IDA’s Crisis Response Window Lessons from IEG Evaluations An IEG Synthesis Report March 12, 2019 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without authorization. Contents Abbreviations .....................................................................................................................................................v Acknowledgments ...........................................................................................................................................vi Key Messages .................................................................................................................................................. vii 1. Background and Context ......................................................................................................................... 1 Evolution of the Crisis Response Window ......................................................................................................... 1 Purpose and Scope of the Report ........................................................................................................................4 2. Use of Crisis Response Window Financing ....................................................................................... 5 3. CRW Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency and Predictability ....................... 9 Timeliness ................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Transparency and Predictability .......................................................................................................................... 12 Tension with Core IDA Principles........................................................................................................................ 12 4. CRW Performance in Supporting Long Term Development Results ..................................... 14 CRW Performance at the Project Level ............................................................................................................ 14 CRW Performance at the Country Level .......................................................................................................... 17 Strengthening the Evaluability of CRW Financing ........................................................................................ 17 Countering Economic Shocks through the CRW ............................................................................. 18 Addressing Natural Disasters through the CRW ............................................................................. 22 CRW Objective of Support for Resilience Build Back Better Principles ................................................ 25 Responding to Public Health Emergencies through the CRW ................................................... 27 Bibliography..................................................................................................................................................... 30 Boxes Box 4.1. “Build Back Better” (BBB) Principles Emerge from Global Review .................................. 26 Figures Figure 2-1. Regional CRW Financed Operations by IDA Cycle .......................................................... 5 Figure 2-2. IDA Cycle CRW Financed Operations by Region ............................................................. 5 Figure 2-3. CRW Financed Operations by Type of Crisis......................................................................7 Figure 2-4. CRW Financed Operations by Region and by Type of Crisis ........................................7 iii Figure 2-5. CRW Financed Operations by Instrument Type and Fiscal Year .................................7 Figure 2-6. CRW Financed Operations by Approval FY and Crisis Type ........................................ 8 Figure 3-1. Time to Delivery for CRW Financed Operations ............................................................ 11 Figure 4-1. Number of CRW Financed Operations Rated by IEG ................................................... 15 Figure 4-2. IEG Ratings of CRW Financed Operations ........................................................................ 15 Figure 4-3. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW Financed Operations for Economic Shocks by Region ................................................................................................................................................................. 21 Tables Table 4-1. IEG Outcome Ratings by Crisis Type ..................................................................................... 16 Table 4-2. CRW Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, FY10-19 ........................................... 19 Table 4-3. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW Financed Operations for Economic Shocks by Region, FY10-19 ............................................................................................................................................... 20 Table 4-4. Selected ICRRs for CRW Financed Operations for Economic Shocks ...................... 22 Table 4-5. CRW Financed Operations for Natural Disasters by Region, FY10-19 ...................... 23 Table 4-6. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW Financed Operations for Natural Disaster by Region, FY10-19 ............................................................................................................................................... 24 Table 4-7. ICRRs for CRW Financed Operations for Natural Disasters ......................................... 25 Table 4-8. CRW Allocations for Public Health Emergencies, FY10-19............................................ 27 Table 4-9. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW Allocations for Health by Region ............................. 28 Appendices Appendix A. Projects with CRW Funding by Crisis Type ................................................................. 41 Appendix B. Instruments Used with CRW Financing by Crisis Type........................................... 50 Appendix C. ICRR Ratings for Bank Performance .............................................................................. 52 Evaluation Managers Director-General, Independent Evaluation Ms. Alison Evans Director, Human Development and Economic Management Mr. Auguste Kouame Manager, Country Programs and Economic Management Mr. Jeffrey Chelsky Task Manager Ms. Malathi S. Jayawickrama iv Abbreviations AF Additional financing AFR Africa Region BBB build back better CAS Country Assistance Strategy CLR Completion and Learning Report CLRR Completion and Learning Report Review CODE Committee on Development Effectiveness CPE Country Program Evaluation CRW Crisis Response Window DPF Development Policy Financing DPO Development Policy Operation EAP East Asia and Pacific Region ECA Europe and Central Asia Region GDP Gross Domestic Project GNI Gross National Income HS Highly Satisfactory IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICRR Implementation Completion and Results Report Review IDA International Development Association IEG Independent Evaluation Group IMF International Monetary Fund IPF Investment Project Financing LCR Latin America and Caribbean Region LIC low income countries MENA Middle East and North Africa MS Moderately Satisfactory MTR Mid Term Review MU Moderately Unsatisfactory P4R Program for Results PBA Performance Based Allocation S Satisfactory SAR South Asia Region UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees WBG World Bank Group All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. v Acknowledgments This Synthesis Paper was prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). Malathi S. Jayawickrama led the team under the overall guidance of Alison Margaret Evans (Director-General, Evaluation), Auguste T. Kouame, Director, Human Development and Economic Management Department (IEGHE) and Jeffrey Chelsky, Manager, Country Programs and Economic Management (IEGEC). The team comprised Erika A. Jorgensen, Consultant, and Breda Griffith, Consultant. Patricia Acevedo provided administrative support. The team would like to thank Peishan Yeo, Strategy Officer, Development Finance Corporate IDA and IBRD (DFCII) and team in DFCII for comments on an earlier draft of this document. vi Key Messages IDA’s Crisis Response Window (CRW) evolved from a single focus on economic shocks to include two other types of crises—natural disasters and public health emergencies. The CRW was set up as a pilot under IDA15 to address repercussions of the global financial crisis on IDA countries. It was amended when made a permanent part of IDA to address the impact of natural disasters in addition to economic shocks. When the Ebola crisis erupted in 2014, CRW coverage was revised to include public health emergencies as eligible for CRW financing. The CRW built on IDA’s experience of crisis response and the need to respond to a perceived gap in the IDA architecture. The CRW has provided IDA with the flexibility to support countries facing shocks within IDA cycles requiring that additional resources be made available faster than possible under the regular IDA allocation framework. The CRW aims to achieve several objectives: rapid response; transparency and predictability; support for resilience in natural disaster response; and supporting long term development objectives. The rapid response of CRW financed operations was to be pursued through accelerated emergency procedures for internal processing– the result has been ‘time to delivery’ shorter than Bank averages for investment operations. Transparency and predictability in access to CRW resources was to be pursued by requiring that Bank Management inform the Executive Board of its intention to draw on CRW resources for a particular operation. Support for resilience in natural disaster response was to be pursued by including measures to strengthen vulnerable areas in each operation, and, in more recent years, incorporating “build back better” principles. Supporting long term development was to be pursued, inter alia, by protecting core spending to preserve progress in poverty reduction. CRW funds have been requested and used regularly since 2010, and projects receiving CRW funds have performed better than the IDA average. Over the period 2010-18, half of CRW financing went to countries in the Africa region, and around half has been for response to natural disasters. The majority of CRW finance has been used for investment project finance (IPF) operations. In line with the evolving scope of the CRW, demand for CRW resources (as well as the type of crisis that is eligible for financing) has varied across IDA cycles, from IDA15’s response to economic shocks, to IDA16’s response to natural disasters, to IDA17 and IDA18’s responses to all three types of crises. Implementation Completion and Results Report Reviews (ICRRs) show that CRW financed operations have performed better than the average IDA operation in delivering project outcomes. The reasons for good performance vary by type of crisis. vii Evaluations of operations receiving CRW financing to counter economic shocks identify some common factors that underpin good performance. These include building on existing operations, close coordination with partners, preparation for future crises, capacity building, and resilience improvements. Speed of preparation and simple and flexible project design contributed to success, but longer-term objectives (such as strengthening countries’ capacity to mitigate crises) did not receive sufficient attention, although this may be partly due to the shorter term focus of operations for crisis response. Finally, it is possible that stronger client ownership and commitment in crisis conditions may play a role in better performance. Evaluations of CRW financed operations for natural disaster response identified several features that contributed to good performance. Partnering with other international institutions, careful instrument choice (including building on existing operations through additional financing), good project design, and flexibility during implementation were common features. Moreover, ‘build back better’ principles of resilience building, which are being incorporated into project preparation and implementation, are expected to strengthen the contribution to long term development objectives. Client ownership and commitment may also have bolstered performance. Financing for public health emergencies presents few lessons to date. The small number of operations point to the success of rapid preparation and partnering with other donors while identifying the challenge of supporting longer term objectives. Not all the objectives of the CRW are easily evaluable, especially given that CRW financing is usually pooled with regular IDA financing for operations. To improve the evaluability of the CRW, its use needs to be recognized in operational documents and self assessments at the project and country level. It will remain difficult to judge the impact of CRW financing in practice until its use is consistently taken into account in project and country evaluations, but recent improvements in staff guidance will help. While it is methodologically challenging to attribute specific results to the CRW given the pooling of resources, more