Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 28571-ER IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-30330) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR $39.1 MILLION (US$ 53 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ERITREA FOR A HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT June 22, 2004 Human Development 1 Country Department 5 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 1997) Currency Unit = Eritrean Nakfa 1 Nakfa = US$ 0.14 US$ 1 = Nakfa 7.10 US$ 1 = SDR 1.37 FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AIPA Africa Institute for Policy Analysis and Economic Integration CAS Country Assistance Strategy CPA Central Personnel Agency EOP End of Project ERREC Eritrea Rehabilitation and Relief Commission ESIP Eritrea Sector Investment Project GOE Government of Eritrea HRD Human Resources Development HRDP Human Resources Development Project ICR Implementation Completion Report IDP Internally Displaced Persons IDA International Development Association MOA Ministry of Agriculture MOE Ministry of Education MOH Ministry of Health MOF Ministry of Finance MOFI Ministry of Fisheries MOND Ministry of National Development MOPW Ministry of Public Works MOT Ministry of Tourism MOTI Ministry of Trade and Industry MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTR Mid-Term Review NGO Non-Governmental Organization NM National Museum PAD Project Appraisal Document PCU Project Coordinating Unit PSEs Public Sector Employees QAG Quality Assurance Group UA University of Asmara UNDP United Nations Development Program Vice President: Callisto Madavo Country Director Makhtar Diop Sector Manager Dzingai Mutumbuka Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Wim Alberts ERITREA Human Resources Development Project CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 7 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 14 6. Sustainability 15 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 16 8. Lessons Learned 18 9. Partner Comments 19 10. Additional Information 19 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 20 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 23 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 25 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 27 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 29 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 30 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 31 Annex 8. Borrower's Evaluation 33 Annex 9. Other Project Data 52 Project ID: P050354 Project Name: Human Resource Development Project Team Leader: Wim H. Alberts TL Unit: AFTH1 ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 22, 2004 1. Project Data Name: Human Resource Development Project L/C/TF Number: IDA-30330 Country/Department: ERITREA Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: Central government administration (50%); Tertiary education (18%); Secondary education (18%); General education sector (14%) Theme: Education for the knowledge economy (P); Administrative and civil service reform (P) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 06/09/1997 Effective: 02/25/1998 02/25/1998 Appraisal: 09/30/1997 MTR: 01/08/2001 01/08/2001 Approval: 01/15/1998 Closing: 07/31/2003 12/31/2003 Borrower/Implementing Agency: Ministry of Finance/University of Asmara Other Partners: HRD Units in Core Line Ministries, ERREC, Macro Policy Unit/Office of the President, AIPA STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Makhtar Diop Oey Meesook Sector Manager: Dzingai B. Mutumbuka Roger Sullivan Team Leader at ICR: Wim Alberts Laura Frigenti ICR Primary Author: Sigrun Aasland; Marylou R. Bradley 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: UN Institutional Development Impact: M Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The development objective and design of the Human Resources Development Project (HRDP) needs to be assessed in the context of : (i) the optimistic and progressive environment in which Eritrea found itself at the time of design; and (ii) the civil service reform process of which the national Human Resource Development (HRD) Program, and the HRD Project were integral parts. These factors must be contrasted against the detrimental effects of the border conflict with Ethiopia, which erupted in 1998, and deteriorated severely in 2000. The conflict had a major impact on the project, as conflicts do on any development activity. After gaining its independence from Ethiopia 1993, Eritrea was subject to great optimism for peace, growth, and stability, both from within and outside the country. From 1993 to 1997, the economy was growing rapidly, with annual GDP growth rate averaging 5.4 percent. In this environment, the HRD Program was an integral part of the civil service reform process that started in 1994, to be implemented in two phases. The critical bottleneck to the national HRD Program was the lack of skilled professional manpower. Key reform measures underpinning the civil service reform process were designed to create a lean, efficient, effective, and transparent civil service. The first phase focused on rationalizing institutions; the second phase aimed to create a set of central ministries that could effectively perform four essential functions: (i) policy formulation; (ii) regulations; (iii) applied research and development; and (iv) human resources development in the respective line ministries. After nearly three years of this extensive two-phase civil service reform process, the GoE identified over 1600 positions in the central ministries and the University of Asmara (UA). These were to be filled through the recruitment of individuals from abroad for positions requiring a higher level education; other vacancies would be filled by Eritreans trained at lower levels. The Project's development objective was to improve capacity of government institutions in a sustainable fashion, by resolving the major problem posed by the acute shortage of skilled and professional manpower. The instruments identified to achieve this objective were the recruitment of foreign specialists to fill the gaps in the central ministries, the University of Asmara, and the Teacher Training Institutes, and the training abroad of approximately 500 Eritreans at BA level and above, who would eventually replace them. The objectives reflected essential priorities for human resources development, as identified both by the GoE and by the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). They were consistent with the government's strategy for addressing the acute shortage of manpower. The overarching development objective ­ to improve capacity of government institutions in a sustainable fashion - was necessarily quite general, but was crystallized into very specific plans ­ to resolve the shortage of skilled professional manpower. The Project's development objective was to improve capacity of government institutions in a sustainable fashion, by resolving the major problem posed by the acute shortage of skilled and professional manpower. The instruments identified to achieve this objective were the recruitment of foreign specialists to fill the gaps in the central ministries, the University of Asmara, and the Teacher Training Institutes, and the training abroad of approximately 500 Eritreans at BA level and above, who would eventually replace them. The objectives reflected essential priorities for human resources development, as identified both by the GoE and by the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). They were consistent with the government's strategy for addressing the acute shortage of manpower. The overarching development objective ­ to improve capacity of government institutions in a sustainable fashion - was necessarily quite general, but was crystallized into very specific plans ­ to resolve the shortage of skilled professional manpower. - 2 - The war between Eritrean and Ethiopia has had devastating effects on all aspects of social and economic life, reversing the positive gains Eritrea made during the post independence period, creating a heavy burden and a severe humanitarian crisis. The war nearly affected 2.2 million people of whom 1.1 million (one-third of the population) were displaced, many lives were lost, and led to a massive destruction of public and private assets, a collapse in agricultural production, and severe economic stress. The war altered the assumptions under which the project was to achieve its development objectives. Eritreans between the ages of 18-40 were mobilized. This mobilization has incapacitated the PCU and HRD units who lost more than 60% of its staff, and left core ministries functioning with minimal capacity. During the war and its immediate aftermath, it was not possible to recruit foreign experts or select Eritreans for training abroad. The two countries agreed to a Cessation of Hostilities on June 18, 2000, and signed a Peace Accord in December 2000, but conflict conditions prevail due to slow progress on border demarcation. These factors have led to delays in implementation, with important multiplier effects on the intensity, efficiency, and manner in which project activities could be implemented sequentially as envisaged as well as help strengthen and sustain capacity of GoE institutions. The consequences of the war have shortened the implementation period and reduced the human and financial resources available to achieve the project's development objectives. With many activities still ongoing, the lack of systematic impact data, and the premature timing to draw conclusions on project outcomes by project closing, this ICR should be regarded as an interim assessment. This ICR recommends that an OED audit be undertaken in FY07 to meaningfully assess the impact of outcomes on HRDP's overarching development objective and to verify the basis for the ICR ratings. 3.2 Revised Objective: During implementation, HRDP experienced two devastating events, the effects of which can still be felt today: the war (1998-2000), and severe drought in 2000. Responding to GoE's request, the entire Bank portfolio for Eritrea was revised and an objective was added to alleviate the impact of the war and drought on the affected population. Available resources from ongoing projects were redirected to finance components of the Humanitarian Appeal coordinated by the United Nations. The proposal for portfolio restructuring, approved by the World Bank Board of Directors in July 2000, included the reallocation of US$20 million from the HRDP to support this new objective. The US$20 million supporting the Humanitarian Appeal was treated as a fourth component to the project. Due to initial implementation delays, the closing date of the Project was extended to December 31, 2003 to allow the completion of ongoing activities in the three original components within the remaining available Project funds. (See Section 5.4) 3.3 Original Components: Component 1: Recruitment of Foreign Experts (US$38.4 million, 73% of IDA Credit). This component was to support the external recruitment of international experts to fill 500 key positions in the UA, the civil service, and in senior teaching institutions. It was expected that these technical experts would fill 160 positions within the Ministry of Education (MoE), serving as senior teachers in existing secondary schools, the two vocational schools, and the primary teachers training college. Other experts would fill 110 positions at the UA and the Pre-University at Mendeferra to work with existing and newly established faculties. Finally, additional experts would be recruited to work in the civil service, filling 230 key jobs in the 16 ministries where advanced training and experience in technical areas was required. Component 2: Training for Eritrean Nationals (US$14.83 million, 26% of IDA Credit). A component was included to finance the external training of about 500 Eritrean nationals with the following breakdown: - 3 - 80 at PhD level, 350 at MA level, and 70 at the BA level in highly specialized disciplines. The selected candidates were expected to come from the civil service, the teaching cadre, or the UA, or would be assigned there once their external training had been completed. The trained nationals were expected to replace the foreign experts after a six-month hand-over period. Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Project Administration (US$0.60 million, 1% of IDA Credit). This component was to finance the strengthening of the UA, the HRD units in the ministries, and the Project Coordinating Unit (PCU), supporting the first two components. The overall coordination of the HRDP was mandated to the UA and its President was charged with the overall responsibility of coordinating the project. The PCU was established within the UA to implement and administer the project and reported directly to the President of UA. The support included the provision of computer equipment and technical support to the HRD units in each ministry to enable them to (i) handle external staff placements, including monitoring and evaluating their performance, (ii) manage the outflow of students to training abroad, (iii) manage the inflow of local staff returning from external training, and (iv) evaluate and monitor the performance of HRD program in the ministries or in the UA. The components were clearly linked to the project objectives, and supported GoE's priorities for human resources development with goals and reform measures underpinning the civil service reform, as well as lessons learned from the pilot phase of the project implemented prior to the IDA Credit. 3.4 Revised Components: Due to the consequences of the war, progress in project implementation lagged behind in each of the three original components. By January 2000, the project had disbursed less than 7% of its target. During the MTR in 2001, the three original components of the project were realigned to allow for greater flexibility in the implementation of project activities and to reallocate resources across the component, while maintaining the project's original development objective focusing on human resources development. A fourth component was included to support the added objective of alleviating the impact of war and drought on affected population discussed in Section 3.2. The reallocation of resources across the components is depicted in Table 1, and the revisions to the original components are discussed below: Table 1: Resource Allocation Across Components (in US$ million) Total Project IDA allocations Components Cost (Orig. Original % of original Revised % of revised allocation) allocation 1/ allocation allocation allocation 1. Recruitment of Foreign Experts 50.55 38.40 73 12.47 23 2. Training of Eritrean Nationals 14.83 14.00 26 19.06 36 3. Institutional Strengthening and 0.65 0.60 1 1.47 3 Project Administration 4. HRD Emergency Program - - - 20.00 38 Total 66.03 53.00 100 53.00 100 1/ Derived from PAD and includes contingencies. There may be slight differences due to the rounding of figures. Component 1: Recruitment of Foreign Experts (US$12.47 million, 23% of IDA Credit). This component was reduced in both total amount and in target number for expatriate staff (from 500 to 320) and included a shift in the distribution of experts across institutions. Responding to the experienced problems in recruitment and in the newly emerged situation of Eritreans residing in Ethiopia being expelled and deported as a consequence of the border conflict, the component now also included the recruitment of 320 Eritrean deportees from Ethiopia and returnees from Sudan. The total target recruitment thus increased from 500 to 640, while the estimated cost was reduced as a result of the reduction of the recruitment of expatriate staff and because the Eritrean deportees/returnees were recruited on local salaries. - 4 - Component 2: Training of Eritrean Nationals (US$19.06 million, 36% of IDA Credit). A higher percentage was now allocated to training, and the focus of this component was broadened, both in the collaboration with institutions abroad, mainly in South Africa, and in the addition of domestic training of civil servants. Types of training was expanded to include post-secondary levels, including short-term (3-6 months) and one year certificate, 2-3 years diploma, Bachelors, Master and Doctoral degree courses at the UA and other Eritrean professional training institutions; distance education; short-term professional training; on-the job training; conferences and workshops; and institutional linkages/exchange programs. Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Project Administration (US$1.47 million, 3% of IDA Credit). This component was slightly increased, from 1% to 3% of total project cost to support the functional analysis of civil service being undertaken by GoE, including related follow-up activities; technical assistance and training to strengthen strategic planning capacity of central government ministries; and to build the institutional capacity for management and monitoring of HR functions in the civil service. Moreover, the organizational and management structure was adjusted to improve coordination and policy development relevance of the project. Component 4: HRD Emergency Program (US$20 million, 38% of IDA Credit). This component was a result of the formal restructuring in July 2000. Unlike the three original components of the project, this component was to support, in the immediate term, emergency relief to help mitigate the crisis following the war as well as the prolonged drought. The allocation financed nutritional supplements, kitchen utensils, stoves, agricultural inputs, and services to transport these items to the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in war and drought-affected regions. The revisions to the first three components were responsive to: (i) the difficulties in recruitment of expatriate experts; (ii) the significant numbers of Eritreans returning from Sudan or deported from Ethiopia; (iii) the lower than anticipated pre-existing credentials for academic studies in the Eritrean civil service; (iv) capacity limitations in the PCU; and (v) institutional weaknesses in the integration of the PCU with HRD Units in the ministries. While maintaining the goal of HRDP, the revisions provided greater flexibility in the implementation of component activities and in the budgetary allocation across the three original components. The inclusion of the fourth component was responsive to addressing the severe humanitarian crisis following the war and further aggravated by the prolonged drought, by providing emergency life-saving interventions to IDPs, many of whom lost their assets and livelihoods and were barely coping to provide for their and their household's basic needs. 