Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00001839 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-42420, TF-55916) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 54 MILLION (US$80 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA FOR AN EDUCATION SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT September 28, 2011 Human Development: Education Eastern Africa 2 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective as at September 2011) Currency Unit = Kenya Shilling KSh 94 = US$ 1.00 FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAG Controller and Auditor General CAS Country Assistance Strategy CIDA Canadian International Development Agency DFID UK Department for International Development DIR Detailed Implementation Review ECD Early Childhood Development EMIS Education Management Information System EFA Education For All EMP Environmental Management Plan ERS Economic Recovery Strategy FMR Financial Monitoring Report FPE Free Primary Education FTI Fast Track Initiative GDP Gross Domestic Product GoK Government of Kenya GPI Gender Parity Index HIV/AIDS Human Immune Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome IAD Internal Audit Department IDA International Development Association IFMIS Integrated Financial Management Information System IFR Integrated Financial Report ISR Implementation Status Report JFA Joint Financing Agreement KENAO Kenya National Audit Office KESSP Kenya Education Sector Support Program KNUT Kenya National Union of Teachers M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDG Millennium Development Goal MoE Ministry of Education MoF Ministry of Finance MoHEST Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology MTEF Medium-Term Expenditure Framework MVC Most Vulnerable Children NARC National Rainbow Coalition NASLA National Assessment of Student Learning Achievement NEMA National Environmental Management Agency NER Net Enrolment Rate NFE Non-Formal Education NGOs Non-Government Organizations PAD Project Appraisal Document PCR Primary Completion Rate PFM Public Finance Management PDOs Project Development Objectives PER Public Expenditure Review PETS Public Expenditure Tracking Survey PS Permanent Secretary SACMEQ Southern African Consortium for Measurement of Education Quality SAGAs Semi-Autonomous Government Agencies SMCs School Management Committees SWAp Sector-Wide Approach TIVET Technical, Industrial, Vocational Education and Training UPE Universal Primary Education UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development WFP World Food Program Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt Sector Manager: Peter N. Materu Project Team Leader at Lending: Michael Mills Project Team Leaders at Supervision: Michael Mills and Shobhana Sosale (co-TTL) ICR Team Leader: Shobhana Sosale   KENYA Education Sector Support Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Profile 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................................. 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 19 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome. ............................................................ 26 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 28 6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 31 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners............... 34 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing ............................................................................. 35 Annex 2: Outcomes by Component ................................................................................. 35 Annex 3: Project Development Outcomes ....................................................................... 50 Annex 4: Economic and Financial Analysis .................................................................... 53 Annex 5: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............... 54 Annex 6: Beneficiary Survey Results .............................................................................. 57 Annex 7: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results...................................................... 62 Annex 8: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ........................ 66 Annex 9: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders .......................... 74 Annex 10: List of Supporting Documents ....................................................................... 83 Annex 11: Original Project Components ......................................................................... 86 Annex 12: KESSP Coordination, Advisory and Oversight Structures ............................ 92 Annex 13: Progress on KESSP Governance Strengthening Plan ..................................... 93 Annex 14: MAP ............................................................................................................... 99   A. Basic Information Education Sector Country: Kenya Project Name: Support Program Project ID: P087479 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-42420,TF-55916 ICR Date: 09/29/2011 ICR Type: Intensive Learning ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: SIM Borrower: KENYA Original Total USD 80.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 55.76M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 51.67M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Education (MOE) Ministry of Higher Education, Science & Technology Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfiD) Education For All- Fast Track Initiative United Nations International Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF) B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 01/19/2005 Effectiveness: 03/28/2007 03/28/2007 Appraisal: 05/18/2005 Restructuring(s): Approval: 11/07/2006 Mid-term Review: 06/15/2009 Closing: 12/31/2010 12/31/2010 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Unsatisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory Quality of Moderately Implementing Unsatisfactory Supervision: Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Unsatisfactory Performance: Satisfactory Performance: i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Quality at Entry Project at any time Yes None (QEA): (Yes/No): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Adult literacy/non-formal education 8 8 Central government administration 21 25 Primary education 48 55 Secondary education 8 8 Tertiary education 15 4 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Child health 17 15 Education for all 33 40 Education for the knowledge economy 17 10 HIV/AIDS 16 20 Nutrition and food security 17 15 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Gobind T. Nankani Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt Colin Bruce Sector Manager: Peter Nicolas Materu Dzingai B. Mutumbuka Project Team Leader: Shobhana Sosale Michael Mills ICR Team Leader: Shobhana Sosale ICR Primary Author: Helen J. Craig ii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the Project is to support the Government's program to provide basic education and improve the quality of education for all children by 2010: (i) ensuring equity of access to basic education; (ii) enhancing quality and learning achievement; (iii) providing opportunities for further education and training; and (iv) strengthening education sector management. These objectives were all framed within the context of the Government's "Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007" and its governance strengthening and anti-corruption program. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The Project Development Objectives remained the same over the Kenya Education Sector Support Program (KESSP) period, but the sources of data for three indicators, as reported in the Implementation Status Reports (ISRs), changed from time to time due to lack of data. See Section 3.2 for further explanation. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Equity in Access PDO: National Average Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) Value 83% (MOE) 92.9% (MoE) quantitative or 96% 79% (KIHBS) 77.2% (Census) Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2009 MOE data show 96% of target achieved, but household surveys and the Comments population census suggest a stagnating trend, with a possible deterioration (incl. % over time. Survey and census data have greater credibility. 2008 post election achievement) violence may have influenced. Equity in Access PDO: Lagging Provinces, such as Northeastern, raised Indicator 2 : closer to the national NER average National Average: National Average: 83%(MOE ) 92.5% (MoE) Value 79% (KIHBS) 78.8% (DHS) Raise closer to quantitative or national average Qualitative) NER Northeastern: NER Northeastern: 23% (MoE) 32% (MoE ) 49.5%(KIHBS) 53.4%(DHS) Date achieved 12/31/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2009 Comments MoE and DPs focused on Northeastern Province where disparity most (incl. % significant. MoE data show no progress in closing gap. Household surveys achievement) show modest reduction in the NER gap between Northeastern and national iii average of about 5 percentage points. Equity in Access PDO: Gender Parity Index in primary education, and Indicator 3 : lagging provinces raised closer to the national average Value 0.988(MoE) 0.957(MoE) quantitative or 1.0 1.03(DHS) Qualitative) 1.03(KIHBS) Date achieved 12/31/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2009 Comments KESSP reported primary NERs by gender. MoE data show girls' enrolment (incl. % lagged behind boys & worsened over time. Household surveys and census achievement) show female school participation rates consistently higher than boys. Equity in Access PDO: Primary Completion Rate (PCR), National, by Indicator 4 : Gender and Region National PCR at National PCR: 80% National PCR:83% Value least 92% Boys: 83% Boys: 88%, quantitative or na Girls: 77% Girls: 78% Qualitative) na Regional Parity na na Date achieved 12/31/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2009 Comments According to MoE data, by 2009, the PCR had increased by 3 percentage (incl. % points over the baseline, or slightly over 25% of the increase targeted for achievement) that period. Quality PDO: Improved Scores in Learning Achievement over a 2005 Indicator 5 : national baseline survey Value English: 56 Some quantitative or Math: 55 NA improvement Qualitative) Science: 40 Date achieved 12/31/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2010 Comments Progress achieved toward attainment of higher learning achievement is not (incl. % rated due to lack of data. achievement) Opportunities for Further Education PDO: Transition Rate to secondary Indicator 6 : education: % of students passing the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education who continue to Form 1 the following year Value quantitative or 54% 70% 67% Qualitative) Date achieved 12/30/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2009 Comments According to MoE data, the target transition rate of 70% was nearly reached (incl. % (67%) in 2009. achievement) Strengthen Sector Management PDO: Primary Education's share of the MoE Indicator 7 : recurrent budget Value quantitative or 57% At least 55% 47.8% Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2006 12/31/2010 06/30/2010 iv Comments Over the KESSP period, primary education's share of recurrent education (incl. % spending fell well below the targeted share. achievement) Strengthen Sector Management PDO: Sustain primary non-salary recurrent Indicator 8 : expenditure at 15% of total primary recurrent expenditure Value quantitative or 14.7% 15.0% 11.1% Qualitative) Date achieved 06/30/2006 12/31/2010 06/30/2010 Comments Over the KESSP period, primary non-salary expenditure declined steadily as (incl. % a share of primary recurrent expenditure, and non-salary expenditure per achievement) student fell as well. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Pupil : Teacher Ratio in public primary schools and reduced district disparity Value (quantitative 43:1 45:1 46:1 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2009 Comments Although the targeted pupil:teacher ratio was achieved, an analysis of district (incl. % disparities conducted 2010 concluded that the available data do not clearly achievement) point to a reduction in district disparities. Indicator 2 : Pupil:Textbook sharing ratio in public primary schools Lower Primary: Lower Primary: English 3:1, English 2:1, Math 4:1, Math 3:1, Value Science 3:1 1:1 ratio in Science 3:1 (quantitative English, Math & or Qualitative) Upper Primary: Science Upper Primary: English 3:1 English 2:1 Math 3:1 Math 2:1 Science 3:1 Science 3:1 Date achieved 12/31/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2009 Comments Sharing ratios (MoE data) show only marginal progress. School surveys (incl. % conducted in 2007 and 2009 point to a deterioration in the average sharing achievement) ratio. Indicator 3 : Government prepares an agreed strategy for secondary education Strategy for Strategies prepared Value secondary, and (partially) (quantitative No agreed strategy TIVET and endorsed for or Qualitative) university KESSP Investment v education agreed Program financing. with donors. Date achieved 12/31/2005 12/30/2008 12/30/2008 TIVET and university strategies still awaiting GoK approval. However, the Comments relevance of the strategy for secondary education was soon eclipsed by the (incl. % introduction of Free Secondary Education which had been part of the achievement) strategy. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 06/14/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.96 2 06/28/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.96 3 12/20/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.96 4 05/30/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 35.96 5 12/04/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 46.77 6 05/14/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 56.85 Moderately 7 11/29/2009 Satisfactory 56.85 Unsatisfactory 8 06/03/2010 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 56.85 Moderately 9 01/11/2011 Unsatisfactory 56.65 Unsatisfactory H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable I. Disbursement Profile vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal1 1. Country context. At the time KESSP was appraised, jointly by the development partners in 2005 and later for approval of the International Development Association (IDA) Credit during 2006/07, the economy had been improving, following a decade marked by macroeconomic instability, rising poverty, major corruption scandals and an erosion of confidence in public institutions, governance and the rule of law. Following elections in 2002, the Kenyan authorities had adopted an Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007 (ERS) and had moved rapidly to restore macroeconomic stability, liquidate domestic debt and increase resources for long-neglected development expenditure. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth had accelerated, and the fraction of individuals below the poverty line of KSh 2,913 a month had fallen from 53 percent in 1997 to 47 in 2006 (World Bank 2008a). Public revenue had risen; donors had begun to return after a long absence; and the medium-term outlook was guardedly optimistic – guarded due to risks associated with weak governance, corruption, impunity and potential (social) risks associated with the forthcoming 2007 elections. 2. The Government elected in 2002 had campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, and a Governance and Anti-Corruption strategy was a core pillar of the ERS. However, although many appropriate laws relating to public procurement and financial management had been enacted and some progress had been made in instituting financial audits and improving expenditure controls, implementation and enforcement lagged behind in many areas, and corruption remained a serious risk. In 2006, detailed implementation reviews (DIRs) were carried out in four sectors of the Bank’s portfolio in Kenya. These confirmed corruption risks with indicators of fraud and corruption in the road, health and HIV sectors, and additional measures were introduced to further safeguard Bank-financed operations from corruption risks. In contrast, the DIR carried out in the education sector concluded that "the mechanisms for community involvement, consultations, accountability, procurement and financial management were satisfactory", while at the same time pointing to the need for "additional safeguards… including public disclosure of performance indicators, independent monitoring of performance and an annual independent audit of procurement". 3. Sector context. Access to education had fallen significantly during the 1990s for several reasons, including particularly cost-recovery policies. In its election manifesto, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) had made a bold pledge to offer Free Primary Education to all children as part of its commitment to poverty reduction and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and Education for All (EFA) goals of Universal Primary Education (UPE). The main component of the FPE program was the elimination of levies and the provision of grants on a per student basis to cover the costs of 1 This ICR written with contributions from Rosemary Bellew. 1 instructional materials and infrastructure maintenance. A pilot of the grants program, supported by DFID, was already underway to develop and test rules, systems, processes and procedures and was showing highly positive results. In 2003, the Kenyan authorities began the roll out of Free Primary Education (FPE). Levies were banned in all public primary schools; children were admitted free of charge; and the Government of Kenya (GoK) committed itself to providing schools with a subsidy of KSh 1,020 per enrolled child for teaching and learning materials and school operating costs.2 The GoK backed up this commitment with resources. In FY2004/05, GoK (recurrent) expenditure on FPE school grants had reached about KSh 7 billion (US$93 million), or about KSh 960 per student attending a public primary school. 4. The impact of FPE was reportedly immediate. According to the Ministry of Education (MoE), in 2003 enrolment in public primary schools had increased by 1.4 million (1.2 million in public primary schools and 0.5 million in non-formal education centers) to a total of 7.2 million (KESSP Project Appraisal Document). The widespread popular response to FPE, however, also resulted in overcrowding, high pupil-teacher ratios in some schools and severe shortage of instructional materials in many schools. 5. The FPE policy was strongly supported and promoted by development partners as an effective strategy to attain UPE. It also presented a unique window for development partners to support the GoK development objectives (especially as there were few sectors where they felt comfortable investing). Further, FPE was directly relevant to decentralization, and to governance objectives of accountability and transparency.3 IDA responded rapidly to support FPE with a US$50 million Credit (Free Primary Education Support Project) which became effective in July 2003 and closed in July 2007.4 The initial successes of FPE were well documented in a 2005 expenditure tracking survey which pointed to high impact on the poor, effective delivery mechanisms (with 98 percent of schools having received a grant averaging KSh 300 per child), and a high level of client satisfaction with the program (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2006). 6. Building on this success, and the need to develop a plan that translated ERS development priorities into strategies and plans, the MoE developed a sector wide policy and strategy which was presented to Parliament as the 2005 Sessional Paper No. 1 on Education and Training. The Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP) 2005- 2010 translated these priorities into investment programs and a comprehensive framework for implementation, and brought various donor-funded projects under one umbrella. In 2005, development partners also adopted “Partnership Principles� for working together in the sector. They collectively appraised the KESSP, approved bilateral funding, supported 2 The per child subsidy was broken down into KSh 650 for instructional materials and KSh 370 for operating expenditure. Schools were permitted to collect extra levies only with written permission from the MoE. However, no child was to be sent home due to non-payment of the approved levies. 