explicit reference to CRW related activities in project and country documents (especially in Implementation Completion and Results Reports and Completion and Learning Reports) should help to clarify the value added of the CRW. Looking forward, IDA’s flexibility and responsiveness have been enhanced by the CRW; however, with this enhanced flexibility and ability to respond quickly come potential tensions with IDA’s performance-based allocation and its core principle of non-earmarked financing. As financing for IDA special windows has expanded, taking a growing share of total IDA resources, it is vital to consider both the balance and potential tradeoffs between greater flexibility and predictability for IDA clients and to monitor this issue going forward. viii 1. Background and Context Evolution of the Crisis Response Window From IDA15 through IDA18, the Crisis Response Window (CRW) evolved from a focus on economic shocks to include two other types of crises—natural disasters and public health emergencies. The CRW was set up as a pilot under IDA15 to address repercussions related to the global financial crisis on IDA countries. When established as a permanent part of IDA, it was amended to address the impact of natural disasters in addition to economic shocks. CRW coverage was expanded to include public health emergencies when the Ebola crisis erupted in 2014. CRW built on IDA’s experience of crisis response while seeking to provide additional flexibility. IDA already had a track record of crisis response, having played an important role in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. IDA had responded to natural disasters such as the 2004 tsunami, economic crises, and public health emergencies such as avian flu. These responses were typically financed by restructuring existing country portfolios and reallocating country allocations. Crisis response financing tended to be ad hoc rather than systematic and reallocation and restructuring processes could be time consuming. The Development Committee concluded in 2009 that “the succession of global crises and natural disasters early in the IDA15 period exposed a gap in the international aid architecture related to systematic assistance to LICs facing large shocks on government core spending and on the poor and vulnerable” (World Bank 2012), and “committed to explore the benefits of a new crisis response mechanism in IDA to protect LICs from crises” (World Bank 2009b). The CRW responds to a real need—to provide additional resources quickly in response to a crisis, ensuring that such support does not come at the cost of achieving longer-term development goals. In fact, IEG evaluations had made a strong case for a window such as the CRW. The concept of a funding window was put forward in the 2006 IEG evaluation on World Bank assistance for natural disasters. The report noted “for the most vulnerable countries, contingency funding needs to be made available, whether as part of another loan, a set-aside in the CAS lending program, or a free- standing catastrophe fund” (World Bank 2006). The report advocated for more investment lending, noting that longer-term activities, such as mitigation, reconstruction and institution building in addition to attention to social issues had been short-changed in the past. Then, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the 2011 IEG evaluation of the global economic crisis noted that low-income countries (LICs) were far less able to bear the costs of the global financial crisis and called for greater proactivity by the Bank on 1 Chapter 1 Background and Context their behalf and highlighted the role of the CRW (World Bank 2011b). Last, IEG’s recent evaluation on health notes the importance of the World Bank’s financing and co- ordination role in responding effectively to deadly virus outbreaks, particularly in countries with lower institutional capacity and complex development partner networks (World Bank 2017c). The CRW was established as a pilot within IDA15 in response to the global financial crisis, approved by IDA’s Executive Directors in December 2009. Its launch followed calls from the Development Committee to consider how IDA could respond to the challenges faced by LICs affected by the global financial crisis,1 which had followed on the heels of the food and fuel price shocks of 2007 and 2008 and had significant and negative impacts on many non-oil exporting LICs. Bank management proposed a pilot IDA CRW, which was discussed at the IDA15 Mid-Term Review (World Bank 2009d).2 Implementation began in January 2010, making the CRW available during the second half of IDA15 (January 2010 to July 2011).3 CRW resources were additional to a country’s regular IDA allocation, since the allocation system under IDA often made it difficult to mobilize incremental financing for IDA countries in the face of an unanticipated shock. The CRW was established as a permanent feature under IDA16 to address natural disasters as well as economic crises. A permanent window was adopted as part of IDA16 to respond to exceptional crises caused by exogenous shocks, with CRW resources as part of a concerted international effort and accessed only as last resort financing.4 Access to CRW resources would be triggered by evidence of an economic 1The negative impact of the crisis was transmitted through several channels (exports, remittances, tourism and foreign direct investment) and resulted in falling growth and employment and in higher poverty. 2IDA Deputies endorsed launching the window under IDA15 and discussed making the window permanent as part of the subsequent IDA16 replenishment, while emphasizing the need to ensure complementarity with other existing mechanisms for crisis support, particularly those of the WBG and IMF (World Bank 2009a). 3This was supplemented by SDR88 million from IDA investment returns and SDR158 millions of contributions from the United Kingdom. 4Although IDA Deputies noted the need to respond to public health emergencies and epidemics, this issue was set aside until the IDA16 Mid-Term Review since public health emergences would require operational changes in IDA to allow for the kind of rapid financing that would be required for an effective public health emergency response (World Bank 2010a, 2010b). 2 Chapter 1 Background and Context crisis projected to reduce GDP by at least three percentage points in a significant number of IDA countries; or exogenous price shocks with widespread impact across IDA countries. Access in the case of natural disasters would be triggered only if the disaster was exceptionally severe and intense and where existing resources were insufficient, with a presumption that a portion would be used to strengthen disaster resilience (World Bank 2010c). The desirability of building resilience into disaster response projects has been confirmed repeatedly and adopted as good practice, but there is an inevitable tension with fast crisis response (UNISDR 2015, World Bank 2017a). Access to the permanent CRW was limited to crises triggered by exogenous shocks.5 Under IDA16, Management was expected to consult with the Executive Board shortly after a disaster occurred to indicate that access to CRW funds would form part of IDA’s response. In most cases, a note was presented to the Board informing Executive Directors of Management’s intention to allocate CRW funds to a specific project and explaining the emergency to which the project responded. In addition, CRW financed operations were eligible for accelerated emergency procedures for internal processing and Board approval (World Bank 2010a, 2010b). IDA17 saw the addition of public health emergencies to the types of crises eligible for CRW financing. The CRW would continue to use the CRW implementation arrangements in place under IDA16. Almost immediately, the question of inclusion of public health emergencies arose due to the Ebola crisis. Extending the use of the CRW to a public health emergency was first requested as part of the Board’s approval of the Ebola Emergency Response Project in September 2014. At the IDA17 Mid-Term Review, IDA Executive Directors formally expanded the eligibility criteria for CRW access to include public health emergencies and epidemics (World Bank 2015b). CRW continued under IDA18, with access to CRW funds for severe economic crises, natural disasters, and public health emergencies (World Bank 2017b). The two- stage approval process established under IDA16 remained to ensure Board involvement and oversight through consultation in the first stage (informing the Board of the borrowing country’s intention to access CRW resources) and simultaneous approval of CRW resources and specific operations in the second stage. As part of IDA18’s effort to expand financing to promote resilience through crisis preparedness and response, the 5For example, an economic crisis triggered by poor economic management would not merit access, while one caused by a sharp commodity price drop or a recession in major trading partners would (World Bank 2010a). 3 Chapter 1 Background and Context CRW was scaled up to SDR2.1 billion and adjustment of financing terms was allowed for the most severe natural disasters6 (World Bank 2017b). Following the IDA18 MTR, the Board approved reallocating $750 million from the CRW as demand for CRW resources up to that point had been modest. Purpose and Scope of the Report This IEG synthesis paper takes stock of experience with IDA’s Crisis Response Window, making use of IEG evaluative evidence. The paper synthesizes findings from existing evaluations and information on CRW performance during its pilot stage under IDA15 and subsequent IDA cycles, to inform stakeholders and promote learning. The audience for this paper is primarily internal, including management, Executive Directors (including the Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE)), and IDA Deputies. Attribution of results to CRW resources is methodologically challenging given the co-mingling of CRW and regular IDA resources in most CRW financed operations. But IEG evaluations provide some basis for assessing CRW contribution to outcomes and the achievement of its objectives. CRW financing is usually used to augment financing for other IDA-supported interventions. This makes it difficult to attribute results to any single source of financing. The frequent use of CRW funds for Additional Financing (AF) also complicates any effort to separate results linked to CRW from other results. Nevertheless, IEG evaluations at the project, country, and sector levels provide useful information from which an assessment of CRW implementation can be derived. The remainder of this report is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief discussion of the CRW’s objectives, focusing on timeliness of CRW financed interventions and adherence to IDA governance arrangements. The third section considers performance of CRW financed projects and the associated country results, making use of IEG evaluations, including separate consideration of performance in response to economic shocks, natural disasters, and public health emergencies. It also draws on relevant IEG thematic and sector evaluations. The 145 projects that have received CRW financing during the reviewed period were matched with 59 associated ICRRs, 44 country strategy Completion and Learning Report Reviews (CLRRs) and their predecessors, and four Country Program Evaluations (CPEs). 6IDA financing terms would be adjusted for countries exposed to severe natural disasters leading to significant damage and losses of over one-third of GDP. 4 2. Use of Crisis Response Window Financing 2.1 The Pilot CRW under IDA15 provided financing to many IDA countries to assist them in mitigating the impact of the global financial crisis. Funding was SDR1.053 billion (about $1.6 billion), of which SDR806 million (about $1.3 billion) came from unallocated IDA general resources (about 13 percent of the estimated financing needed to protect core spending in non-oil exporting IDA-only countries) (World Bank 2009d). These IDA resources were additional to a country’s regular IDA allocation. Fifty- six IDA-only countries were recognized as eligible for these funds.7 CRW funds were allocated among the 56 countries based primarily on estimated crisis impact and need (World Bank 2010a).8 By the end of IDA15, $1.4 billion had been committed (Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2). Figure 2-1. Regional CRW Financed Figure 2-2. IDA Cycle CRW Financed Operations by IDA Cycle Operations by Region Notes: One project in Africa and its additional financing, both in IDA17, were regional, covering three African countries. 