3.5 Quality at Entry: Quality at entry is rated satisfactory. The rating is based on: (i) the consistency and coherence of the project with the overall country context, GoE's civil service reform process and HRD Program, and the Bank's CAS; (ii) the unusually high level of country ownership and commitment; (iii) a high level of responsiveness and risk taking from the Bank in terms of addressing urgent requests from the Borrower and in supporting the proposed innovative "out-of-the-box" solutions to difficult human resource capacity problems; and (iv) the specificity and clarity of the output targets. Resolving the acute shortage of skilled and professional manpower was a specific and achievable operationalization of the broader project development objective. However, the link between the project activities/outputs and the overall DO of strengthening capacities of GoE institutions in a sustainable manner is not clearly articulated within the project design. Finally, the focus of the project seemed to have been stronger on outputs than on institutional performance measures. - 5 - A QAG review of Quality at Entry in early 1999 assigned a "satisfactory" rating to the project. The QAG review particularly highlights the GoE ownership and Bank responsiveness. The level of Borrower leadership and commitment was recommended to be the "gold standard for Bank operations". However, the QAG review also concluded that a sound technical and analytical basis, may have been sacrificed to the new client-driven approach, and that the project preparation seemed to have relied more on strong intuitive judgments than sound technical and analytical findings. This QAG finding was disputed by the Task Team and sector, country and regional Bank management and depicted as a clash between the old-style, conservative and bureaucratic Bank and the "new Bank", that puts the client in the driver-seat, promotes Borrower ownership and Bank responsiveness. Country context and strategy. The Bank's CAS for Eritrea, discussed by the Board in February 1996, included the objectives to assist Eritrea in its overall process of growth and development, and in developing its human resources base as the key input in the growth process and as a means of increasing income-earning prospects of the population. Further, the project was an integral part of GoE's HRD Program. The GoE stressed the fact that the project needed to be seen as the first step of a longer-term collaboration between the GoE and IDA in this area. Institutional Set-up and Capacity. The overall coordination of the HRDP was mandated to the UA where the PCU was located and its President was charged with the overall responsibility of coordinating the project. The PCU, including a project manager and 5 project staff, reported directly to the President of UA. HRD units were established in all ministries to identify HR capacity needs, implement HR strategies and monitor and evaluate HR developments. A Policy Committee, comprising high level officials, was provisioned to provide evaluation, policy support and guidance for the project, and oversee the implementation of the HRD Program to ensure that project implementation was consistent with overall GoE civil service reform and HR policies, and to review and adjust plans on an annual basis as necessary. A Technical Committee, comprising Director Generals (DGs) from core ministries, was established to assess project needs and performance, as well as enable smooth working of both the placement of external experts and training abroad. The choice to establish the PCU in the UA was based on: (i) the leadership of the President of the UA in the preparation of the project and his prominent role in Eritrea's HR development strategies more in general; (ii) the experience gained with the pilot HRD project in the UA; (iii) the strategic choice not to be aligned too closely to one of the individual line ministries and assure strategic and managerial autonomy; (iv) the premise that there would be more flexibility in project implementation through a semi-autonomous unit; and (v) the perception that UA possessed greater implementation capacity than any of the other institutional options for project management. The institutional set up was in principle designed to help mitigate capacity constraints, however, the set-up could have benefited from a broader capacity building approach that takes into account the complexity and multi-sectoral nature of the project. The institutional development component was under-funded at entry, which had to be corrected for at MTR. Readiness for Implementation. A pilot phase of the project was implemented prior to the IDA credit, with financing from the UNDP. This involved the recruitment of over 100 professionals, mainly from India, to the UA. The experiences obtained during the pilot were built into the design of the project, and included: (i) the outsourcing of recruitment of international experts to a consulting firm (Global Placement) proved efficient and cost-effective; (ii) the experts needed to be fully integrated, as producers, not advisors, subject to the same standards and treatment as their Eritrean colleagues; and (iii) the package of salary and benefits offered in the pilot proved sufficient to attract well-qualified experts. The QAG review found the implementation plan to be adequate, detailed and realistic, and assessed the readiness for implementation as highly satisfactory. - 6 - Risk Assessment and Sustainability. The critical assumptions from purpose to goal for the project, as recognized in the PAD, were: (i) the overall success of the government HRD program; (ii) success in complementary programs in health and education; (iii) macroeconomic stability; and (iv) timely availability of human resources. Other risks in implementation of the components included that (i) Eritreans trained abroad would not return to duty, which was mitigated by only providing the formal graduation papers upon return to Eritrea; and (ii) foreign experts would need more time for adjustment and integration. The risk of conflict was not addressed in project design. At the time of effectiveness, peace had prevailed for five years. In hindsight, the project from the start also faced three other risks: (i) the very same weak institutional capacity in the civil service that the project sought to address; (ii) that sustainability hinged on the overlap and smooth transition from expatriate staff being replaced by Eritrean trainees, requiring appropriate timing of both; and (iii) unrealistic assumptions were made about the formal academic credentials of civil servants qualifying them for university-level training abroad. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The overall achievement of the development objective (DO) is rated marginally satisfactory. The original development objective, maintained during the life of the project, had two levels. The overarching objective was to "improve capacity of government institutions in a sustainable fashion", and this would be done by "resolving the major problem posed by the acute shortage of skilled and professional manpower." The project performed fairly well in achieving its output targets supporting the lower level objective and at a lower cost. Achievements at this level are actually quite considerable under the current conflict conditions and these are reflected by the progress on the outcome indicators that were identified in the PAD as measures of project performance in achieving the development objectives (see Annex 1): (i) by EoP, enrollment rates had increased at all school levels: elementary by 20%, middle by 17%, secondary by 32%, teacher training by 40%, TVET by 49% and UA by 45%; (ii) by EoP, 40% more teachers had been trained at the Teacher Training Institutes and the UA; (iii) during the life of the project 45% more students graduated with degree programs; (iv) most Ministries involved in the HRD project improved their respective sector policies and operationalized them at regional and national levels, with the help of the recruited foreign experts; (v) most ministries carried out rigorous training needs assessments within the framework of the HRDP, and the certificate level training programs at the UA have been tailored to address the specific requirements of the line ministries. Several faculties have also upgraded their diploma programs to degree programs (Faculties of Engineering, Education, Political Science, Anthropology/Archeology, Sociology, History, Journalism, Computer Science); (vi) data on the increase in the ratio of local experts/foreign experts in charge of research are not available; and (vii) there are clear indications that MoE, MoH, MoTI, MOFI, MoT, MoPW, MoLHW have improved the regulatory frameworks for their respective sectors with help of the HRDP. Moreover, the ICR Task Team notes other positive achievements. The UA, with assistance from foreign experts and the establishment of effective institutional linkages and strong collaboration with other institutions of higher learning, was able to: (i) expand its program offerings from 28 to 42 degree programs; (ii) supply a fairly significant number of graduates to core ministries and other institutions; and (iii) advance work to permit the launching of a Master' level program in 12 disciplines starting in the next academic year. - 7 - The project therefore did address the shortage of skilled and professional manpower, and capacities have improved in a number of institutions, as evidenced by policy and regulatory development, expansion of faculties and study programs at the UA, and increased enrollment in secondary education. As discussed below, many project activities are actually still continuing after project closing and it can be expected that with the return of the majority of the students studying in South Africa, that the shortage of skilled and professional manpower will be further reduced. While acknowledging the important achievements of the project, the ICR Task Team faced major challenges in providing an appropriate rating for the achievement of the overarching development objective, at this point in time: · The project has been implemented under very difficult security, political and macro-economic conditions. The border conflict with Ethiopia considerably reduced the chances for the project to achieve its objectives as it completely altered the assumptions under which the project outputs were to have the desired impact. During the war and its immediate aftermath it was not possible to recruit foreign experts or select Eritreans for training abroad, a large majority of PCU and HRD unit staff was drafted into the army, ministries were functioning at marginal capacity and the strengthening of GoE institutions became a lower level priority for GoE. After the ceasefire, many of the conflict conditions prevailed because of the lack of progress in the border demarcation and the perceived security threat from across the border. The slow progress with the demobilization process and the continuing high levels of mobilized skilled manpower in the army has had a very negative impact on HR capacity in GoE institutions. Today, GoE's macro-economic policies, sector development strategies and public sector management are still dominated by the prevailing conflict conditions. · The timing of the ICR impact assessment of the project is unfortunate, and comes too early for the following reasons: (i) the whole cycle of recruitment and training started two to three years later than originally assumed, and although the project has closed, the cycle has not yet been completed; (ii) because of this, the overlap between the experts and the trainees did never really materialize; (iii) a lot of the training is still ongoing and its impact cannot be assessed at this point in time (many students still in South Africa and students at the UA still continuing); and (iv) foreign experts have in many cases not been able to fulfill their responsibilities for the full period that was envisaged initially (many contracts have been extended after project closing on the basis of grant funding and/or from other ongoing projects). · The project did not systematically collect information to measure the progress on the impact level indicators. Neither the PCU, nor the HRD units in the beneficiary institutions were able to operationalize the use of the logframe and the outcome/impact indicators that were developed during the logframe workshops were never collected and processed. The available impact information is based on an assessment of the ICR team in collaboration with the PCU and the UA at the time of the ICR mission. The unfortunate and early timing of the impact assessment, the absence of systematic impact data and the altered project assumptions explain to a large extent why the overall achievement of the DO is rated marginally satisfactory. The ICR Task Team is in addition not able to assess adequately at this point in time how the project activities/outputs and the achievements at the lower level of the DO have contributed to the sustained capacity building of GoE institutions. The achievement of objective to help alleviate the impact of war and drought on affected population is rated satisfactory. The implementation of emergency assistance was provided in a timely and effective manner to vulnerable groups barely coping with the crisis; implementation arrangements capitalized on existing institutional structures and emergency distribution mechanisms which still remain in use today; and - 8 - disbursement, procurement, and financial management activities were managed transparently. 4.2 Outputs by components: Component I: Recruitment of foreign experts. This first component is rated satisfactory. A total of 672 experts were recruited to 14 government institutions, against 500 originally projected. These experts filled positions within various GoE institutions for which there was an acute shortage of highly skilled and professional manpower to implement sector-specific and national development programs. In addition to the 352 expatriates recruited, 320 deportees from Ethiopia and returnees from Sudan with professional qualifications were recruited through the project to serve in the public administration. Although there is no evidence to suggest that these recruits had the necessary capacities to fill the gaps as those of expatriate experts, often with higher academic credentials, the ICR Task Team feels that this was a responsive and realistic strategy given the recruitment as well as displacement problems the project and the country were faced with. Many of these recruits have been retained beyond the project life, and so these recruitment countered the severe general lack of manpower caused by the conflict. Details on the overall status of the recruitment of experts are provided in Annex 9. Until the MTR restructuring, the project faced problems in recruiting foreign experts. Firstly, considerable delays occurred between the interview and the receipt of contracts for selected candidates, and consequently many lost interest or accepted other offers. Secondly, the initial salary/benefit packages were not competitive for some professional groups such as doctors and engineers. Finally, the border conflict discouraged some applicants from moving to Eritrea. After the revisions at MTR, the recruitment of the foreign experts was implemented more smoothly. The delays in implementation. however, limited the extent to which the recruitment strengthened the overall capacities of the benefiting ministries. The first batch of 178 Eritrean students under Component 2 only returned from South Africa in early 2003. As a result, the planned overlap between the foreign experts and the newly trained Eritreans to sustain the human resource capacity and institutional impact across all benefiting GoE institutions, had not yet materialized at the time of project closing. The UA (20%) and the MoE (60%) received the largest share of the resources allocated to this component. For the UA, the recruitment of experts has significantly contributed to the expansion of its program offerings from 28 to 42 degree programs. The new programs and colleges where over two-thirds of senior faculty staff were employed with HRDP funds include the Faculty of Law, Colleges of Engineering, Education and Health Sciences. During the life of the project, enrollment at Certificate, Diploma and first Degree programs increased from 60, 366, and 2,726 in academic year 1997/98 to 500, 545, and 4,987 in 2002/03, respectively. The number of graduates completing certificate, diploma and first degree programs increased in the same period from 56, 56, and 323 to 470, 182, and 777 respectively. Faculty staff increased by over 20% from 210 in 1998 to 260 in 2003. Of the total 71 expatriates recruited to the UA, 51 (71%) have been retained beyond the project life to complete their responsibilities for the full period of their assignments, with financing from UA and grants from other partner institutions. For the MoE, the recruitment of experts comprised mostly teachers, technical vocational instructors and expert trainers. These have positively contributed to increasing access to secondary schools and technical vocational schools as well as to improvements in quality of education services delivery. Between the academic years 1998/1999 and 2001/2002, enrollments at secondary schools and technical and vocational schools increased from 47,533 to 70,183, and from 908 to 1,992, respectively. During the same period, the supply of teachers increased from 982 to 1,419 at secondary level, and from 101 to 174 for technical and vocational schools. After project closing, the majority of the expatriate teachers have been retained by the MoE through financing made available through the Education Sector Investment Project (ESIP). - 9 - The recruitment of experts has also benefited core line ministries. Among others, experts have contributed to the expansion of the national agricultural research center (MoA); developing policies related to setting standards and norms for infrastructure development, while also assisting in the implementation of the reconstruction campaign (MoPW); the development of regulations for the classification of hotel systems and strategies for tourism (MoT); program strategies, especially in the area of social welfare (MoLHW); engineering services and assistance in developing technical designs for infrastructure development (Master Plan) and housing in Maekel zoba (MoLG); and expanding access to health services, while also contributing to strengthening health sector performance (MoH). The recruitment of expatriate experts have considerably assisted UA to expands it programs and boost its enrollment and completion rates, with a fairly significant number of graduates having joined various core ministries, including private entities (see Annex 1). The placement of these graduates in several core ministries, if adequately capitalized on and provided proper incentives, would help improve capacity in GoE institutions in a sustainable fashion. Component II: Training of Eritrean Nationals. This second component is rated marginally satisfactory. The rating is based on an assessment of the ICR Task Team at this point in time. The assessment balances the outputs produced against the unfavorable environment in which the HRDP was implemented and factors which have contributed to delays in implementation. The assessment recognizes the positive aspects which included the sound and responsive reshaping of the component at midterm review, allowing a broad beneficiary base with increases in training opportunities for 3200 PSEs, leading to a fairly substantial output exceeding the original target and at a lower cost; the high performance of the majority of students abroad that actually did complete their study programs; and UA's carefully worked out institutional linkage system with other institutions of higher learning in order to build its capacity to ensure the sustainable production