No. E 68-A RESTRICTED 66975 r:;: ONE '\f..- tf\rhi.§..l report is restricted to use within the Bank INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT SURVEY OF BRITISH COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY November 9. 1949 Economic Department Prepared by: B. King TABLE OF CONTE.t-J'TS Page No. I. PREFACE (and Map) • • • • • • • • • t • • .. .. i II. SPi!IMARY • • • • • • . .. . . ., . . , . · .. . iv .. .. .. .. . . • • , . III. THE COLONIES UP TO 1940' •• • 1 TJi.BLES I '& II • .'. . ..•• • • • • • • 8 IV. . THE COLONIES SINCE, 1940 • • • • • • • • • • • 10 TABlES III to VI • • • 0 • • • • • • • • 29 APPElIIDIX - THE CURRENCY SYSTEMS OF' THE cOtOlUAL EI'!PlRE . . . . . , , , . , . 34 (i) I. PREFACE The British Colonial :empire is a sO!!lm-:hat loose expression embracing some forty dependencies of the United Kingdom. For the purposes of this paper the term vdll be used to cover all dependencies administered through the Colonial Office on December 31" 1948 cmd" in addition, the three :30uth African High Cowmission territories, which are under the control of the Commonwealth Relations Office. This definition is adopted" since its scope is the same as that of the various Acts of Parliament passed since lSll.~O to Dovcloptx;nt promote colomal development, including the Overseas Resourceshct y::rLcl1 established the Colonial Development Corporation. A full list of the~e ter:-itories 17ill be found in the list following. It [;hould be noted th'lt in conform..i.ty vri th the provisions of the recent Acts vIhieh apply only to flcolonies not possessing responsible govermnent,uYthe definition given above excludes the self-governing colony of Southern :Ehodesia, v(nose rela- tions with the United Kinr;dom are conducted through the Co:nmonlrealth Relations Office. It also excludes the Condominium of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the independent states under British protection in ;\rabia such as Kuvvait" Relations with these ter;dtories are condEcted through the Foreign Office. Y Colonial Development and ''''elfare Act, 1940, paragraph 1. (5) • [[[ffi BRITISH COLONIES, PROTECTORATES AND TRUST TERRITORIES UNITED KINGDOM, DOMINIONS AND SO. RHODESIA D ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN (J'" ~ ~ l4.I ~ . .' <:,) o • ST HELENA I. a~CHUANA~~ .... MAURITIUS C') PIroTECTO .. i!. .1 rn ~~ ~ , ' ~ '" N o C·' E A ~ SOURCE: The Crown Colonist (ii) The Jritish Colonial Empire Area Territory status --...- - - Africa r!est: Gold Coast) Colony and Protectorate TogolEmd )J,~ Trust territory Ga~bia Colony and Protectorate Nigeria ) Colony and Protectorate Cameroons)"~ Trust territory St. Helena Colony (including Ascension I and Tristan el mha) Sierra Leone Colony and Protectorate -- East; British Somaliland Kenya Tanganyika Protectorate colony ffi1d Protectorate Trust Terri tory Uganda Protectorate Zanzibar Protectorate Central: Northern Rhodesia Protectorate Nyasaland Protectorate South African High Commission Territories: Bas utol and Protectorate Bechuanaland Protectorate SViaziland Protec.torate East Asia Brunei Protected state Hong Kone; Colon;)r Halaya" Federation of Protectorate . .,{:r +1 '" "'." .cv .. ( 0 (~" "<"r"""" ,-,-""C 1".• Labuan) Colony Saravrak Colony Singapore (incl. Cocos Is .. and Christmas I.) Colony Indian Ocean. "~.den Colony and Protectorate Hauritius Colony Seychelles Colony Mediterranean Cyprus Colony Gibraltar Colony lIalta Colony * Common administration (iii) Pacific Ocean Fiji Colony Hestern Pacific: Gilbert & ~llice Is. Colony New Hebrides Condominimn with France PH,ca:.rn I. colony Solomon I. Protectorate 'Tonga Protected state canton a Enderbur~ ls. Condominimn with U.S" Hest Indies and Atlantic Bahamas Colony Barbados Colony Bermuda Colony British Guiana Colony British Honduras Colony FaJJdand Is. Colony Jamaica (incl, 1'u.:;....ks a Caicos Is. and Cayman Is.) Colony LeeYJard I s . , Colony (AntigtJ.a, Uontse:::orat, st. Kitts, Virgin Is.) Trinidad anel Tobago Colony ',;-indward Is. Colonies (Dominica, Grer.~~a, st. Lucia, st. Vincent) --~------------------------------------------~-------------------.------- Notes: a) GeogJ:fi:Jj:hical classifications of the colonies 8.1'e ver-y loose, e060 East Africa is frequently used to include Central !~fr:Lca. The cl,sssification used here broadly follows that in the B.I.~). publication liThe B::~:i.tish Colonial Empire in 1948 u (I.D. 907) b) It should be noted that the South African niGh ::;ommission Territories do not come under the colonial Office, but are included here for t 118 :::O08Bons stated in the preface. The Condominia, '7hile administered by- the Colonial Office, dQ not. :-'.p)ear to be covered by the provisions of the 1940 Act~ c) The meEming of the different statuses is de~cribed in the following quota- tion from the B.IoSCI. publication, !tTowards Self-Government in the J:3ritish Coloniesfl(I.Do 598): "There are certe.in legal differences in the status of Colonies and Prot..3ctorates. Thus uhile a Colony is British territory under the Crolim, in a Protectorate the Crm-rn exercises authority without annexing the territoryt' In Protected States authority is vested in t~1e sovereign of each state, and not in the Croym which derives its fu.l1ctions from treaty agreements conferring certain powers and duties upon it. For administrative purposes, however, the general framework is very similar." (iv) II, SUliHARY 1. The greater part of the British Colonial Empire, as at precent constituted, emerged from a primitive condition only about 70 years a3 0 end its economic development has therefore not proceeded far. 2. Before 1940 the colonies were regarded, in principle, as fir:ancially self-sufficient entities and were granted financial aid by the British gO'ITernlIlent only in cases of particular need. The colonial governments "were thus dependent largely on their own local revenue, a large part of YI11ic11 T[aS required for administration and the service of debts incurred for e}~enditure on railroads, ports 2.nd other public works. Apart from some assist2.nce to peasant agriculture most colonial governments had not the resources to undertalce any other economic activity; nor, in fact, was it reg2rded as their function. 3. The colonies did, however, receive certaip. benefits from the Bri.tish connection. For example, loans could be raised on the London market on advantageous terms. Eri tish trading companies 2nd investors TIere e::ncouraged by the existence of a Dri tish adrninistration and its consequences: political stability, common laws and, in effect, a common currency. 