2.2 CRW resources under IDA16 were not fully utilized. IDA Deputies had set aside SDR1.335 billion (about $2 billion) for the CRW for IDA16, about four percent of 7Reflecting the ongoing impact of the food and fuel price crisis, 23 IDA countries were excluded as they were significant oil exporters, had higher income levels, or had arrears to IDA and/or IBRD. 8The projected decline in GDP growth was used as the main indicator of crisis impact while per capita GNI was used to indicate need. 5 Chapter 2 Use of Crisis Response Window Financing total IDA16 resources. By the end of IDA16, $937 million had been committed for 27 new operations or as Additional Financing to existing well-performing operations that could effectively respond to crisis conditions. Of these, a special CRW allocation of $500 million went to Haiti to support recovery efforts after the 2010 earthquake. The unused amounts in the CRW were redistributed, with about $470 million reallocated to IDA’s Regional Integration Program at the time of the IDA16 MTR and about $540 million carried over to the IDA17 CRW (World Bank 2010a, 2013, 2015a) (Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2). 2.3 Demand for CRW financing exceeded expectations during IDA17. At the start of IDA17, SDR0.6 billion (about $840 million) had been allocated to the CRW (World Bank 2014).9 At the Mid-Term Review (November 2015), resources of $900 million were added as demand was higher than expected. This constituted a doubling in size from IDA16. Resources were fully utilized (World Bank 2018a). By the end of IDA17, $1,752 million had been committed for 37 new operations or as additional financing. To date under IDA18, $350 million has been committed for six new operations or as Additional Financing (Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2). 2.4 Since its inception, the CRW has been used regularly, with countries in the Africa region accounting for half of CRW commitments. Over the entire period, CRW financed projects included 145 loans (for 139 operations).10 Total IDA commitments for these loans totaled $ 7.7 billion, of which the CRW provided $4.4 billion. A few countries drew repeatedly on the CRW: Haiti ($608 million in CRW financing for 16 projects); Nepal ($389 financing for five projects); Yemen, Republic of ($364 million for three projects); and Ethiopia ($356 million for four projects)11 (Figure 2-2, Figure 2-4). 2.5 Financing in response to natural disasters has taken up about half of cumulative CRW resources. Out of the total CRW financing provided, 37 percent of (57 percent of operations) responded to an economic crisis, 49 percent (39 percent of operations) to a natural disaster, and 14 percent (four percent of operations) to a public health emergency (Figure 2-3, Figure 2-4). 9But it was noted in the final report launching IDA17 that, in the event of exceptional circumstances, CRW funding could be exceeded, subject to approval by the IDA Board of Executive Directors (World Bank 2014). A given project may receive more than one loan with CRW financing. A parent project with 10 CRW financing may receive Additional Financing, part or all of which came from the CRW. 11These four countries accessed more than $300 million each from CRW to date. Another seven countries accessed $100 to 300 million each. 6 Chapter 2 Use of Crisis Response Window Financing Figure 2-3. CRW Financed Figure 2-4. CRW Financed Operations by Operations by Type of Crisis Region and by Type of Crisis Notes: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. 2.6 Investment Project Finance (IPF) has been the instrument of choice in the majority of CRW financed operations. They accounted for 86 percent of CRW commitments and 110 projects (of 145 total), out of which 63 (about half of commitments) were for Additional Financing. Development Policy Finance (DPF) constituted 13 percent of commitments and 34 operations. While overall use of CRW funds has varied sharply year by year, investment projects have remained dominant (Figure 2-5). Figure 2-5. CRW Financed Operations by Instrument Type and Fiscal Year 7 Chapter 2 Use of Crisis Response Window Financing Notes: One investment project and its additional financing, both in FY15, were regional, covering three countries. 2.7 The demand for CRW resources has varied across IDA cycles even as the types of crises eligible for access has expanded. After its first two years, little CRW finance was called on to address economic crises, while starting in FY12, the need for CRW financing for natural disasters has varied year by year, with heaviest use in FY17. Public health emergencies were less frequent, with only two years when CRW financing was requested (Figure 2-6). Figure 2-6. CRW Financed Operations by Approval FY and Crisis Type Notes: A public health emergency investment project and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. 8 3. CRW Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency and Predictability 3.1 The objectives of the CRW can be found in a series of IDA papers.12 The discussion of the CRW includes a long and shifting list of objectives. Under the Pilot, the key objective was to help countries deal with the impact of the global economic crisis by providing additional resources for short term crisis mitigation to reduce the impact on countries’ long-term development activities. It was expected that CRW would provide financial assistance to protect core spending on health, education, social safety nets, infrastructure and agriculture. Teams were encouraged to utilize instruments which would result in projects being rapidly implemented (World Bank 2009d). 3.2 When permanent CRW was established, its key objective was to protect core spending in the short-term and avoid derailing long-term development objectives. Other aims were: (i) establishing a more systematic approach for IDA to respond to severe crises caused by exogenous shocks; (ii) enhancing IDA’s capacity to provide rapid response and effectively participate in global disaster response efforts; and (iii) providing additional and predictable financing to countries hit by crises. Since natural disaster response was added to the CRW, a portion of CRW resources was to be used to strengthen disaster resilience with eligibility for only exceptionally severe and intense disasters. A two-stage process for eligibility was designed to ensure a systematic, predictable, and transparent allocation of CRW resources. (World Bank 2010c). It was emphasized that special IDA windows such as the CRW should not undermine core IDA objectives. 3.3 How did the CRW perform against these objectives? Some areas are easier to assess than others, and four of those against which performance can be judged are considered in this report.13 They are the objectives of (i) rapid response; (ii) transparency 12The main IDA reports in which CRW objectives are discussed are: World Bank 2009c, 2009d, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012, 2015b, and 2018b. 13The IDA18 Mid-Term Review (MTR) report on CRW addressed a different list of CRW objectives and found that the CRW has generally performed well against them. The report presents evidence that the CRW responded to the most severe crises. It argues that burden- sharing was reasonable so that access to CRW remained a last resort, with CRW funding comprising less than one-sixth of overall planned crisis response including other donors (although this ratio was not validated ex post). Further, within the WBG, countries with greater 9 Chapter 3 CRW Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency and Predictability and predictability; (iii) support for resilience; and (iv) supporting long-term development objectives. Rapid response or the timeliness of CRW response to crises is discussed below. Transparency and predictability, as operationalized through the CRW eligibility process, is also discussed. Consideration of CRW’s performance in helping countries return to their long-term development path is the focus of Chapter 4, which also looks at support for resilience to future natural disasters and whether recently, CRW has helped countries comply with the principle of “build back better” (BBB). A brief discussion of the implications of special window financing for IDA core allocations concludes this chapter. Timeliness 3.4 Quick response is essential in addressing a crisis, and there are indications that IDA’s responses to various crises have been more rapid because of the CRW. The speed of response to the global financial crisis was striking. With financing from CRW, IDA prepared and delivered 51 operations ($884 million in CRW financing) between February and end-June 2010. For natural disasters, IDA teams mobilized quickly, typically sending a team within a week of receiving a request from the government. After information was collected, usually in a Post Disaster Needs Assessment undertaken in coordination with development partners, a request was made to the Board via a technical briefing to access CRW. The median time from the disaster date and the Board Technical Briefing was 86 days (World Bank 2018b).14 3.5 CRW operations have been timely, with average ‘time to delivery’ much shorter than the average for Bank IPF operations, and their speed in disbursing financing has been improving. Time to Delivery (average number of months for an investment project to move from concept note review to first disbursement) has fallen steadily, from an average of 20 months in FY10 to below six months since FY15 (Figure 3-1).15 By this measure, CRW financed operations have performed significantly better than Bank-wide averages for investment operations. CRW financed operations have also uncommitted performance-based IDA allocations at the time of a crisis received relatively less CRW financing (adjusted for crisis severity), according to the report. Last, the IDA MTR concludes that the CRW exercised flexibility when needed in special cases such as the Ebola crisis (World Bank 2018b). 14 There is no benchmark for this indicator. 15For time to delivery, the mean rather than the median is used, matching practice for Bank wide statistics. 10 Chapter 3 CRW Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency, and Predictability been timely in disbursement when gauged by median time from approval to first disbursement, with an average of 4.8 months (compared to 7.1 months for other IDA operations). CRW funded IPF median time from approval to disbursement of 5.5 months was shorter than other IDA IPF time to disbursement of 8.1 months, while CRW financed Development Policy Financing (DPF) time to disbursement of 1.5 months was shorter than for other IDA DPFs (2.3 months), as reported in the IDA18 Mid-Term Review (MTR) report on CRW (World Bank 2018b). This better-than-average and improving performance is evidence of the CRW’s success in timely preparation and processing of operations. Figure 3-1. Time to Delivery for CRW Financed Operations16 Notes: Investment operations only. Time to delivery is average number of months from concept stage to first disbursement. For some operations missing concept review dates, the date of technical briefing to the Board is used. Years with data from fewer than five operations are omitted. Due to limited data, Additional Financing are included in the CRW operations. Bank-wide data only available starting in FY12. 3.6 Speed in preparation and time to disbursement varied depending on the type of crisis, with public health emergency projects moving extremely fast. CRW operations for economic shocks had an average time from concept review to fist disbursement of 19 months while those for natural disaster averaged 11 months. The six public health emergency projects averaged 3.5 months from concept review to first 16The mean is used to allow comparison to Bank reporting. The overall mean for FY10-17 for CRW operations was 14.2 while the median was 11.9 (and the Bank average was 26.6). Without Additional Financing, the average for CRW operations for FY10-17 is 15.2. For some operations missing concept dates, the date of technical briefing to the Board is used, which raises the average time to delivery of CRW operations. By all these calculations, CRW operations were timely. 11 Chapter 3 CRW Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency and Predictability disbursement. As is discussed in Chapter 4, CRW timeliness may reflect the decision to attach CRW financing to operations likely to proceed quickly all the way to disbursement, in line with CRW guidance for teams to utilize instruments which result in projects being rapidly implemented (World Bank 2011a). Transparency and Predictability 3.7 A second objective of the CRW--transparency and predictability--was operationalized through the CRW eligibility process, with good compliance. The two- stage process for access to CRW resources was designed to ensure a systematic, predictable, and transparent allocation of CRW resources, and CRW operations have followed the procedures set up for access. CRW financed operations are required to lay out the justification for access to CRW funds in technical briefings to the Board, providing evidence that the country has been hit by an eligible crisis. The requirement for consulting with the Board on access to CRW was established with IDA16.17 Since then, all use of CRW has required an Eligibility Note submitted to the Board in advance of project preparation, except for Haiti. The response to Haiti’s earthquake was instead discussed with the IDA Deputies as part of IDA16. However, important information in the Eligibility Notes was rarely incorporated into project documentation, and while acknowledgement of CRW funding was usually included in project documents, it rarely made it into project or country evaluations. These omissions have made it difficult to assess the adequacy of transparency and predictability, or achievement of other objectives discussed in the Eligibility Notes, beyond confirming compliance with the governance arrangements for access to CRW funds. Tension with Core IDA Principles 3.8 IDA’s flexibility in response to special situations has been enhanced by the CRW which has proven to be useful complement to the IDA performance-based allocation (PBA) system. But concerns have been voiced that the increasing use of special windows for IDA could undermine the PBA system. Special IDA windows have grown as a share of total IDA commitments, from eight percent in IDA15 to 16 percent in IDA17. Within this total, CRW financing during IDA16 constituted about 1.5 percent of total IDA commitments, doubled to about three percent during IDA17 and underwent a significant scale-up in IDA18 to about four percent of much-expanded IDA resources, which was adjusted downwards in response to modest demand to about three percent at 17The establishment of the CRW as a permanent window included a requirement to prepare a note for the Board on eligibility for access to CRW resources. (World Bank 2010c). 