3 FPE decentralized resources to the point of service delivery; it involved civil society stakeholders in the management of school resources; and it required and promoted increased transparency (e.g., posting summaries of receipts and expenditures in a visible place outside the school). 4 The Credit supported implementation of the Instructional Materials Component of the FPE grant, Capacity Building, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and the development of a broader sector policy and program. 2 additional resource mobilization from the EFA-Fast Track Initiative (FTI) to help cover the financing gap in the first three years (2005-2007); and established a Joint Financing Agreement for those partners willing and able to join in a pooled fund arrangement. 7. Governance. Strengthening Governance was a national priority that cut across all sectors, including education. At the time of the launch of the KESSP in mid-2005, there was a consensus that considerable achievements had been made in strengthening accountability in the primary education sub-sector. However, it is also clear that the education sector was still recognized as facing serious governance and corruption risks (see Section 2.6) 8. Rationale for Bank assistance. The Kenya Education Sector Support Program (KESSP) was a central program of the ERS and of the Bank’s 2004 Country Assistance Strategy. In addition to the high performance ratings of the Free Primary Education Support Project, the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) cited the following rationale for Bank support: (a) familiarity with the sector acquired through the Free Primary Education Support Project and as supervising entity of the FTI grant; (b) extensive experience with large scale education reform programs; (c) good positioning to strengthen the link between education reform, macro-economic management and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework and (d) the World Bank’s increased attention to governance issues. The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) completion report of 2010 also noted that education was the highest disbursing sector, and where outcomes had been achieved. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 9. The KESSP was a medium-term plan, covering the years 2005-2010, and was officially launched by the MoE in 2005. 10. The KESSP adopted a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) Chart 1. KESSP Financiers, 2005-2010 to the development of the Financier KESSP Phase I education system. The Program 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 identified four priority goal or JFA Partners thematic areas: (i) ensuring GoK/MoE equity of access to basic IDA FPESP education; (ii) enhancing quality IDA KESSP and learning achievement; (iii) providing opportunities for FTI further education and training; DFID and (iv) strengthening education UNICEF sector management. Twenty- CIDA three investment programs (IPs) Other Bilaterals & were developed to support the Multilaterals attainment of these goals, each Footnotes:    Financing through pooled funding for the KESSP. with multiple activities. A Financing as non-pooled funding for the KESSP. pooled funding mechanism, 3 with contributions from GoK and development partners and governed by conditions laid out in a Joint Financing Agreement (JFA), was developed. Development partners participating in the pooled fund over the five-year KESSP period included IDA, EFA-FTI, DFID, CIDA and UNICEF. Chart 1 shows the evolution of KESSP partners over time. 11. When the International Development Association (IDA) Credit became effective in March 2007, KESSP had been under implementation for almost two years. The Credit financed continued implementation of the KESSP Investment Programs. The results framework for the IDA Credit is the results framework for the overall KESSP. Since 2005 was the baseline for KESSP, progress towards the achievement of program targets is also assessed relative to this baseline. Given that IDA financing was pooled with Government and other development partner financing, it is not possible to attribute the financing of a particular partner to specific inputs, outputs or outcomes. 12. Progress towards achievement of the KESSP development objectives was to be measured particularly by:  The primary net enrollment ratio (NER), disaggregated by gender and province;  The primary completion rate (PCR), disaggregated by gender;  Learning achievement levels based on results from periodic National Surveys of Learning Achievement (NASLA) ;  The transition rate from primary to secondary education; and  Recurrent expenditure shares for primary education and, within that, the share allocated to non-salary expenditure. 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification 13. The PDOs remained the same over the KESSP period but the sources of data for three key indicators, as reported in the Implementation Status Reports (ISRs), changed from time to time due to lack of data. See Section 3.2 for further explanation. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 14. Based on the objectives and investment program activities, the intended direct beneficiaries of the project’s financing can be identified as: (a) primary school-aged children, particularly the most vulnerable, who would benefit from lower out-of pocket costs and all would benefit from having more instructional materials; (b) secondary school- aged youth, particularly the poorest, who would benefit from increased opportunity to attend secondary school; (c) teachers, administrators, managers, governance bodies and technical staff at all levels of the education system, including primary school management committees, secondary school boards of governors, and semi-autonomous Government agencies (SAGAs), that would benefit from capacity building. The country as a whole would also benefit in the longer term through higher productivity of the labor force, among other benefits. 4 1.5 Original Components 15. KESSP had four “components� and 23 investment programs. These programs reflect the strategies that Government adopted to achieve the targets set in each of the four components. Below is a brief summary. (Annex 2(a) shows the investment programs mapped to the respective component and program development outcomes; Annex 11 provides a full description of each component taken from the PAD). 16. Ensuring equitable access to basic education (US$ 154.0 million, 12 percent of total). The investment programs to achieve this objective aimed at reducing disparities in education opportunity due to wealth, geographic location and gender. They addressed both supply and demand side constraints to equitable access including: (a) continuation of the successful FPE school grant program; (b) expanded programs to address access constraints of children with special needs, children in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) areas and informal settlements, girls and adults; and (c) a school infrastructure program targeted to the neediest communities, with a specific focus on water and sanitation. 17. Enhancing quality and learning achievement (US$735.0 million, 54 percent of total). At the primary level, the strategy to achieve higher learning outcomes was to ensure that a set of essential learning materials was available to every child; instructional materials were effectively utilized; learning was the central focus in the classroom; learning progress was regularly measured; children were more ready to learn; and the quality of schooling was effectively monitored and supported. The main investment programs supporting these objectives included: (a) FPE instructional materials grants for primary students, (b) grants to early childhood development centers; (c) primary school feeding, health and nutrition programs targeted to the most vulnerable; and (d) at the secondary level, scaling-up a successful math and science teacher in-service education program in partnership with Japan. 18. Providing opportunities for further education and training (US$389.0 million, 29 percent of total). The main strategies under this component aimed to expand opportunities for post-primary education, particularly to secondary education and to populations with low access and incomes insufficient to afford the cost of secondary education. The investment programs for these levels of education foresaw the preparation of strategies for secondary, Technical, Industrial, Vocational Education and Training (TIVET) and post-secondary education as a first step, while investing some resources in expanding day secondary education and providing bursaries to needy students until the strategies were completed. 19. Strengthening sector management (US$76.3 million, 6 percent of total cost). The objective of this component was to strengthen capacity of implementation and policy support systems. The corresponding investment programs focused principally on: (a) teacher management; (b) strengthening the MoE’s Education Management Information System (EMIS) to provide reliable and timely data; (c) training of all stakeholders involved in the management of school infrastructure grants, FPE grants and other student subsidies; (d) process monitoring and impact evaluation; and (e) HIV/AIDS. 5 20. Across the four components, and relative to the KESSP financial framework, increasing opportunities for all children to attend and complete a quality primary education was the main priority, comprising over 60 percent of KESSP’s estimated total cost of US$1.4 billion for the five-year period 2005-2010. (Project costs and financing are in Annex 1). 1.6 Revised Components 21. No component was formally revised. 1.7 Other Significant Factors 22. Suspension of disbursements. IDA financing for KESSP was active for only about 30 months of the 45 month duration of the Credit. Due to emerging evidence of fraud and corruption, IDA replenishments were effectively suspended from July 2009 through to December 2010 when the credit closed. Project implementation was fundamentally affected by the post-election violence which started in January 2008, and the suspension of disbursements. 23. Design, scope and scale. KESSP review processes were set up to provide flexibility to expand the Program as MoE developed strategies for secondary and other levels of education (agreed with development partners), and to adjust allocations annually across investment programs IPs depending on implementation. However, in 2007/08 GoK announced, and began implementing, a policy of Free Secondary Education which eliminated tuition fees initially in public day secondary schools and provided a per student subsidy of KSh 10,265. The policy was soon scaled up to encompass all public secondary schools, including boarding schools where the per student subsidy was much higher. The implementation of the policy significantly increased the scale of the secondary education program and taxed overall MoE implementation and financial management capacity (see section 2.2). 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 24. Relevance. The KESSP was relevant to the development objectives set out in the Government’s national development and poverty reduction strategies. As a medium-term plan for the sector, the KESSP incorporated these objectives and formulated strategies and IPs to achieve them. The choice to use a Sector-wide Approach (SWAp) to program development was highly appropriate because the national development strategies placed the need for a more highly skilled labor force at the center of economic development and poverty reduction objectives, in addition to the achievement of UPE. FPE was also a central component of a broader decentralization and social accountability agenda. It was within this context that the IDA and FTI support was provided (paragraph 8 explains more fully the rationale for IDA support). 6 25. Sector Wide Approach. The design of the IDA credit to support KESSP implementation was appropriate. When the IDA credit was prepared in 2006/07, all evidence pointed to considerable achievements in the sector-wide approach (with a pooled fund) that the GoK and development partners had already been implementing. There was a clear consensus among Government and development partners that having a sector-wide approach in the education sector was appropriate to promote greater aid alignment, harmonization and coordination, and to reduce the fragmentation of external support. There was also consensus that a sector-wide approach was feasible in view of: (a) the progress that had already been made in these areas since KESSP was launched in 2005, and (b) demonstrated strong GoK leadership in the sector. 26. KESSP had many characteristics of good practice in sector wide approaches in its preparation and design including the following:  GoK had consistently shown a high level of leadership and ownership of the KESSP, and it backed-up its commitment to KESSP with public resources.  Consultations on the design were broad-based and drew from a range of instruments to engage stakeholders, including (i) more formal meeting/workshop events which opened up opportunities for engagement with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), and (ii) client satisfaction and expenditure tracking surveys (for FPE) which provided feedback from stakeholders that were not well represented in formal partnership bodies. The KESSP Governance Action Plan planned to further strengthen these and other client feedback mechanisms.  There was strong donor coordination and alignment. The KESSP had a formalized Government-led process for donor coordination and reporting that functioned reasonably well from the perspective of MoE and development partners.5 There was also a donor working group (with a rotating lead coordinator), which served as a forum to exchange information, discuss sector issues and coordinate support. There was broad consensus between Government and development partners on most key policy and management issues in the sector. Development partners had collectively appraised KESSP in 2005 and had aligned their financing to it.  Since 2005, development partners had been supporting the use of country systems for implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation. They drew on common analyses and worked with the MoE to strengthening these systems. A pooled fund was also operational. This aimed to lower transaction costs and facilitate the use of country systems for budgeting, financial management and procurement, and the capture of external financing in the public budgeting process. 5 Two annual reviews contributed to “joint� monitoring of implementation, problem identification and solving, and prioritization of resource allocations for the following year. Conclusions and next steps were summarized in a “joint� aide-memoire issued by the MoE. 7 27. Technical and financial. KESSP was based on substantial sector work conducted by the GoK and others. As far as primary education is concerned (which comprised the majority of KESSP costs initially), available studies provided a credible basis for policy and program development. 6 The MoE was also building on its FPE track record and lessons learned were incorporated. Where studies provided an insufficient basis for policy development, they were planned to fill the gaps. Potential efficiency gains were analyzed with respect to teacher deployment, and strategies were developed to support financial sustainability. KESSP strategies were also informed by the results of controlled experiments to assess the impact of deworming, school uniforms and school meals on school attendance and learning outcomes in Kenya.7 28. High priority issues such as regional disparities, gender disparities, poverty disparities, HIV/AIDs, orphans and vulnerable children and children with special needs were assessed. Targeting strategies incorporated by investment programs included a geographical focus (ASAL areas and urban settlements), institutions known to serve poor populations (NFE schools), populations vulnerable to food insecurity (school feeding program), and the most disadvantaged communities (within broader investment programs such as school infrastructure). 29. KESSP was developed within, and was accompanied by a comprehensive medium- term resource and expenditure framework for the sector to facilitate coherence between policy objectives, resources, results and sustainability. Within the framework, expenditure was prioritized in terms of budget shares to protect the highest priority expenditure (i.e., FPE). KESSP planning and budgeting cycles were aligned with national cycles and the projected resource and expenditure framework was to be updated annually as part of GoK- wide Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Public Expenditure Review (PER) processes. 30. Despite the strength of the program’s design, two aspects of the design proved to make the monitoring of achievement towards certain KESSP targets difficult: (a) lack of clarity in the definition and measurement of some progress indicators (such as provincial disparities and equity in teacher distribution), and (b) a KESSP budget structure that did not easily correspond to that of the MoE, rendering it very difficult to have clear visibility on total expenditure by program - MoE and development partners combined. 6 These included poverty assessments, studies of orphans and vulnerable children, FPE expenditure tracking and Non-Government Organizations studies on vulnerable populations 7 Distribution of school uniforms has been shown to reduce dropout rates (Evans, Kremer, and Ngatia, 2008, and Duflo, Dupas, Kremer and Sinei, 2006). Deworming has been shown to be a highly cost-effective strategy to increase school attendance (Miguel and Kremer, 2004). This reduced absenteeism by 25%. On the basis of the evaluation, the KESSP helped to scale up deworming to a country policy level. School meal programs have been shown to increase attendance at pre-schools, especially among the poorest children (Kremer and Vermeersch, 2004). 8 31. Governance and fiduciary matters. The Bank team exercised a high level of fiduciary due diligence at the project entry stage, and risk mitigation measures included in the project were comprehensive. The project’s risk assessments drew on relevant aspects of country and sector public financial management assessments, including: (i) a 2006 Country Portfolio Performance Review, (ii) a 2006 detailed risk assessment carried out by DFID on behalf of development partners covering financial management, procurement, governance and the FPE instructional materials grant program, (iii) a 2006 World Bank detailed implementation review of the education sector, and (iv) KESSP financial audit reports on the KESSP pooled fund from 2005 and 2006. The various reports concluded that despite progress in the implementation of FPE, the risk of corruption remained high. The DFID assessment concluded that there was a general positive trajectory of change in the education sector, which the education sector had an excellent project track record, and there was a credible program of public financial management reform in place at the national and sectoral levels. The assessment also identified major risks in the areas of procurement, internal controls, ineffective oversight and lack of capacity. The detailed implementation review (2006) cited the need for additional safeguards in public disclosure of information, independent performance monitoring and annual independent procurement audits. Financial audits highlighted issues of un-surrendered imprests, irregular payments to officers and contractors, eroding compliance with FPE processes, and weakness in monitoring expenditure at the school level.8 32. The issues highlighted in these reports were clearly summarized in the KESSP 9 PAD and the studies’ recommendations were incorporated, along with other measures, in: (i) a Governance and Accountability Action Plan (GAAP) which focused on improving consultations, social accountability, procurement, financial management and public expenditure management; and (ii) a Governance Strengthening Plan (GSP) which included specific actions to strengthen monitoring and evaluation, communication, public disclosure and KESSP management structures (PAD Annex 2). The overall risk of the IDA credit at entry was assessed as substantial in the first year of the project and modest thereafter, assuming that the risk mitigation measures were implemented well. Efforts were undertaken to strengthen fiduciary capacity prior to Credit effectiveness while effectiveness conditions related exclusively to financial management and procurement measures.10 33. KESSP performance monitoring instruments were comprehensive, and designed to provide an adequate level of checks and balances. Monitoring progress towards the achievement of the KESSP outcomes was to be done by MoE systems, namely the education management information system (EMIS) and the National Assessment of 8 A 2006 year-end audit report by Ernst and Young found that as a share of sampled primary schools: (a) 54 percent had complied with procedures for the establishment and maintenance of School Management Committees, down from 90 percent in 2005; 20 percent complied with procurement procedures; and 69 percent received funds in line with enrolment compared with over 90 percent in 2005. 