'rhe influonce of the trading companies stimulated production for the Trorld market and exports of such commodLtiesas rubber, tin, cocoa and vegetable oils increased rapidly. In some cases, notably mining, this "las achieved with the aid of private capital, mainly British, but a sllbstantial p,grt of the exports ca:ne from peasant agriculture. In the t~ar East, "mother important source of income YJ'as the large entrepot trade Trhich flowed through Hong Kong and Singapore, amounting to perhaps two fifths of all the trade of the British colonies~ (v) 4. At the beginning of the 1930's there nas some change of policy. The Colonial Development Act of 1929 granted some fin~~cial aid to the colonies and the ottawa agreements of 1932 intro~ced a degree of tariff preference that had previously been largely excluded by the prevailing policy of free trade. S. The first major change in policy, however, took place in 19ho, Y:hen it was decided that lithe principle that a coJ,.ony should have only those services 'which it can afford to maiI'ltain out of its 01:'Jn resources ..... noYT calls for revision. 1l To implement the new policy a Colonial Jevelopment and t'elfare Act was passed in that year. This !'. ct, as amended in 1945, novl' provides for a total assistance of ~l20 million over the ten years to 1956. 60 This assistance to colonial governments TraS augmented in 1948 by the formation under the Overseas Resources Development Act of a Colon..i.al Develop- ment Corporation with long-term borrowing poy;ers up to ~OO million. This Act also created the OVersea:;; Food COJ.~poration, Y:hich operates the East African groundnuts scheme, but this Corporation is likely to be of less importance to the colonies in the long run than the C.. D.C. 7. Broadly speaking, the functions of the colonial governments are: !Ito obtain adequate knowledge of the resources of each territory; to maintain and improve the basic economic services, especially ra.ilyrays, roads, po:t'ts and other means of communication; 2.nd to secure improve14ents in the health and education of the people, Trhich can only be sustained by rising productivit~r but are equally the essential conditions of expanding economic development"n Those of the C.D.C. are: lito maintain and improve existing ind'ustrios; and to develop the most prom.i.sing nev: sources of production and ne17 forms of '.reclth. n The latter is also the field of private enterprise. 8. Besides the legislative measures mentioned above the British govern- ment has by ac111inistrative action encouraged grefJ.ter economic stability in (vi) the colonies through long-term contracts ar.d price stabilization schemes for producers and by insistence on the importance of local secondary- industry 'which har.J!lent. At the same time the flow of private inve~tment from outside fell abruptly. - :3 - 20. Although :Brl Ush policy 1}'as some1trhat modified during the 1930 1 s and some extraordinary aid ~ras extended to the colonies, the amount of aid "las hardly comparable ",1 th the emergency. The colonies had to f1trug~le out of the depression largely on their O"Tll resources, The economic progress of the colonies up to 1940 ~'as. therefore. broadly similar to that of other countries at a similar stage of development. 21. Although the problems of development before the colonies I"ere essentially no different from those of other cOlmtries. the fact of colonial status introduced a number of elements '1lh1ch strongly a,ffected the manner in ",h1ch those problems "rere met. In most cases any statistical asses~ment of the effect is impossible, but this does not mean that these differences are any the less important for being imponderable. 22. The existence of a Brl tish administration 1;las. of course, the primary difference from whioh all the other differences spring~ The immediate imposition of la"r, order p.nd continuity of government by a. competent adminis-,. tration "las by i helf of undoubted value. The general economic effects 1,rere those that follo'" from being part of a large economic unit rather than a smp.ll one. The existence of common la1·'s. customs, language and, in effect, a common currency made for an easier flo<" of trade t.,rith Britain and greater security for the British investor. The Colonial governments, for example, '"'ere able to raise loans on the London market on much the sa~e terms as British mlxnici- pall ties, becaUse it was inconceivable that the British Treasury ~'1ould allo~r them to go into default. The sense of security meant that large manufacturing interests in Britain were encouraged to invest capital in technical as~iptance to native farmers from which the returns could only be distant and inctirect. This l}ras particularly true of the cotton and tobacco industries. -4- 23. In addition certain central organizations for research ~- in tropical agr1cult1.U'e and medicine, for example -- Ners set by up the British Government. Another central organizettion of interest is kno~,'n as the Cro~"n Agents for the Ooloniss. This bo~ performs many useful service~ for the colonial governments; the most important is the purchasing of machinery ~~d raw materials on their account, but their operations include such financial services as the investment of surplus funds and the flotation of bond issues. 24. The aid to the colonies provided by the Colonial Development Act of 1929. "rhile small, should not be discounted. Its oatenai ble objective 1"as as much to relieve unemployment in the U. K. as it \"&8 to develop the colonies, but in practice the latter ",ras made the main U1lr!lose of the Act. T116 total amount disbursed over the fol1o\'ring decade ',ras only =9 million, but this does not tell the "rhole story, since the greater part Nas c!.il'ltributed to the -poorel'lt and most distre~sed colonies. 25. The denre~sion of the 1930 l s introduoed an element into the colonial relationship that "'as more controversial than those hitherto dis- cussed. namely t tariff preference. Before 1930 there had been a gr(Ming tendency to give preference to certain colonial products in the U.K., but protection did not extend to many commodities nor 1·'as it particularly hiGh. The influence of the 19th century free trade policy ~"as still strong. On the other side, there ~.rere scarcel;r any instances of tariff preference to Eritish produots by the colonies. 