Document of The World Bank Group For Official Use Only Report No. 23822 AF TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT STRATEGY AFGHANISTAN March 12, 2002 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AAA Analytical and Advisory Activities IsDB Islamic Development Bank ADB Asian Development Bank MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency AIA Afghanistan Interim Administration NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund O&M Operations and Maintenance Cdf Comprehensive Development Fund PCF Post-Conflict Fund IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and SG Steering Group Development SME Small and Medium Enterprise IDA Intemational Development Association TA Technical Assistance IFC International Finance Corporation TSS Transitional Support Strategy IG Implementation Group UN United Nations IMF International Monetary Fund UNICEF United Nation Children's Fund ISAF International Security Assistance Force in UNDP United Nation Development Programme Afghanistan UNSG United Nations Secretary General The World Bank Vice President Mieko Nishimizu, SARVP Country Director Alastair McKechnie, SACAG Task Manager Anne Tully, SACAG FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1..................................................... ......... II. POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT - A TRAGIC HISTORY. .2 A. A Turbulent Political Background .............................................................. 2 B. Social and Economic Context - Lost Decades .............................................................. 3 m. HISTORY OF WORLD BANK ENGAGEMENT ................................................... .. 5 IV. AFGHANISTAN'S RECONSTRUCTION - THE CHALLENGES AHEAD ...... .. 6 A. Key Development Challenges ................ .............................................. 6 B. Government's Vision and Priorities .............................................................. 8 C. Response of the International Community ........................................................... 8 D. Management and Funding of Reconstruction ....................................................... 9 E. Guiding Principles for the Reconstruction and Assistance Effort ...I .................. 10 V. THE BANK GROUP'S TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT STRATEGY - BUILDING CAPACITY AND COOPERATION .......................... 11 A. Transitional Support Strategy - Towards Reengagement ........................................... 11 B. Strategic Approach ........................................... I I C. Strategic Sequencing of Bank Outputs and Instruments ........................................... 12 D. Implementing the TSS - Operational Issues .............. ............................. 19 VI. PROSPECTS, RISKS AND MITIGATION MEASURES ................................... 20 A. Prospects for Economic and Social Recovery ........................................... 20 B. Risks Remain High ........................................... 21 VII. CONCLUSION ........................................... 22 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. DL4GRAMS Diagram I Timeline of World Bank Assistance Flows ............................... 13 Diagram 2 Flow of Funds ............................... 16 Diagram 3 A Comprehensive Approach ............................... 17 ANNEXES Annex I Bonn Agreement . Annex 2 History of World Bank Engagement in Afghanistan. Annex 3 Executive Summary of Preliminary Needs Assessment. Annex 4 Basic indicators. AFGHANISTAN TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT STRATEGY March 12, 2002 We are not starting from scratch in Afghanistan. Our institutions have been substantially weakened but they are there. We will need support to help us rebuild these institutions and to revive our economy. And we do have a great opportunity now: we should not think in terms of taking Afghanistan back to where it was in 1978 (pre-conflict). We Afghans must envision our future boldly. We must think creatively, embracing strategies and technologies for Afghanistan to leap ahead on a faster development track and plcay a positive and constructive role in the development of the region as a whole. (Hedayat Amin-Arsala, Vice Chairman and Minister of Finance, Afghanistan Interim Authority, Washington, 14 December, 2001) I. INTRODUCTION 1. More than two decades of conflict in Afghanistan since 1978, combined with the current three- year drought, have resulted in widespread human suffering and massive displacement of people (both within Afghanistan and as refugees in neighboring countries). Afghanistan's infrastructure has been degraded or destroyed; its human and environmental resources severely depleted; and its social capital eroded. State institutions are largely non-functional, and the economy and society have become increasingly fragmented. Currently, an estimated seven million people are vulnerable to famine and dependent on food aid for survival. Women and children have been particularly affected by the decades of conflict and lack of basic services. In addition to restoring political stability and security, Afghanistan faces a dire humanitarian emergency in the short run and enormous needs for reconstruction and development over time. 2. The political settlement reached among the various Afghan factions following the fall of the Taliban, and the roadmap set out in the historic Bonn Agreement in December 200 1, provide a window of opportunity for Afghanistan to move out of protracted conflict and to reintegrate itself into the international community. The situation remains fragile, however, and there is an urgency to ensure that humanitarian, reconstruction and development assistance can quickly support the peace process and provide real hope for Afghans. 3. This Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) outlines a program of World Bank Group assistance to Afghanistan for the next 6-9 months, after which time Bank Management would update the Board. The TSS, which builds on the experience acquired by the Bank in its engagement with Afghanistan in the past (refer Annex 2) and in other post conflict countries, will enable the Bank to respond to the needs of the Afghan people for peace, economic and political stability. The strategy focuses on the restoration of normal relations with the Bank, and on the provision of exceptional IDA support for urgent recovery and technical assistance needs, supplemented by a program of policy advice, analytical work and strong coordination with other donors. 4. Afghanistan's reconstruction presents extraordinary challenges for the people and government of Afghanistan, and for the international community which has pledged large amounts of funds to support the reconstruction effort. Afghans have shown remarkable resilience throughout the decades of conflict. However, now that a political process is in place expectations are high that the government' and international community will respond quickly to meet the urgent recovery needs of the population. At the same time, and in order to ensure the effective delivery of assistance in the short and long term, there is a need to focus quickly on building capacity and accountable mechanisms for managing the resource flows coming Afghanistan's way. The Bank's strategy is to support the overall peace and reconstruction process with assistance that will quickly respond to the real needs of Afghans for an improvement in living conditions, within a sound policy framework. At the same time, the Bank will use its comparative advantage to support the Afghan authorities in building essential institutions and capacity to manage the large inflow of aid resources. The Bank has worked closely with UN agencies, NGOs and bilateral donors on assistance to Afghanistan in the past. This close engagement will continue in order to ensure that assistance is well coordinated and responds to the priorities set by Afghans and their government. II. POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT-A TRAGIC HISTORY A. A Turbulent Political Background 5. Afghanistan is a landlocked, mountainous, ethnically diverse, yet geopolitically important country. It was founded in 1747, but its present borders were determined primarily by British and Russian imperial rivalries and Afghan resistance in the 1880s and 1890s. Afghanistan's location at an historical crossroads of population movements accounts for its marked ethnic diversity. While precise data on Afghanistan's population is sketchy, the present in-country population is estimated at 18-20 million-and up to 25 million if all refugees were to return. 6. Afghanistan's strategic geopolitical position resulted in a turbulent and troubled history, with limited development and modernization. The country was at peace between the 1930s and the late 1970s and underwent a modest degree of economic and social development during that time. Modernization was concentrated in the cities and towns, however, and most rural areas retained their traditional mores and governance structures. The Afghan state remained relatively weak and had limited reach in most of the country. 7. The Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 in support of the Communist government of Afghanistan (which had taken power in a military coup the previous year) marked the start of more than two decades of conflict. Over the course of the ten-year Soviet occupation, resistance efforts (Mujaheddin) flourished, backed by various external actors and accompanied by a significant inflow of weapons and military hardware. The protracted conflict generated the largest refugee problem in the world (six million), primarily in Pakistan and Iran. By February 1989, after significant losses and rapidly depleting support at home, the Soviet forces withdrew, leaving the Communist government in Kabul to its own devices. By April 1992, the Mujaheddin resistance took control of Kabul and installed an interim government under the leadership of President Burhannudin Rabbani. Much of the country, however, remained ruled by local and regional warlords. 8. The Taliban movement emerged in 1994 in response, initially, to explicit needs expressed by many Afghans. The Taliban presented themselves as an Islamic solution to the widespread criminality and anarchy that had increasingly come to dominate many areas, particularly Kabul and the Pashtun tribal belt. The Taliban movement took Kabul in 1996 and eventually came to control about 90% of Afghanistan's territory. While the Taliban had strong religious ideological views, their support among Afghans was largely tied to their promise of peace and stability in a country that had been at war for a generation. While they gained and maintained military control over most of the country, they made little ' Government refers to the Interim Administration of Afghanistan and its successors as specified in the Bonn Agreement of 5 December, 2001. 2 effort to form a civilian government and provide public services. In addition, their extreme version of Islamic justice and treatment of women increasingly alienated large segments of the population. 9. Over the course of the last five years, the UN sponsored numerous initiatives to bring peace to Afghanistan as fighting continued between the Taliban and rival opposition forces, united under the banner of the Northern Alliance. These initiatives achieved little success. Meanwhile, Afghanistan faced increasing international isolation as a result of continued fighting, the Taliban's treatment of women, and their harboring of international terrorists. The continuing conflict, international isolation, sanctions and severe drought, combined to exacerbate the situation of an already vulnerable population. 10. Recent Developments. Dramatic military and political changes have taken place in Afghanistan following the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The military intervention of US-led coalition forces resulted within two months, in the collapse of Taliban control throughout the country. Through talks sponsored by the United Nations and chaired by the UNSG Special Representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, agreement was reached in Bonn on December 5, 2001, to establish a six month Interim Authority that consists of the Afghanistan Interim Administration (AIA), the Supreme Court and a special independent Commission for convening an Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand National Assembly). The agreement provided for the Interim Authority to be followed by a two-year Transitional Authority, decided by the Emergency Loya Jirga, leading to a new Constitution and a fully representative electoral process. 11. The Bonn Agreement (Annex 1) explicitly states that the Interim Authority is the repository of Afghanistan's sovereignty and that it will hold Afghanistan's seat at the UN and other international agencies. The AIA, consisting of a Chairman, five Vice Chairpersons, and 24 Ministers, established itself peacefully on December 22 and is receiving widespread international recognition, with many countries in the process of establishing diplomatic missions. The Bonn Agreement also contains provisions for the establishment of a multilateral security force to be deployed in Kabul for six months and for the establishment of independent Civil Service and Human Rights Commissions. 12. Subsequent to the Bonn Agreement, the Security Council authorized an International Security Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) to assist the AIA in maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas. The United Kingdom took the lead in organizing and commanding the ISAF, whose forces began arriving in Afghanistan in late December and whose numbers now stand at 4,500 troops. In addition, some bilateral countries are assisting the AIA with training for police and establishing a national army. In the context of continued factional fighting in various parts of the country, the AIA remains intently concerned about its ability to maintain security and has requested the international community to expand and extend the mandate of the ISAF. B. Social and Economic Context-Lost Decades 13. The quality of life in Afghanistan presents a dismalpicture. Even before the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in the world, but war and isolation have prevented any progress that might otherwise have occurred and on the contrary made the situation worse. In 1996 Afghanistan ranked 169th (out of 174 countries) in the UN's Human Development index. War has brought massive upheaval for the population, and in the areas of education, health, water supply and sanitation, Afghanistan ranks among the worst in the world, with women and children hit the hardest. In addition, women have been increasingly marginalized from public, social and political life. 14. The impact of war on Afghanistan's population cannot be underestimated. Between 1979 and 1988 more than one million Afghans lost their lives, an estimated 700,000 were left physically or mentally disabled, and large numbers of Afghans have been internally and externally displaced. Despite efforts at repatriation, large numbers of Afghans remain outside the country as refugees. It is estimated 3 that two million Afghan refugees are now in Pakistan and 1.4 million in Iran. Women and children constitute three quarters of the refugee population. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans have also settled in the Persian Gulf, in Europe, the USA, Canada, and elsewhere, and an entire generation of Afghans has matured and in many cases taken citizenship in these countries. While undergoing many hardships, Afghan refugees have also gained skills which make them a valuable resource for Afghanistan's reconstruction. 15. Access to education in Afghanistan is extremely limited, and the quality of the education which is available, is poor. With a few local exceptions, girls were officially excluded from formal education under Taliban rule, and females excluded from teaching, exacerbating historical and traditional gender imbalances. The primary gross enrolment rate has been estimated most recently at 39% for boys and 3% for girls. Secondary and higher education, crucial to producing skilled professionals for the future, faces an even bleaker picture. The demand for education now far outstrips supply, and NGOs and communities have stepped in to provide whatever services they can. 16. The health status of Afghans is grim. Infant mortality is estimated by UN agencies and NGOs to be one of the highest in the world at around 152 per 1,000 live births, while 257 of every 1,000 live births die before reaching the age of five. The maternal mortality rate is estimated at 1,700 per 100,000 live births, with nearly 99% of deliveries taking place at home and only 9% being attended by trained personnel. Malnutrition affects up to 52% of children under age five and only around 30% of children under one year of age are fully immunized. Life expectancy at birth is estimated at 44 years for men and 45 for women. With Afghanistan's lack of education facilities, the number of health professionals is low and 70% of the health care system is dependent on external assistance. In addition, Afghanistan probably has the largest population of disabled in the world as a result of war, and especially landmines. 