9 Analysis of Risk (Table 5), Analysis of Fiduciary Issues (Table 7) and Public Expenditure Management Assessment (Table 8). 10 Effectiveness conditions were conversion to the general ledger module of the Ministry of Finance Integrated Financial Management Information System, recruitment of an independent Procurement Monitoring Agent, procurement staffing, and adoption of procurement manuals. 9 Student Learning Achievements (NASLA). The main accountability interventions included: (i) technical audits of processes (expenditure tracking surveys and school audits), (ii) financial audits, (iii) social accountability instruments (Client Satisfaction Surveys and School Score Cards), and (iv) an inclusive management framework that brings together Government, development partners, private sector and civil society as shown in Annex 11. A high quality Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) and baseline NASLA had been conducted, and joint review meetings had been taking place regularly. 34. With the benefit of hindsight, given that PETS and social accountability instruments were either partially implemented or not implemented at all before credit closing (see section 2.2), greater clarity in the attribution of responsibilities for the implementation of all elements of the governance plans at the design stage may have helped to enable their implementation earlier. 2.2 Implementation 35. Country environment. The positive economic trends and relatively stable political environment during the period following the 2003 elections had begun to erode. In early 2008, post-election violence rocked Kenya, resulting in the deaths of over 1,100 people, the displacement of over 300,000 people, and vast property damage. Many schools in the most affected parts of the country became overcrowded, having to accommodate additional children of internally displaced families; others were burned down, looted or vandalized. The post-election violence significantly disrupted normal operations of the school system and administration in the affected parts of the country, and necessitated a focus on emergency measures to rebuild and rehabilitate schools in the affected areas for at least six months.11 Further, political developments in 2008-2009 (e.g. the formation of the coalition government and the adoption of a new Constitution in 2010) gave rise to challenges associated with staff changes and with re-districting. From a governance perspective, the Government’s auditing capacity gradually improved in 2009-2010 which enabled the uncovering of fraud and corruption through GoK processes. 36. Project at risk status. During the first year of the IDA Credit, progress attained on development outcomes and implementation progress was rated Moderately Satisfactory as systems were being established. By December 2008, both ratings improved due to the progress recorded toward the PDO targets and on the fiduciary front, respectively. Project monitoring during the year, however, was affected by factors including the post-election crisis. By May 2009, implementation progress ratings declined steadily due to the lagged effects of the post-election emergency, and as audits were conducted and evidence of fraud and corruption emerged. Subsequently, the IDA credit fell into problem status (section 2.4 outlines the actions taken by the World Bank in response to the audit findings.) The Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) recorded this trend for implementation. 11 Informal settlements in Nairobi, and the towns of Eldoret, Nakuru and Naivasha in the Rift Valley Province, Kisumu in the Nyanza Province, and Mount Elgon in the Western Province were the most affected areas. Many schools became temporary camps for internally displaced persons; others were burned down, looted, and vandalized. 10 However, with the information at hand, the progress rating towards the project development objective should have also been downgraded at this time. It subsequently was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory, but regrettably, this final ISR was archived shortly after the formal project closure, and therefore not recognized as one of the final ratings by project closure. Further data became available on the project progress after project closure, which after careful analysis, has led the ICR team to conclude an Unsatisfactory rating overall for the project. Achievements 37. Annex 2, Table 2(b) outlines the achievements based on available data. Below are some specifics for KESSP investment programs which received consistent and relatively significant support over the five-year period (2005-2010). 38. KESSP leadership and participation. MoE technical leadership was maintained throughout KESSP implementation (at least until April 2010) in the areas of sector strategy development, planning and managing two KESSP reviews annually, and developing investment program work plans and budgets. Further, over time, participation in KESSP reviews was also broadened to include representatives of non-government organizations. 39. Planning and policy development. KESSP helped to build a planning culture in the MoE, and all partners expect to continue to combine their efforts to support an overall sector strategy. The KESSP also put the issues of raising quality and using learning learning assessments more firmly on the policy agenda. Further the range of policy and strategy development supported under KESSP was extensive, including strategies for early childhood education, school health, gender, non-formal schools, secondary education, university education and TIVET. 40. Schools. Despite the findings of fraud and corruption in the primary and secondary school grant programs, the physical environment in many schools and the strategy of providing resources to primary schools with community participation and monitoring was effective during the early years. To a certain extent, the FPE strategy was a victim of its own initial success, in that school grants became the dominant mechanism to achieve objectives across the sector - for early childhood development centers, non-formal schools, adult education centers and then, particularly, secondary schools. But, systems did not keep pace as financial transactions multiplied.12 Further, the institutional capacity of the KESSP Secretariat was heavily stretched as the KESSP grew larger. Despite this challenge, the team worked to stay on course. IDA as the Joint Financing Agreement partner contact and the supervising entity for the FTI had provided technical assistance to the MoE for the development of financial management and procurement manuals. Related and continual training had also been provided to appropriate entities at national and sub-national levels. 12 Disbursements were made from the MoE through commercial banks to school accounts (two school accounts in the case of FPE) two or three times a year to more than 22,000 institutions. 11 41. Development partner coordination. The findings of an FTI 2009 external evaluation were that Kenya stood out among the nine reviewed countries (Cambodia, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan and Yemen) in the areas of sectoral coordination, alignment, donor harmonization, and using a sector wide approach which provided a basis for dialogue. 42. Parent’s perceptions. A beneficiary assessment (Annex 6) undertaken by an independent firm to inform the KESSP ICR shows that parents confirmed the perception that access to schooling has increased, and that children are attending school more regularly and performing better. 43. School health. In 2009, 3.6 million school age children were dewormed representing 80 percent of those at risk. Appropriate information on health issues have been shown to be effective at reducing risky behavior. By improving the provision of information and lifeskills education, the KESSP helped to address HIV/AIDS risks. Lifeskills education was a high priority school health initiative in Kenya, and 22,000 primary schools received grants for training The Ministries of Education and Health co- developed the first School Health Policy and Strategy for the country, and officially launched the policy and strategy in 2009. The policy is currently under implementation, and is focusing on developing an “essential� package of school health interventions in Kenya, tailored to the sub-national needs. 44. Most vulnerable children (MVC)13. The objective of the MVC support program is to assist the children to access quality primary education in schools across Kenya. Basically the program is intended to ensure that the MVCs currently enrolled in school stay in school, those who have dropped out return to school, and those who have never been to school are enrolled. The 2010-2011 Ed-PETS survey collected information on the impact of the program. According to 94 percent of the head teachers, the MVC program has been successful in realising its objectives. Nonetheless, 6 percent of schools are of the opinion that the program has not full realised its objectives. In terms of the program impact on the MVC population and the overall pupil population, 53 percent and 59.7 percent of headteachers revealed that the grant has had a large positive impact with 45.3 percent and 39.5 percent revealing that the program has had some positive impact on the overall pupil population and MVC population, respectively. 13 The MoE and development partners have been working to ensure that orphans and most vulnerable children are retained, returned and enrolled in primary schools. The program, called the Most Vulnerable Children (MVC) Program, is in response to the increasing number of orphans in and out of school as a result of HIV/AIDS and other reasons. Orphans are defined as children who are below 18 years, and who have lost one or both parents for whatever reasons. On the other hand, vulnerable children are those children who: (i) live households with a chronically ill person, whether a parent or not; (ii) live outside the family, under the care of others; (iii) have been abandoned, neglected or abused; (iv) come from households where parents are too poor to provide the necessary care and support; or (v) have been identified as vulnerable by the MVC Sub-Committee based on local knowledge and experience. A total of 3,251 schools have received MVC grants since the introduction of the program in 2007. 12 45. Secondary education-Secondary Math and Science Teacher Training Program (CEMASTEA). Primary and secondary inservice teacher training received attention under the KESSP. Specific support on secondary science and mathematics training was provided by the Japanese Technical Cooperation. From 2004-08 secondary school teachers were provided training in mathematics and science. The objective was to upgrade the capability of young Kenyans in mathematics and science. An evaluation undertaken by the Japanese Technical Cooperation (JICA) in September 2007 showed that technical transfer was effectively and efficiently conducted in both academic and management areas (SMASSE3, 2007). However, specific impact assessment of the training is yet to be undertaken14. The SMASSE is a well-known program in the East African Community. Student performance in science at primary school level shows an increase as measured by the KCPE (see paragraph 73). 46. Spatial mapping of schools. The KESSP provided the basis for significant work in the area of spatial mapping of schools. Over a three-year period from 2008-2010 the MoE’s Planning Unit focused on identifying all public and private primary and secondary schools in the country using Geographic Information Systems technology. The School Mapping information was officially launched during the 2011 Joint Review of the Education Sector and Annual Budget Review Workshop. Challenges/shortcomings 47. Findings of fraud and corruption.  The findings of fraud and corruption had a substantial negative impact on KESSP implementation. In addition to the loss of donor financing15, there was more impact due to the time and effort required to deal with the issues, the impact on staff morale, and subsequent turnover of staff, etc. 48. Institutional development. The MoE and Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology (MoHEST) are massive ministries to manage. However, the KESSP was largely implemented by a small number of heavily worked and committed staff. As a result, the performance of the sector was significantly affected by changes in key staff positions, especially as the KESSP management systems were insufficiently institutionalized in the MoE and efforts to strengthen institutional capacities were rather fragmented and inadequate. Primary challenges during implementation set in during the post-election emergency period and after, with the introduction of new policies and strategies. The demands on institutional capacities of the two ministries of education increased exponentially. This most likely contributed to the deterioration over time, in the implementation progress of the KESSP. A compounding factor was the governance issues 14 The monitoring and evaluation unit at CEMASTEA is tracking the in-service training activities implementation including the application of ‘Activity Student Experiment and Improvisation’ (ASEI) and ‘Plan, Do, See Improve’ (PDSI) in the classroom. ASEI/PDSI is the SMASSE principle/philosophy for student-centred teaching and learning. 15 The suspension of donor financing may have contributed to communities not receiving second and third tranche infrastructure grant payments, which is very regrettable. However, when JFA disbursements were suspended in 2009, the GoK allocations were more than sufficient to cover the gap left by development partners. 13 which imposed significant constraints, leading to demoralization over time of a relatively highly motivated staff. Until June 2010 technical dialogue with the ministries was ongoing, and program implementation for several activities proceeded with financing from government. The IDA team and JFA partners also provided significant technical assistance and capacity building support to help address the growing institutional demands as the KESSP implementation responsibilities increased over time. 49. Rapid increase in GoK financing and scale up of KESSP relative to capacity. GoK resources allocated to education increased significantly over time, particularly in FY 2008/09 and 2009/10, due to FSE and higher allocations for tertiary education.16 Recurrent non-salary expenditure on secondary education jumped from only KSh 1 billion in 2006/07 to 15 billion in 2009/10, (compared with KSh 6-7 billion per year for FPE grants). Unlike primary education, where systems had been developed over years for infrastructure and school grants, funds were disbursed for secondary school infrastructure and FSE grants in the absence of clear policies, allocation criteria, guidelines, disbursement systems and oversight, significantly elevating risks of fraud and corruption.17 50. At the same time, the increased expenditure on secondary education stretched human resource capacity in MoE and its antennae offices which had a negative impact on the primary infrastructure program and the instructional materials grants. This happened at a time when there was need for urgent attention to be given to the continued training of School Management Committees (SMCs) and school heads due to rapid turnover, and when school audit capacity fell well below what would be required to achieve the 5 percent target anticipated (Abagi 2010). Financial management capacity also became increasingly inadequate relative to the speed at which financial transactions multiplied. 51. Governance. The governance and accountability action plan does not appear to have benefited from the same level of leadership and ownership. Most components of the governance and accountability action plan and governance strengthening plan relating to oversight, social accountability and transparency were either only partially implemented or not implemented at all which elevated governance risks associated with allowing the MoE to plan, implement and monitor itself (Transparency International 2010). For example, of 16 In 2008/09, MoE development allocations doubled (from less than KSh 4.5 billion to KSh 10.3 billion), and doubled again in 2009/10 (to KSh 20 billion) most of which was allocated to secondary and tertiary education. The additional increase in 2009/10 was mainly financed by the economic stimulus program. Of the stimulus amount, 30 percent was allocated to primary school infrastructure and 60 percent to secondary schools in each constituency (340 total) to upgrade into centers of excellence. Part of the MoE’s allocation was counted as GoK financing of KESSP Investment Programs, part was managed outside that framework. During JFA meetings, development partners expressed concern about the need for/to a financial sustainability analysis of FSE, an “update� the secondary strategy accordingly and ensure the availability of manuals and training of those involved. For these reasons, JFA partners decided against donor financing for FSE. 17 An assessment of the FSE program in 2008 noted an urgent need to upgrade school financial management capacities and introduce greater frequency and rigor in school account certifications and audits. It noted that only one third of districts had received basic training; guidelines. Procurement and financial management manuals were lacking. And only 200 provincial and district school auditors were responsible for the certification and audit of at least 24,000 education institutions, which was grossly insufficient to meet the accountability requirements of the Education Act (Read and Read 2008). 14 the advisory and management structures, which were intended to enhance participation, accountability and transparency, only the Donor Coordinating Committee and the KESSP Secretariat were established and functioning. The two main interventions to enhance social accountability (community score cards and expenditure tracking surveys) were not fully implemented. 18 In the absence of external information, monitoring and evaluation depended heavily on what the MoE produced. Finally, public disclosure of information (e.g. EMIS data, KESSP review reports, aggregate exam results, school grant amounts) on the web was not achieved. The details are provided in Annex 13 which shows progress on the KESSP governance strengthening plan. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 52. The SWAp was designed to house the M&E activities within the KESSP Secretariat. The design also required the use of country systems. It was agreed between GoK and the development partners that the KESSP mid-term review would be undertaken as a joint stakeholder exercise. It was also set to coincide with the annual Joint Review of the Education Sector since the mid-term review exercise required harnessing the institutional capacities of the MoE, the SAGAs, and the development partners actively supporting the KESSP. The original date of the mid-term review per KESSP design was October 2007. The date was however moved to October/November 2008. This was to allow more time for implementation to get underway, and to have available data to enable the assessment of progress. It was also agreed that in keeping with the use of country systems, procurement for the mid-term review would be the responsibility of the MoE, with technical support from JFA partners and technical specialists (consultants). Additional external/third party evaluations, impact evaluations, and value-for-money audits were to be undertaken over the KESSP implementation period as an integral part of the program monitoring and evaluation. 