of the needed manpower at various levels, including at the Master's level. The ICR Task Team is aware that an assessment of the outputs of this component at this point in time does not do sufficient justice to what can be achieved in terms of training outputs in the near future. Once the majority of students complete their studies in South Africa and at the UA, and return to their positions in the civil service, there will be a significant influx of skilled manpower into the GoE institutions. After MTR, a total of 674 students have been sent for degree studies abroad. At project closing 178 (26%) had completed their studies. Another 354 (53%) are continuing their studies and are expected to complete (with financing from ESIP or grant funding), and 142 (21%) have absconded or will not complete for other reasons. Another 1700 public sector employees (PSE) benefited from internal first degree, diploma and certificate programs, and close to 900 enrolled for distance training managed by the UA. Close to 1000 (60%) PSE's have completed the internal degree programs, about 400 (23%) are continuing their studies and are expected to complete (tuition waved by the UA and salaries/allowances paid by GoE), and about 300 (18%) PSE's did not complete their studies. Diploma candidates at UA have in the main been selected from Certificate-level completers who have performed extremely well. The attrition rates are high for the PSE's that enrolled for distance learning. A little over 40% passed and close to 60% withdrew or failed. Distance education programs for PSEs (mainly at BA level) have been discontinued due to lack of funds; most PSEs enrolled in MA-level programs are able to continue with financial support from ESIP. Following recommendations by a joint evaluation team from UNISA and UoA, the Consulting Testing and Training Center of UA has been mandated to build the necessary infrastructure for a more structured tutorial and related support systems, and in collaboration with UNISA to establish a proper distance learning program. The overall status of training during the life of the project is provided in Annex 9. Until January 2001, only 91 Eritrean students were enrolled in external training programs. The low enrollment related to several factors, including: (i) many education institutions abroad turned out to have quotas for foreign students which made it impossible for them to accept more than a small number of Eritrean students (particularly in India); (ii) overestimated assumptions of academic credentials in the - 10 - Eritrean civil service - many of the candidates proposed by ministries did not qualify for admission at the institutions identified; (iii) limited follow-up by ministries in nominating candidates; and (iv) negative impact of war with the mobilization of individuals between 18-40 years who were the primary candidates for training. At the MTR, the training component underwent major restructuring, providing more flexibility and diversified approach to training leading to an expansion of the external as well as internal training venues. The MTR revisions introduced opportunities for enrollment at the UA for first degree, certificate and diploma programs, as well as distance training. The range of training offered was expanded to include shorter term and technical training. Candidates selected by various ministries to pursue training in academic fields available at the UA were subsequently enrolled. It was further proposed to expand the number of universities to provide training for BA, MA, and PhDs. Memorandum of Understanding were signed with 15 South African universities/technikons and institutions of higher learning in other countries to assist UA to build its capacity in the development of curriculum in academic disciplines; to allow Masters and PhD-level students to conduct their research on projects that are responsive to the country's needs and skills gap in various sectors, and to allow students to study in foreign universities. The collaboration with South African institutions of higher learning absorbed the majority (90%) of the Eritrean students since January 2001. This component has achieved considerable outputs which are contributing to a reduction in the shortage of professional manpower in GoE institutions. However, the ICR Task Team is not able to make a sound impact assessment at this point in time. There is still a significant number of students enrolled in universities abroad and at the UA who are only expected to complete by end-2004. While most trainees who have completed and returned to Eritrea in the last six months have joined various GoE institutions, there is limited data on how these trainees are applying their new knowledge and skills to improve capacity in GoE institutions. Component III: Institutional Strengthening. This third component is rated unsatisfactory. This was the weakest component of the project, and the source of many of the implementation problems, in particular: (i) low capacity of staff placed in the PCU and HRD, including lack of clarity and/or internalization of related roles, functions, and areas of accountability; (ii) inadequate links between the different parts of the institutional set up of the project and weak coordination between the PCU and the HRD units in the line ministries; (iii) inadequate project management in activities related to both human resource capacity building for the education sector and capacity development for the civil service; and (iv) and weak implementation of monitoring and evaluation tools developed, and monitoring of impact of project activities on institutional performance. This component could have benefited from a larger allocation from the outset, allowing for more systematic and strategic capacity building as part of project implementation. In addition, policy and technical committees did not function effectively during project implementation. PCU. The learning curve of the PCU was very steep. From initially being a weak unit with insufficient communication with ministries, as well as weak implementation capacity within its own ranks, the PCU significantly improved its performance after January 2001. The staff initially assigned to the PCU were young and inexperienced, and given their junior positions in the hierarchy were not positioned to credibly steer, advise, and guide more senior staff in the ministries. These factors likely affected both their implementation capacity and their relationship and standing with the different ministries. The border conflict further aggravated this situation as the PCU lost 60% of its staff due to mobilization. The project however was able to strengthen the capacities of the PCU after the MTR and established more efficient project management. This was to a large extent the result of the recruitment of more senior and qualified - 11 - staff which included a more experienced project manager, and more senior staff in the areas of: (i) training; (ii) recruitment; (iii) accounting; and (iv) monitoring and evaluation. The PCU was also instrumental in facilitating the establishment of HRD units in the ministries. In hindsight, the institutionalization of civil service human resource management in the UA/PCU was less effective given its marginality to core public management functions. HRD Units in Line Ministries. The establishment of HRD units in the central ministries was in principle a positive undertaking. These units were however not able to effectively execute their mandate and functions, owing to: (i) low capacity of core staff; (ii) detachment of the majority of HRD units in the ministries from the departments they would serve; (iii) in some cases, overlapping functions with personnel/administration departments in their respective ministries, leading to unclear lines of accountability; (iv) lack of understanding about their roles, responsibilities, and areas of accountability; and (v) lack of clarity of several ministries on their training needs. Policy and Technical Committees. The Technical Review committee, established during the first year, did not meet regularly. In the initial year, more senior authorities who could have provided guidance and advice to junior and inexperienced HRD unit staff in preparation of sector strategic development plans, were not included in this Committee. The Policy Committee and Policy Review (Steering) Committee were established only in 2000 and also did not meet regularly. The institutional set up was not favorable to the HRD project becoming an integral part of the national HRD Program. The organizational placement of the PCU under UA may have had the benefit of neutrality in the placement of experts and trainees, but given its marginality to core public management functions, it was less effective in steering, advising, and supporting capacity building in civil service. In addition, weak organizational arrangements did not permit a proper coordination and follow-up of project activities between PCU and HRD units in the ministries. The placement of PCU in UA may have contributed to less than ideal collaborative planning and stronger engagement of HRD units. Some HRD units perceived a lack of understanding by the PCU of the sector-specific HR needs in the ministries. Moreover, sub-optimal communications between the PCU and the ministries about project activities, combined with the lack of clarity from central ministries on their development strategy and related training needs, affected the efficiency and effectiveness by which the implementation of the training component could be advanced. AIPA. AIPA, an Eritrean NGO based in South Africa, facilitated contacts with South African institutions, including the transfer of funds to Universities and to students' accounts (i.e. payment of student stipends, school fees, book allowance, health insurance, study permits, etc.), and served as a point of reference for students abroad in case of emergencies. AIPA also assisted the project in setting up a financial management and monitoring system in South Africa. Towards the end of the project AIPA's role diminished, and the Eritrean Embassy took over the administrative tasks relating to Eritrean students. While AIPA has helped facilitate the training contracts with South African universities, only receiving resources from the project for incremental operating expenses, a few weaknesses were identified: (i) weak financial and management system which did, in some cases, lead to late tuition payments and students not starting classes on time; and (ii) as a two-person team, AIPA faced a fairly demanding workload which at times proved to be difficult to manage, thus reducing their level of efficiency and in some cases, responsiveness to students' needs. This may have also affected the timely reporting of AIPA to PCU on the status and performance of students placed in South African universities. Monitoring and Evaluation. While the project has critically underscored the importance of monitoring and evaluation, achievement in this area is overall limited. The comprehensive Logframe indicators that were developed for all GoE institutions during the Logframe workshops in 1999 and 2000 were not brought - 12 - forward and internalized in the HRD units or departments in the ministries. The planned Logframe training on strategic planning for more senior officials (DGs and ministers) did never take place. Overall, the M&E activities were not sufficiently institutionalized. While tools were provided through logframe monitoring forms and training, the capacity to effectively implement these was not present, and not sufficiently followed up. At the PCU and HRD units, institutional performance measurements were not conducted. Individual performances of foreign experts and trainees were not tracked on a regular basis, despite the well prepared assessment tools developed by the project. The lack of performance and impact data available for the ICR Task Team upon which to make an assessment of the achievement of outcome and objectives is indicative of the level of systematic reporting throughout the life of the project. Component IV: HRD Emergency Program. This fourth component is rated satisfactory. The war has severely affected local food production capacity, with a negative impact on the country's food security and further compounded by the drought. A significant proportion of people who were affected by the drought were also directly affected by the war. During the war, many houses and other social and economic infrastructure were destroyed, and property, including household items, livestock, and farm implements were looted. Prolonged drought has negatively affected agricultural production. In June 2000, an emergency appeal for US$166 million was launched to provide emergency relief assistance to about 1.66 million persons (about 50% of the total resident population of Eritrea at the time). These individuals included 1.22 million war-affected; 290,600 drought-affected; and 150,000 victims of urban poverty. Responding to GoE's appeal for emergency support, US$20 million was reallocated from the IDA credit to contribute to the financing of three components (food and nutrition, households items, and agricultural inputs) of the Humanitarian Appeal coordinated by the United Nations. These funds were fully disbursed within four months. The HRDP reallocation financed: (i) provision of agricultural inputs to assist poor farmers affected by the war to resume their farming activities and reduce their dependence on food aid in the coming year, implemented by MoA. Most of these farmers lost their livestock, household assets, including seeds and farm implements. The timing of the support was especially critical because the destruction and displacement took place in May-June which is the beginning of the main planting season. (ii) distribution of kerosene stoves and food to vulnerable groups in Debub, Gash Barka and Southern Red Sea, implemented by the Eritrean Relief and Refugee Commission (ERREC), the national coordinating agency for humanitarian relief assistance, following established emergency response mechanisms in Eritrea. Priority targets were the 400,000 people living in camps at the time, IDPs outside the camps, and host communities, of which over 90% of IDPs and expellees were women and children under 15 years. The provision of stoves enabled households to cook the distributed food aid, because fuel wood was scarce and the protection of the environment from further deterioration by IDPs was essential Food distribution followed the established emergency response mechanisms in the country. ERREC is the coordinating agency for humanitarian relief assistance and closely collaborated with various sector ministries and their respective zonal branches, the zonal administration, including their structures that go down to the village administration council level. The screening of beneficiaries and identified needs started at the village level and facilitated by the village administrative council. The needs were then compiled at the sub-zoba level by sub-zoba administrations, discussed with ERREC sub-zoba representatives and forward to the zoba level. At the zoba level, the ERREC zoba director, in consultation and discussion with the Zoba Director for Social Affairs reviews the needs proposal, and with the approval of the Zoba Administrator is then finalized and forwarded to ERREC headquarters for action. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: NPV/ERR not calculated for the Project. - 13 - 4.4 Financial rate of return: NA 4.5 Institutional development impact: The institutional development impact is rated as modest. In the long term, the ability of GoE to focus on longer term strategies and the sustainability of the activities financed will depend on the normalization of the overall situation in the country, and advancement with the ongoing civil service reform. Moreover, the level of impact is also linked to how training will be strategically applied and capitalized to strengthen capacity of GoE institutions. To this end, optimal returns to training investments would require an enabling environment where adequate opportunities and institutional and financial incentives for newly trained Eritreans to use and extend new skills that result in sustained improvements in capacity of GoE institutions. The institutional development impact at this point in time is reflected in more detail in Annex 1 and in the Borrower's contribution to this ICR. This ICR recommends that an OED audit be carried out in FY07 to enable a meaningful assessment of project outcomes and impact on the achievement of HRDP's overaching development objective, including the sustainability of operations, and to verify the ICR's ratings. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: The border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia seriously affected implementation of the project, as well as the resources available to it. With the deterioration of the border situation in 1998-2000, an estimated 60-70% of the civil service was absorbed by the conflict by being drafted to the Army. An estimated 80-90% of the HRD personnel was drafted. The PCU lost three of its members to the military service, and it was extremely difficult to fill the vacancies. After the ceasefire many of the conflict conditions prevailed, and the slow progress with the demobilization process and the continuing high levels of mobilized skilled manpower in the army has had a very negative impact on HR capacity in GoE institutions. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: As discussed in Section 4.2, there were several factors subject to GoE control affected implementation negatively. These included: (i) inadequate institutional set-up; (ii) low capacity in PCU and HRD units in the ministries; (iii) disconnect between mandate and organizational positioning of HRD units; and (iv) the late start-up and operationalization of committees. The QAG review raised concerns about the appropriateness of the PCU providing the leadership and management required to address two related but distinct project activities: (i) human resource capacity building for the education sector; and (ii) capacity building for the civil service. While the UA/PCU may have been strong in carrying human resources development responsibilities in the education sector, it had less comparative advantage in carrying out capacity building of civil service. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Although comprehensive yet user-friendly Logframe were developed as the result of a three-week series of training workshops in Logframe design and use, these were not used in the monitoring and evaluation of the project. As a result , there is limited data available on the impact of project activities on the overarching objective of improving capacity of GoE institutions in a sustainable manner. Most reporting has been on output targets and did not focus on institutional performance measures which is particularly important given the lack of essential informational building blocks related to the institutional capacity of government to manage, coordinate, and sustain robust capacity building activities for civil service, to manage the - 14 - transition from technical experts to Eritrean nationals, and to absorb trained staff into improved organizational contexts. The PCU could have monitored the project better for management and planning purposes, in order to ensure the relevance of degrees pursued, the timeliness of graduation, and the cost effectiveness of the project vis-a-vis the cost of training, and the cost of recruiting experts in relation to the improvement in individual as well as institution performance outputs. Audit reports after fiscal year ending 2001 remain outstanding. 