17. Access to adequate and safe water and sanitation facilities is limited, although in some areas NGOs and communities have improved conditions. Currently an estimated 23 % of the population has access to safe water, although this masks wide differences among provinces and districts. Water borne diseases are a major cause of the prevailing high infant and child mortality rates. Approximately 85,000 children under age five die annually from diarrhoeal diseases. Few residential or public buildings in Afghan cities have sewerage systems, and those that do discharge wastewater directly into rivers without treatment. In 1997, sanitation coverage was estimated to be 23 % of the urban population and eight percent of the rural population. Hygiene education accompanying water supply installation has been introduced by some NGOs, but coverage remains limited. 18. Afghan women face extraordinary obstacles to social and economic development. The war, and more recently the Taliban's overtly discriminatory policy on gender issues, have reversed any pre-war progress in Afghanistan in terms of women's social emancipation and equality. Afghanistan is a patriarchal society organized around tribal affiliations and alliances. Women's roles were largely reproductive and family-related. Throughout Afghanistan's history, efforts have been made to improve the position of women, particularly in the areas of education, employment and marriage practices, but steps forward have frequently been met by steps back. Gender gaps in social indicators remain large and are the result of long years of deprivation, war, and traditional practices, compounded by the policies of the Taliban. 19. Community resources and social capital remain intact, to a degree. Afghan communities have shown remarkable resilience. Community groups have reconstructed mosques, schools, and houses; repaired irrigation and water supply systems; and rebuilt livelihoods. Social institutions at the community level vary from region to region in function and structure. Most commonly referred to as shura and jirga, they are convened for functions such as resolution of disputes and organization of collective action. UN agencies and NGOs have supported traditional shuras and jirgas as well as parallel community-based 4 mechanisms to help implement local level projects. These institutions and associated reserves of social capital, although depleted by the years of war and famine, are one of the most important assets for reconstruction. 20. The long drawn-out war of Soviet occupation and subsequent internecine conflict severely damaged Afghanistan's already under developed economy. Prior to the war the bulk of the total labour force was engaged in agriculture, livestock and livestock-based handcrafts, with manufacturing limited to a few large industrial units (in textiles, cement etc.). As a result of foreign aid, the country had a relatively good highway network and some other infrastructure including major irrigation and hydroelectric facilities. This infrastructure, however, did not extend beyond the main arteries and urban centers. By the mid-1990s, most of the country's limited modern infrastructure had been destroyed or oriented toward the war effort. Inflation wiped out the value of the Afghan currency. Agricultural output came down sharply, livestock herds were depleted, and the few large-scale industries stopped functioning. Even more important was the increasing breakdown of the state and civil society and the progressive erosion of institutions-both modern and traditional-which had governed the pre-war economy and society. The key economic institutions of State-central bank, treasury, tax collection and customs, statistics, civil service, law and order, judicial system-became extremely weak or non-existent. Government provided social services, which had limited outreach into the rural areas, atrophied and to a large extent stopped functioning. Finally, landmines, which had been sown indiscriminately throughout the country, caused enormous human and economic losses. 21. Most recently, Afghanistan has been hit by a severe, protracted drought, starting in 1999 and continuing. Given the breakdown of the state and civil society and consequent inability to respond adequately, this drought has led to the risk of famine and has exhausted what coping capacity was left among families and civil society. Crop production has been halved and livestock herds depleted, more than erasing the modest gains of the early and mid-1990s. Large and increasing numbers of people have lost their means of livelihood and have become displaced, either internally or to neighboring countries. Drought conditions have been exacerbated by the widespread degradation of environmental resources. Massive deforestation and degradation of watershed areas, vegetative cover and biodiversity as well as water management problems have had a serious impact on rural livelihoods and pose longer term sustainability challenges. 22. The mid 1990s also saw an unprecedented expansion in various kinds of unofficial economic activities, most notably long-distance trade (particularly re-exports to Pakistan) and opium poppy cultivation. Also falling in this category is uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources-timber, gems, marble and granite-which has resulted in extensive deforestation and environmental degradation. 23. Afghanistan's economic and political conditions have had significant regional spill-over- through unofficial trade, narcotics, terrorism and extremism, financial flows, and movements of people. These spill-over effects have undermined revenue collection, governance and the effectiveness of economic policies in neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan, and contributed to instability in the wider region. It is imperative that Afghanistan's reconstruction takes place in the context of wider regional development in order to ensure the sustainability of peace in Afghanistan. HII. HISTORY OF WORLD BANK GROUP ENGAGEMENT 24. Afghanistan became a member of the World Bank in 1955 and is also a member of IFC, MIGA2, ADB and the IMF. IDA has provided 21 credits to Afghanistan since 1964 in a wide range of areas 2 Afghanistan signed the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency on 12 February, 2002 and is in the process of completing necessary membership requirements. 5 including education, roads and agriculture. Of the original $231 million credits approved under IDA, $83.8 million was disbursed and $147 million was subsequently canceled. Afghanistan has repaid $9.2 million to IDA and remained current on debt service payments until June 1992, when the country went into arrears. As of February 28, 2002, Afghanistan's total outstanding debt to IDA stood at $74.7 million of which arrears were US$25.2 million. Bank operations were suspended shortly after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Resident Mission in Kabul was closed in 1982. 25. IDA lending was suspended after 1979 due to continuing fighting, absence of a national government and Afghanistan's entry into non-accrual status with IDA. Nevertheless, the Bank has remained engaged with the rest of the donor community, so as to be better prepared for future reconstruction. Activities have included continuous monitoring of political and economic developments, managing three income-generating projects for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, working closely with the UN and donors, undertaking knowledge-building and knowledge-sharing activities, and providing analytical underpinning for the work of the wider assistance community. 26. Following Bank participation in a 1997 UN mission to Afghanistan the Bank developed a pro- active "Watching Brief' engagement with Afghanistan in line with the Bank's policies on relations with countries in conflict. The goal was to prepare the Bank for eventually contributing to a reconstruction program and future operational work in Afghanistan by expanding knowledge of key economic and social issues and by developing contacts with members of Afghan society and the international assistance community. A full description of the Bank's engagement with Afghanistan and activities under the Watching Brief is provided in Annex 2. IV. AFGHANISTAN'S RECONSTRUCTION-THE CHALLENGES AHEAD A. Key Development Challenges 27. Afghanistan's humanitarian, reconstruction and development needs are immense. Its economy is in a state of collapse, its infrastructure destroyed, its formal state institutions severely undermined or non- existent, and its social indicators the worst in the world. While the agreement reached in Bonn is historic and encouraging, the political environment remains fragile and the challenges ahead are immense. 28. Afghanistan will undoubtedly need major re-investment in all sectors. Significant resources will be needed not only to rebuild the human and physical capital destroyed over the last two decades, but to move Afghanistan onto a higher trajectory of growth and human development for the medium term. In the short term, moreover, there is a pressing need to meet the expectations of a war-weary population and help ensure that the transition to peace is as smooth as possible. 29. The Bonn agreement provides clear political markers that the country needs to meet in order to sustain international support. The AIA has only a total of six months in office before a transitional government is appointed. In that time, it is essential that early assistance provides a stake in the peace process for ordinary Afghans in addition to those who might otherwise engage in conflict or illicit activities. 30. The key challenges in the short-run are to quickly establish basic security for the population, revitalize agriculture, economic activity and basic infrastructure and social services so as to provide a real return to peace for the population. There are high expectations that after 22 years of war, three years of drought and massive displacement the future will offer much more than the past, and the international community will mobilize quickly to demonstrate that the returns to peace are high and can be sustained over time. 6 31. Restoring meaningful security in people's lives is a priority identified by most Afghans and important to creating the conditions in which the political process can gain strength as well as enabling economic activity to resume. This is going to require restoring a basic level of law and order and removing the threat of mines and the war economy promoted by drug production. In addition, the effective reintegration of refugees, displaced persons and former combatants will be urgently needed to minimize the potential for these groups to undermine the political settlement and security situation. 32. Restoring an acceptable level of basic social services and providing some level of social protection for the many vulnerable groups in Afghanistan including widows, refugees and intemally displaced people, disabled, orphans, and ex-combatant children, will also be a high priority. In health, the most urgent need is to revive the preventive and public health services, including expanding the basic programs of immunization, reproductive health, communicable disease control and maternal and child health. In education, a key challenge will be to find ways to rapidly expand primary and secondary education, particularly for girls, tlhrough reactivating schools, re-hiring teachers, providing them with essential teaching materials and using whatever spaces are available for conducting lessons. 33. Major infrastructure bottlenecks will need to be removed in order to stimulate early economic recovery and growth. War has not only devastated Afghanistan's existing infrastructure but prevented new investment from taking place. Immediate challenges include removing major transport bottlenecks, re-establishing emergency air traffic services, repairing urban piped water and sanitation systems, restoring essential electric power supplies and establishing communications systems. 34. Restoring institutions of good governance will be essentialfor laying a strong foundation for future development. Over the course of the past two decades many of the key traditional and formal governance institutions have been eroded. Afghanistan now has the opportunity to rebuild a nation based on strong civil society and communities, good governance, a vibrant private sector, transparency, and open and positive relations between local communities and government. This will require restoring the rule of law, determining the appropriate balance of centralized and decentralized functions, instituting simple and transparent procedures to minimize corruption, and effective aid management within a lean government bureaucracy. Early attention will also be needed to restoring critical economic and financial functions: strengthening the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance, strengthening the payments system, and implementing a basic regulatory framework for commercial banking. 35. The government will also need to address the social ramifications of war and demonstrate its commitment to restoring equity. Afghanistan has experienced severe social upheaval, including massive displacement, breakdown of traditional social structures, separation of families, in addition to the legacy of war and discriminatory policies on the situation of children and women. Afghanistan now has the opportunity to rebuild a society that protects its vulnerable members and enables all persons to participate equally in the development process, including women and men and all regional and ethnic groups. 36. The operating environment for the Afghan Government and the international community is likely to remain challenging in the nearfuture. The current security situation, widespread destruction of infrastructure and institutions and the limited communications facilities create serious constraints for the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. These constraints will have implications for how the international community engages with Afghanistan, and for the nature and delivery modes of assistance. In addition, the government has limited capacity to generate revenue, requiring external funding for the critical costs of government, including salaries of security forces, government teachers and health workers. 37. Afghanistan's reconstruction and development will require vision, leadership and skills to design the reconstruction effort and to manage the influx of assistance agencies and emerging commercial 7 interests in many spheres of activity. While some technocratic capacity exists within the civil service in a few areas, the decades of neglect have not equipped it to deal with the challenges of reconstruction or transition to a modern state. Developing this capacity, and ensuring the participation of women, will be a significant challenge in the context of pressing needs in all areas. B. Government's Vision and Priorities 38. The immediate priorities of the AIA are to address the most urgent humanitarian needs of the population and to take the essential steps today to prepare the ground for political transition and sustained economic and social development in the future. 39. Although the AIA has only been in power since late December, it has started to formulate a vision to guide reconstruction and development. At the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, held in Tokyo, Chairman Karzai presented his vision of a prosperous and secure Afghanistan that would also bring prosperity to its trading partners and stability to the region. He stated the AIA's intention to build a credible state with an efficient and transparent government, accountable to its citizens as well as to the international community. He also stressed the importance of building a vibrant and competitive private sector and a well-developed civil society with democratic institutions. For the reconstruction program, the AIA identified key outcomes, including political stability and security, access to basic services, an adequate standard of living for the people, economic growth, and in the longer term independence from foreign aid 40. To accomplish its goals the AIA plans to proceed on several fronts: * Placing high priority on the elimination of corruption, the imposition of the rule of law, and rebuilding effective public institutions; * Restoring and maintaining security-including de-mining, demobilization, effective law enforcement and drug control; * Revitalizing economic activity-including restoring essential infrastructure, stimulating job creation and providing an enabling environment for strong private sector led growth; * Redressing severe social development weaknesses-including the impact of 20 years of neglect of education and health services and severe gender imbalances; * Requesting from the international community predictable, simple aid financing mechanisms that allow for quick disbursement and, adherence to the budget to ensure coherence of assistance; and, * Giving priority in the reconstruction program to regions most affected by conflict and drought. 