73159 I N T E R N A T I O N A L S U P P O R T F O R C A P A C I T Y D E V E L O P M E N T I N P O S T- C O N F L I C T S T A T E S REFLECTIONS FROM TWO CASE STUDIES IN WEST AFRICA A JOINT INITIATIVE BY THE WORLD BANK’S FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES GROUP (OPCFC) AND THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME’S BUREAU FOR CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY (BCPR) INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES: REFLECTIONS FROM TWO CASE STUDIES IN WEST AFRICA CONTENTS BY PETER MORGAN page 3 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The views expressed in this 5 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS publication are those of the author(s) and do not 7 FOREWORD necessarily represent those of 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY the United Nations, including UNDP, or the UN Members 13 I. INTRODUCTION States; or the World Bank Group or its Member Countries. 15 II. THE CONCEPT OF CAPACITY 15 A. Gaining a shared understanding of capacity 16 B. Questioning a sole focus on capacity 17 III. CAPACITY CONTEXT OF POST-CONFLICT STATES 18 A. Nature and demands of post-conflict states 19 B. Capacity system collapse and fragmentation 20 C. Effects of psychosocial trauma on capacity development 21 D. Nature of the organizational actors 21 E. Patterns of complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability 22 F. Influence of informality, ghosts, and multiple systems 24 G. Influence of power and politics 24 H. Emergence of wide-ranging capacity needs and interventions 25 I. Presence of dilemmas, paradoxes, risks, and traps 25 J. Challenge of transitions, schedules, deadlines, and timing 28 IV. PROGRAMMING IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES 28 A. Importance of individual behavior and change 29 B. Evolution and stages of capacity development 30 C. Two mental models of change and capacity development 31 D. Needs, absorptive capacity, and readiness 32 E. Importance of legitimacy 32 F. Capacity development as the management of transitions and hybrids 33 G. Interrelationships between performance and capacity 33 H. Time and timing THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 1 page 34 I. Sequencing of capacity development interventions 35 J. More emphasis on leadership systems 36 K. Dynamics of country and IAA ownership 38 V. CONSEQUENCES FOR IAA POLICY AND PRACTICE 38 A. Crafting IAA strategies for capacity development 39 B. Understanding and integrating the country or regional context 41 C. Managing the IAA role, relationships, and capabilities 43 D. Adapting results-based and performance management 44 E. Designing and managing technical assistance in a post-conflict state 45 F. Strengthening the need for coordination and harmonization 46 G. Moving to an expanded set of concepts and analytical frameworks 48 H. Better ways to address risk and failure 49 I. Learning, researching, monitoring and evaluating capacity issues 50 J. Communication and outreach 51 K. Crafting a national capacity development strategy 53 VI. FINAL OPERATIONAL POINTS 53 A. Speci�c challenges of post-conflict states 53 B. Interconnections of peacebuilding, statebuilding, and capacity development 54 C. Need for development of IAA own capabilities 55 Annex A. Questions Surrounding Country Ownership 57 Annex B. Analytical Frameworks 59 Notes BOXES page 26 BOX 3.1: Responses to Dilemmas, Paradoxes, Risks, and Traps 26 BOX 3.2: A Balanced View from the Field 29 BOX 4.1: Capacity Development Emerging through Stages 40 BOX 5.1: Issues Confronting IAA in Formulating a Capacity Development Strategy 51 BOX 5.2: Other Points on M&E TABLES page 31 BOX 4.1 2 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES ACRONYMS AND A B B R E V I AT I O N S AFR Africa Region (World Bank) BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery GDP Gross domestic product GEMAP Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program IAA International assistance agency IMF International Monetary Fund M&E Monitoring and evaluation NGO Nongovernmental organization OPCFC Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group (World Bank) UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNMIL United Nations Military Intervention in Liberia WBI World Bank Institute THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author of this report is Peter Morgan with inputs from Greg Ellis (World Bank), Ana Paula Fialho Lopes (World Bank) and Euge- nia Piza-Lopez (UNDP). Principal reviewers were Graham Teskey (World Bank) and Jennifer Colville (UNDP). Sheldon Lippman provided editorial support. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 5 FOREWORD sustainable path out of conflict and fragility lies in reports on that assessment. This paper also draws on the views A a State’s ability to develop and harness national capacities. For states to become more stable and effective, individuals and institutions must have the capacity to mediate conflict peacefully, and develop and imple- of international experts who convened in Washington DC in June 2010 to discuss the effectiveness of recent approaches to capacity development. The paper seeks to provide a fresh perspective on capacity ment policies that can guide economic and human develop- building in post-conflict countries and reflects critically on ment. Supporting the development of the capacities to build whether our current efforts are working. The paper reviews and maintain the institutions of the State remains a core prior- capacity development approaches through the lens of peace- ity of development assistance, especially for countries where building and state-building and draws from the experience of fragility remains endemic and where conflict often recurs. human development beyond the aid world. It calls for the In 2009, with funding support from the Norwegian and Aus- international community to challenge current approaches and tralian Governments, a small team from the World Bank (Frag- seek new ways to build the dynamic capacities that a state, ile and Conflict-Affected States Group) and the UNDP (Bureau particularly one recovering from conflict, in order to ful�l the for Crisis Prevention and Recovery) reviewed a number of pro- development aspirations of its citizens. grams in Sierra Leone and Liberia to assess their contribution The views expressed in this publication are those of the to state-building and the development of national capacity. author and do not necessarily represent those of the World This paper and its companion piece ‘State-Building: Key Bank, United Nations, or their respective Member States. Concepts and Operational Implications in two Fragile States’ 1, Joachim von Amsberg Jordan Ryan Vice President Assistant Secretary-General, UNDP Operations Policy and Country Services Director - Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery World Bank August 2011 1 World Bank/UNDP 2009 THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY C apacity development is essentially a form of change effects of the various transitions (e.g., the move to elections) with a variety of different aspects—cognitive, per- can briefly open or shut down windows of opportunities for sonal, organizational, political, physical, social, capacity development and accelerate political predations on �nancial, and institutional. It is about people taking up new public sector organizations. roles and skills, thinking in different ways, doing different The concept of capacity itself needs to be seen differently things, and entering into new relationships. It is about the way in post-conflict states. In particular, it needs to be deepened complex human systems shift and grow and move over time. and broadened in order to capture the non-technical factors The need to understand this dynamic of change is heightened that shape its emergence. The post-conflict context creates in post-conflict countries as individuals, organizations, and unique demands on international assistance agencies (IAAs) systems emerge from collapse or severe dysfunction. that should lead to rethinking many aspects of IAA policy and It might be helpful at the outset to admit that we still have practice. little systematic, tested understanding about how and why ■ Capacity development takes place in a context of collapsed development happens in countries such as Sierra Leone and and fragmented organizations and institutions requiring Liberia. Progress depends on persuading hundreds or even participants to think how best to address that particular thousands of groups and individuals to change the way they condition. work, a transformation people will accept only if they can be ■ A focus on formal organizations as key actors is necessary persuaded to think differently about hierarchy and authority, but not suf�cient. Informal, traditional, donor, and criminal risk, personal safety, professionalism, informal loyalties, and networks also exert influence. other factors. ■ The influence of power and politics is pervasive in shaping This report is partly based on observations from joint visits to and inhibiting capacity development and needs to be fac- Sierra Leone and Liberia by UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention tored into the crafting of all interventions. and Recovery and the Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries ■ Most capacity development participants must face a pat- Unit of the World Bank in 2009. It also draws from the wider tern of dilemmas, paradoxes, and traps as the processes of literature on capacity development and statebuilding in fragile/ change unfold, a pattern considered more influential and post-conflict states. This summary gleans from these observa- more intractable in post-conflict states than in comparable tions, discussions, and readings some of the more salient points low-income states. on capacity development in post-conflict countries. ■ Constant transition and change happens in all countries. But the Governments and IAAs in Sierra Leone and Liberia face particular challenges for managing a variety of transitions, CAPACITY CONTEXT OF schedules, and deadlines that act to undermine the devel- POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES opment of national capacity. DEVELOPING RESILIENT CAPACITY in any context is challeng- ing. Many factors increase the complexity of capacity issues in PROGRAMMING IMPLICATIONS FOR post-conflict states. The context usually remains characterized CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN by uncertainty, underlying tension, and many unresolved griev- POST-CONFLICT STATES ances. The physical constraints reinforce the barriers to progress. The legacy of trauma can remain largely unaddressed. The dis- CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IS essentially a form of change and ruption and damage to the social fabric makes it more dif�cult transition. Outside interveners need a change theory (as opposed to create the capacity to develop capacity. And not least, the to a results chain) to understand and manage the shift from THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 9 one capacity con�guration to another. Many system changes ■ Most capacity analyses tended to focus on institutions or will unfold in the process. Participants need some awareness structures or processes of some kind but the role of leader- of these dynamics and a sense of what they can influence and/or ship as a contributor to capacity development is important. change and what they cannot. Any engagement around leadership needs to consider the ■ With few established rules and institutions, small organi- complexity, opacity, and the dynamic nature of power and zations, informal coalitions and networks, the behavior of influence. individuals—their interests, actions, values, influence, ■ More intractable issues—the personal, organizational, control—in country organizations in Sierra Leone and and political dynamics—have emerged in shaping country Liberia significantly mattered. ownership. Dealing with the ownership dynamic has turned ■ Two analytical approaches or “mental models� of capacity out to be a good deal more problematic and complex than development seemed to underlie most of the thinking in the aid community had imagined. Sierra Leone and Liberia. Most technical assistance was implicitly aligned with the direct or planned approach IMPLICATIONS FOR IAA POLICY model with all its attendant contributions and blind spots. AND PRACTICES Civil society gravitated much more to the indirect or emer- gent approach. THE PARTICULAR NATURE of the capacity development chal- ■ Capacity analyses have historically been oriented to diag- lenges post-conflict countries pushes IAAs to come up with nosing, indentifying, and addressing country needs. In the imaginative and less formulaic approaches. They must be more process, however, not enough attention has been given to nimble strategically and operationally, listen, learn, and respond, clarifying absorptive capacity or readiness or willingness to and be more aware of and sensitive to a changeable implemen- act. This trifecta of strategic direction, country commit- tation environment. ment, and ability to implement seems critical in Sierra ■ The IAAs need well-grounded capacity development strate- Leone and Liberia. gies at all levels. Currently capacity development efforts ■ Governments in Sierra Leone and Liberia emerged from are on the whole under-strategized, under-operationalized, conflict with signi�cant challenges to their legitimacy. Any under-energized, and under-funded. process of capacity development has to contribute to a ■ The country and institutional context should be the starting social contract that encourages citizens to maintain a con- point of any serious capacity analysis. In line with this nection to the state and support a change agenda. established line of thinking, IAAs need to shift their own ■ Tension frequently exists in post-conflict states between emphasis from the application of more imported interven- IAA-supported interventions designed to generate perfor- tions to ones that are more customized. mance and those focused on developing capacity. In many ■ The current development orthodoxy, including in post- cases, the need for short-term action without country conflict states, emphasizes predicting, measuring, and capacity leads to only secondary attention paid to capacity achieving performance outcomes. Results-based and perfor- development mance management methodologies can apply in many ■ Few issues in capacity development in post-conflict states instances but are not without downsides. The challenge is seem so misjudged as the time and timing issue. The imple- to get away from one-size-�ts-all and come up with a range mentation time needed for programs is invariably and of approaches that suit a variety of situations. chronically underestimated. Short-, medium-, and long- ■ Two familiar problems with technical assistance did re- term interventions can and do get muddled up. appear in Sierra Leone and Liberia: �rst, the dif�culties in ■ Like other statebuilding activities, capacity development is managing technical assistance to make a signi�cant con- never linear. The sequencing entanglement in capacity devel- tribution to capacity development; and second, the perva- opment is dif�cult to unravel. There are limits to both macro sive systemic pressures that drive its overuse especially in and micro scheduling, but while capacity development inter- fragile situations. ventions need to be responsive and adaptable, they cannot ■ Virtually every capacity analysis in Sierra Leone and Liberia simply start without any sense of priority or strategy. called for greater coordination and collaboration on all sides. 10 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES Yet the constraints to complex joint action on the issues ■ Structural, political, and institutional constraints create remain pervasive. Many �xes were evident in both coun- the potential for a whole series of risks and failures in post- tries. The IAAs were trying to co-join their programs but in conflict states, a serious challenge to capacity development. the absence of strong national leadership, the level of pro- And yet IAAs and governments do little to acknowledge these gram coherence remains highly variable. risks and seek actively to manage them. ■ Capacity development strategies tend to be void of discus- ■ The process of communication, outreach, and connection has sions on costs, both to countries and to donors. And yet cost to do with creating basic understandings, inducing support issues, especially the operational and recurrent variety, from groups outside the particular intervention, �nding cre- kept emerging in Sierra Leone and Liberia basically due to ativity and space in unlikely places, and earning legitimacy lack of �nancing available from the two Governments and in ways that �ts the culture and politics of a particular the additional costs to IAAs for higher-level support for country. capacity development. ■ Working in a post-conflict state puts a premium on the abil- ■ Practical concepts and frameworks to guide capacity devel- ities of both countries and donors for learning, adapting, and opment remain illusive. Some tools exist, yet few use them adjusting in a complex, rapidly changing, and uncertain systematically in daily work or for extended periods of time. environment. The ability of IAAs and their national partners This pattern seems to intensify in post-conflict states. to work in such an environment often appears limited. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 11 II. THE CONCEPT OF CAPACITY F ew discussions are more tedious than trying—once and skills of people to do something. From a development again—to come up with a ‘de�nition’ of capacity that perspective, capacity thus has to do with the ability of peo- has real operational value across a varied range of cir- ple to work together to generate some sort of positive devel- cumstances. Some de�nitions are narrower and more focused opmental gain over time. It is about intentional collective on problem solving, carrying out technical functions, and per- action. forming. Some are broader and are more concerned about Capacity is a potential state. It is the condition of a foot- country systems being able to survive, grow, and create value. ball team as it lines up to start the game. Capacity is not by Readers may feel more comfortable with one type or the other. itself about actually playing or doing things. Performance, What matters more is the second stage of the discussion— on the other hand, relates to action, delivery, production, coming up with a shared operational framework that practition- implementation, and execution. These two states—capacity and ers derive from applying the overall concept of capacity to the performance—are intertwined. They need to be assessed in speci�c set of circumstances they are facing. Some may talk relation to each other. And they are not direct and linear. about capacity through training workshops. Others may have an Performance can, for example, go down in the short term as the image of capacity as governments being able to address and participants work through the disruptive effects of a capacity solve national service delivery issues. Still others may be think- development intervention that unsettles a country organization. ing about the capacity to unite and inspire. An initial challenge Most practitioners have little patience with the idea of for participants is therefore to agree on a range of shared ideas, capacity as a development end in itself. It is usually seen as strategies, assumptions, and vocabulary that helps them to talk strictly instrumental or a means to something more important, about capacity issues and act on them in a productive way. as in the perennial question, Capacity for what? Or what capac- ity is needed to implement IAA-supported interventions? That Capacity is that combination of skills, is not the position taken in this report. It is about the ability to keep generating the capacity that sustains the development attributes, and relationships of a process. The point here is that only if capacity in some form is human system that enables it to seen as an end in itself or as a critical form of development in create development value for others. and of itself will participants, including IAAs, see the need to balance and trade-off its demands versus those of other per- formance ends such as health or education.7 A. Capacity is seen in this report as an element of a human sys- tem and is made up of the competencies of individuals and the GAINING A SHARED collective capabilities of the system itself.8 In a variety of ways, UNDERSTANDING OF CAPACITY individuals develop abilities and skills across a range of activi- ties. To do this, they need access to resources, funding, space, ALL FORMULATIONS OF THE concept of capacity have at their leadership, and many other elements. These competencies core the idea of the ability or the willingness, power, resources, contribute, in turn, to the emergence of collective capabilities THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 15 such as program management. These capabilities, in turn, contribute to the overall capacity of the system, which could be B. an organization or a network or any organized collective body. This capacity can be understood in terms of its performance, QUESTIONING A SOLE resilience, positioning, integrity, effectiveness, and legitimacy. FOCUS ON CAPACITY Many competencies and capabilities assume a specific form such as technical skills required in an environmental THE DEMANDS OF post-conflict states prompt questions about assessment. Some have to do with organizational and logisti- the value of a sole focus on capacity issues. It is not dif�cult cal functions such as project or information management to detect a kind of capacity development fatigue emerging. A or strategic management. But others will be in the form of a sole focus on capacity development as an activity associated general function that focuses more on human behavior such with organizational and institutional engineering (i.e., the tech- as creating and sustaining relationships or mediating con- nical upgrading of formal organizations through the use of tech- flict. As such, capacity can have a psychological aspect such nical assistance) seems inadequate. But so does a view of as con�dence or determination or trust. capacity as some sort of macro-concept into which all others Capacity can also be viewed as made up of fundamental such as governance and statebuilding must be subsumed.11 competencies such as levels of national literacy or numeracy Existing capacity development theories and strategies are or proper work behavior. And it also has to do with looking after still far from robust or based on much more than advocacy the health, coherence, protection, and vitality of a human sys- and generalized good practice. It seems at times that such tem. Capacity systems must therefore have the ability to do theories still seem unable to answer even basic questions about policy analysis. But they must also develop the capability to which approaches to capacity development and change work act, to learn, and to adapt. best under a variety of conditions. Such competencies and capabilities can be located in In certain instances in which quick action is necessary to public sector organizations, in NGOs, in communities, or in stabilize a situation, conventional long-term capacity devel- private �rms.9 They can be in service delivery organizations opment focused around technique and knowledge transfer with tangible outcomes or in advocacy groups with hard-to- seems irrelevant and a waste of time. The pressure of events measure services. They can also be in networks or even infor- in some post-conflict states needs participants to rethink the mal coalitions of country actors. Capacity can be found in complex relationships between capacity, performance, and “nested� systems ranging from the individual to the organi- results under a variety of conditions. zational to the sectoral to the regional, country, and global What seems to be happening is the start of a rethinking 10 levels. of concepts such as capacity, statebuilding, and governance. Capacity is also intertwined with statebuilding, gover- Capacity development, as used in this report, is intended to nance, and peacebuilding. Such activities need to generate refer to a process that is wider and deeper, that focuses on a their own capabilities to be effective. And they obviously con- broader range of public and statebuilding issues, that is shaped tribute to the emergence of capacity in formal organizations through state/society interaction, and that is more reflective and institutions. of the country context. 16 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES I. INTRODUCTION T his report provides a general analysis of the capac- there be more decentralization or privatization or contract- ity issue in post-conflict states and its support ing out? How should the health sector be reconfigured 1 by international assistance agencies (IAAs). The after the conflict? What should be the role of government— analysis draws from a wide range of literature on the subject coordination, regulation, or implementation—or of country of capacity development and on-site visits to Sierra Leone and non-state actors? Should there be more reliance on develop- Liberia in 2009. ing the capacity of networks or market-based solutions? Analyses of capacity issues alone (without the focus of a Strategy issue #3. What kinds of ‘processes’ or approaches post-conflict setting) have an inherent tendency to generate to capacity development might have the best chance of misunderstandings given the wide-ranging definitions and working with strategy issues #1 and #2? What might be perspectives. The we-don’t-know-what-we-want-but-this-isn’t- a workable approach to personal, organizational, and/or it phenomenon is pervasive in the world of capacity analyses. institutional change? Should capacity development center Having said that, it seems that efforts at supporting capac- on supply-driven technical assistance or more demand-side ity development needs in any country through a coherent facilitation? Should capacity development focus on conven- strategic approach should address �ve basic issues—three on tional ‘machine building’? Or should it have a broader reach program strategy and two on participant capability: to include awareness raising, participation, relationship building, coalition building, learning, and a different pattern Strategy issue #1. In what sectors and development activities of incentives? What interventions will have the best chance should external interveners such as the World Bank and of changing human behavior? the UNDP focus their interventions, including capacity development? Are there ‘core functions’—security, anti- Country capability issue. Given their level of political com- corruption, service delivery, public �nancial management, mitment, resources, and absorptive capability, will gov- rule of law—that should be targeted �rst? Or should inter- ernments and organizations have a reasonable chance of ventions go in a different direction? This is the strategic pro- actually implementing the preferred donor-supported inter- gramming choice to which countries and donors normally ventions? 3 How are the issues of feasibility and absorba- devote a lot of attention.2 bility addressed as opposed to that of need? What about country ownership and readiness? Strategy issue #2. What kinds of ‘macro’ capacity develop- ment strategies should be tried given the type and direction IAA capability issue. Do external interveners such as the of the programming decisions in strategy issue #1? Should World Bank or UNDP have the capabilities, resources, and Author’s note on the use of IAA: I use the generic term international assistance agency (IAA) rather than ‘donors’ or ‘multilaterals’ to refer to organizations that provide concessional �nancing and technical support to post-conflict states. This does not come from a wish to add to the long list of terms and acronyms that are already in use. But it is dif�cult to �nd one label that covers all international organizations. Neither the UNDP nor the World Bank, for example, is a donor in the strict sense of the term. The UNDP does �t well under the term ‘multilateral’. The acronym ‘IDA’ is already in widespread use; hence, the use of IAA, which can also be taken to cover international nongovernmental organizations and bilateral agencies. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 13 commitment needed to make an effective contribution? How There are also reasons for selective optimism about capac- can they organize themselves to make their capacity devel- ity development in post-conflict states. Important gains in opment interventions more effective? To what degree are capacity have been and can still be made in Sierra Leone and they part of the capacity challenge in post-conflict states? Liberia. People in these countries have skills and tremendous resilience. Strategies that address strengths as well as weak- Most capacity analyses still focus primarily on the questions nesses are crucial. in strategic issues 1, 2, and 3, which reflect a long-standing There is a growing skepticism about the continuing rele- donor preoccupation with diagnosing and addressing develop- vance of capacity building as a developmental approach, espe- ment need. This report, in contrast, focuses more on strat- cially in fragile or post-conflict states.5 Some are exasperated egy issue 3 and the two capability issues on the assumption by its apparent ambiguity and ungraspability. This report also that the dilemmas of feasibility, execution, and implemen- touches on the issue of capacity fatigue and the rethinking tation need more serious attention than they have received necessary to deal with it. to date. Of course, any serious effort to come up with an The World Bank and the UNDP are a bit lumped together effective capacity strategy has to address and integrate all of in this report. But they are obviously quite different organiza- these aspects. Some macro interventions, for example, may be tions with different mandates. The UNDP can implement proj- highly desirable from an IAA perspective but are not wanted or ects directly (direct execution) in cases of lack of government feasible from a country perspective. And visa versa. capacity. Or it can shift to national execution in most other Any serious effort at a capacity development strategy at cases. The Bank does no direct implementation. The same any level must involve serious thinking and strategic manage- lumping point could be made for Sierra Leone and Liberia, ment to have a chance of getting the various pieces of the which have both similarities and major differences. capacity puzzle to �t together over time. Based on the expe- This report was designed to cover conditions in states that rience in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the assumption in this are loosely known as post-conflict. We chose to use the term report is that the challenges of achieving more integration post-conflict to emphasize the huge impacts of the conflicts and coherence in any capacity development strategy is likely in both Sierra Leone and Liberia on capacity development. to be greater in post-conflict states compared to other low- The term “fragile state�, which includes many states with no income countries. history of civil conflict, does not capture this aspect. It is also Almost all capacity analyses in international development true that post-conflict loses its relevance as countries evolve are still written from the IAA or external perspective, including toward more stable conditions. this report. We need many more accounts from the country’s The report is partly based on the results of visits to Sierra side that can give insight into what is likely to be a quite dif- Leone and Liberia in 2009. It also draws from the wider ferent view of capacity development in general and IAA contri- literature on capacity development and statebuilding in fragile/ butions in particular.4 The issues of legitimacy and ownership, post-conflict states. An earlier version of the report served as for example, would look quite different to country participants a background document for a Joint UNDP (BCPR) and World than they do to donor staff and consultants. Bank (OPCFC, WBI, AFR) Experts Workshop on Capacity This report discusses the usual constraints, gaps, and weak- Development Challenges in Fragile States held in Washington, nesses in the capacity situation in Sierra Leone and Liberia. DC, June 15–16, 2010.6 14 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES III. CAPACITY CONTEXT OF POST-CONFLICT STATES C ountries coming under the general classi�cation of Both countries lost a major proportion of their skilled pro- post-conflict states differ a great deal in their history, fessionals during the conflict through death, disappearance, their politics, their challenges, and their potential. and emigration, perhaps amongst the greatest losses in recent The national histories of Sierra Leone and Liberia are quite dif- human history.12 The conflict in Sierra Leone, from 1991 to ferent. Sierra Leone was a British colony; Liberia became inde- 2001, resulted in a displacement of 50 percent of the popula- pendent in the 19th century and has a unique Diaspora given tion and the death of 2 percent. Liberia, where conflict lasted its historical ties to the United States. Many of the current min- from 1989 to 2003, found one-third of its population displaced isters in Liberia are American citizens. Before discussing the and one-third of its population killed. Both countries also suf- capacity context in post-conflict states, it is important to under- fered economic collapse; the GDP in Liberia fell 90 percent stand the circumstances faced by Sierra Leone, Liberia, and between 1987 and 1995, one of the largest economic declines other similar countries. ever recorded. Both countries remain desperately short of all Rwanda suffered a catastrophic genocide but with manage- kinds of technical and organizational skills.13 able damage to its infrastructure. Liberia, in comparison, lost Sierra Leone and Liberia remain near the bottom of the almost all its physical assets, including bridges, roads, schools, Human Development Index.14 The physical health of both pop- health posts, and communication systems. In Mozambique, the ulations declined dramatically during the conflicts.15 Sierra conflict produced clear winners and losers. In Liberia, the win- Leone now has the highest rate of child and maternal mortality ners and losers were more dif�cult to discern; many perpetrators rate among member countries in the World Bank Group. Yet, of abhorrent abuses continue to sit as elected of�cials. While both countries have extremely young populations. Sierra Leone religion plays a signi�cant role in the Southern Sudan, it appears has the biggest youth demographic bulge of any country in the less important in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Somalia has no state world.16 �nancial resources of any kind. Angola is flush with cash from Since the end of hostilities, Sierra Leone and Liberia have oil revenues. Sierra Leone seems relatively stable in the short held successful elections: Sierra Leone in 2007 and Liberia term; Southern Sudan struggles to contain militias and other in 2004.17 But both have long-standing failures in gover- armed groups. And within countries, sectors and regions and nance stemming from the exploitation of the rural hinterland by individual organizations can differ dramatically. urban-based elites in Sierra Leone’s capital, Freetown; and Sierra Leone and Liberia, with populations of 6 million Liberia’s capital, Monrovia. Both countries have porous borders and 3 million, respectively, have both suffered civil wars of that have served as launching pads for raids into each other’s unfathomable brutality. In Sierra Leone, most of the civil territory. Both countries are seeing increases in human traf�ck- war was fought between groups in rural areas. Many of the ing, drug trading, and other international criminal activity main central government departments escaped destruction. since the end of the two wars. Consequently, both countries Liberia, in contrast, saw a good deal of fighting in its capi- are struggling with major corruption issues, both having been tal city, Monrovia, and widespread collapse of its govern- rated in the bottom 10 among African countries listed in the ment infrastructure. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.18 THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 17 For some analysts, the capacity challenges in post-conflict communication, and trust. Post-conflict states, including Sierra states look much the same as they do in most low-income Leone and Liberia, usually have more dif�culty in generating a countries. The World Bank Joint Country Assistance Strategies basic level of collective action in support of some sort of devel- for Sierra Leone and Liberia look surprisingly like those from opment effectiveness.20 They usually lack groups or coalitions or other states in Africa. But in discussions, a number of signif- formal organizations with enough power, space, energy, critical icant differences did emerge that could and should affect the mass, and motivation that can make a difference.21 way donors approach capacity issues in post-conflict coun- The IAAs are faced with the challenge of playing a much tries. This chapter provides an overview of these outstanding wider range of roles, including facilitator, protector, politi- differences. cal analyst, technical adviser, and implementer. The IAA procedures that fixate on control, accountability, and risk aversion should be supplemented by approaches that pro- A. mote faster implementation, experimentation, adaptability, and responsiveness. The capacity development challenge in NATURE AND DEMANDS post-conflict states applies as much to donors as it does to OF POST-CONFLICT STATES countries. Most of the conventional aid tools and techniques that are CAPACITIES—IN FORMS of organizations, institutions, behav- applied widely in aid planning and management, such as strate- iors, and values—derive their positioning, freedom of action, gic planning, project and results-based management, capacity resources, support, and legitimacy in part from the wider soci- assessment, conventional reporting, and monitoring and evalu- ety in which they function. At one end of the spectrum, coun- ation (M&E) are not likely to be a good �t in their current form tries with a high social cohesion and high capabilities (e.g., in post-conflict conditions. The current formula for aid effective- Australia, Costa Rica, Germany, and Singapore) have an enor- ness (i.e., country ownership, donor harmonization, results-based mous advantage in generating reinforcing cycles of capacity management) also struggles for various reasons. development. At the other end, countries with low cohesion and The functioning and even basic purpose of formal organi- low capabilities often get trapped in dysfunctional patterns of zations in post-conflict states needs to be thought of differ- behavior in which most efforts at capacity development are ently compared to those in more stable states. Mental models undermined, captured, or immobilized.19 based on global generic patterns and good practice are not likely to add much value and may end up as one more capac- ity development intervention. Informality, hidden agendas, This report emphasizes the differences in survival strategies, complex relationships and incentives, aid planning and management that arise elite bargaining, and shadow systems exercise real influence. between conventional low-income states The crucial state/society relationship also frequently needs to and those emerging out of conflict and be recon�gured. Performance is important in helping do that, collapse. It points to the need for donors but social accountability and legitimacy is as well. to rethink the way they do their work in Activities in post-conflict states usually involve contribu- tions from a wide range of international actors, most of whom post-conflict states. have different agendas. The dif�culty of gaining and sustain- ing any kind of coherent approach to capacity development is Sierra Leone and Liberia were in this latter pattern before the higher in post-conflict states despite all the claims for whole- conflicts. Both suffered from ethnic divisions, rural–urban cleav- of-government or harmonization or coordination. ages, a stark disconnect between the state and society, a culture The point here is the need to rethink the capacity develop- of impunity, and an historic inability to foster inclusiveness and ment issue in post-conflict states. And such rethinking applies legitimacy. The length and brutality of the ensuing conflict, in not only to the what and the why and the who and the when, but turn, undermined a good deal of the social capital that still also, crucially, the how—from the perspective of the country and existed in the form of collaborative norms, patterns, reciprocity, the IAA. 18 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES cation broke down. Most logistical and operational support B. systems disintegrated. Most planning efforts ceased. Key staff departed, were killed, or simply disappeared. Organizational CAPACITY SYSTEM COLLAPSE manuals and policy statements disappeared. Some government AND FRAGMENTATION ministries lost everything in the conflict, including buildings, transport, desks, chairs, paper, staff, and institutional memory IN PRACTICE, IT IS hard to grasp the implications of infra- in the form of lost �les and missing staff.25 And just as impor- structural and organizational collapse in a country when viewed tant, many of the broader inter-organizational systems (e.g., the from a world of formal, well-functioning organizations. Liberia government �nancial or the justice system) fell apart. New pat- remained in a physically wrecked post-conflict condition with terns appeared such as non-state actors starting up informal destruction of government buildings, schools, bridges, busi- operations or existing agencies with few resources going in and nesses, ministries, public transportation, power, hospitals, and little performance going out. homes.22 Liberia’s road system received little or no mainte- From an historical perspective, efforts at capacity develop- nance for two decades during the conflict and ended up in ment in post-conflict states such as Germany and Japan could a state of serious disrepair. Certain regions remain cut off build on historical traditions and national memories of effective for 4–5 months at a time in the rainy season despite the public institutions. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, such national small size of the county. Virtually everyone interviewed for memories, for the most part, do not exist or have been hollowed this report in Liberia cited the roads issue as a key barrier out by decades of conflict and neglect.26 Many public institu- to national capacity development. tions from the pre-conflict era remained as symbols of oppres- sion or exclusivity. Service delivery, for example, has never been an important national objective in either country especially in Virtually everyone interviewed for the hinterlands. Strong relationships between state and society this report in Liberia cited the roads had never existed in either country.27 Post-conflict capacity issue as a key barrier to national development was faced with the challenge of overcoming these negative legacies. capacity development. In practice, the formal organizational structures in many public sector organizations frequently added up to a small Capacity development in Sierra Leone and Liberia thus group, a minister, and a few senior staff, tenuously connected to takes place in a world of fragmented, dysfunctional, and broken a huge, unproductive, operating level and with few skills.28 As systems. Former Liberian President Charles Taylor targeted a result, most public sector organizations in Sierra Leone and much of the formal public sector for destruction in an effort to Liberia have a huge missing middle level.29 Yet in most nor- concentrate power and resources under his personal control mal situations, this middle group was the one that had the and eliminate any potential sources of opposition. Many of the executive capacity, did the operational work, and connected formal structures thus ceased to function during the conflict the top of the formal structure to the lower levels. Without the especially outside the main urban areas.23 The shrinking flow of commitment and involvement of this group, capacity develop- operating funds, in particular, affected government service deliv- ment as a process of change lost traction and the ability to ery in the small cities and rural areas. This included the military, move forward. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, staff who remained the police, the judicial system, and the district governments. at the middle level had few support systems or access to The institutional destruction still seemed pervasive with whole operating funds. ministries needing to be put back together, physically, organiza- During the conflict, Sierra Leone and Liberia also lost the tionally, and psychologically.24 ability to develop and sustain their own capacity. The growth Organizations everywhere are essentially patterns of personal of civil society virtually stopped. Many other capacity-building and institutional relationships that sustain access to resources, organizations—universities, polytechnics, training colleges, protection, and knowledge. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, many secondary and primary schools—ceased to function.30 Skilled of these connections were shattered and fragmented during staff emigrated at unprecedented rates in recent global the conflict. Command, hierarchical control, and communi- experience. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 19 Given these liabilities, most public agencies in Sierra Leone agenda in any serious way in Sierra Leone or Liberia.34 In and Liberia no longer had the capacity to execute or perform only one formal meeting with Liberians was the subject 31 complex functions. They could negotiate and plan at a basic raised. Few external organizations in Liberia, with the excep- level. Many might be able to devise strategies of one kind or tion of the Carter Center and the UNDP, have given even lim- another. Most could create the appearance of activity. But they ited thought to the issue.35 Country governments seemed could not manage complex systems as part of any approach to unwilling to use aid funds for this purpose. Donor agencies implementation. also found it difficult to address such an issue within their conventional programming. Most conveniently they relied on Inducing some coherence out of these the idea of the individual resilience of individuals to over- fragmented systems—reconnecting come the legacies of war. In the end, capacity development people and organizations—seems was still seen as functional, economic, and organizational rather than psychosocial. one of the real capacity development Yet this legacy of trauma could have profound implica- challenges in Sierra Leone and Liberia. tions for the process of capacity development especially with regard to the psychology of collective action.36 People Developing or maintaining the capacity of collapsing sys- developed a wariness of collective action and ended up trust- tems, especially those having to do with service delivery, ing few outsiders. In the memorable phrase of one Liberian involved all sorts of dilemmas and constraints. It was diffi- interviewed, “our minds are still armed�. In addition, this cult to avoid country systems ending up with a patchwork of sense of trauma can persist over time and can be transmit- different systems, strategies, and interests given the number ted across generations.37 of new and different actors providing support. New junior- These attitudes could have profound effects on group level, technical assistance staff arrived in both countries, and organizational behavior. People tended to focus on the including many from the Diasporas, with quite different immediate and the tangible. There was less collaboration on ideas about what and how to manage.32 New organizations, supplying public goods38 Getting private interests to con- such as anti-corruption agencies, appeared. New philoso- tribute to the wider public interest became more difficult. phies such as performance management, decentralization, A tendency to get rich quick at all costs increased.39 The and contracting out came into fashion. Different IAAs with effects of trauma could shape attitudes and behavior with different programs and different views about capacity devel- respect to trust, co-operation, learning, hierarchy, imagina- opment began to pull and tug at these country organiza- tion, risk, sharing of information, memory, meaning and tions, which in many cases were in no position to debate identity, adaptiveness, leadership and followership, and these issues. planning—all attributes normally associated with effective capacity development. There was also evidence that the C. legacy of trauma affected individual health and physical well-being. EFFECTS OF PSYCHOSOCIAL The empowerment of traumatized people became a real challenge to efforts at capacity development. The answer to the TRAUMA ON CAPACITY question—To what might people commit given the legacy of DEVELOPMENT trauma and why and how?—requires thoughtfulness in a context where formal, legal, or physical protections are still not avail- BOTH SIERRA LEONE and Liberia suffered great damage to the able to most citizens. The development of individual compe- social fabric and pattern of human relationships that people tencies is particularly needed to address the psychological everywhere need to generate collective action. 33 But as has and emotional aspects as well as the purely logistical and been the case in other post-conflict states, issues related to functional ones.40 Put another way, outsiders needed to think devastating psychological, emotional, and spiritual legacy of carefully about what would constitute incentives for the sur- conflict and brutality have not appeared on the development vivors of trauma.41 20 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES D. level. Social and personal networks shaped communication and decision-making. Political pressures and protection mat- NATURE OF THE tered. Informal systems provided support to individuals and groups functioning in dif�cult circumstances. Country partici- ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS pants could access hidden resources, both �nancial and human and unknown to many of the external participants, for a vari- EQUALLY IMPORTANT AS Capacity for what? is the question ety of purposes. Few change processes in either Sierra Leone Capacity of, or for, whom? In many cases, the implicit image or Liberia seemed to work if they undermined or weakened the of organizations in post-conflict states is that of small but informal mechanisms, which generated energy and momen- deficient pieces of formal, functional machinery. These actors tum in the system. apparently need a major tune up, a host of spare parts and train- ing for the mechanics that will look after them. The transfer of generic techniques—good practice—and their disciplined appli- Informal systems provide support to cation can be critical for eventually getting them to produce individuals and groups functioning outputs and outcomes. in difficult circumstances. Sierra Leone and Liberia can produce and generate only a limited range of organizational structures and behaviors, bear- None of this is to say that such organizations character- ing some of the following characteristics: ized above cannot be effective. Or that post-conflict states I Organizations are not ‘separated’ from society in the sense cannot produce more modern organizational actors. What it of having a detached identity. The ruling coalition will fre- does imply is the impetus to better understand the nature of quently use its power and resources to buy off dissenters or specific organizational actors requires approaches to change maintain coalition stability. and capacity development that fit the actual structure and I Organizations end up as �efdoms of their leaders. In prac- behavior of such an actor. tice, informal networks and patron/client relationships shape behavior. The behavior and role of individuals matters the most. E. I Major decisions can frequently be made outside the organization. PATTERNS OF COMPLEXITY, I The formal shell of the organization is mostly symbolic and protective. The energy in the system lies on the informal side. UNCERTAINTY, AND I Most are inherently unstable and subject to collapses and UNPREDICTABILITY abrupt shocks and disruptions. I Decisions based on mostly unwritten and uncodi�ed min- WHAT SEEMED OBVIOUS in Sierra Leone and Liberia was the utes, reports, and agreements are not protected or respected. unsettled and uncertain nature of the organizational and insti- I Most organizations run on a closed, unspeci�c, and con�- tutional systems in public, private, and civil society sectors. dential system. The predictive style of results-based manage- Both societies, even before the conflict, operated with a lack ment also fails most of the time. of formal, enforceable rules or institutions that could guide I Inef�ciency and internal chaos can be intentional. behavior. The conflict then had the effect of destroying the few I Few can afford any kind of long-term view or strategy. that did exist. A paramount challenge that faced both countries Plans are put in place to mollify donors and other external was �nding an effective way to prevent the recurrence of the groups. conflict and in general to avoid further violence.42 Part of the I Accountability is hard to ensure in a context of weak demand challenge of capacity development was to help country partic- and little idea of the public interest. ipants re-establish these rules and relationships. The fragmentation could be seen in all aspects of national Much of the process of change in Sierra Leone and Liberia life, especially the political. Groups and organizations had a dif- seemed to take place at a covert, informal, almost-invisible �cult time in forging a consensus or shared understanding and THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 21 then having it last to enable some sort of operational progress. opment situations in such states can be classified as simple, The barriers to collective action were pervasive. Most organiza- complicated, and complex. The simple problem is clear both in tions in the two countries appeared to lack the capacity for a terms of ends and means and lends itself to detailed plan- self-managed transformation driven by effective internal learn- ning, controlled implementation, and precise measurement. ing and adaptation. The complicated problem is more intractable but can still be The turnover at senior management level is constant as solved given the application of current levels of knowledge and staff leave to join the aid system or the private sector. Politicians experience. Complex situations will have high levels of uncer- could be tempted to curtail the independent power of the pub- tainty, ambiguity, conflict, and lack of predictability. Existing lic sector by accelerating staff rotations and preventing political/ formulas or good practice may be of little help in addressing bureaucratic coalitions from coming together. In Sierra Leone, them. Customization, rapid learning, and adaptation may be for example, past elections have led to a sudden turnover in pub- the only way forward. The dilemma here is that most capacity lic sector and parastatal staff based on political and personal development situations in post-conflict states are complex. af�liation. But most donor procedures remain con�gured to address the Organizational and functional systems usually designed to simple and the straightforward. provide some sort of predictability did not function properly in either country. The most obvious example would be the proce- dures for distributing funds from the central government to rural districts and service providers. Effective support and F. logistical systems, so necessary in all public sectors, were usu- ally lacking or functioning at a low level. INFLUENCE OF INFORMALITY, The continued functioning of capacity systems appears to GHOSTS, AND MULTIPLE SYSTEMS depend to a large extent on a selected set of key relationships and personal involvements deep in the heart of the system INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL informality seem pervasive (e.g., between the Permanent Secretary and the President or in both Sierra Leone and Liberia. The IAAs, not surprisingly, tend between two ministers from a particular geographic area). In to focus their capacity support on the (supposedly) apolitical countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, the nature of and modern structures such as ministries, agencies, strate- power seemed intensely personal and relational. Such relation- gies, parliaments, statutes, and policies that are familiar to ships could fracture easily and undermine the whole direction outsiders. And yet in both countries, informal patterns of of a program. Based on this fragility, capacity bubbles could norms, unwritten rules, patterns of human behavior, customs, quickly appear, expand rapidly, raise hopes and illusions, and and institutions had a major influence on shaping individual then suddenly pop and collapse. and organizational behavior.43 The informal organization seemed more powerful and resilient than the formal counterparts, many of which had The instability of both countries lost trust and legitimacy over the years. Capacity in the form derived in part from their geographical of formal organizations had been, in some cases, reduced to location.The porous borders allowed shell (or ghost) structures sustaining the informal and re- protagonists in one country to seek assuring the external participants. Informal systems could refuge in another. Charles Taylor, for have the power to bring down the Government or to obstruct its reform program in certain key aspects. But informal net- example, former President of Liberia is works based on personal ties and loyalties could also be now on trial in The Hague for atrocities instrumental in keeping aspects of the public sector from committed in Sierra Leone. collapsing further. An important capacity challenge is thus to encourage the migration over time of some elements of Sierra Leone and Liberia were struggling to emerge from a authority, decision-making, and legitimacy from the infor- permanent state of instability. Using a current typology, devel- mal to the formal.44 22 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES The underlying capacity complexities are apparent in Sierra complement the modern and the formal or it can have several Leone and Liberia. In practice, power, legitimacy, and resources governments. Hidden networks and coalitions of provincial are distributed across �ve main systems: 45 “big men� in Sierra Leone, for example, exerted significant I Formal systems are expanding with a good deal of donor control over policy-making at the center. In some cases, elite support. Both countries had begun to implement major groups in the shadow state maintained their patronage power by programs in public sector reform. In Sierra Leone, the stripping resources out of the formal (public sector) system and post-conflict period had also seen the growth in non-ethnic distributing through the informal to maintain their power and civil society organizations such as NGOs, Rotary Clubs, credit position.50 groups, churches, and Islamic fraternities. The national capacity development strategy in Liberia focuses almost entirely on the formal. Patterns of informal behaviors, power, I Informal systems consist of hidden patronage networks, per- resources, relationships, groups, sonal relationships, coalitions, and elite groupings that networks, and structures, which can come out of neo-patrimonial relationships connecting differ- operate as a hidden but coherent ent groups and regions to the center. More attention in any system, run parallel with the modern capacity analysis or assessment is needed into the informal at times and intertwine with it system given its fundamental importance. sometimes. I Traditional systems revolved around institutions such as the chiefs and other indigenous practices, including the religious, where the depth of cultural and historical roots What all this amounted to in Sierra Leone and Liberia 46 varies. This system could intermingle and compete with was a complex, interconnected mix of the formal and the the formal state as in the cases of the relationships between informal, the explicit and the implicit, the open and the hid- 47 chiefs and local governments in Sierra Leone, or between den. It is, of course, true that all countries may have these formal and traditional systems of justice. intertwined systems to some degree. The difference in I The donor-funded parallel policy and management system states such as Sierra Leone and Liberia was the likelihood in both countries had reached a size and scope with the of the greater power and influence of the traditional, infor- potential to by-pass and/or overpower the formal. The danger mal, the parallel, and increasingly the criminal systems.51 here is of IAA technical assistance and contract employees Capacity models from high-income countries face difficulty ending up doing most of the economic and �scal manage- in gaining traction, effectiveness, and legitimacy in this ment, program design and implementation, and monitoring context. and evaluation. In Sierra Leone, in particular, this parallel This leads directly to the need for more complex assess- system included such structures as joint sector and the- ments of the interaction of these systems.52 And post-conflict matic working groups and separate delivery organizations states are more likely to have many different sources of cred- such as project implementation units. ibility, resources, and legitimacy—all of which leads in turn I Criminal system frequently intertwined with the informal to a series of questions: Which system can command the had emerged in both countries. 