5.4 Costs and financing: Of the IDA Credit of US$53 million originally allocated to the project, US$20 million was reallocated to finance emergency needs created by the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and further aggravated by the prolonged drought. Moreover, allocations across the original components of the HRDP were significantly revised at Mid-Term. The initial allocation was 73% to recruitment of foreign experts, 26% to training, and 1% to institutional strengthening. After restructuring, of the total IDA Credit of US$53 million, 23% was allocated to recruitment of foreign experts and Eritrean deportees and returnees, 36% to training, and 3% to institutional strengthening. The remainder (38%) was used to finance urgent basic needs of internally displaced persons and displaced communities under the HRD Emergency Program. At project closing, US$50.9 million had been disbursed, including the reallocation for the HRD Emergency Program. The discrepancy is due to exchange rate fluctuations of almost US$2.0 million, and final disbursement was 100%. Total government contribution to the HRDP, including the HRD Emergency Program, is estimated at US$14.29 million equivalent, of which 75% was to support the recruitment of experts. Due to initial delays in implementation, the original closing date of HRDP was extended five months to December 31, 2003 to enable students pursuing training at several Universities and Technikons in South Africa to complete their degree programs. Agreement between the World Bank and GoE was reached to adopt the following extension scenario: (i) extend HRDP until December 31, 2003, and finance HRDP project activities for the year 2003, as agreed and costed in the proposed Action Plan, with the remaining funds in HRDP Special Account; and (ii) include financing of the remaining EHRD expenses for 2003-2004 under the ESIP from which US$2.4 million was reallocated. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Overall the sustainability of the project is rated unlikely. The absence of systematic data on the impact of project activities/outputs on strengthening the capacities of GoE institutions and on overall institutional performance makes it difficult to assess sustainability at this point in time. The project made significant contributions at the lower-level DO to address the acute shortage of skilled and professional manpower in GoE institutions. However, it seems unlikely, at this point in time, that the achievements at the lower level DO can contribute sufficiently to achieving the overarching DO of strengthening capacity of GoE institutions in a sustainable fashion. GoE's macro-economic policies and public sector management are still dominated by the prevailing conflict conditions. Capacity constraints continue to be widespread in Eritrea and these affect policy planning and implementation of development programs, including movement of civil servants in GoE institutions. Faced with this situation, more prominence was de facto given to addressing the acute shortage of manpower in the short term, with a lower priority to institutional and organizational development activities. While important contributions have been made to fill capacity gaps in GoE institutions, the institutional and organizational levels of capacity development could not be sufficiently addressed. The project has not been able to track adequately how graduates are being employed in GoE institution, which positions they assume, and whether their know-how and skills can be - 15 - applied. Current country conditions have not yet allowed for an effective transition from the short term focus on the manpower shortage to improving institutional performance of GoE institutions in a sustainable manner. On the positive side, the program offerings of UA have expanded from 28 to 42 degree programs. The recruitment of experts have considerably contributed to an expansion of UA programs and faculties, boosting enrollment and completion rates. The ICR recognizes that while still young and inexperienced, a significant number of graduates have joined several GoE institutions, and are expected to contribute to strengthening capacity in GoE institutions over time. Through the establishment of effective institutional linkages and collaboration with other institutes of higher learning, the UA: (i) was able to design and organize more work oriented advanced 3-year diploma programs; and (ii) work towards the launching of a Masters Level Program. These positive academic achievements notwithstanding, there are not yet clear and sufficient indications that demonstrate the impact of these achievements on strengthening capacities in GoE institutions in a sustainable fashion. HRDP has not been able to track adequately how graduates are being employed in GoE institutions, which positions they assume, and whether their know-how and skills are being applied. With certificate programs tailored to the sector-specific needs of core ministries, a general assumption is made that PSEs will be able to progressively apply their enhanced know-how and skills to the requirements of their posts in the short term. However, the level to which these skills are applied and the impact would need to be monitored and assessed over time. As an emergency operation, the sustainability of Component 4 is not rated. However, the ICR Team acknowledges the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation arrangements adopted to support emergency interventions. The implementation of this component did capitalize on existing networks, institutional and organizational structures, and emergency response mechanisms to support emergency-type operations, important elements which are still being utilized today. The reallocation of US$20 million were effectively used to provide urgent basic needs to IDPs, including displaced communities, many of whom were barely coping with providing for their and their household's basic needs. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: The project was envisaged as a first step of a longer-term collaboration between the GoE and the Bank in the HRD sector, but the major event (war) that occurred during implementation and the reduction in financing has affected momentum. Additional financing, time, adequate performance incentives for civil servants, and the overall normalization of country conditions would be required to realize the full potential of project investments. The ESIP has assumed responsibility for some transitional arrangements supporting the replacement of expatriate teachers by Eritrean teachers at the secondary level. In addition, a total of US$2.4 million of ESIP funds have been reallocated to support the degree program completion of about 225 students still on training abroad, including the continuation of 21 PSEs in MA-level programs through distance learning. With funds from grants and its own resources, the UA has retained about 70% of its expatriates in order to complete the full cycle of their assignment. Anecdotal information indicate that many deportees and returnees have been integrated in civil service. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Bank lending performance is rated as satisfactory. During preparation, the Bank was highly responsive to priorities and strategies brought forward by GoE, while also ensuring consistency with the CAS for Eritrea. At the time, the Bank was the only funding agency who could make available the necessary level funding in a single project and in a fairly short time. The team recognized GoE's leadership, political will, and commitment to drive the capacity building process. Project design accounted for flexibility to adjust targets - 16 - as the need arises, lessons learned from the UNDP pilot and related experiences from other countries. On the negative side, while recognizing the weak capacity in the civil service, project design could have better addressed potential pitfalls associated with (i) not having clearly defined organizational arrangements and appropriate coordination mechanisms upfront, both in view of the agreed placement of PCU in UA and the complex and multi-sectoral nature of the Project; and (ii) insufficient upfront operational guidelines to support the timely establishment of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms at PCU and HRD unit levels. 7.2 Supervision: The mission reviewed 9 Aide Memoires and 9 Project Status Reports (PSR) and found in all a remarkable level of detail and a clear identification of project problems. The link between the work of supervision missions and subsequent operationalization of recommendations is generally strong, although the ICR notes that at least 50% of the PSR reports did not include feedback from Management. The realignment of the project in 2000, consolidated after the MTR in 2001, showed responsiveness to problems partly resulting from inappropriate assumptions at the outset. The complete turnaround in performance after this restructuring indicates that the appropriate measures were taken in order to bring the project back on track. On the negative side, the Bank could have provided more support and follow-up in the operationalization of the Monitoring and Evaluation Tools developed. The Bank should have been more systematic in monitoring Borrower's compliance in regards to the submission of financial audit reports, and pro-active in taking timely corrective actions as necessary. There was a change in Task Team Leaders (TTL) during implementation, although the second and final TTL was a key member of the original core team. Although rated "S" for most of the implementation period, the DO rating was downgraded to "U". The project continued to make substantial contributions toward its output targets (see Section 4). However, with the stalling of the border demarcation process and the deterioration of the security situation, the last Implementation Support Mission in 2003 recognized that it seemed unlikely that in the near future the project would be able to fully meet its overarching development objective. In the long term, however, it is still expected that once the overall situation in the country normalizes and the process of demobilization is accelerated, GoE will be able to focus more on developing longer term strategies and strategic planning capacity for which GoE remains committed, as it is critical to the sustainability of activities financed. Recognizing the positive outcomes achieved by HRDP in such a difficult environment and with a shortened implementation period, the ICR has rated the DO "marginally satisfactory". This interim rating is however subject to verification by the OED audit. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Overall and based on the assessment above, Bank performance is rated as satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The GoE demonstrated strong ownership and commitment to the project as part of its broader HRD strategy in the preparation of the project. The GoE was pro-active in identifying the best strategy to address the human resource problem and capacity constraints in the country, and following this process, developed its strategy and from which the project proposal for HRDP evolved. High level officials collaborated in preparing the project. GoE embarked on the implementation of a selected set of activities on a pilot basis, lessons from which were incorporated in the design of HRDP. Finally, GoE's decision to finance technical assistance, an area traditionally financed by grant resources, and agreement to contribute over 20% towards the total project costs, are equally important indications of GoE commitment. The QAG review found "the project objectives well focused, utilizing an out-of-the-box solution to an acute capacity shortage by adopting a South-South transfer of know-how and technical assistance. The solution was - 17 - carefully tailored to country circumstances to optimize cost-effectiveness". Borrower performance during preparation is rated as highly satisfactory. 7.5 Government implementation performance: In implementation, the Government did not allocate adequately qualified staff to the project and did not sufficiently integrate the opportunities offered by the project into its national HRD Program. The Ministries were not always clear on their needs for foreign experts, resulting in high rejection rates of foreign expert applications at the outset. While the establishment of the HRD units was a positive undertaking, the detachment of these units from the departments they would serve have affected the efficient functioning of these units. Moreover, the roles, responsibilities, areas of accountability of the HRD units were not clearly delineated. Some HRD functions overlapped with personnel or administration departments in the ministries. Key committees - the Policy Committee, Policy Review Committee, and Project Technical Committee, were established but hardly functioned in practice. Government performance improved after restructuring, in allocating qualified staff to the PCU and in providing a more suitable institutional setup. Unfortunately, the attention of the government was diverted by the conflict, and the civil service reform has yet to be implemented. HRD units remained understaffed and the links between the PCU and the HRD units under-utilized. Government implementation performance overall is rated as unsatisfactory. 7.6 Implementing Agency: From having disbursed 1.5% of the allocated funds 17 months after effectiveness, the project finally disbursed all funds minus the USD$20 million reallocation that went to the HRD Emergency Program, and even overachieved on the output targets in recruitment and training. The performance of the implementing agency is marked by a shift from "unsatisfactory" to "satisfactory" after the restructuring in January 2001. From that point onwards, the PCU became much more effective in managing and coordinating the project and established efficient and effective partnerships with the South African institutions and with the UA, and was able to place many more Eritrean students and foreign experts than originally anticipated. The PCU was, however, less effective in ensuring the systematic and rigorous monitoring and evaluation of project activities. The PCU was also not fully effective in ensuring compliance with the legal covenants, as witnessed by the highly delinquent submission of the financial audit for 2002. Thus its overall performance is rated as marginally satisfactory. The HRD Emergency Component was implemented by, and funds were disbursed according to plans within four months. The performance of the implementing agency for this portion of the project is rated as satisfactory. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Overall and based on the assessment above, borrower performance is rated as satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned Conflict is detrimental to promoting growth and development. Conflict reverses the effects of development, imposes large economic and welfare costs on society, and hampers ongoing development activities in their implementation. Not only do conflicts result in direct economic losses in countries at war (as a result of the loss of life, destruction of key economic infrastructure, reduced export earnings and reduced business investment), but they also have lasting impacts on living standards, private sector development and human development outcomes. Do not overestimate the capacity of civil service institutions in a (post)-conflict environment. A government emerging from conflict is likely to have a weak institutional and civil service capacity, and - 18 - needs close follow-up and implementation assistance to put provided tools into use, and to monitor progress and address implementation issues in a responsive manner. Make realistic assumptions about prior academic credentials of beneficiaries, while also broadening concepts of training to increase responsiveness to beneficiaries' practical needs. Formal education at higher levels requires formal qualifications and credentials. Especially in a country where access to education has been limited historically or by conflict, it may be more realistic to broaden the scope to also include more informal training such as on-the-job training, short term courses, workshops and distance learning. Training is more than formal university degrees, and shorter programs may be more appropriate for some potential beneficiaries. After the project broadened the concept of training it proved to be: (i) more inclusive; and (ii) more cost-effective. Establish partnerships abroad to facilitate implementation. An implementing partner abroad is key to effective management of funds, links with learning institutions, and follow-up of students abroad. AIPA served this purpose in South Africa, and contributed to the acceleration of student admissions and degrees at foreign universities after nine South African institutions were included in the project from 2001. Capacity development issues are complex phenomena relating to human, organizational and institutional change. Recognition of these three interrelated elements is important to achieving optimal results in human resources development project. The individual staff training and the placement of foreign experts would have benefited from complementary institutional and organizational strengthening activities. Cost-quality principle. The project used a cost-quality principle that has proven an important factor in achieving the outputs of the project. The search for good quality education at a reasonable cost opened up venues for extending the learning opportunities to South Africa and a broader orientation towards training through internal scholarships and distance learning. The search for good quality experts at a reasonable cost was most successful for the MoE and the UA, but more difficult in fields where the incentive package offered was not considered competitive enough (e.g. engineering, health, etc.). Cost-effectiveness principle. The project also used a cost-effectiveness principle, and the project has been much more cost-effective than originally anticipated, with US$20 million being re-allocated towards the emergency efforts, the project achieved nevertheless larger outputs in terms of PSE's trained and in terms of experts recruited. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: The University of Asmara provided comments on the preliminary draft Report and these have been taken into account in the revised draft ICR. No further comments were received from the Borrower on the final ICR. (b) Cofinanciers: There were no cofinanciers in HRDP, although the project benefitted from UNDP support for the pilot. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): 10. Additional Information - 19 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate 1. Increase in total enrollment at all levels of Between AY 1998/1999 and AY 2001/2002: education by end of project (i) Elementary: Level: 20% (ii) Middle Level: 17% (iii) Secondary: 32% (iv) Teacher Training Institute: 40% (v) Tech. & vocational (all levels): 49% 2. Increase in new teachers trained by end of Between AY 1998/1999 and AY 2001/2002: project 40% 3. Increase in the number of students Between AY 1997/1998 and AY 2002/2003 educated in Asmara at University level for degree programs: 45% 4. National/Sectoral policy development - MOA: Expansion of national agricultural programs improved and operational research center in Hal-Hale - MoPW: Development of policies related to setting standards and norms for infrastructure development - MoT: development of classification systems and strategies for hotel and tourism industry - MoLHW: policy development and research related to social welfare programs - MoLG: technical designs for infrastructure development and housing in Maekel zoba - MOH: increase in general practitioners/other specialized health personnel; strengthen health programs (epidemiology, monitoring of HIV/AIDS); and support to setting up production system of pharmaceutical unit - MoTI: strengthen quality control and management standards and guidelines, design and/or upgrading of computerized systems for licensing, registration, and collection of external trade statistics - MoE: increase teaching personnel for secondary education and technical/vocational education & training - MoFI: development of quality and safety assurance manuals, training programs, laboratory and testing procedures consistent with international standards - CPA: support to ongoing CPA review and civil service reform process - NM: carry out field work and archeological excavations, including related training of nationals - 20 - - UA: Expansion of faculty and academic programs 5. Training programs better reflect previously UA: One-year certificate programs tailored to identified needs address specific requirements of core line ministries; upgrading of diploma programs to degree programs (Faculty of Engineering, Faculty of Education, Political Science, Anthropology/Archaeology; Sociology-Social Work; History, Journalism and Mass Communication, Computer Science) - MOE: Strengthening of educational services delivery secondary education and technical/vocational education levels - MOT: Training on various modules in support of hotel/tourism industry - MOTI: Training in the collection of price information - MOFI: Training programs developed for national fish-inspection and quality control - NM: training on management and preservation of cultural assets 6. Increase in ratio of local experts/foreign Data not available consultants in charge of research 7. Regulatory framework for each sector - MOFI: updating/implementation of national improved fisheries regulations for fish products processed in establishments-on-land and in factory vessels, aquaculture products/residue monitoring, surveillance and control - MoLHW: drafting of regulatory framework in areas dealing with pension, "sex-trade", orphans - 21 - All PSRs did not include information on progress with indicators. AY = Academic Year Output Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate Number of international experts recruited and Target of 640 by Mid-Term. (This included Total of 352 expatriates and 320 national in service in Asmara international and national experts) experts recruited Number of students being trained in Target of 650-791 by Mid-Term Total of 674 students enrolled, of which 178 universities abroad students completed and returned by project closing Number of HRD unit staff trained on M/E Target of 50 by Mid-Term 50 Number of Training needs assessment Target of 18 by Mid-Term 17 (excludes Ministry of Defense) produced M/E system in place by end of year two end of year two and three, albeit of varying quality and application Students trained internally Target of 1200 by Mid-Term Total of 1696 studies enrolled in UA for first degree (505); certificate (1073); and diploma (118). Total of 988 students completed by project closing, comprising first degree (44); certificate (927); and diploma (17) Total of 889 enrolled in distance learning, of which 273 students passed (Semester II, 2003) ToR for each policy, regulatory, and research Data not available and development unit to be upgraded by the completion of 3rd year of implementation 90% of trained Eritreans to have replaced About 30% of Eritreans trained abroad foreign experts in 16 ministries by project reported to have replaced foreign experts in completion at least 5 core ministries, including in UA. 160 foreign teachers in place by completion By 12/2000, 132 foreign teachers recruited to of 3rd year of implementation. MoE, and 59 (professors) recruited to UA 90% of trained Eritreans to have replaced Most foreign teachers recruited to MoE have teachers by the date of project completion. been retained beyond the project life due to expansion of schooling system 110 foreign professors in place in UA by By 2000, 59 foreign experts recruited to UA; completion of 3rd year of implementation by 2002, increased to 71 experts. New discipline in Health Sciences New programs and colleges established for (Pharmacy, Medicine, Dentistry), Engineering Faculty of Law, Colleges of Engineering, (Electrical, Civil, Mechanical, Chemical, Education, and Health Sciences. Architecture), Education (Secondary-Level teachers, supervisors, school administrators) to be available to students by date of project completion. A database established in UA/HRD units Data base in UA and most HRD units level by completion of second year of established later in implementation phase implementation. and of varying quality. Timely submission of Annual Work Program Annual work programs and budgets and Budget submitted throughout implementation period. 1End of project The last PSR did not include data for end of project. Data under column "Projected in last PSR" reflects targets by Mid-Term. - 22 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Component US$ million US$ million 1. Recruitment of Foreign Experts 45.96 25.40 55 2. Training of Eritrean Nationals 13.48 18.23 135 3. Institutional Strengthening and Project Administration 0.59 0.24 41 4. HRD Emergency Program 0.00 21.29 Total Baseline Cost 60.03 65.16 Physical Contingencies 0.00 Price Contingencies 6.00 Total Project Costs 66.03 65.16 Total Financing Required 66.03 65.16 Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 0.00 0.35 0.08 0.00 0.43 (0.00) (0.35) (0.08) (0.00) (0.43) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 51.30 0.00 51.30 Experts, Technical (0.00) (0.00) (38.40) (0.00) (38.40) Assistance and Studies 4. External Training 0.00 0.00 14.00 0.00 14.00 (0.00) (0.00) (14.00) (0.00) (14.00) 5. Operating Costs 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.30 (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.20) Total 0.00 0.35 65.68 0.00 66.03 (0.00) (0.35) (52.68) (0.00) (53.03) - 23 - Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) () (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 0.00 0.00 22.30 0.00 22.30 (0.00) (0.00) (20.17) (0.00) (20.17) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 14.31 10.15 24.46 Experts, Technical (0.00) (0.00) (14.31) (0.00) (14.31) Assistance and Studies 4. External Training 0.00 0.00 16.35 1.88 18.23 (0.00) (0.00) (16.35) (0.00) (16.35) 5. Operating Costs 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.04) Total 0.00 0.00 53.13 12.03 65.16 (0.00) (0.00) (50.87) (0.00) (50.87) 1/Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies. 2/Includes goods to be procured through international and national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs. For emergency reconstruction component, ICM, force account for tractor services, shopping procedures were utilized. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. Recruitment of Foreign 38.40 12.90 0.00 14.30 11.10 37.2 86.0 0.0 Experts Training for Eritrean 14.00 0.00 0.00 16.35 1.88 116.8 0.0 0.0 Nationals Institutional Strengthening 0.63 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.11 20.6 110.0 0.0 and Project Administration HRD Emergency Program 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.09 1.20 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 24 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits The HRDP used a cost-quality principle that has proven an important factor in achieving the outputs of the project. The search for good quality education at a reasonable cost opened up venues for extending the learning opportunities to South Africa and a broader orientation towards training through internal scholarships and distance learning. The search for good quality experts at a reasonable cost was most successful for the MoE and the UA, but more difficult in fields where the incentive package offered was not considered competitive enough (e.g. engineering, health, etc.). The HRDP also used a cost-effectiveness principle, and the project has been more cost-effective than originally anticipated, with US$20 million being re-allocated towards the emergency efforts, the project achieved nevertheless larger outputs in terms of PSE's trained and in terms of Experts recruited. Component 1: Recruitment of foreign experts. Two aspects must be considered in a cost-benefit analysis of the expert component. First, the number of foreign experts was downscaled from the original 500 projected to 320 at mid-term review, and finally 352 experts were actually recruited from abroad. This downscaling was combined with a reduction in total allocation to the component, from US$38.4 million at appraisal to US$12.47 million after mid-term review. The initial cost estimate was thus 38.4million /500, or US$76,800 per expert. Second, however, the mid-term review also introduced a second group of national experts to be recruited, responding both to lower than expected supply of expatriates, and to new supply of Eritreans deported from Ethiopia due to the conflict, or returning from refugee status in Sudan. This group amounted to 320 individuals and were paid much lower salaries. Of the total revised allocation of US$12.47 to this component, US$2.2 million was earmarked to finance the 320 national experts. During implementation, the total amount of US$14.30 million was disbursed towards the recruitment of 352 foreign experts, at an average cost of US$34,375 per expert, and 320 national experts, at an average cost of US$6,875 per expert. While the recruitment of the latter category of experts may have been of lower level of expertise among some, a total of US$14.30 million was disbursed, bringing the average unit cost of experts at US$21,280, 77% lower than originally envisaged. Component 2: Training of Eritrean Students. A total of 674 students were enrolled in various degree programs at foreign universities. Of these, 178 (26%) students have completed their degrees and have returned to Eritrea, 354 (50%) are still pursuing their studies abroad, and 142 (21%) did not complete, (due to failure or abscondment). Of those students still pursuing their studies, about 354 students are expected to complete by December 2004; the financing of their degree program completion have been carried both by the training budget under HRDP, and under extra allocations from the Education Sector Improvement Project (ESIP). With more than 50% of students still in training abroad, it is difficult to make an exact estimate of costs and benefits of investments in training abroad at this time. The project also financed the domestic training. Of the total 1696 students enrolled in UA, 988 (58%) have completed and 396 (20%) are still pursuing their first degree programs. For distance learning, 273 PSEs with the majority (90%) pursuing BA-level programs, have passed their training modules by the second semester of academic year 2003. In 2004, 21 PSEs enrolled in the MA-level programs are continuing their studies with allocations from EESIP. Training of PSEs at BA level has been reportedly discontinued, due to lack of funding. The table below provides data on actual and projected success rates. Assuming a 78% success rate among degree students abroad, 532 will complete their degree program. For the certificate and diploma training, a total of 1367 students are expected to complete, an average success rate of 86%. At project closing, 178 students had completed their degrees abroad, 988 their degree and non-degree programs at UA, and 273 their distance learning programs. Counting only the completed for all types of training abroad and - 25 - internally, and excluding Distance Learning, the number of total trainees amounts to 1,166. With the total amount disbursed under the training component of US$16.35 million, this gives an average cost per trainee of US$14,022. This average unit cost would in fact be further reduced by about 23% if resources disbursed for Distance Learning are taken into account. Degree Total Students % success Students still Total students Total % Students completed/returned rate by pursuing completing success rate initially by project closing project studies their programs (estimate) enrolled closing ABROAD 674 178 30% 224 (by 532 78% 12/04) 130 (enrolled on their own) INTERNAL -Degree 505 44 9% 396 440 80% -Certificate 1073 927 90% - 927 90% -Diploma 118 17 10% - 17 10% TOTAL 2,370 1,166 49% 750 1,916 80% Projecting future trainees based on the success rates above will give a total of 1,916 students completing training abroad and programs at UA. The average cost per trainee thus amounts to US$8,533. The estimate at appraisal was 500 students at a total cost of $14 million. This would have been at an average cost of $28,000, for degree students only. While the decreased cost estimation must take into account the low-cost types of training that were introduced at MTR, this introduction was also based on a more realistic assessment of prior credentials and qualifications among potential trainees, including utilizing academic programs available at UA, and thus a more relevant training framework. - 26 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation June 30-July 5, 3 Social Scientist (1); Economist 1997 (1); Sector Manager (1) September 8-12, 1 Social Scientist (1) 1997 Appraisal/Negotiation October 15-17, 5 Social Scientist (1); 1997 Economist (1); Senior Counsel (1); Senior Disbursement Officer (1); Senior Staff Assistant (1) Supervision 1/18-23/1999 3 Social Scientist/Task S HS Manager (1); Economist (1); Sr. Education Specialist (1) 5/29-6/17/1999 2 Social Scientist/TTL (1); Team U S Technologies (1) 1/14-21/2000 1 Social Scientist/TTL (1) U S 10/1-7/2000 1 Sr. Social Protection Specialist U S (1) 1/8-15/ 2001 3 Social Scientist/TTL (1); Sr. U S Social Protection Specialist (1); Lead Specialist AFTQK (1) 6/18-30/2002 1 Sr. Social Protection Specialist S S (1) 10/21-27/2002 2 Sr. Social Proteciton S S Specialist/TTL (1), Operations Officer (1) 3/5-14/2003 2 Sr. Social Protection S S Specialist/TTL (1); Operations Officer (1) 12/8-18/2003 2 Sr. Social Protection S U Specialist/TTL (1); Operations Officer (1) ICR April 19-30, 2004 2 ICR Task Team Leader (1); S S Operations Officer (1) The ICR's DO rating is subject to verification by an OED audit recommended to be undertaken in FY07 (b) Staff: - 27 - Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 56.60 84.90 Appraisal/Negotiation 116.50 132.30 Supervision 111.00 351.58 ICR 10.0 32.47 Total 294.1 601.25 Corresonding budget used for "Identification/Preparation" are no longer available in the system; US$ amount estimated at 1,500 per sw. - 28 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA - 29 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU - 30 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Annual Report Project Coordination Unit 1998 Annual Work Plan and Budget Year 1, December 1997(not confirmed) Annual Work Plan and Budget Year 2, December 1998 Annual Work Plan and Budget Year 3, December 1999 Annual Work Plan and Budget Year 4, December 2000 Annual Work Plan and Budget Year 5, December 2001 Annual Work Plan and Budget Year 6, December 2002 Consultation between Project Management and Project Beneficiaries in December 1999 and January 2000, Memo Consultations Conducted at the Level of the Director Generals and Directors of the Beneficiary Ministries, Minutes, December 29, 2000 and January 3, 2001 Development Credit Agreement (Human Resource Development Project) between the State of Eritrea and International Development Association, February 10, 1998 Draft Progress Report Eritrea Human Resources Development Project, Project Monitoring Mission May 29-June 15, Wim Alberts and Sergio Jellinek, June 15, 1999 Draft Proposal for Restructuring, October 2000 Evaluation Phase II: Progress report on Eritrean postgraduate students, with reference to the August 2001- August 2002 intake by South African Universities, Prof. Philip Black, September 2003 Evaluation Report of Human Resource Development Project (HRDP), University of Asmara, Michael Beyene DEVECON Consulting, December 2000 HRD Emergency Program, Credit No. 3033B Implementation Report on Reallocated Credit in the Amount of USD $20 million to the State of Eritrea Human Resource Needs Assessment Proposal, Ministry of Trade and Industry, August 1998 Implementation Plan of the Eritrean Human Resource Development Project OED Study on the World Bank's Experience in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Eritrea Case Study, Draft: August 1997 Opinions and Inputs towards Project Restructuring ­ Consultations Conducted with HRD Unit Heads and the Technical Committee, Minutes, December 2000 - 31 - Project Appraisal Document Eritrea Human Resource Development Project, Report No. 17001, December 10, 1997 Project Concept Document Eritrea Human Resources Development Project, July 12, 1997 Project Information Document for the Eritrea Capacity Building Project, July 1997 Project Performance Monitoring Report (PPMRR) Monitoring Data Sheets, June 1999 Proposed Amendments to the Credit Agreement, from The President, June 2000 Second Projects Coordinating Committee Forum Summary Proceedings, April 1999 Self Evaluation by the PCU, 2000 Terminal Report and Exit Strategy, December 2003 and comments from the World Bank on Terminal Report and Exit Strategy, March 2004 Training Needs Assessment of the Project Coordination Unit, USAID/PCU, October 2000 - 32 - Additional Annex 8. Borrower's Evaluation STATE OF ERITREA BORROWER'S EVALUATION OF THE ERITREA HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT I. PERPSECTIVE. The Eritrean Human Resource Development (EHRD) project constitutes a major articulation of the Eritrean Government's generalized human resource development endeavours. Its overarching goal, at the time of the project's inception, was to upgrade and enhance the skill base and quality of human resource of the nation's civil service sector. Starting from scratch in 1998, with a team whose most members were "recent" University of Asmara (UA) graduates, the EHRD project had to face a rather steep learning curve, a disruptive war, drastic reduction in original fund allocation, and subsequent mid-course mission realignment. In spite of these operational challenges and unanticipated difficulties that the task environment presented, with a track record of frugal and smart management and strategic alliances with premier institutions of higher learning in South Africa, the accomplishments of the EHRD program are far and above initial plan targets. Close to 2,400 public sector employees had the opportunity to have access to higher level training abroad and internally. The EHRD project ended up benefiting more than 30 governmental organizations and public enterprises. Utilizing project funds, a series of new training programs were initiated and articulated. Equally, significant impacts were accomplished and institutionalized in the policy, regulatory and standardization domains. This evaluative report is an attempt at substantive documentation of the execution, track record, outputs and national and sectoral impacts of the EHRD project, and lessons learned, in the 1998-2003 period. II. PROJECT COMPONENTS AND OBJECTIVES. The EHRD project is/was comprised of three core components: (1) Staff Training; (2) Staff Recruitment; and (3) Institutional Strengthening. Equally, the project started off with the following three primary objectives: Staff Training. Train 70 Eritreans at the BA/BSc level, 350 at the Masters, and 80 at the PhD level. Per the revised action plan (January 2000), with fund allotments reduced by 40%, about 150-200 candidates were to be placed abroad by July 2001 and another batch of 300-350 by January 2002. Two other dimensions of the revised staff-training objective were in-country training at the nation's flagship institution, and distance learning in collaboration with UNISA. Staff Recruitment. Recruit 500 foreign experts and place them at sixteen line ministries, the UA, and the Ministry of Education's teacher training institutes and vocational schools. Subsequent to the revision and realignment of project objectives and direction, the expatriate recruitment figure was reduced to 300-320. Institutional Strengthening. Enhance the institutional capacity of the UA and build the capabilities of the line ministries' HRD units and the EHRD unit. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTPUTS. The EHRD project commenced its activities in February 1998. Be that as it may, no formal implementation of project activates could take place in that year as it was for the most part dedicated to consolidating the EHRD management team and for the line ministries conducting needs assessment operations. It needs to be emphasized at this juncture that project - 33 - activities were drastically impacted by the war that started in May 1998 and whose consequences manifested themselves in several ways: (1) Potential candidates for training from the line ministries and other public entities had to go to the war fronts, (2) Personnel in the HRD units were to some degree similarly affected, and (3) Recruiting, and retaining, foreign experts became a challenge. Following the war, project objectives had to be realigned and adjusted and project funds reduced to the 60% level of the original amount. Among the added revised objectives were the inclusion of the domestic component to the training program--in-service and job-specific short-term programs, certificate, diploma and degree, and distance learning--and the gainful employment of Eritrea deportees and returnees from the Sudan. External Training. In the 1999-2003 period, EHRD placed 674 Eritrean public sector employees at thirty universities and technikons in eleven countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Approximately 90% (some 598) ended up enrolling at South African universities and technikons. Table 1 displays enrollment by degree programs. Approximately 80% are/were enrolled in second-degree programs. The trainees came from no less than 29 public sector entities and public enterprises. Table 1: Enrollment of 1999-2003 EHRD Trainees by Degree Type Degree Type Enrollment B. Tech/BA/BSc. 133 LLM/MA/MSc. 533 MD/Ph.D. 8 Total 674 For more detailed scrutiny of data pertaining to external training, a closer examination of Table 2 and Table 3 is suggested. Other than the degree programs cited in the foregoing, twenty-one employees of the Ministry of Fisheries were in 1998 placed in Tanzania to attend a short-term training program. - 34 - Table 2: EHRD Trainee Enrollment by Public Entity by Program/Institution: 1999-2003 No. Of Students Placed B.Tech/ BA MA/MSc/ LLM PhD./MD Total SN University/ Technikon 1. Cape Technikon 26 2 - 28 2. MEDUNSA 14 3 17 3. Durban Inst. Of Technology 2 - - 2 4. Natal Technikon 15 - - 15 5. Peninsula Technikon 19 - - 19 6. University of Cape Town - 30 - 30 7. University of Durban Westville 3 3 - 6 8. University of Free State - 108 - 108 9. University of Natal 9 115 1 125 10. University of Pretoria - 74 2 76 11. University of Rhodes 3 2 - 5 12. University of Stellenbosch - 78 - 78 13. University of Western Cape - 42 1 43 14. University of WITS 3 34 - 37 15. WITS Technikon 9 - - 9 16. University of Delhi, India - 17 - 17 17. National Law School of India University - 6 - 6 18. Andra University, India - 5 - 5 19. Indian Agricultural Research Institute - 1 - 1 20. G.B. University of Agriculture & Technology - 1 - 1 21. Central Institute of Fisheries Education India - 2 - 2 22. Assumption University, Thailand - 4 - 4 23. Thai CERTC Consortium - 1 - 1 24. University of the Philippines - - 1 1 25. University of Zimbabwe 24 2 - 26 26. University of Botswana 6 - - 6 27. University of Kenya - 2 - 2 28. European Universities - 4 - 4 Total 133 533 8 674 - 35 - Table 3: EHRD Trainee Enrollment by Public Entity by Program: 1999-2003 Enrollment Ministry/Institution SN B.Tech/ BA MA/MSc/ LLM PhD./MD Total 1. Audiovisual 1 0 - 1 2. Audit Service Corporation - 1 - 1 3. Auditor General - 17 - 17 4. Bank of Eritrea - 3 - 3 5. Barca Canneries - 1 - 1 6. Eritrean Salt Works - 1 - 1 7. ERREC - 4 - 4 8. EWDFA - 1 - 1 9. Immigration Office - 1 - 1 10. Min. of Agriculture 7 66 73 11. Min. of Defense - 16 1 17 12. Min. of Education 16 41 - 57 13. Min. of Energy & Mines - 5 - 5 14. Min. of Finance 12 49 - 61 15. Min. of Fisheries - 30 - 30 16. Min. of Foreign Affairs - 5 - 5 17. Min. of Health 25 9 4 38 18. Min. of Information 7 11 - 18 19. Min. of Justice - 14 - 14 20. Min. of Labour & Human Welfare - 12 - 12 21. Min. of Land, Water, & Environment 3 26 - 29 22. Min. of Local Government 3 14 - 17 23. Min. of Tourism 6 7 - 13 24. Min. of Trade & Industry 2 24 1 27 25. Min. of Transport & Communications 4 15 - 19 26. Ministry of Public Works 8 1 - 9 27. NICE - 2 - 2 28. NUEW - 1 - 1 29. NUEYS - 3 - 3 30. Office of the President - 2 - 2 31. Released From the Min. of Defense - 60 - 60 32. University of Asmara 36 91 2 129 33. Unspecified Ministries 3 0 - 3 Total 133 533 8 674 Domestic Training. In the 2000-03 period, 1696 public sector employees had access to the domestic version of the EHRD training program. Some 505 (29.8%) were enrolled in UA degree programs, 118 (7.0) in diploma and 1073 (63.4%) in certificate programs. As data contained in Table 4 demonstrate, 28 public sector entities participated in the program. Related domestic training programs that EHRD sponsored worth mentioning, including customized in-service modules, include: Veterinary Assistant; English Language Skills; Social Work; Human Resources; Legal/Paralegal; Log-frame Workshop; Project Management; Materials Management. - 36 - Table 4. Table: Internal Scholarship Enrollment by Public Entity by Program: Academic Years 2000-2003 Enrollment Public Entity Degree Diploma Certificate Total Auditor General 3 - - 3 Bank of Eritrea - - 1 1 Commercial Bank of Eritrea 7 - - 7 Eritrean Refugees & Rehabilitation Commission 12 - 15 27 Eritrean War Disabled Fighters Association 7 1 8 16 Housing and Commercial Bank 1 - - 1 Min. of Agriculture 24 20 16 60 Min. of Defense 210 56 591 857 Min. of Education 42 7 20 69 Min. of Energy and Mines 2 - 8 10 Min. of Finance 11 3 34 48 Min. of Fisheries 3 - 6 9 Min. of Foreign Affairs 5 - 25 30 Min. of Health 45 - 29 74 Min. of Information - - 5 5 Min. of Justice 8 - 24 32 Min. of Labor & Human Welfare 17 - 17 Min. of Land, Water, & Environment 7 1 6 14 Min. of Local Government 38 9 83 130 Min. of Public Works 2 1 8 11 Min. of Tourism 3 - 4 7 Min. of Trade & Industry 7 4 12 23 Min. of Transport & Communications 13 5 20 38 National Union of Eritrean Women - - 1 1 National Union of Eritrean Youth & Students 2 - 3 5 National Insurance Corporation of Eritrea 1 - - 1 Office of the President 33 11 137 181 University of Asmara 2 - 17 19 Total 505 118 1073 1696 Distance Education. A total of 889 trainees from some 34 public sector entities were originally enrolled in 44 areas of specializations of the UNISA program. The attrition rate was quite high as the table below shows. While 213 (24.0%) failed another 276 (31%) had to withdraw before completing their respective training modules. The main beneficiaries of the UNISA program are/were the Ministries of Education and Defense who together account for 53% of participants followed by the Ministry of Local Government. Table 5: Status of UNISA Enrollees Status Number Passed 358 Failed 213 Withdrew 276 Other 42 Total 889 Expatriate Staff Recruitment. At the peak of the foreign experts recruitment period, in 2002, a total of 352 expatriate staff were working at fourteen governmental organizations. While 59% of these recruits worked for the Ministry of Education, the UA accounted for another 20%. Per the project document, the target beneficiary entities were designated to be the Ministry of Education and the UA. As the recruitment data abundantly demonstrate, these two entities accounted for approximately 80% of the expatriate staff. An examination of Table 6 is suggested. Furthermore, by offering 320 deportees and returnees from the Sudan with employment opportunities, the EHRD project was able to address a pressing social situation (during the period when the deportees/returnees had to be absorbed/settled) and contribute to the effectiveness of the 18 organizations where they are/were gainfully employed. - 37 - Table 6: Expatriate Recruits by Public Entity Public Entity Recruits 1. University of Asmara 71 2. Ministry of Education 206 3. Ministry of Local Government 7 4. Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare 3 5. Ministry of Land, Water and Environment 3 6. Ministry of Agriculture 22 7. Ministry of Fisheries 4 8. Ministry of Information 2 9. Ministry of Tourism 3 10. Ministry of Trade and Industry 6 11. Ministry of Public Works 12 12. Ministry of Health 11 13. Office of the President 1 14. Conf. Of Eritrean Workers 1 Total 352 IV. PROJECT OUTCOMES. Starting from scratch in February 1998, with a team whose most members were "recent" University of Asmara (UA) graduates, and with an overarching goal to contribute to the transformation of the productive and human resources capacity of the nation's public sector entities, the EHRD project had to face a rather steep learning curve, a disruptive war, drastic reduction in original fund allocation, and a subsequent mid-course mission realignment. In spite of these operational challenges, with a track record of frugal and smart management and strategic alliances with premier institutions of higher learning in South Africa, the accomplishments of the EHRD project could be described as far and above initial plan targets. Quantitative and qualitative indices will be employed in the succeeding pages to examine and document the accomplishments and outcomes of the project and lessons learned. External Staff Training. By the time the project was phased out in July 2003, close to 700 public sector employees from 28 governmental entities had been placed at 30 tertiary institutions in eleven countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Presently, approximately a quarter of those placed abroad are persisting in their studies and expected to get done by November 2004. Most of them are undergraduate trainees. About 20%, who should have been back here last November 2003, are enrolled "on their own". Some of the latter are being sponsored by respective South African institutions while the rest are apparently covering their own training and related expenses. Provided those scheduled to complete by June 2004 return, including those who are already back here, more than a third of all trainees placed abroad would have joined/rejoined the nation's work force. Conversely, close to 20% are unfortunately categorized as absconders. Their loss is a serious brain drain and significant financial loss that the nation could hardly afford. An examination of Table 7 is suggested. As of April 2004, 178 EHRD trainees completed their programs and are back in Eritrea. While approximately 91% are Masters-degree holders, 7.7% are honours degree holders, and the rest, 1.6%, are terminal or MD degree holders. The bulk of the completers, more than 75%, are graduates of South African institutions. - 38 - Table 7: Status of EHRD Trainees Abroad (1999-2003) Status Number Enrolled 172 Enrolled on their own 130 (sponsored by their respective University in South Africa.) Completed 178 Scheduled to Complete 52 Incomplete 11 Absconded 131 Total 674 As summarized by Table 8, these completers are presently deployed in, and providing productive services to, no less than 23 public sector entities and one public enterprise. The main beneficiaries of the completers' services are the Ministry of Education (17.4%), the University of Asmara (16.3%), the Ministry of Agriculture (14.0%), and the Ministry of Finance (8.4%). While it is rather early to talk about the impact of the services of these trainees on the 24 public sector entities where they are placed, we can confidently state that these institutions' skill and human resources bases have been improved--in some cases quite significantly. Indeed, the Ministries of Agriculture and Trade and Industry have for the most part been able to replace virtually all their foreign experts. Table 8: EHRD Trainees Who Completed/Returned by Public Entity & by Program SN Public Entity B.Tech/ BA MA/MSc/ LLM Ph. D./MD Total 1. Ministry of Agriculture - 23 23 2. Ministry of Defense - 8 1 9 3. Ministry of Education - 31 31 4. Ministry of Energy & Mines - 2 2 5. Ministry of Finance - 15 15 6. Ministry of Fisheries - 8 8 7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs - 2 2 8. Ministry of Health 4 1 5 9. Ministry of Information 1 4 5 10. Ministry of Justice - 6 6 11. Ministry of Labour & Human Welfare - 5 5 12. Ministry of Land, Water & E. 1 8 9 13. Ministry of Local Government 2 1 3 14. Ministry of Public Works 1 - 1 15 Ministry of National Development - 1 1 16 National Union of Eritrean Youth & Students - 1 1 17 Ministry of Trade & Industry - 6 6 18 Ministry of Transport & Communications - 4 4 19 Ministry of Tourism 1 1 20 Central Personnel Administration - 1 1 21 Office of the President 1 1 2 22 University of Asmara 4 24 1 29 24 National Insurance Corporation 2 2 25 Returned Yet To Be Assigned 1 6 7 Total 11 164 3 178 A cogent summary with respect to the external training component is contained in Table 9 below. Among the seven broad discipline domains that external trainees have been specializing in, the area of business and economics accounts for approximately a third of enrolments, followed by agricultural sciences (18%) and natural sciences (16%). Comparatively, among completers, this same pattern seems to hold true. - 39 - Table 9. Actual Placement and Completers of EHRD External Training Programs by Program/Area of Specialization BA/BSc./B.Tech MA/MSc./LLM PhD./MD Total Areas of Actual Completed Actual Completed Actual Completed Actual Completed Specialization Placement & Returned Placement & Returned Placement & Returned Placement & Returned Agricultural Sciences 8 - 110 31 - - 118 31 Business & Economics 20 3 200 55 1 - 221 58 Education 0 - 36 26 - - 36 26 Engineering Sciences 42 3 13 4 - - 55 7 Health Sciences 33 2 12 8 5 2 50 12 Natural Sciences 15 3 95 25 1 1 111 29 Social Sciences 15 - 67 15 1 - 83 15 Total 133 11 533 164 8 3 674 178 A rather pleasant by product of the external training program has been the research works and research outputs of the graduate-level trainees (regardless of where they were placed). EHRD has to date been able to process/approve no less than 160 dissertation research projects. Per EHRD management policy and regulation, with a few exceptions, all the dissertation works dealt with topics that are pertinent to the nation in general and the entity of the trainees' affiliation in particular. It would be fair to say that, in addition to upgrading the conceptual, analytical and research skills of the individual trainees, the external training programs have significantly contributed to upgrading the knowledge and information/document base of the nation also. It is important to note that the fact that most (if not all) of the research works were done here enabled EHRD management to adhere to a cost effective formula as trainees were made to follow a rather strict budget regime. The attached appendix contains a list of dissertation research topics and the tools administered to monitor and control the cost and quality of research efforts. Domestic Staff Training. As a direct outcome of the revised project objectives, close to 1700 public sector employees ended up enrolling at the UA. Twenty-eight entities were able to benefit from this version of the staff-training component. More than half of the participants are/were from the Ministry of Defense many, if not most, of whom are presumed to be veteran fighters. Most participants were enrolled in the certificate program (63.2%), while enrollments in the degree and diploma programs were respectively 30% and 7%. While the trainees had individually the opportunity to upgrade their intellectual and analytical skills and credentials, they also significantly contributed (or are about to) to the beneficiary institutions' skilled workforce and human resources bases. Table 10 contains domestic training completers data, by program, that indicate that close to 1,000 civil service employees had their skills upgraded and the human resource bases of the concerned entities appreciably improved. Furthermore, Table 11 displays completer data by beneficiary entity and by program. Table 10: EHRD Domestic Training Completers by Program Type (2000-2003) Program Number Certificate 927 Diploma 17 Degree 44 Total 988 - 40 - Table 11. EHRD Domestic Training Completers by Program/Institution: 2000-2003 Ministry/Institution Graduates Degree Diploma Certificate Total Auditor General 1 - - 1 Bank of Eritrea - - 1 1 Commercial Bank of Eritrea 3 - - 3 Eritrean Refugees & Rehabilitation - 13 Commission - 13 Eritrean War Disabled Fighters Association - - 6 6 Housing and Commerce Bank - - - - Min. of Agriculture 2 - 13 15 Min. of Defense 26 10 518 554 Min. of Education 7 - 17 24 Min. of Energy & Mines - - 7 7 Min. of Finance - 1 25 26 Min. of Fisheries - - 6 6 Min. of Foreign Affairs - - 21 21 Min. of Health 2 - 28 30 Min. of Information - - 5 5 Min. of Justice - - 21 21 Min. of Labour & Human Welfare - - - - Min. of Land, Water, & Environment - 1 6 7 Min. of Local Government - 3 72 75 Min. of Public Works 1 - 4 5 Min. of Tourism - - 4 4 Min. of Trade & Industry - 1 9 10 Min. of Transport & Communications 2 - 19 21 National Union of Eritrean Women - - 1 1 National Union of Eritrean Youth & Students - - 2 2 National Insurance Corporation of Eritrea - - - - Office of the President - 1 117 118 University of Asmara - - 12 12 Total 44 17 927 988 Conversely, the distance-learning (DL) program could hardly be described a success as the attrition rate has been prohibitively high. Indeed, for a number of reasons, the undergraduate