26. As a result of the Otta1.'1a agreements of 1932 a regime of imperial preference was instituted, primarily' at the instance of the Dominions. The colonies both received and granted preferences, but the effect varied greatl;r from one colony to another. The main beneficiaries of empire preference "'ere the "fest Indian sugal'! producers. It l,tas of no value to producers of commodities - 5- such as oocoa, rubber and tin that l'lere in surplus supply ,.rithlnthe empire. No preference "'as given on some other commodities -:... cotton and. iron ore, for example ...- I.,'here it "Tould have benefitted thee:x:norttrig colonies. 27. Preferences granted by the colonies also varied. The major part of Africa, for example, "'as prevented by international treaties from giving any preference at all. The complicated pol! tical relationships bett"een the various states in lJlala;ra made it difficult to impose differential tariffs. Other colonies, however, suffered from the loss of cheap sources of supply, . especially Japan. 28. One measurement of the results of the colonial relationship 1s posd ble; the proportion of the trade "ri th Britain in the total trad.e of the colonies. Here global figures are quite misleading, since they throN together the large entrepot trade of ports such as Hong Kong and Singapore and the more direct trade of most other colonies. as Table I sho~·rs, for the latter -,.... or non-Asiatic -- group, British trade in 1938 accounted for 4O~45% of the total. The proportion varied somevrhat from one area to another, being higher in "rest Africa and lo\'rer in East Africa. but broadly spea. 1dng this is atypical figure. It may be noted that this is much less than that of Frenoh trade ~n the trade of her colonies. It is also less than the ~hare of U.S. trade in the trade of some independent areas 't7ith 'rrhich commercial relations are particularly active suoh as the tropical countries of Latin America •. 29. The trade of the Asiatic group shol,red a very different picture. The share of the U. K. in this trade l,ras less than 15%. Only about a third of this trade of this group consisted of exports of domestio produce or im- ports fOT local consumption; the remaining t~'ro-thirds ~·ras entrepot trade 1p r ith the local merohants acting as intermediaries betNeen producers in neighboring countries and the rest of the "rorld. -6- 30. The trade of the '!Ihole colonial empire ',.rith the U.K. Nas, in fact, only a small part of the U.K.'s· total trade. From 1934 to 1938 less than £$' ot British imports came frGID the colonies and 85S of Bri Hsh exports ~!Tent to the colonies. The valueo! the colonies to the United Kingdom did not lie in their exploitation as exclU$ive markets or sources of supply. In the main the colonies ",ere developed for ·the 'florid market. 31. The list of commod! ties exported. by the colonies (Table II) sl:,oHs that three of the most important \·rere rubber, tin and cocoa. These "rere '1."0- duced far in excess of the United Kingdom's - or indeed the Common"'ealth's -.,.. requirements. The Bri thh colonies ,,'ere the major I·rorld suppliers in each cas ell and large quanti ties 1I1ere shipped ehe1,ihel"e: p,estinatio,l'l of.r.l!Jor polon1,al E*l?0r~s j( 12;3.9L (Percent) !l.J4. U;.S.A. ElsEl1l!here Rubber 18 S2 30 Tin 14- 57 29 Cocoa 36 33 21 Source; IIVlF Nemorandwn RD-643. 32. The advantages to the U.K. came ra.ther from production under the control of Br1thhcapi tal and' the amount of trade that pa.ssed· through the hands of British merchants. Proportionately. both ',rere certainly much in excess of the trade "r1th the United. Kingdom alone. For example. i t has been !I Percentages of ~.r~rld production; Rubber 43% (1938) Tin 46% (1938) Cocoa S4% (1939) -,7 - estimated that' 70% of equity 1nvestment1r in l"l'al~ ',rere British. In Afric~ the proportlon ,.raspro bably higher;. :3). The COncentration of' hade' "7tth :Br1 tishmerchanh NaB also heavy. In ~'rest Africa .. forexample t " the Uft1 ted Africa CotnpalW alone eontr<>l.led one- half of the export's of agricuituraI produce (or 30% of all exptlrts) and sold a third of all imports.. Exceptfol"a fe~~T French, German and. Indl~n firms most of the other trading companies on the,T'lest- Coa.st "ren :Brl tish •. :34. '\1est Africa is probably the outstanding example of trade concen- tration, bu.t large trading companies like the Un! ted Africa Company operate in other areas -- Mitchell" Cotts and Company in Eas~ Africa and Harrisons and Crostield in the Far East" for example., 35.. From the colonies r point of vie"l t the effect of colonial eta tu.g is a matter of judgment. There seems little doubt that economic benefit l~~as derived from the particular attractions offered to investors and traders and imperial preference certainly shielded some colonies f)."o)ll the full impact of the depression.. H01"ever, any dhcuss"on of such matters haG been rendered academicby' the evenh that have taken place since 1940. - 8 - ~Ll (i) Trade of the Colonies l1rith the U. K." 19~8 Total .':lithU,:K. (a;,m.) (a;, m.) (%) Colonies other than: Asiatic Exports (domestic) 44 Imports 40 Aden, Ma1w:a, Hop.g Kong Exports (incl. reexports) 101.0 10.9 11 Imports 107.8 15~'8 11-1-1/2 !Totes: a) Reexports of the first group of colonies, 1~hich are not included here, l1Tere hardly more than ;;'2.5 million. In the Asiatio group. eboutone- third of the exports Nere exports of dome$ltic produce - almost all from fvTalaya, about another third reexports from Singapore and Penang, the remaining third being reexports from Hong :Kong and, to a small extent, Aden. The trade of Brunei, 1\T. Borneo and Sara.~rak is o.mitted altogether since their trade passes mainly through Singapore. b) Gold is excluded. (11) COmPat'ative~!,9de Fitfures',:f'or Other Areas; 1938 Total (Fr. b) FrenehCo 10 nie s Exports 6.82 4.44 Imports 5.98, 3.22 Total' ($ m.) Tropical AmeriCA Bxports 791 )68 47 Imports 787 348 44 Notes; a) French Colonies exclude North Africa. b) Tropical America includes Mexico, all the CaTi b1;lean Republics t Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Brazil. Venez\lela is excluded o"'ing to the complications caused by petroleum. Sources: Statistical Abstract of the British CClmmonNealth 1936-45. H. M. S~O~, Cmd 7224. Bulletin rviensue], de Statistique d'Outre-ivTer. I.;:r~S.J'i.l.E., The net~~lork of 'forid Trade, League of ~Tations, 1942. -9- Table II f4ain Exports of Brl tish Colonies - 19)2 Total. fu2.,ul'£.£t. (i m.)' (Percent) Africa Malaya other Areas (l, m.) Rubber 57.2 }O 0.2 57.0 Tin 24.8 I} 2.7 22 .1 Vegetable oils & fats 18.3 9-1/2 12.7 4.3 1.3 Cocoa 14.5 7-1/2 1}.6 0.9 Copper 11.1 6 10.7 0.4 SUgar 9.4 5 0.2 9.2 Gold 6.6 }-1/2 5.6 0.7 0.4 Cotton 5.8 } 5.7 0.1 Others 43.7 22-1/2 8.9 20.5 14.3 Total 192.4 100.0 60.) 