48 International gangs have most legitimacy with which groups? Which system is likely begun to use countries in West Africa for diamond smug- to exert the most control over delivering goods to citizens? gling, money laundering, human traf�cking, and drug trad- What is the incentive for bureaucratic and political elites to ing to Europe. 49 In the medium term, the danger exists of make genuine efforts to develop the capacity of the formal criminal groups and networks taking over whole ministries sector given the hidden rewards available from informality? or government agencies. How will the interactions of these systems shape change and reform in the public sector? How should we think differ- All kinds of complex interrelationships between the formal and ently about capacity development given these complex rela- the informal or between the informal and the criminal or tionships? What should be the implications for donors of between the formal and the parallel are possible in post- focusing their support on perhaps the most fragile of all the conflict states. A country can have informal institutions that country systems? THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 23 depends mainly on the crafting, acceptance, and upholding G. of these rules especially by elites, then the process of put- ting in place the legitimate institutions that both countries INFLUENCE OF POWER so badly need could take decades to play out. This sense of AND POLITICS a political time-scale needs to be balanced off against the bureaucratic and the programmatic to come to any sensible CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN any human situation is also about estimate of time required. allocating authority, access, resources, control, and power. The interrelationship, between power and capacity, matters In some instances, capacity development can proceed in a rel- at the project and program level as well. Which organizations atively apolitical fashion (e.g., the enclave of a central bank pro- and which staff get access to what resources are crucial factors. tected by powerful international supporters such as the IMF and Who bene�ts? and How? are key questions in capacity devel- the country participants having a shared understanding and opment even at the micro or individual level. The behavior and acceptance of international practice). In others such as forestry interests of individuals, groups, and factions that surround departments or universities, conflict over power, authority, and a capacity system need to be included in any exercise in organizational identity can go on for generations.53 capacity mapping. Making that connection between the politi- In Sierra Leone and Liberia, political power and practice cal economy and the state of the public sector becomes a key were structured in particular ways. In the case of Sierra Leone, analytical task of the donor. the political system, with similar patterns in Liberia, had some of the following characteristics:54 I General system of patrimonialism, H. I High levels of political disorder, I Lack of institutionalization, EMERGENCE OF WIDE-RANGING Limited adherence to formal rules and procedures, and CAPACITY NEEDS I I Resort to personal and vertical solutions. AND INTERVENTIONS The international development community has long been both unwilling and unable to synthesize the technical and the polit- CHARACTERISTICS OF POST-CONFLICT states include a wide and ical. Much of this attitude is now changing with the accep- varied range of capacity needs and opportunities at all levels and tance of the importance of political economy. in all forms. Some can be quite sophisticated and formal. Others will be basic, informal, and simple. Some may see capacity development mainly as a technical or functional issue. Others Post-conflict states tend to generate emphasize the political and psychological aspects. Given this political and economic systems whose variety, conventional approaches to capacity development main priority is societal control and become simply one of many possible interventions that must be stability, elite survival, and the avoidance matched up with needs and feasibility. of violence. Some sort of dominant The IAAs and governments need to address this range of needs with flexibility and imagination. In Sierra Leone and coalition sets the rules that indirectly Liberia, we could see a range of capacity interventions at work govern the who-gets-what aspects of that went beyond the usual approaches: capacity development. I Quick-acting capacity interventions (or surges) can make a difference in the short term. In Liberia, the Emergency The rules for use of political power in Sierra Leone and Capacity Building Support, the Transfer of Knowledge Liberia—its source, nature, application, and abuse—was not through Expatriate Nationals, and the Senior Executive settled in either country given their recent histories. But if Service were established to attract skilled Liberians into we accept that capacity development in any lasting form the public sector. 24 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES I Helping elite groups in Liberia come to some kind of accommo- External help and even control may be crucial at the begin- dation was exempli�ed by the support to peacebuilding and ning of post-conflict operations to stabilize the situation and awareness-raising by the United States Institute of Peace make citizens believe that something—anything—is being and the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.55 This type done to make their lives better.60 And yet as the process pro- of intervention goes back to an earlier point: that peace- ceeds and parallel structures are created, IAAs and countries building, statebuilding, and capacity development may fre- reach some sort of tipping point beyond which direct IAA con- quently intertwine. trol and execution begins to marginalize the government and I Building social capital and support networks were evident in undermine the very country capacity that is needed to make the Enhancing the Interaction and Interface between Civil any kind of sustainable difference. Society and the State to Improve Poor People’s Lives in External efforts at capacity development in Sierra Leone Sierra Leone, which was working with the Government on and Liberia appeared to be unaware of dilemmas or of being a national collaboration strategy.56 close to the point of falling into one trap or another. Most IAA I Awareness raising and attitudinal change in support of reform documents in Sierra Leone and Liberia at some point called was an undertaking by the Sierra Leone’s task force on atti- for a comprehensive approach. But when the intervention was tudinal change. In Liberia, two key civil society actors were designed to be simpler and more tightly focused, the lack of the Center for Promotion of Democracy and the Of�ce of attention to those broader factors made it lose effectiveness. Women Lawyers. Can a ‘simple’ approach to capacity development produce the I Connecting capacity systems at various levels (e.g., chiefs, initial platform that can, in turn, allow for more ‘complex’ councilors, parliamentarians, professional staff, donors and approaches over time? Can analysis and experimentation lead service providers at the district level) through poverty reduc- to �nding the small interventions that can make a big differ- tion strategies.57 ence? It is also dif�cult for IAAs to push for results and capac- I Addressing the needs of particular groups with the inclination ity development effectiveness while at the same time allowing to restart the conflict. In both countries, youth in general country participants to �nd their own way. The sense is that would be in this category.58 this pattern of dilemmas, paradoxes, risks, and traps is more I Building coalitions and partnerships in both the public and widespread and more intractable in Sierra Leone and Liberia private sectors with the capacity to advocate for and actu- and other post-conflict states than in comparable low-income ally deliver development results. The Liberia Development states. But such a condition does not have to lead inexorably Alliance, a private sector coalition, was one example. to stalemate and immobility. BOX 3.1 elaborates further on responses to dilemmas, paradoxes, risks, and traps. I. PRESENCE OF DILEMMAS, J. PARADOXES, RISKS, AND TRAPS CHALLENGE OF TRANSITIONS, ALMOST ALL EFFORTS at capacity development in post-conflict SCHEDULES, DEADLINES, states by both country governments and IAAs are continually AND TIMING faced with dilemmas, paradoxes, risks, and traps. Country organizations get trapped in low-demand, low-support, low- TRANSITION AND CHANGE is constant in all countries. But both performance systemic patterns from which they cannot escape Governments and donors in Sierra Leone and Liberia were without outside help.59 The IAAs push for improvement in challenged with managing a variety of transitions, schedules, one direction only to find that things are getting worse in and deadlines that applied to capacity development interven- another. The drive for more efficiency undermines organiza- tions. Sierra Leone and Liberia seemed much more liable to tional sustainability. More IAA control lessens some risks entanglement with time and timing issues as they tried to but increases others. move out of the immediate post-conflict phase. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 25 BOX 3.1 RESPONSES TO DILEMMAS, PARADOXES, RISKS, AND TRAPS Post-conflict states have capacity needs in all areas of national to a slow-down in operations, disempowering local institutions, and life. And they need the development of a wide range of capabili- undermining capacity development. ties. In response, the boundaries of capacity strategies stretch to External funders are reluctant to pay for the overhead and operat- the point where they are indistinguishable from the development ing costs of NGOs and other civil society groups on the grounds of process itself. And then the focus on capacity itself disappears. encouraging sustainability. These groups in turn, feel pressure to Any effort at capacity development needs improvement in individ- comply in an effort to maintain program funding. They end up ual skills through mentoring and training. Yet the more skilled trapped in a vicious cycle of under-achievement.a staff become, the more marketable they become and the faster Efforts to work with informal actors and a wider range of country they move to better jobs. actors may threaten the interests of certain elite groups whose A range of service delivery options need to be maintained in case commitment is key to supporting capacity development. Ownership, some cease to function. And yet the fragmentation of delivery in certain instances, may be a barrier to moving forward. options is one of the bad outcomes that can appear in many post- Adapting to country culture can make it easier to get external conflict states. interventions to take hold. And yet accepting country practices can also legitimize dysfunctional structures and ideas. The high incidence of corruption in post-conflict states can lead IAAs to insist on transparent and tightly controlled �nancial man- a For an analysis of this pattern, see A.G. Gregory, and D. Howard, “The agement and procurement. But such an approach can easily lead Nonpro�t Starvation Cycle�, Stanford Social Innovation Review, Fall 2009. BOX 3.2 A BALANCED VIEW FROM THE FIELD It is important not to get carried away with the dysfunction of the Judging from the situations in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the over- capacity situation in post-conflict states. In certain instances, it all pattern is a complex mixture of the dysfunctional and the hope- is important and justi�able to take a more optimistic view of the ful. Some areas remain impossible to reform in the short or potential in Sierra Leone and Liberia. medium term and should be avoided regardless of need. Others may present real possibilities. In Sierra Leone, two peaceful, legit- In common, everywhere, people in these two countries have abili- imate elections for President, Parliament, and local councils have ties, take ownership of valued activities, feel committed about cer- been held. A good deal of progress has been made on reintegra- tain things, and want to make their lives better. In many capacity tion and reconstruction. Major improvements have been made to situations, we saw inspired leadership, political protection, staff the military and the police. There has been substantial decentral- pride and energy, and ethnic resilience that kept things function- ization to district councils. The functions of �nancial management ing. Older dysfunctional institutions may have been shattered. And and procurement are said to be better. donor pressure for reforms may have the potential for more of an impact. In Liberia, virtually all UNMIL staff with experience during the immediate post-conflict period pointed to the substantial The point here is that these strengths exist but sometimes not progress made since 2004 in local government, tax administra- in a form that technocratic interventions can easily recognize tion, and election management. The Liberia Institute of Statistic and use. Latent invisible strengths, like market opportunities in and Geo-Informational Services and other such organizations are high-income countries, may be hiding in plain sight. A key chal- beginning to function well. The Liberian private sector has shown lenge for IAAs is helping put in place processes of capacity energy and promise. The challenge for both countries and IAAs is development that can help unlock these assets and put them to to have a sense of these conflicting patterns and the ability to take productive use. advantage of the opportunities. 26 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES Much of the work in Sierra Leone and Liberia suffers from UN Security Council) responding to agendas of little conse- the pattern of chronic underestimation of the time required quence to needed capacity development in the country. The for effective capacity development. Part of this has to do with mandate of the United Nations Military Intervention in Liberia trying to �t such activities within the bureaucratic schedules (UNMIL), which has played a huge role in capacity develop- of donor agencies. Part has to do with too much attention paid ment in Liberia, is scheduled to end in 2012. Combined with to the organizational engineering aspects and too little to the the usual pattern of short or transient donor attention spans, development of relationships, political initiatives, mindsets, and capacity development processes in post-conflict states fre- changed behaviors. Some international development agencies quently end up trapped in schedules, deadlines, and exit could live with this complex process of quasi-developmental points that make little sense in terms of normal organizational activities. Others found it more dif�cult. or institutional evolution. BOX 3.2 provides a perspective by Many of the schedules and targets are set by external the author of impressions of activity on the ground in Sierra actors (e.g., political actors in bilateral IAA countries, and the Leone and Liberia in terms of capacity development. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 27 IV. PROGRAMMING IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES G iven these capacity challenges in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the question emerges, so what? What are A. likely to be the implications for capacity develop- ment efforts? IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL One specific area of capacity development as a form of BEHAVIOR AND CHANGE change that needs much more analysis and research is that of the emergence of collective capabilities. How do capabilities THE USUAL DISCUSSION about levels of capacity development in form under a variety of conditions and in support of a variety post-conflict could be heard in Sierra Leone and Liberia. And in of functions, both logistical/technical and otherwise? How recent years, both theory and practice have emphasized the can we better understand the complex systems changes that importance of going beyond the focus on the individual. But the are involved? Efforts to address these questions in Sierra critical importance of individuals—their interests, their actions, Leone and Liberia were some of the least instructive. People their values and background, their influence, and their control espoused one theory only to actually implement another. for better or worse—was also evident in both countries. In a As capacity development interventions became ever more context of few established rules and institutions, small organi- complex and multi-layered, the range of capacity develop- zations, informal coalitions, and networks, the behavior of ment strategies that seemed to be at work expanded dramat- individuals in country organizations in Sierra Leone and Liberia ically with little real effort at encouraging more coherence. mattered crucially. The IAAs and countries tend to have answers to the what, The importance of individuals at the operational levels of when, and why questions. But they are frequently vague on country structures influenced the perennial debate between the the how issues. Many approaches to capacity development so-called hard and soft approaches to change. In Sierra Leone seemed poorly conceived in many of the interventions we and Liberia, capacity development was basically about people looked at. changing their individual behavior. And yet we still know little 28 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES of operational use as to why people in post-conflict states are BOX 4.1 motivated to make those changes.61 How does knowledge con- tribute to the social capital that can in turn, help to strengthen CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT EMERGING institutions? How can people better learn to reflect on their own THROUGH STAGES behavior and move to new levels of awareness and learning? What kinds of relationships help with this process? And what, Overall capacity emerges out of a combina- if anything, can donors do to contribute and support such an tion of interacting processes and appears to proceed through stages. One hypothesis activity? about actual change process emerges from It is, of course, true that IAAs may have little to contribute in the following: this area of changing complex human behavior. Perhaps as a result, they gravitate to the technical, the rational, and the logis- Individuals acquire skills, competencies, tical. But they do need to accept the importance of the emo- motivation, con�dence, access to resources, tional and the psychological especially in countries with searing and support structures. memories of the past. At the very least, they need to try to do whatever is possible to avoid undermining country motivation. Collective capabilities begin to cohere and form in a variety of areas such as technical and organizational functions, social and B. human behavior. EVOLUTION AND STAGES These collective capabilities themselves bal- ance and reinforce each other as the organi- OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT zation or system becomes more varied and complex. THIS PROCESS OF capacity development was a complex one in Sierra Leone and Liberia for two reasons. First, both countries The organization performs in various ways themselves were moving, albeit at various speeds, from imme- and in the process, searches and hope- diate post-conflict to the initial transition and on to early recov- fully finds some sort of niche or area of ery; and the broader context for capacity development was con- contribution. stantly shifting. Second, the capacity systems themselves (e.g., groups, organizations, networks) were also evolving through The system establishes relationships and networks of support that can help ensure its stages and becoming more complex in function and structure. survival, legitimacy, and access to resources Box 4.1 provides an hypothesis of an actual change process. Almost all formal organizations, which were visited in prepar- The organization or system strives to insti- ing this report, in both countries were struggling to regain their tutionalize itself and acquire some sense of structural integrity and coherence. District governments and sustainability. Parliament were two of the most obvious. Almost all were seek- ing to re-establish an identity and �nding a contribution or niche that could lead to public value. Many need new legislation that could underpin new roles and functions.62 The likelihood in post- conflict states, however, is that most formal organizations may tion. The IAAs, not surprisingly, focused on the transfer of tech- have regressed back to the early stages of capacity development. nique and knowledge in the short term. And yet the key survival That pattern, in turn, has implications for the type of technical capabilities—to act, to cope, to be resilient, to create space, to assistance that would be needed, the absorptive capacity of the adapt, to relate, to communicate, to create legitimacy—tend to organization, and the time required to make progress. emerge later in the process. Such collective capabilities usually The early stages relate to putting in place the strategies, only emerge over an extended period of time. Getting these structures, systems, and staff that make up the organizational capabilities routinized and institutionalized was a particular hydraulics—the technical or functional—of the system in ques- challenge in both countries. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 29 The latter stages extend into the medium and longer the direct or planned approach and the indirect or emergent term, laying at the heart of the capacity development chal- approach. Most technical assistance, for example, was implic- lenge. The risk for donors was the strengthening or creation itly aligned with the direct model with all its attendant contri- of shell organizations and institutions that had no resonance butions and blind spots. Civil society gravitated much more or rootedness in society with few useful outputs. Missing in to the indirect. both Sierra Leone and Liberia was the capacity to protect The direct or planned approach to capacity development and sustain a complex process of change under dif�cult con- has been a mainstay of development cooperation for over ditions over a long period of time. The IAAs usually com- a half century. The heart of the direct perspective is the assump- pounded the problem by running out of patience soon after tion that the participants in any capacity development inter- the early stage of knowledge transfer and functional upgrad- vention are autonomous actors who will choose to do better ing. This pattern had already begun to unfold in Sierra Leone if they know better. They are willing but unable. The assump- and Liberia. tion here is the value of human intentionality and cognition. Gaining coherence is a dilemma that is more heightened Objectives can and must be figured out in advance. Plan- in post-conflict states. Most organizations have been frag- ning is key. mented and need support across the board. Yet they did not The indirect or emergent approach is based on a quite dif- have the absorptive capacity to take on complex programs of ferent set of assumptions and a different rationality. The focus capacity development especially in the short term. Some got is on �nding a pattern of capacity opportunities in the struc- stuck at a certain point in their development and could not ture and behavior of the country—its political, economic, get unstuck using the conventional methods that got them cultural, social, historical, and psychological aspects. A key to that point. assumption of the indirect perspective is the importance A good deal of formal capacity development in Sierra of these country political and economic systems in shap- Leone and Liberia had to do with positioning rather than just ing the emergence of capacity in the form of organizations functional upgrading. Disabled organizations such as schools and institutions. This approach tries to come to grips with and health posts were trying to re-establish old roles. Others dynamics of complex systems change. This perspective puts such as county councils were trying to establish new ones. forward a different cause and effect rationality compared to What ensued was a complex pattern of institutional and orga- the direct approach. This approach has much less empha- nizational change in which various actors jostled for position sis on prediction and control. It is much more bottom-up and survival, searched for resources and legitimacy, sought and emergent compared to the more top-down of the direct support and protection, and tried to craft new identities or approach. get rid of old ones. Capacity building from this perspective Table 4.1 outlines two ideal types or approaches to design- had to do with helping key groups to develop new patterns ing or crafting a capacity development intervention. of relationships, awareness, and acceptance; and of seeing Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses. At its their connective systems and then connecting them in some worst, the direct approach can reinforce the arti�ciality and way to citizens. disconnection of the state from the rest of society and can undermine existing informal arrangements that actually work better. External support can sustain this divide and lessen the incentives for state actors to base capacity building on coun- C. try resources and institutions. The end result is a mismatch between state and society that severely limits any process of TWO MENTAL MODELS OF CHANGE capacity development. A danger of the indirect approach can AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT be the loss of coherence and direction. We need to appreciate the interconnections between FOR THE PURPOSES of the analysis, two approaches or “men- these two approaches. They can be cast as archetypes or tal models� of capacity development seemed to underlie opposite ends of the capacity spectrum. They do, of course, most of the thinking in Sierra Leone and Liberia.63 These are differ on the purpose and nature of change. And they are 30 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES TABLE 4.1 Aspect Direct approach Indirect approach Direction of initiative Top-down Middle-up-down or bottom up Style More technocratic and engineering Hard and soft Standards of performance Tends to optimal Tends to good enough Role of technical expertise TA expert-driven Expert facilitated Focus on gaps and strengths Focused more on gaps and weaknesses Focused more on strengths, assets participant energy Attitude to control and learning Oriented more towards structure and control Oriented towards organic adaptation and learning Nature of objectives Clarity of ends and means General strategic intent Attitude to context Focus on how system should work Focus on how system does work Attitude to planning Faith in programmed change Faith in emergence and evolution Approach to results management Focus on end state results Focus on incremental discovery Outlook Limited perspectives especially the technical Multi-perspectives Nature of change Knowledge transfer and changes to formal structures Partnership and coproduction Systems view Reductionist emphasis on the parts Systems emphasis on wholeness. Analytical biases Emphasis on analysis, design and prediction Emphasis on observation and experimentation Ideology – the what Process – the why, when, and how View on expansion Emphasis on scaling up and expansion Emphasis on organic growth Emphasis and orientation Emphasis on ef�ciency and effectiveness Emphasis on relevance, legitimacy Comparative advantage Best suited to addressing simple and complicated Best suited to addressing complex situations situations based on different conceptions of development. But in real life in post-conflict states, only a few capacity challenges D. can be resolved by relying solely on one of these approaches. Every organization, for example, needs technical and func- NEEDS, ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY, tional skills to do something. And every technical organ- AND READINESS ization is part of a larger complex human system that needs to respond and adapt and draw resources from its context CAPACITY ANALYSES HAVE historically been oriented to diag- in a variety of ways. The issue is the balance and the syn- nosing, identifying, and addressing country needs. In the thesis in a particular case.64 What may be needed in many process, however, not enough attention has gone into clarify- post-conflict states is a complex range of interventions, the ing absorptive capacity or readiness or willingness to act. We direct in some limited instances, the indirect in others, and know that political and bureaucratic systems generate space, finally many hybrid interventions that try to incorporate opportunity, and dead-ends. the strengths of the indirect and informal into the direct and A tension will usually exist between visions of transforma- formal. One of the best examples of both these approaches tion and those more to do with incremental change.66 Certain at work has been the reform of the security sector in Sierra groups, including many from outside, tend to see capacity Leone.65 The evolution of the implementation of the national collapse as an opportunity to put in place something new and capacity development strategy in Liberia will likely be more functional.67 But they may have less understanding another. of the potential system-wide risks of dramatic attempts at THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 