53. As the KESSP implementation unfolded, however, the demands on a small number of monitoring and evaluation staff grew exponentially. This resulted in a slowing down of progress on monitoring and evaluation. Insufficient progress on this also contributed substantially to elevated risk and inadequate performance tracking. The monitoring and reporting systems never developed sufficiently to provide reliable information on progress achieved towards the development outcomes. Although some progress was made in expanding the coverage of non-public schools, the EMIS data remained of questionable reliability, despite the availability of capacity building support (including technical assistance, hardware and software development, equipping and training district officers, and school mapping). There were repeated expressions of concern by development partners about the quality of the data, but all stakeholders used the data for monitoring purposes. 54. MoE requested that an external firm undertake the evaluation on its behalf. The mid-term review was significantly delayed due to procurement issues, with the final report 18 Community score cards were not implemented due to opposition from Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) to the solicitation of feedback from parents on the performance of teachers. Expenditure tracking surveys were not undertaken because the cost was deemed too high. 15 being presented during October 2009. The report by the external firm was considered to be of unsatisfactory quality by the development partners. The JFA partners were closely engaged throughout the mid-term review process, from the development of the terms of reference, through to the conclusion of the process. Significant technical assistance by sub- sector was brought to inform the mid-term evaluation. The activities included carrying out interim supervision missions due to the size of the program, advising the external firm about the issues, and in reviewing the draft versions of the mid-term review report. Throughout the period KESSP implementation progress was satisfactory, with systems which were initiated in the previous periods unfolding positively from a technical perspective. Concurrently, however, the growing fraud and corruption aspects which emerged in 2009 placed additional supervision demands. The KESSP Secretariat, the JFA partners, and the MoE’s mid-term review team were unable to keep pace with the emerging issues. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 55. The pooled fund account was to be monitored through: (i) quarterly Integrated Financial Reports (IFRs)/Financial Monitoring Reports (FMRs) prepared by MoE and reviewed by IDA; and (ii) audits of the financial statements prepared by the Kenya National Audit Office (KENAO). 56. As part of its strategy to support the strengthening of country systems, IDA and other development partners provided support to strengthen GoK audit capacities, among other key initiatives to strengthen Public Financial Management (PFM) systems19. As a result of the policy dialogue, in 2008 MoF expanded the remit of the Internal Audit Department (IAD) to include donor funded projects as well as value for money audits, and provided a framework for conducting risk assessments. The auditing capacity of KENAO also improved. 20 Thereafter, in consultation with IDA, Treasury directed the IAD to conduct a Risk-Based Fiduciary Review and Funds Flow Analysis of all (25) World Bank funded projects and Trust Funds (January – March 2009). The risk profiling assessment identified 5 active projects with potentially serious integrity issues, one of which was KESSP. 21 Subsequently, treasury directed IAD to conduct in-depth reviews of these projects, with IDA providing technical, financial and supervisory assistance to the IAD. 57. The in-depth audit was conducted over three months (July-September 2009) and was limited to only 30 percent of MoE headquarter payment vouchers and 48 imprest 19 An indepth discussion of the chronological governance and risk management aspects of the KESSP is available in the project files (see Mills and Sosale, March 2011). Also refer to Annex 13. 20 During the first two years of the IDA Credit/JFA, KENAO did not follow international auditing standards and conducted only a desk review of the financial statements provided by the MoE (with no sample verification of documentation, assessment of internal controls, etc.). Further, the audits focused were mainly on KESSP Secretariat and did not extend to the investment programs and school-level spending. 21 The review of KESSP flagged weaknesses in school financial management, in compliance with budget, accounting, and procurement laws and regulations, in transparency, accountability, governance and internal control systems. Further, financial audits for the previous three years had all been qualified. MoE rejected the report (due to the small sample) and failed to implement any of its recommendations. 16 vouchers for the month of June 2009, and to 96 primary schools and 68 secondary schools, among other tests. Based on a draft report, in September 2009, the Minister of Finance issued a press statement that IAD had found evidence of fraudulent and corrupt activities in KESSP and that the Government had initiated a series of actions.22 Key findings of the in- depth audit (October 2009) included losses of KSh 234 million (US$ 3 million) from the small sample of expenditures for a single month, and coordination structures that were either not functioning as envisaged or were sidelined in certain decision-making processes. The draft audit report had not yet been completed or validated by the audited entity (i.e. MoE) at that time. 58. Following the announcement and discussion with GoK officials, IDA decided informally to suspend disbursements pending completion and validation of the audit reports which were completed in April 2010. The JFA partners also suspended disbursements to the pooled fund pending: (a) completion of the audit with validation of the report by IAD and MoE, (b) separation from the project of staff alleged to have been involved in fraud or corruption, (c) clear identification of misappropriated funds and reimbursement by GoK, and (d) an action plan that fully addresses systemic failures in project implementation identified by the audit, acceptable to the JFA Partners. The World Bank’s Integrity Department (INT) also advised that a comprehensive forensic audit be undertaken to assess whether further investigative work would be required. 59. The MoE took four months to validate the staffing portion of the audit report23 and another three months to validate school-level issues and prepare an action plan. Yet still, outstanding information required from the MoE precluded finalization of the in-depth audit. After consultations with development partners, World Bank officially suspended disbursements to KESSP on May 1, 2010, pending: (a) validation of the remaining sections of the IAD report, (b) reimbursing ineligible expenditures in the agreed proportions with KESSP pooling partners, and (c) providing evidence of improvements in the MoE’s financial management systems in accordance with the agreed action plan. 60. In July 2010, the forensic audit was launched by IAD with support from the IDA financial management team and the Department of Institutional Integrity (INT).24 The audit covered FY2007/08 and FY2008/09, a larger number of investment programs and a representative sample of primary and secondary schools. In September 2010, a draft report was available with provisional findings of KSh 8.4 billion (US$105 million) in ineligible expenditure. However, still much documentation was missing from the MoE and numerous 22 The actions included initiating the suspension of staff implicated, instructing the Attorney General to freeze the project accounts, and referring the IAD report to the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) for further investigation. 23 Staff members alleged to have been involved were suspended and their cases turned over to the KACC. 24 The forensic audit outputs were: (i) an Internal Controls Environment Report for MoE and MoHEST; (ii) a Quantification Report on ineligible expenditures; (iii) a Forensic Report of suspected fraud (to be referred to the KACC), and a (iv) School Level Report. 17 issues were identified, including lack of effective oversight; non-cooperation with the audit, numerous examples of internal financial controls not working, disbursement schedules open to manipulation and human error, persistent entry of incorrect information, routine flouting of financial management procedures, tampering with approved disbursement schedules, and extremely deficient record keeping others. Problems were also found in the MoE’s procurement systems. 61. The forensic audit concluded in May 2011 and showed unaccounted expenditure of Kshs.4.8 billion (US$60.2 million) for fiscal years 2007/08 and 2008/09. The financial audit for FY 2009/10 identified additional ineligible expenditure in the TIVET program. 62. Other Safeguards. Due to the school building component, the Project triggered the Environment Assessment and Involuntary Resettlement Operational Policies (OP 4.01 and 4.12) with a Category B rating. In line with World Bank policy, prior to appraisal, an acceptable Environmental Management Plan (EMP) and implementation manual had been prepared by the Borrower, and these provided guidelines and processes for the screening of school infrastructure projects to be funded by KESSP and relating to land acquisition, involuntary resettlement and impact on livelihoods. The MoE conducted widespread training in the application of these procedures, under the leadership of the Ministry of Environment and with technical assistance provided by KESSP partners. The application of the EMP was moderately satisfactory during project implementation. The majority (95 percent) of school infrastructure sub-projects financed by the KESSP concerned the rehabilitation of existing structures, and many of the new projects were too small to necessitate a full Environmental Assessment. The National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) granted licenses before construction on new schools began, and all local and national environmental regulations were followed in the screening and construction at the project sites. 63. While the Project improved the health environment of the schools that received funding (due to cemented floors and improved availability of water and latrines), the gap in basic infrastructure remains large. In 2010, about 80 percent of a sample of schools were found to have incomplete priority infrastructure in place. Further improvement is also needed in enforcing procurement regulations and providing quality control as numerous examples of poor construction quality were also found (Abagi 2010). 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 64. From the MoE’s perspective, the next phase of KESSP will be delayed for about two years due to the time that it will take to: (i) resolve the fraud and corruption issues; (ii) revise the next program based on lessons learned; (iii) re-align the education sector to the new Constitution; and (iv) develop a new Sessional Paper and Education Act. With respect to IDA, sector financing would depend upon actions taken by GoK to address the findings of the IAD forensic audit. 18 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 65. KESSP was a central program of the GoK’s national development strategies (ERS and Vision 2030) and of the World Bank’s 2004 Country Assistance Strategy. The KESSP strategy and investment programs remain highly relevant to Kenya’s current development priorities and to global education priorities, including the focus on the achievement of the MDGs for education, and the strategies developed for TIVET and university education. Using a SWAp and a pooled fund was consistent with global good practice recommendations to enhance aid-effectiveness. However, this harmonized approach makes it difficult to attribute specific outcomes to IDA financing alone, especially when that support was such a small proportion of total program resources available. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 66. There were ten project development objective indicators associated with the four “project components�. Six related to primary school access and completion, one to secondary school access, one to primary student achievement, and the other two to GoK expenditure effort on primary education. The indicators were to be monitored by the monitoring and evalaution components of the KESSP-- namely EMIS, NASLA and annual sector expenditure reviews. The analysis below is based on triangulating data from available sources in order to establish a degree of objectivity to the review (refer Annex 3 for the analysis and rating method adopted). PDO Objective 1: Equity in Access to Basic Education 67. Indicator 1: Primary Net Enrolment Ratio (NER). The KESSP targeted the achievement of a primary Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) of 96 percent in 2010 over the 2005 EMIS baseline of 83 percent, for a 13 percentage points increase over the five-year KESSP period 2005-2010. Chart 2. Primary Net Enrolment Ratio (NER): MoE and 68. Chart 2 shows a comparison of the MoE Survey/Census Results, 2005-2009 NER and those published by household surveys Percent 100 and the population census over the same period with a linear trend line derived from the data 90 points. The growing difference over time between the two data sets is striking. According 80 to MoE data, significant progress was achieved. 70 Between 2005 and 2009, the NER rose by 10 percentage points. Projecting the trend to 2010, 60 the NER would reach the KESSP target which 50 would be a highly satisfactory outcome, 2005 2008 2009 particularly in light of any mitigating effects that Surveys 79.0 78.8 77.2 the period of post-election violence in 2008 might MoE 83.2 92.5 92.9 have had. Surveys MoE Sources: 2005 KIHBS, 2008 DHS, 2009 Population Census, 2010 MoE Statistical Report 19 69. In contrast, however, household surveys and the population census show a stagnating NER at around 79 percent, with a possible deterioration over time. Given that greater credibility is placed in the survey data which show no increase in the NER over the entire period, progress achieved would be rated Unsatisfactory. However, the stagnation/decline of the NER over time may have been partly influenced by the period of post-election violence whose impact cannot be measured with the available data. A Moderately Unsatisfactory rating would imply an adjustment of four to six percentage points, or between one-third and one-half of the increase targeted over the KESSP period. 70. Indicator 2: Provincial Equity. Progress toward improvements in equity across Provinces was to be measured by the difference between the average NER for each Province and the national average NER. “Lagging� Provinces were defined as those that fell below the national average NER. 71. Charts 3 and 4 show a comparison of the difference between the national average NER and provincial averages based as reported by the MoE for 2005 and 2008 (the latest year for which data were available), and by the 2005 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) and the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). Compared with the household survey results, the EMIS: (a) significantly overestimates the relative disadvantage of Nairobi and central provinces which have historically reported NERs above the national average, and (b) underestimates the relative disadvantage of the Rift Valley Province which is the most populous province (27 percent of the population), was the province most affected by post election violence, and which fell further behind. Chart 3. Difference between Provincial Primary NER and the Chart 4. Difference between Provincial Primary NER and the National Average (in percentage points): Reported by EMIS National Average (in percentage points): Reported by 2005 for 2008: KIHBS and 2008 DHS: Western Western Rift Valley Rift Valley Nyanza Nyanza North Eastern North Eastern Eastern Eastern Coast Coast Central Central Nairobi Nairobi �35 �30 �25 �20 �15 �10 �5 0 5 10 15 �70 �60 �50 �40 �30 �20 �10 0 10 20 percentage point difference from the national average percentage point difference from the national average 2008 2005 2008 2005 Sources: 2005 KIBHS, 2008 DHS Source: MoE EMIS.Statistical Report 2010 72. To assess progress towards the objective of raising lagging provinces closer to the national average, in practice, MoE and development partners focused on northeastern province where the gap was widest. However, MoE data show no progress in closing the gap between the average NER for northeastern province relative to the national average, and perhaps a slight regression. Household surveys show a modest reduction in the gap of 5 percentage points (from 30 to 25). Assuming the same trend forward, in 2010 the gap 20 between northeastern and the national average would be projected to have closed by about 8 percentage points over the KESSP period. Giving greater credibility to the survey data and considering that no specific target had been set, and that northeastern province should be used to assess progress on this indicator because that is effectively what was used by MoE and development partners, progress achieved toward this objective is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 73. Indicator 3: Gender Equity. The objective of KESSP was to reduce the disparity in the NER of girls relative to boys where the 2005 baseline values were 83 percent for girls and 84 percent for boys. No specific target was set. To facilitate a comparison of the gender-specific ratios over time, they are simply converted to the widely used Gender Parity Index (GPI)25. Table 1 shows the gender-specific NERs reported by the MoE and household surveys, and the resulting Table 1. Gender Parity Index (GPI) 2005-09: MoE and Survey Data Comparison gender parity indices. As with the other access 2005 2008 2009 indicators, the two data sources show different MoE trends. According to the MoE, girls’ enrolment Female NER 82.6 90.5 92.1 lagged behind that of boys over the KESSP Male NER 83.8 94.6 93.6 period, and worsened over time. According to GPI national 0.99 0.96 0.98 GPI Northeastern 0.71 0.62 na household surveys, female school participation rates were consistently higher than those for Household Surveys KIBHS DHS boys and this advantage increased over time. Female NER 80.2 80.0 Consistent with the decision rule of giving Male NER 78.0 77.6 greater weight to survey results, progress GPI national 1.028 1.031 GPI Northeastern 0.700 0.907 achieved in boosting the NER for girls is rated Sources: EMIS Education Statistics 2010, 2005 KIBHS, 2008 DHS Satisfactory. 74. Indicator 4: Primary Completion Rate (PCR). Progress achieved toward the attainment of the PCR target is rated Unsatisfactory. The EMIS is the only source of data for the Primary Completion Rate indicator.26 The KESSP set a target to reach a national average PCR of at least 92 percent in 2010, relative to the 2005 baseline of 80, or a 12 percentage point increase over 2005-2010. According to the MoE, by 2009 the primary completion rate had increased by 3 percentage points over the baseline, or about one-third the increase targeted over that period. PDO Objective 2: Enhance Quality and Learning Achievement 75. Progress achieved toward attainment of enhanced learning achievement is Not Rated due to lack of data. Progress towards this objective was to be measured by a criterion-referenced sample-based National Assessment of Learning Achievement 25 The GPI is computed by dividing the average NER for girls by the average NER for boys. A value of one equals parity; less than one indicates a female disadvantage; and more than one indicates a male disadvantage. 26 The EMIS defines the primary completion rate as “the ratio of the total number of students successfully completing or graduating from Standard 8 in a given year to the total number of children of official graduation age in the population.� 21 (NASLA) comparable to the national assessment conducted in 2005 that formed the baseline. Although a follow-on NASLA was fielded in 2009 following four years of design work (results were published in 2011), the results cannot be used to assess progress in learning achievement against the baseline because the NASLA tested Class 3 students against the learning objectives for that grade, whereas the baseline tested Class 4 students. 