105.6 26.6 Note,: a) Reexports have been left out as far as possible. Exports from Hong Kong. ,·,hieh are virtually all reexports, have been omitted entirely. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to separate the very large reexport t:t'ade (about ;SO million) that passed through Singapore. Consequently the figures for rubber and tin are much exaggerated, perhaps by as much as 25%. Those for vegetable oils and fats and for gold are affected but muoh less so. As the exports of J3ru..."lei, :i!T. Borneo and Sara',ra,k mainly pass through Singapore, they have been omitted from the table. b) The category vegetable oils and fats is not completely comprehensive, but the omissions are unimportant. The principal commodities are: pa~ro oil and kernels (~7.8 m.); groundnuts (~5.0 m.); copra and coconut oil (~4.8 m.). Souree: Statistical Abstract of the British Commonl,realth 19}6-45, H.l'i)".S.O •• Cmd. 7224. - 10 - IV. THE COLONIES SINCE 1940 36. The 1930 t $ produced a crop of riots, strikes and similar evidence of dissatisfaction. The most turbulent area ",ras the heavily populated .rest Indies 1!1hioh had 11 ttle tradition of subshtenoe farming. Unemployment there consequently caused great hardship. In August 1938 a Royal Commission 1,ras sent there 1111 th the broadest terms of reference: II to investigate social and economio condi tiona •••• and to make reoommenda tions tl • Their recommendatj.ons, published in February 1940, revealed a ne\" approaoh to the prob:J.ems and coin- cided both 1n time and in spir1 t \-Ii th a nevr It statement of Policy on Colonial Development and :1/e1fare ll issued by the Colonial Secretary on the same day. In this statement it T"as latd dOT'In that It the principle that a colony should have only those services 1}lhlch it can afford to maintain out of its ol!rn resources .••• no . . ' calls for revision". The era of financial self,...sufficiency thus carne to an end. 37. The ne . . ' policy "!as put into effect by the nassage of the Colonial Development and l'lelfare Act of 1940 ~,·!hich provid.ed for an expenditure of not more than ~5-l/2 million a year for 10 years "for a:n:y purpose likely to pro- mote the development of the resources of any colony or the 1.re1fare of its people", and "'hieh also remitted certain outstanding Treasury loans to the colonies. The "Tar naturally imposed limitations on the implementation of the Aot and only ~10 million l,ras actually disbursed during the period. In 1945 a ne,·, Colonial Development and ~1elfare Act raised assi>::tanee to a total of ;H20 million for the next 10 years and permitted expenditure up to ;11-1/2 million in any one year, thus giving more scope for raising the level of annual exnen- diture graduaIly.l1 JJ An amending Act ra.ised this 'limit to 1,20 million in July 1949. - 11 - 38. Soon after the passage of the Act, the Secretary of State for the colonies outlined the principles on 1,,'hich he expected to operate. Eaoh depen- dency ~,ras asked to dra1jlr up a broad lO-year development plan for the approval of the Colonial Office. To assist in the preparation of these plans a new step was taken. An allocation "ras inunediately earmarked for each dellende!l.cy. the total of these initial allocations being ;,85-1/2 million out of t.he total of ;'120 million. ;'23-1/2 million "ras allotted to oentral schemes and research and the remaining ;'11 million held in reserve. 39. No single criterion was used to determine the sums to be allocated to each territory. Factors taken into account included lithe size and popula.... tion of the territory tits kno\,Tn economic resources and possibiU ties, the present state of development. the development schemes kno1•rn to exist or to be under contemplation and the financial resources likely to be ava,ilable locally." The colonies were urged to help themselves. firstly 'by reviel:'ring their tax rates particularly on high~r incomes and secondly by not under- taking projects "'hich they 1"rould find it difficult to maintain. D~'V'elopment plans "rere not to be conf;tned solely to territorial limits, but the importance of regional schemes - particularly in the wiest Indies, East Africa and Central Africa -- "'as stressed, some of the allocations being mad.s on a regional basis. 40. ~!renty... one plans have no. . ., been approved; the sums involved vary from the is55 million, l/,hieh Nigeria propo ses to expend. to J,200, 000 for St. Helena. As Table IV sho\'rs, there is also a great variation in the propor- tions in 1,rhich the to tal expense is to be borne by local revenue. loans, and the Colonial Development and "le1fare Vote. 41. Besides these important legislative measures, the general change of policy t'laS reflected in various administrative actions. Efforts Nere made - 12 - to reduce the dependence of the co1oniet'! on a fe l!! commodities vulnerable to "'orld prices, plant disease or techIlica.l 0 bsole seence. And great tmportance \,'as attached to increasing participation in econ(lmic affairs by the native inhabitants. 42. The shortage of imports during the ,.rar had greatly stimulated local industry in m~ colonies. In a memorandum of the Colonial Economic Advisory Committee circulated in February. 1946 indUf1trial development \"as established as a matter of the first importsuce in diversifying colonial economies. Government departments or semi-independent boards "'ere set up in many colonies for promotion of industry. A nell' policy tov-rards mining ,,'as also adopted. the Colonial Secretary urging colonial governments to tru~e steps to ensure that mining was carried on in the interests of the territory and, "There necessary. to undertake mining ope:'ations themselves. It \"a13 further suggested that taxation of mining companies should be modified accor~ing to the phase of the business cycle in order to maintain a steady level of production and employment. 43. In agriculture definite steps "rere taken to erect ne,,' defenses against the vagaries of ,.rorid prices. Even before the Nar. the undesirable effects of price fluctuations I,Tere underlined in the report of the Commis~ion appointed in 1938 to enquire into the marketing of West African oocoa. In 1944 it "las decided that marketing boards should be established after the "Tar in the Gold Coast and Nigeria to purchase the entire crop at uniform prices and resell it. ~ proceeds being used for price stabili~ation funds a~d. research. 