31 reform.68 Internal groups have a much better sense of these ages citizens to maintain a connection to the state. Capacity in internal dynamics and the costs of uprooting structures and the form of legitimacy, it turns out, is something that is con- practices that have long been effective and that have survived ferred from the outside as well as developed from the inside. the long period of conflict. But these internal groups can also Country actors themselves have the main role in address- miss windows of opportunities that might close abruptly in the ing the legitimacy de�cit. But external groups can contribute future. In many situations, it is not clear if windows of reform something to this stage of capacity development. opportunity exist only at the early stages of reconstruction The IAAs need to be aware at least of the legitimacy issue compared to later in the process. Do capacity ‘windows’ shut and its importance as an element of and a contributor to capac- or widen later on? Does this system have the absorptive capac- ity. And they need a broader view of legitimacy itself. In some ity to integrate the capacity development intervention that is cases, legitimacy may mean a kind of acceptance amongst groups in the political and bureaucratic systems. Or more likely, under discussion? The experiences in Sierra Leone and Liberia it can come from the usual performance and service delivery tend to suggest that external enthusiasm for clean slates is not improvements that dominate donor interest. Charles Taylor in always advisable. This trifecta of strategic direction, country Liberia won a certain amount of legitimacy in the 1997 pres- commitment, and ability to implement seems critical in both idential election in Liberia as the only candidate who could countries and largely shaped outcomes in the medium term. impose some order of sorts. Effective capacity development should be based on some Capacity development can end up as part of an imported and sort of policy agreement or even an informal, shared under- imposed set of institutions that gets little traction or credibility standing of the way forward in a particular sector. There should in post-conflict states and ends up as ghost or shell structures be enough elite political accommodation to allow some societal with little sustainability or legitimacy.69 Such interventions consensus on the type and nature of various organizations and are usually initiated in the early stages of capacity develop- institutions that were needed to deliver development value. ment, but there is usually little public demand or understand- In addition, it helps if a basic strategy of change has some sort ing. The interventions can end up being kept on life support to of understanding and momentum behind it, including that maintain international standing or maintain the flow of �nancial between the IAAs and the governments. resources. They can frequently end up as shell structures Capacity development in many cases can amount to a patient and get stuck in low-support, low-expectation, low-performance search for small opportunities and pockets of energy, which can traps from which they cannot extricate themselves. possibly be scaled up for greater impact. The implication here The do-no-harm principle can come in at this point. The is the need for venture capacity development (i.e., IAAs support- IAAs must be careful to at least not de-legitimize groups and ing varied small experimental projects that can generate knowl- individuals with whom they work. Or, conversely, be careful edge or country patterns of energy and commitment and build about appearing to legitimize people with unhelpful agendas. relationships based on these). And IAAs need to be conscious of the degree to which their own struggles for legitimacy with domestic audiences can E. undermine efforts at legitimacy at the country end. IMPORTANCE OF LEGITIMACY F. CAPACITY, IT HAS been established, needs a broader interpreta- CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT tion in post-conflict states. State/society relations and partic- ularly the importance of legitimacy must be included as key AS THE MANAGEMENT aspects. Governments in Sierra Leone and Liberia emerged OF TRANSITIONS AND HYBRIDS from conflict with signi�cant challenges to their legitimacy. The absence of such legitimacy may have provoked the conflict THE MANAGEMENT OF transitions seemed particularly important in the �rst place. Any process of capacity development has to in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Programs dominated by technical generate some form of societal acceptance over time. It has to assistance had to �nd a way to transition to a structure that contribute to some sort of implied social contract that encour- relied much more on country expertise and systems. Capacity 32 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES development strategies had to shift from being dependent on learning and reflection in the interest of keeping projects and donor operational �nancing to one �nanced much more from programs moving forward.73 country resources. Organizations focused much more on survival We can contrast these two approaches to change. The �rst— needed to reach a point of self-sustaining performance. A real the performance approach—is usually driven from the top of a danger in post-conflict states is that of capacity development structure. It is more planned and programmed and targeted. processes getting stuck and trapped by failing to manage a Performance is seen as the end. Capacity is quite clearly a particular transition. means to help implement the changes needed to achieve per- The IAAs might therefore be looking at a range of non- formance. Incentives for staff usually �gure more prominently. traditional actors, including informal networks, coalitions, The second—the capacity-focused approach—can go in hybrids with decision-making structures, transitional structures, quite different directions. The goal here is the development of and operational capacity outside the normal formal boundaries. key capabilities. A capacity development approach is usually Unique hybrids may emerge at the country level that may look much more process and learning oriented. It is less programmed nothing like the conventional models of international good prac- and more emergent as participants �gure out new roles, relation- tice.70 This issue of capacity transitionals (or hybrids) appeared ships, and behaviors. Capacity development is an end in itself in many of the discussions during the country visits. The IAAs and can be given space and resources that would otherwise have have familiar organizational capacity and delivery models for the gone to getting immediate results. Participation, as well as more short and long term. But those that can function in the mid- emphasis on values and culture, matters. Technical assistance range are not being utilized. Sierra Leone and Liberia seemed to is designed more to facilitate than to energize performance. need a range of actors—regional service authorities, quasi- The tension between the two is likely to be greater in post- government agencies outside the public service, special imple- conflict states given the pressing needs for short-term action. mentation units, trust funds, separate capacity development The challenge is to �nd a more integrated approach to change facilities, provincial reconstruction teams, the use of non-state that can somehow combine performance and capacity. In the actors, traditional courts, decentralized service development end, the aim is a kind of rising spiral, in which performance units, and capacity development facilities.71 Many of these are leads to capacity, leading to greater performance. decentralized, voluntary, and issues oriented, both public and The two approaches can be consciously sequenced with private.72 In Liberia, the Governance and Economic Manage- performance and task accomplishment coming before capac- ment Assistance Program (GEMAP) was one of the best exam- ity development. The reverse does not seem to work. Programs ples of a mid-term transitional structure. But these structures and interventions that make space and resources available for all needed to come with a reintegration and mainstreaming learning and reflecting can accomplish both objectives. Train- approach built into them from the outset to avoid the creation of ing programs, particularly on-the-job training, can be designed a permanent, parallel system. to integrate working and learning. Clearly, a leadership style that combines task and perform- G. ance with that of capacity development enables the integrated process to take hold. Technical assistance staff need to be INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN clear on the possible dilemma and �nd ways of structuring their role accordingly. PERFORMANCE AND CAPACITY TENSION FREQUENTLY EXISTS in post-conflict states between H. IAA-supported interventions designed to generate performance and those focused on developing capacity. In many cases, the TIME AND TIMING need for short-term action in the absence of country capacity leads to the drive for results with only secondary attention paid FEW ISSUES IN capacity development in post-conflict states to capacity development. In other cases, technical assistance seem so misjudged as time and timing. The implementation staff are tasked by IAAs and countries to focus on task accom- time needed for programs is invariably and chronically underes- plishment. The IAA staff themselves frequently have to sacri�ce timated. Implicit judgments (“progress appears disappointing�) THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 33 on achieving objectives seem completely disconnected from capacity development in post-conflict states is a dif�cult issue any serious analysis of the time needed to accomplish anything to unravel.78 Participants are dealing, directly or indirectly, with signi�cant. Short-, medium-, and long-term interventions get at least four time-related issues: muddled up. Impatience for results grows at the same time I Absolutely critical interventions to help prevent state col- that IAA are also proposing ever-more complex reform pro- lapse or at least the restart of conflict (e.g., the short-term grams. Capacity development activities in particular can lag reform of the police);79 behind other elements given the dynamics of change involved. I Interventions with potentially urgent impacts that would be Some end up trapped in a repeating pattern of inappropriately needed in the short and medium term to help ensure state �t interventions.74 stabilization (e.g., putting in place basic �nancial control The growing understanding of the effects of political econ- systems or approaches to dispute resolution); omy has encouraged the need to keep in mind a long-term per- I Interventions that must be started in the short term but spective on capacity development.75 Capacity, especially in the whose potential bene�ts and impact may not appear until form of the emergence of sustainable organizations and institu- the medium or long term (e.g., law enforcement or certain tions in the public sector, is essentially the outcome of political aspects of the rule of law); and bargaining or actual conflict.76 Part of this process has to do with I Interventions whose commencement can be deferred for the transformation of a multiplicity of meanings and values into the medium term (e.g., some forms of service delivery).80 some sort of shared values.77 In many countries, we can see this long-wave evolutionary perspective bumping up against the short-wave engineering view commonly held by both govern- The strategic objective here is for IAAs in post-conflict states to ments and IAAs. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, efforts at decen- act with urgency, focus, scale, and effectiveness. Many coun- tralization, for example, showed both approaches. Different try programs now talk of capacity surges to help ensure stabi- groups, including ministries, parliamentarians, local politicians, lization. In Liberia, the UNDP-supported Emergency Capacity- and community groups, contested over power and legitimacy at Building Support Project was designed to place senior Liberian the local level. Much of this reflected struggles that had been of�cials in public service to stabilize its functioning quickly. underway for decades. At the same time, IAAs were helping In some cases, this emphasis could mean deferring attention to refine techniques to do with performance budgeting and to conventional capacity development interventions that are reporting. The challenge here is for participants to get the two important but not urgent. What seemed to work in Sierra Leone processes to overlap and reinforce each other in a positive way. and Liberia was a process of sequential ‘muddling through’ in What can be done in the short term (3 to 6 years) to stabilize which some activities were structured and phased and others an organization? How can a very short-term intervention best were reactive to events. be designed to lay the basis for medium- and long-term ap- An undue emphasis on sequencing can lead IAAs back into proaches? With regard to the time and timing issue, what seems an undue reliance on planning, scheduling, and targeting that to be important is to treat it as a design question that requires can quickly lose sight of political dynamics or country capac- serious analysis in terms of contextual factors, historical patterns ity to implement. Larger trends and patterns of statebuilding of implementation, the political economy of change, and others. and political change can shape sequencing.81 There are thus Simply stuf�ng capacity development interventions into the con- limits to the possibilities for both macro- and micro-scheduling straints of donor approval and budgeting systems seems a recipe of capacity development activities in terms of phasing, timing, for more missed opportunities and possible failures. and rolling out activities as part of a centrally directed set of interventions that build logically on each other into a coherent I. whole at process end.82 Another key element is the respective roles and degree of SEQUENCING OF CAPACITY control of IAAs and country governments in sequencing these DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS interventions. In some cases, IAAs may control short-term efforts at stabilization with no anticipation of later country MOST POST-CONFLICT STATES have immediate short-term needs involvement. In others, the country may take the lead. What that should be addressed. The sequencing entanglement in seems important is some sort of strategic sense of the broader 34 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES process unfolding over time (i.e., focusing on key short-term interventions, balancing the short-, medium- and long-term J. aspects and managing the transition from IAA control to country implementation). What can be done in the short term MORE EMPHASIS ON that can have long-term capacity and performance benefits? LEADERSHIP SYSTEMS What would a capacity development strategy look like in a project implementation unit charged with carrying out short- THE IAA COMMUNITY in general has re-discovered the role of term tasks? leadership as a contributor to capacity development.83 Most Some literature refers to a need for the achievement of a sort capacity analyses in recent years have tended to focus on insti- of shared national vision to precede the effective sequenc- tutions or structures or processes of some kind and not enough ing of capacity development. In particular, there needs to be a on leadership. Leaders in a small post-conflict country can have consensus on the core functions of government, an issue that is a disproportionate effect on the actions of other people partic- highly political in every country. There was no indication in ularly in the absence of settled institutions and organizations. Sierra Leone or Liberia of such a political consensus magi- Most organizations in Sierra Leone and Liberia and other such cally appearing in such fragmented political conditions. Can countries remained reflections of whomever had power over some sort of political coalition emerge that can generate a form them. And most networks were webs of individuals in relation- of collective direction and sequencing? How can capacity ships and not organizations. Capacity development in many sit- development interventions best be designed in the absence uations could add up to helping leaders (or capacity entrepre- of such a consensus? neurs) do what they already intended to do. Some sequencing strategies may be needed but are sim- Any new reinvigoration of leadership roles would benefit ply not politically or organizationally feasible. Improvements from reflection on past limitations. There is a limit to the to service delivery, for example, might not be possible in the benefits of fixating on characteristics of individual leaders absence of reforms to the broader public sector, or in the and the degree to which they demonstrate attributes and absence of a major program of infrastructure development in capabilities familiar to Western audiences. What seemed the form of roads, offices, and power. In addition, sequenc- more relevant in Sierra Leone and Liberia was the role of ing can place untenable demands on country organizations in leaders, élites and coalitions in shaping and sustaining new terms of planning, budgeting, and coordination. Countries and locally appropriate institutions for the promotion of sta- may not have the capacity to sequence capacity interventions ble polities, economic growth and inclusive development. that depend on implementation of other activities. Put another What conditions, factors, or incentives could help to induce way, the issues of simultaneous activities and interdepend- elite groups to abandon predatory behavior and opt for more ence may be as important as sequencing. Effective sequenc- collective action in support of developmental goals? 84 What ing implies the careful management of transitions from incentives did elites actually have to stop benefitting from short to medium and long term, which are difficult to design disorder and fragility? Why exactly would they want to sup- and manage. port capacity development? These questions reiterate some of the sequencing and The potential to abandon predatory behavior appears to timing challenges that demand careful consideration in post- be not simply dependent on rational thought or donor encour- conflict countries. From the same perspective, can the IAA agement. In many cases, leaders are members of country community manage these streams of sequencing that achieve elites that show common patterns of thought and behavior. both capacity and performance goals? Can, for example, the Members of such groups frequently face a dilemma by either program objectives, the technical assistance, the contractual embarking on major reforms and losing support from impor- accountabilities, the program structure, the projected results, tant interest groups or going for modest incremental changes the reporting, and the staf�ng be designed in a way that can that can fit within the accepted boundaries of safety and do both? Can they build and then reintegrate the transitional privilege. and the hybrid in the right way and at the right time? Can they Organizational leadership in a post-conflict state would put in place the aid coordination mechanisms to make sequenc- appear to face particular capacity challenges. Many formal ing a shared activity? structures have collapsed or fragmented. What appears to THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 35 matter in such conditions is the ability of leaders/managers to Leadership for political change and economic development re-establish connections and relationships, and to create some is one thing, as support of capacity development is another. sort of coherence, safety, and con�dence. Leaders also need One of the key contributions that a leader can make is to under- followers or at least the energy of a committed group behind stand and explain the nature and source of capacity problems. them if they hope to make progress.85 The leadership issue In this sense, what programs may require in terms of leadership thus ties into those of ownership and change. is capacity entrepreneurship.89 What appears to matter . . . is the ability of leaders to re-establish connections and relationships, and K. to create some sort of coherence, DYNAMICS OF COUNTRY safety, and confidence. AND IAA OWNERSHIP The IAAs tend to support leaders who share their own self- perceived characteristics—educated, progressive, forward look- AID EFFECTIVENESS CONFERENCES in Paris and Accra focused ing, and more. But this fondness for like-minded champions can on the importance of national or country ownership to devel- frequently produce relationships with people with little domes- opment effectiveness. An assumption has been that limiting tic power. The IAAs bene�t from familiarity with country condi- the intrusiveness and supply-driven practices of IAAs would tions and sources of authority that individuals in the country help create the space for country actors to claim the driver’s bring to the process of capacity development. The IAAs want to seat, leading to more attention to county priorities, more use avoid betting on leaders as champions.86 Reforms can be under- of country systems, more encouragement of country leadership mined if too closely linked to an individual who falls from and motivation, and eventually greater development effective- favor.87 And some leaders can end up blocking capacity devel- ness. This connection had become unbalanced given the opment by their attempts at controlling the growth of an organiz- variation in power, capabilities, and resources between funder ation or system long past the point of utility. agencies and partner countries. The aid relationship needed Different kinds of strategies exist in support of leaders.88 The to be reshaped. By reshaping the aid relationship, the well- search for leadership should extend beyond the top level of the intentioned people especially in the countries would have formal systems of government and civil society. Informal lead- more space, commitment, and opportunity to do the right ers have importance in Sierra Leone and Liberia. And leadership thing. at the middle levels of public sector agencies could, in practice, There are still limitations in understanding and addressing be more important than top levels in the capacity development the issues associated with country ownership especially in process. Some potential leaders may be intellectual but may post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia. More intractable issues have no political credibility. Some may be excellent in soothing have now emerged (i.e., the personal, organizational, and the IAA community but have no ability to make governmental political dynamics involved in shaping country ownership), systems work for a particular purpose. Part of the assessment most of which got little attention in the earlier discussions cen- process lies in understanding the mix of leadership in a partic- ular situation and its effects on capacity development and tered on the influence of the aid relationship. Dealing with the performance. ownership dynamic has thus turned out to be a good deal more It seemed to be the case in Sierra Leone and Liberia that problematic than the aid community had imagined. A series of each effort at capacity development revolved around the activ- questions surrounding the issue of country ownership are ities and interaction of a few key people—capacity entrepre- presented in Annex A. neurs, benign protectors, members of informal coalitions and After the visits to Sierra Leone and Liberia, there was an networks, “big people�, and a few influential specialists. The uneasy sense with the application of the broad concept of coun- process effectiveness depended largely on the relationships try ownership. Nobody is downplaying the importance of coun- among this controlling group. Once coherence and collabora- try control, motivation, and determination; but it comes with tion collapsed, the entire intervention was put at risk. risks and downsides that have been downplayed in the current 36 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES international embrace of ownership as the latest key to aid The challenge in Sierra Leone and Liberia is to get beyond effectiveness. In practice, relying on the power of the general the vague notion of ownership and look more directly at the principle of country ownership tends to absolve many of the par- dynamics of interests, beliefs, and commitments involved in ticipants, both in the country and in the IAA community, from energizing—or not energizing—capacity development. More sorting out a number of tricky political and bureaucratic issues evidence of the connection between commitment and owner- that lurk beneath the surface of any capacity intervention. In ship is required. particular, the concept does not shed much light on the two An equal concern should be about too little IAA ownership, key aspects that are needed for real ownership: first, a coali- (i.e., too little patience for the long haul, too much temptation tion of country actors arising out of the bureaucratic or polit- to try and support capacity development on the cheap and in ical system that has the power, the authority, the capacity, the short-term, and too little inclination to adapt their own the intentions, and the determination to put in place the policies and procedures to meet these new challenges). What capacity needed to create some sort of public value; and sec- seems to matter is not simply the strength of country ownership ond, an IAA system (i.e., program design, contracting, report- but rather the complex interrelationships between these two ing) that has been reconfigured to support country control ownerships—of countries and IAAs—and the way they interact and commitment. to generate capacity outcomes. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 37 V. CONSEQUENCES FOR IAA POLICY AND PRACTICE T he IAAs face many of the same imperatives for cies, prescriptions, strategies, intent, results, and the commit- capacity development that they are also urging on ment of funds. their country partners. In practice, the commitment Capacity development is not a priority for the Millennium and ownership of IAAs to adapt their own capabilities to the Development Goals. It has never been the subject of World needs of particular countries is a key piece of the capacity puz- Development or Human Development Reports. It is usually not zle. If supporting capacity development in post-conflict states effectively addressed in poverty reduction strategy papers or is a major priority for IAAs, some major reform and adaption other such exercises. The attention it received in the Accra Dec- would be needed. laration and other such efforts seems mainly symbolic. More to The particular nature of the capacity challenges in Sierra the point, capacity development has had no powerful domestic Leone and Liberia puts a premium on IAAs coming up with advocates in IAA countries comparable to those pushing for gen- imaginative and less formulaic approaches to capacity develop- der, human rights, climate change, or even statebuilding. As a ment.90 The business-as-usual approach to capacity develop- development activity, it still does not command the attention, ment can still work in some stable contexts. But the challenges resources, leverage, and priority it needs to gain real effective- of capacity development in post-conflict states create a grave- ness. Most IAAs are simply not organized for making a substan- yard for predictions and detailed planning. As a result, they tial contribution to capacity issues. have the potential to expose the gaps in IAA capabilities. This chapter looks at issues that donors should address if Little of this will be easy. The IAAs, for the most part, have they wish to build their effectiveness in capacity development. historically had an ambiguous, somewhat hesitant approach to capacity issues.91 Many claim that capacity development is the critical issue in their work and that they are focusing on it as a key priority. But it is hard to sustain that argument looking at activities on the ground. In the current aid environment, the A. capacity development issue comes with too many risks and liabilities. Knowledge is limited. Success rates remain low. CRAFTING IAA STRATEGIES Devising strategies to implement complex change, in partic- FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT ular, remains a puzzle. The process and outcomes of capacity development are also A KEY OBJECTIVE FOR IAAs is formulating well-grounded, multi- littered with intangibles that cannot be measured or claimed. level capacity development strategies. However, neither the It �ts uneasily into the current results paradigm. The main ben- UNDP nor the World Bank appears to have a clear approach to e�ts of capacity development are suspected to be long term or capacity development in Sierra Leone and Liberia. At present, long past the point when the credit can be claimed by any of the capacity development efforts in both countries seemed the current participants. For different reasons, neither IAAs nor under-strategized, under-operationalized, under-energized, and governments have given the capacity issue much sustained under-funded. And both Governments seemed to use the issue attention over the years. Both are far more interested in poli- more as a slogan than any kind of de�ned objective. 