76. In the absence of comparable achievement assessments, the Implemention Status and Results Reports (ISRs) reported a measure of the national average Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) exam score as an alternative. The KCPE exam constitutes the sole, nationwide, standardized test for primary students in Kenya. It is administered at the completion of eight years of education. Taking the KCPE is a necessary requirement for completion of primary school, but is not necessarily taken by all pupils enrolled in grade eight. There is self-selection of exam takers due to varying reasons (Bold, Kimenyi, Mwabi and Sandefur, 2010). According to the Kenya National Examinations Council (KNEC), the KCPE exam mean percentage score is calculated as the sum of the scores of all students who took the exam divided by this number of students. The numerator is a standardized score. Although generally there has been a rise in the national mean percentage score since 2008 compared with other years, it is unclear if this is statistically significant since the standard deviation is not known. Over the KESSP period, KCPE results show a mixed picture of decline in English, flat in Math and improvement in Science relative to the baseline. 77. For the purposes of the ICR, the mean KCPE score trend, therefore, cannot be meaningfully interpreted primarily, but not exclusively, because further analysis of the underlying data would be required to assess whether changes in the overall test taking population occurred in order to control for sampling biases. This is especially important in Kenya where analyses of changes in learning achievement using the KCPE exam scores during the early years of FPE showed a substantial change in public and private enrolment and the socio-economic composition of children in the two sectors (Bold et al 2010, Mbiti 2009). An extension of the Bold and Mbiti analyses to more recent years would help provide an interpretation of more recent trends in KCPE results, but that is beyond the scope of the ICR. PDO Objective 3: Provide Opportunities for Further Education and Training 78. Progress towards this objective was to be measured by the Secondary School Transition Rate. This is defined as the percentage of youth who passed the KCPE examination who enrolled in secondary school the following year. The target was an increase in the transition rate from 54 percent in 2005 to 70 percent by 2010. The EMIS, which shows the target having been achieved in 2009, is the only source of data for this indicator. Therefore progress is rated Satisfactory. 22 PDO Objective 4: Strengthen Sector Management 79. It was estimated that assuming a modest average annual growth rate in public revenue, and based on the KESSP targets and projection forward of unit costs at each level of education at the same relative ratio, Table 2. Non-Salary Expenditure assuming high utilization of primary school teachers, primary education 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 would require the maintenance of the Non-Salary Expenditure Per Student (KSh) baseline 55 percent share of total Primary 986 1,054 1,131 861 927 recurrent education expenditure to Secondary 3,310 1,018 6,933 11,799 - finance principally teachers and FPE Total Non-Salary Expenditure (KSh billions) grant expenditure, and would Primary 7,149 7,747 8,529 6,670 7,489 correspondingly require an estimated Secondary 1,019 8,009 14,960 14,810 16,810 15 percent of primary non-salary Sources: Sector PERs, EMIS enrolment. expenditure. 80. Progress in maintaining the targeted levels of expenditure is rated Unsatisfactory not only because the shares declined,27 but more importantly because by 2009, total non- salary expenditure per primary student had fallen well below the requisite FPE grant. Further, within primary education, non-salary expenditure dropped to 11 percent of recurrent expenditure. On average, during 2008/09-2009/10 primary non-salary expenditure was KSh 2 billion less than the amount required. In contrast, non-salary expenditure on secondary education had increased by KSh 12 billion, and per student expenditure quadrupled (Table 2). Intermediate/Output Indicators 81. Intermediate/Output Indicator 1. Pupil: Teacher Ratio rises along with a decline in district disparity. The pupil:teacher ratio was intended to monitor progress towards a more efficient, equitable and effective deployment of primary teachers - efficient to reduce the fiscal salary burden through a rise in the national average pupil: teacher ratio from 43:1 to 45:1, and equitable because it would be achieved in part by reducing the share of districts that fell furthest above and below a set norm. 82. Progress is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. Although the national average target was achieved, district disparities were not reported as part of KESSP monitoring. An analysis of district disparities conducted 2010 concluded that the available data do not clearly point to a reduction in district disparities (Brown 2010). 83. Intermediate Outcome/Output Indicator 2. Student:Textbook Ratios. The objective set in KESSP was that by 2010 all primary school students would have sole use 27 By 2009/10, primary’s share of recurrent education expenditure was 48.7 percent of education recurrent expenditure. 23 of a set of three books -- one each for English, math and science. Progress towards the attainment of this target was to be monitored by the student:textbook sharing ratio. Sharing ratios provided by the MoE’s textbook 3. Percentage unit, and as reported in the project’s ISRs, Table 2005, 2007 and of Students by Textbook sharing Ratio 2009 School Surveys suggests that little progress was achieved 1:1 2:1 3:1 Above No Total 3:1 Book towards the attainment of target with sharing Baseline NASLA 2005- Standard 4 ratios falling only marginally from 3:1 to 2:1 in English 9 25 51 10 6 100 Mathematics 8 21 44 14 13 100 English, and from 4:1 to 3:1 in mathematics Science 9 26 49 10 7 100 over the period 2005-2010. School surveys with Baseline NASLA 2005- Standard 6 English 14 43 29 5 10 100 representative samples conducted in 2007 and Mathematics 14 38 28 8 12 100 2009 also point to little progress achieved, and Science 14 43 28 5 10 100 possibly a deterioration (Table 3). Although the SACMEQ 2007 Std 6 a/ 18 22 59 2.2 100 NASLA 2009 English Std 3 9 28 51 12 0.4 100 classes sampled across the surveys differ, the NASLA 2009 Mathematics Std 3 10 0.8 100 30 50 9 NASLA results show that in 2009 over 60 a/ SACMEQ data pertain to four books. percent of class three students were sharing a Math or English book with at least three other students. Only 10 percent of students had sole use of either and English or a mathematics book. These results combined with the fundamental centrality of the FPE instructional materials grant to the achievement of all the KESSP objectives for primary education, progress achieved is rated Unsatisfactory. 84. Intermediate/Output Indicator 3. Strategies for Further Education and Training. Achievement is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Significant policy development was undertaken. In 2007, the MoE prepared a secondary education strategy. Donor partners appraised and endorsed it. This was followed by the preparation of strategies for TIVET and university education. Although the TIVET and university strategies are still awaiting cabinet or parliamentary approval, they are making their way through the “system� and may be expected to support major reforms in the future. However, the relevance of the strategy for secondary education was soon eclipsed by the introduction of FSE which like FPE eliminated school fees and provided a Government subsidy per student to replace them. FSE was not a not a part of the secondary education strategy that development partners had endorsed. Development partners recommended that the strategy be revised and that a sustainability analysis of the new policy be conducted before donors would contribute to its financing. The revision and analysis have not yet been done. 3.3 Efficiency 85. The absence of recent surveys on employment and household expenditure precludes an analysis of the private and social returns to investments in education.28 Certainly, the financial losses under KESSP both increased the cost of the progress that was achieved and lowered the probability of achieving development outcomes. However, for a cost- effectiveness analysis of the various investment programs, complications are introduced by the difficulty of: (a) matching the KESSP investment program structure to the MoE budget, and (b) deriving an estimate of the full extent of losses by investment program. 28 In 2010, a DFID economic team extensively explored the feasibility of estimating rates of return and found it to be not feasible. 24 86. Nevertheless, to provide some perspective of the impact, as of June 2011, total ineligible expenditures for the Fiscal Years 2007/08 and 2008/09 channeled through the pooled fund mechanism stood at KSh 4.8 billion (US$60.2 million), which represents 12.8 percent of total expenditure by the fund over that time. In 2008, a value for money study estimated that the instructional materials grants disbursed to primary schools over 2005- 2008, barring exceptional circumstances, should have been sufficient to reach the KESSP target of a set of three textbooks for each primary student. In addition to losses to due fraud and corruption documented in the financial audit reports, this study estimated additional losses due to textbook theft at about 10 percent of the book stock in the primary schools. Assuming the same loss rate in 2009, total losses in the primary instructional materials grant program might be roughly estimated at a minimum of 22 percent of total expenditure on that program over this time. 87. From a policy perspective, whether the Free Secondary Education policy was the most cost-effective option to improve equity in access to secondary education is a pertinent question for two reasons. First, although a slightly larger proportion of low-income students were able to attend secondary education, this result might have been achieved with significantly lower expenditure through an expanded and better targeted bursary program. Second, the FSE policy jeopardized the attainment of the objectives for primary education to the extent that: (a) the policy placed fiscal pressure on non-salary expenditure, and (b) expenditure on FPE fell below the entitlement amount. 88. The value for money study on infrastructure which was an external review found that overall, most respondents at national, district and school levels held the view that: (a) the selection process for KESSP schools was very fair because it was informed by actual visits to schools and determination of the nature and level of needs of individual schools in a participatory process that involved school committees and district teams; (b) the selection of program schools was also deemed equitable because the distribution of the funded schools was concentrated in the low resourced communities in the districts. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 89. The overall outcome rating is Unsatisfactory based on an all-round assessment of relevance, achievement and efficiency. The table below provides the individual ratings. Achievement Relevance of PDOs Efficiency 1. Equity in Access to Basic Education High MU U 2. Enhance Quality and Learning Achievement High NR NR 3. Provide Opportunities for Further Education and Training Medium S U 4. Strengthen Sector Management High U MU Notes: S Satisfactory; MU Moderately Unsatisfactory; U Unsatisfactory; NR Not Rated 90. Component objectives were mostly of high to medium relevance to development needs, and some progress was made towards achieving targets for gender parity, reducing net enrolment disparities in Northeastern province, and increasing the transition rate from 25 primary to lower secondary school. However, achievement of project development objectives was largely not met for the following key areas: overall net enrolment rate, primary completion rate, primary education share of the MoE recurrent budget, primary non-salary expenditure, and textbook/pupil sharing. Another major area of the quality focus was student learning achievement, but this objective could not be rated due to lack of comparable data. 91. Based on the earlier discussion, the efficiency with which resources were employed is rated “Unsatisfactory� across the three areas that account for over 90 percent of audited expenditure for fiscal years 2007/08 and 2008/09, namely: (i) primary instructional materials grants (30 percent), (ii) primary school infrastructure (16 percent), and (iii) secondary education (45 percent), due to significant efficiency losses resulting from fraud, corruption and weak management oversight. Strengthening sector management is rated “Moderately Unsatisfactory� based on the following considerations. The MoE exerted considerable effort to manage the primary teacher salary budget (by allowing the student:teacher ratio to rise) and to pursue solutions to resolve inequities in teacher distribution (e.g. hiring contract teachers), measures which were strongly opposed by the teacher’s union. However, efficiency within the capacity building program was unsatisfactory due to considerable loss of funds and the continued need for a more comprehensive capacity development program. Finally, from an equity perspective, the allocative efficiency of resource distribution between primary and secondary education fell. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development As noted above, satisfactory progress was made towards gender equity. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Not applicable. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and Stakeholder Workshop See Annex 6 and Annex 7 for findings. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome. Rating: High 92. At appraisal, Bank staff identified seven main risks to progress towards the Development Objectives, two of which were assessed to have a high probability of occurrence and pose significant risks - limited technical capacity for financial management and procurement, and corruption and misuse of funds. Detailed analyses of the risks were conducted, and a comprehensive package of risk mitigation measures was adopted. 93. Two areas where the risks were difficult to foresee were those generated by: (a) lack of implementation of social accountability and transparency measures which were 26 intended to provide ongoing feedback on the effectiveness of FPE processes and impact even if financial audit capacities were weak, and (b) a significant increase in GoK financing and scaling-up of secondary and tertiary education expenditure which elevated governance risks. 94. An area where the risk was underestimated was that posed by insufficient impact of capacity building on the quality of the data systems that were relied upon to monitor progress towards development outcomes. Robust and timely data were particularly important for the KESSP given that the annual allocations to the KESSP and across the investment programs were based on outcome and implementation progress. 95. Risk to Continuing Operation. KESSP was designed for a period of five years which came to an end in 2010. Many of the key KESSP programs are likely to continue over the medium term. Specifically, barring a financial crisis, the FPE and FSE school grants programs are likely to continue because they have political support, are anchored in GoK’s national development plans, and have consistently been backed up with public resources. School feeding, early childhood development, and programs for vulnerable children and in arid and semi-arid lands areas are continuing with support of World Food Program (WFP), UNICEF and USAID. And there is little reason why, from the perspectives of financial burden or human resource capacity, the NASLA and further data analysis could not continue. 96. However, based on the results to date, there are significant risks to: (a) the achievement of the MDG of full enrolment and the completion of primary school by all school-aged children, and (b) higher achievement due to lack of sole use of instructional materials. The main problem is not resources, and evidence from earlier years suggests that when well implemented the FPE strategy can produce value for money. The greatest risks lie in continued corruption, inadequate oversight and accountability systems, and the implementation of costly policies for short-term political gain. 97. The continued operation of a SWAp is difficult to assess because it is influenced by countervailing factors. On the country side, several factors facilitate the continuation of the approach. First, experience has been built in the MoE and MoHEST for strategy development and sector program management, and sound sector strategies exist in many cases. Second, the benefits of donor coordination in terms of lower transaction costs are widely acknowledged. Third, sustained use of MTEFs and expenditure reviews by GoK will continue to provide a sector-wide financial framework as per the national budget. On the development partner side, the Education Donor Coordination Group (EDCG) continues to function, however, in the absence of strong leadership of the program by the MoE/MoHEST and also unless there is strong attention given to fiduciary issues over an extended period of time, the development partners may be reluctant to engage again in the same manner, at least until the final results of the audits are available and certain conditions are met. For example, DFID has recently decided to channel its aid to NGOs rather than through the GoK. 27 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory 98. The preparation of KESSP was led by Government and supported by all development partners, with IDA playing a key supporting role in ensuring the quality of the work through the provision of financing and technical support for studies, consultations and policy dialogue, and extensive training of MoE staff. IDA brought in appropriate technical expertise as needed across a variety of areas to assess the program (e.g. financial, modeling, policy and strategy development). It would have been helpful to have looked more closely at the realism of the set targets. 99. IDA staff analyzed the risks and supported the Government to develop comprehensive mitigation plans. In particular, the project design contained a detailed risk assessment and a comprehensive governance action plan, based on background reviews and studies. Around the launch of KESSP, various audits and analyses were conducted by contributors to the pooled fund to assess the risks of the sector and the KESSP, and to identify mitigation measures. There was a consensus then that considerable achievements had already been made in strengthening accountability in the sector, especially in the primary education sub-sector, but it was also recognized that the sector still faced serious governance and corruption risks. Important documentation and training measures were therefore taken to continue to build fiduciary capacity in 2006, prior to project implementation. Governance concerns continued to be prominent as the IDA support to the KESSP was put in place, with four effectiveness conditions all relating to fiduciary issues. Notably, the declaration of project effectiveness was postponed, as the principle was rightly maintained that project activities could not be allowed to commence until the fiduciary strengthening conditions had been met. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 100. IDA supervision can be divided into three types: (a) technical/sectoral, (b) coordination and (c) fiduciary. Technical supervision was carried out in two ways - through day-to-day implementation support and through joint development partner- Government activities, which were exercised through semi-annual joint reviews29. These 29 On specific policy and operational matters, there were several areas where the Bank and other development partners expressed repeated concerns that could pose a threat to development and intermediate outcomes. These included: (a) the large number of out-of-school “missing children� not being reached by the program, (b) the weaknesses of teacher management policies and practices to achieve greater equity across districts and schools; (c) the need for a strategic and prioritized capacity building plan to support the implementation and continued operation of the programs; (d) weak M&E and incomplete or unreliable data; and (e) the need for greater communication and transparency, particularly through participation of a wider range of stakeholders, as well as public disclosure of sector data and KESSP reports. The actions that development partners took to 28 included randomized school site visits. IDA contributed significantly to the technical policy dialogue and provided quality technical assistance for the MoE in its development of sub- sector strategies. An amendment of the targets during the project was needed, but was not undertaken for reasons noted earlier. 