41. The government has expressed its strong commitment to private-sector led growth, trade promotion and openness, and sound policy reform. It has already undertaken some actions to promote trade and investment, including signing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) convention, and securing an Overseas Investment Guarantee Corporation (OPIC) guarantee. C. Response of the International Community 42. The international community has moved quickly to assist Afghanistan in laying the basis for sustained peace and recovery. A number of meetings have been held on Afghanistan's reconstruction, starting even before the AIA came to power. These included: the meeting of the newly-formed 8 Afghanistan Steering Group in Washington, DC on November 20, 2001; a conference on preparing for Afghanistan's reconstruction organized by the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) together with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Islamabad, Pakistan, during November 27- 29, 2001; a second meeting of the Steering Group in Brussels on December 20-21, 2001; and the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held in Tokyo during January 21- 22, 2002. In addition there were two meetings in Brussels on gender issues in Afghanistan, a parallel NGO meeting to the Bonn negotiation process, and a meeting of the Afghanistan Support Group in December 2001 to discuss urgent humanitarian needs. 43. At the Washington meeting, the ADB, World Bank, and UNDP were tasked to produce a preliminary needs assessment for Afghanistan's reconstruction to be presented at the Tokyo ministerial meeting (see Executive Summary in Annex 3). The needs assessment, completed on a very tight time frame by a team of more than 60 staff of the three agencies provided an excellent example of how the three agencies have worked together cooperatively. The assessment was well-received at the Tokyo meeting, and generated pledges of external support for Afghanistan's reconstruction of $1.8 billion for the first year and $4.5 billion for the first 30 months. The AIA, represented at the Tokyo meeting by its Chairman, emphasized its commitment to reconstruction and its determination to lead this effort, coupled with a strong commitment to financial transparency and accountability. 44. The preliminary needs assessment provided a rough estimate of the external assistance needed to support Afghanistan's economic and social recovery and reconstruction over the short to medium term, within a broad development framework that emphasized the need to: * Involve Afghan men and women at all stages; * Ensure that appropriate policy and institutional frameworks are in place; * Incorporate institutional support to communities and government institutions; * Promote human rights and social inclusion. 45. In addition to identifying immediate priorities for donor assistance in the areas of security, governance, labor-intensive public works programs, health and education, the needs assessment emphasized the importance of providing adequate funding for the Govemment's recurrent budgetary expenditures so that much needed services, including health, education and security, could be provided to the population. 46. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the World Bank has strengthened its knowledge building activities, expanded its country team and engaged actively in consultations with the Afghan Interim Administration including the Chairman, the Vice Chairs for Finance and Women's Affairs and a number of other Ministers. The AIA has reactivated its membership in the World Bank Group and the IMF. D. Management and Funding of Reconstruction 47. Management of the reconstruction effort will be an enormous challenge in the face of the limited technical and revenue generating capacity of government, and the large numbers of donors and implementing agencies. The AIA has decided to establish an Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA), under the guidance of the Chairman and a number of economic Ministers. The AACA will be responsible for leading the government's efforts in reconstruction including developing a National Development Framework based on an assessment of needs, undertaking programming, aid coordination, and procurement. This agency will require urgent capacity building in order to effectively take on these roles. 9 48. Implementation wil! also be a challenge given the limited government capacity and the logistical and security problems throughout the country. The AIA has expressed its commitment to use the full variety of institutional actors in the reconstruction effort, including NGOs, UN agencies and the private sector. Local governments are likely to play a role in the delivery of some services as the appropriate degree of decentralization is determined. 49. The government has requested that the budget be the central instrument for guiding policy making, programming of assistance and accountability. The AIA plans to prepare the FY03 budget in the near future. In order to facilitate coordination of donor support within the framework of a unified budget, a multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) will be established to fund the government's recurrent budgetary expenditures, priority sectoral investment and program costs and capacity building projects. These expenditures would be fully incorporated within the government's budget and other bilateral assistance would be encouraged to align activities within the budget process and framework. E. Guiding Principles for the Reconstruction and Assistance Effort 50. Some key principles are emerging for how the international community, including the World Bank, slhould engage with Afghans in the reconstruction and development process. * Strong national ownership and government leadership of the reconstruction and aid process are critical. Although domestic capacity is limited, the people and government of Afghanistan have expressed their intention and will to lead and drive the reconstruction effort. * Reconstruction efforts should build on and strengthen existing capacity. Afghans and local communities have many strengths that can be utilized in the short term and scaled up over time- including a vibrant private sector spirit, community driven efforts, NGO experience in service delivery and traditional institutions for guiding resource allocation decisions. * Reconstruction and development across all sectors must be accompanied by an equal emphasis on capacity building. * Women as well as men must be fully engaged in reconstruction planning and development and ethnic, regional and gender equity needs to be embodied in all activities. * Genuine partnerships, both within the international assistance community and with the government, are essential. Aid coordination and funding should strengthen rather than undermine government institutions and budgetary processes, and aid management systems need to be kept as simple and straightforward as possible. * While there will be a need for early assistance to Afghanistan to address urgent needs, "quick fixes" at the expense of institutional options (such as private provision) and regulatory development should be avoided along with the tendency to set up inappropriate and costly precedents that would be difficult to fix later on. * Building sound economic institutions at the outset is also critically important, including a central monetary authority, a fiscal system and a functional financial and payment system. 10 V. THE BANK GROUP'S TRANSITIONAL SUPPORT STRATEGY- BUILDING CAPACITY AND COOPERATION A. Transitional Support Strategy-Towards Reengagement 51. The dramatic recent developments in Afghanistan create the opportunity for a more substantial re-engagement by the World Bank in Afghanistan, and for the preparation of a Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) in line with Bank Operations Policy OP2.30. Afghanistan now meets the criteria for this new phase of World Bank engagement. * The persistent conflict has dramatically died down and there is good reason to expect that this trend will continue and stabilize over time; * The AIA is an appropriate, effective counterpart with which the World Bank can work. * There is substantial international cooperation in the reconstruction effort, with an important, clearly-defined role for the Bank that includes administering a multi-donor trust fund, taking a strong role in the aid coordination process, as well as providing analytical and financial support; * World Bank staff have already traveled to Afghanistan for discussions with the government and other stakeholders and the Bank is preparing to open an office in Kabul. 52. Given the current limited state of Bank knowledge of Afghanistan, the short duration of the AIA and the time needed for the government to articulate strategies at the sectoral level, this TSS covers a time frame of up to 9 months. Bank management would come back to the Board of Executive Directors with an updated TSS after this time and in light of developments on the political and reconstruction fronts. B. Strategic Approach 53. Afghanistan's reconstruction and development require a compelling national vision and a long- term commitment by donors. The aim over the medium to long term is not merely to return Afghanistan to where it was prior to war but to lay the basis for a prosperous, modern and peaceful country that can fulfill the expectations of its people and contribute positively to the development of the region. The key objective of Bank support to Afghanistan is to assist the people and government of Afghanistan in this transition and to help lay the foundations for Afghanistan to become a prosperous, inclusive and peaceful country in the future. 54. The historic agreement reached in Bonn provides Afghanistan a precious opportunity to break out of the entrenched pattern of conflict, return to normalcy, and enable its long-suffering people to rebuild their lives. Afghanistan has begun a delicate evolution toward sustainable peace and political rebuilding. The success of this process and the success of reconstruction are inextricably intertwined. Hence it is essential for reconstruction to support the political process and respond to the legitimate demand of the Afghan people for quick results on the ground while at the same time building the institutional and human capacity for economic recovery and sustainable growth and poverty reduction over time. 55. The immediate challenges facing the government, including its limited capacity and outreach, the large number of donors (many with little prior experience in Afghanistan), the difficult logistical and security conditions, and the high expectations of the population make a strong case for a phased assistance strategy by the Bank, in partnership with other donors. If assistance is not provided quickly to help the government respond to the needs of the population and manage the inflow of aid resources, there is a risk that the fragile political and security environment will unravel and that donor resources will be 11 wasted and international support lost. This TSS focuses on assisting the government, over the course of the next 6-9 months, in responding to the most urgent recovery needs of the population within a sound policy fiamework, as well as putting in place the necessary capacity to ensure that the reconstruction and aid process is effectively managed and supports the government's medium term development goals. The Bank will assist the government with: * Rebuilding or strengthening essential governance institutions and capacity, particularly in areas important for facilitating the overall reconstruction, economic recovery and aid process. * Designing and activating high-priority, high impact reconstruction programs that will help restore livelihoods, kick-start economic activity, restore essential infrastructure, communications and social services and facilitate the development of the private sector; * Ensuring the international community is effectively coordinating assistance efforts under government leadership and within a comprehensive development framework (CDF). * Building a better knowledge base and analytical underpinning for the work of the international community and for future Bank assistance. C. Strategic Sequencing of Bank Outputs and Instruments 56. The Bank will strategically sequence available Bank instruments in line with the objectives, timetable, and sequencing of actions under the Bonn Agreement and so as to make most effective use of available resources (see Diagram 1). Until the installation of the Transitional Authority, and prior to arrears clearance, Bank support will come primarily in the form of grant assistance. Post Conflict Fund (PCF) resources will be used to bridge to IDA post conflict grants for technical assistance and high impact reconstruction activities. After the Transitional Authority takes over, Bank relations with the government would be increasingly normalized; arrears would be cleared and IDA operations would be undertaken. Engagement in the needs assessment and Bank analytical work and policy dialogue will help to build a knowledge base for future IDA assistance. 57. Throughout the period of the TSS the Bank will play a key role in putting in place mechanisms to maximize coordination of both funding and the overall reconstruction effort. The Bank will remain actively engaged with the government and other agencies and donors in the needs assessment process and will champion strong coordination mechanisms, including the multi donor ARTF in support of the government's budget and reconstruction priorities. 58. Continuing Active Engagement in the Needs Assessment: The Bank will continue to collaborate with ADB, IsDB and UNDP through a series of multi donor sector missions in areas selected by the AIA as priorities, in order to build a coordinated approach to reconstruction and to build knowledge for designing future IDA assistance. These missions are organized under the umbrella of the Implementation Group for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan (para. 69). The missions will work with the AIA to identify priority projects that could be funded by donors, including IDA, as well as broader institutional, capacity building and policy-related work needed in each sector for longer term development. Sectors identified for immediate attention include demobilization and reintegration, roads, water and sanitation, telecommunications, education, health, agriculture and rural development, urban development, the finance and budget and monetary policy. 12 Diagram 1 - Timeline of World Bank Assistance Flows June'01 Dec '01 June '02 Dec 02 June'03 Dec '03 TSS (BB) _ ------------- Needs Assessment (BB) PCF Active Grants: • Watching Brief- 1 ($350,000, completed) * Teacher Training for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan ($1.5m) * Watching Brief -2: Reconstruction Strategy for Afghanistan with Afghan and Other Stakeholders Participation (Bank-executed, $860,000) * Watching Brief -2: Enhancing Knowledge and Partnership (UNDP-executed, $365,000) Proposed Grants: * TA PCF grant: Rebuilding Key Govt. Institutions ($2m) * TA JPCF grant: Economic and Social Reconstruction Activities IDA IDA Grants: (Up to $570m * Emergency Public Administration Project ($10m) over 30 - TA for managing the reconstruction and -------------------------------------- months) aid process - Board date 04/04/02 * IDA Reconstruction Project (up to $90m): High impact reconstruction activities Board date ---------------------------------- - late FY02 IDA Operations Reconstruction, development and capacity _ _ --------- building projects over next 30 months. ARTF Donor _rants: * Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (recurrent budget, priority reconstruction activities)…… _ Policy * Gender Assessment, macro and sector dialogue, Dialogue/ other AAA activities ----- AAA (BB) 13 59. The Bank would utilize Post Conflict Fund Grants as a bridge to other capacity building assistance to strengthen institutions essential to the reconstruction effort. The Bank has made substantial strategic use of PCF funds during the past three years to support analytical and capacity building objectives. This will continue over the duration of the TSS. PCF resources are already being utilized for knowledge and partnership building activities (Annex 2). The Bank will utilize PCF (and Japan PCF) grants to bridge to other capacity building assistance (through IDA grants) by funding the provision of urgent technical assistance for budget preparation, utility regulation, investment and project preparation and aid coordination. PCF and other grant facilities would also be used to support high- impact initiatives focusing on building capacity within the government, NGOs and the local Afghan community, including assistance for strengthening the Ministry of Women's Affairs and funding quick impact activities through NGOs. 60. IDA Support. At the Tokyo Ministerial Conference the Bank pledged $500 million of IDA support over the next thirty months, with immediate action to provide about $70 million, in addition, in grant assistance. Given the urgent needs for early assistance to Afghanistan, Bank management intends to provide an indicative planning figure of up to $1 00 million in use of IDA grants this fiscal year within the overall envelope pledged in Tokyo. If some activities are not sufficiently progressed this fiscal year they will be developed for IDA operations next fiscal year. 61. IDA Post Conflict Grants3 The TSS proposes to make strategic use of IDA post-conflict grants totaling up to $100 million over the next 4-9 months in support of Afghanistan's immediate reconstruction and development priorities and to complement assistance efforts of the rest of the international community. 