38 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES A basic decision facing IAAs and governments had to do with the operational contexts. The potential choices and needs the following questions: Should capacity development be seen are enormous. The Government may be uncertain of its pri- simply as a program component or should it also be treated as orities or have a range of hidden agendas. As a result, IAAs a program in its own right? Does it merit sustained independent can devise capacity development strategies that are clear, attention? Or is it simply to be factored into on-going devel- understandable, concrete, measurable, time-bound, coherent, opment interventions on an intervention-by-intervention, and ineffective. as-required basis? Or can it be both—that is, an independ- ently conceived approach to creating and/or strengthening capacity and also integrated into technical and sectoral Capacity development interventions can interventions? lose traction at any time and at any level The World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy in Liberia in a post-conflict country, more so than followed the program component strategy. It set out what in other states. Any strategy needs amounts to a loose collection of capacity components of constant adaptation and renewal. projects and programs. It was decidedly less than a program or an objective in its own right. In the documentation, it is Outsiders in general and donors in particular can easily per- described as a “cross-cutting� issue that can be found through- suade themselves that their interventions are determinant and out the programs at various levels of scope and intensity. From that they can actually build capacity directly through an elixir this perspective, capacity development was not a program or of clever strategy, well-designed technical assistance, and an objective in and of itself, and it required no dedicated staff units or time or resources beyond those included in reg- a strong dose of results-based management. Their inter- ular programs. ventions can be helpful and, in some instances, critical. But The problem with the program component approach was outsiders in the capacity game remain marginal players the resulting lack of focus, intensity, learning, and coher- struggling with issues that they only vaguely understand and ence. The design of many capacity development interven- do not control. This does not imply fatalism or the inevitable tions was implicitly delegated to technical assistance staff failure of any kind of intervention. But it does infer the need and government direction with only modest experience and to be realistic about the leverage that external interventions interest. Nobody was responsible for the quality and effec- can have. tiveness of the interventions. In Sierra Leone, the World Bank seemed taken aback by the lack of capacity develop- ment outcomes associated with project implementation units. The lack of any systematic program or point of management B. hindered learning, experimentation, and strategic think- ing. Basing a capacity development strategy on a project-by- UNDERSTANDING AND project basis did not seem effective in terms of coherence and effectiveness. INTEGRATING THE COUNTRY What would a capacity development strategy look like? What OR REGIONAL CONTEXT value would it add and to what? The analysis of the efforts to put in place a national capacity development strategy give some hint THERE IS AN ACCEPTED line of thinking in international devel- of the challenges involved in answering these questions. But in opment that the country context should be the starting point the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia, the World Bank and UNDP of any serious capacity analysis. 92 In line with this under- had to make a series of choices with or without the bene�t of standing, IAAs should shift their own emphasis from the careful thought and analysis. Box 5.1 gives 10 main issues and application of more generic, imported interventions to ones that supporting questions to consider when an IAA is formulating a are more customized to the particular country context, reinforc- strategy for capacity development. ing local expectations of function, and not preconceptions Sierra Leone and Liberia and other post-conflict states of ideal forms, as the means to determining the more suit- offer particular challenges to IAAs at both the strategic and able approach.93 THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 39 BOX 5.1 ISSUES CONFRONTING IAA IN FORMULATING A CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 1. What is the ‘vision’ of peacebuilding, statebuilding, and capacity 5. How does the IAA see its capacity development role in the building that an IAA is attempting to support in the country? What country changing over time? How would that be negotiated are the choices it is confronting and which choice is it making and managed? And with whom? How would that affect the ‘aid and why? Is the direct support of social cohesion a part of that relationship’ over time? vision? How can these approaches be combined effectively? 6. How is the IAA going to encourage country ownership? 2. What is it trying to do in terms of capacity development? In particular, can the technical/functional be adapted to 7. How does the IAA see the role of technical assistance in reflect country patterns of behavior, institutions, values, contributing to capacity development? How will that role and attitudes? How does it intend to address both the for- change over time? What is the role of the IAA in facilitating mal and the informal? How will it help to facilitate and that evolution? guide change? 8. What is the intent in terms of working with other actors, (e.g. 3. Does the IAA have the basic diagnostic processes in place to other donors, non-state actors, the private sector, etc)? How help staff address the capacity issue? If so, are the implica- will those relationships be managed and by whom? tions broadly understood? If not, what aspects have to be improved? Is there, for example, any kind of a ‘state of the 9. Does the IAA have the capabilities to address these issues state’ analysis that looks at current trends in the public sec- and help manage them effectively? Does it have the capacity tor and its interface with the non-state domain that would to do serious capacity assessments? Does it have the opera- influence any capacity development strategy? tional budget to implement such an approach? If not, what changes would have to be made to the strategy? 4. What are the key dilemmas that the IAA will have to face as it tries to support capacity development? How will they be rec- 10. What are the lurking dangers of an IAA program making ognized? How can they best be addressed? How, for example, things worse? For example, what is the likelihood of improv- is the donor going to manage its increasing involvement in ing state capacity to be even more captured, oppressive and issues that have real political elements? predatory? What can be done to lower the risk? Three aspects of this contextual issue seemed important in space for reform? Where is there evidence of commitment, Sierra Leone and Liberia: energy and motivation? What changes are already under- I Structural features that shape the existing patterns of capac- way? What can the system likely absorb or accept in terms ity such as history, regionalism, political economy, patterns of capacity development? 95 of behavior, national myths and images, ethnic composi- I Context of the aid systems that are supporting the capacity tion, nature and distribution of resources, and levels of interventions under discussion. The outcomes of capacity social capital.94 How did this country get to where it now is? interventions come about through the interaction between What accounts for its most striking patterns of collective two complex systems: that of the country and that of the behavior aid system that is engaged in inducing change in that coun- I Nature of the country’s bureaucratic, institutional and politi- try system. The context of that aid system (i.e., the pressures, cal systems. How do they actually work? What are their incentives, myths, current fashion, and patterns of behavior) strengths? What are the traps? Who bene�ts from the polit- should be factored into the analysis. ical system? What is the nature of the management systems already in place? What forces, interests, and incentives are The IAAs have increasingly emphasized universalized and currently holding various capabilities in place for good or homogenized knowledge over customized country knowledge.96 bad? What are the resources available? What is the political Knowledge about technical subjects (e.g., �nancial manage- 40 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES ment, water resource development) and administrative practices and incentives for doing so. That change would, in turn, have (e.g., performance management, monitoring and evaluation) implications for postings, promotions, and hiring. External have become more valued compared to country-based knowl- and in-country institutions could also be engaged to conduct edge. This trend has often been strengthened by the insistence research and work on selected topics. The respective efforts of country governments anxious to be perceived as using state- could be coordinated and shared with other IAAs. In addition, of-the-art methodologies. a network of country analysts and observers on retainer could The demands of aid coordination, harmonization, and keep aid staff up to date on more immediate political and eco- decentralized functions have required a great deal of �eld staff nomic developments.98 energy and attention. Many bilateral donors have been con- The IAAs should be able to integrate the contextual knowl- verted, as a consequence of their �eldwork, into contracting and edge into their own operations and those of their country part- processing agencies with little residual capacity for research ners and technical assistance staff. Some shared sense of the and analysis, especially at the country level. And, despite their significance and implications of contextual understanding complaints about donor agencies importing inappropriate mod- needs to be in place for it to be useful. The IAAs have to decide els, it is not at all clear that country governments are totally if they wish to develop their own capability for contextual interested in donor agencies developing real insight into local analysis given all their other priorities and the constraints to systems. actually doing it. The IAAs are faced with a decision about developing their capabilities for working in post-conflict states. Any effort at improving the understanding of country systems implies a C. deeper shift in donor behavior, mindsets, and structures. The influence of contextual factors can underpin a quite different MANAGING THE IAA ROLE, mindset about how organizational and institutional change hap- RELATIONSHIPS, AND CAPABILITIES pens. From this perspective, capacity is an evolved response to a variety of contextual factors rather than a consciously engi- THE IMPLICIT CHOICE in terms of IAA capabilities seems to be neered activity, which simply takes context into account. between two options: (a) decide that the challenge of balancing The IAAs need a better sense of which contextual analysis the volume, speed, and focus of their overall programs pre- is essential from the outset and which is simply good to have cludes the added effort and investment needed to get their available. How much is needed to start? Which can be added capacity development interventions up to the next level of effec- through experience and operational learning? How can a �eld tiveness, or (b) decide that the special demands of working in a of�ce be organized for continuous learning? Can it develop the post-conflict state rules out anything approaching business ability to put together a composite picture of a country or a as usual. sector or an issue from disparate bits of information and In the �rst option, incremental improvements can be made insight? How, for example, the political and the technical best to technical assistance, monitoring and evaluation, and a few be synthesized at the country level? How can regional and other aspects. Additional efforts such as more political economy global knowledge be factored in? And can that understanding analysis may not generate much in the way of added bene�ts. be fed into decision-making effectively? For the second option, an expanded and more complex level of Tools and frameworks are available to help donors address the IAA capabilities especially at the �eld level are necessary—a 97 contextual issues. But, alone they are not a viable solution to much higher level of contextual analysis, more direct monitor- gaining a serious understanding of context. The issue is not so ing and supervision, more learning and experimenting, more much their availability as is accessibility and usefulness to a attention to coordination and facilitation, more time devoted to range of practitioners, including in country governments. The crafting strategy, more �eld-based analysis, more focus on IAAs need to address more than the what question but should developing and managing a complex range of relationships, and also seek answers to So what? and Now what? so on. What capabilities will be needed to support the capacity Some staff in �eld of�ces should be dedicated full-time to development program? Which ones are critical? Which ones are building contextual knowledge, with more built in rewards underdeveloped? Which ones are both? THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 41 This second option is deceptively dif�cult. The typical pres- retail activities, a role that comes with its own dilemmas and sures that come with the development business tend to act challenges. against it (i.e., too little time); there is the pressure to get Another issue in this discussion is that of procurement. In results; the lack of staff incentives to spend time on ambigu- some post-conflict states, the high levels of technical assis- ous, possibly unproductive activities that have no career value; tance contracts, equipment supply, and infrastructure can and the shortage of staff in smaller �eld posts. These factors amount to 60–70 percent of the entire program. The pace of do not imply a return to a pattern of direct IAA control. But capacity interventions can be set by the speed of the procure- they do mean a greater IAA investment in indirect support and ment (e.g., vehicles, generators, temporary housing). Many involvement. 99 low-income countries rarely have the capacity to manage such The range and complexity of the capacity issues make loads. The UNDP or the World Bank, in many of these cases, it unlikely that technical assistance, training, restructuring, must be able to either supply the capacity or make a major workshops, and system upgrades—the usual capacity develop- effort to assist country governments. The UNDP has put in ment suspects—can make a real difference by themselves place fast-track procedures to reduce workload and add speed in most cases. And yet the possibility of applying a much and flexibility in post-conflict states. wider range of interventions, a much more comprehensive Capacity development in Sierra Leone and Liberia and other option, is unlikely within the current IAA resources and time post-conflict states usually turns out to be a labor-intensive available. exercise that can eat into administrative budgets and staff time The unsettled, fast-moving, conditions of post-conflict at all levels.100 Managing whole-of-government relationships states put a premium on IAA capacity for the strategic man- and increased donor coordination can impose huge burdens on agement of relationships of all kinds at all levels. Staff must IAA �eld staff. Any additional project, however small in nature, have this competence plus the time and inclination to focus just compounds the constantly growing responsibilities of on this activity. The IAAs in Sierra Leone and Liberia were budget preparation and reporting. The combined effect can put faced with managing diverse and shifting patterns of relation- enormous pressure and time constraints on IAA �eld staff and ships with governments. Some early patterns had the UNDP, can limit opportunities and space for more complex reflection the World Bank, and other IAAs, for example, playing intru- and planning. sive roles in designing and managing recovery programs in the Incumbent on IAAs is the encouragement and support of absence of government leadership and capacity. Over time, country participation, providing strategic facilitation or medi- they needed to shift and rebalance as they tried to move to a ation, and creating and sustaining new connections and rela- more collaborative relationship. To make matters more com- tionships in the process. The IAAs must try to broker and plex, this process of relationship change needed to go at differ- energize change rather than direct it. But again, this role must ent speeds for different interventions in different ministries be played in such a way that does not preempt or overshadow and departments. indigenous country processes. In many cases, IAAs must care- Many IAAs have been trying to shift from retail to whole- fully pass credit on to country participants even when under sale delivery in their capacity development work, mean- pressure to demonstrate results to domestic groups. ing greater attention goes to supporting the work of country If capacity development in post-conflict states is to be actors who, in turn, do the operational delivery and/or execu- given more attention, the nature of �eld staff jobs would need tion. But many formal organizational actors in Sierra Leone to change. In Sierra Leone and Liberia there was a noticeable and Liberia have collapsed or been severely weakened. The variety of relationships and demands ranging from high-level opportunities for wholesale delivery (e.g., partnerships, con- analysis to managing logistics to entering into a constant tracting out, or intermittent support) thus became much less exchange and dialogue with various groups. The capacity than in many other low-income countries. This situation demands of post-conflict states put a premium on the decen- could have two implications: first, a greater attention on tralized UNDP and World Bank staff with more generalized the part of IAAs to working with individuals, informal groups, skills. A centralized IAA model based on sectoral or technical and networks that emerge on the other side of the conflict; skills does not appear to offer the coherent, multi-disciplinary and second, a need for IAAs to revert to some degree to more approach that is often needed in such countries. 42 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES capacity development intervention. Applying a layer of results- D. based management onto a program that has few strategic or theoretical underpinnings seems a recipe for misplaced out- ADAPTING RESULTS-BASED comes. They tend to focus on measuring pieces and not the AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT whole of the capacity puzzle. And they can induce IAAs to sup- port projects that best �t within the measurement con�nes of THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT orthodoxy, including in post- the results-based orthodoxy. At its worst, results-based man- conflict states, puts emphasis on predicting, measuring, and agement can degenerate into a kind of program accounting and achieving performance outcomes. Much of this approach has control device and an end in itself servicing the control needs been codi�ed into increasingly structured approaches to results- of IAAs at the expense of capacity development effectiveness. based and/or performance management, which are now close Few capacity targets and indicators in Sierra Leone and Liberia to being of universal acceptance.101 Many analysts doing work seemed to have any resonance for country participants.105 The challenge is to get away from one-size-�ts-all approaches in post-conflict situations also see these approaches as essen- and come up with a range of approaches that can �t a variety tial to development effectiveness.102 of capacity situations in post-conflict states.106 Some capacity Results-based and performance management methodolo- development interventions—the so-called conventional prob- gies carry signi�cant risks and disadvantages characterized by lems, such as those focusing on introducing techniques of uncertainty, complexity, and lack of consensus such as those �nancial management—may lend themselves to more speci�- in Sierra Leone and Liberia. One inherent dilemma is that of cation of means and ends.107 Others in which the outcomes are premature and inflexible clarity in the short term, focusing much less predictable—the so-called messes—need a more attention on capacity results that in the light of implementa- experimental approach in which the feasible and relevant tion in the medium and longer term may not be appropriate or objectives and measures are discovered through successive even feasible. The power of prediction seems especially low in approximations. In the end, IAAs are faced with combining the post-conflict states. The Carter Center in Liberia, for example, adaptation needed for an effective capacity development strat- did a good deal of upfront thinking and analysis of their future egy with the more predetermined demands of results-based role in capacity development in Liberia but was still faced with management. major rethinking and adjustment once they encountered �eld But most IAAs have not yet crafted and applied these more conditions. varied techniques and would bene�t from consideration of Results-based and performance management also tends to ways for moving forward toward a results-based management shift donors toward the achievement of tangible, short-term out- approach: comes that can be easily measured.103 This is not conducive I Combine up-front strategic thinking with the evolution of to sustainable capacity development. Simply put, many of the more speci�c results and outcomes—sequencing in which current results-based practices induce and reward people for experimentation leads to more direction and clarity—or, achieving and measuring the wrong things.104 They have an in- combine in some fashion the techniques and assumptions built bias for product over process, which when linked to con- of results-based management and complex adaptive sys- tractual payments could, for example, take technical assistance tems thinking. out of the capacity development business. They tend to shrink I Emphasize learning, continuous adaptation, experimenta- the space for adaptation and experimentation. They tend to tion, and country participation as results (seemingly more focus almost entirely on organizational and institutional formal- appropriate than the conventional accountability and con- ity. In the process, they can end up as symbolic activities giv- trol versions). ing little insight into the deeper patterns of system behavior at I Avoid results-based schemes that substitute for serious the country level. thinking about change, performance, and value. And such Particular downsides emerge at the intersection of theories schemes need to be only one way out of many methods that of change and the application of results-based methodologies. contribute to an overall judgment on capacity development Results-based management can evolve into a substitute for, effectiveness. Qualitative analysis and stories can be use- rather than a complement to, a theory of change guiding a ful in assessing capacity results. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 43 I Results-based management schemes need to be legit- That lack of energy applies in particular to senior managers imized and made useful for skeptical country bureaucrats in government. Their influence gets too little attention in the who must in many cases supply the energy, resources, infor- analysis of why technical assistance is unable to contribute mation, and commitment needed to make the schemes much to capacity development. Most such managers have a function. long-term, general interest in capacity development and a short-term, immediate need to get work done. Few technical assistance staff will engage seriously in a capacity develop- E. ment effort without the daily operational space provided by DESIGNING AND MANAGING country managers. Both Sierra Leone and Liberia Governments showed some TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE signs of classic behavior of dealing with large flows of technical IN A POST-CONFLICT STATE assistance, including the lack of capacity to impose their prior- ities on donor preferences. Part of this behavior was country cri- THE CONDITIONS OF POST-CONFLICT states can also present ticism of technical assistance in the aggregate and on principle, dilemmas connected to technical assistance. At �rst glance, the combined with the continued acceptance of more technical importation of technical assistance seems a natural response assistance even in cases where it was not needed or even not to the obvious—an acute lack of country skills and a huge wanted. This behavioral pattern, which can be seen in many backlog of needs and work. But it is also likely that dysfunc- other post-conflict states, has partly to do with the uncertainty tional side effects of technical assistance can be even worse faced by mid-level ministry of�cers when contemplating the in post-conflict states. There are particular technical assis- refusal of technical assistance that is perceived to be free but tance issues connected to post-conflict conditions in the con- tied into donor priorities. In addition, technical assistance staff text of Sierra Leone and Liberia: �rst, the challenges involved can be more obedient and, in some ways, more manageable in getting technical assistance to make a useful contribution than country staff who have more complex personal, ethic, and to capacity development; and second, the systemic pressures political agendas that can complicate life for senior national in the aid business that drive the overuse of technical assis- managers. tance especially in post-conflict situations.108 With the exception of project implementation units, issues Most conventional technical assistance interventions are such as deployment of country counterparts, coaching and men- preceded in post-conflict states by activities of UN peacekeep- toring, transfer of knowledge and techniques, design of training ers and other immediate post-conflict staff. In Liberia, a total programs, or reporting relationships of technical assistance staff of 107 civil affairs of�cers of the UNMIL were still in the coun- seemed to get little sustained analysis and discussion. try in 2009 doing everything from helping to formulate a The deployment of technical assistance personnel seemed national youth policy to trying to strengthen the capacity of the totally neglected as a subject of discussion in both countries. NGO community. The transition from these interventions to the Most of the countries’ technical assistance staff seemed vague more conventional technical assistance needs to be managed or somewhat uncertain about their role in capacity develop- carefully. ment.109 One implication is the need for Government, the World Getting all the varied actors in this complex system to focus Bank, and the UNDP to be more directive about the capacity in a coordinated way on capacity development faces real bar- development aspects of technical assistance programs. riers in generating a shared direction. The Ministry of Finance Without that countervailing influence in Sierra Leone and can have one view, and the Ministry of Transport another. Liberia and other such states, the inexorable tendency is for Senior staff in a country ministry may favor more technical the design and implementation of technical assistance to end assistance. The external �rms recruiting and managing tech- up in a conventional default position of task accomplishment nical assistance have their corporate interests. The technical combined with modest amounts of training and knowledge assistance staff will have a personal set of objectives. It is not transfer. Most of the more demanding aspects of capacity clear who in this cast of characters has the real energy and development—contextual analysis, systems approaches, wide- commitment to embed a capacity development strategy in a ranging change strategies, balancing the easy and the hard, or technical assistance intervention. the short and the long term—seemed to fade quickly into the 44 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES background at the project or program level. Capacity develop- value of training as an element of capacity development. But the ment interventions in post-conflict states, using a signi�cant extreme shortage of people in both Sierra Leone and Liberia may amount of technical assistance, need governments and donors require special efforts to train many more people in at least the to impose an agreed upon strategy. medium term. Saturation training has worked in other settings. The capacity development of formal organizations in more In conclusion, the type and purpose of technical assistance stable situations usually progresses through rough stages toward needs adapting as Sierra Leone and Liberia evolve through the greater complexity and scope. Individual competencies develop recovery phase. Interventions that are designed to be direct and and expand, as do the more collective capabilities. In post- intrusive in year 1 may need to transition into something more conflict states, the likelihood however is that most formal organi- indirect and facilitative by year 5. The UNDP, World Bank, and zations may have regressed back to the early stages of capacity the Governments need to lay down basic strategies and prin- development. That pattern has implications for the type of tech- ciples of capacity development that they want accepted and nical assistance that would be needed, the absorptive capacity implemented by technical assistance staff. That suggestion, of the organization, and the time required to make progress. in turn, would depend on thinking through their approach to Getting technical assistance personnel with the appropri- capacity development in a more systematic fashion, and then ate skills and inclination to encourage capacity development sharing the emerging experiences during implementation with seemed a major constraint in Sierra Leone and Liberia. And technical assistance personnel. the solution of hiring country-based personnel did not always present an easy solution. Those country personnel could bring complex personal agendas and in certain cases less legitimacy F. required to press for reform with former colleagues. Members of the Diaspora, particularly in Liberia, seemed to have less STRENGTHENING THE NEED patience with country practices and behavior than their tech- FOR COORDINATION nical assistance colleagues from other countries. AND HARMONIZATION Most staff on technical assistance assignments were unable to bring their families to Sierra Leone and Liberia, a condition PEOPLE ENGAGED IN STATEBUILDING and peacebuilding and that affected the long-term approaches to capacity develop- capacity building are in the business of helping with system ment. In practice, the technical assistance turnover seemed reconstruction in post-conflict states. And they must try to high. To make matters worse, this frequent turnover was mir- do it through the complex systems under their own umbrella. rored with IAA and country government staff also shifting in Doing so without coordination and harmonization can create then out of projects. This pattern led to a pervasive barrier of huge transaction costs for all. Virtually all capacity analyses in getting people who have both