101. The IDA team was regarded as a reliable partner in enhancing donor coordination through active participation in Education Development Coordination Group (EDCG) meetings, in engaging in a pooled funding arrangement and in being the lead agency for the JFA partners. In particular, although consultation and lines of communication may not always have been optimal, the JFA partnership worked with a high level of collegiality, and the Bank generally made significant efforts to respect the terms of the JFA and consult partners especially on fiduciary issues arising. 102. From the fiduciary perspective, IDA had supervision responsibilities for managing: (a) the fiduciary aspects of the IDA Credit; (b) the FTI resources provided to the GoK, on behalf of the contributing development partners; and (c) the resources put through the pooled fund, as the lead agency for the JFA. The IDA team executed its coordinating responsibilities, took actions to strengthen the GoK fiduciary processes and capacity, and investigated suspicions and evidence of poor governance, fraud and corruption. In particular, the strategy adopted by IDA to support the strengthening of GoK auditing capacity was appropriate for the context. Regarding the corruption found: (a) the task team did not release any funds at the start of FY10 even prior to the completion of the in-depth review, due to concerns about governance; (b) the steps taken by IDA to undercover the fraud were sustained, despite the difficulties and pressures encountered; (c) considerable efforts were made to support those in Government who were responsible for the investigatory work in order to strengthen country systems, to support the implementation of the Government’s GAC plan, and to help build the capacity of Government systems.30 These extensive measures put substantial strain on IDA, as its financial management capacity for such work in Kenya did not grow along with its country commitments, which rose from US$500 million in 2007 to US$ 1.7 billion in 2009. Nevertheless, the required auditing work was carried out with the support also of other development partners and the leveraging of the Government’s own work. 103. Since pre-effectiveness of the IDA and the programmatic FTI support, the task team was acutely aware of the potential for governance challenges in the Project. Hence the team’s emphasis on the conditions for effectiveness which were: (a) conversion to an Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) of the operation of the general ledger module within the MoE in a manner satisfactory to the Association; (b) recruitment of an Independent Procurement Monitoring Agent (PMA) under terms of address these weaknesses included supporting specific studies (e.g., non-formal schools, school mapping, and textbook value for money audit), and technical assistance and training. 29 reference satisfactory to the Association; (c) recruitment, within the procurement unit of the MoE, of two additional procurement staff under terms of reference satisfactory to the Association; and (d) finalization and adoption of the Procurement Manuals in accordance with the Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005, and its implementing regulations, in a manner satisfactory to IDA, and subsequently their adoption. The IDA team also emphasized and monitored the implementation conditions. 104. One major reporting issue relates to the inadequate EMIS, and particularly the enrolment data. While the poor quality of the data was noted throughout the implementation of the KESSP, and while several attempts were made to improve the EMIS, the reality is that little progress was made. This may be partly attributable to several factors: (a) the large number of investment programs and corresponding indicators to be monitored; (b) insufficient time given to study the various EMIS-related reports during the annual reviews; and (c) the nature of the JRES reporting process with a “joint aide- memoire� issued by MoE and characterized by multiple lists of recommendations with little prioritization. In addition to the EMIS data being produced two year late, there was a lack of alternative sources of data on key outcome and intermediate indicators until 2009- 2010. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 105. The World Bank established and maintained good working relationships and open dialogue with the MoE and with other development partners throughout KESSP preparation and implementation. It brought in appropriate technical expertise as needed in areas where it had a comparative advantage. IDA proactively identified fiduciary threats and took appropriate steps to address them. However little progress was made in the improvement of EMIS data. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 106. GoK displayed strong ownership of and commitment to the development objectives, particularly UPE and later FSE, through its national development strategies, MTEF and budgetary allocations31. The fraud and corruption found in KESSP emanated directly from the strengthening of GoK’s own audit capacity, and the Kenyan authorities took appropriate follow-up action, including for example, undertaking a forensic audit, referring cases to KACC, and adopting new regulations for the management of imprests. Despite 31 Here the “Government� is defined as primarily the Ministry of Finance and only relevant ministries involved in the KESSP, excluding the MoE and the MoHEST (as they were the implementing agencies and therefore rated separately). 30 this, Government’s performance with the overall fraud and corruption issues remained problematic. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory 107. The MoE displayed strong ownership and exercised leadership throughout the KESSP preparation, and in preparing progress reports and managing the semi-annual joint reviews. And as noted in section 2.3, KESSP and its processes registered some achievements that are highly likely to continue. But the MoE’s performance was highly unsatisfactory with respect to its fiduciary responsibilities and with its compliance in the implementation of key components of the governance and accountability action plan that were intended to provide a measure of checks and balance, including social accountability and transparency measures and institutional structures to broaden stakeholder participation. Negligence in these matters placed the entire KESSP program at risk of not achieving its development objectives. The MoE was also slow to take any action to remedy the weaknesses. It was largely uncooperative with auditors, and took far too long to validate audit reports, thus delaying the start of further investigations for many months, and raising the risk of evidence tampering. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory Government displayed strong ownership and commitment to the development objectives. However, the MoE’s performance was highly unsatisfactory with respect to its fiduciary responsibilities and compliance with the governance and accountability action plan. Performance with the overall fraud and corruption issues remained problematic. 6. Lessons Learned 108. Developing systems requires taking informed risks. At the start, there did not appear to be significant threats to the development outcomes, from the perspective of policy or strategy. Indicators were moving in the right direction, as reported by the MoE, and the main programs were therefore believed to be having the intended impacts. But the  KESSP was an emerging program which would be scaled-up based on results and newly developed strategies. It was also being implemented within an environment that evolved in unexpected ways, due to economic and political circumstances, institutional weaknesses and staff movements. In this, the education sector was not alone, as the World Bank 2010- 2013 Kenya Country Partnership Strategy notes that “experience shows that the economic, social and political circumstances of Kenya may change unexpectedly.� Many lessons can be drawn from the KESSP experience. Below, the focus is primarily on lessons relating to the achievements and the most predominant weaknesses and challenges of the KESSP as a SWAp attempting to use Government systems in a country environment where governance risks are high. The lessons learned also align with the priority themes of the World Bank Country Partnership Strategy. 31 109. In order to ensure value for money and control corruption risks the focus needs to be on strengthening Government systems, and particularly on risk based approaches in financial management, procurement and auditing systems. In the case of the KESSP, the strengthening of KENAO and IAD were key ingredients to uncovering the fraud and corruption that occurred. In the absence of these improvements, it is unlikely that the fraud and corruption would have been discovered at that time, given the lack of robust data on implementation and outcomes, and the inadequate implementation of social accountability and transparency measures. In particular, since school audits were deemed by the MoE to be too costly to carry out everywhere, consideration should be given to adopting elements of the risk-based approach introduced by IAD to determine if they might be useful for the development of such an approach to school auditing. In addition, it is notable that the KESSP was scaled up significantly (particularly with FDSE) without clear procedures and adequate institutional capacity, and this contributed significantly to KESSP’s downfall. Another lesson is that, when programs are about to be scaled-up, it may be useful to re- evaluate institutional capacity quickly and immediately for fiduciary, collateral and implementation risks.   110. SWAps must include a strong focus on governance and accountability. This can be achieved by including measures relating to social accountability, transparency, societal participation and a well-functioning whistle-blowing policy and procedures, particularly to ensure sufficient financing for them during implementation. While it is impossible to determine how KESSP might have evolved if all of the planned governance strengthening measures had been implemented, it is clear that the slow pace of implementation raised program risks substantially. Implementation of the KESSP governance and accountability action plan may have been facilitated by focusing on a smaller number of strategic actions, given limited Government capacity to undertake them. It is possible that the extensive number of actions in the governance and accountability action plan were due to the review processes among development partners, between development partners and the MoE, and within the World Bank which placed pressure to build consensus, and incorporate “suggestions� and requirements for additional measures, without due recognition of implementation capacity. This pertains notably to the social accountability measures. 111. Greater reliance should be given to civil society organizations in monitoring progress in the sector and in implementing accountability measures (including through school report cards, expenditure tracking and sample studies of specific programs, etc.), with careful monitoring of the selection process if the services are procured by the MoE. There are many NGOs, CBOs and research institutions in Kenya with good technical expertise that could be utilized, as demonstrated during the earlier years of KESSP, and they could help to enlarge the capacity needed to undertake such work. In particular, more impact might have been achieved from civil society involvement if they had participated more in monitoring program achievements. 112. The appraisal of country sector plans should be strengthened to ensure the inclusion of appropriate results measurement indicators and to set realistic targets. Bank projects supporting SWAps could then use the same indicators and targets to measure project results. The EFA-FTI is revisiting its guidelines to strengthen the appraisal process. 32 113. Credible, robust and independent information and data should guide the design, implementation, and financing of a SWAp. In the case of the KESSP, JFA partners took a flexible, or what development partners considered a pragmatic approach, to the allocation of donor financing that aimed to link resource allocations to credible strategies and implementation results on an annual basis. However, a near exclusive reliance on MoE information systems which were weak and uncoordinated made it difficult to generate robust indicators necessary for planning and supporting effectiveness and efficiency in resource targeting and utilization. While continued and more coordinated efforts need to be made to understand the lack of progress in this domain and to strengthen the credibility of the MoE’s data systems and indicators, the risk of making decisions based on questionable data may be reduced by: (i) ensuring at the outset that there is an effectively functioning EMIS that is capable of providing reliable data on the basic key indicators identified; (ii) using periodic independent school sample surveys for school-level indicators to test the credibility or margin of error of EMIS/MoE indicators and gather data for those for which the EMIS is not suitable (e.g., textbook sharing ratios); (iii) exploiting the results of household surveys for national and sub-national indicators to capture the experience of the entire population not only of the children attending school (notably net and gross enrolment ratios), and to explore specific policy-relevant issues on aspects that EMIS systems are not designed to capture reliably (e.g. distance/time to school, private expenditure on education, grade repetition, etc.); (iv) developing incentives (and sanctions) for schools and the MoE to report accurately; and (v) undertaking more independent analytical work particularly in expenditure analysis and exploiting MoE and survey data. 114. Putting in place a series of impact evaluations during Program implementing can help to progressively develop informed policy decisions about scaling up specific interventions as was done in the case of the KESSP. This was particularly relevant to the school health interventions, to put in place the cost-effective measures such as deworming. 115. It is important to match up the program structure with the budget structure and to be able to monitor total expenditures on priority programs. The structure, financing mechanism and financial reporting of the KESSP made it extremely difficult to obtain clarity on actual total expenditures on the KESSP programs, particularly FPE and FSE per student grants, which captured the largest share of “KESSP� financing. The experience illustrates the importance of matching the program structure with the budget structure, and classifying budgetary resources and expenditures consistently across the sources of financing. 116. Building systems leading to substantive policy development and strengthening country systems (financial management and procurement) requires concerted collaboration and predictable financing. In the case of the KESSP implementation, the development partners exercised a positive role in supporting the KESSP review processes, engaging in substantive policy dialogue and strengthening MoE financial management and procurement systems. Less clear is the importance and predictability of the development partners’ financial contributions to the program. Although the financial resources provided by the development partners are only a small share of total public expenditure, they represent a large share of development expenditure in education. However, a large share of donor 33 resources also financed some recurrent expenditures (e.g. the FPE grant) for which resource predictability was extremely critical, but the donor resources channeled through the pooled fund were not always predictable (which led the MoE to rely increasingly on budgetary resources for these programs). The experience suggests that: (i) when the amount of donor financing is a small share of total expenditure, the relevance of donors in the sector will depend increasingly on the strength and credibility of their technical support, and their ability to engage in technical and policy-dialogue and to connect to local networks of researchers and relevant organizations agencies; and (ii) when donors wish to finance recurrent expenditure, such as FPE grants, using country systems, there is little obvious advantage in doing so through a pooled fund that finances the development budget. Also with respect to development partner collaboration, the management of the JFA was a weighty responsibility with associated costs. The partnership may have been more effective with greater clarity and specificity in the roles and responsibilities of each partner in the policy dialogue and program supervision, as well as in sharing the cost of supervision responsibilities. 117. Finally, working in a sector-wide approach that aims to utilize country systems requires strong, sustained and effective collaboration across the World Bank country team, particularly: (i) with the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management department of the World Bank on expenditure reviews, the design of household surveys, analyzing survey data, and strengthening public financial management systems; and (ii) with the financial management team on mitigating fiduciary risks. Given the governance issues in the country and sector, it might prove useful to have: (i) a Bank team in the country comprising staff of appropriate skills, dedicated to supporting the design and supervision of measures to strengthen accountability, particularly social accountability, and transparency; and (ii) reliable and sustained support from seasoned staff and commensurate resources to address governance and fiduciary issues. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies – The Borrower provided its own ICR, including a summary which is found in Annex 8. Comments from other development partners regarding KESSP are also recorded in Annex 8. The Borrower confirmed that it had studied this ICR report and found it acceptable. No further issues were raised by other partners. (b) Cofinanciers - The full text is in Annex 9. (c) Other partners and stakeholders - The full text in Annex 9. 34 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Percentage Appraisal Estimate Components Estimate of (USD millions) (USD millions) Appraisal Ensuring equity in access to basic education * 154.00 170.81 111 Enhancing quality and learning achievement 735.00 453.87 62 Providing opportunities for further education 389.00 647.35 166 and training Strengthening education sector management * 76.30 45.25 110 Total Baseline Cost 1,354.30 1,317.17 97 Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 1,354.30 1,317.17 97 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 Total Financing Required 1,354.30 1,317.17 97 (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage Type of Source of Funds Estimate Estimate of Cofinancing (USDmillions) (USD millions) Appraisal Borrower Pooled 616.00 410.86 66.7 International Development Association Pooled 80.00 56.65 (IDA) 70.8 Other Multilateral & Bilateral Agencies Pooled 388.00 236.36 75.0 Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund Pooled 73.00 121.00 165.8 Financing Gap 197.30 529.43 193.5 Total Financing 1,354.30 1,354.30 (c) Financing Plan (US$ m) at Appraisal Source Local Foreign Total Borrower/Recipient 92 524 616 International Development Association 12 68 80 Other Multilateral & Bilateral Agencies 58 330 388 Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund 11 62 73 Financing Gap 30 167 19732 Total 203 1,151 1,354.30 32 In the table above, the Financing Gap is different from that figuring in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) (US$277). The proposed estimated amount (US$197) results from a proposed correction of the amount considered in the PAD, which seems to have been overestimated. 