12 Chapter 3 CRW Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency, and Predictability the time of the IDA18 MTR (World Bank, 2018c). As the use of IDA special windows has expanded, taking a growing share out of total IDA resources, Bank Management has argued that it is important to consider the tradeoffs between the additional responsiveness of the windows and “the core IDA principle of non-earmarked country funding, which provides predictable, counter-cyclical funding in alignment with client priorities” (World Bank 2018a). The trade-offs associated with greater use of special windows and the core IDA principle of non-earmarked financing could benefit from monitoring going forward. 13 4. CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results 4.1 Another objective of the CRW is to return crisis-affected IDA countries to their long-term development paths. CRW financing is intended to help protect core spending on health, education, social safety nets, infrastructure, and agriculture in the short-term, thereby avoiding an erosion of progress achieved or a derailment of progress towards long-term development objectives. Progress towards this objective was assessed by reviewing IEG project and country level evaluations for CRW financed operations and try to assess the contribution of CRW. Findings and lessons at the project level from ICRRs and from the available country evaluations are reviewed and then grouped according to the type of crisis addressed. Suggestions on how to improve the evaluability of CRW’s contribution to development effectiveness are included. 4.2 Attributions of the impact of CRW financing is made challenging by the fact that CRW funds are typically blended with other financing in supporting a project or operation. Omission of references to CRW financing in some project and most country documents further complicates attribution of impact. Moreover, CRW is rarely acknowledged in project or country evaluations. Nevertheless, and while the number of evaluations of CRW financed operations completed to date is limited, they still provide valuable insights on the impact of the CRW and on how to improve the design and implementation of CRW financed operations to strengthen development effectiveness. CRW Performance at the Project Level 4.3 IEG ratings are available for many CRW financed operations, but the bulk have not yet been evaluated. In total, IEG has rated 40 percent of CRW financed operations constituting 23 percent of CRW financing (or 59 projects and $1.0 billion). Not surprisingly, older projects are more likely to have been rated, and many newer operations have yet to close.18 Almost two-thirds of IDA15 CRW projects have been rated, compared to a quarter of IDA16, ten percent of IDA17, and none for IDA18. Since the CRW began as a vehicle to address economic shocks in the wake of the global financial crisis, almost 60 percent of projects responding to economic shocks have been 18For IDA16, 20 of 27 operations remain active; 33 of 38 IDA17 operations are active and all six IDA18 operations are active. 14 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results rated, constituting 50 percent of financing, but only small proportions of natural disaster or public health emergency operations have been rated (Figure 4-1). Figure 4-1. Number of CRW- Figure 4-2. IEG Ratings of CRW Financed Financed Operations Rated by IEG Operations Note: A given project may receive more than one loan with CRW financing. A parent project with CRW financing may receive additional financing, part or all of which came from the CRW. Multiple projects with CRW financing may be rated together by IEG as part of a series. Health Emergency is public health emergencies. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 4.4 CRW financed operations have performed better than the average IDA operation for “project outcome” and for “Bank performance.” Of the CRW operations with completion reports reviewed by IEG, 80 percent of operations (and 85 percent of financing) were rated moderately satisfactory or higher for outcome.19 This performance surpasses that of all of IDA (68 percent by number and 75 percent by commitments rated moderately satisfactory or higher for projects closed during FY12-14). Within this group, as for IDA overall, IPFs appear to have performed better than DPFs, but the sample is small.20 Ratings for Bank performance are moderately satisfactory or better for 86 percent of CRW financed projects (88 percent of financing) and also surpass overall IDA performance (70 percent of operations or 79 percent of commitments for projects closed during FY12-14) (Figure 4-2, Table 4-1, Appendix C). 19Outcome ratings are based on ratings for: (i) the relevance of objectives; (ii) efficacy or achievement of the Project Development Objective; and (iii) efficiency (for IPFs only). 20Within rated CRW operations, 87 percent of IPFs were moderately satisfactory or higher for outcome compared to 70 percent of DPFs, with a sample comprised of 32 IPFs and 27 DPFs. This performance is better than for IDA overall, with 71 percent of FY12-14 IPF operations rated moderately satisfactory or higher and 60 percent of DPFs. 15 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results 4.5 The performance of CRW financed operations for economic shocks was the strongest. More than 80 percent of rated economic shock operations (and 84 percent by financing) were rated moderately satisfactory or better by IEG. About 70 percent of natural disaster operations (and near 90 percent by financing) were rated moderately satisfactory or better. Too few public health emergency operations have been rated for the average to mean much yet. The first wave of CRW operations, prepared rapidly during the last 18 months of IDA15, have performed very well. (Figure 4-2, Table 4-1). Table 4-1. IEG Outcome Ratings by Crisis Type Public Health Economic Shock Natural Disaster All CRW operations Emergency Total o/w: Total o/w: Total o/w: Total o/w: IDA CRW IDA CRW IDA CRW IDA CRW Rating No. $m $m No. $m $m No. $m $m No. $m $m HS 1 55 5 - - - - - - 1 55 5 S 11 275 129 3 415 110 - - - 14 690 239 MS 27 1,379 598 4 73 65 2 80 20 33 1,532 683 MU 8 336 110 3 28 28 - - - 11 364 138 U 1 71 16 - - - - - - 1 71 16 NR 34 1,623 765 47 2,772 1,994 4 620 600 85 4,965 3,359 Total 82 3,738 1,622 57 3,288 2,197 6 700 620 145 7,726 4,439 Notes: A public health emergency project and its additional financing were regional covering three countries. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. NR = not rated. 4.6 A common factor in poorly performing operations is a failure to take account of limited government capacity and the higher risks of complex projects or programs. For the nearly 20 percent of projects with moderately unsatisfactory ratings or worse, one lesson commonly recorded in ICRRs is that project or program design often did not sufficiently take into account the limited implementation capacity of the government. Especially in the wake of a crisis, project design should take into account the capacity of country counterparts. For development policy operations, the complexity of prior actions and the degree of coordination needed between government departments should be a critical input in designing reform programs. 16 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results CRW Performance at the Country Level 4.7 A review of country-level evaluations found that CRW financing was infrequently mentioned in self-evaluations (Completion and Learning Reports, CLRs) or the IEG reviews. The 145 projects that received CRW funding were matched to available country evaluations by IEG. The review included 44 IEG reviews of country strategy self-evaluations (CLRRs, and their predecessors), and four CPEs. This review found that the CRW was mentioned in country evaluations rarely, if at all. Even in cases where an operation was financed entirely from the CRW and supported the objectives and focus areas of the country program, this was not mentioned in the country evaluation. While several IEG evaluations of country programs commented on the flexibility and responsiveness of IDA to a crisis and noted where countries adjusted their programs to meet the emergencies that arose, they did not explain how the CRW helped. Exceptions are the 2016 clustered CPE on small states that noted that demand for CRW finance in small states was very strong in response to cyclones; the evaluation for Liberia (2017) which identified the role of the CRW, both in addressing the Ebola epidemic and in providing supplemental financing for poverty reduction DPFs; the CLRR (2016) for Mozambique, which notes “the CLR does not report on what the Bank did to mitigate the risks (for the program) except for the impact of floods in early 2014 where the Bank provided emergency funding from the CRW;” and the Solomon Islands 2017 CLRR which notes that the IDA allocation was leveraged by financing from the regional IDA program as well as CRW. Strengthening the Evaluability of CRW Financing 4.8 Given the effort involved in justifying access to CRW financing ex ante, it is surprising that ex post self-evaluations rarely mention CRW financing. CRW financed operations are required to lay out the justification for access to CRW funds in technical briefings to the Board, but this information is rarely mentioned in project documents or in the subsequent project or country self-evaluations. Project documents sometimes note, for example, that CRW financing has been used to address the financing gap caused by a crisis but no link to results is made. Project documents do occasionally indicate that CRW financing has been used to support objectives related to addressing the impact of the crisis. For example, project documents for Liberia’s Second Additional Financing Road Asset Management operation, which received CRW financing, describe how the operation helped to prevent the erosion of core development spending in health, education, social welfare, security and decentralization. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, project documents describe how CRW financing helped the investment program shift from mining and infrastructure to social sectors following the financial crisis. 