international experience and Sierra Leone and Liberia called for greater coordination and knowledge of country practice and behavior. Perhaps the most collaboration on all sides. promising technical assistance pattern on display in Sierra Many �xes for coordination have been happening in Sierra Leone and Liberia was the sourcing of expertise from Ghana Leone and Liberia where IAAs are trying harder than ever to and Nigeria and other countries in the Africa Region. Com- merge their programs.110 Whole-of-government approaches pared to those from high-income countries, such technical were more and more in use. Country ministries and departments assistance personnel come with major advantages such as were trying to work together to reduce fragmented decision- more comparable experience, more cultural connections, closer making. Trust funds and pooled arrangements were in use in geographical proximity for repeat visits, and lower costs. This both countries. During visits to Sierra Leone and Liberia, evi- rise in regional technical assistance may, in fact, be the key dent patterns were observed with regard to the efforts and prob- innovation in both countries, keeping in mind the potential, lems in dealing with coordination and harmonization. reciprocal problems in the country of recruitment where Neither Government had experienced people (with the obvi- capacity might be thin. ous exception of the President of Liberia) with strong competen- The contribution of training in most countries to organiza- cies in coordinating the capacity development interventions of tional as opposed to individual improvement has seemed lim- IAAs. Both Governments needed additional help and leverage to ited. It has become conventional wisdom to de-emphasize the do this. Worth considering would be the type of joint monitoring THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 45 system, which has shared objectives and accountabilities for Increased coordination usually comes in the form of an both IAAs and countries and which is now in use in Mozambique unfunded mandate for donor agencies. Both the World Bank and Tanzania. Under this approach, external and internal moni- and the UNDP are usually urged to do more coordination by var- tors report periodically on the coordination performance of both ious groups that are unable or unwilling to give them the neces- government and the donors. A mild form of naming and sham- sary �nancial and staff resources to do it. The World Bank of�ce ing can be used to strengthen this approach. in Liberia, for example, was more than willing to collaborate Post-conflict states appear at times to be starting over or more with the UNDP on rule of law issues but had no personnel even to be in a sort of capacity vacuum. Such a situation tends with the time and background to participate. This reinforces one to energize donors to escalate their level of prescription and of the underlying themes of this report—donor support of capac- advocacy beyond normal levels. They tend to become capacity ity development is a good but under-resourced intention. entrepreneurs looking for buyers and owners in the government Too much emphasis on coordination and coherence can marketplace. The result is a rise in the supply of potential inter- impose staff costs on government of�cials and IAA country ventions to be coordinated. of�ces, which could over-dominate more substantive issues. Another source of the increased supply comes with the per- Too much harmonization can lead to thinking and acting in vasive nature of capacity interventions. In Sierra Leone and terms of the lowest common denominator; this inadequate �x Liberia, most IAA-supported interventions claimed to be in can block the imagination, ingenuity, and experimentation that the capacity development business. Such interventions are noto- are so badly needed in post-conflict states. A block of coordi- riously dif�cult to coordinate given the different de�nitions, nated donors can more easily impose solutions on country gov- methodologies, perspectives, sectoral influences, and conflict- ernments but can undermine the motivation and ownership ing views of implementing agencies. Access to reliable informa- that drives national efforts. tion about what is being delivered compounds the problem. Both the World Bank and the UNDP have faced challenges even when coordinating capacity development interventions within their G. own organizations. The danger here was of uncoordinated IAAs tugging and pulling on weak country organizations in an effort to MOVING TO AN EXPANDED implement their particular approach to capacity development. The issue of capacity development coordination presented SET OF CONCEPTS AND a choice for governments and IAAs. Did they want to fashion a ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS broad compact or agreement that would guide the actions of all the actors in a particular country in terms of their efforts at MANY ANALYTICAL TOOLS and frameworks for capacity issues capacity development? A national capacity development strat- already exist. Yet, as has often been the case, when the newly egy was one possible way to coordinate the flow of international designed tools and frameworks are presented in some form, few support to Liberia. Or did they want to move more incrementally people actually use them systematically in their daily work for and opportunistically on a program-by-program basis? Or could extended periods of time. This pattern seems to intensify in they manage to induce coordination at a variety of inter- the context of post-conflict states where few frameworks have connected levels? gained the allegiance of both donors and country participants. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, there was an obvious need for Why is this? 111 the UNDP and the World Bank to go beyond the usual informa- Most frameworks are designed by IAAs or consultants to at tion sharing. The UNDP could provide capacity development least partly address their own concerns. Such frameworks fre- support to Bank operations. The Bank could consider some quently serve as transmitters of international good practice, or support to the national capacity development strategy. Some as efforts at methodological standardization, or as expressions collaboration on the joint use of mapping and assessment of the particular perspective of an individual donor. But they frameworks could be tried in the interests of joint action. Both may not be useful solutions to speci�c local problems espe- organizations could, in the future, do more to co-ordinate their cially in a post-conflict context. Many approaches, for example, approaches to decentralization and the rule of law. Analytical assume the universal bene�ts of technical rationality. But and research support from either side could be shared. country practitioners may not �nd them helpful in addressing 46 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES the dif�cult political and implementation issues that they must There are several analytical frameworks and tools that might confront on a daily basis. be useful if carefully used. Some of these—Rapid Results, Frequently focused on only one aspect of a complex prob- Political Economy, and Capacity Mapping and Assessment— lem, most frameworks do not get past the utility/complexity are already used in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Some of the dilemma.112 Most are exercises in fragmentation and part-by- others, such as Dilemma and Trap Analysis and the Agreement part analysis. The insights generated can disguise as much as and Certainty Matrix, are not widely used at present. Explana- they reveal. tions of these two framework models and others are provided Few analytical frameworks and tools have much appeal for in Annex B. senior decision-makers in country organizations that rely much The way forward on capacity mapping and assessment in more on intuition, accommodation, finesse, and intentional countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia might take the fol- ambiguity to address complex issues. Mid- and lower-level lowing points into consideration: country participants will have their own tacit, indigenous I All external interveners need to restrain their enthusiasm frameworks, which may vary by position. Administrative min- for complex analytical methodologies.113 What seems to istry officers, for example, might have a much more complex matter more is the willingness to listen to various groups, mental model of their work environment compared to that analyze their meanings, look at the development issue from held by the donor staff. The ministry officers, whose main a country perspective, and learn from rather than merely aim is survival, may silently contest IAA models that focus study the people involved. on results and accountability. The relationship of such cus- I What matters more in terms of the use of tools and frame- tomized, tacit country frameworks compared to generic, explicit works is their contribution to the development of broader IAA models require more attention, in particular, to localizing capabilities for strategic thinking and management by the assessment function using country-based organizations external actors such as the World Bank and UNDP. Such and frameworks. capabilities require the synthesis of a variety of skills and It was possible to detect assessment fatigue in Sierra Leone structures, including action research, facilitation, aware- and Liberia. Some organizations were perceived to be tired of ness, and analysis. Some of the tools and frameworks dis- being subjected to endless IAA assessments. Middle managers cussed in Annex B might not be suitable for country in these same organizations have little incentive or time to col- practitioner use; but they could help staff in the UNDP and lect the data that is almost always missing on capacity issues. World Bank of�ces.114 And the trust that is needed for key parts of the analytical puz- I Methodologies need to address more than the usual gaps and zle to emerge is usually not present in the early stages of any constraints, although these remain a crucial part of the analy- design process. Most capacity baselines have limited utility for sis.115 It will be equally important to look for latent or hidden this reason. strengths, opportunities, energies, and possibilities.116 It may Assessment frameworks, whose scope goes beyond the obvi- be, for example, that good performance—the so-called pock- ous and the familiar (e.g., objectives, structure, systems, out- ets of productivity—comes not from capacity per se but by comes, staff) and ventures into the political, the cultural, the the nature of the work being done, by the groups that support historical, or even the psychological can generate discomfort and it, by the serviced constituencies, and by the political factors resistance from both donors and governments. Resorting to that shape its functioning. Assessment frameworks need to tools and frameworks can frequently represent an easy way be able to cover these broader systems issues as well. out for IAAs unable to address the harder tasks of capacity I Capacity mapping frameworks should focus on what assessment and analysis, (i.e., the development of a deeper in- organizations can actually do as opposed to identifying house capability to support a range of capacity interventions). what assets they have or how they are structured. (There What analytical frameworks and tools might be helpful in is a line of thinking that interventions should be designed the post-conflict world of capacity development? Are there to the level of capacity and reviewed for expansion as analytical techniques that can be both insightful and manage- capacity increases incrementally.) Still missing are ana- able? Can they have a reasonable chance of integrating the lytical frameworks that can give practitioners insight into the contextual, the technical, and the organizational? Can they development and interaction of competencies; capabilities; resonate in any way with country staff? and capacity of complex, multi-actor systems. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 47 I It is possible to speculate on what should be included in any context of post-conflict states create the potential for risks and capacity assessment methodology for use in a post-conflict failures. It is also important to keep in mind that the potential state. For example, issues to do with informality, legitimacy, for risk extends to both governments and individuals in post- absorptive capacity and readiness, relationships, history, conflict states. Few country actors get rewarded for experimen- political economy, human system dynamics, networks, tation and innovation. Individuals, in particular, can encounter coalitions, and ownership would need more attention than danger to career and life by challenging vested interests dur- they get in conventional frameworks. Assessing capacity in ing an effort to develop capacity. structures other than formal organizations would be needed. I There is a need to devise analytical frameworks that are What are some approaches to managing risk and failure? accessible to and usable by country practitioners (i.e., par- Putting the potential rate of risk and failure in perspective, the ticipatory diagnostics); at issue is diffusion and mainstream- brutal fact is that most efforts at organizational and institu- ing. Much of the national capacity development strategy in tional change fail everywhere most of the time, especially the Liberia, for example, is premised on the capability of the �rst time, including in the private sector in high-income coun- Government to carry out serious self-assessments of capac- tries. Most capacity development efforts in post-conflict states ity across the range of departments and agencies. And yet are going to fail. The challenge here is in applying serious much of the assessment work done to date is too complex for judgments (i.e., balancing the excusing and tolerating of poor most country practitioners to �nd useful. outcomes with the recognition of the need for greater realism I If the World Bank and the UNDP are serious about leaving in judging those efforts and outcomes). The principle of good a legacy of capacity thinking in Sierra Leone and Liberia, enough capacity development that could be applied over a they would further encourage the Governments to see the realistic timeframe would help. value of such investment in development of country capa- The World Bank is searching for ways to address and man- bilities for capacity mapping and assessment. This could age risk. Development agencies, by the very nature of their include collaboration on a capacity development industry work, cannot make a sustained contribution to development in countries that have the capabilities to do research, analy- outcomes by avoiding risk. The need in post-conflict states is sis, consulting, and program delivery. University institutes, for more systematic risk management by which both IAAs and private research groups, and consulting �rms would seem country governments do more to identify risks and make a to be the obvious actors to assist and encourage. conscious effort to monitor them over time. This approach, in I Finally, the World Bank and the UNDP should provide turn, requires greater knowledge of speci�c country conditions more in the way of policy and logistical support to the and more ongoing monitoring. Field staff would logically be in capacity interventions they support. One possible way of the best position to track the dynamics of political and bureau- doing this would be the design and provision of something cratic risks within country governments. A country program approaching a capacity development toolkit that could would have to be crafted to have a balanced portfolio. provide guidance on addressing capacity issues across a In practice, the failure of most capacity development inter- range of circumstances. It could be updated regularly to ventions is the price of doing business. The few successes— reflect changes in government and donor policy. the high returns—will more than compensate for the many failures. Can IAAs be more open about publicly addressing the risks and failure that lie in wait for any effort at capacity H. development in states such as Sierra Leone and Liberia? Or are IAAs condemned to implicitly promise levels of success BETTER WAYS TO ADDRESS in capacity development in such countries that are simply RISK AND FAILURE unachievable? The most effective way to address risk is not to generate MUCH OF THE ANALYSIS of capacity issues in Sierra Leone and ever more complex designs in a desperate effort to foresee and Liberia remains optimistic in terms of potential progress. Yet, control all the dif�culties. A more promising option would be the constraints in the structural, political, and institutional to come up with more general designs and then focus more on 48 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES adaptation and re-design during implementation. The IAAs to What capacity development strategies work? And, for whom? would, in effect, highlight projects and programs facing major And, under what conditions? And, why? risks and then shift scarce operational resources from initial The following points should be considered in the challenge design to ongoing implementation support, monitoring, and to improving the analysis and research on capacity develop- supervision. One issue here is that the current incentive system ment in Sierra Leone and Liberia: inside IAA agencies, including promotions and career patterns, I Carry out action research on speci�c programs in both coun- is heavily oriented towards design and not implementation. tries that can provide decision-makers among donors and This is yet another indication of the dif�cult internal changes governments with useful insights. Such analysis needs to facing IAAs as they try to come to grips with the challenges of be done quickly to meet real-time needs. working in post-conflict states. I Develop country capacity for research and analysis on capac- ity issues. Neither country has enough research institutions or private consulting �rms that can conduct analysis on I. capacity issues. I Expand analysis and research on broader capacity themes for LEARNING, RESEARCHING, both countries’ programs either at respective headquarters MONITORING AND EVALUATING or in other countries. Both country programs seemed to have little access to relevant support. CAPACITY ISSUES I Improve ways of disseminating and synthesizing any capacity development analysis and research with other country pro- AN ASSUMPTION OF THIS report is the critical need for rapid, gram activities (e.g., health policy or environmental protec- real-time learning in post-conflict states. Working in a post- tion) in a way that is accessible for practitioners. conflict state puts a premium on the abilities of personnel I Share learning and coordinate analysis and research with the within both countries and IAAs to learn, adapt, and adjust in a wider aid community in both countries. complex, rapidly changing, and uncertain environment.117 What I Be prepared to conduct research and analysis in a difficult is happening and what is emerging? Are the ‘right’ results being context. Security issues, political pressures, other donor achieved? What is unexpected? What are the patterns? What concerns may dictate action over investigation and analy- should be done differently and why and when? To address these sis. In practice, the need for rapid decision-making in a questions, donors need to focus on learning and reviewing and post-conflict situation might always overwhelm the pace of rethinking. And they need to try and encourage the same qual- data gathering and reflection. ities in their country partners. Effective ways to research, report, monitor, and evaluate become critical. One possible way to accomplish both research and analysis is Such abilities remain works in progress for all the inter- for the World Bank and the UNDP to include some �nancial national development agencies in Sierra Leone and Liberia, support for research on capacity issues at the country level. including the UNDP and the World Bank.118 All but the most Some activity is, in fact, already underway in both Sierra Leone determined will usually feel defeated by barriers to effective and Liberia on political economy and other topics. Particularly learning, including the amorphous nature of the capacity con- in these countries, it is important to have a better understanding cept, the absence of reliable data, the uncertainty of change, the of the trajectory of organizations in post-conflict states as they pressure of events, the lack of incentives, psychosocial legacy of move through various stages—dysfunction to stability—with conflict, the reluctance to question, and the vested interests of “good enough� progress and not to just focus on the “excellent� potential learners. The IAA country of�ces also seem under- or well-performing public sector organizations. staffed given the pressure and intensity of events. Space and As for monitoring and evaluation, the methodologies under- time for reflection are usually the �rst to get short-changed. lying the capacity development efforts are uneven in Sierra This paper has pointed to the unsatisfactory state of analysis Leone and Liberia. Both the World Bank and the UNDP recog- and research on a variety of capacity issues.119 There is little nize their need to improve the effectiveness of their respective empirical, tested evidence in either Sierra Leone or Liberia that M&E approaches to capacity development. Resource inputs and is readily available to practitioners that sets out robust answers performance metrics, as usual, get the most attention; but the THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 49 more strategic and intangible aspects of capacity develop- the UNDP and the World Bank could also experiment with a ment (e.g., legitimacy, resilience, sustainability, coherence, variety of other M&E techniques such as Most Signi�cant dilemma management, mastering change) get very little. And Change and Outcome Mapping. Emerging methodologies for the heart of the matter—the actual nature of capabilities and evaluating the behavior of complex systems might also be capacity in Sierra Leone and Liberia and the various pathways tried.122 Box 5.2 adds some additional points for consideration of their evolution and emergence—remains unaddressed. The in monitoring and evaluation. IAA community does not yet have a tested, accessible way of doing capacity development evaluations in post-conflict states. The evaluation of capacity development in Sierra Leone and J. Liberia faces the same issues that are present on the assess- COMMUNICATION ment side. A much wider range of formal and informal actors (e.g., coalitions, inter-organizational relationships, informal net- AND OUTREACH works, hybrid structures) need attention in addition to the usual MUCH THINKING ABOUT capacity development comes with a suspects in the public sector. At the same time, more attention functional, introverted focus. The IAAs have traditionally been should be paid to informal monitoring systems in both coun- inattentive to communication outreach during project design tries, including gossip and storytelling. Such an activity would or implementation. And yet it seemed clear in Sierra Leone triangulate with the contextual analysis talked about earlier. and Liberia that outreach and connection in various forms Countries themselves need help in developing their M&E played a key role in improving both capacity and performance. capacity. In Liberia, the M&E Unit in the Ministry of Economic Most IAA-supported interventions contained groups and indi- Planning is the predominant country actor. In Sierra Leone, the viduals (e.g., in ministries, community groups, civil society Statistics Sierra Leone and the Development Aid Coordination organizations, and legislatures) who did not understand the Of�ce of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development role of IAAs, the concept of capacity, the role and limitations is responsible. The challenge comes with helping the two coun- of technical assistance, or utility of government policy. tries design M&E systems that do not quickly degenerate into A significant part of the capacity development process symbolic ritual; there is nothing to gain from the production of in post-conflict states has to do with creating basic under- costly data that is not used for any particular operational pur- standings, inducing support from groups outside the partic- pose. Another challenge is to help both governments create ular intervention, finding creativity and space in unlikely incentives for mid-level staff in public agencies to support places, and earning legitimacy in ways that fits the culture monitoring and evaluation, considering the bulk of the work will and politics of a particular country. Any number of terms— public sector marketing, social marketing, strategic communi- end up on their desks. And finally, both the UNDP and the cations, relationship building—could describe this function.123 World Bank can help develop the capacity of independent All are focused on building commitment to and energy for groups to monitor the work of public sector agencies.120 capacity development across a wide range of groups and In Sierra Leone and Liberia, it may be advisable to have two individuals. different kinds of evaluations: (a) those focused on accounta- The communication and connection capability in Sierra bility using high-level external participation and (b) those Leone and Liberia is limited. Informal communication systems focused on learning using high-level country staff. and their reliance on rumors cannot serve the full needs of a There may be a need in both countries to rethink conven- modern state. In Liberia, the road system was still rudimentary. tional M&E approaches to capacity development. In real life, Television coverage was marginal. Newspapers did not circu- summative evaluations are usually not designed to give busy late much beyond the main urban areas. The UN radio system managers at either the country or the IAA level much in the had national coverage but could not address regional and local way of useful information that can help daily decision-making issues with equal depth. On the other hand, private radio sta- and operations. Instead of going with conventional M&E, it tions reached much of the population and had proven effective might be useful to experiment with a technique called devel- in promoting national reconciliation and healing. opment evaluation, which is designed to combine monitoring The more encompassing process of statebuilding depends in and evaluation and provide participants with rolling evaluation part on the capability of public agencies to disseminate its mes- function over the course of program implementation.121 Both sage to a wider range of groups and actors. There is a sense in 50 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES BOX 5.2 OTHER POINTS ON M&E It would seem timely to rethink the utility and relevance of results lem is compounded by the destruction of buildings and �les, the ‘chains’ and the associated idea that capacity development disappearance of staff, and the frequent reluctance of people to unfolds in a linear sequence beginning with ‘inputs’ and moving talk openly about issues to do with power, corruption, and so on. through ‘outputs’, ‘outcomes’, and ‘impact’. This classi�cation Baselines in many cases do not exist and only emerge after trust may still be useful as an IAA accounting system. It may still work and con�dence is established.b in simple stable situations. But it no longer applies in capturing the phenomenon of emergent change in complex systems. The conventional program objectives—ef�ciency, effectiveness, relevance, and sustainability—usually assessed in evaluations Barriers remain to conducting effective M&E, such as issues deal- seem awkward when applied to capacity issues in Sierra Leone and ing with the lack of shared meanings and mental models. Attempts Liberia. Not only do they conflict in many instances, but their pur- at causal analysis (What caused what? and What led to what?) are suit in some instances can be problematic. That of ‘ef�ciency’ in usually contested and open to a quite different interpretation. particular can make little sense given the need for patience, exper- Logistical and security issues intrude. The effects of inappropri- imentation, and addressing complex human issues.c ate timeframes need to be addressed. And in some cases, govern- ments can be unsettled by analyses that go into sensitive issues aThe International Development Research Center is working with such as leadership, political economy, and others. International Conflict Research located in Northern Ireland on a proj- More thought needs to be given to the issues involved in M&E in ect entitled Evaluating Research in and on Violently Divided Societies. conflict-affected societies.a Issues include the ethical dilemmas bEfforts are being made in Liberia through the national capacity devel- faced by researchers, the risk of access to information, commu- opment strategy to put together baselines for measuring human and nication strategies, political and logistical challenges, and the institutional capital. potential impact of the �ndings and on whom. cFor an account of the struggle of Dr. Paul Farmer to get international agencies to move beyond ‘efficiency’ with respect to TB treatment in There is usually a pervasive lack of data on capacity issues in Haiti, see Tracy Kidder, Mountains Beyond Mountains (Random House, post-conflict countries especially on process issues. This prob- 2004). Sierra Leone and Liberia of the need to develop the capability to communicate in all the key government organizations.124 K. Activities might include helping country groups and individuals to raise their awareness of change, to manage or raise public CRAFTING A NATIONAL CAPACITY expectations, and to explain key issues such as the outcomes DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Liberia. Budgets and staff resources are required to make a critical difference in CRAFTING AND IMPLEMENTING a national capacity development this arena. strategy was at play in Sierra Leone and Liberia.126 In both Ways of communicating in Sierra Leone and Liberia and countries, strategies and plans existed or were under prepara- other post-conflict states will likely rely more on indigenous tion for national development, poverty alleviation, sectorwide channels and traditional actors, going beyond the usual forms approaches, anti-corruption, water, health, human resource, of marketing and advocacy in more highly developed commu- Millennium Development Goals achievement, and more.127 In nications strategies. Communication along the cultural grain Liberia, the UNDP was making sustained efforts to help the has promise. The images and messages may be quite differ- Government design and implement a national capacity devel- ent. In addition, the possible politicization of any more formal, opment strategy. modern communication campaign might introduce other com- This report has already analyzed the barriers to effective plications into the process.125 planning in post-conflict states. Part of the problem is the THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 51 dif�culty in coming to any real consensus on the purpose of device and a way to keep a group of diverse actors moving in such a national capacity development strategy, the meaning the same general direction. From this perspective, both Gov- of capacity as an objective of government policy, and the com- ernments and IAAs need to do more to co-create strategic plexity of implementation: direction with respect to capacity development. A strategy will I Some promote a conventional plan guiding investments in more likely emerge and evolve over time in response to chang- capacity over a 10- to 20-year period. ing events and ideas. I Some, especially in government, prefer focus on one or two Such a principles-based approach could be used to influ- key issues. The Government of Liberia seemed most inter- ence the capacity development aspects of other strategies and ested in issues to do with human resource planning. budgetary processes, including any national development plan, I Some prefer a coordination and facilitation device, which joint assistance, program designs, peace consolidation, and depends more on scenario planning, learning, adaptation, poverty reduction, all of which are usually de�cient on capac- piloting, and incremental implementation rather than pre- ity and implementation issues. Building the capability of gov- dictive targeting especially in the early stages. ernment to design and cost out major capacity development interventions would be a contribution. The ef�cacy of national capacity development planning strate- Any associated support unit to a national strategy could gies in post-conflict states should be seriously reconsidered. provide technical support to specific capacity development Faith in big plans of any kind now gets less support than in the initiatives wanted by a government. It could, for example, past.128 Economists see market mechanisms as a better way to manage any capacity development fund or facility that might allocate resources. 