62. The first such grant for $10 million would support an Emergency Public Administration Project to assist the government to put in place, on an emergency basis, capacity to manage the reconstruction and aid process in order to ensure the effective flow, delivery, and utilization of international assistance within a framework that is driven by AIA priorities. Assistance will focus on capacity building in budget management, financial management, procurement and audit. Assistance could also be provided to help the government develop and implement policies and programs important for longer term development, such as banking, utility regulation and putting in place regulatory frameworks to provide an enabling environment for private sector growth, community development and the rule of law. The documentation for this grant is accompanying this TSS. It is anticipated that the Emergency Public Administration Project will become effective in May and will pave the way for further IDA support in addition to facilitating the flow of assistance through the ARTF and from other donors by having the necessary government executing capacity in procurement, financial management and audit, in place. 63. Additional IDA activities for reconstruction are under preparation and would aim to identify high-impact assistance that could be put in place over the next 4-9 months to help the government kick- start economic activity and restore essential services and infrastructure to effect immediate improvements 3 Under IDA's Twelfth Replenishment Resolution IDA 12 donor funds may be used for post conflict grants under the following conditions: (i) the proposed grant has been designed in accordance with OP2.30; (ii) early performance is promising as evidenced by the recipient country having taken convincing steps towards social and economic recovery; (iii) arrears to IBRD/IDA are large and protracted and cannot be easily or quickly cleared using domestic resources; (iv) a concerted international effort to provide positive financial flows and other assistance is underway and other creditors have agreed not to make net withdrawals of financial resources from the country; and (v) alternative sources of financing for post conflict recovery are inadequate or available only on inappropriate terms. 14 in the lives of Afghans. This assistance will be designed not only to alleviate the suffering and constraints faced by ordinary Afghans, but to ensure that the reintegration of former combatants, returning refugees and displaced people is as smooth as possible. Activities will be identified through the multi-donor needs assessment process and will be in areas that will lay an appropriate foundation for longer term development in the sector. Priority activities would be included in an IDA Reconstruction Project4 - funded by a further IDA post-conflict grant - which could total up to $90 million and would be submitted for Board approval by the end of the fiscal year. Other activities identified from the joint missions will be proposed for funding to the ARTF, to other donors and considered for future IDA operations. Options being pursued for this quick support include: * Community-driven investments across various sectors, through a national funding mechanism to support NGOs and community group priorities; * Non-formal education for illiterate and poorly educated young women, together with early childhood education; support for the initial rehabilitation of tertiary institutions; capacity building tlhrough establishment of a Global Distance Leaming facility; and capacity building for the Ministry of Education; * Restoring basic health facilities and services in targeted areas. * Restoration of water supply and sanitation services in secondary cities and sanitation in Kabul (other donors are already engaged in provision of water supply in Kabul); * Reconstruction and rehabilitation of power facilities in Kabul and secondary towns, and related institutional development activities; essential communications facilities to improve connectivity; * Repair of roads to remove major transport bottlenecks for humanitarian assistance and economic and social activity; * Agriculture rehabilitation to restore food security - focusing on seed and fertilizer supply, emergency pest control; improving rural livelihoods in the areas of livestock, horticulture, non- farm enterprise development; and improving natural resource management in Afghanistan's critical forest and watershed areas. 64. IDA Operations After FY02. Further IDA concessional support, within the envelope indicatively pledged at Tokyo, would come after arrears clearance and would reflect normalization of Afghanistan- Bank relations. Assistance would respond to priority needs identified by the Afghan people and would build on areas identified under the ongoing sector based needs assessment missions. Preparatory work for these operations will get underway during the period covered by this TSS, and if ready, one or more IDA operations may be submitted to the Board within the next 6-9 months. This assistance may also include programmatic support to the Afghanistan government. 65. Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTTF5). In order to provide a simple and coordinated vehicle for channeling donor assistance in support of Government priorities, the multi-donor Afghanistan 4 The Bank is preparing a range of priority activities to include in the IDA Reconstruction Project. While efforts will be made to incorporate activities into one grant operation, should some be ready earlier than others and more appropriately be treated separately, Bank management may present more than one project to the Board for approval but within the overall envelope identified here. 5See Board Paper on Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) OM 2002-0022. A final paper on the ARTF will be submitted to the Board in March 2002 . 15 Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) will be established before the end of the fiscal year (see Diagram 2). The ARTF will provide financing for essential government recurrent costs as well as priority sector and investment programs and projects. It would fund salaries/non project TA/O&M and other recurrent expenditures in the government's budget; investment activities and programs, including quick-impact recovery projects; and costs of contributions to reconstruction by Afghan experts resident abroad and traininig programs for Afghans in Afghanistan. The ARTF is expected to be effective in April and would take over the financing of government salaries from the UJNDP Interim Fund (established in late December to channel emergency donor assistance to the government's budget) in July 2002. 66. The Bank has been requested to be the Administrator of the ARTF with overall fiduciary responsibility. The Bank will also have a key role as a member of the Management Committee, comprising ADB, IsDB, World Bank and UNDP, responsible for determining resource allocations in consultation with the government. While the Bank would appoint a Monitoring Agent to assist with fiduciary oversight, the ARTF would utilize the procurement, financial and audit capacity created under the Emergency Public Administration Project (para. 62). Diagram 2: Flow of Funds * Reconstruction activities * Wage payments * Development projects * Other recurrent costs Development Budget Recurrent Budget Comprehensive Budget Aid Coordination --------------- -- ----------- ( :::::W orld administrator Bank WoTld BankOte Projects Donor Contributions 67. Donor Coordination within a Comprehensive Framework The Bank Group's assistance to Afghanistan is based on partnerships and close coordination among donors. Outcomes that improve the lives of Afghans cannot be addressed by the Bank alone, but as part of a coordinated effort of all donors. A clear consensus has emerged that reconstruction assistance and donor efforts should be driven by a comprehensive framework with the new government in the driver's seat. The large number of donors engaging in Afghanistan and the enormous challenges facing the country provide a clear rationale for utilizilg a CDF approach. 68. While it is not possible to prepare a full CDF partnership matrix at this stage, the CDF process would be followed, leading to development of a full CDF matrix over time (see Diagram 3) that reflects and builds on the government's own National Development Framework. Priority policy and investment needs in various sectors will be factored into the National Development Framework from the multi donor sector missions (para. 58). 69. Mechanisms are already in place for coordinating donor assistance but they need to be simplified and consolidated and aligned with government leadership of the aid coordination process. The Steering 16 Group (SG) established in November 2001, is intended to provide political support for reconstruction. An Implementation Group (IG) would meet quarterly in Kabul, chaired by the government, with the ADB, IsDB, World Bank, UNDP and the Afghanistan Support Group Chair as Vice-Chairs. The IG would provide a vehicle for coordination amnong donors and ensure that the key priorities for Afghanistan's reconstruction are supported. The IG is expected to work alongside the ARTF Donor Committee as well as tlhe Afghanistan Support Group in ensuring that bilateral support is consistent with that provided through the ARTF and that the transition from humanitarian to reconstruction and development assistance is smootli. It is expected that these mechanisms would eventually evolve into a normal Afghan-led Consultative Group process. Diagram 3: A Comprehensive Approach Near Term Objectives Instruments of International World Bank Instruments Community Contilnuing progress of * UN support to Loya Jirga and peace process other institutions Establishing basic security * International Security Force. * Assistance with training * ARTFt national army/police * Support for demining. * Support for DDR * IDA Reconstruction Project(s)' Building institutional and * Technical Assistance * PCF Grants finanicial management * Emergency Public capacity Administration Projecte * Policy Advice/AAA Restoring infrastructure * TA for regulatory framework * Emergency Public and social services * Quick impact reconstruction Administration Projecte projects * IDA Reconstruction Project(s)- * ARTF * AAA * TA for regulatory/enabling * PCF Grants Reviving the private sector framework * IFC Technical Assistance * Micro finance * Policy Advice/AAA Generating income for the * Public works programs * IDA Reconstruction Project(s)- poor and displaced * Community driven * ARTF development Saving lives and providing * International humanitarian hunmaniitarian support assistance Coordinated provision of * Steering Group * Needs assessment. funds and assistance. * Implementation Group * PCF and Emergency Public * Afghanistan Support Group Administration Project (TA for aid coordination) * ARTF 4 ARTF is a multi donor trust fund co-managed with other international institutions (ADB, IsDB and UNDP) and administered by the World Bank. * The IDA Reconstruction Project(s) would be in the form of an IDA post-conflict grant(s) totaling up to $90 million. 0 The IDA Emergency Public Administration Project would be in the form of an IDA post-conflict grant totaling $10 million. 17 70. Analytical Work and Policy Dialogue. Over the longer term, the Bank aims to assist the government achieve sustainable reductions in poverty and improvements in social indicators. In order to achieve these aims the Bank will build an analytical basis upon which policy advice, technical assistance and further operational work by the Bank can be determined. In addition, there is a need to develop robust databases on key development indicators in order to monitor the impact of reconstruction assistance and guide the Government's poverty reduction efforts. 71. Under the Bank's Watching Brief for Afghanistan a range of economic and sector work was undertaken to build knowledge about Afghanistan's future reconstruction and development priorities as described in Annex 2. Subsequent to the events of September 11, 2001 the Bank prepared several pieces of analytical work-including the Afghanistan Approach Paper (November, 2001), the Afghanistan Border States Development Framework Approach Paper (November, 2001), the Study on the Socio- economic Impacts of Mine Action in Afghanistan (December, 2001) and the Conference on Preparing for Afgllaniistan's Reconstruction (November, 2001). The Bank has conducted policy dialogue in areas such as telecommunications regulation, civil service pay and structuring and budget preparation. 72. Building on this work the Bank would build up a program of AAA and policy dialogue in order to contribute to longer term development assistance for Afghanistan. In line with the Bank's programs elsewlhere in South Asia, AAA activities will respond to clear client "pull", will be in areas where the Bank can provide significant value added and will be designed in coordination with work of other multilaterals and donors. In FY03 it is anticipated that the Bank will undertake analytical work in gender as well as civil service reform issues. In order to develop a baseline for monitoring impact and guiding resource allocation the Bank will begin work with UNDP, through a PCF grant, on a Household Survey utilizing Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) techniques. Sectoral strategies and priorities for policy dialogue will be identified in the course of the needs assessment and will focus on areas where the government faces complex policy and investment decisions, including in water resource management, infrastructure regulation, private sector development, financial sector reform and trade policy. It is anticipated that the Bank will also provide policy advice, on demand, in areas such as customs and tax adminiistration, restructuring and privatizing state owned enterprises and foreign direct investment. 73. The IMF is engaged in dialogue with the AIA in a variety of macroeconomic areas including strengthening Central Bank functions and providing advice on currency and budget matters, with a view to establishing a normal Fund program in about a year's time. The Bank is working in close partnership witli the IMF in areas of shared responsibility, such as the financial sector, and will continue do so. 74. IFC Assistance. IFC intends supporting the international assistance effort where expertise is relevant and helpful. Development of the private sector is a key plank in the Government's recovery and development strategy and is essential for achieving long-term stability and improving living conditions in Afghanistan. IFC will draw on the lessons of experience from other countries affected by conflict (e.g., West Bank and Gaza and Kosovo), and leverage other sources of finance from the donor community to SUpport a technical assistance program. Afghanistan is a likely candidate for support for micro and small enterprises, including the establishment of microfinance/SME finance institutions and perhaps a project development facility. The other priority for IFC investment is a business hotel in Kabul. IFC could help identify potential foreign technical partners in these sectors. IFC would support further investments in Afghanistan after the basic elements of an enabling environment for the private sector are in place. 