17 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results 4.9 To improve the evaluability of the CRW, its use needs to be more routinely recognized in operational documents and self-assessments at the project and country level. CRW resources are often pooled with regular IDA financing for operations as part of an ongoing effort under emergency situations to leverage existing operations, mechanisms and capacity to reduce the administrative burden on the client (and the Bank). Many CRW operations were prepared as Additional Financing, which utilizes the implementation arrangements and capacities of the parent project for support. This consolidation enables the client to have common reporting requirements for both CRW and non-CRW funding streams. The Bank likewise stands to gain by leveraging economies of scale through the pooling of its internal budgetary resources. However, this pooling of financing raises methodological challenges in evaluating the value added of the CRW. The CRW has not become a standard part of self-evaluation. CRW operations were found to follow the main elements of the procedures set up for access to CRW financing; however, at the end of the country cycle, IEG country evaluations provide only some hints on the impact of CRW at the country level. It will remain difficult to judge CRW financing in practice until its use is consistently included in project and country evaluations, but recent efforts should assist. For IDA18, staff guidance on CRW processing includes templates that specify the use and size of CRW funds on the first page of Project Appraisal Documents. While it is methodologically challenging to attribute specific results to the CRW given the pooling of resources, more explicit reference to CRW-related activities in project and country documents, especially in ICRs and CLRs, should help to clarify the value added by the CRW. Countering Economic Shocks through the CRW 4.10 CRW financing to counter the economic shocks of the global financial crisis was substantial and delivered quickly; this part of the window was not accessed again until FY17. CRW funding for economic shocks amounted to 82 operations totaling $1,622 million from the beginning of the CRW Pilot in mid-FY10 to end 2018. Of these, 75 projects (with $1,106 million of CRW funding) were approved during FY10 and FY11 in response to the global financial crisis. This funding was significant for the countries receiving it, with the allocations for FY10-FY11 representing 9.5 percent of countries’ regular IDA allocations. After the CRW’s launch in December 2009, 51 operations ($884 million in CRW financing) were approved to end-June 2010. In FY11, another 24 projects (with $516 million of CRW financing) were approved, all in response to the global crisis. CRW funding to respond to economic shocks was not accessed again until FY17. Altogether, CRW operations in response to economic shocks have been undertaken by 48 countries, of which 27 were in the Africa region. Two-thirds of CRW commitments went to projects in the Africa region. Forty-nine were new operations, and the rest were 18 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results provided as additional financing. AF was extended to well-performing active operations that were expected to help crisis mitigation, or where achievement of the project development objectives was threatened by crisis-related financial constraints. AF amounted to $501 million, or 35 percent of CRW commitments aimed at countering economic shocks. (Table 4-2, Appendix A, Appendix B). Table 4-2. CRW Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, FY10-19 Region Projects CRW commitment Number Share (%) $ million Share (%) AFR 56 69 1,028 63 EAP 7 9 166 10 ECA 5 6 57 4 LCR 4 5 60 4 MNA 2 2 42 3 SAR 8 10 270 17 Total 82 100 1,622 100 4.11 Within CRW financed operations, those addressing economic crises performed better than other CRW operations and better than IDA averages, according to IEG outcome ratings. To date, more than half of CRW projects for economic shocks have been rated by IEG, and 81 percent of these (84 percent of financing) received an outcome rating of moderately satisfactory or better. IEG’s ratings of Bank performance are similar. It is important to note that many fewer IPF operations than DPFs have been closed and rated so the apparent superior performance of economic crisis CRW operations may not be sustained. (Table 4-1, Table 4-3, Figure 4-3). 4.12 IDA’s experience in implementing the Pilot CRW identified important elements of success in providing significant additional resources quickly. These included building on existing operations, close coordination with partners, preparation for future crises, capacity building, and resilience improvements. A World Bank report, prepared in October 2012 for the IDA15 replenishment, reviewed IDA experience under the Pilot CRW. According to this report, the Pilot CRW highlighted IDA’s comparative advantage in responding to diverse country-specific situations and mobilizing support to affected sectors, helped by strong analytics. IDA country projects presented an efficient way to intervene quickly in the wake of economic shocks either through additional financing, which represented over 40 percent of Pilot CRW resources, or through new projects that were aligned with existing implementation capacity. In addition, IDA’s close co-ordination with other development partners such as the IMF, UN, regional development banks and bilateral partners was seen to have helped address 19 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results the critical gaps in emergency assistance and ensure a targeted response in areas where the CRW could make the most impact. The experience gained from implementing the Pilot CRW drew attention to the need to help countries prepare for the impact of multiple crises occurring simultaneously or in close proximity, noting that climate change is expected to increase such trends (and response to natural disasters, to which CRW was extended after the Pilot, requires a longer-term framework of investments to build countries’ resilience over time). In addition, the experience gained re-emphasized the need for a continuous focus on strengthening countries’ capacity to mitigate crises and improve their resilience (World Bank 2012). Table 4-3. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW Financed Operations for Economic Shocks by Region, FY10-19 AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAR Total No. $m No. $m No. $m No. $m No. $m No. $m No. $m HS 1 5 - - - - - - - - - - 1 5 S 6 69 2 19 2 27 1 14 - - - - 11 129 MS 16 347 4 67 3 30 1 2 - - 3 10 27 598 MU 6 64 - - - - - - - - 2 46 8 110 U 1 16 - - - - - - - - - - 1 16 NR 26 527 1 80 - - 2 44 2 44 3 122 34 765 Total 56 1,028 7 166 5 57 4 60 2 42 8 271 82 1,630 Notes: HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory; NR = not rated. 20 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Figure 4-3. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW Financed Operations for Economic Shocks by Region Notes; HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 4.13 Lessons from a sample of ICRRs for CRW economic shock operations emphasize that speed of preparation and simple and flexible project design are important but longer-term objectives cannot be ignored. A review of ICRRs21 found multiple examples of CRW financing that allowed countries to continue social spending from spending on health in Mozambique to energy in Burundi to urban poverty in Djibouti—evidence that, at least in some cases, the CRW’s objective was being achie ved. ICRRs also highlighted that project design in post-crisis situations needs to account for various constraints. Bank teams need to strike a balance between speed, implementation risk, and project quality. In post-crisis situations, client capacity is often weakened, and project design and implementation should be simpler and be accompanied by technical assistance during implementation. For example, geographic targeting with more resources allocated to poorer households was found to work well for horizontal equity. In the case of the Senegal project, its highly satisfactory rating can be attributed partly to its innovative design that advocated social connection programs as the best way to achieve the water and sanitation Millennium Development Goals. Also, the implementation structures for ongoing operations may not fit the needs of a crisis 21Seven ICRRS for economic shock operations were selected for intensive review. Six of these were operations fully financed by CRW resources, under the hypothesis that such operations would be more likely to aim for CRW’s high-level objective of protecting core spending and long- term development objectives. The seventh was the sole operation rated Highly Satisfactory and so might present useful lessons. 21 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results response project, and technical assistance for project implementation may be warranted. An emerging lesson from the sample of ICRRs suggests that the Bank could do more to guide the client towards longer-term benefits, for example, by suggesting alternatives to the system of cash transfers in Mongolia (Table 4-4). Finally, stronger client ownership and commitment in crisis conditions may play a role in stronger performance. Table 4-4. Selected ICRRs for CRW Financed Operations for Economic Shocks Country Project Project IDA CRW IEG ID $m $m Rating Burundi Emergency Energy Project from IDA P122217 15 15 MS CRW Central African Economic Management and P120534 9 9 MU Republic Governance Reform Grant III Djibouti Urban Poverty Reduction Project P120190 3 3 MU Mongolia Second Development Policy P117421 30 30 MS Financing Mozambique Health Commodity Security Project P121060 39 39 MS Senegal Water and Sanitation P109986 55 5 HS Tanzania Second Social Action Fund P120881 35 35 S Notes: HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. Addressing Natural Disasters through the CRW 4.14 CRW financing to address natural disasters included 57 projects accounting for $2.2 billion in commitments. During IDA16, the CRW was used almost exclusively by countries that had been affected by natural disasters. Twenty-six projects financed from CRW, totaling $937 million, addressed the fall-out from cyclones in Samoa and Tonga, drought in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, the earthquake in Haiti, and floods in Mozambique, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, a regional Horn of Africa project responded to drought. During IDA17, twenty-six projects for natural disasters were financed from CRW, totaling $ 1.2 billion, for cyclones in Vanuatu and Tuvalu, drought in Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, earthquakes in Nepal, floods in Solomon Islands, Malawi, Myanmar, famine/drought in Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, and a hurricane in Haiti. During IDA18 so far, $70 million in CRW funds have been allocated for hurricane recovery in Dominica and a cyclone in Tonga. It is noteworthy that 39 of the 57 CRW- supported projects intended to address natural disasters were designed in the aftermath of extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods, cyclones or hurricanes. These 22 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results weather events are linked to climate change. Viewed in this light, the CRW reinforces IDA’s commitment to strengthening long-term climate-change adaptation. 4.15 CRW financing for natural disasters flowed mostly to the Africa and Latin America regions and has favored IPF. About one-third of natural disaster-related commitments have been for projects in the Africa region, with almost an equal share in the Latin America region. Of the 57 projects with CRW financing for natural disasters during IDA16, IDA17 and IDA18, IPF was the most common instrument used, with only six uses of DPFs and one P4R. Out of the 57 operations, 28 were additional or supplemental financing (Table 4-5, Appendix A, Appendix B). Table 4-5. CRW Financed Operations for Natural Disasters by Region, FY10-19 Region Project CRW commitment Number Percentage $ million Percentage AFR 18 32 753 34 EAP 12 21 212 10 ECA 1 2 100 5 LCR 19 33 694 32 MNA 4 7 138 6 SAR 3 5 300 14 Total 57 100 2,197 100 4.16 Few natural disaster CRW financed operations have been rated by IEG; to date, three of the ten projects rated have fallen short on outcomes. Of 57 natural disaster projects, only ten (and $203 million in CRW financing) have been rated by IEG. Seven have been rated moderately satisfactory or above for outcome as well as Bank performance. Three projects were rated moderately unsatisfactory – two of which were rated moderately unsatisfactory for both outcome and Bank performance, the third (was rated moderately satisfactory for Bank performance (Table 4-6, Appendix C). 23 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Table 4-6. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW Financed Operations for Natural Disaster by Region, FY10-19 AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAR Total No. $m No. $m No. $m No. $m No. $m No. $m No. $m S 2 100 1 10 - - - - - - - - 3 110 MS - - 2 7 - - 1 8 0 0 1 50 4 64 MU - - 1 3 - - 1 20 1 5 - - 3 28 U - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NR 16 653 8 192 1 100 17 666 3 133 2 250 47 1,994 Total 18 753 12 212 1 100 19 694 4 138 3 300 57 2,197 Notes: HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 4.17 ICRRs for CRW financed operations addressing natural disasters identify features that contributed to better performance--partnering with other international institutions, careful instrument choice, good project design, and flexibility during implementation. Development outcomes for IPFs in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia and a DPF in Samoa were rated satisfactory for development outcome. Contributing to this rating for the health and nutrition project in the Horn of Africa was the successful partnering with other agencies, in particular, UNHCR. This partnering helped to generate substantial efficiency gains. Instrument choice was difficult for Samoa, given the combination of a need to disburse funds rapidly post cyclone but also for longer- term reforms, a Development Policy Operation (DPO) was selected. The instrument choice for Ethiopia – IPF – provided suitable support to the program and facilitated ongoing program evaluation, learning and adjustments. The importance of good project design that included advance analytic work and technical design in addition to addressing client capacity was a key lesson that emerged from these three projects. For Haiti’s urban project, redesign was needed at the mid-term review, as a consequence of which the project was able to set up a strong foundation for disaster response efforts in public neighborhood infrastructure. By comparison, (complex) project design and (weak) client capacity influenced the moderately unsatisfactory rating for a Second Additional Financing for Power Access and Diversification in Djibouti’s energy project and the DPFs for Haiti and Tuvalu. As for economic shock operations, client ownership and commitment may play a role in boosting performance (Table 4-7). 