129 The political economy perspective ques- be established. This capacity development unit could also tions the likelihood of big plans generating much in the way of serve as technical management and support group, an advo- sustained political support. Complexity theory emphasizes the cacy unit, and an IAA coordination point for capacity issues. need for more emergent actions that eventually coalesce into Ultimately, the key objective should be to develop the capa- something resembling a coherent direction. It questions the bility of the government to manage national processes of detailed planning approach with its inflexibility in the face of capacity development over time. This objective could be at uncertainty, conflict, and lack of agreement.130 the heart of any long-term compact between the government In post-conflict states, it is best to take a principles-based and the participating donors.131 approach to national capacity development planning strategies. Governments may have a particular view of their purpose One implication may be to recast the purpose of a national and utility, which may or may not be workable in a national capacity development strategy as a kind of mainstreaming and capacity development strategy. The task for IAAs would be facilitation effort. From this perspective, such a capacity devel- more to help governments think through the value and imple- opment effort would be less a plan and more a means of policy mentation of such strategies and help guide their evolution in advocacy and a forum for aid coordination in capacity issues. the medium and longer term towards something that can make Such an approach can also function more as a communication a genuine contribution.132 52 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES VI. FINAL OPERATIONAL POINTS A re the challenges to achieving effective capacity development in post-conflict states much the same B. as they are in other low-income countries? Or are there real differences that outside interveners (i.e., IAAs) INTERCONNECTIONS OF need to take into account? These questions are meant to help PEACEBUILDING, STATEBUILDING, the development community determine what it is up against in operational terms in trying to help build capacity in post- AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT conflict states. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT states cannot be seen as putting in place some kind of apolitical structures dis- connected from the bigger political and social trends underway A. in a society. Despite their separate spheres, peacebuilding, statebuilding, and capacity building overlap and intertwine. SPECIFIC CHALLENGES Peace building creates the security and the confidence to OF POST-CONFLICT STATES underpin capacity building. State building provides some strategic framework and direction to the choices and opera- THE APPLICATION OF GENERIC, imported, technical, apolitical tions of capacity development. Disconnected choices, on solutions typical of the past few decades to address gaps and the other hand, could lead to bad outcomes. Building the constraints in formal country organizations using technical wrong kinds of institutions, for example, can hinder the assistance is not likely to be effective as the main capacity development of state legitimacy and threaten the stability of development strategy. The other usual suspects—more trans- the peace. These three activities can reinforce each other or parency and objectivity, universality, product-focused, planned can undermine each other. And all their interconnections change—are also likely to make only a limited contribution. put a premium on the strategic management of donor inter- What is required to supplement and in some cases replace the ventions and the need for productive relationships with conventional is something more customized, more varied, and country partners. more imaginative: The political economy of capacity development in post- I Engage with a wider range of stakeholders to get a sense of conflict states is usually decisive. Capacity development strate- the space and opportunities available; gies that focus solely on the technical and functional may I Make a particular effort to gauge the issues to do with fea- survive only in isolated protected islands of activity. A pervasive sibility and implementability as opposed to need and desir- challenge for both countries and IAAs is to engage in capacity ability; development that combines performance and results in the I Focus on the nature of the relationships involving control, short term with legitimacy and relevance in the medium and power, communication, trust, and motivation between IAAs longer term. The issue of who benefits from any increased and their country partners. performance is key. THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 53 resources and assets that are already in place? Or do they want C. to make increased efforts in terms of building their own capa- bilities to support these kinds of interventions? Or, do they NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT want to transform the way they engage in capacity develop- OF IAA OWN CAPABILITIES ment? How and by whom would this issue be decided? The signi�cance here is likely to center on factors to do with THE DEMANDS OF CAPACITY development have policy and oper- political economy, culture, strategic choice, and patience. The ational implications for donors in precisely those areas where IAAs need to be transparent about their ownership and their their capabilities are in question—contextual understanding, capacity to sustain their own support. Understanding and sup- adaptiveness and flexibility, integration and coordination of porting complex change, including the emergent variety in sup- effort, patience, and a long-term view. port of capacity development, is a particular challenge. A more The IAAs should decide more explicitly what kind of robust and accessible body of practice is needed. The IAAs and a capacity contribution they wish to make to post-conflict their country partners need the capability to combine learning, states given their other priorities and interests. How impor- experimentation, and adaptation. This will involve regular stock- tant is capacity development in their shifting priorities? taking, an emphasis on communication, monitoring, and differ Do IAAs only have the resources and staff to continue with combine both centralized and decentralized approaches to their current approaches to capacity development? Should they work. That need has implications for IAA structure, staff incen- continue to muddle through and to do it on the cheap with the tives, and policies. 54 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES ANNEX A. QUESTIONS SURROUNDING COUNTRY OWNERSHIP C ountry ownership has become a widely applied I If ministers and senior public servants in either country do mantra but divining the reality of ownership is elu- not or cannot control or even manage their own departments, sive. The assumption in the IAA community is that who can credibly deliver on the basis of country ownership increased ownership leads to improved results. That may be at the senior levels? If ownership and commitment are them- true under certain circumstances and strategies. But it may selves outcomes of the form of an organizational capability also be untrue under other circumstances and time scales. and not so much a condition or a starting point, how exactly The question for both IAAs and county governments is which do countries develop that capability? What allows a country efforts are in which categories? When does an enhanced state or even an organization to commit and act? And what, if any- of country ownership help set up a virtuous cycle that leads thing, can donors do about it? Can IAAs actually do anything to better outcomes? And can IAA procedures and incentives to ‘ensure’ country ownership as a program outcome? I If post-conflict states are entering a prolonged period of support that cycle? instability and contestation, how can country ownership be To what extent is the expression of ownership the rhetoric expected to be in place for longer than the short term? How of a narrow elite than a broader and deeper expression of com- does ‘short-term’ country ownership match up to ‘long-term’ munity commitment to the endeavor? donor commitment? Or visa versa? If the ownership of an I The evolution of ownership in Sierra Leone and Liberia had external intervention is seen to be vested in one group of a lot to do with the nature and legacy of the peace agree- country actors, will other individuals and groups then start to ment, the line-up of the winners and losers, and their will- disown it? How can ownership survive the rapid turnover of ingness to abide by any agreements. Who in a country after country actors? the conflict gets to ‘own’ country ownership? Is it an issue I Ownership supposedly has to reside in inter-organizational that the conditions cited by IAAs for effective ownership are systems and informal networks such as those for security or rarely in place? 133 Who in the country political system can �nancial management or health. How is it understood in post- induce and enforce country ownership? conflict states who is in the system and who is not? To what I If politics are still conducted mainly on a neo-patrimonial degree does ownership extend to the individuals, the groups, basis that, by their very nature, do not focus on the general the task networks or coalitions whose involvement is critical welfare and the public interest, what does ownership mean in for any kind of effective implementation on the ground? Do such a context? And whose ownership? Who gets to have own- the people and groups whose resources and energy are criti- ership ‘rights’ and how? Commitment to what exactly? And cal for implementation on the ground have ownership? Are, why? What happens when the ‘wrong’ people from a donor for example, the informal actors also included? How does perspective—people who bene�t from dysfunction and weak such collective ownership work and shift over time? capacity—take ownership of an external intervention? Or the ‘right’ people own the wrong things? Ownership may be strong One of the challenges facing IAAs is conducting a serious in terms of country control but non-existent in terms of search for country ownership, motivation, and commitment. In changing existing organizational structures and practices. some ways, this reverses the usual design and programming THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 55 logic. The task then is to �nd motivated individuals and groups of imbalances? Do heavily aid-dependent countries actually and then support whatever capacity development efforts they have any incentive to exert their ownership in the face of are promoting rather than the other way around. We are talk- IAA dissatisfaction? ing here about country vision, motivation, and entrepreneur- I What power and control are IAAs willing to give up or trade- ship and matching them up with windows of opportunities and off in order to create the space for countries to exercise enabling circumstances. more ownership? More fragmentation? Less accountability? I If, as is now claimed, country ownership is essential for More risk? Is there any domestic support in IAA countries development effectiveness, then what happens when such for that argument in high-risk contexts? How is risk shared ownership is weak or non-existent on key interventions? 134 in an era of greater country ownership? Can IAAs accept How do IAAs tell when country ownership is ‘good enough’ that country ownership should equate with country control and conversely ‘not good enough’? At what point should IAAs and power? exit as a result of deteriorating local commitment? What hap- I The IAAs, for example, usually struggle to understand a pens when resistance to an external intervention is a sign of key aspect of the ownership issue in a post-conflict state country ownership? (i.e., the attitudes, motivations, and interests of different I Are there institutional set-ups in a country that promote space groups of participants.) Who are these people and what and country ownership? The mandate of the Government do they want? This similarly happens in donor countries. Reform Secretariat in Sierra Leone, for example, is to ‘drive’ Why would country participants be ‘able’ but ‘unwilling’ public sector reform. Is that the best way to get country to do the right thing? Why would country participants ownership of reform? What kind of institutional set ups would oppose options that seem obvious from a development work best in what conditions to encourage country ownership? perspective? How can the design and management of technical assis- I Are there, in practice, different kinds or patterns of country tance, for example, be done to foster broad-based country ownership? Some that are themselves fragile and easily ownership? What kind of an approach to program design, for undermined? Some that are supported by informal actors example, can best foster the collective creative energy at the whose interests are unknown to external agencies? Some country level? that have a good deal of political support and interest? I Ownership usually refers to the preferences of senior Others that have none? And is it possible that different urban-based elites mainly in government ministries who are types of country ownership fit well with different kinds of knowledgeable about global models and approaches. But external interventions? For example, are there such things such preferences are usually disconnected from the prac- as ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ ownership and how they �t with tices of the majority of the citizens. How do wider groups different kinds of interventions? Does the IAA community of people get to ‘own’ imported practices? What, for exam- have a good sense of what the legal term ‘ownership’ actu- ple, are parliamentarians expected to own? Is ownership ally means in operational terms to different country groups just a state-centered issue? Is civil society part of owner- in different country settings operating in non-English ship? How does a beneficiary-focused or a ‘bottom-up’ environments? 135 approach to ownership work? I How do the qualities of ‘readiness’ and ‘absorptive capac- I Can a country with minimal �nancial resources effectively ity’ relate to that of ownership? Are they the same or are take ‘ownership’ of an IAA-funded activity? If Sierra Leone they different? Are all three needed? To do what? pays less than 20 percent of its development costs, can the I Are there particular issues associated with the ownership of imbalance given the IAA share of over 80 percent ever lead capacity development given its inherent lack of tangibility to serious country ownership? Can good intentions to get and meaning? What would such ownership look like? Why beyond aid dependency succeed in the face of these kinds would it happen given other options and opportunities? 56 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES ANNEX B. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS T here are several analytical frameworks and tools that Power relationships. Much of capacity development actually might be useful if carefully applied in post-conflict unfolds in the context of human relationships that are shaped environments. Included below are brief explanations by power and authority. Practitioners need some basic ways of their purpose and potential applicability. of assessing the impact of power in a variety of settings and the onward implications for change and capacity develop- Scenario planning. A number of techniques exist for putting ment. A tool called the Power Cube has been specifically together stories or scenarios of different voyages into the designed for this.139 136 future. These could be useful in avoiding the temptation of the ‘one-best-way’ thinking that limits creativity. In so doing, Dilemma and trap analysis. Any capacity assessment frameworks it could open up the discussion of different alternatives and need to help illuminate the dilemmas and traps. There needs to possibilities for capacity development. be as much attention to ‘trap’ analysis as to ‘gap’ analysis.140 Rapid Results. This technique of mounting 100-day efforts Agreement and Certainty Matrix. This framework can be useful aimed at achieving specific goals seems well suited to in highlighting the management implications of capacity conditions in a post-conflict state. Rapid Results does not development interventions that go beyond the conventional require the in-depth, up-front analysis. It focuses on specific ‘close to agreement and close to certainty’ scenario, which problems and can offer operational help to mid-level man- emphasizes conventional concepts such as clear objectives, agers. It can generate action and results in the short term. cause and effect, results chains, inputs, and outputs. Most sit- Greater country commitment may, in practice, be a poten- uations in post-conflict states come with either little certainty tial outcome of a Rapid Results approach.137 The World or little agreement, or both.141 Bank Institute (WBI) has used Rapid Results in its work in Sierra Leone, especially the decentralization program with Social networks and linkages. In many post-conflict states, infor- good results. mal networks within and outside formal structures house a good deal of the decision-making authority, motivation and commit- Checklists. A key attribute of any analytical framework in ment, access to resources, information flows, and individual countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia would appear to loyalties.142 Many of the ideas that underpin capacity develop- be simplicity of use. Complex tools requiring large amounts ment are spread and communicated through such networks. of new data do not appear to have much operational feasi- Methodologies are now available to map these connections. bility or country interest. One approach that meets this cri- teria would be basic general checklists of issues and Political economy. Country actors have their own tacit, personal questions that could guide the work of both donor and coun- frameworks for thinking about political factors, many of which try participants. A good deal of experience is now available are not obvious or even accessible to outsiders. The issue then about how to construct such checklists and how to use them becomes the ability of outside actors such as donors to think in daily operations.138 through their own mental model of political economy. Some THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 57 progress has been made with respect to methodologies, a Complex adaptive systems. Capacity development in a post-con- trend we can see at work particularly in Sierra Leone. The DFID flict country usually deals with groups of individuals (e.g., in an sponsored a Drivers of Change study in March 2005.143 The organization) or organizations, including governments that are World Bank commissioned a useful study on political economy linked together in some way in an informal network or system. in October 2008 and is extending the work in other sectors There is now an emerging way of thinking, namely complexity including power and decentralization.144 Indeed, a number of theory or complex adaptive systems thinking that can help IAAs are now devising frameworks for political analysis that are to explain the unpredictable behavior of such systems. This now being tested in a number of countries.145 set of ideas has implications for program design, for planning, understanding complex change, for thinking about achieving Appreciative inquiry. Post-conflict countries do have genuine results, and for monitoring and evaluation.147 A good deal of strengths, hopes, opportunities, pockets of energy, and commit- operational research is now underway around the world on ment. The effectiveness of capacity interventions is determined how best to use the ideas in complexity theory in develop- to a large degree by their ability to tap into these sources of ment.148 The University of Brisbane in Australia, for example, strength. Appreciative inquiry is a methodology designed to is doing complexity research in Solomon Islands, a fragile 146 discover and encourage these resources. state in the Pacific. 58 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES NOTES 1 I use the phrase ‘post-conflict’ in this report to emphasize the huge impact 22 In Liberia, one survey estimated that 242 out of 293 health clinics were of the conflicts in both countries on capacity development. The term ‘fragile’ looted or damaged. which includes a large number of states with no history of civil conflict does 23 A point emphasized in our interview with representatives of the NGO, not capture this aspect. But it is also true that the term ‘post-conflict’ loses InterPeace in Monrovia which works in the rural areas. relevance as countries evolve towards more stable conditions. 24 One policewoman in Liberia talked about capturing criminals and then 2 The UN strategy document for peacebuilding presented (July 22, 2009) by having to ask to use their cell phones to notify police headquarters. Police the Secretary General identi�es rebuilding the army and police, strengthening have to sleep in tents outside their stations or place of training with no the rule of law, supporting political processes, building the civil sector, estab- uniforms, raincoats. Parliament must get the permission of the Ministry of lishing tax and other public administration systems, and promoting stronger Finance to rent a car. And so on. economies through job creation. 25 About 50% of all Liberian professionals fled the country during the civil 3 This comment mirrors that of the Director of the Ko� Annan Institute at the war. University of Liberia, namely that Liberia knows what to do but not how. Governments and donors in both countries are seen as much weaker at imple- 26 Dr. Amos Sawyer of the Governance Reform Commission was of the mentation than they are at policy and programming. opinion that Liberia has never in its history had a functioning public sector 4 See, for example, K. Abouassi, “International Development Management Through especially in the hinterland. A Southern Lens� Public Administration and Development, vol. 30 (2010). 27 Most of the health and education systems in Liberia were built by 5 The Dili Declaration recognizes the “limited effectiveness of capacity devel- churches and NGOs. opment approaches� and calls for new lines of action. 28 Almost half the support staff have no high school education equivalency 6 The report is one outcome of two joint missions organized by the World 29 Estimated in Sierra Leone to be about 2% of total staff. Bank’s OPCS and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 30 DFID estimates that 75% of all educational institutions in Liberia were (BCPR) in June and July 2009. Two other country reports resulted from this destroyed during the �ghting. mission as well as a companion piece on statebuilding: Sue Ingram State 31 In Sierra Leone, AfDB, DGID, EC, and World Bank established a memoran- Building—Key Concepts and Operational Implication in Two Fragile States (World Bank, March 2010). All mission reports and terms of reference can be dum of understanding in 2006 to begin multi-donor budget support. Thirteen found at www.worldbank.org/fragilityandconflict. percent of total overseas development assistance (ODA) now goes through the budget and a further 14% through various program-based approaches. Recent 7 For the same debate in the private sector, see Jim Collins, and Jerry I. initiatives have been provided in the form of sector-wide approaches (SWAps) Por ras, Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies (HarperCollins and multi-donor trust funds. In Liberia, no ODA goes directly through the Publishers, 1994). budget and the government systems. 8 A system is de�ned as an entity that maintains its existence and functions 32 Over half of all staff in security and economic management institutions in as a whole through the interrelationships amongst its parts or elements. Liberia come from the Diaspora. 9 There is a literature on evaluating empowerment in development. See for 33 This is an issue in all post-conflict states; see N. Colletta, and Michelle example, Peter Oakley, (ed.), Evaluating Empowerment: Reviewing the Cullen, Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons Concept and Practice (INTRAC, 2001). Also Deepa Narayan, (ed.), Measuring from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia (World Bank, 2000); and Empowerment: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (World Bank, 2005). This lat- Kimberly Maynard, “Rebuilding Community: Psychosocial Healing, Reintegration ter book de�nes empowerment as “the expansion of assets and capabilities of and Reconciliation at the Grassroots Level� in K. Kumar (ed.), Rebuilding poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold Societies after Civil War: Critical roles for International Assistance (Lynne accountable institutions that affect their lives.� Rienner Publishers, 1997). 10 Take for example macro-capacities; see The Atlantic Century: Bench 34 The foreword by President Sirleaf to the National Human Development Marking EU and US Innovation and Competitiveness, (European-American Report 2006 talks about “continued deep psychological stress and trauma.� Business Council, February 2009). 35 The UNDP has supported some psychosocial work in Liberia by Dr. Hilary 11 The concept of ‘good governance’ can also be said about ‘capacity’: Denis; see NHDI 2006, p. 32; and K. A. Maynard, “Rebuilding Community: Merilee Grindle, “Good Governance: The Inflation of an Idea,� Harvard Psychosocial Healing, Reintegration and Reconciliation at the Grassroots Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series (June 2010, p. 1). Level,� in K. Kumar (ed.), Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997). 12 45% of Sierra Leone’s professionals fled during the period 1992–2002. 36 By way of comparison, one analyst estimated that individual Cambodians 13 Sierra Leone has a total of 84 doctors for the whole country, including were exposed to an average of 16 traumatic events in Cambodia during the 5 pediatricians and 1 gynecologist. Khmer Rouge period; see Derek Summerfeld, “The Psychosocial Effects of 14 Sierra Leone at 180 and Liberia at 169 according to 1980 Human Conflict in the Third World,� Development in Practice (1991, p. 161). Development Index. 37 “It is estimated that as many as 40% of the population are suffering from 15 The world �gure for infant mortality per 1,000 live births is 54. Across post-traumatic stress syndrome�; Paul Bennell, From Emergency Recovery to Community-Driven Development: The National Commission for Social Action Sub-Saharan Africa, the �gure is around 100. In Liberia, the number is 157, in Sierra Leone, paper prepared for the LICUS Program, (World Bank, January in Sierra Leone 170. 2005, p. 4). 16 In Sierra Leone, 42% are under 15, 34% between 15 and 35 38 “Once the reputation for honest interaction has been lost, the incentive for 17 Carol Lancaster, We Fall Down and Get Up: State Failure, Democracy and honest behavior in the future is greatly weakened and the cost of enforcing Development in Sierra Leone (Center For Global Development, Washington, transactions increases exponentially�; African Capacity Building Foundation D.C., 2007). Occasional Paper #3 (2004). 18 Sierra Leone is ranked 146 out of 180 on the 2009 Transparency 39 Validation and Analysis of Civil Servants Census, Final Report (Update, International Corruption Perceptions Index. January 2008, p. 12). 19 Seth Kaplan, Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development 40 M. Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights,� Harvard Human Rights (Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2008). Journal, Vol. 20, 2007. 