44. Nigerian and C~ld Coast Cocoa Boards have accordingly been set up and also oilseed Boards in several. ':lestern African colonies. The assets - 13- of these organizations at's probably not less than *'75 million.lI Similar schemes are in hand in Uganda and Nigeria for Qotton and in Jamaica for bananas. The looal producer boards set up for the stabilbation of prioes or general improvement of marketing have pressed for the security provided by long-term contracts \>,1 th those departments of the :Brithh government Nhioh make bUlk-purohases.Y In Various official publications the importance of stable markets for the produoer, particularly of tree-orops •. has been strpssed. In September 1948 the Chancellor of the Exchequer stat·ed the policy- of the British government on long-term contracts. He reaffirmed the need on both sides for such contracts. but doubted the practioali ty of a term exceeding 10 years; furthermore, prl0·es "rould have to be subject to periodic negotia- tion or a formula based on t-rorld prices. The prinoiple has been carried into effect in the case of all colonial sugar t Jamaican bananas, ',;fest India..."l orange-juice and some oilseeds. And contracts "lith British manufacturers have encouraged greatly increased production of tobacco in Central Afrioa, 4S.. In February .. 1948 a nei!T Act ,. the Overseatl ReSQurces Development Act, 'toras passed. This created two neN corporations. the Colonial Development Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation; the first, i.l1th borro'toling po"rers up to i,110 million and the second up to *'55 million, of 11rh1ch ib10 and *'5 million respectively are short-term only. The association of these t'l<10 corporations in the one act is apt to be misleading, particularly since their one purpose in common, the increased production of dollar-earning or dollar-saving commodities t obscures their differences. The magnl tude of this suni may 'be gauged from the fa~t tmi.t It'isno't ID'U,ch less than the total exports of the Gold Coast and Nigeria in 1947. Agricultural commodities subject to bulk-purchases are: cocoa. tea, coffee, sugar, oranges, p;rapefruit, bananas, oilseeds, tanning materials, some hides and skins and some timbers (as of January 1949). -14- 46 •. The Overseas Food Corporation is responsible to the l.linistry of Food and has as its object the production, processing and marketing of agri~ cul tural products anyrlhere outside the United Eingdom. It So happens that the first project to be undertaken, and so far much the biggest, is the vre11- known East ft1rican groundnuts scheme, in which some ~30 million has already been invested and whose eventual cost is expected now to be at least f,50 million. Although the project v,rill have a profound effect on the Territoj:'~r of Tanganyika, the Corporation may not in the long run be of great importance to the colonies as a Yihole, since it iNill in future only operate in the Colonies at the invitation of the Colonial Office aQ,d there has been 'wide-,. spread critioism of the wisdom of allowing such action by an Italien" ministr'J" 47,. The Colonial I:eveloprr.ent Corporation, on the other hand" is responsible to the Colonial Office, which has stated that it is "to encourage elJterprise, strelJgthen the colonial as well as the United Kingdom economies and to stimulate production for internal needs and for supplies vlanted 1/ externally. It-' The need for such a Corporation to supplement the lo..year plans arose because these plans 'Nere cancer-ned largely with the e:.;:pansion of basic public utilities, social services and such economic services as agri- cultural research and geolOGical surveys. The sums devoted to direct prociuc- tive enterprise were small. The division of responsibility is aheem by the list of functions that the Colonial Office has defined for tLe application of capital to colonial developrr.ent: (i) to obtain adequate knowledge of the resources of each territor;y; (ii) to maintain 4Ud improve the basic economic services, especially railways, roads, ports and other means of communication; --------------~--------------------------~~--~----------~---,------------- Y The Colonial Empire 1947-48, Cmd. 1433. - 1.5 - (iii) to secure improvements in the health and educa.tion of the people, ,,'h1ch can only be s1;l.Etained by rising productivity but are equally the essential conditions of expanding economic development; (iv) to maintain and improve existing industries.; (v)' to develop the lIlost promising ne",r SOUl'G~S of produ~tion and ns'" forms of wealth. In general, the'lO-year plans are responsible for (1) to (iii). the C.D.C. (and presumably private enterprise) for (tv) and (v). 48. The C.D,C., haSt in fact, the broadest sco:oe and ma¥ be considered as taking on any role that colonial governments and private enterprise are unable orun\·rilling to fill. It is not intended to supplant either pu'olic or private enterprise.' On the contrary ~ in a number. of its. pro,jects it has attracted the participation of private enterprise, both British and roreifn, and in several others it is cooperating ,.r1th colonial governments: . for ex- ample, in its f~nanoing of the East African lndustr~al Hanagement Board. 49. The colonies are nm", therefore, in a much betterposi tion to face their problems of development than the¥ have ever been before. They have been assured of' capital on advantageous terms. I:'r1th '.·'hieh continuity of research and enterprise can be maintained. They are being afforded more secure markets for their export product arid. thus. more stable incomes. It is no'" more pos131ble to pla.11. for the long-term Ifri thout regard to temporary setbacks, .50. Hm",ever. there is one matter of great importance that impinges on the Whole future of colonial development.....,.. the dollar shortage of the sterling area. Sinee the 1940 and 1945 Acts ",'ere passed ,.r! th the main object of raising the standard of living of the colonial peoples, it has caused a shift of emphasis in colonial development" - 16- .51. The need to explore the possibilities of the oolonies in order to increase their already substantial dollar earnings was officially recognized in May 1947 "'ith the creation by the Colonial Office of the Colonial Primary Products Committee l..rith these terms of reference: tiT!) revie,,', commodity by commodity, the possibility of increasing colonial prod.uction} having regard on the one hand to the interests of the Colonial Empire and, on the other hand. to the present and prospective 1·'orld needs and the desirability of increasing foreign exchange resources. 