24 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Table 4-7. ICRRs for CRW Financed Operations for Natural Disasters Country Project IDA $m CRW $m IEG Rating Djibouti Second AF for Power Access and 5 5 MU Diversification Ethiopia Productive Safety Nets Project Third 370 70 S Adaptable Program Loan Haiti Economic Reconstruction and Growth 20 20 MU Development Policy Credit Haiti Urban Community Driven Development 8 8 MS (UDD) Project Horn of Africa Horn of Africa Emergency Health and 30 30 S Nutrition Project Nepal Road Sector Development Project 55 50 MS Samoa Development Policy Operation 15 10 S Samoa Agriculture and Fisheries Cyclone Response 5 5 MS Solomon Economic Reform and Recovery Operation 5 2 MS Islands Tuvalu Supplemental Financing for Second 3 3 MU* Development Policy Operation Notes: HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. * The ICRR notes that MU was the rating given to the entire series of DPFs for Tuvalu, focusing primarily on DPO1 and DPO2 with an IDA commitment (revised) of $7.5 million and $7.7 million (actual), with little information on the CRW financed Supplemental operation. CRW Objective of Support for Resilience Build Back Better Principles 4.18 The CRW committed to strengthen resilience to future shocks as part of the response to natural disasters, which in recent years has translated to adoption the principle of “build back better.” While the CRW is designed to provide speedy responses to crises—in this case, natural disasters—it also aims to foster resilience to future natural disasters, despite the inevitable tension between these two goals.22 Since it is expected that CRW financing will be applied to well-designed operations, those addressing natural disasters should, in theory, already apply BBB principles in their design (Box 4.1). 22When the permanent CRW was established, it was specified that “unless addressed by pre - existing projects, CRW resources would be provided under the presumption that a portion of these resources would be used to strengthen disaster resilience” (World Bank 2010c). 25 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results Box 4.1. “Build Back Better” (BBB) Principles Emerge from Global Review “Build back better” was set out as part of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015, and it is considered good practice in World Bank operations (UNISDR 2015, World Bank 2017a). Recently, a 2018 World Bank report, “Building Back Better: Achieving Resilience Through Stronger, Faster and More Inclusive Post-Disaster Reconstruction,” examined extensive evidence on disaster resilience and proposed “build back better” principles as good practice. BBB leads to repaired or replaced assets being more resilient, and the recovery process being shorter, more efficient, and not leaving anyone behind. The report reviewed experience in 149 countries, including 17 small island states. It found that, in small island states in particular, better post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts reduced annual losses by an average of 59 percent. When countries rebuild stronger, faster and more inclusively after natural disasters, they can reduce the impact on people’s livelihoods and well-being by as much as 31 percent, potentially cutting global average losses from $555 billion to $382 billion per year (Hallegatte 2018). 4.19 CRW financed operations for natural disaster response since the establishment of the Sendai Framework in 2015 have generally followed BBB principles, with some projects incorporating elements of resilience-building such as better construction standards, new technologies, and improved government capacity. A sample of CRW financed operations illuminates how BBB is being incorporated. Five disaster relief projects with CRW financing approved during IDA15, IDA16 and IDA17 that included BBB were selected to see how those elements were incorporated into design and implementation. The projects from Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, Tonga, and Bosnia and Herzegovina include a variety of detailed BBB actions. In Bangladesh, the project is funding new technologies for farmers to improve resilience to saline water inundation and studies to assess reconstruction of shelters and embankments that would withstand disasters.23 The Malawi project is helping reconstruct critical public infrastructure (roads, schools and health facilities) to improved standards and developing national building codes. The Nepal project is financing multi-hazard resistant core housing units, applying resilient and innovative technologies for constructing rural homes. In Tonga, the project is strengthening government ability to BBB and supporting retrofitting and construction of dwellings according to ‘resistant standards.’ The Bosnia and Herzegovina project supports better resilience of infrastructure to future flooding and landslides. Although ICRRs are not yet available, supervision reports on the Bangladesh project, which has been under implementation the longest, provide some early lessons: (i) supporting country systems is critical for timely response; (ii) multi-sector projects require adequate 23Note that because the Bangladesh project was part of the Pilot CRW during IDA15, it is defined as responding to an economic crisis, the underlying reason for which is a cyclone. 26 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results planning for coordination and implementation arrangements; (iii) land acquisition procedures for emergency situations need to be accelerated; (iv) a well-defined results and M&E framework enhances achievement of outcome; and (v) regular community consultations can guide the appropriate choice of investments and generate practical improvements to increase impact. Responding to Public Health Emergencies through the CRW 4.20 During IDA17, the CRW was used to respond to a public health emergency (Ebola) as an exception to CRW policy, and the CRW was expanded to include such crises going forward. Six public health emergency projects have been approved, with CRW financing of $620 million. The World Bank was a vital member of the coalition against the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 and 2015 and mobilized needed financial resources (World Bank 2017c). Part of this response was $420 million from the CRW for Ebola in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2015. Most recently, in 2017, IDA allocated $200 million from the CRW to Yemen to cope with one of the world’s worst cholera outbreaks amidst continuous conflict that had driven GDP down by 40 percent. The Bank responded within two months with additional financing of $200 million in the form of an IDA grant completely financed by CRW resources. (Table 4-8). Table 4-8. CRW Allocations for Public Health Emergencies, FY10-19 Region Project CRW commitment Number Percentage $ million Percentage AFR 5 83 420 67 MNA 1 17 200 32 Total 6 100 620 100 Notes: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. 4.21 There is yet little evaluative evidence about the public health emergency CRW operations, but the two available ICRRs point to the success of rapid preparation and partnering with other donors while falling short on longer-term objectives. It is worth noting that while a post-disaster CRW operation is designed and implemented in the aftermath of a crisis, a public health emergency operation is often designed and implemented during an ongoing epidemic, a factor which may contribute to variations in performance. The two evaluated projects are moderately satisfactory on outcome and Bank performance. The Sierra Leone DPF aimed to strengthen budget management and reduce fiscal risks heightened by the Ebola epidemic as well as improve public transparency and accountability. It was rated moderately satisfactory due to shortfalls in strengthening longer term fiscal management. The other ICRR is for a Guinea DPF, 27 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results which aimed to strengthen management of public funds in response to the Ebola crisis and address related macroeconomic and fiscal shocks. Processing had a compressed schedule of six weeks and was undertaken in close cooperation with a multi-donor support group. While the operation introduced monitoring and accountability arrangements critical to ensuring effective utilization of donor support and triggered early steps towards public financial reform, none of the original targets were fully achieved. Importantly, no supervision report was prepared for this operation, partly explained by the high-risk operational environment, preventing adequate verification of monitoring and evaluation data. (Table 4-9, Appendix C). Table 4-9. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW Allocations for Health by Region AFR MNA Total Number CRW $m Number $m Number $m S - - - - - - MS 2 20 - - 2 20 MU - - - - - - U - - - - - - NR 3 400 1 200 4 600 Total 5 420 1 200 6 620 Notes: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 4.22 Country and sector evaluations illuminate the important role of the Bank in fighting the Ebola epidemic, but acknowledgement of CRW assistance is scarce. The recent IEG evaluation on WBG support to health services notes the importance of capable health systems in responding effectively to deadly virus outbreaks. It noted also that the World Bank’s financing and co-ordination role are more important in countries with lower institutional capacity and more complex development partner networks, implicitly supporting CRW’s role on health in IDA countries. (World Bank 2017c). Of the four countries that have been allocated CRW financing for public health emergencies, country-level evaluations are available for two. In the case of Guinea, the Ebola Emergency Response Project and its additional financing and the Emergency Macroeconomic and Fiscal Support Grant supported the country program objective to contribute in the short term to the control of the Ebola outbreak and the availability of selected essential health services, while mitigating social and economic impacts. IEG rated this objective as achieved in its 2017 CLRR. However, the role played by the CRW was not discussed. By contrast, the 2017 CLRR for Liberia noted that the CRW 28 Chapter 4 CRW Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results supported the regional Ebola emergency operations and provided supplemental financing for a the ongoing programmatic DPF series. The Ebola Emergency Response Project and its additional financing helped to support two objectives of the country program that targeted the improved capacity of health service delivery in selected secondary level health facilities and improved protection of poor and vulnerable households. Both objectives were rated as mostly achieved by IEG. 29 Bibliography Hallegatte, Stéphane; Rentschler, Jun; Walsh, Brian. 2018. Building Back Better: Achieving Resilience through Stronger, Faster, and More Inclusive Post-Disaster Reconstruction. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29867 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. UNISDR. 2015. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-2030. 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IEG Review of the Liberia 2009-2011 Joint Country Assistance Strategy, the JCAS Progress Report and the JCAS Completion Report. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. July 16, 2013. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_liberia1317.pd f ———. 2013. Review of the 2007-2012 Malawi Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), the 2009 CAS Progress Report and the CAS Completion Report. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. January 17, 2013. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Malawi_CASCRR. pdf 34 Bibliography ———. 2013. Review of the 2007-2012 Mauritania Country Assistance Strategy Completion Report (CASCR). Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. September 17, 2013. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_mauritaniafy1 316.pdf ———. 2013. Review of the 2007-2010 Senegal Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), the 2009 CAS Progress Report and the CAS Completion Report. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. January 16, 2013. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Senegal_CASCRR. pdf ———. 2013. Review of the 2008-2011 Zambia Country Assistance Strategy, the 2012 CAS Progress Report and the CAS Completion Report. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. March 14, 2013. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Zambia_CASCRR. pdf ———. 2014. Review of the 2011-2014 Bhutan Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) and the CPS Progress Report (CPSCR). Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. September 12, 2014. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Bhutan_CPSCRR_ Revised_907200CASCR0P1010Box385322B00OUO090_0.pdf ———. 2014. Review of the 2009-2013 Djibouti Country Assistance Strategy Completion Report (CASCR). Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. March 5, 2014. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Djibouti_2009- 2013_CASCRR_85994_0.pdf ———. 2014. Review of the 2010-2014 Kenya Country Partnership Strategy Completion Report (CPSCR) and the CPS Progress Report (CPSPR). Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. May 28, 2014. http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/1 FA08994AC54FDBC85257D3B006737A8/$file/Kenya_CPSCRR_Rev_883840CASC R0P1010Box385224B00OUO090.pdf ———. 2014. Review of the 2009-2013 Rwanda Country Assistance Strategy Completion Report (CASCR) and the CAS Progress Report (CASPR). Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. May 21, 2014. 35 Bibliography http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Rwanda_CASPRR _Rev_882760CASCR0P1010Box385212B00OUO090_0.pdf ———. 2014. Review of the 2005-2012 Sao Tome and Principe Country Partnership Strategy Completion Report (CPSCR) and the Interim Strategy Note (ISN). Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. June 23, 2014. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/SaoTomePrincipe_ Jun23_2014_CPSCRR_Rev_891650CASCR0P1020Box385272B00OUO090_0.pdf ———. 2014. Review of the 2010-2014 Tajikistan Country Partnership Strategy Completion Report (CPSCR) and the CPS Progress Report (CPSPR). Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. May 28, 2014. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Tajikistan_CPSCR R_Revised_884630CASCR0R2010Box385222B00OUO090_0.pdf ———. 2015. Bosnia and Herzegovina CLR Review FY12-15. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. December 9, 2015. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/CLR_Review.Bosn ia_and_H.pdf ———. 2015. Côte d’Ivoire: CLR Review FY10-14. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. September 18, 2015. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Cote_d_Ivoire_CL R_Review_0.pdf ———. 2015. Haiti CLR Review FY09-14. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. September 22, 2015. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Haiti_CLR_Revie w_0.pdf ———. 2015. Honduras CLR Review FY12-15. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. December 9, 2015. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/CLR_Review.Hon duras.pdf ———. 2015. CLR Review Mali (FY08-15) Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. September 3, 2015. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/CLR_Review.Mali _.pdf ———. 2016. People’s Republic of Bangladesh CLR Review FY11-15. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. March 23, 2016. 36 Bibliography http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/BangladeshCLR.p df ———. 2016. Ethiopia CLR Review FY13-16. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. June 7, 2016. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr-ethiopia- 07112017.pdf ———. 2016. Guyana Completion and Learning Review FY09-12. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. April 20, 2016. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/guyana_clr_2016.p df ———. 2016. The Kingdom of Lesotho CLR Review FY10-14. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. June 21, 2016. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr_lesotho_0716.p df ———. 2016. Sri Lanka CLR Review FY13-16. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. June 16, 2016. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr_srilanka_0716. pdf ———. 2016. Republic of Uganda CLR Review. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. April 13, 2016. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/uganda_clr_2016_ 0.pdf ———. 2016. Republic of Yemen CLR Review FY10-15. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. July 11, 2016. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr_yemen_0716_0 .pdf ———. 2017. Cameroon CLR Review FY10-14. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. March 15, 2017. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr-cameroon- 04072017.pdf ———. 2017. Kosovo CLR Review FY12-16. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. May 11, 2017. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr-kosovo- 06052017.pdf 37 Bibliography ———. 2017. Madagascar CLR Review FY07-13. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. June 16, 2017. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr-madagascar- 07112017.pdf ———. 2017. Moldova CLR Review FY14-17. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. July 14, 2017. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr-moldova- 08082017.pdf ———. 2017. Mozambique CLR Review FY12-15. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. April 12, 2017. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr-mozambique- 592017.pdf ———. 2017. Togo CLR Review FY08-17. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. May 10, 2017. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clr-togo- 05262017.pdf ———. 2018. Benin: CLR Review FY13-18. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. June 20, 2018. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_beninfy13- 18.pdf ———. 2018 Gambia CLR Review FY13-16. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. May 31, 2018. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_gambiafy1316 .pdf ———. 2018 Guinea CLR Review FY14-17. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. May 24, 2018. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_guineafy1417. pdf ———. 2018. Kyrgyz Republic CLR Review FY14-17. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. October 16, 2018. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_kyrgyz1417.p df ———. 2018. Liberia CLR Review FY13-17. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. November 13, 2018. 38 Bibliography http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_liberia1317.pd f ———. 2018 Mauritania CLR Review FY14-16. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. June 29, 2018. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_mauritaniafy1 316.pdf ———. 2018. Nicaragua CLR Review FY13-17. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. March 5, 2018. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_nicaragua.pdf ———. 2018 Solomon Islands CLR Review FY13-17. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. July 23, 2018. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_solomonfy131 7.pdf ———. 2018 Tanzania CLR Review FY12-16. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. March 6, 2018. http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/clrr_tanzania.pdf 39 Appendix A. Projects with CRW Funding by Crisis Type Economic Shocks IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Water and Sanitation Millennium IDA15 FY10 Senegal IPF 55.0 5.1 HS Project Economic Stabilization and IDA15 FY10 Maldives DPF 13.7 1.6 MU Recovery Credit Infrastructure and Institutional IDA15 FY10 Haiti IPF 65.0 25.0 n.a. Emergency Recovery Project Lao People's IDA15 FY10 Democratic Road Sector Project IPF 27.8 8.8 S Republic Second Poverty Reduction IDA15 FY10 Lesotho Support Credit and Grant DPF 25.0 10.2 MS (PRSCG-2) Sixth Poverty Reduction Support IDA15 FY10 Rwanda DPF 115.8 29.8 MS Grant Republic of Social Fund for Development IDA15 FY10 IPF 60.0 38.8 n.a. Yemen Phase IV Project Second HNP and HIV/AIDS IDA15 FY10 Nepal IPF 129.2 44.2 MU Project Lao People's Lao Uplands Food Security IDA15 FY10 Democratic IPF 10.0 10.0 S Improvement Project Republic Second Urban Development IDA15 FY10 Bhutan IPF 12.0 3.6 n.a. Project Sixth Poverty Reduction IDA15 FY10 Benin DPF 30.0 9.9 MU Development Policy Financing Kenya Youth Empowerment IDA15 FY10 Kenya IPF 60.0 30.0 S Project Sao Tome and Additional Financing for the IDA15 FY10 IPF AF 2.1 1.1 MS Principe Social Sector Support Project Third Economic Governance and IDA15 FY10 Côte d'Ivoire DPF 90.0 15.0 MS Recovery Grant Additional Financing for Energy IDA15 FY10 Tajikistan Emergency Recovery Assistance IPF AF 15.0 15.0 MS Project Economic Crisis Recovery IDA15 FY10 Samoa DPF 20.0 20.0 MS Support Credit IDA15 FY10 Ghana Social Opportunities Project IPF 88.6 47.5 n.a. 41 IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Third Economic Recovery and IDA15 FY10 Togo DPF 16.3 4.3 MS Governance Grant Uganda Health Systems IDA15 FY10 Uganda IPF 130.0 30.0 MS Strengthening Project Additional Financing for Social IDA15 FY10 Nepal IPF AF 47.8 44.8 MS Safety Nets Project IDA15 FY10 Tanzania Transport Sector Support Project IPF 270.0 15.2 MS Kenya Electricity Expansion IDA15 FY10 Kenya IPF 330.0 29.9 n.a. Project IDA15 FY10 Tanzania Tanzania Strategic Cities Project IPF 163.0 10.0 n.a. Tanzania Agriculture Sector IDA15 FY10 Tanzania Development Project - Second IPF AF 35.0 35.0 n.a. Additional Financing Transport and Urban Mobility IDA15 FY10 Senegal IPF 55.0 5.0 n.a. Project Fourth Poverty Reduction IDA15 FY10 Senegal Support Development Policy DPF 43.0 9.4 MU Financing Additional Financing for Fourth IDA15 FY10 Nicaragua Roads Rehabilitation and IPF AF 39.3 14.2 S Maintenance Project Emergency Crises Response IDA15 FY10 Comoros IPF 5.3 1.5 S Project Additional Financing for IDA15 FY10 Afghanistan Strengthening Health Activities IPF AF 49.0 49.0 n.a. for the Rural Poor Project Fourth Poverty Reduction IDA15 FY10 Mali DPF 70.5 15.6 U Support Credit Second Social Action Fund IDA15 FY10 Tanzania Project - Additional Financing - IPF AF 35.0 35.0 n.a. Additional Credit II Third Poverty Reduction Support IDA15 FY10 Malawi DPF 54.0 14.0 MS Development Policy Financing Additional Financing for Djibouti IDA15 FY10 Djibouti IPF AF 2.9 2.9 n.a. Urban Poverty Reduction Project Supplemental Financing for the IDA15 FY10 Sierra Leone Third Governance Reform and DPF 7.0 7.0 S Growth Credit Lao People's Sixth Poverty Reduction Support IDA15 FY10 Democratic DPF 20.0 10.0 MS Operation Republic 42 IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Additional Financing for Cote IDA15 FY10 Côte d'Ivoire d'Ivoire Emergency Urban IPF AF 50.0 15.0 n.a. Infrastructure Project Democratic Additional Financing for the IDA15 FY10 Republic of Emergency Urban and Social IPF AF 40.0 40.0 n.a. Congo Rehabilitation Project Fourth Programmatic IDA15 FY10 Tajikistan DPF 25.4 8.6 MS Development Policy Financing Additional Financing for Strengthening Higher Education IDA15 FY10 Afghanistan IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. Project and Amendment to the Development Grant Economic Recovery Development IDA15 FY10 Moldova DPF 25.0 11.1 S Policy Financing IDA15 FY10 Liberia Youth, Employment, Skills Project IPF 6.0 6.0 MU Additional Financing for the IDA15 FY10 Mauritania IPF AF 25.5 15.5 n.a. Urban Development Project Multi-Sectoral Technical IDA15 FY10 Mongolia IPF 12.0 7.2 MS Assistance Project Second Economic Governance IDA15 FY10 Guinea-Bissau Reform Development Policy DPF 6.0 6.0 S Financing IDA15 FY10 Honduras Social Protection Project IPF 40.0 18.6 n.a. Tenth Poverty Reduction Support IDA15 FY10 Burkina Faso DPF 90.0 19.9 MU Grant Third Education Sector Project in Support of the Second Phase of IDA15 FY10 Gambia, The IPF AF 5.5 5.5 n.a. the Education Sector Program - First Additional Financing Additional Financing for IDA15 FY10 Togo IPF AF 8.7 8.7 n.a. Community Development Project Additional Financing for Urban IDA15 FY10 Liberia and Rural Infrastructure IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. Rehabilitation Project Youth Employment Support IDA15 FY10 Sierra Leone IPF 20.0 20.0 MS Project Additional Financing for Third IDA15 FY10 Malawi Social Action Fund Project (Phase IPF AF 14.0 14.0 n.a. II) Additional Financing for National IDA15 FY11 Benin Community-Driven Development IPF AF 12.0 12.0 S Support Project Emergency Electricity & Water IDA15 FY11 Guinea-Bissau IPF 12.7 12.7 n.a. Rehabilitation Project 43 IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Small and Medium Enterprise IDA15 FY11 Sri Lanka IPF 57.4 57.4 MS Development Facility Project Additional Financing for the IDA15 FY11 Lesotho IPF AF 15.0 5.0 n.a. Integrated Transport Project Central African Third Economic Management IDA15 FY11 DPF 8.8 8.8 MU Republic and Governance Reform Grant Additional Financing for IDA15 FY11 Malawi Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and IPF AF 12.7 12.7 S Agricultural Development Project Additional Financing for the IDA15 FY11 Zambia Increased Access to Electricity IPF AF 20.0 10.0 n.a. Services Project Additional Financing for the IDA15 FY11 Bangladesh Emergency 2007 Cyclone IPF AF 75.0 49.6 MS Recovery and Restoration Project Additional Financing for the Central African Emergency Urban Infrastructure IDA15 FY11 IPF AF 23.9 10.1 n.a. Republic Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project Urban and Water Development IDA15 FY11 Cameroon Support Project - Additional IPF AF 28.7 28.7 n.a. Financing Eighth Poverty Reduction IDA15 FY11 Uganda Support Development Policy DPF 100.0 40.1 MS Financing First Sustainable Employment IDA15 FY11 Kosovo Development Policy Operation DPF 6.3 6.3 MS Program IDA15 FY11 Ethiopia Agricultural Growth Program IPF 150.0 86.4 MS Growth and Competitiveness IDA15 FY11 Gambia, The IPF 12.0 5.1 MS Project Reengagement and Reform IDA15 FY11 Liberia DPF 11.0 6.0 MS Support Program III Water Services and Institutional IDA15 FY11 Mozambique IPF 37.0 26.1 n.a. Support Project Additional Financing for a IDA15 FY11 Burkina Faso IPF AF 16.0 16.0 MS Transport Sector Project Additional Financing for Rural IDA15 FY11 Mali IPF AF 11.2 11.2 n.a. Community Development Project Health Commodity Security IDA15 FY11 Mozambique IPF 39.0 39.0 MS Project IDA15 FY11 Burundi Emergency Energy Project IPF 15.4 15.4 MS 44 IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Kyrgyz IDA15 FY11 Emergency Recovery Project IPF 70.0 15.7 S Republic Improving Teacher Education IDA15 FY11 Guyana IPF 4.2 1.8 MS Project Second Additional Financing for IDA15 FY11 Zambia Road Rehabilitation and IPF AF 15.0 9.7 MU Maintenance Project Second Development Policy IDA15 FY11 Mongolia DPF 29.7 29.7 MS Financing IDA17 FY17 Liberia LR-PRSC III DPF 40.0 8.