35 Annex 2: Outcomes by Component Table 2(a): KESSP Investment Programs Mapped to Goal Areas and PDOs Estimated Cost PDO Indicator KESSP Investment Programs (US$ millions) Equity in access to Basic Education 154.0 Primary Net Enrolment Ratio School infrastructure 88.0 Provincial NER distance from national Non-formal education average 26.0 Gender Parity Index Special needs education 20.0 Primary Completion Rate by gender and Province Adult education 17.0 Education in arid and semi-arid lands 2.0 Gender and education 1.0 Enhance Quality and Learning Achievement 735.0 FPE Instructional materials 475.0 Early Childhood Development 32.0 Increased Achievement Scores School feeding, health and nutrition 121.0 Pre-service primary teacher education 18.0 In-service primary teacher education 37.0 Quality assurance and standards 27.0 Secondary INSET for math and science 20.0 ICT for promoting learning 5.0 Opportunities for Further Education and Training 389.0 Transition rate from primary Secondary education 168.0 Guidance and counseling 6.0 TIVET 45.0 University education 170.0 Strengthen Sector Management 76.3 Primary recurrent spending as a % of education recurrent spending HIV/AIDS 56.0 Primary non-salary expenditure as % of primary recurrent spending Capacity building 11.0 Education management information system 7.0 Monitoring and evaluation 2.0 Teacher management 0.3 TOTAL 1,354.3 Note: There is a discrepancy between this table and that on page 123 of the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), Annex 7 Project Costs, due to an error in the latter one. The total amount for the Gender and Education Program is misrepresented in the PAD annex table. This amount appears as US$6.4 million, but it is US$1.0 million, as also indicated in the main text of the PAD, Section 4 Program Components, paragraph 33, page 18. 36 Program Components, Subprograms, Outputs, Outcomes and Impact Table 2(b) provides some further information of the progress of the component activities against the original project targets. The table is completed to the level of available data. 37 Table 2(b): Program Progress by Component33 Component/ Program Activities Target Output/ Responsibility Achievement/ Outcomes/Impact Subprogram/ Objective Beneficiary Actual Output Outcomes Impact I. Ensure equity of Identification of location on the NER (primary level): close MoE, Directorate of NER (primary level): Reducing disparities in The EMIS data shows access to basic basis of a comprehensive to 100% (at least 96%) by Basic Education; 92.9% in 2009 education opportunity due NER combining public education analysis of the 2004 school 2010 EMIS Unit of (MoE); 77.2% (Census) to wealth, geographical and private schools. (US$154 mil) mapping data (overcrowding, Planning PCR: 83.0% in 2009 location and gender by Triangulation of the data greatest demand, longest PCR: at least 92% by 2010 Department of the (Boys: 88.0% and Girls: creating an opportunity for with survey data (KIHBS distance), and other interim MoE 78.0%) all children (including & 2009 Census data) intervention criteria as NER and PCR in lagging those of the poorest shows that NER in public applicable. provinces raised closer to N.E. NER: 32.0% families and those living in schools has remained national average (MoE); 53.4% remote areas) to attend a more or less constant North Eastern: (Census)in 20009 school of acceptable over time. NER: 40% in 2010 quality. It is impossible thus, that MVC: 384,000 the NER increase is may Most Vulnerable Children Reduction in out-of-school be due to more children (MVC): 728,000 GER: 104% on 2009 children during the KESSP attending private schools. Enrolments: 8.9 milin Phase I period. PCR increased over time, 2009 however only slightly Reported out-of-school: over 25% of the proposed 1.2 mil (2005) down to increase for the period. 0.6 mil (2010) 33 As mentioned in paragraph 5 of Annex 3 in this document, the analysis in the ICR made use of data estimates for 2009. In this table, an attempt was made to provide some figures for 2010, which were received during the joint review in April 2011 i.e. after the main data collection process for this ICR. It is completed to the level of available data. 38 (i) Primary school (a) Rehabilitating dilapidated Ratio of pupils to permanent MoE, Basic Ratio of pupils to Improving equitable access The beneficiary infrastructure schools and construction of classrooms in public Education permanent classrooms to primary education. assessment findings subprogram additional facilities in existing primary schools decreases Directorate and in public primary indicate that parents have (US$88.0mil) schools in poorest areas. significantly from 50:1 to Primary schools decreased on confirmed that access to 40:1. Infrastructure Unit average nationally to schooling has increased, To improve access 46:1 (2009) and that children are (b) Constructing new primary Target number of new Number of new attending school more schools in areas where there was classrooms in 2010: 4,000. classrooms by 2010: regularly.. overcrowding in existing schools Target number of Phase I: 1,940; and and/or where there were no rehabilitated classrooms in Phase II: 1,873 in primary schools based on 2010: 8,000. selected schools. priority needs across the Number of classrooms country. rehabilitated in Phase I: 4,000; and Phase II: 3,537. (ii) Non-formal schools (a) Developing a curriculum on Enrolment in non-formal MoE, Basic Enrolments in 2010: Supporting non-formal EMIS data shows that (US$26.0 mil) non-formal education. schools. Education 173,500. schools towards providing enrolments in non-formal Baseline in 2007: 99,979. Directorate improved education for schools have increased. To strengthen the (b) Providing grants for Target number in 2010: children in slums. Further, instructional capacity of non- instructional materials to non- 300,000. The rehabilitation and materials support has formal schools formal Schools (NFSs) and non- construction of assisted children to formal education centers infrastructure has been a sustain school attendance. (NFECs), and rehabilitation or major challenge especially construction of infrastructure. in the slums. Registration of non-formal schools has (c) Introducing non-formal been a longstanding issue. education management Mainstreaming non-formal information systems. schools and centers has been difficult to achieve. (d) Building management Challenges remain with capacity. respect to improving the quality of non-formal (e) Mainstreaming and education. coordinating non-formal schools and centers. 39 (iii) Special needs (a) Conducting a national survey Special needs education MoE, Basic Terms of reference No survey was undertaken The status of special education on special needs education survey completed. Education developed, but no due to the interruption of needs education (US$20 mil) Directorate survey undertaken. KESSP JFA support continues to be (b) Providing equipment and the following the audit issues. unmeasured. However, To improve special relevant instructional materials Equipment and relevant enrolments have needs education instructional materials improved. (c) Training teachers provided. (d) Providing grants for special Pre-service and inservice needs education teacher training completed (e) Promoting advocacy and Improvement in enrolments: Improvements in awareness creation 200,000 enrolments: 243,324 (f) Financing operating costs. (iv) Adult basic (a) Establishing a program on Female Iliteracy reduced by MoE, Basic 126,324 learners of Improved learning While the long term education quality assurance and 50% (3.9 million); Education which 53,965 male; opportunities for adult impact in this (US$17.0 mil) accreditation. Directorate; 61.5% functional learners. subprogram needs to be Women learners increase by Ministry of Gender literacy. assessed, Free Primary To improve the (b) Establishing a program on 10% /year; Program progress has Education which is open quality of basic partnership for collaborative UNESCO-financed slowed considerably due to to all regardless of age education program support. 50% of the learners to Adult Literacy Test was financial reporting issues. could address some of the acquire basic literacy and completed and the adult literacy issues. (c) Establishing a program for numeracy. recommendations are monitoring and evaluation of the under implementation. subprogram. (v) Gender and (a) Preparing a Gender and Gender and Education MoE, Basic Gender and Education Significant emphasis on The gender sensitive education Education Policy. Policy document. Education Policy successfully gender related breakdown approach to policy investment program Directorate and prepared. of data and gender development in the (US$1.0mil) (b) Increasing enrolment and Gender Parity Index (GPI) Gender and sensitive policies in the education sector has retention of girls in schools (and at 1 by 2010. Education GPI at 0.98. education sector. contributed to improving To ensure that boys where applicable), girls’ Subprogram team. the IDA CPIA gender aspects participation and performance in benchmark for Kenya. received attention education. through the KESSP implementation (c) Water and environmental sanitation in schools. (vi) Expanding basic Developing a Nomadic 900 mobile schools by 2010; MoE, Directorate of 4,437 mobile schools The provision of additional While enrolments have education Education Policy and School meals program for Basic Education established; support to low cost increased the quality of opportunities in Establishing mobile schools beneficiaries in 63 districts. and Quality 392 low-cost boarding boarding schools in Arid low-cost boarding Arid and Semi-Arid Assurance and schools with an and Semi-Arid Lands schools requires specific Lands (ASALs) Standards enrolment of 110,490; (ASALs) has been attention. Greater (US$2.0 mil) Department School meals (refer enhanced resulting in more support is necessary to School Health children enrolling in promote a cleaner Investment Program). schools. environment for the children in school. 40 II. Enhance quality Ensuring that a set of essential Improved scores by 2010. MoE, Directorate of KCPE mean scores in In the absence of With greater numbers of and learning inputs is available to every child, Quality and end-2010 academic achievement data, the children enrolling in achievement that these inputs are effectively Progress to be measured by Standards, and year. KNEC standardized tests primary school from less (US$7345.0 mil) utilized, that learning is the the NASLA, comparable to were used for reporting. well-off families due to central focus in the classroom, a baseline. KNEC After four years of But these too are not targeted grants reaching that learning progress is design work, a follow- comparable with the at least many, if not all of regularly measured, and that the on NASLA was fielded baseline NASLA baseline. them, student learning quality of schooling is in 2009 to Class 4 It is also unclear what the achievement levels are effectively monitored and students, while the indicators represent. being more or less supported. Also included in this baseline was for Class 3 maintained. The 2008 category are teacher students, and the results SACMEQ results show development, and School Health were published in 2011. that Kenya was managing and Nutrition (SHN) The assessment was not to maintain learning interventions to enhance comparable with the achievements over time. children’s readiness for learning. baseline either in grades tested or in testing/ scoring design. (i) Early childhood and (a) Developing national policy Baseline in 2005: MoE, Basic 2010 The growing attention In keeping with the development (ECD) guidelines and service standards GER Boys 59.6 Education GER Boys 61.6 since 2009/10 to the ECD KESSP development (US$32.0 mil) on early childhood development. GER Girls 56.2 Directorate GER Girls 58.7 sub-sector is resulting in strategy, the ECD sub- GER Total 57.9 GER Total 60.2 more focused financing sector began receiving To enhance the (b) Reviewing and updating the Target in 2010: and human resources attention and financing quality of ECD curriculum on ECD. GER Total: 60% development support to the only towards 2009/10. sub-sector. It is still too Prior to this the emphasis (c) Mobilizing and building the early to measure the was on accelerating capacity of communities on outcomes. Early outcomes access to and improving ECD through awareness indicate that GER is the quality of primary and creation. increasing. secondary education, and to putting in place the (d) Providing community TIVET and University support grants to promote early sub-sector strategies. The childhood access, health, ECD area is now nutrition, and primary school receiving increased readiness. attention. (ii) School health, (a) Promoting health, education School meals program MoE, Basic -School health policy Systematic collaboration A virtuous cycle of nutrition and meals and parasite prevention. outreach enhanced. Education and strategy developed between the education and impact evaluations have (US$121.0 mil) Directorate, School for the first time. health sectors on school informed policy, strategy, (b) Building capacity on school health, nutrition and - 3.6 million children health issues especially implementation, and To enhance the health and meals program. meals directorate. dewormed (2009) deworming, HIV/AIDS practice. school meals reducing school life skills, immunization, program absenteeism by 25% education regarding the use - 22,000 primary of bednets and malaria schools received grants control, hand-washing for for lifeskills training. disease prevention. 41 (iii) Primary school (a) Providing instructional Pupil/textbook ratio in MoE, Basic Avg Lower primary: Improving school Teachers are able to instructional materials. public primary schools— Education English: 2:1 attendance and learning reinforce learning with materials one textbook per subject Directorate, and Math: 3:1 achievements the materials and through (US$475 mil)* (b) Providing funds for general (English, math and science) Textbook Science: 3:1 regular homework.. purposes. per child by 2010—1:1 Management Unit Upper primary: Preparing and distributing However, learners were Textbook evaluation (clear (TMU) English: 2:1 the Orange books to enable dissatisfied with the (c) Reprinting instructional tools and processes): 6 titles Math: 2:1 schools to procure the titles levels of teaching materials. per subject. Science: 2:1 the School Textbook materials, the quality of In some schools 1:1 Management Committees learning environments (d) Providing stationery and target has been achieved vote to be most and the low support they equipment. in the subjects in 2009. appropriate. got from their parents. Reversal of trend observed in 2010 2010 Textbooks Orange Book with titles for each subject area. (iv) In-service Primary (a) Extending the successful 60,000 KRTs MoE Basic 83,000 KRTs Reinforcement of the Anticipated Teacher Education School-based Teacher Education in 2009 services and efforts of the improvements in (INSET) Development Program (SbTD) 18,000 HTs Directorate, INSET 18,000 HTs SbTD, SPRED 2, and SEP classroom instruction not (US$37.0 mil) which was one component of the Unit in 2009 resulting in all primary commensurate with the MOEST Strengthening Primary school teachers receiving capacity building efforts. Education (SPRED 2) Project II, MoE Quality some form of in-service This is partly due to the support by DFID, to include the Assurance & training during the KESSP growing student training of an additional 36,000 Standards Unit Phase I period (2005- enrolments, but also the Key Resource Teachers (KRTs) 2010). absence of a concerted (18,500 for Kiswahili and policy regarding the 18,500 for Guidance and deployment of teachers Counseling teachers—one in across the country every school in the country). although teacher rebalancing was attempted in the early (b) Continuing the second years of Program national program of school- implementation. based development called the School Empowerment Program (SEP). Note: * Primary school instructional materials. The subprogram objective was to provide all public primary schools and non-formal schools with instructional materials in order to increase access and address quality. This was to be achieved through the logical development of a continuous and well tested set of reforms in textbook financing through a basic decentralized instructional materials system on which the IDA Free Primary Education Support Project procurement system was based, and one which was pioneered by a pilot project supported by the Dutch Government and launched in Laikipia and Machakos Districts in 1996. From 1999 until 2006 the pilot project initiatives were further developed by the Government/ DFID SPRED 3 project, which extended the same basic principles to every district in Kenya. These were successful, established programs for the provision of textbooks and other materials at primary level through the school level SIMBA account. There was evidence from various studies that there were positive impacts of the materials support, especially, improvements in student retention and attendance, improved performance in school, and easing the teaching challenge for teachers who were able to convey skills and knowledge more quickly, and enabling them to give homework assignments. 42 Component/ Program Activities Target Output/ Responsibilit Achievement/ Outcomes/Impact Subprogram/ Objective Beneficiary y Actual Output Outcomes Impact (v) Pre-service teacher (a) Establishing a Local Improved teaching skills of MoE Basic Access to in-service Increased financing to Local The anticipated medium term education Resource Center and equipping graduates of teacher training Education teacher education has Resource Centers has impact is improved classroom (US$18.30mil) it with the relevant materials and institutes. Directorate improved. resulted in the availability of instruction, and the equipment. improved materials. availability of better trained To strengthen Improved quality of Teacher Bursaries for needy and teachers at primary education primary teacher (b) Providing funds in the form instruction in PTTC. Training marginalized students Improved access to TTIs for level. However, training of bursaries to needy students. Institutes provided. needy and marginalized improvements in the actual (TTIs) students. classroom instruction will (c) Providing transport to depend on the increased primary teacher training college. recruitment of trained teachers by the Teacher (d) Monitoring of pre-service Services Commission, and the teacher program. appropriate deployment of teachers. (vi) Quality assurance (a) Establishing a national A national assessment MoE, National assessment Progress was relatively The arrival of the fibre optic and standards assessment system. system. Directorate of policy was prepared in unsatisfactory. There is no cable and its use is to be (US$27 mil) Quality 2009, and 10,054 evidence that the average explored by KIE for the (b) Harmonizing training in Quality assurance Assurance, schools assessed. achievement level of dissemination of the national To ensure quality of learning achievement studies. assessments of 10,560 KIE, and primary pupils improved curriculum through education with institutions. KNEC SACMEQ III 2007 data during the KESSP period. alternative approaches standards (c) Setting up an examination analyzed in 2010/11. The 2009 NASLA did not item banking system. Improved KCPE average test the same baseline grade, score by 2% (250.5) MLA average and so no comparison is (d) Monitoring student score=300: Standard 3 possible. The only achievement. Increased number of (2008) comparable survey over candidates with C+ and Literacy=297.58, time is the SACMEQ, which (a) Undertaking curriculum above (2010 target 69,857) Math=295.61 (2009) shows that the national review and material for non- average scores in reading science students, adult basic Improved KSCE average Number of candidates and mathematics stayed flat education for the Kenya score by 20% with C+ surpassed the between 2000 and 200734. Certificate of Primary Education 2010 target in 2009 Examination statistics, (KCPE) and Kenya Certificate Introduction and systematic (81,048) whatever they measure, also 34 The average pupil reading score dropped from 546 to 543, while the average mathematics score dropped from 563 to 557. However, these minor changes are not statistically significant. Also, a simple comparison of test scores over time is misguided, as FPE brought about a very significant change in the composition of the student population in Kenya, as (i) dramatic growth in student enrolments put downward pressure on per student investment, and (ii) user fee abolition was accompanied with flight from public schools. So the student populations tested by SACMEQ were, on average, not fully comparable. It is also possible that the stable KCPE scores may have been due to score normalization, rather than stability in school quality. Yet, the KCPE scores increased faster in the poorer districts, where student enrolment and class size growth were concentrated, even though higher class sizes are associated with lower growth in KCPE scores. A recent paper by Bold, Kemenyi, Mwabu and Sandefur (2010) showed a widening public-private exam performance gap (and increased socio-economic sorting between public and private schools), but roughly zero change in overall mean performance, despite an increase in the number of test-takers. So it appears that there was not a decline in the value added of public schools. Indeed, even though the public school population shifted to "harder to teach" children, the mean performance remained stable, which is encouraging. 