1I The C.D.C. undoubtedly has a close connection ,·ri th the Primary Products Oommittee t since a number of its projech spring directly from the Committee's recommendations or those of the missions sent out to the colonies on its initiative. Examples are the groundnuts schemes in Nigeria and the Gold Coast and, probably, the rice scheme in Gambia.> Increased production of tung oil, ",hich the C,D.C. intends to pro- mote in Nyasaland, has also been r~commended by the Committee. 52. An examination of the dollar-earning poseibili ties of the colonies is.. therefore, called for. 5J. The colonies as a group have for many years had a favorable balance of trade Nith the United States, but their dollar"'earning capacity is highly concentrated. Before the \"ar only a fel!T colonies ~,!ere among the small group of tropical countries having such a favorable balance, the out- standing one being !vlalaya. Nalaya, in fact. normally had a larger trade surplus with the United States than any other country in the Horld: - 17 - L~adi:qg, Co;w:trietsHaving a ~~vorable ~lance ~fTrade '.r1th. the U. S. - 1938 ($ If;illion). Exports Importa Balance Malaya 116 10 106 . IT.E. I. 69 28 41 Brazil 98 62 ;36 Cuba 106 76 30 Source: League of Nations, the l\fetl.rork of ';[orld Trade: Annex IV (using U.S. figures). 54. The only othel' colonies having a favorable trade surplus of any importance ,·d. th the Unl ted States '·rere the Gold Coast and Nigeria; the Gold Coast, in addition, '·'as the principal source of gold in the colonies. HO',r- ever, the favorable balance of these tHO colonies approximately offset the defioits of the remainder. 55. ~'Thlle it ,.ras still possi1:)le for the rest of the \.ror· i to balance its aocounts ",rith the United. States Nithout stringent monetary restrictions, the significance of Malaya ~"as no greater than that of any other source of dollars. In the post't>lar era of the dollar shortage it has a.ssumed great importance as being the largest of the fe\<1 dolla.r....earntng units in the ster- ling area.. ':/est Africa has also attained greater prominenc~ as a dollar- E:arner, 56. The order of magnitude of the colonies' contribution may be seen in Table V w'hich shol·'s the trad.e balance l..ri th the Un! ted. States and Canada of various groupe ,·,ithin the sterling area. Exports of the U.K. I the colonies and the other common\oTeal th countries "rere each between $500 and $600 million in 1948. The colonies had a surplus over imnorts of some $250 million, ~rhile the U.K. had a deficit of $750 million and the trade of the remainder I.ras about in balance. The major change in the first half of 1949 is the emergence - 18 - of large unfavorable balance for the Dominions (principally India); the colonies actually appear to be improving their position. 57. It should 'be emphasized that these figures are purely illustra- the. For one thing they are oased on United States and Oanadian statht1cs,. ",hich differ considerably from Britbh sources. They exclude trade yTi th other countries that iSfihanced in dollars or other hard cur,.-encies; examples are dollar payments to Indonesia on reexports through Singapore and to Vene!:uela for imports of petroleum into Trinidad, They also exclude payments for services of Nhich tourism in the 'Jest Indies is the largest item on the positive side, offset semei-That by dollar freight charges on colonial trade in general. 58, In addition, . the gold production of the eolonies amounts to some $30 million a year 1 59. An official BritiSh estimate has put the net dollar earning';',!! as running at a rate of(P150millionp. a. in the first half of 1948. They 1,'ere probably no higher a year later, both exports and i!t!Ports having been reduced. )'fhatever the precise position, it is cleQr that the contribution that the colonies make to the central reserve! of the ~terling area is a subfltantie.l one. 60. This contribution is" h01,rever. a vulnerable one. Colonial ex- ports to the Ulll ted S'~8tes an.d Canllda are heavily concentrated on rubber, cacao and '(;in; :'..',~ 1948 ·chasE. three accounted for 855& of the total. JJatural rubber is threatened by synthetic. ',,'hether the latter is produceod in the United States for purely economic or for·~trategic reasons. Tin prices are notoriousJ.y sensi.tive to changes in. 1"orld demand. A..?ld both these commoc1.ities -i/""r"'-l-ifo-d-;:i;i ti~;~f-t;.i';'t~;~~2;;~7tl;bl-;'~ItI;-;'t~e...t;:-th~1lgh-U- is likely. that it inclul~es gold production. - 19 - are produced mainly in Halaya, 111h1ch has already suffered the effects of the postTrial" political ferment in Eastern Asia, Cacao, 1>Ih1ch is produced in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, faces a different problem, namely disease. The effects of II s1I1011en-shoot ll t which is currently ravaging the Gold Coast and a;.u~. is also present in Nigeria, are expected to cut output from 350~illton tons ~. in 1946 to 265 .ilUou tons in 1952-53. Nell! plantings are being made or are envhaged in the Far East and the Caribbean, but the trees take four to five years to start bearing and several years more to reach full production. 61. The report of t~e Overseas Territories Committee of O.E,B.d. puts no great hopes on the expansion of these traditional exports to the United states and Canada. On the 1.rhole, a fall in dollar earnings it;! more likely, although the long-run prospects for rubber are more favorable. ~le report does envisage some increased exports from the Brit1~h colonies of certain minor commodities such as shal and hemp, hardT/'ood!;'!, bauxite, manga.,. nese and a few other mineralA. E.D.A. has, in fact, financed plants for the increased production of cobalt and kyanite. In addition. gold production, "rhich l'ras declining under the influence of the fixed price, may 'be expect~d to receive a pONerful stimulus from the recent devaluation of sterling. 