20 The Government of Sierra Leone is currently formulating a national collab- 41 For the work of an organization that specializes in addressing trauma oration strategy. issues, see www.vivo.net. 21 “The most important weakness of a segmentary society is its inability to 42 See Douglass North, Jon Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Limited Access achieve collective action at a large scale for extended periods of time�: F. Orders: An Introduction to the Conceptual Framework, paper prepared for Fukuyama, State Building in The Solomon Islands, unpublished memo workshop on How Institutions Matter: The Interplay of Economics and Politics (July 9, 2008, p. 4). as the Drivers of Development (World Bank, June 3–4, 2010). THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 59 43 C. Pycroft, and R. Butterworth, “Where Capacity Is Not the Only Problem: based on previous work by Chris Argyryis. People everywhere develop defen- Moving from Generic Capacity Building to Support for Issue-based Change in sive routines that insulate these mental models from scrutiny and examina- Nigeria,� Capacity Development Briefs #12 (World Bank Institute, September tion. People develop ‘skilled incompetence’ which allows them to avoid the 2005). discomfort posed by new ideas and learning. 44 Problem-driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis, (World Bank, 64 T. Land, V. Hauck, and H, Baser, Capacity Development: Between Planned 2009, p. 41) puts forward four relationships between the formal and the Interventions and Emergent Processes, Implications for Development informal—complementary, accommodating, substituting, and competing or Cooperation, ECDPM Policy Management Brief, #22 (European Centre for subverting. Development Policy Management, March 2009). 45 ‘Systems’ de�ned here as the con�guration of ways in which people col- 65 For an account that focuses on the British contribution, see P. Albrecht, laborate and work together. and P. Jackson, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997–2007 (UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool, 2009). 46 Sue Ingram comments on the relationship between the formal and the tra- 66 “The main challenge in this regard derives from the fact that the crisis ditional systems in State Building—Key Concepts and Operational Implication in Two Fragile States (World Bank, March 2010, p.15). See also C. Logan, tends to bring about new policy preferences and strategic directions for which “Traditional Leaders: Can Democracy and the Chief Co-Exist?� AfroBarometer, few actors are adequately prepared. The extent of such change requires major, Working Paper #93 (2008). systematic transformation of the governance framework. Conversely, it implies that policy process and state/society relationships should be based on com- 47 The role of chiefs is a contentious with some observers pointing out that pletely new foundations and supported by a solid political and social realign- the institution of chiefdom had lost its traditional legitimacy sometime ago. ment�; Nenad Rava, Progressive Governance and Inclusive Policy-making in Chiefs in the Liberian system are apparently quite different than those in Turbulent Periods (Sept. 24, 2009). Ghana or Nigeria. 67 Typical of the ‘transformation’ view is Haiti: A Once-in-a-Century Chance 48 UN Of�ce on Drugs and Crime, Drug Traf�cking as a Security Threat in for Change, Beyond Reconstruction: Re-envisioning Haiti with Equity, West Africa, November 2008. Peter Pham, “The Security Challenge of West Fairness and Opportunity, Oxfam Brie�ng Paper 136, (March 2010). Africa’s New Drug Depots,� World Defense Review, 2007 68 Derick Brinkerhoff has set out four degree of capacity development 49 See J-F Bayart, S. Ellis, and B. Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in change—reinforcement, integration, transformation, and reinvention. See Africa (James Currey, 1999). The same pattern is evident in Haiti and “Developing Capacity in Fragile States� in Public Administration and Afghanistan. Development, Vol. 30, Issue 1, February 2010, p 66–78. 50 William Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (1996). For a 69 The example of Somalia is the one that proponents of this view cite the speci�c example of the destruction of the formal and the rise of the informal, most. “These extensive and intensive informal mechanisms of self-government see Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History . . . are virtually invisible to external observers whose sole preoccupation is Denied (2003); and Griff Witte, Taliban Shadow Of�cials Offer Concrete often with the one structure that actually provides the least amount of rule of Alternative, Washington Post (Tuesday December 8, 2009). law to Somalis . . . the central state� in K. Menkhaus, “Governance without 51 P, Chabal and J-Pascal Daloz, “Whither The State?� in Africa Works: Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of Coping� Disorder as Political Instrument (chapter 1, 1999) International Security, 31(3) (2006/7). 52 “The challenge is to harness the culture of Africa to fund such workable 70 For an example from Somaliland, see Timothy Othieno, A New Donor hybrids for the rest of the continent. The overall lesson is that outside pre- Approach to Fragile Societies: The Case of Somaliland, Opinion (Overseas scriptions only succeed where they work with the grain of African ways of Development Institute, 2008) doing things� Commission for Africa (2005, p. 35). 71 See Albert Hirschman, “The Autonomous Agency as Hybrid,� Development 53 For a history of institutional change in Liberia, see Amos Sawyer, Beyond Projects Observed, (1967, pp. 153–9). Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 72 M. Sha�k, “From Architecture to Networks: Aid in a World of Variable 2005). Geometry, Ideas4 Development (2009). 54 J. A. Robinson, Governance and Political Economy Constraints to World 73 For analysis of some the dilemmas involved in these kinds of issues, see Bank CAS Priorities in Sierra Leone (World Bank, 2008). M. Beer and N. Nohria, “Resolving the Tension between Theories E and O of 55 Howard Wolpe, and S. MacDonald, “Burundi’s Transition: Training Leaders Change,� in M. Beer, and N. Nohria, Cracking the Code of Change (Harvard for Peace,� Journal of Democracy, vol. 17, #1 (January 2006). Business School Press, 2000) 56 www.enciss-sl.org 74 “The minimalist state in Afghanistan must be rebuilt at breakneck speed;� 57 For more about the process of ‘seeing systems,’ see Barry Oshrey, Seeing Ahmed Rashid, Afghanistan: Let’s Keep it Simple, Washington Post (Sunday, September 6, 2009). Systems: Unlocking the Mysteries of Organizational Life (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 1995). 75 The IMF estimates that it took 200 years to develop sound budgetary insti- 58 See, for example, P. Peeters, W. Cunningham, G. Acharya, and A. Van tutions in countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States; see Richard Allen, The Challenge of Reforming Budgetary Institutions Adams, Youth Employment in Sierra Leone: Sustainable Livelihood in Developing Countries, IMF Working Paper (International Monetary Fund, Opportunities in a Post-Conflict Setting, (World Bank, 2009) 2009). 59 For more on “traps,� see T. Addison, C. Harper, M. Prowse, and A. 76 R. H. Bates, Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Shepherd, The Chronic Poverty Report 2008–2009: Escaping Poverty Traps Development (W. W. Norton & Company, Ltd., 2001). (Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 2009). Jeff Sachs in his Reith Lectures for the BBC focused on four development traps—poor nutrition, debilitating dis- 77 “A measure of the time it takes for institutionalization to become sustain- ease, terrible infrastructure, and high fertility. Paul Collier also talks about able can be approximated by estimating the time it takes to transform the wider development traps in The Bottom Billion, (Oxford University Press, multiple meanings of the actors into shared meanings, shared meanings into 2007, chap. 2). agreements, these agreements into desired actions:� N. Boyle, Putting Theory 60 “Every major previous attempt at public sector reform has been driven by and Practice to Work in Institutional Development (ID): A Case Study, (undated, p. 22). the exigencies of crisis considerations. Under such circumstances, initiatives have been preoccupied with ameliorating the crisis facing the government 78 “Thus capacity building in vulnerable states necessitates well-calibrated, neglecting the need for longer-term institutional reforms�; National Human properly sequenced, and carefully coordinated cross-sect oral engagement by Development Report in Liberia, p. 41. bilateral and multilateral donor agencies� Hrach Gregorian, G8 Security 61 See Geert Hofstede, “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do Sector Capacity Building in Fragile States: Examining Effectiveness and Coherence, paper prepared for Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute American Theories Apply Abroad?� Organizational Dynamics (Summer 1980). (May 2010). 62 The Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, for example, could not �nd 79 In the South Sudan, the lack of a functioning policy force threatened to the legislation setting out its own mandate. undermine the referendum in early January 2011. Out of desperation, the 63 In his book The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Government of South Sudan minister in charge of internal security proceeded Organization (Doubleday, 1990), Peter Senge discusses ‘mental models’ to recruit about 7,000 police trainees over 2–3 months. Actual training began 60 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES in an open �eld with no instructional facilities, little housing or even sanitation. 91 For an earlier analysis of the same pattern, see Donor Support for The UNDP and other donors quickly provided tents, food, and temporary build- Institutional Capacity Development in Environment: Lessons Learned (OECD, ings for a police-training system that was ‘good enough’ to meet the urgent 2000, pp. 17–9). needs for policing in the preparation for the referendum in January 2011. 92 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and 80 “In Sierra Leone, DFID’s political economy and conflict analysis concluded Situations (OECD, 2007). In Sierra Leone, the UN Peace Building Mission that security and the rule of law were pre-conditions for progress in other areas: seemed to have the capability for political analysis and its dissemination it also found that building the state and transforming formal and informal power- across the UN system. sharing mechanisms were critical to the peacebuilding process. The DFID and donor partners took dif�cult choices about what to prioritize and how to manage 93 Dr. Amos Sawyer of the Governance Reform Commission in Liberia the tensions between short-tern and long-term objectives. It was agreed that in remarked that amongst his biggest surprises was the reluctance of donors to the �rst few years, DFID would invest in (i) building the key capacities of the customize their interventions to �t Liberian conditions. state, and (ii) supporting progress on security to sustain the peace. Service deliv- 94 “The central message [. . .] is as applicable to statebuilding as it is to ery and growth promotion were seen as second generation reform areas with peacebuilding: donors must be sensitive to the specific context in which budget support the main delivery mechanisms. Part of the rationale for limiting they are intervening, that is universal templates seldom can make an effec- support to service delivery initially was that other development partners would tive contribution to statebuilding and donors need deeper knowledge of the cover this suf�ciently. The recent Country Program Evaluation found that this did history and diversity of the country�; M. B. Anderson, Do no Harm: How not hold true, highlighting the importance of continually re-assessing priorities Aid Can Support Peace—or War (Lynne Rienner Publishers/Colorado, and monitoring assumptions�; see DFID, Building the State and Securing the 1999, p. 4). Peace, Emerging Policy Paper, (June 2009, p. 19). 95 “The greatest challenge is appreciating and managing the political, social 81 See Thomas Carothers, “How democracies Emerge: The Sequencing and �nancial reality within which this project is being implemented� quote Fallacy� Journal of Democracy, 18/1 (2007). from the Diaspora Support Project in Sierra Leone. 82 The Update in Liberia (p. 22) has a relentlessly technocratic model called 96 Dr. Amos Sawyer, the Chairman of the Governance Reform Commission the Capability Building Staircase model: “In arriving at a ‘correct’ sequence, GOL stakeholders will have essentially followed a four part process. First, the in Liberia, remarked that one of his biggest surprises had been the diffi- long-term objectives will have been clari�ed. Second, the stakeholders will have culty in getting donors to customize their approaches to fit Liberian worked backwards from the desired end point. Third, they will have conditions. considered the current situation in detail. Fourth, they will have developed 97 See Tools for Institutional, Political and Social Analysis of Policy Reform: sequential action plans to close any gaps.� A Sourcebook for Development Practitioners (World Bank, 2007), and 83 See, for example, David Brady and Michael Spence (eds.), Leadership and Understanding Local Context: The Use of Assessment Tools in Conflict and Growth, Commission on Growth and Development, Adrian Leftwich, Leaders, Fragile States, draft (International Peace Institute, 2009). Elites and Coalitions Research Programme (www.lecrp.org, 2010). The UNDP 98 People met in Sierra Leone and Liberia would be willing to play this role. and the World Bank Institute are also collaborating on the Global Leadership One person pointed to his cell phone that (he claimed) rang every ten minutes Initiative Research Program. See also G. Heidenhof, S. Teggemann, and keeping him up to date on the latest political and economic developments in C. Sjetnan, A Leadership Approach to Achieving Change in the Public Sector: Liberia. The Case of Madagascar, World Bank Institute Working Paper (World Bank, 99 This general point about the need for more institutional adaptiveness in 2007). donor agencies is not new. For a detailed analysis, see “The Bank’s Institutional 84 See Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Challenges for New Leadership Teams in Fragile Arrangements� in the OED evaluation entitled The World Bank’s Experience States, Capacity Development Briefs (World Bank Institute, 2007). with Post-Conflict Reconstruction, (World Bank, 1998). It is also the case that 85 For the experience in The Solomon Islands, see Laura Bailey, Building the Bank is still working on implementing the recommendations of the 1997 Post-crisis Capacity in The Solomon Islands, Capacity Development Briefs Word Development Report on public sector work. The long-term perspective (World Bank Institute, 2009). applies to donors as well as countries. 86 The assessment of the evaluator of World Vision’s programme in Bosnia 100 “. . . that a lack of recognition of the need for investment in staf�ng in and Herzegovina was that “while training of individual representatives from parliaments and governing authorities that given rise to a culture that seeks organizations is a highly effective means of individual capacity building, it is ‘funding that implements itself. This is not viable in normal contexts; it is poorly suited to building organizational capacity.� even less viable in early recovery contexts where the management, security, and supervision costs of implementation escalate�; M. B. Anderson, Do no 87 Sue Ingram has also points out the ethical issues involved in picking Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War (Lynne Rienner champions and, in the process, exposing them to danger from which they Publishers/Colorado, 1999, p. 8). cannot (or will not) be protected by a particular donor; Sue Ingram State 101 “It makes sense to link payments and strategies as tightly as possible Building—Key Concepts and Operational Implication in Two Fragile States (World Bank, March 2010, p. 18). to outcomes. The old aid model was to track money spent and other inputs; 88 The Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington in Liberia focused this is no longer good enough. . . . Taking results-based aid to its logical conclusion gets you to a proposal like Nancy Birdsall’s innovative cash-on on mediating and breaking down barriers and mistrust between key leadership delivery aid, where money is only disbursed after results have been groups (say between the army and politicians). The Senior Executive Service audited�; Todd Moss, Dambisa Moyo’s (Serious) Challenge to the in Liberia provided �nancial incentives for senior Liberians to take leadership Development Business (Center for Global Development Essay, April 2009, positions in the public sector. Other IAAs trained key groups from which a p. 5). See also N. Birdsall, W. Savedoff, and K. Vyborny, Cash on Delivery: leader might emerge. In this sense, they were targeting a generational group A New Approach to Foreign Aid with an Application in Primary Schooling rather than individuals. For a UNDP approach, see UNDP Practice Note (Center for Global Development, 2009) 2008. 102 A. Ghani, M. Carnahan, and C. Lockhart, Stability, State-building and 89 This kind of person is highlighted in David Bornstein, How to Change the Development Assistance: An Outside Perspective (The Princeton Project on World: Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New Ideas (Oxford University National Security, 2006). Press, 2004). 103 “Work that produces measurable outcomes tends to drive out work that 90 “External actors tasked with supporting statebuilding in Somalia would produces immeasurable outcomes�; J. Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What simply not be able to import �xed statebuilding project templates, could not Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York, NY: Basic Books, insist on standardized judicial and other systems, and would have to learn to 1989, p. 161). work with local polities in Somalia on their own terms rather than attempt to transform them into images in their own likeness. That level of programmatic 104 “If we fail to convince Congress, the public and others who make funding flexibility and local knowledge has not been a strong suit of international aid decisions that many reforms do not show up on quarterly reports or annual agencies in the past. This is especially true of statebuilding programs which statements but take years, then we will lose funding and mandate to partici- are amongst the most formulaic, unimaginative, work-shop infested enter- pate in long-term change efforts. This will result in ‘quick win’ pathologies prises in the whole foreign aid portfolio�; Kenneth Menkahaus, “Somalia: where small, super�cial changes are in heavier demand than systemic Governance vs. State building� in C. T. Call with V. Wyeth (eds), Building changes�; from Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, “International Development States to Build Peace (International Peace Institute / Lynne Rienner Management: A Northern Perspective,� Public Administration and Publishers, Colorado, 2008, p. 212). Development (2010, p. 109). THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 61 105 “It is important to understand that the success of the neo-patrimonial state 122 B. Williams and I. Imam (eds.), Systems Concepts in Evaluation: An was measured domestically by both rulers and ruled, in terms of how well it per- Expert Anthology (EdgePress/American Evaluation Association, 2007). formed according to the criteria relevant to the workings of the informal political sphere. Outside Africa, however, achievement was gauged in terms of how the 123 See, for example, C. Cabanero-Verosa and H. R. Garcia, Building state performed according to the criteria applied to its modern Western bureau- Commitment to Reform through Strategic Communication: The Five Key cratic equivalent. While African politicians attempted to placate both domestic Decisions (World Bank, 2009); and S. Kalathil, with J. Langlois, A. Kaplan, and foreign (particularly donor) constituencies, their ability to do so rested on Towards a New Model: Media and Communication in Post-Conflict and Fragile their being able to ful�ll utterly divergent demands�; Patrick Chabal, The State States, Communication for Governance and Accountability Program (World Of Governance In Africa, Occasional Paper #26 (South African Institute for Bank, 2008). International Affairs, Feb. 2009, p. 6). 124 UNMIL still provides 80 percent of the funding for radio broadcasting in 106 One analyst has set out three different kinds of results-based methodology— Sierra Leone. the strategic, the competitive, and the improvement-focused. See Ken 125 Sierra Leone tried to put in place a National Communications Plan with Stephenson, Chapter 3 on “Results-based Management� in G. Anderon, (ed.), UNDP support in 2005. According to the International Crisis Group, the pro- Shaping International Evaluation, A 30-Year Journey, (Univeralia Consulting gram was then taken over by the Government to disseminate SLPP propa- Company, 2010). ganda during the election campaign. The effort was suspended by the new 107 For example, Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, Performance Government pending an investigation. Measurement Framework (PEFA Secretariat, World Bank, June 2005). 126 The Paris Declaration Indicator 4 requires support of counterpart 108 For the same patterns in Afghanistan, see S. Michailof, Review of national capacity development strategies in which country participants exer- Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in Afghanistan, Discussion cise effective leadership over the capacity development program supported by paper (Afghanistan Development Forum, undated, p. 6). “Unfortunately, the international development agencies. lessons of the weaknesses and frequent failures of these three to four 127 One other informal calculation for Sierra Leone was that of about decades of TA and capacity building projects in Africa do not seem to have influenced donor policies in Afghanistan. The lessons and international best 35 strategies or plans under preparation involving the Government and the practices which in the 1990s were drawn out of approaches conducted in donor community. extremely low capacity context seem to have been lost in the emergency of 128 “It is important to understand the signi�cance of a strategy in the Afghanistan reconstruction.� process and to begin with developing a national capacity-building strategy. A 109 One exception was the decentralization technical assistance team in strategy gives a road map that integrates, into coherent whole, desired goals, Sierra Leone. Their presentation to a workshop on decentralization in intended interventions and assumptions to be monitored. It provides a broad Freetown showed a good deal of thought about the issue. approach that is comprehensive in scope and focused on targeted interven- tions on strategic issues and challenges to achieve desired results. A strategy 110 The Government of Liberia has completed its Paris Declaration Survey on is also aimed at producing optimal results. Consequently, an initial step Aid Coordination and Harmonization. towards building post-conflict Liberia is for the Government to formulate an 111 www.reflectlearn.org integrated comprehensive capacity-building strategy with a focus on creating individual, institutional and societal capabilities to manage development 112 “The consultant �rm that links its prestige to dealing with one set of vari- affairs� National Human Development Study for Liberia, p. 50. ables (e.g., systems and structures) because that is where its operational 129 Readers will be familiar with the criticism by economists on the role of experience lies, runs the risk of doing a superlative job on an irrelevant issue�; Charles B. Handy, Understanding Organizations (Oxford University planning in development cooperation. See, for example, William Easterly, The Press, 1993, p. 16). White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (The Penguin Press, 2006); and Owen Barder, 113 “Much of the material remains unprocessed, or if unprocessed un- Beyond Planning: Markets and Networks for Better Aid, Working Paper 185 analyzed, of it analyzed, not written up, or if written up not read, of if read, (Center for Global Development, 2009) not used or acted upon. Only a few minuscule proportion, if any, of the �nd- 130 In an interview. H. Courtney talks about four perspectives on strategic ings affect policy and they are usually a few simple totals�; Robert Chambers, Revolutions in Development Inquiry (Earthscan, 2008, p. 49). planning—a single view of the future, some alternative views of the future, a range of possible futures, and true uncertainty with not even a range of possi- 114 A useful discussion can be found in S. Otoo, N. Agapitova, S. Fisher, The ble future outcomes; H. Courtney, A Fresh Look at Strategy under Uncertainty Need for a Conceptual and Results-Oriented Framework in Capacity in www.mckinseyquarterly.com, April 2009. Development: Discussion of a New Approach, WBI Capacity Development 131 Closing the sovereignty gap would be at heart of any long-term compact. Briefs (April 2009). See A. Ghani, C. Lockhart, and M. Carnahan, Closing the Sovereignty Gap: 115 AusAID issued Strengths-Based Approaches: Advantage’s and How to Turn Failed States into Capable Ones (Overseas Development Institute Disadvantages. Opinions, July 2005). 116 See, for example, D. K. Leonard, Where are ‘Pockets’ of Effective 132 Market mechanisms might be part of a national capacity development Agencies Likely in Weak Governance States and Why? A Propositional strategy. This methodology may not �t conditions in some countries but chal- Inventory, Working Paper #306 (Institute of Development Studies, June 2008). lenges the conventional approach to designing and implementing such a strat- 117 For a description of the ways that the U.S. Government is building egy; Clifford Zinnes, Tournament Approaches to Policy Reform: Making learning processes into its effort to improve the capacity of the American Development Assistance More Effective (Brookings Institution Press, 2009). health sector, see Atul Gawande, “Testing, Testing� (The New Yorker, 133 “Capacity development requires strong domestic political ownership at Dec. 14, 2009). the highest levels with wide participation, transparency and clear accountabil- 118 See for example, Elliot Berg, “Why Aren’t Donors Better Learners?� in ity,� National Human Development Strategy, p. 17. Jerker Carlsson and Lennart Wohlgemuth, (eds.), Learning in Development 134 One sliding scale or typology for country ownership is the following: Co-operation (Expert Group on Development Issues, 2000). Also Jenny (a) clear demand, (b) interest but no leadership, (c) interest but no capacity, Pearson,�Pushing at a Half-Open Door,� IDS Bulletin, Vo. 41 (May 2010). (d) general lack of interest in the decision community, and (e) disinterest or 119 Note that in many instances, a bias exists at the �eld level against any hostility in the same community; Fred Carden, Knowledge to Policy: Making the Most of Development Research, (IDRC, 2009). activity labeled as research. 135 In most societies, the term ‘ownership’ has to do with legal possession of 120 S. Kosack, C. Tolmie, and C. Griffen, From the Ground Up: Improving a tangible object. It does not translate into motivation or commitment or the Government Performance with Independent Monitoring Organizations protection of collective or personal interests. (Brookings Institution Press, 2010). 136 See, for example, Peter Schwartz, “Steps to Developing Scenarios,� 121 For more details, see J. A. A. Gamble, A Developmental Evaluation Appendix in The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain Primer (The McConnell Foundation, 2008); F. Westley, B. Zimmerman, and World (Currency Doubleday, 1991). M. Q. Patton, Getting to Maybe: How the World Is Changed (Vintage Canada, 2006); and Michael Quinn Patton, Developmental Evaluation: Applying 137 R. H. Schaffer, and R. N. Ashkenas, Rapid Results: How 100-Day Complexity Concepts to Enhance Innovation and Use (New York, NY: The Projects Build the Capacity for Large Scale Change (Jossey-Bass, John Wiley Guilford Press, 2011). and Sons, Inc., 2005). 62 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN POST-CONFLICT STATES 138 See Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto: How To Get Things Right 145 OECD, Survey of Donor Approaches to Governance Assessment (2008). (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2009). 146 See F. J. Barret, and R. E. Fry, Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach 139 www.powercube.net. to Building Cooperative Capacity (Taos Institute Publications, 2005): also 140 Such analyses are discussed in R. Paris and T. D. Sisk, The Dilemmas of C. Sampson, M. Abu-Nimer, C. Liebler, and D. Whitney, (eds), Positive Approaches to Peacebuilding: A Resource for Innovators (Pact Publications, 2003) State Building: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (Routledge, 2009). 147 The Association of Women Lawyers in Sierra Leone in many ways operated 141 See Ralph Stacey, Complexity and Creativity in Organizations (San on the basis on complex systems theory by intervening in a variety of ways and places (e.g., the courts, legislature, bureaucracy, the media, informal networks, Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 1996) and rural communities) to create systems change in support of women. 142 For an amazing account of using social networking tools to �nd Saddam 148 See ODI, Exploring the Science of Complexity Theory, Working Paper #285 Hussein after the end of the Iraq War, see C. Wilson, “Searching for Saddam� (2008); Samir Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice: in Slate Magazine Feb. 2010. Understanding Non-Linear Realities (Zed Books Ltd., 2002); L. Douglas 143 T. Brown, R. Fanthorpe, J. Gardner, L. Gberie, and M. G. Sesay, Sierra Kiel, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government: A New Paradigm for Leone: Drivers of Change (The IDL Group, 2005) Managing Change, Innovation and Organizational Renewal (Jossey-Bass, 1994); and E. E. Olson, and G. H. Eoyang, R. Beckhard, and P. Vail, 144 James A. Robinson, Governance and Political Economy Constraints to Facilitating Organization Change: Lessons from Complexity Science World Bank CAS Priorities in Sierra Leone (Harvard University, 2008) (Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer, 2001). THE WORLD BANK—UNDP 63 The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433 USA www.worldbank.org/fragilityandconflict UNDP New York Of�ce Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, UNDP One United Nations Plaza, DC1 20th floor New York, NY 10017 www.undp.org/cpr © 2011, The World Bank and UNDP