75. MIGA Assistance. Afghanistan is completing membership requirements for MIGA. Once it subscribes the shares allocated to it, MIGA will be able to offer guarantees against political risks to investors seeking to invest in Afghanistan. MIGA will complement and supplement the private sector initiatives taken by the World Bank and the IFC and will provide technical support such as capacity 18 building and introducing the Investment Promotion Agency net-work (IPA-net) through the MIGA Information and Marketing Department. MIGA has experience in supporting the private sector in post- conflict countries and regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and West Bank and Gaza, particularly througlh the creation of special investment guarantee trust funds to cover investments in those areas. MIGA will endeavor to find innovative mechanisms to encourage the flow of private investments into Afglhanistan. 76. Key Outcomes. The Bank's program will ensure that capacity building is a key priority in all sectors and that the reconstruction effort supports the participation of women as well as men, and of all ethniic and regional groups. In nine months time the aim will be to see: * The Afghan government fully in control of the reconstruction and aid process with sound financial management, procurement and other accountability mechanisms in place to facilitate the effective flow of funds; * The AIA's priorities as reflected in the budget, adequately funded and essential government services reactivated; * Increased employment and school enrolment (including for women and girls), and improvements in basic infrastructure and facilities as a result of early recovery activities. * Growth in agriculture, small and medium businesses, small scale construction and repair work underway and private sector regeneration in a range of areas. * Donors organized around a comprehensive national framework for development and engaged in real coordination, led by the Afghan authorities. * Enhanced knowledge by the Bank and the intemational community of key sectoral and institutional issues important for Afghanistan's longer term development; active dialogue with the authorities on macroeconomic, budget and various policy and institutional issues. D. Implementing the TSS - Operational Issues 77. The Bank's assistance program will maximize the engagement of NGOs, community groups and the private sector in the planning and implementation of the recovery and reconstruction program, building on the operating experience these groups have had over the last 20 years. In the short run, engagement with the AIA is likely to be mainly at the central government level, until such time as decentralized political structures and delivery mechanisms become possible. Delivery of assistance to areas outside Kabul would utilize the experiences and networks of NGOs, UN agencies and the private sector, or would rely on new mechanisms to channel funds directly to communities. 78. Social and Environmental Safeguards. The massive environmental and social problems of Afghaniistan cannot be addressed separately from the overall effort of reconstruction. Therefore, the Bank will ensure that social and environmental concerns are mainstreamed into its assistance strategy, both during the transition and over the longer term. In particular, social and environmental due diligence requirements of the Bank (safeguard policies) will be adhered to in a way that is adapted to both the urgency of the recovery effort and the needs on the ground. This will be done so as to avoid causing harm or exacerbating social tensions and in order to encourage consistent treatment of social and environmental issues by all donors and the Afghan authorities. 19 79. Field Presence and Outreach. An important complement to donor coordination and partnership building is the Bank Group's overall outreach - not only to other donors but to NGOs, members of civil society and the wider Afghan and international community. The interest in Afghanistan is intense and informiation about its current status and prospects is scarce. The Bank has taken an open and transparent approach to the sharing of information. This approach will continue, and the Bank would increase its interactions with government, media, civil society, members of the Afghan Diaspora and the business community to establish partnerships around a shared vision for Afghanistan's future. 80. In order to effectively fulfill these roles, and to enhance dialogue with the AIA, the Bank is establishing a country office in Kabul, which will be officially opened in May 2002 and will include a public information center. The office would help organize policy advice and technical assistance for the AIA, establish effective relationships with a broad range of civil society institutions as well as governiment, serve as a focal point for donor coordination, administer and manage the ARTF, support operational work and take a pro active role in explaining the Bank's role in supporting the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. 81. The Bank will also examine other opportunities to promote the sharing of knowledge. The Bank has set up a public website, which will include an interactive database for Afghan nationals who wish to contribute to the reconstruction effort. The Bank is also assisting the government with establishing internal and external communications facilities as well as utilizing the Development Gateway to promote widespread availability of detailed information on Afghanistan's reconstruction. The Bank will work witlh the government on communicating its vision and programs widely and will investigate the potential for training programs for Afghan media in addition to those being planned through the World Bank Institute for government and NGO officials via global distance learning and other training programs. 82. Arrears Clearance. In order to resume normal IDA operations Afghanistan's arrears to the Bank need to be cleared. Afghanistan has been in arrears to IDA since June 1992 with outstanding principal of $74.7 million and overdue charges and principal of $25.2 million, as of February 28, 2002. 83. Under the framework for IDA's provision of post conflict grant assistance, other multilateral creditors must agree not to make net withdrawals of financial resources prior to arrears clearance. Afglianistan has arrears to the ADB of $15.8 million and outstanding charges to the IMF totaling approximately $9 million. The Bank, ADB and IMF have agreed that arrears would be cleared in a coordinated fashion and that all three institutions would keep each other informed of developments. Furthermore, it has been agreed that there would be no net withdrawals of resources from Afghanistan by any Il1ultilateral institution prior to arrears clearance. Bank staff are working with the authorities on modalities to clear arrears in the context of IDA operations that are planned for the first half of FY03. Some donors have already indicated their willingness to help with arrears clearance through the use of grant resources. VI. PROSPECTS, RISKS AND MITIGATION MEASURES A. Prospects for Economic and Social Recovery 84. Prospects for a short-run economic recovery are subject to security improving on a nationwide basis and sound economic policies being pursued by the Government. The agriculture sector has shown remarkable resilience in the past and, if there is a break in the chronic drought conditions of the last three years, has the potential to recover rapidly, especially if fully supported by the international community tlhrough the distribution of much needed inputs, for example, seeds and animal vaccines. In addition, if security conditions permit substantial reconstruction activities outside Kabul, the rehabilitation and 20 reconstruction of infrastructure, provision of jobs, education etc, should facilitate an overall economic recovery throughout the country. 85. Afghanistan's long-term prospects depend critically on domestic and regional political stability. The success of the peace process initiated in Bonn will be critical for establishing an environment within whichi Afghan women and men can rebuild their lives and look forward to a more secure and prosperous futurle for themselves and their children. 86. Reconstruction and longer-term development are inseparable in the case of Afghanistan. Afghaniistan's longer-term prospects are good if reconstruction is successful and if there is a serious and sustained effort to address the country's very poor social indicators. Initial efforts have started to increase the numbers of boys and girls in schools but this, and similar efforts in the health sector, will have to be multiplied many times in order to ensure that the benefits of development are widely shared. B. Risks Remain High 87. The critical risk is that Afghanistan's delicate evolution toward a stable peace with an effective, fully representative, accountable government will be derailed. This could involve in the worst-case scenario reversal of progress and degeneration into the kind of conflict and violence that plagued most of Afglhanistan in the early 1990s, or to a lesser extreme in the political process getting bogged down. Related risks include an inability to provide an adequate degree of security to enable reconstruction and economic recovery to take place; entrenchment or strengthening of regional warlords; inability to de- mobilize combatants; etc. 88. In the short term, Bank engagement will focus on high-impact activities that are designed to create jobs and essential infrastructure, ensure that the benefits of reconstruction are widely spread, and promote delivery at the community level. These activities would aim to build ownership of the reconstruction program and mitigate some of the security risks. The Bank will also closely monitor the overall security situation and will report regularly to the Board on developments. Should the security situation deteriorate substantially, steps will be taken to scale back risky activities and, if need be, reduce Bank presence in the field. 89. Limited institutional capacity in Afghanistan could hamper the implementation of reforms and policies as well as the overall management of the aid process. Donor assistance could become fragmented and uncoordinated, detracting from the efforts of the government to establish and stabilize itself. The Bank's strategy emphasizes the importance of capacity building within all reconstruction activities - whether sector based or directly focused on institutional development. In order to mitigate against the risk of fragmentation of donor assistance the Bank will provide assistance to the government in maniaging the aid and reconstruction process. In the short run international contractors are likely to be used for major procurement, audit and financial management functions, to ensure the speedy and efficient flow of funds, but this will be accompanied by major capacity building efforts. The Bank will also work closely with the government in encouraging donors to work within a coordinated framework led by the government. 90. Inadequate funding for the Government's budget would pose a risk to both reconstruction and political efforts. Ensuring adequate funding for the government so that it can provide security, education, health and other services throughout the country will be important for restoring livelihoods and a sense of physical and economic security to the population as well as lending legitimacy to the political process. The Bank is working actively with the government to address this issue through utilizing the ARTF and coordinating with major bilateral donors who are expected to fund the recurrent budget. 21 91. There are also some more specific risks that will need to be taken into account, for example that the severe drought will continue for some time to come; that poppy cultivation will resume on a large scale; that the economic and political situation in the region will deteriorate and adversely affect Afglhanistan's recovery; and that the return of refugees in the absence of suitable preconditions may lead to social, and economic problems. The Bank is working with governments in the region on reorienting poverty reduction programs to ensure that problems in border areas are adequately addressed, mitigating the risk that they become areas of instability. The Bank is also working closely with the government and other partners to ensure that early programs focus on rapid job creation, agricultural recovery, and provision of education and other services so as to mitigate against some of the other risks. VII CONCLUSION 92. Recent developments in Afghanistan present the country, and the international community, with a historic opportunity. The experience of the last two decades has left Afghanistan's infrastructure in shambles, its institutions weak and its social indicators grim. Nevertheless, it is clear that in the wake of the tragedy of the last two decades there is still an enormous will among Afghans to unite to rebuild a peacefil and prosperous country for the future. The challenges ahead are formidable for a country that has been in conflict for two decades, and the transition from conflict and isolation to political and economiiic stability will be fraught with inevitable ups and downs. Strong and sustained international support for this process is essential, given the limited resources of the Afghan Administration. However, the high level of international support must not be allowed to undermine the process of building an Afghanl driven vision and program of reconstruction and development, or to overwhelm the existing capacity in Afghan civil and public society. The World Bank's strategy focuses on helping the Government and the international community in this fragile period of transition so that solid and productive partnerships are laid now for cooperation and collaboration in the future. James D. Wolfensohn President By Shengman Zhang March 12, 2002 Wasllington, D.C. 22 Annex 1 AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN PENDING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMIANENT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country, Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice, Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, over the years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and have played a major role in the struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them both heroes of jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland, Afghanistan, Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires the implementation of emergency interim arrangements and expressing their deep appreciation to His Excellency Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an interim authority which is to be established pursuant to this agreement, Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been adequately represented at the UN Talks on Afghanistan, Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are not intended to remain in place beyond the specified period of time, Recognizing that some time may be required for a new Afghan security force to be fully constituted and functional and that therefore other security provisions detailed in Annex I to this agreement must meanwhile be put in place, Considering that the United Nations, as the internationally recognized impartial institution, has a particularly imnportant role to play, detailed in Annex II to this agreement, in the period prior to the establishment of permanent institutions in Afghanistan, Have agreed as follows: THE INTERIM AUTHORITY I. General provisions 1) An Interim Authority shall be established upon the official transfer of power on 22 December. 2001. 2) The Interim Authority shall consist of an Interim Administration presided over by a Chairman, a Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga, and a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, as well as such other courts as may be established by the Interim Administration. The composition, functions and governing procedures for the Interim Administration and the Special Independent Commnission are set forth in this agreement. 3) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Authority shall be the repository of Afghan sovereignty, with irnmediate effect. As such, it shall, throughout the interim period, represent Afghanistan in its external relations and shall occupy the seat of Afghanistan at the United Nations and in its specialized agencies, as well as in other international institutions and conferences. 4) An Emergency Loya Jirga shall be convened within six months of the establishment of the Interim Authority. The Emergency Loya Jirga will be opened by His Majesty Mohammed Zaher, the former King of Afghanistan. The Emergency Loya Jirga shall decide on a Transitional Authority, including a broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections to be held no later than two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. 5) The Interim Authority shall cease to exist once the Transitional Authority has been established by the Emergency Loya Jirga. 