not find jobs and peaceful life styles after demobilization, they revert to violence to sur- vive. Perhaps one of Colombia's few advantages from its peace processes is the experience it has acquired in designing and executing programs to assist demobilized people. An attempt should nonetheless be made to improve on this knowledge. If similar budgets to those allocated to the previous processes were invested for this purpose, the fiscal cost could be manageable, even in the State's current precarious financial situation. Problems could arise in timely design and management of programs required to optimize attention to ex-combatants Finally, in the post-negotiation phase, information systems and international aid are important. Monitoring compliance with the accords is fundamental to stay abreast of progress, identify problems quickly, and prompt needed adjustments as required. To do all this, objective, transparent information must be provided very broadly. Anyone who needs information should have access to it. The process of disclosing information should also become an exercise in democrat- ic participation. In monitoring and verification activities, international cooperation is essential. Since foreigners maintain a certain distance from Colombia's daily problems, they can assume neutral positions on such sensitive issues as human rights violations, political guarantees, and the like. International financial help in rebuilding the country is also sorely needed, especially in its difficult fiscal situation. This is where the pos- sibility of help is greatest when problems are in their most critical phase-in this case, during war and fighting. That is why it would be unwise to await signature of the peace accords to begin to seek interna- tional support. THE COSTS OF WAR AND PEACE: BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVES In discussions of armed conflict in Colombia, little effort has been made to quantify the economic repercussions of either the armed confronta- tion or the peace process. Calculating and evaluating the costs of the conflict are important exercises for two reasons: first, they help to high- light the economic costs for Colombia's armed conflict; second, they can be used to outline financing plans for a peace process. This section of 108 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT this chapter also investigates whether the costs of negotiations and the peace accords hinder the process.8 The Costs of Armed Conflict Any armed conflict generates direct and indirect economic costs. The direct costs are made up of losses of physical and human capital. The indirect costs consist of disinvestment, allocative distortion (use of pro- ductive assets to fight the rebellion), and increased transaction costs. On the other hand, resources allocated to the war represent an opportunity cost for the economy, since, under other circumstances, they could have been allocated to the production of goods and services to increase the population's well-being. To finance armed conflict in 1991-96, Colombia spent an average of 1.5 percent of the GDP a year. The biggest cost was excess military spending (figure 3.1). FIGURE 3.1 GROSS COSTS OF ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA, 1991-96 Kidnapping, theft, and extortion 29% Military expense 61% Terrorism Loss of life and health care costs 50% Source: Trujillo and Badel (1997). 8 This chapter is based mainly on the work of Trujillo and Badel (1997) and on the model for minimizing the costs of peace, developed by Edgar Trujillo while conducting that work but not included in the cited publication. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PEACE IN COLOMBIA 109 Average net costs in 1991-96 amounted to 1.1 percent of the GDP, a lit- tle more than US$1 billion in 1999 dollars.9 Military spending contributes 85 percent of the net costs of the armed conflict in Colombia. Peace would spare Colombia some of these costs. However, not all the resulting savings are convertible into current revenue that could be spent on goods and services. Loss of human life carries (among many other things) an economic cost represented as the present value of income that this person could have earned during his or her productive life, because society will not be able to benefit from the person's capacity to produce. Therefore, in peace, saving lives is a future benefit. Ending the armed conflict would also benefit Colombia by freeing up resources. Money previously spent on war and replacing capital losses from terrorism could be used to produce goods and services that would increase society's well-being. In this case, it is estimated that with peace, the Colombian economy would annually free up nearly US$920 million.10 As mentioned earlier, achieving peace will also require resources to reincorporate the armed groups into civilian life and to carry out the social programs agreed upon a peace negotiations. How, then, can peace be financed? To prevent creating a macroeconomic imbalance, the financing should come first from taxes. Because of Colombia's fiscal con- straints, however, foreign credit or foreign aid will also be required. In that case, proper precautions will be needed to avoid exchange imbal- ances or inflation. Although peace can be considered as a public good, and its costs must be paid by the entire society, some people will receive more immediate benefits from pacification than others. These beneficiaries are mainly businesses in places where rebel groups have concentrated their illegal activities, looking for financing through theft, kidnapping, and extortion. This high-income group has presumably been hit the hardest in econom- ic terms by the armed conflict, and, for that reason, its contribution to peace costs may be higher. Victims of kidnappings, extortion, and theft have been paying a total average of US$400 million a year. The Costs of Peace Today, there seems to be a consensus that violence in Colombia has become an obstacle to its development. Consequently, peace will bring Net costs are obtained by deducting the gross costs of crime that represent transferred assets, but not loss assets such as kidnapping, theft, and extortion. 10 However, this estimate differs from the assumption that excess military spending can be eliminated quickly. This is questionable in view of the current and future pensions ear- marked for the armed forces. 110 COLOMBIA: ESSAYS ON CONFLICT, PEACE, AND DEVELOPMENT economic benefits-a greater accumulation of physical and human capi- tal and increased productivity. However, reducing violence to socially and economically tolerable lev- els has its costs, irrespective of the means used to achieve it. If military force were the means chosen, the economy would have to allocate resources to wartime endeavors, and state investments would be affect- ed. War would also accelerate the destruction of physical and human cap- ital. If peace is achieved through negotiations, the agreements reached will imply an economic commitment, in addition to political obligations, that the country must comply with immediately. In Colombia, the armed groups have more than an economic agenda. They are pursuing political and social vindication that would positively affect the people's well-being. Thus, aside from the costs of reintegration, the accords would have not just an economic cost but a net benefit. This statement is not an absolute truth, however, and therein lies part of the problem. Also on the Colombian guerrilla agenda are proposals for pro- grams such as agrarian reform, for example, that have economic costs for the State. The short-term costs of peace are greater than its benefits, which will be felt only over the longer term, while all costs must be shouldered immediately. Even though the benefits outweigh the costs, it does not fol- low that society can pay any price for peace. Economists would agree that society must minimize the cost of peace, although this work is basically an economic analysis. Of course, beyond economic considerations, peace is an ethically desirable state. A formal cost estimate would begin by observing that there are two ways to end an armed conflict: through military action and through nego- tiations, which are not mutually exclusive. Negotiations can come about because one of the parties has a weak military. Then, the cost of peace c (equation 1) has two components: the cost of armed conflict g and the cost of agreements from peace negotiations p: c = g + p(g);p