62. Immediately after the "rar the colonies' needs for textiles and cereals, tltro of the main import categories. had to be i!IlPorted fr,om North AmeriCa to such an extent that for some time they Nere :running a dollar deficit. Although s~pplies from this quarter have been mUch reduced, there ~s still room for further saving of dollars; in 1948 imports of textiles into Nalaya alone totalled $50 million and imports of cereals into the ~;Jest Indies, $25 million. Supplies of textiles from inside the sterling area have improved considerably of late and a trade agreement batt'Teen the United Kingdom and Japan made in ~Tovember 1948 provided for the supply of considerable. quantities - 20 - of textiles to the colonies. The t.rorld supply of ri~e is Ukely to "become much easier in the next fe'lJo1 years. In the colonies themselves a number of projects for rice production are in hand and there are a1ao plans for produc- Han of textiles from locally grotlTn cotton in !lTigeria and Uganda. Some possi bili ties for reducing colonial imports from north America exist, therefore, 6). The British Government estimates that the net effect of the~e increased exports and reduced imports tl711l raise the net dollar earnings of the colonies from the current rate of 3150 million to $300 million per annum by 1952/53. a figure ~';hich appears to be somel.That optimistic, in viet.r of the limiting fact·ors mentioned above. 64. Perhaps the most important ne'lJo' contribution that the colonies can make to the alleviation of the dollar shortage is to increase their produotion of cornmod! ties no", imported by sterling area countries from th,~ dolb.r area. Sugar and vegetable fats and oils are important agricultural commodities in this group. The quantity of sugar produced ,.rithin the sterling area is small compared ,.,;1. th the requirements and any conceivable increase in colon:i.al sup- plies eould be absorbed. The target for oolonial sugar exports in 1952/53 is slightly over .50~; more than the 1947 figure; estimE.I,tes of the 19 l i-9 sugar crop are already one-third higher. 65. Before the "'ar the commonl'realth "'as a net exporter of fats and oils (other than dryillg oils), but exports of groundnuts from Incl:il1, '·'hich ,,'ere very large before the "'ar. have since fallen to quite small omO'L."lt s. There is currently a deficit, ",hieh in vie\-, of higher consumption in India is likely to continue. In the colonies the greatest attention has been given to groundnuts, ",hich have the advantage of being an annual crop_ The ,,'e11- known Tanganyika project of the Overseas Food Corporation can be expected to overcome its early difficulties and, in due course, to bear fruit. Currently, - 21 - ho",ever t more important results m8¥ be expected from Nigeria. ~.rhere large crops have been held back from ezport by insufficient motive pot,'er on the raU,·rays; this is already largely remedied and. the large backlog of ~toclta should 'be cleared early in 1950. The C. D. C. also has schemes for putting nellr ar~as under production in several '-fest Afrioan colonies. A considerable increat'le in palm oil output is ezpected from Nigeria through the introduction of ne\" oil mills giving a much higher yield than the traditional peasant methods of production. Increased production of other oils and oUeeeds -- e.g. cotton- seed. tung, linseed -- is also anticipated, but these are relatively un.impor.,.. tanto The British Government ezpects tr...at by 1952/53 the United Kingdom T.rll1 no longer need to import any fats and oils except linseed oil from the Western Hemisphere. In view of the fact that the Tanganyika scheme is nOT" much behind sched.ule. this m8¥ only be achieved by sloyling up the rate of increc.se in consumption. 66. Copper is the out!'1tanding mineral from !·,hich increased output is hoped. Production in Horthern Rhodesia, ",hieh ,.ras about 220,000 tons before the 1,olar, and some11'hat less in 1948, is expected to exceed 300 I 000 tons in 1952/53. Current performance sw,:ge~ts that this is 1·'e11 "rithin the realm of pro babili ty. The United Kingdom could absorb this amount by reducing imports from the ',"estern Hemisphere even ,.rithout increasing its current consumption. Compared T,ri th copper. other minerals such as iron ore and lead are unimporta.'lt. 67. ~ith this increased production the proportion of British imports from the colonies nO\'T running at 10% of the total as against less than 6% before the ,,'ar t may rise to as mUch as 12;& in 1952/53. The order of magnitu(le of this increase in imports is probably around $150 million. Part of this - 22 - will go to increased consumption but the remainder should represent a saving of imports from the 'Jestern Hemisphere. 68. For the first fa'" years after the ,·rar the development of the colonies \.ras held up by a shortage of supplies of all kinds. e.g. steel, machinery and textiles. As there Nere eompeting claim$ fot' reequipment of existing installations, particularly raihtays. nel.' projects 1,1e1'e held U)). In addition. there I,tere insufficient consumer goods to absorb the purohasing pO'·rer accumUlated during the "rar and the period of high prices immediately after it "ri thout a substantial degree of inflation. labor' costs 1,'er9 cont'le- quently high. The immediate effect on production in genet'al t.ras a sUb,-,tpntial drop from postwar peaks. 69. The position is nO T" greatly changed. SUpplies are coming forl~1ard much more rapidly and there have even been local gluts of eonsume~ goods. Although the colonies have sterling balances amounting to nearly ~400 million over and aboVe the necessary backing for their currency issues, the prime heed may soon be for financial capital. On July 20 the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated: liThe indications are that ~'re shall have allOcated all the money which t,'as provided by Parliament under the :1.945 Act !.rithin a cocrpe,ra.":' tively limited time ahead. That ,.rill probably mean that urgent projects "'hieh the Colonies lrTant may not be possible because there are no f'llndg available, thereby creating a situation in "'hlch the C'.overnment \,'ill need to oonsider , . hether a nel,7 bill should be asked for. II 70. The pace of investment is thus accelerating fairly ~apidly. A list of long-term investments in hand or likely to be in hand shortly "'af-1 recently submitted by the British Government to O.B.E.C. The cost of the projects on this list, ,.rhieh may very '·'ell not be exha,ustive 1 i~ over t,400 million. - 2;3 - 71. It should. be understood that tl1ese projects do not fit into a closely knit plan. The Colonial Office has stated that there is a plan only 1\ in the sense that Government provid.es a certain general framel"ork: l,rhich may be very sketchy or very comprehensive, but llfhich still leaves a more or less substantial residual of decisions about both production and consumption to the private planning or initiative of individuals. II Its l'rincipe~l concern has been to make sure that a proper balance is maintained betl"een eoo:nomic development and the improvement of l!relfare services. Othe!'1.'