6) A Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened within eighteen months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan. In order to assist the Constitutional Loya Jirga prepare the proposed Constitution, the Transitional Administration shall, within two months of its commencement and with the assistance of the United Nations, establish a Constitutional Commission. II. Legal framework and judicial system 1) The following legal framework shall be applicable on an interim basis until the adoption of the new Constitution referred to above: i) The Constitution of 1964, a/ to the extent that its provisions are not inconsistent with those contained in this agreement, and b/ with the exception of those provisions relating to the monarchy and to the executive and legislative bodies provided in the Constitution; and ii) existing laws and regulations, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this agreement or with international legal obligations to which Afghanistan is a party, or with those applicable provisions contained in the Constitution of 2 1964, provided that the Interim Authority shall have the power to repeal or amend those laws and regulations. 2) The judicial power of Afghanistan shall be independent and shall be vested in a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, and such other courts as may be established by the Interim Administration. The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the United Nations, a Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions. III. Interim Administration A Composition 1) The Interim Administration shall be composed of a Chairman, five Vice Chairmen and 24 other members. Each member, except the Chairman, may head a department of the Interim Administration. 2) The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan have invited His Majesty Mohammed Zaher, the former King of Afghanistan, to chair the Interim Administration. His Majesty has indicated that he would prefer that a suitable candidate acceptable to the participants be selected as the Chair of the Interim Administration. 3) The Chairman, the Vice Chairmen and other members of the Interim Administration have been selected by the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, as listed in Annex IV to this agreement. The selection has been made on the basis of professional competence and personal integrity from lists submitted by the participants in the UN Talks, with due regard to the ethnic, geographic and religious composition of Afghanistan and to the importance of the participation of women. 4) No person serving as a member of the Interim Administration may simultaneously hold membership of the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. B. Procedures 1) The Chairman of the Interim Administration, or in his/her absence one of the Vice Chairmen, shall call and chair meetings and propose the agenda for these meetings. 2) The Interim Administration shall endeavour to reach its decisions by consensus. In order for any decision to be taken, at least 22 members must be in attendance. If a vote becomes necessary, decisions shall be taken by a majority of the members present and voting, unless otherwise stipulated in this agreement. The Chairman shall cast the deciding vote in the event that the members are divided equally. 3 C. Functions 1) The Interim Administration shall be entrusted with the day-to-day conduct of the. affairs of state, and shall have the right to issue decrees for the peace, order and good government of Afghanistan. 2) The Chairman of theInterim Administration or, in his/her absence, one of the Vice Chairmen, shall represent the Interin Administration as appropriate. 3) Those members responsible for the administration of individual departments shall also be responsible for implementing the policies of the Interim Administration within their areas of responsibility. 4) Upon the official transfer of power, the Interim Administration shall have full jurisdiction over the printing and delivery of the national currency and special drawing rights from international financial institutions. The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the United Nations, a Central Bank of Afghanistan that will regulate the money supply of the country through transparent and accountable procedures. 5) The Interim Administration shall establish, with the assistance of the United Nations, an independent Civil Service Commission to provide the Interim Authority and the future Transitional Authority with shortlists of candidates for key posts in the administrative departments, as well as those of governors and uluswals, in order to ensure their competence and integrity. 6) The Interim Administration shall, with the assistance of the United Nations, establish an independent Human Rights Comnission, whose responsibilities will include human rights monitoring, investigation of violations of human rights, and development of domestic human rights institutions. The Interim Administration may, with the assistance of the United Nations, also establish any other commissions to review matters not covered in this agreement. 7) The members of the Interim Administration shall abide by a Code of Conduct elaborated in accordance with international standards. 8) Failure by a member of the Interim Administration to abide by the provisions of the Code of Conduct shall lead to his/her suspension from that body. The decision to suspend a member shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the membership of the Interim Administration on the proposal of its Chairman or any of its Vice Chairmen. 9) The functions and powers of members of the Interim Administration will be further elaborated, as appropriate, with the assistance of the United Nations. IV. The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga 1) The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga shall be established within one month of the establishment of the Interim Authority. The Special Independent Commission will consist of twenty-one members, a number 4 of whom should have expertise in constitutional or customary law. The members will be selected from lists of candidates submitted by participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan as well as Afghan professional and civil society groups. The United Nations will assist with the establishment and functioning of the commission and of a substantial secretariat. 2) The Special .Independent Commission will have the final authority for determining the procedures for and the number of people who will participate in the Emergency Loya Jirga. The Special Independent Commission will draft rules and procedures specifying (i) criteria for allocation of seats to the settled and nomadic population residing in the country; (ii) criteria for allocation of seats to the Afghan refugees living in Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere, and Afghans from the diaspora; (iii) criteria for inclusion of civil society organizations and prominent individuals, including Islamic scholars, intellectuals, and traders, both within the country and in the diaspora. The Special Independent Commnission will ensure that due attention is paid to the representation in the Emergency Loya Jirga of a significant number of women as well as all other segments of the Afghan population. 3) The Special Independent Commission will publish and disseminate the rules and procedures for the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga at least ten weeks before the Emergency Loya Jirga convenes, together with the date for its conmnencement and its suggested location and duration. 4) The Special Independent Commission will adopt and implement procedures for monitoring the process of nomination of individuals to the Emergency Loya Jirga to ensure that the process of indirect election or selection is transparent and fair. To pre- empt conflict over nominations, the Special Independent Commission will specify mechanisms for filing of grievances and rules for arbitration of disputes. 5) The Emergency Loya Jirga will elect a Head of the State for the Transitional Administration and will approve proposals for the structure and key personnel of the Transitional Administration. V. Final provisions 1) Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armned groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces. 2) The Interim Authority and the Emergency Loya Jirga shall act in accordance with basic principles and provisions contained in international instruments on human rights and international humanitarian law to which Afghanistan is a party. 3) The Interim Authority shall cooperate with the international community in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime. It shall commnit itself to respect international law and maintain peaceful and friendly relations with neighbouring countries and the rest of the international conmnunity. 5 4) The Interim Authority and the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga will ensure the participation of women as well as the equitable representadon of all ethnic and religious communities in the Interim Administration and the Emergency Loya Jirga. 5) All actions taken by the Interim Authority shall be consistent with Security Council resolution 1378 (14 November 2001) and other relevant Security Council resolutions relating to Afghanistan. 6) Rules of procedure for the organs established under the Interim Authority will be elaborated as appropriate with the assistance of the United Nations. This agreement, of which the annexes constitute an integral part, done in Bonn on this 5th day of December 2001 in the Enalish language, shall be the authentic text, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the United Nations. Official texts shall be provided in Dari and Pashto, and such other languages as the Special Representative of the Secretary- General may designate. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall send certified copies in English, Dari and Pashto to each of the participants. For the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan: Ms. Amena Afzali Mr. S. Hussain Anwari Mr. Hedayat Amin Arsala Mr. Sayed Hamed Gailani Mr. Rahmatullah Musa Ghazi Eng. Abdul Hakim Mr. Houmayoun Jareer Mr. Abbas Karimi Mr. Mustafa Kazimi Dr. Azizullah Ludin Mr. Ahmad Wali Massoud Mr. Hafizullah Asif Mohseni Prof. Mohammad Ishaq Nadiri Mr. Mohammad Natiqi 6 Mr. Yunus Qanooni Dr. Zalmai Rassoul Mr. H. Mirwais Sadeq Dr. Mohamrnad Jalil Shams Prof. Abdul Sattar Sirat Mr. Humayun Tandar Mrs. Sima Wali General Abdul Rahim Wardak Mr. Pacha Khan Zadran Witnessed for the United Nations by: Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan 7 ANNEX I INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCE 1. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan recognize that the responsibility for providing security aid law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves. To this end, they pledge their commitment to do all within their means and influence to ensure such security, including for all United Nations and other personnel of international governmental and non-governmental organizations deployed in Afghanistan. 2. With this objective in mind, the participants request the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces. 3. Conscious that some time may be required for the new Afghan security and arrned forces to be fully constituted and functioning, the participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and other areas. 4. The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan pledge to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which the UN mandated force is deployed. It would also be desirable if such a force were to assist in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's infrastructure. ** * 8 ANNEX II ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD 1. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General will be responsible for all aspects of the United Nations' work in Afghanistan. 2. The Special Representative shall monitor and assist in the implementation of all aspects of this agreement. 3. The United Nations shall advise the Interim Authority in establishing a politically neutral environment conducive to the holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga in free and fair conditions. The United Nations shall pay special attention to the conduct of those bodies and administrative departments which could directly influence the convening and outcome of the Emergency Loya Jirga. 4. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General or his/her delegate may be invited to attend the meetings of the Interim Administration and the Special Independent Commission on the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. 5. If for whatever reason the Interim Administration or the Special Independent Commission were actively prevented from meeting or unable to reach a decision on a matter related to the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall, taking into account the views expressed in the Interim Administration or in the Special Independent Commission, use his/her good offices with a view to facilitating a resolution to the impasse or a decision. 6. The United Nations shall have the right to investigate human rights violations and, where necessary, recommend corrective action. It will also be responsible for the development and implementation of a programme of human rights education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights. 9 ANNEX III REQUEST TO THE UNITED NATIONS BY THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE UN TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan hereby 1. Request that the United Nations and the international community take the necessary measures to guarantee the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Afghanistan as well as the non-interference by foreign countries in Afghanistan's internal affairs; 2. Urge the United Nations, the international commnunity, particularly donor countries and multilateral institutions, to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their coimmitment to assist with the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with the Interim Authority; 3. Request the United Nations to conduct as soon as possible (i) a registration of voters in advance of the general elections that will be held upon the adoption of the new constitution by the constitutional Loya Jirga and (ii) a census of the population of Afghanistan. 4. Urge the United Nations and the international community, in recognition of the heroic role played by the mujahidin in protecting the independence of Afghanistan and the dignity of its people, to take the necessary measures, in coordination with the Interim Authority, to assist in the reintegration of the mujahidin into the new Afghan security and armed forces; 5. Invite the United Nations and the intemational comnunity to create a fund to assist the families and other dependents of martyrs and victims of the war, as well as the war disabled; 6. Strongly urge that the United Nations, the international community and regional organizations cooperate with the Interim Authority to combat international terrorism, cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs and provide Afghan farmers with financial, material and technical resources for alternative crop production. ** * 10 ANNEX IV COMPOSITION OF THE INTERDVI ADMINISTRATION to be completed Chairman: ........................... Hamid Karzai Vice Chairmen: Vice-Chair & Women's Affairs: ......... Dr. Sima Samar Vice-Chair & Defence: ................... Muhammad Qassem Fahim Vice-Chair & Planning: .................. Haji Muhammad Moha'qqeq Vice-Chair & Water and Electricity: ... Shaker Kargar Vice-Chair & Finance: ................... Hedayat Amin Arsala MIembers: Department of Foreign Affairs: ......... Dr. Abdullah Abdullah Department of the Interior: ............ Muhammad Yunus Qanooni Department of Commerce: ............... Seyyed Mustafa Kazemi Department of Mines & Industries: ...... Muhammad Alem Razm Department of Small Industries: .......... Aref Noorzai Department of Information & Culture: ... Dr. Raheen Makhdoom Department of Communication: ........... Ing. Abdul Rahim Department of Labour & Social Affairs:. Mir Wais Sadeq Department of Hajj & Auqaf: .............. Mohammad Hanif Hanif Balkhi Department of Martyrs & Disabled: ...... Abdullah Wardak Department of Education: .................. to be completed Department of Higher Education: ......... Dr. Sharif Faez Department of Public Health: .............. Dr. Suhaila Seddiqi Department of Public Works: .............. to be completed Department of Rural Development: ....... Abdul Malik Anwar Department of Urban Development: ...... Haji Abdul Qadir Department of Reconstruction: ............ to be completed Department of Transport: .................. Sultan Hamid Hamid Department for the Return of Refugees:.. Enayatullah Nazeri Department of Agriculture: ................. Seyyed Hussein Anwari Department of Irrigation: .................... Haji Mangal Hussein Department of Justice: ....................... Abdul Rahim Karimi Department of Air Transport & Tourism: to be completed Department of Border Affairs: ............. to be completed *1* ANNEX 2. WORLD BANK ACTIVITIES 1. Afghanistan is a member of IDA, IFC, MIGA, ADB and the IMF. No international organization has accepted the Taliban government as representing Afghanistan. In the Bank and the Fund, there is now no Governor or Alternate Governor for Afghanistan, and Afghanistan has not been represented at annual meetings since 1996. 2. Afghanistan became a member of the World Bank in 1955. IDA has provided 21 credits to Afghanistan since 1964 in a wide range of areas including education, roads and agricultural activities. The last two credits approved by the Board for Afghanistan in June 1979 were for Roads and Rural Development. Of the original $230 million credits approved under IDA for Afghanistan, $83 million was disbursed and $147 million was subsequently canceled. Bank operations were suspended shortly after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Resident Mission in Kabul was closed. Afghanistan has repaid $9.2 million to IDA and was up to date on debt service payments until June 1992, when it went into non accrual status. As of February 28, 2002, Afghanistan's arrears to IDA stood at US$25.2 million. Lending operations have remained suspended due to the continuing fighting, absence of a national government and Afghanistan's entry into non-accrual status with IDA. 3. The ADB and IMF have had little contact with Afghanistan in recent years. The last Article IV consultations between the IMF and Afghanistan were held in 1991 with Bank participation. Apart from occasional meetings at the time of the Annual Meetings in 1994 and 1995, the Fund's last contact with Afghan authorities took place in Pakistan in 1993. Afghanistan's quota with the Fund stands at SDR 120.4 million with a net accumulative allocation of SDR 26.7 million. There are no outstanding purchases or loans but an overdue obligation (consisting entirely of SDR charges and assessments) of SDR 7.1 million as of 31 January, 2002. Afghanistan's outstanding debt with the Asian Development Bank is approximately US$27.7 million, with arrears of $15.8 million. Clearance of arrears to the three institutions will be a key feature in resuming lending operations in the future (box 1). Box 1: Arrears Management Resuming normal financial relations with the international financial institutions will require clearance of outstanding arrears, which total some $50 million as set forth below. In non- accrual workouts in other countries, most have used a combination of donor resources, their own reserves and other non-Bank financing (including bridging finance) to clear arrears. The presence of arrears does not, however, preclude mobilization of resources from the donor community (e.g. into a trust fund) or (on an exceptional basis) non-lending assistance from the international financial institutions. IDA US$25.2m ADB US$15.8m IMF US$8.9m Total US$49.9m 4. In 1992, when the Afghan resistance finally took Kabul and agreed on an interim Government (i.e. the Rabbani regime), the World Bank and the wider assistance community, including the IMF, participated in the development of a nine-volume plan for the immediate rehabilitation of Afghanistan. The plan was intended to provide a framework of viable, sustainable activities which could be implemented immediately and through which rehabilitation activities could be expanded. The cost for undertaking initial selected rehabilitation activities over a two year period was estimated at US$622 million. The subsequent political breakdown in Afghanistan made the plan largely irrelevant by the time it was published in 1993. 5. Although the World Bank has not conducted any lending operations inside Afghanistan since 1979, we have remained engaged with the rest of the assistance community, so as to be better prepared for future reconstruction. These efforts have included continuous monitoring of political and economic developments; managing selective investments in the Afghan refugee communities (see Box 2), working closely with the UN and donors; undertaking knowledge- building and knowledge-sharing activities; and providing analytical and strategic depth for the work of the wider assistance community. Box 2: Income Generating Projects for Refugee Areas Over a 12-year period beginning in 1984 the Bank managed (on behalf of UNHCR and bilateral donors) three Income Generating Projects for Refugee Areas (IGPRA I, II and III) for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, with a total cost of US$81.2 million. The projects were funded entirely by donor grants channeled through a multi-donor trust fund. Through nearly 300 sub-projects in public works, forestry and conservation, the projects provided much needed employment, training and skills to refugees. They also provided considerable benefits to Pakistan in the form of rehabilitation of infrastructure including irrigation and roads. Almost two-thirds of project expenditures were made in NWFP and one-third in Balochistan. An independent evaluation (conducted by OED in 1996) found the achievements of the three projects to be impressive. A substantial range of assets was created, implementation was relatively problem-free and there was a strong positive impact on refugees' employment and incomes. The projects exceeded employment objectives and provided for an estimated 1 1% of the employment needs of the available refugee labor force and improved the skills of Afghan workers. 6. Following Bank participation in a 1997 UN mission to Afghanistan as part of efforts to improve coordination under a "strategic framework" for assistance, the Bank developed a pro- active "Watching Brief' engagement with Afghanistan in line with the Bank's policies on relations with countries in conflict. The overall goal has been to prepare the Bank for eventually contributing to development of a reconstruction program and future operational work in Afghanistan by expanding our knowledge of key economic and social issues and by developing contacts with members of Afghan society and the intemational assistance community. Activities under the Watching Brief have included: * Periodic updates on the political and economic situation, regular updates on topical issues, and workshops on issues of interest to the assistance community. * Economic studies on topics of importance for Afghanistan's economy, such as Afghanistan- Pakistan Trade Relations, the Role and Importance of NGOs in Afghanistan, and the Role of the Livestock sector in Afghanistan. * An Afghanistan Watching Brief pilot program, funded by a post conflict fund grant, implemented jointly by UNDP and the World Bank, which has included economic and sector 2 studies, workshops on relevant issues and pilot programs for Afghan women NGOs in Pakistan (see Box 3 for more details). * Active partnership with the United Nations. * Participation in donor meetings and (on selective, demand-driven basis) in working groups on various topics (e.g. Principled Common Programming, Food Security). Box 3: Post Conflict Fund Watching Brief Pilot for Afghanistan Objectives: To improve the Bank's understanding of the economic situation and prospects in Afghanistan, strengthen the Bank and its partners' analysis of key social and economic issues related to recovery and reconstruction and enhance the Bank's ability to support assistance initiatives of the international community. Under the pilot a range of studies, conferences and workshops have been held in order to build knowledge of the social and economic situation and to bring together the operational expertise in Afghanistan around key analytical themes. Support has also been provided for short-term job-related training for Afghan women's NGOs. Most of these activities were supported by a grant of $350,000 from the Post-Conflict Fund and implemented jointly with UNDP. Studies Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations (1996) Back-To-Office Report and Travel Notes on mission to Afghanistan (1997) The Role of the Livestock Sector in Afghanistan (1999) The Role and Impact of NGOs in Assistance to Afghanistan (2000) Afghanistan's International Trade Relations with Neighboring Countries (2001) Food Security Strategy for Afghanistan (2001) The Socio-Economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan: A Cost-Benefit Analysis (2001) Agriculture in Afghanistan (in process) The Socio-Economic Impact of Remittances to Afghanistan (in process) Conferences/Workshops Social Development in Afghanistan (February 1998) Workshop on Micro Credit (April 1998) Infrastructure in Afghanistan (1999) Education for Afghans (November 1999 Islamabad, December 1999 Washington) Health Service Delivery in Afghanistan (June 2000) Food Security Strategy for Afghanistan (November 2000 and April 2001) International Conference on the Analytical Foundations for Assistance to Afghanistan (June 2001) 6. The Watching Brief pilot program also funded provision of short-term training for Afghan women's NGOs based in Peshawar. This was designed to improve the capacity of Afghan professional women and the NGOs they work for. This successfully provided training to 350 women in the first year and another 450 women in the second year. In May, 2001 a US$1.5 million Post Conflict Fund grant was approved for training of Afghan teachers, to be implemented by Save the Children, USA, GTZ and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. 3 This assistance is designed to train Afghan teachers for teaching in refugee camps now and in Afghanistan when they return. 7. The Watching Brief has enabled the Bank to provide strategic and analytical depth to the work of the assistance community as well as helping to build our knowledge base for future reconstruction efforts. Some examples of these contributions are discussed below. 8. In response to increasing concerns about the crisis in food security in Afghanistan, the World Bank was asked to facilitate the work of an inter-agency working group whose objective was to develop a medium-term operational food security strategy for Afghanistan. Persistent drought has exacerbated the broader impact on agriculture of protracted conflict, the erosion of the agricultural production base, loss of irrigation and other infrastructure and declining non agricultural income generation opportunities. The working group, consisting of UN agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs, developed broad strategic principles to guide the formulation and implementation of the food security strategy. It recommended key strategic priorities for agencies in providing assistance. Two conferences were held (in November 2000 and April 2001) to bring together representatives of the entire assistance community to discuss food security issues. The strategy and work of the inter-agency working group was endorsed by the Afghanistan Support Group and has been seen as a successful example of agency/donor collaboration around medium-term priorities. 9. The Bank funded, provided technical oversight and co-authored a study assessing the socio-economic impact of de-mining in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is among the most mine affected countries in the world, a legacy of more than two decades of conflict. Mines have taken a devastating toll on human lives, heath and livelihoods. The international community has been putting substantial resources into de-mining (on the order of $20 million per year). In response to donor demand, this study evaluated the socio economic benefits and costs of the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA). The study concluded that MAPA generated substantial net socio-economic benefits which fully justify continued funding by the assistance community. The study also provided clear recommendations for prioritization of different types of land for mine clearance, for the choice of de-mining techniques, for introducing systematic cost-benefit analysis in operational decision making, and for encouraging greater community participation in mine action planning and prioritization. 10. The Bank also funded and provided technical oversight and guidance for a study assessing the size and role of the livestock sector in Afghanistan's economy. As a result of the war and especially during the recent drought, a significant portion of livestock and other assets were destroyed, and livestock extension services almost collapsed. The study provided an overview of the livestock sector, estimated its size and contribution to GDP, identified regional differences in livestock varieties and uses, the programs and activities in support of the sector, and constraints for future development. It also identified areas for future development in the areas of animal health, nutrition, product processing, rangeland development, credit facilities and training and education. 11. A series of conferences sponsored by the Bank began with one on Social Development in Afghanistan in 1998. Participants included a wide range of donors, UN officials, NGOs and senior regional Bank staff. The meeting discussed the following topics: economic and social context; social development-ground realities; gender and development; and education. Participants discussed future analytical work needed, including on the role of NGOs and issues related to community involvement, as well as the need to continue to focus on gender issues and understand more fully the constraints in the education sector. 4 12. In 2000 a workshop was organized by WHO, UNDP and the World Bank to address constraints and opportunities in Health Services Delivery. Over 50 participants from professional and assistance backgrounds (including NGOs) participated, with the purpose of promoting information sharing and consensus building on issues related to health services delivery. The conference identified gaps and problem areas and options for addressing these and other major issues in health services delivery. The conference provided an excellent opportunity for the different partners to clarify roles and responsibilities in the health field. 13. In 1999, two conferences sponsored by the Bank in coordination with Save the Children US, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and UNICEF, focused on the crisis in education for Afghans. Following these workshops, the Bank has worked with other agencies to raise the profile of education within the international assistance community. The conferences also led to the Bank's grant-based investments in teacher training for Afghan teachers. 14. In June 2001 the Bank jointly with UNDP organized an intemational conference on Analytical Foundations for Assistance to Afghanistan. This event brought together the assistance community to discuss key strategic and sectoral issues based on analytical work done as part of the Watching Brief program. The conference was held immediately before a special meeting of the Afghanistan Support Group and provided background and inputs for that meeting. There was widespread demand expressed at the conference for the World Bank to continue its activities under the Watching Brief. 15. Following the events of September 11, 2000, the Bank stepped up its knowledge building and consultation activities. Two further requests for PCF grants were approved: an Afghanistan Expanded Watching Brief - Enhancing Knowledge and Partnerships executed by UNDP; and Afghanistan Expanded Watching Brief - Toward a Reconstruction Strategy for Afghanistan with Afghan and other Stakeholder Participation executed by the Bank. The main objective of this program of activities is to develop over time a reconstruction strategy and plan for Afghanistan, whose process and product would follow the CDF approach. In addition, the Bank, along with ADB and UNDP, organized a conference on Preparing for Afghanistan's Reconstruction in Islamabad in November. The conference was attended by a large number of Afghans, NGOs and donors and discussion focused on identifying priorities, challenges and opportunities for contributing to Afghanistan's reconstruction. 