part of the DL had recently to be abandoned and many of those in the graduate UNISA program are not in good academic standing either Staff Recruitment. The primary target beneficiary institutions, the Ministry of Education and the UA, ended up employing approximately 80% of the foreign experts. While recruiting high calibre expatriates and their retention was not made easy because of the war situation, those recruited were a significant addition to the latter organizations' skilled workforce and human resources bases. Then as now, it would be inconceivable to see the nation's secondary school system, the teacher training and vocational institutes, functioning without the input and services of the foreign instructors. Thus it could be said that access to the secondary school system was/is made possible as a direct outcome of the recruitment of the expatriates. Similarly, by employing as many as 70 instructors, the UA was able to boost its enrollment and record exponential growth in its academic program contents. UA degree programs in the Faculty of Engineering, College of Arts, College of Social Sciences and College of Health Sciences, and the Faculty of Law, are made possible because of the services of foreign experts. Along the same vain, the Ministry of Public Works would not have been able to play its leading role in the reconstruction campaign without the services of its dedicated and skilled foreign recruits. Employment of Deportees/Returnees. As an outcome of the restructured project activities and objectives, about 320 deportees and returnees from the Sudan ended up working at eighteen governmental institutions. The absorption and settlement of these individuals was thus made possible because of the EHRD project. - 41 - The Ministry of Education's share was in the range of approximately 61% (196) followed by the Ministry of Agriculture (27), Ministry of Health (25) and the University of Asmara (21). Institutional Strengthening. As attested by the productive track record in the staff training and staff recruitment domains, an effective EHRD management team was established. The series of customized training programs that EHRD sponsored and organized have resulted in the creation and strengthening of HRD units at many, if not all, the sixteen line ministries also. Conversely, the monitoring and evaluation tasks of the EHRD could not be said to have been carried out satisfactorily. Among all the public entities, the Ministry of Education and the University of Asmara had the most to gain from enhancing their institutional capacities. In the case of the UA, the academic linkages that have been cultivated with South Africa's premier higher education institutions have been instrumental in the development of the institution's about to commence graduate programs. V. FUND DISBURSEMENT. In the course of the 1998-2003 phase of the EHRD project, approximately $ 31.0 million were expended on the three core EHRD activities. Approximately 55% of funds were disbursed to cater to training costs, and about 44% were spent to cover foreign expert expenses. Less than one percent of fund resources were spent on the third component, namely institutional strengthening. It is to be noted that, except for the 24 PCs and some four printers and accessories, and office furniture pieces, no other procurement activities took place. The staff-training component was operationalized most effectively in the post-war period and accounted for the lion's share (60.1%) of expenditures in that specific phase of the project. As summarized by data in the table below, taking into account the almost $ 2.0 million that the project "lost" because of currency fluctuations, fund disbursement rate of almost 100% was attained by the time the funding life of the project came to an end--July 31, 2003. Of the total expenditures on training, approximately 38% was for the domestic component and the remaining 62% for the external one. Table 12. EHRD Expenditures by Project Component: 1998-2003 PROJECT YEAR YEAR YEAR YEAR YEAR YEAR COMPONENT 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 TOTAL Foreign Experts 7,004.31 733,894.13 2,540,414.02 4,797,347.30 3,716,961.13 1,907,764.71 13,703,385.60 Training 127,663.00 330,040.52 698,743.05 4,883,313.10 6,741,627.81 4,183,455.54 16,964,843.02 Institutional Strengthening 19,272.69 114,547.35 52,227.32 35,274.40 16,482.45 1,671.81 239,476.02 T O T A L 153,940.00 1,178,482.00 3,291,384.39 9,715,934.80 10,475,071.39 6,092,892.06 30,907,704.64 VI. PROJECT IMPACT. The EHRD project has had a truly national and wide ranging impact in the institutional, human resource and social domains of the nation. The institutional impacts are enumerated below. Ministry of Education. It would be inconceivable to see the nation's secondary school system and technical and vocational schools functioning--at a critical epoch in the nation's history when many instructors had to go to the war fronts--without the services of expatriates. Expansions and more access to these schools and institutes were made possible because of the employment of these experts. Attrition and matriculation rates also improved partly because of the impact of foreign experts. More teachers and vocational school graduates were produced. The Ministry's "tentative" attempt to engage some of the experts in activities - 42 - other than teaching could be said were not satisfactory. The University of Asmara. The breadth and depth of the University of Asmara's academic staff, academic program contents, enrollments, and academic linkage programs were significantly impacted. The institution's degree programs expanded from 28 to 42, graduate programs in twelve MA/MBA/MSc. degrees developed, access to the UA increased by almost a third, linkages with the UNISA program and with premier South African institutions established, and the UA had managed to place about 129 of its staff for training abroad because of the involvement and employment of foreign experts. Expansion of and improvements in the credentials and qualification of the instructional staff (see Table 13) and concomitant growth in the academic program contents of the institution had in the 1998-2003 period resulted in the granting of 1300 certificates, 946 diplomas and 3263 degrees in some 40 discipline domains. All in all, the UA had in the 1998-2003 period added 5449 skilled workers to the human resource base of the nation ( Table 14). The subsequent employment/re-employment of these graduates has ended up enriching the human resources bases and lent institutional effectiveness to many public and private entities' operations. An examination of degrees granted data in Table 15, along with the beneficiary public sector entities, shows that the nation's flagship institution has during the period cited done much to lend to the effectiveness of virtually all the line ministries of the Government of Eritrea. Again the entity that has benefited the most from the degrees produced is the Ministry of Education. TABLE 13: UNIVERSITY OF ASMARA FACULTY WITH PH.D DEGREES BY ACADEMIC YEAR Academic Year Ph.D. Holders 98-99 85 99-00 97 00-01 102 01-02 121 02-03 112 Expatriates earlier recruited under a different program retained using EHRD funds. In the range of 60-70 expatriates were employed, per academic year, during the period cited. Table 14: University of Asmara Graduates by Program Academic Year 1998-99 to 2002-03 Program Graduates Certificate 1,300 Diploma 946 Degree 3203 Total 5,449 - 43 - Table 15: Degrees Granted at the University of Asmara by College/Faculty & Year COLLEGE/FACULTY 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total SCIENCE 116 108 96 81 115 111 627 Beneficiary Entities BIOLOGY 24 26 17 13 22 29 131 MH/ME/MF CHEMISTRY 34 28 16 16 23 18 135 MH/ME/ME M GEOLOGY - 3 22 20 24 20 89 MEM/MPW MARINE SCIENCE - 14 6 15 14 13 62 MF MATHEMATICS 36 36 24 14 18 15 143 ME/NSO.ALL PHYSICS 22 15 17 16 14 16 100 ME/MEM/ALL HEALTH SCIENCES - - 28 19 59 49 155 CLINICAL LABORATORY - - - - 18 15 33 MH SCIENCE - MH PUBLIC HEALTH & - - 28 19 26 10 83 CLINICAL SCIENCES - - - - 15 24 39 MH PHARMACY ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES 59 115 97 177 132 147 727 ARCHAEOLOGY - - - 16 10 10 36 MT/MLG/UA ENGLISH 30 40 36 37 12 14 169 ME/ML ME/MLWE/MA/ML GEOGRAPHY - 6 26 16 18 16 82 ME/MT/UA/MFA HISTORY - 1 2 12 15 16 46 MI/ME/UA JOURNALISM & MASS - - 2 9 14 15 40 MFA/UA COMM. - - - 18 9 17 44 MSW/MLG/UA POLITICAL SCIENCE 2 32 2 18 14 12 80 NSO/UA SOCIOLOGY & - - 11 32 21 37 101 ANTHROPOLOGY STATISTICS & DEMOGRAPHY LAW 27 36 18 19 19 10 129 MJ/MLG/UA BUSINESS AND 99 253 102 80 65 105 704 ECONOMICS ACCOUNTING 41 89 35 26 18 41 250 MFI/BANKS/ALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 33 107 30 26 17 30 243 ALL ECONOMICS & FINANCE 25 57 37 22 26 21 188 MFI/BANKS/ALL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION - - - 6 8 13 27 MLG/ALL AGRICULTURE 51 76 50 44 48 70 339 ANIMAL SCIENCE - 20 14 13 21 27 95 MA/MH PLANT SCIENCE 25 26 17 15 13 28 124 MA/MLWE SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 26 16 13 16 14 15 100 MA/MPW/MLG/MLWE ENGINEERING FACULTY - - - 77 67 76 220 CIVIL ENGINEERING - - - 37 33 37 107 MPW/MLG MEM/MTC ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING - - - 21 18 31 70 MEM/MLG MECHANICAL ENGINEERING - - - 19 16 8 43 EDUCATION FACULTY - 2 5 93 130 201 431 EDUCATIONAL ADM. - - 1 14 15 21 51 ME EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY - 2 1 11 11 12 ME SCIENCE EDUCATION - 37 ME BIOLOGY - - - 12 19 27 58 - - 1 9 16 17 43 ME CHEMISTRY ME MATHEMATICS - - 1 10 12 17 40 ME PHYSICS - - 1 3 9 6 19 ME SOCIAL SCIENCE EDUCATION - - - - 10 14 26 50 ME ENGLISH ME GEOGRAPHY - - - 9 20 44 73 ME HISTORY - - - 13 14 31 58 ME Total 325 378 571 616 759 3203 554 The employment of senior foreign experts enabled the UA to upgrade diploma programs to degree granting ones. Cases in point are the Faculty of Engineering, Faculty of Education, Anthropology-Archeology, Sociology-Social Work, Political Science, History, Journalism and Mass Communication, and Computer Science. In light of their seniority and leadership track records, many of these expatriates serve/served in management posts--one is a dean while a few are department chairs. Graduates from these degree programs have found gainful employment and contributed to the effectiveness and productive capacities of the Ministries of Education, Public Works, Energy and Mines, Transport and Communication, Foreign - 44 - Affairs, Health, Labour and Social Welfare, Justice and Information. Over the last five years, the institution has added approximately 900 graduates to the nation's teaching-profession (Ministry of Education) workforce; virtually all the professional journalists and reporters at the Ministries of Information and degree holders at Justice and National Museum are UA products. With respect to completers, the UA has now no less than 35 MA/MSc. degree holders and one Ph.D. in mathematics (some are recent transfers from other Ministries) working in several academic and non-academic departments/areas. The employment of these EHRD training completers has resulted in the termination of the contracts of some expatriates (there are 52 expatriates now compared with 71 last year), the strengthening of some existing ones (for example Biology, Chemistry, Computer Science, Mathematics, Anthropology-Archaeology, Accounting, Library and Information Studies, Eritrean Language Studies, and Land Resources & Environment), and the initiation of the launching of one new degree program--marketing. Moreover, the improvement in the effectiveness and content of academic areas, along with the strategic alliances with premier South African higher education institutions, have been instrumental in the development of the about-to-start graduate programs in some 12 areas of concentration. National Museum. An entity (a constituent part of the UA) which is entrusted with the task of upkeep and maintenance of the nation's heritage and regulation of archeological/excavations sites/practices, the National Museum (NM) benefited from the affiliation of foreign experts (whose primary task was instruction at the University) with its operations. These experts led a number of fieldworks and excavations and trained future Eritrean archeologists. Many of these students now constitute core professionals at the NM. One EHRD trainee who earned his MA from the University of Witwatersrand, and specialized in cultural and heritage studies is now working as Head of Outreach & Training. Ministry of Public Works. Almost all of the 12 foreign experts recruited by the Ministry were senior with many years of experience. They constituted (and continue to do so) the most senior staff at that entity. They were key players in the reconstruction and infrastructural activities of the Ministry. Another major contribution of these experts is their active participation in standardizing and testing of building materials and certification/grading of contractors and their licensing. As their services are needed, most of these experts have been retained. One completer with a BSc. in civil engineering has joined the ranks of the organization. Comparatively, civil engineering graduates of the UA (who graduated after the upgrading of the diploma program to a degree one following the employment of foreign experts at the Faculty of Engineering) are working there. Ministry of Agriculture. Foreign experts enabled the Ministry to strengthening its research center and to engage in skills/knowledge transfer activities. As a significant number of its trainees are back at their posts--having upgraded their credentials, skills, and knowledge--most of the foreign experts have now been replaced. Ministry of Trade and Industry. While foreign experts were predominantly preoccupied with regular jobs, some of their time was dedicated to improving/changing the institutional culture, practice, document/data base, setting standards and compiling business profiles, and project and country profiles. Highlights of foreign-expert impacts are: (a) The Quality Management expert affiliated with the Eritrean Standards Institute developed Quality Management Manual specifically addressing the quality control aspect of industrial products. (b) He conducted a series of TQM training sessions. (c) The two chemical engineers prepared two proposals, Cement Factory establishment and Flour Mill establishment. They also prepared a series of "Small Scale" project profiles. (d) One of the experts assisted in upgrading and computerizing the External Trade Statistics of Eritrea. This capability has enabled the Trade Department of the Ministry to generate specific foreign country product profiles. Experts trained staff of the Department to collect price information by using the Internet. (e) Expert in the License Department designed a computerized system. - 45 - System in place has been institutionalized and is assisting the unit to issue, renew and/or cancel licenses; and registration and trade names. Finally, return of completers has enabled ministry to terminate all contracts of foreign experts. Ministries of Health. The 14 foreign experts were an important addition to the skill base of the Ministry and ended up filling a critical gap in the general practitioner and specialized fields. Some were assigned to remote areas of the nation (Assab and Gash Barka) and contributed to expanded access to the nation's healthcare system. Highlights of the impact of their affiliation with the Ministry include: (a) the nation's Central Health Lab in better shape due to the contributions of the microbiologist (who had to leave after 2.5 years of service); (b) the production expert affiliated with the pharmaceutical unit assisted in setting up production system and the production of drugs and supplies; (c) the neurosurgeon, the only on in the nation, saved many lives; (d) a dental surgeon was an important/great addition to the few dentists in the nation; and (e) many of the foreign experts served as members of medical boards, and editorial and other committees. Finally, one of the completers, an MD, is now occupying the post of Head of Epidemiology and Monitoring of HIV/AIDS. Ministry of Fisheries. Other than their regular duties and responsibilities, the four foreign experts were engaged in the following activities: (a) preparing Quality (Good Practices) Manual; (b) prepared Safety Assurance (Hazard Analysis Critical Point Control) Manual; (c) developed and implemented training programs for national fish-inspection and quality-control officers; quality managers, fish retailers and processors; (d) involved in updating and implementing the national fisheries regulations for fishery products being processed in establishments-on-land and in factory vessels, aquaculture products and aquaculture residue monitoring, surveillance and control; and (e) the microbiologist (foreign expert) developed lab procedures that live up to international standards; developed test procedures and trained lab staff. The ministry terminated all foreign-expert employment contracts as 8 of its employees who completed their training have rejoined its ranks. Ministry of Tourism. Foreign experts recruited by this Ministry were for the purpose of training/teaching in the Hotel and Tourism Training Center (front office operations, house keeping, food & beverage service, food preparation--culinary skills--hospitality, accounting and travel operations). Experts revamped the contents of the training program and Center is to be upgraded to diploma level once the UA's College of Business & Economics scrutinizes the curricular content drafted. A code of conduct/standard for Hotel & Motel professionals drafted by foreign experts and adopted as a national norm. Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. Its three recruits were policy and research experts. Experts assisted in drafting policy/regulation documents in areas dealing with pension, "sex trade", orphanage etc. They had served as mentors to junior staff and helped impart some of their skills. With respect to completers who have rejoined the entity, they are respectively working as Head of HRD, Head of Research, Head of Inspection, and as Experts in Employment and Social security. Central Personnel Agency. Two completers have rejoined the CPA and have been promoted (from their previous positions) to Head of Inspection and Head of Job Classification. They are actively engaged in the on-going CPA review and reform processes. Finally, the execution and subsequent operationalization of project activities, in a cost effective and result-oriented mode, made possible because of the establishment and functioning of an effective EHRD management team. The monitoring and evaluation impact of EHRD unit could be said was not effective. HRD units at line ministries created and were enabled to actively engage in human resource development activities. Moreover, it could be fairly argued that the impacts enumerated in the foregoing (item 2 above) - 46 - at least indirectly culminated in strengthening the beneficiary governmental entities. VII. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. The EHRD project was conceived and executed in a resource deficient and institutional constraining environment. An EHRD management team, whose lofty mission was to oversee a multi-million dollar project and juggle and manage complex objectives, had to be created from scratch. The coordination and maintenance of the involvement of diverse and dozens of public sector entities, whose institutional cultures and endowments drastically varied, was a challenging task. Major operational constraints that the EHRD project had to deal with and surmount include, but are not limited to, the following: War. The total war that the enemy unleashed had a disruptive impact on EHRD operations. Target beneficiary institutions had to release their employees, many candidates for the training programs, to join the war effort. The releasing of employees equally affected the HRD units that were in the process of being established. Those that remained on their jobs had to carry a workload that did not lend itself to the effective implementation of the UNISA program. Drastic Fund Reduction. The EHRD project had to deal with a reduced fund amount of 60% of initial levels. Recruitment. As the nation was declared a "no travel " area, recruiting, and retaining high caliber foreign experts was difficult. Institutional Culture. EHRD project target institutions had their own cultures, weaknesses and strengths, and their degree of involvement in EHRD operations varied. For the most part, institutional cultures did not lend themselves to the utilization of foreign experts' skills and knowledge to the "fullest" extent. Monitoring and Evaluation Capability. A better and more effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism both at the EHRD level and in South Africa would have been desirable. Distance Learning Mechanism. For the UNISA program to operate effectively, investing in the creation and functioning of a mentoring system was required. VIII. BORROWER'S EVALUATION OF THE BANK. The Bank staff was actively engaged in the operationalizations of the EHRD project. Staff members were accessible and accommodating and quite engaged in finalizing the action plan for the continuation of project activities beyond the July 2003 period. However, the transition to the new arrangement has not been the smoothest. Moreover, the financial implications of the fluctuations of the US dollar (that ended up "costing" the project about $ 2.0 million) came to the attention of EHRD management very late in the funding life of the project and did not help matters. IX. EXIT STRATEGY. Given the delays and disruptions that the project had to overcome for much of its implementation phase, and the enrollment of the bulk of the trainees a year or so before the expiration of the funding life of the same, it was a foregone conclusion that an extension of the activities was to be unavoidable. An exit strategy of sorts had to be deployed to cater to the trainees remaining abroad--virtually all at South African institutions of higher learning. An exit strategy and an action plan, which would not only ensure the integrity of project activities but also facilitate and promote the realization of the underlying objectives--specifically the human resource development objective--were ultimately adopted. The exit strategy's features are highlighted below: Termination of Expatriate Employment. With a few exceptions, virtually all foreign-expert contracts were terminated. Government entities whose need for continued use of the services of expatriates had justifiably been documented were by and large reluctantly allowed an extension until December 31, 2003. The Government of Eritrea assumed the salary cost for retaining foreign experts until December 2003. December 2004 Termination of EHRD Training. All trainees placed abroad are to get done with their - 47 - studies by December 2004 at the latest. This management decision was transmitted to all parties--most of all the trainees. Termination of Domestic Training Program. No new domestic training programs at the certificate/diploma level to be considered and all support to "present" enrollees at the UA terminated by July 2003. Securing Requisite Funds. In light of the looming financial obligations with respect to the training programs abroad, project management needed to workout an action plan that would secure the requisite funding. The Bank and relevant governmental institutions, along with EHRD management, managed to secure the necessary basic funding for the duration of the training programs in question. Funds amounting to US $ 2.4 million were re-allocated from the Education Sector Investment Project. Termination of Deportees Employment. Employment of deportees/returnees phased out effective June 30, 2003. - 48 - SUMMARY REPORT HRD Emergency Program 1. BACKGROUND. The total number of people, who needed emergency relief assistance during the second half of 2000, after Ethiopia's invasion, was 1,665,000. This figure is about 50% of the total resident population in Eritrea at that time.It was in the context of a grave humanitarian crisis that the reallocation/reprogramming of the HRD funds to the emergency response become necessary. The IDA reallocation of USD20 million was intended to supplement the responses solicited/to be solicited through emergency appeals. The emergency appeal launched in June 2000, is summarized below: 2. FOOD AND NUTRITION COMPONENT. Main distribution from this project were mainly sugar, milk powder, edible oil and cooking stove. ERREC was the main government institution responsible for the distribution of these items.Number of beneficiaries in war and drought affected Zobas are detailed in the table below. Of the total, 400,000 from IDP's constituted 24% of the total beneficiaries. S/No Description Zoba No. Of beneficiaries 1 War affected Debub 492,000 Gash Barka 485,000 Southern R/sea 44,000 Expellees 30,000 Host communities 170,000 Sub Total 1,221,000 2 Drought affected Anseba 150,000 Northern R/sea 140,600 Sub Total 290,600 3 Urban poor Urban poor 150,000 Sub Total 150,000 Grand Total 1,661,600 3. TRACTOR SERVICE AND SEED COMPONENT. Provision of the tractor services and seed distribution is another important component implemented by Ministries of Agriculture. The objective was to assist the farmers affected by the war to resume farming activities so that; their dependence on food aid for the following year will be reduced. Population and hectares coverage by Zobas is indicated the table below. Tractor Service Area of land cultivated S/N Place of work Total Tractor Hours (Ha) No. of Beneficiaries 1 Zoba Maekel 19,936 15,398 30,796 2 Zoba Anseba 79,260 34,807 69,614 3 Zoba Debub 24,378 9,189 12,252 4 Zoba Gash Barka 36,797 41,286 41,286 5 Zoba S/K/Bahri 7,747 2,780 2,780 Grand Total 168,118 103,460 156,728 - 49 - Seed Distribution S/N Type of Seed Weight in M.T Hectares covered No. of Beneficiaries 1 Barley 2,285 17,577 35,154 2 Wheat 2,700 21,600 48,200 3 Sorghum 990 66,000 132,000 4 R.Taff 500 50,000 100,000 5 Chick pea 200 2,500 5,000 6 Horse Bean 300 3,750 7,500 7 Sesame 200 33,333 66,667 8 Ground Nut 150 1,875 3,750 Grand Total 7,325 196,635 398,271 4. SUSTAINABILITY. As the project was an emergency response intervention, it was useful in averting famine, important in life saving interventions in-favor of the war affected beneficiaries. The impacts are therefore, of short time nature. Indirectly, once people have been enabled to survive through the immediate crisis, they will require to be assisted to rebuild their livelihoods. Unfortunately, following the conflict, Eritrea faced the drought of 2002 and this exposed over two-thirds of the countries total population to the threat of famine. The war affected and others that were hit by the drought become largely dependent on humanitarian assistance in 2003. More or less similar number of people are also dependent on emergency assistance in 2004, because of the lingering effect of the war and erratic rainfall the resulted in the production of only 20% of the annual national crop requirement of the country. While the Bank's contribution was important in complementing other partner's efforts, mainly the UN system and NGO's, the legacy of the war and drought is so immense that the humanitarian problems continue. The success story is that, it was possible, through the combination efforts, to avert a famine situation where people die en masse. 5. BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE Bank. Bank performance during the preparation phase is rated as highly satisfactory. Program objectives were consistent with the need and priorities of the country emergency humanitarian crises. The program was designed in a simple, predetermined procurement procedure, transparent and building on the country and bank experience in alleviating the urgent humanitarian crises. The Program design correctly identified key measures to facilitate the achievement of the program's objectives. There was continuity and close collaboration with participating Bank staff throughout the implementation phase. In this regard the overall Bank performance is rated as highly satisfactory. Borrower. The program was a priority for the Government. There was strong commitment to the program as reflected in its agreement to establish HRD Emergency Program unit with small but qualified staff. The program was implemented during a difficult period when Eritrea was confronted with another war only shortly after independence. The strong leadership role and continued commitment of the Government, however, enabled HRD Emergency Program Office to achieve its humanitarian objectives. There was good collaboration with stakeholders particularly the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, ERREC, Grain Board, Red Sea Corporation, Bank of Eritrea, Commercial Bank of Eritrea and the Bank. Throughout the implementation phase, Government continuously provided its full counterpart contribution. The HRD Emergency Program fully complied with the legal covenants and the - 50 - Bank's fiduciary requirements. The program procurement and fund management promoted transparency and was in accordance with the Development Credit Agreement and General Accepted Accounting standards. HRD Emergency Program promoted teamwork, joint decision-making, and staff autonomy while maintaining clear areas of accountability. In this regard the overall Borrower performance is rated as highly satisfactory. 6. LESSONS LEARNED. (i) Pre-designed procurement guidelines. Taking into account the country's commercial practices, the Bank and the Government prepared predefined procurement methods to address as early as possible the humanitarian crisis faced the country; the lesson can be taking as base for such urgent humanitarian assistance. (ii) Performance indicators: Performance indicators are useful tools to signal the outcomes of project objectives; such indicators were however not included in the design of the HRD Emergency Program. (iii) Use of existing channels of distribution: The program was designed using the existing channels of distribution to reach the emergency areas rather than setting new and complicated channels. - 51 - Additional Annex 9. Other Project Data ADDITIONAL PROJECT DATA FOR COMPONENTS 1, 2 AND 3. Table 9A: Status of Recruitment of Experts (1998-2003) Planned T=Rev.Target ; A=Actual Actual Experts (at MTR and following restructuring) (at project closing) No. Of Beneficiary No. of Beneficiary No. Of Beneficiary Experts Ministry/Instit. Experts Ministry/Instit. Experts Ministry/Instit. Foreign 500 MoE=250 T=320 MoE=190 (T); 132 (A); 352 MoE=206 UA=71 UA=80 A=257 UA=50 (T); 59 (A) Other =75 Other =170 Other = 80 (T); 66 (A) National - - T=320 MoE=196 (A) 320 MoE = 61% UA=21 (A) MoA = 27% Other = 103 A) MoH = 25% UA = 21% Total 500 T=640 672 A=577 Table 9B: Summary of Recruitment of Experts SN Ministry/Institution National Foreign Total Graduates No. of graduates as Experts Experts (Abroad) % of expatriates Posted recruited 1 Education 196 206 402 31 20% 2 Agriculture 27 22 49 23 99% 3 Fisheries 4 4 8 8 200% 4 Health 25 11 36 5 50% 5 Labor and Human Dev. 3 3 6 5 170% 6 Land, Water & Environment 4 3 7 9 300% 7 Public Works 1 12 13 1 8% 8 Tourism 2 3 5 1 33% 9 Trade and Industry 6 6 12 6 100% 10 Local Government 7 7 3 43% 11 Finance and Financial Sector 12 12 15 - 12 Justice 2 2 6 - 13 Information 2 2 4 5 250% 14 Transport & Communication 13 13 4 400% 15 Energy & Mines 2 - 16 Foreign Affairs 2 - 17 University of Asmara 21 71 92 29 40% 18 Office of President 2 1 3 2 200% 19 Confederation of Eritrean Workers 1 1 - - 20. National Development 1 - 21. Defense 9 - 22. Central Personnel Administration 1 - 23. National Insurance Corporation 2 - 24. National Union of Eritrean Youths and 1 - Students 24. Yet to be assigned 7 - Total 320 352 672 178 50% - 52 - Table 9C: Status of Training Activities Abroad and Internally (1998-2003) PLANNED At MTR Actual (at project closing) TYPE LEVEL (inception) RT (Rev. Target) Enrolled Completed Not Training Avg. (A) Actual Completed Ongoing Time BA/BSc 84 35 (A) 132 11 11 ongoing MA/MSc 376 54 (A) 534 164 incomplete; 2 ½ yrs. Phd 185 2 (A) 8 3 131 354 3 ½ yrs. absconded ABROAD Certificate - 177 (A) 1073 927 137 - 3-6 mos. Diploma - 34 (A) 118 17 33 - 6-12 mos. Degree - 264 (A) 505 44 142 396 4 yrs. DOMESTIC Distance - 300-500 (RT) 889 273 (passed) 108 423 - Education AB= 650-791 (RT); 91 (A) AB= 674 AB = 178 AB = 142 AB = 354 - UA = 298 (A) UA= 1696 UA= 988 UA = 312 UA = 396 585 DL= 300-500 (RT) DL =889 DL 273 DL 108 DL = 23 TOTAL AB= Abroad; UA = University of Asmara; DL = Distance Learning (UNISA) Table 9D: Summary of Training Activities Abroad Level of Planned Total Actual Actual Actual Technical Field Education At project Placements Completed as % of as % of inception Planned Placement Agricultural Sciences PhD.MD 8 - - 0% 0% Agricultural Sciences MA/MSc/LLM 36 110 31 86% 28% Agriculture Sciences BA/BSc/B.Tech 8 - - 0% Engineering Sciences PhD 11 - - 0% - Engineering Sciences MA/MSc/LLM 65 13 4 6% 31% Engineering Sciences BA/BSc/B.Tech 72 42 3 4% 7% Health Sciences Phd/MD 15 5 2 13% 40% Health Sciences MA/MSc/LLM 18 12 8 44% 67% Health Sciences BA/BSc/B.Tech 3 33 2 67% 6% Natural Sciences PhD 40 1 1 3% 100% Natural Sciences MA/MSc/LLM 129 95 25 19% 26% Natural Sciences BA/BSc/B.Tech 5 15 3 60% 20% Social Sciences PhD 36 1 - 0% 0% Social Sciences MA/MSc/LLM 71 67 15 21 22% Social Sciences BA/BSc/B.Tech 15 - - 0% Business & Economics PhD 15 1 - - 0% Business & Economics MA/MSc/LLM 57 200 55 96% 28% Business & Economics BA/BSc/B.Tech 4 20 3 75% 15% Education PhD - - - - - Education MA/MSc/LLM - 36 26 126% 72% Education BA/BSc/B.Tech - - - - - TOTAL 585 674 178 30% 26% Table 9A and 9B summarize the overall status of the recruitment and placement of experts during the life of the Project. Tables 9C and 9D summarize the status of training abroad and internally. A review of the data presented in Tables 9B and 9D reveal variances in the recruitment of experts to key positions in 13 institutions and the corresponding placement of the 171 students in 23 government and other public institutions and 7 yet to be assigned. While the average ratio of positions filled by expatriates to the number of graduates posted is 2:1, variances exist across beneficiary institutions, with some institutions benefiting from graduates to fill vacancies not originally identified at project inception, while in others - 53 - (MoE, MoLG, MoH, MoPW, MoT) the number of graduates posted fall short of the total number of positions filled by expatriates, including the UA. One reason provided for the former is to strategically align training in specific fields with current gaps and critical needs in other GoE institutions for which optimal benefits could be derived. In these cases, the posting of graduates to other GoE institutions are discussed, reviewed, and agreed between relevant GoE authorities and UA. Of the total 277 posts filled by expatriates in UA and MOE, about 30% have been filled by graduates. While the recruitment of experts was intended to serve as an interim measure to bridge the capacity gap until the return of graduates, opportunities for transferring skills and know how to other relevant national staff with whom experts collaborated existed but were not optimally tapped. Performance assessment of foreign experts and expert's self-evaluation have been carried in several ministries, albeit not regularly. Of the total 352 foreign experts, assessments for no more than 20 experts working in 8 GoE institutions were submitted to the PCU for review. Based on assessments submitted by line ministries, the PCU prepared a (one time) summary report covering the period 1999-2001; no additional assessments appear to have been made after 2001. Assessments completed by beneficiary institutions generally indicate satisfaction with experts' overall performance in executing their work plans. Likewise, most experts are satisfied with their work plans and work load, and indeed value the cordial working relationship with their supervisors and co-workers. Most assessments, however, generally lacked information on the specific outcomes and key contributions of experts. Information on the link between quality and responsiveness of services/outputs provided by experts in relation to filling capacity gaps in GoE institutions are not fully documented. Similarly, processes adopted for transferring skills and knowledge to national counterparts were not sufficiently discussed. While the recruitment of experts have enabled ministries to implement their programs, its impact in terms of sustaining capacity in GoE institutions following the experts' departure, through the proper transfer of skills and know-how, cannot be assessed at this point in time. There was initially a high level of enthusiasm among PSEs to enroll in distance learning, with over 2800 applications received from almost all government institutions. Following a screening process conducted by CTTC/UA to determine eligibility, about 75% (BA 1730; MA 381) of applications were submitted to UNISA, leading to the enrollment in 2002 of a total 889 PSEs from 37 GoE institutions in BA level degree programs. An additional 50 applications for Masters Program were processed in 2003. Of the 889 PSEs enrolled in 2002, 364 PSEs passed their training modules, and 507 (60%) either failed or withdrew. By the second semester of Academic Year 2002/03, only 404 PSEs with less than 15% females, were enrolled. Of these, 273 passed; about 125 or 46% failed. Overall, the high attrition rate was reportedly due to several factors: (i) students have difficulties in managing their study program while also coping with their work pressures; (ii) some students lacked the discipline to pursue their studies independently; (iii) lack of computer skills; and (iv) in some cases, students felt that tutorials and support systems were inadequate. Of the total 354 students still on training in South Africa , 52 are expected to return by June 2004 and 173 by end December 2004. Funds have been allocated from the IDA-project Education Sector Investment Project (ESIP) to cover the cost of seeing these students through their program. The remaining 129 students are pursuing their studies on their own, with subventions provided by their respective universities; completion dates for these students have not yet been confirmed. A total of 11 students did not complete and 131 absconded (21%). Of the total 79 students enrolled in other foreign universities apart from those in South Africa, 4 students (52%) did not complete their studies due to illness, or failure, and a fairly significant proportion (34%) absconded and did not return to Eritrea. - 54 - - 55 -