!ise the initiative is left largely to the colonial governments, private enterprise e.nd the G.D. C. 72. In these circumstances, it is to be expected that the nature and the scope of the projects l•.lould vary ,.ridely. Those undertaken by colonia.l governments range from a few large public utility schemes to a multitude of small projects designed to ameliorate living conditions or to improve present methods of peasant cultivation. One e~ample of the first t:{De is the East African raihray link from Kenya to :'oTorthern Rhodesia ~.rhich is under consid-,. eration. Another example is the ONen Falls dam and hydroelectric plant on the Upper IUle in Uganda. "rhich Fill help to control l.ratar for irrigation in Egypt; a contract for the construction of this dam has recently been signed. 73. Projects of this magnitude in primitive territories are necessarily a gamble I since they are undertaken in the expectation but tid thout the eel''''' tainty of a grotoJing demand for their services. In the past the fi:~ed. interest and aIllOrtization payments on capital borro,-"red for simila.l" e:'q)endi tures often ~ut heavily into a colony's revenues until the project became self-financing, which often took many years. Although the colonies are DO\·7 in a much more flexible financial pod tion. there is clearly a limit to the number of such projects that can be safely undertaken. In this field, therefore~ inter- national cooperation through such organizations as O.E.E.C. is particularly - z4- im:portant~ Efforts are already b~ing made to establi,sh closer coordination of transport plans in Africa. 74. A large part of the investment by colonial go;vel"nmen1is ~!ill necessarily be of the second type, t.rhieh 1s less spectacular but no less important. As an example of this the proposals for 1/r ater supplies in the Oyprus development plan may be cited. The plan includes a min;tmum 150 small gravity irrigation schemes and the piping of domestic 1rlater to 5.50 villa.ges at a total cost of some tl-l/2 million. 75. The bu;Lk: of investment by private ente:rprise ia unli!te1y to be much different from ,.,hat it "ras in the past. 4 large part \ring tendency to process export cornmedi ties instead of shipping them as rat-r ma.terials, there is obviously a limit to this, too. -26 -. 81.. One solutlo:n of the populati-o:n problem, ,·rhere i t is possible, is to open IIp new land.. In the ~$land.s of the '.Jest, Ind.ies, an acutely over- populated area" no nell1 land is availabl.e and the problem is to be tackled by migration to the mainland colonies of Bri Ush Honduras and British Guiana. In an elaborate plan outlin.ed by a ROYal CommissionY it t,ras estimated that the capital costa! provi,ding hOllsing and employment·forlOO,OOOimmigrants over a period of 10 years might be in the region of ;20 million even \dthout actual transport costs •. And this\·rould hardly relieve the islands of the natural increase in that period. 82. In Africa population dend ties, tCiken over the ,,'hole area of each colony, are in general very 10''', .but ·10 cally they may be extremely h1,gh. Thi s is partly because large areaS are dry anti unproduct ive t but there are. in addition, .vast' areas that ',are scarcely ~nhabited because of infestation by the tsetse~fly, the carrier of trypanosomiasis.&! This disease can be controlled in human beings, but could not. until recently, in cattle. The discovery of a neN drug. ant:!'ycicie, ~'Those effectiveness is by no me~,ns yet determined,holds out greater promise. i.radication of the fly by clearing bush is,. ho~·rever, the only satisfactory cure and this is a costly and tE'dious process. 8). The opening up of ne,,' ll;'l.nd it;) thus <9, distinct pos.sibility in Africa. The ~langa:nyika groundnu.t scheme must, be. regarded as a desirable move in this direction, although itiJlustrates at the same time the dif- ficulty and the cost of bringing under cultivation areas ",hleh are remote and whose physical and climatic, characteristics are imperfectly kno"rn. 11 Report of the Brit'{shd-GU:ianaand3Titi~hHo~dur;s 'Se'tt1;io~nt'Corntll1ssion. H.N. S.O., Cmd. 75:3:.3.. y In Africa as a. "rhole,. the area is sal,d to be mU9h larger than the U.S. - 27 - Schemes of a less ambitious kind are being undertaken by the C.D.C,. in :':Tigeria. for example. and by colonial governments. On t,rhatever scale they are lL"1der- taken, they must be expensive o1Pring to the high overhead cost of installations in hitherto uninhabited la.nd. The problems of over-population and under-popu- lation thus exist side by side. 84. Settlement on new land has one great advantage in the development of the ealonies. It makes po~sible the organization of the economic life of the ne\'T communities on entirely nellT lines ,.rithout the barriers to greater productivity that land tenure systems and social customs have erected on the old land, especially the highly populated land. It is I for example, a 1.rid.ely held viell! that Southern Nigeria lITould have deriVed great economic ben€'f1t from the introduction of oil-palm plantations instead of having this branch of agriculture as a simple collection of lIdld fruit. The grant of land for this purpose \"as refu1':led to a British company because native land rights had to be respected, but attempts to enoourage plantations by the natives have met l.·'i th meager success. There are similar difficulties l!Ti th forest conservation and utilization. It is even more dif'fioul t to nersuade primitive peoples to give up existing rights in favor of long-rlln benefits than it is to persuade more advanced peoples. 85. It is not surprising to find that the habit of savine is hard to inculcate. The principal source of saving is taxation, "'hieh Hithout extra'" ordinary administrative expense can only follm·, a policy of rOUGh justice. As it is inequitable to tax the normally small cash incomes heavily, the larger ones tend to escape. Perhaps the most promising source of saving is voluntary labor for small local projects. An outstanding example can be found in Uganda t "There a first-class road system has gradually been constructed Nith little capital cost to the colony through the medium of the looal native - 28 - administration. On a smaller scale, this method has had eneouragln~ success in Southern Nigeria. Nevertheless, even such saving as e~ists stil~ takes unproduQtive and even destructive forms, such as the keeping of cattle merely as a token of ostensible 1. if,