5 Annex 3. Executive Summary: Afghanistan Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction January, 2002 More than two decades of conflict and three years of drought have led to widespread human suffering and massive displacement of people in Afghanistan. Resolution 1378 of the UN Security Council provides the opportunity and framework for recovery and reconstruction efforts to buttress the political settlement. Afghans themselves need to manage the process of reconstruction and the international community is committed to help. To this end, a Steering Committee of donor governments requested the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank to conduct an urgent preliminary needs assessment for consideration at a Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo on 21-22 January, 2002. The purpose of the assessment is to help determine the requirement of external assistance to support Afghanistan's economic and social recovery and reconstruction over the short and medium term. The assessment does not cover humanitarian assistance. It identifies a program of activities that encompass both short term priorities and options for longer-term development initiatives. Accordingly, the estimated funding requirements cover 1, 2½2 (expected term of the Transitional Administration), 5 and 10 year horizons. Given past turmoil in Afghanistan, much of the available data on the country is out of date. Nor, in view of the time and security constraints, was it possible to field test the available information. All data and conclusions in this document should therefore be treated as indicative. Consultations were held with Afghan civil society representatives in Islamabad and Tehran and the views of members of the Interim Administration were solicited in Kabul. More detailed consultations, as well as field work, will be undertaken after the Tokyo meeting to flesh out the reconstruction program and firm up the funding requirements. The Development Framework Investments in rehabilitation and reconstruction should: * Involve Afghan men and women at all stages (in planning, design and implementation) * Be contingent on having appropriate policy and institutional frameworks in place * Incorporate substantial components of institutional support to local communities and emerging government institutions * Promote human rights and social inclusion, including support and protection of vulnerable groups The reconstruction program would also help reverse environmental degradation in rural areas and facilitate private sector engagement in re-building the economy. Key members of the Afghan Interim Administration consulted in Kabul expressed commitment to cooperate with all the potential partners for recovery and reconstruction, namely communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international development agencies and the private sector (domestic and international). Institutional capacity needs to be established for approving and managing reconstruction contracts with the private sector, and for transferring resources to communities and strengthening local institutions. Security, Justice and Human Rights The Bonn Process has infused a new sense of hope for Afghans to live in an environment that is safe from physical violence and arbitrary coercion. The first step is to create the conditions in which the fragile political process can gain strength and proceed with assurances. Priorities include physical security, removal of the threat of mines and of the war economy promoted by drug production. The requirements for the short and long term include organizing a security force and finding alternative livelihoods for thousands of ex-combatants. Afghanistan had been the source of 80 percent of the world's poppy production. The ban imposed by the Taliban had been enforced effectively. Now, though, land previously planted with poppy, particularly in the southwest and northeast of the country, is likely to revert to that use. This resurgence of drugs poses a serious threat to the political process underway. Effective enforcement of the ban on poppies is essential. Currently, Afghanistan is the most mine- and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affected country in the world. There are some 200,000 survivors of mine/UXO accidents, and the death and injury rate ran at 150-300 per month prior to the current crisis. In addition to the human toll and loss of livestock, mines/UXO pose problems for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and for agriculture operations and rehabilitation of rural infrastructure. Fortunately, mine action in Afghanistan has been extremely cost-effective with experienced UN and NGO teams. The focus should be on expanding the mine action program such that the country could be free from the impact of mines and UXO in 5-7 years. Governance and Economic Management The Bonn Agreement provides the basis for a widely respected and understood legal framework. In addition, establishing the rule of law will require a Supreme Court and lower courts, a Human Rights Commission, as well as procedures for resolving rural and urban land disputes. The disruption of the last two decades offers an opportunity to rebuild government structures. Recreating the government activities and systems of public management of the 1970s seems neither necessary nor desirable. Good governance to suit Afghanistan's current needs would call for: * A limited, but effective state that takes full advantage of existing capacity at the community level * A balance of centralized and decentralized functions * Simple and transparent procedures to minimize corruption and discrimination * Effective aid management within a lean government bureaucracy 2 * Limited policy interventions to reflect essential actions in the near term During the early years when the Afghanistan Government is unable to collect substantial tax revenue, it is essential that the international community provides funding to cover the recurrent costs of basic functions of government, including salaries of teachers and health workers. It is also important for the central government to be responsive to the regions, districts and communities. Transfer of resources to local institutions is expected to help achieve real benefits in various sectors such as school construction, road access, water supply and sanitation. For the economy to stabilize and begin to grow, attention is needed to restore critical economic and financial functions. Here the focus should be on strengthening the central agencies, Da Afghanistan Bank and the Ministry of Finance, strengthening the payments system, and implementing the basic regulatory framework for commercial banking. Early attention is also required for creating a sound investment climate aimed at the re-emergence of an efficient and thriving private sector. Social Protection, Health and Education Social protection is necessary for many vulnerable groups including women, refugees and internally displaced people, the disabled, orphans, and ex-combatant children. Central to the recovery strategy is the building of community and individual assets, leading to the resumption of sustainable livelihoods. Activities could include public works programs (food-for-work and cash- for-work), micro credit support (especially for women), skills training and vocational support. In addition, support to key civil service institutions should include affirmative action to increase female employment at all levels. Improving the health status of Afghans is a pressing priority. Life expectancy at birth is 44 years, one in four children dies before age 5, one in 12 women dies in childbirth and the population growth rate is 3%. In health, the most urgent mission is to revive the preventive and public health services, including a few low-cost interventions that have high payoff. This means expanding the basic programs of immunization; reproductive health; communicable diseases control (polio, measles, TB, HIV/AIDS); maternal and child health (supplementary and therapeutic feeding, emergency obstetrics care); health and hygiene education and communication; and refresher training for existing health workers, many of whom will be women. Afghanistan will also need the capacity to deal with war-related catastrophic health problems (reconstructive surgery, artificial limbs, mental trauma care). This program will require government provision of the recurrent costs of reviving the public health delivery system (salaries, transport, vaccines, drugs, contraceptives, other supplies, and facility rehabilitation). Afghanistan's education system is also in a state of virtual collapse. The gross enrolment ratio in primary education is 38% for boys and 3% for girls. Rebuilding the education system is one of the country's immediate priorities. The most urgent task is to rapidly expand primary and secondary education. This involves reactivating government schools, re-hiring teachers, providing them witlh essential teaching materials and using whatever spaces are available for conducting lessons. While the program needs to be 'Learning for All', the emphasis should be on getting school age girls back to school. Also important is the rehabilitation of Kabul University and regional colleges. All of this will require funds for teacher salaries, learning materials and such 3 minimal rehabilitation as to provide an acceptable learning environment. Maximum use needs to be made of ongoing community and NGO programs that are already providing education. Beyond the immediate recovery period, there is a long agenda to address: pre-school classes, revamping the curriculum, establishing systematic teacher training, developing better textbooks, and promoting adult learning. Infrastructure The ravages of war not only devastated Afghanistan's infrastructure and deferred maintenance, it also prevented new investment that would have raised services above pre-war levels. In fact, it is difficult to understate the low base from which reconstruction will begin. Only 23 percent of the population has access to safe water and 12 percent to adequate sanitation; only 6 percent of Afghans had access to electricity in 1993 and energy consumption (45 kWh per capita) was among the lowest in the world; and there are only two telephones per thousand people (compared with 24 in Pakistan, 35 in Tajikistan and 68 in Uzbekistan). It is estimated that much of the primary road network of 2500 kilometers needs rebuilding. The short-term priorities vary across the sectors, and for network (national/urban) compared with non-network supply (particularly in rural areas). They include: * Removing transport bottlenecks, such as collapsed bridges, disintegrated pavements and damaged tunnels, to restore normal traffic operations on the main road network * Emergency Air Traffic Services for international and domestic air traffic * Essential repairs to urban piped water systems, and improving access to water in priority rural areas • Repair power supply, especially for health facilities, water supply, key government offices, businesses and, where possible, private residences * Emergency radio broadcast services Longer-term priorities in infrastructure could include construction of new highways, a rural access road construction program, rehabilitation of key airports, improving water access for more than 2 million people in rural and urban areas, and countrywide expansion of broadcast services. 4 Agriculture, Food Security and Natural Resource Management Although Afghanistan's agriculture system is robust and resilient, crop production and livestock have suffered badly due to drought (over 50% decline in grain production in the last two years). Prior to the onset of drought, however, agriculture had made a good recovery from war-related loss of productive capacity in the 1980s and early 1990s. Despite environmental degradation caused by the war, and the problem of mines and UXO, there is no reason why Afghan agriculture cannot recover again. In the short term, the priorities would be: * In the crop sector, supply of essential inputs (seed, fertilizers, tools) and raising seed production * In the livestock sector, collecting data on stocks and pasture conditions, and restoring veterinary services * In the horticulture sector, an inventory of existing orchards, and supply of propagative material and seeds Effective enforcement of the ban on poppies is essential. However, the challenge in the agriculture sector is to provide alternative livelihoods to farmers and seasonal workers who depend on the poppy harvest. In most parts of the country, water is an even more critical resource than land. Rainfall is scant and highly variable. Irrigation is vital for agriculture. The immediate task is collection of reliable baseline information on what currently exists to help prioritize repair of small irrigation schemes. A national assessment of groundwater resources should also be undertaken as a matter of urgency. Over the longer term, attention could be given to improved technologies, medium and large irrigation/hydropower schemes and expanded watershed management, and establishment of export-oriented markets. Cost Estimates The projected funding requirements of the Afghanistan reconstruction program are estimated on a commitment basis. Actual disbursements relative to investments may experience a variable lag depending on the nature of the projects. Recurrent expenditures, however, are not likely to experience such disbursement lags. Projected cumulative funding requirements are as follows: In millions of U.S. Dollars Scenario 1 Year 2.5 Years 5 Years 10 Years BASE CASE 1,700 4,900 10,200 14,600 LOW CASE 1,400 4,200 8,300 11,400 HIGH CASE 2,100 6,500 12,200 18,100 5 Annex 4. Afghanistan Facts and Figures* Population and Geography Population: In excess of 25 million (including refugees) * Population growth rate (annual % 2000) 2.6% * Population density (people per sq. km) 40.7 Urban population (% of total) 21.9 * Total Area: 652,100 sq. km * Land Boundaries: Total 5,529 km (China 76 km; Iran 936 km; Pakistan 2,450 km; Tajikistan 1,206 km; Turkmenistan 744 km; Uzbekistan 137 km) Economy * Natural resources: natural gas, crude oil, coal, copper, talc, barites, sulphur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious stones * Exports: $236 million; commodities: natural gas 55%, fruits and nuts 24%, hand-woven carpets, wool, cotton, pelts * Industries: Textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, and cement; hand-woven carpets; natural gas, oil, coal, copper * Agriculture: Largely subsistence farming and nomadic animal husbandry; wheat, fruits, nuts, karakul pelts, wool, mutton Socio-Economic Indicators Average life expectancy: Males-44 years, Females-45 years. * Illiteracy rate: 64 percent i.e., nearly two-thirds of Afghan adults. * Illiteracy rate, adult males: (0/oof males 15+) 48.1% * Illiteracy rate: adult females: (% of females 15+) 78.1% * 30 - 40 percent of population has access to basic health care. * Less than 20 percent of urban households have access to piped water. * Less than 10 percent of rural areas have access to sanitation. 50 percent of households have no solid waste collection. * 6 percent of total population has access to electricity. * 70 per cent of Afghan population is malnourished and only 23 per cent have access to safe water. In 1999 less than one-third Afghan children were enrolled in schools. This includes enrolment in religious schools. Primary school enrolment ratio for boys: 39 per cent. * Primary school enrolment ratio for girls: 3 per cent. The assistance community is able to provide education to only 7 per cent of 4.4 million children of primary school age. * Over 800,000 disabled with approximately 200,000 disabled as a result of land mines. Women and Children in Afghanistan * An estimated 15,000 women die every year from pregnancy related causes -at the rate of approximately one every 30 minutes. Estimated maternal mortality rate is 1,700 per 100,000 live births. 75 percent of population has no access to emergency obstetric care. One of every two Afghan children is malnourished. * Half of all children are stunted in height - shorter than average for their age. * Diarrhea and acute respiratory infections account for around 41 per cent of all child deaths, with vaccine-preventable diseases for another 21 per cent. * Reliable data on the situation in Afghanistan is very limited. This information has been collated from various sources and is a best effort at indicating the overall situation. * Mortality rate of children under 5 years of age: 25.7 per cent, i.e., 257/1000 live births. * Estimated 2 million widows. Internally Displaced People (IDPs) * Internally displaced Afghans in the wake of the current situation have risen from 900,000 to an estimated 1. I million. * Internally displaced persons inside Afghanistan could go from 1.1 million to 2.2 million as a result of the on-going situation. * About 300,000 people in Kabul and up to 300,000 in Herat, and another 535,000 IDPs in the Northern areas from Badghis to Badakshan are currently getting help from WFP. Another 500,000 are supported in rural areas. a An estimated 2 million people will run out of food by the end of this year in Northern Provinces of Afghanistan. Another 4 million people are dependent on food elsewhere. * 6.1 million Afghans are vulnerable (in need of basic food items, drinking unclean water, lack of medical supplies etc.) Refugees in Pakistan and in the region * Number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan before the current crisis: 2 million. Number of Afghan refugees in Iran: approximately 1.4 million. Number of Afghan refugees in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan: approximately 400,000. Sources: UNDP, UNHCR, UNOCHA, UNICEF, WFP, World Bank, Afghanistan Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction (January 2002). ***** 2