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Chad Development Policy Operations DPF SF 80.0 80.0 n.a. West Africa Agric Prod Program IDA17 FY17 Guinea IPF AF 23.0 15.0 n.a. (WAAPP-1C) Second AF LR Road Asset IDA17 FY17 Liberia IPF AF 40.0 12.0 n.a. Management GN: Economic Governance IDA17 FY17 Guinea IPF AF 22.0 7.0 n.a. Technical Assist Productivity and Transparency IDA17 FY17 Sierra Leone DPF 30.0 20.0 n.a. Support Cr Economic Management Support IDA18 FY18 Mongolia DPF 120.0 80.0 n.a. Operation First DPF Notes: FY = approval year; projects are sorted (oldest to newest) by approval date. DPF = development policy financing; IPF = investment project financing. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory; n.a. = not available. Natural Disasters IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Africa Regional Horn of Africa Emergency IPF 30.0 30.0 S IDA16 FY12 Project Health and Nutrition Project Haiti Education for All Project - IPF 70.0 70.0 n.a. IDA16 FY12 Haiti Phase II Disaster Risk Management and IPF 60.0 60.0 n.a. IDA16 FY12 Haiti Reconstruction Project Relaunching Agriculture: Strengthening Agriculture IPF 40.0 40.0 n.a. IDA16 FY12 Haiti Public Services II Project Health Sector Support Project - IPF AF 56.8 56.8 n.a. IDA16 FY12 Kenya Additional Financing 45 IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Additional Financing Productive Safety Net APL III IPF AF 370.0 70.0 S IDA16 FY12 Ethiopia Project Additional Financing for Water and Sanitation Services IPF AF 300.0 20.0 n.a. IDA16 FY12 Kenya Improvement Project IDA16 FY12 Djibouti Social Safety Net Project IPF 5.0 5.0 n.a. Second Additional Financing for Power Access and IPF AF 5.2 5.2 MU IDA16 FY12 Djibouti Diversification Project Additional Financing for Rural Community Development and IPF AF 3.0 3.0 n.a. Water Mobilization Project IDA16 FY12 Djibouti (PRODERMO) Rebuilding Energy Infrastructure and Access IPF 90.0 90.0 n.a. IDA16 FY13 Haiti Project Additional Financing for Infrastructure and Institutions IPF AF 35.0 35.0 n.a. IDA16 FY13 Haiti Emergency Recovery Project Improving Maternal and Child Health through Integrated IPF 70.0 70.0 n.a. IDA16 FY13 Haiti Social Services Project Business Development and IPF 20.0 20.0 n.a. IDA16 FY13 Haiti Investment Project Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy DPF 20.0 20.0 MU IDA16 FY13 Haiti Financing IDA16 FY14 Samoa Development Policy Financing DPF 15.0 10.0 S National Water Resources Development Flood Response IPF AF 32.0 32.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 Mozambique Project IDA16 FY14 Samoa Enhanced Road Access Project IPF 20.0 5.0 n.a. Agriculture and Fisheries IPF 5.0 5.0 MS IDA16 FY14 Samoa Cyclone Response Project Roads and Bridges Management Maintenance IPF AF 39.4 39.4 n.a. IDA16 FY14 Mozambique Project Phase II Regional Disaster Vulnerability St. Vincent and Reduction Project - Additional IPF AF 35.6 19.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 the Grenadines Financing Center & Artibonite Regional IPF 50.0 50.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 Haiti Development Project. 46 IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Cultural Heritage and Tourism IPF 45.0 45.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 Haiti Sector IDA16 FY14 Tonga Cyclone Reconstruction IPF 12.0 12.0 n.a. Disaster Vulnerability IPF 41.0 17.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 St. Lucia Reduction Project IDA16 FY14 Haiti Urban CDD Project AF IPF AF 7.5 7.5 MS Bosnia and Floods Emergency Recovery IPF 100.0 100.0 n.a. IDA16 FY14 Herzegovina Project Solomon Solomon Islands Rural IPF 9.0 4.0 n.a. IDA17 FY15 Islands Development Program II Solomon Economic Reform and DPF 5.0 2.0 MS IDA17 FY15 Islands Recovery DPO IDA17 FY15 Malawi Floods Emergency Recovery IPF 80.0 80.0 n.a. IDA17 FY15 Nepal Financial sector stability DPC2 DPF 100.0 50.0 n.a. Earthquake Housing IPF 200.0 200.0 n.a. IDA17 FY15 Nepal Reconstruction Project Solomon AF for SB-Rapid Employment IPF AF 1.5 1.0 n.a. IDA17 FY16 Islands Project Supplemental Financing for DPF SF 3.0 3.0 MU* IDA17 FY16 Tuvalu Second DPO Infrastructure Reconstruction IPF 50.0 50.0 n.a. IDA17 FY16 Vanuatu and Improvement Project IDA17 FY16 Ethiopia Additional Financing PSNP IV IPF AF 100.0 100.0 n.a. Flood and Landslide IPF 200.0 100.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Myanmar Emergency Recovery Project Road Sector Development IPF AF 55.0 50.0 MS IDA17 FY17 Nepal Project Second Additional Financing IPF AF 70.0 11.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Malawi for MASAF IV Malawi Drought Recovery and IPF 104.0 9.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Malawi Resilience Social Safety Net Drought IPF AF 35.0 20.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Madagascar Response Crisis response AF to SA IPF 20.0 20.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Lesotho project Emergency Resilient Recovery IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Mozambique Project AF IDA17 FY17 Mozambique Social Safety Net project IPF AF 10.0 10.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Kenya AF for the NSNP P4R AF 50.0 35.0 n.a. ET Productive Safety Nets IPF AF 108.1 100.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Ethiopia Project 4 IDA17 FY17 South Sudan Emergency Food and Nutrition IPF 50.0 50.0 n.a. 47 IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Yemen Emergency Crisis IPF AF 200.0 125.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Yemen Response Project Emergency Drought Response IPF 50.0 50.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Somalia and Recovery Project Disaster Risk Management & IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Haiti Reconstruction Agriculture and Rural IPF AF 35.0 35.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Haiti Development IDA17 FY17 Haiti Sustainable Rural WSS Project IPF AF 20.0 20.0 n.a. Improving Maternal and Child IPF AF 25.0 25.0 n.a. IDA17 FY17 Haiti Health Emergency Agricultural Livelihoods and Climate IPF 25.0 20.0 n.a. IDA18 FY18 Dominica Resilience Project IDA18 FY18 Dominica Housing Recovery Project IPF AF 40.0 30.0 n.a. Supplemental Financing to the Second Inclusive Growth DPF AF 10.0 10.0 n.a. IDA18 FY18 Tonga Development Policy Operation Additional Financing to Pacific Resilience Project under the IPF AF 14.95 10.00 n.a. IDA18 FY19 Tonga Pacific Resilience Program Notes: FY = approval year; projects are sorted (oldest to newest) by approval date. DPF = development policy financing; IPF = investment project financing; P4R = Program For Results. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory; n.a. = not available. *The ICRR notes that MU was the rating given to the entire series of DPOs, focusing primarily on DPO1 and DPO2 with an IDA commitment (revised) of $7.5 million and $7.7 million (actual) with little information on the CRW financed Supplemental. Public Health Emergencies IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Ebola Emergency Response IDA17 FY15 Guinea IPF 25.0 25.0 n.a.. Project Ebola Emergency Response IDA17 FY15 Liberia IPF 52.0 52.0 n.a. Project Ebola Emergency Response IDA17 FY15 Sierra Leona IPF 28.0 28,0 n.a. Project Poverty Reduction Support IDA17 FY 15 Liberia DPF 30.0 10.0 n.a. Credit II Emergency Macroeconomic and IDA17 FY 15 Guinea DPF 50.0 10.0 n.a. Fiscal Support Grant 48 IEG Outcome Instrument CRW Amt $ million $ million IDA Amt AF or SF Lending Rating IDA FY Country Project Name Cycle Ebola Emergency Response IDA17 FY 15 Guinea IPF AF 72.0 72.0 n.a. Project – Additional Financing Ebola Emergency Response IDA17 FY 15 Liberia IPF AF 115.0 115.0 n.a. Project – Additional Financing Ebola Emergency Response IDA17 FY 15 Sierra Leona IPF AF 98.0 98.0 n.a. Project – Additional Financing Emergency Economic and Fiscal IDA17 FY 15 Sierra Leona DPF 30.0 10.0 MS Support Operation (EEFSO) Yemen Emergency Health and IDA18 FY 18 Yemen Nutrition Project Second IPF AF 200.0 200.0 n.a. Additional Financing Notes: FY = approval year; projects are sorted (oldest to newest) by approval date. DPF = development policy financing; IPF = investment project financing. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory; n.a. = not available. The Ebola Emergency Response Project and its Additional Financing were both regional projects covering Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. They are split by country here to show financing amounts. 49 Appendix B. Instruments Used with CRW Financing by Crisis Type Table B.1 Instruments used with CRW Financing for Economic Shocks by total number of projects and projects rated by IEG Projects Projects Rated Instrument No. IDA CRW % % No. IDA CRW % % of $ $ of of rated $ $ of of projects million million IDA CRW million million IDA CRW Development Policy 25 1,077.5 471.3 28.8 29.0 21 807.5 283.2 38.2 33.0 Financing (DPF) Investment Project 57 2,660.8 1150.7 71.2 70.9 27 1,308.1 574.0 61.8 67.0 Financing (IPF) Total 82 3,738 1,622 100 100 48 2,116 857 100 100 50 Table B.2. Instruments used with CRW Financing for Natural Disasters by number of projects and projects rated by IEG Projects Projects Rated % of CRW % of CRW No. rated % of IDA % of IDA projects million million million million CRW $ CRW $ No. of IDA $ IDA $ Instrument 6 153.0 95.0 4.7 4.3 4 43.0 35.0 8.3 17.2 Development Policy Financing (DPF) 1 50.0 35.0 1.5 1.6 - - - - - Program for Results (P4R) 50 3,085.1 2066.9 93.8 94.1 6 472.7 167.7 91.6 82.6 Investment Project Financing (IPF) 57 3,288 2,197 100 100 10 516 203 100 100 Total Table B.3 Instruments used with CRW Financing for Public Health Emergencies by total number of projects and projects rated by IEG Projects Projects Rated % of CRW % of CRW No. rated % of IDA % of IDA projects million million million million CRW $ CRW $ No. of IDA $ IDA $ Instrument Development Policy 3 110 30 15.7 4.8 2 80 20 100 100 Financing (DPF) Investment Project - - - - 3 590 590 84.3 95.2 0 Financing (IPF) Total 6 700 620 100 100 2 80 20 100 100 Notes: An investment project and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. 51 Appendix C. ICRR Ratings for Bank Performance Table C-1. IEG Bank Performance Ratings for CRW Financed Operations by Crisis Type, FY10-19 S MS MU U Not Total rated Economic Shock Number of projects 11 30 6 - 35 82 IDA Commitment ($ million) 369 1,379 294 - 1698 3738 CRW Commitment ($ million) 119 594 95 - 814 1,622 Natural Disaster Number of projects 1 7 2 - 47 57 IDA Commitment ($ million) 30 461 25 - 2772 3,288 CRW Commitment ($ million) 30 148 25 - 1,994 2,197 Public Health Number of projects - 2 - - 4 6 IDA Commitment ($ million) - 80 - - 620 700 CRW Commitment ($ million) - 20 - - 600 620 Notes: A public health emergency project and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. Table C-2. IEG Bank Performance Ratings for CRW Financed Operations for Economic Shock by Region, FY10-19 S MS MU U Not rated AFR No. of projects 6 19 5 - 26 CRW $ million 49 401 51 - 527 EAP No. of projects 2 4 - - 1 CRW $ million 29 57 - - 80 ECA No. of projects 2 3 - - 0 CRW $ million 27 30 - - 0 LCR No. of projects 1 1 - - 2 CRW $ million 14 2 - - 44 MNA No. of projects - - - - 2 CRW $ million - - - - 42 SAR No. of projects - 3 1 - 4 CRW $ million - 104 44 - 122 Total No. of projects 11 30 6 - 35 CRW $ million 119 594 95 - 814 Notes: HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 52 Table C-3. IEG Bank Performance Ratings for CRW Financed Operations for Natural Disaster by Region, FY10-19 S MS MU U Not rated AFR No. of projects 1 1 - - 16 CRW $ million 30.0 70.0 - - 653.2 EAP No. of projects - 4 - - 9 CRW $ million - 20.0 - - 192.0 ECA No. of projects - - - - 1 CRW $ million - - - - 100.0 LCR No. of projects - 1 1 - 17 CRW $ million - 7.5 20 - 666.0 MNA No. of projects - - 1 - 3 CRW $ million - - 5.2 - 133.0 SAR No. of projects - 1 - - 2 CRW $ million - 50.0 - - 250.0 Total No. of projects 1 6 2 - 48 CRW $ million 30.0 144.5 25.2 - 1,997.2 Notes: HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. Table C-4. IEG Bank Performance Ratings for CRW Allocations for Public Health by Region, FY10-19 S MS MU U Not rated AFR No. of projects - 2 - - 3 CRW $ million - 20.0 - - 400 MNA No. of projects - - - - 1 CRW $ million - - - - 200 Total No. of projects - 2 - - 4 CRW $ million - 20.0 - - 600.0 Notes: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory. 53