43 of Secondary Education (KCSE) use of formative and show no consistent pattern equivalent. summative evaluations of KCSE average score of improvement. This student achievement increased by 19% generally suggests minimal (b) Ensuring curriculum support Training programs progress. material production and Summative evaluation of (a) under preparation induction of teachers. primary curriculum in all subjects except Social Examination item (c) Exploring alternative Studies and Life Skills banking system ongoing teaching/learning approaches. Education Systematic monitoring (b) secondary curriculum in ongoing through all subjects except Business formative (EGRA, Education and Life Skills SACMEQ) and Education summative (KCPE and KCSE) evaluations Preparation of revised curriculum support materials Curriculum review & related induction completed for all subjects at primary and Digital content for primary secondary education and secondary mathematics levels; draft reports and science curricula for prepared in 2010 being standards 4, 5, 6 and 7 undertaken in conjunction with the teacher pre-service & INSET investment subprograms Digital content for primary and secondary math and science completed for Standards 4 & 5; Standards 6 & 7 in process. (vii) In-service training Providing INSET to upgrade Mathematics and science MoE, Through SAMASSE Capacity developed of all Expected improvement in of teachers to mathematics and science teaching improved. Directorate of program, math and teachers in mathematics and teaching and learning of math upgrade teaching. Quality science teaching have science. and science. mathematics and Assurance, received significant science instruction and attention. (US$20.0 mil) TSC To promote stronger mathematics and science instruction 44 (viii) Information and (a) Preparing an ICT policy and ICT policy and strategy for MoE ICT Unit Fibre optic cable arrived Too early to measure the Enhanced ICT knowledge is communication strategic plan. introducing technology in Kenya only in outcome. Student learning expected to have positive technology in knowledge in the classroom. September 2009. achievement testing in ICT spillover benefits especially education (b) Establishing an educational Meanwhile, a country subjects may or may not for secondary school (US$5.0 mil) administrative system. Enhanced access to ICT in level ICT policy and improve learning outcomes graduates due to the schools. strategy was developed. overall. acquisition of more market To promote (c) e-Learning delivery system. The education level oriented skills such as using information and policy and strategy were computers. communication (d) Developing the ICT under development in technology in the infrastructure. 2010. classroom Learning assessment in (e) Capacity building for the use ICT subjects prepared of technology in the classroom and piloted. and in education administration. III. Provide Developing the strategies for Secondary education MoHEST, The three post-basic Progress towards the The impact of increasing opportunities for Secondary Education, TIVET strategy developed and TIVET and education strategies objective is measured by the enrolments is already being further education and University Education. operationalized. University were developed and percentage of youth who experienced as the capacity of and training Directorates have been “passed� the Kenya the system is being stretched. (secondary, TIVET strategy developed operationalized Certificate of Primary Further, the quantity and TIVET, university) and operationalized. according to MoE and Education (KCPE) and quality trade-offs are putting (US$389.0 mil) MoHEST. enrolled in secondary pressure on the sectoral University strategy school, with the target being budget. Further, donor developed and an increase in transition rate funding was suspended in operationalized. from 54% in 2005 to 70% in 2009-10 due to fraud detected 2010. in the MoE. (i) Guidance and (a) Developing a policy for all All institutions have MoE Basic G& C units established Provided psychological The subprogram investment counseling education institutions. Guidance and Counseling Education in all institutions. support to children of was critical during the post- (US$6.0 mil) departments. Directorate, Internally Displaced Persons election emergency in 2008. (b) Developing, implementing, Guidance and Number of student (IDPs) during the post- It contributed to building To prepare a and monitoring of training Reduction in career Counseling strikes reduced by 50%. election emergency period. peace education in schools. comprehensive programs for teachers and indecisiveness by 50%. Unit guidance and learners. Helped teachers to cope counseling Number of drug related with personal traumas and framework for a (c) Developing and incidents KESSP 40% those relating to instructing cross-section of disseminating information a mixed student population. beneficiaries booklet and materials on careers. Increased retention, 40% improvement in exam (d) Developing a counseling results service at the workplace in the MoE. (ii) Secondary Developing a strategy for Transition to secondary MoE --Transition to Expanding the number of Transition from primary to education secondary education. education of students Secondary secondary education of students that could continue secondary education has (US$168.0 mil) passing KCPE of at least Education students passing KCPE with education or training increased significantly. (a) Providing 70% by 2010. Directorate reached 74% in 2010 after completing primary There is overcrowding in the 45 bursaries/scholarships especially --Enrolment increased school. The surge in classrooms. to the poor and disadvantaged Secondary education MoE, Quality from 0.8 million in 2008 enrolment due to FPE had students strategy completed. Assurance to 1.7 million in January increased the demand for A full-fledged IDA additional Directorate, 2011. access to secondary financing operation with a b) Constructing classrooms in Secondary GER: 40% and -- The Strategy was education. reformed bursary scheme was ASALs and urban slums completed in 2007 and completed in 2009. However, including providing the schools Reformed secondary bursary TSC Secondary Education Improved access to and the the KESSP fraud & with basic equipment and scheme to improve targeting became eligible for quality of secondary corruption prevented the facilities KESSP financing in education to minimal extent. bursary reform from being Pre-service enrolment 2008. This is due to the emerging operationalized. In the end the (c) Supplying science equipment increased by 10% to 17,000 -- Government fraud and corruption issues IDA operation was not in targeted schools introduced Free Day in FY08/09. submitted for Board approval. 22,000 teachers with in- Secondary Education The reforms articulated in the (d) Recruiting teachers and service training (FDSE) in 2008. The MoE’s 1999 secondary proposed IDA operation providing them with in-service -- Secondary GER: bursary scheme continues to continue to be relevant. An training. Pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) at Total 45.3% be in operation although ongoing Ed-PETS pilot is primary education level: Boys 49.0% there are significant picking up on the issues. (e) Providing ICT in secondary 40:1. Girls 41.8% targeting and allocation schools. -- 17,922 enrolled in problems associated with the PTR: 45:1 at secondary 2009; 22,000 teachers scheme. (f) Introducing open and level (2010). trained in-service distance learning (ODL) -- PTR at primary strategies. Teacher rebalancing and education level: 46:1. recruitment. -- PTR: 36:1 at secondary level (2009). -- Teacher rebalancing undertaken for 170,834 primary school teachers, and 37,397 secondary school teachers. 46 (iii) Technical, Industrial (a) Developing a national skills TIVET strategy completed MoHEST The Strategy was To increase access to and JFA partners’ Financing for and Vocational training strategy. TIVET completed in 2008 and improve the quality of TIVET came to an abrupt halt Education and Directorate TIVET became eligible TIVET. in September 2009 following Training (TIVET) (b) Enhancing transition from for KESSP financing in the announcement of fraud & (US$45.0 mil) primary to TIVET. 2009. corruption in the education sector. To improve access (c) Establishing centers of All established program to and support the excellence in TIVET. activities are ongoing provision of quality TIVET instruction. (d) Enhancing skills for automation and computer integration in industry. (e) Setting up and operationalizing a bursary awards program. (f) Establishing production centers in TIVET institutions for teaching and producing goods and services for sale. (iv) University education (a) Developing a university University education MoHEST University education Changes in the University It is too soon to assess the (US$170.0 mil) education strategy strategy completed University financing and capacity education legislation have impact of the reforms to be Education development studies been introduced. The Bill is introduced in the sector. To improve equity (b) Introducing governance and Directorate completed in 2009 and before Cabinet for approval. in access to efficiency in the management of 2010 with IDA TA university education university education. Open University study (c) Enhancing the use of completed with DFID information technology in public TA. universities through the provision of ICT equipment and training. IV. Strengthen sector Maintaining education service At least 55% of the MoE Planning Progress has been Developing the capacity of Sector management capacity management delivery during a period of recurrent budget allocated Unit, unsatisfactory because the implementing structures was tested during the KESSP (US$76.3 mil) increasing enrolments by for primary and Finance and the shares declined over of the KESSP, and provide Phase I period under maintaining the share of primary 15% for non salary Accounting time. By 2009 total supporting tools including implementation. Highly education budget for primary expenditures Units non-salary expenditure EMIS and monitoring and decentralized decision- and non-salary expenditures. per primary student had evaluation. making led to centralized More efficient teacher fallen well below the control. deployment, effective data requisite FPE grant. By 2009 non-salary collection, monitoring and Further, within primary expenditure on secondary The impact of large evaluation processes, and education, non-salary education had increased and expenditure on FDSE at the streamlined decision expenditure dropped to the per student expenditure expense of FPE is already making, 11% of recurrent had quadrupled. This was at being felt. FPE gains are 47 expenditure. the expense of primary being eroded over time. education. (i) HIV/AIDS (a) Maximizing the potential HIV/AIDS life skills MoE ACU, Teaching of life skills Awareness about the Effects of the efforts through (US$56.60mil) strengths of education mainstreamed MoHEST being undertaken during HIV/AIDS pandemic has been the KESSP will become institutions in all sub-sectors to ACU one PE lesson increased significantly among evident only over time as the To mainstream help prevent new infections; Roll-out in primary and school going children and next generations of students HIV/AIDS introduction of life skills subject secondary schools. teachers. graduate and move into the mitigation in (preparation of life skills next stage of their lives. education in line curriculum).  with the (b) Extending evidence-based Government’s initiatives to the widest scale Policy on possible, whilst maintaining HIV/AIDS which effectiveness.  includes prevention, (c) Utilizing existing training care & support, and capacity and teaching and workplace issues learning resources strategically especially and cost-effectively. strengthening ACUs (d) Protecting, caring and and supporting providing support to the most university ACUs in vulnerable, including orphans, HIV/AIDS and drug girls, those out-of-school and dependency those with special needs in initiatives. education. (e) Leading others in developing strong multi-sectoral partnerships. (f) Mobilizing education services providers to implement HIV/AIDS policy in the full and in conjunction with other sectors. (g) Strengthening and extending the response to the prevention and care needs of education service providers. (h) Capacity programs delivery through on-the-job training, national and international level participation in various levels of study for appropriate beneficiaries with the support of technical assistance. 48 (ii) Education (a) Harmonizing education data TSC database merged with MoE Planning TSC and EMIS data NER and PCR indicators To broaden the information management between EMIS, TSC, KNEC and EMIS database Department, were coded to bring in produced by MoE’s EMIS base for an assessment of information system other sources. EMIS Unit, the linkage with Unit were based on progress achieved in the (US$7.0 mil) More efficient ICT Unit HIV/AIDS. administrative data. Although KESSP, the results are drawn (b) Providing ICT equipment for administrative processes the coverage of EMIS from school and household To improve MoE’s data data processing and Reduced time of EMIS Spatial mapping of improved over time, the data surveys (with representative collection, analysis and management. reporting; schools undertaken. were made available with a samples) carried out during dissemination capacity long delay that undermined the KESSP period, and also (c) Establishing Local Area % of districts that are use A minimum level of their usefulness, and their from the 2009 population Networks (LANS) for ICT effectively. ICT equipment for data validity and reliability census. Conducted according information sharing. processing provided to remained problematic. to acceptable technical district level staff. Further, the data are standards, the surveys and (d) Training of education staff at LANS set up at district inconsistent over time leading census are given greater all levels in the management of level. to overestimations of weight. EMIS for policy and planning enrolment increases that Training provided to all accompanied the KESSP. The time, effort and financial (e) Capacity building for MoE, Provincial and Finally, some key indicators, support through the KESSP teachers, districts and TSC DEO level staff. such as the NER and regional Phase I implementation headquarters to perform Databases linked in and gender disparities, do not period towards setting up the devolved functions  2008/09. correspond to information systems is beginning to result from other sources, such as in greater levels of data (f) Improve the efficiency of household surveys. availability and sharing, teacher deployment and leading to the facilitation of utilization system by Significant improvements in data availability for carrying implementing the completing the School out Public Expenditure recommendations of the ongoing Mapping exercise with the Review, Public Expenditure study on staffing norms data having been released. Tracking Surveys (PETS), and surveys relating to (g) Monitoring and evaluation of Progress on the acquisition of service delivery mechanisms. the actions to be undertaken. ICT equipment and training for staff at Headquarters and district levels. (ii) Monitoring and (a) Preparing the KESSP Impact evaluations on Third party ** Third party evaluation(US$2.40mil) baseline.(b)Establishing a process various topics evaluations. evaluations completed on To ensure effective monitoring system.(c) Seek towards piloting topics in the areas of school monitoring and impact evaluations.  interventions for scaling up. health, TIVET, teaching & evaluation of the KESSP  learning. Note: ** Third party evaluations undertaken in the following areas: school health and nutrition; TIVET vouchers; early-grade reading assessment; value-for-money audits in the areas of textbooks, infrastructure. (iii) Capacity Building (US$11 mil) (iv) Teacher Management (US$0.3 mil) Data Sources: 1.End-KESSP Phase I Appraisal Report. August 2010. By Rosemary Bellew, Consultant, World Bank. 2. Education Management Information System (EMIS), Planning Unit, MoE. 3.Kenya National Examinations Council (KNEC). 49 Annex 3: Project Development Outcomes A. Analysis and Rating Method: The following criteria were used to arrive at the ratings. 1. As KESSP outcome targets and indicators remained the same during KESSP implementation, progress was assessed against the extent to which progress was achieved relative to the targets that were set, and according to how the outcome and output indicators had been defined or were intended to be measured, as reflected in the KESSP PAD. 2. As a general rule, and wherever possible, the rating was based on an assessment of the level of attainment of the target defined as the change in the absolute value of the indicator between the end year and the baseline relative to the change targeted. For example, if the targeted change in the NER was 10 percentage points and the NER rose by 2 percentage points, 20 percent of the target was achieved. The following scale was used as a guide: highly unsatisfactory for negative change, unsatisfactory for 0 <= change < 25 percent of the target; moderately unsatisfactory for 25 <= change < 50 percent of the target, moderately satisfactory for 50 <= change <70 percent of the target, satisfactory for 70 < = change < =80 of the target, and highly satisfactory for change > 80 percent of the target. 3. The ratings also took into consideration the weight of the importance of the indicator to the KESSP program. This criterion did not influence ratings to shift from the unsatisfactory to the satisfactory side of the scale or vice versa. Rather, it helped to make the finer distinctions and/or add additional justification for the ratings given. This applied to two indicators – Government financial effort on primary education, and the availability of textbooks. 4. Where possible, the analysis underlying the assessment of progress drew from published results from two types of sources: (i) data and indicators published by the MoE in Statistical Bulletins, and (ii) data and indicators from the 2009 population census and household surveys which are recognized as meeting an acceptable technical bar of quality (namely the 2005 Kenya Integrated Budget and Household Survey, the 2005 Demographic and Health Survey for enrolment indicators, and the 2009 NASLA for the textbook indicator. There are advantages and disadvantages to using only the published data. With respect to the surveys, the main advantages are: (a) given their technical quality, the results are widely accepted and published by the GoK. The disadvantage is that access to the 2009 census data was limited to the national NER. For the MoE EMIS data, the advantage is that they are the numbers effectively used by MoE and development partners to monitor progress during KESSP implementation.35 The disadvantage is that the 2010 publication, which was the latest available at the time of data collection for the ICR, stops at provisional estimates for 2009. For more recent years, EMIS results were made available informally for only a limited number of indicators because the underlying data have not yet been sufficiently cleaned or stabilized for publication. 35 EMIS data are also submitted to the UNESCO Institute of Statistics for international reporting. 50 5. When ascertaining the extent of progress achieved for a particular indicator, both MoE and survey results are presented where available and greater weight is given to survey results for the following reasons. First, the EMIS data have validity and reliability issues that are reflected in a high level of internal inconsistency and instability over time which is magnified at disaggregated levels such as Province, gender and grade enrolments (Rotich et al 2010). 36 The causes of the instability and margin of error that may be introduced as a result have not been assessed. The Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) measure is also affected by inconsistent measurement of both the numerator (enrolment) and denominator (school-aged population) over time due to the difficulty in obtaining sufficient coverage of private school attendance, and highly inconsistent assumptions about population growth. The impact of each on the estimation of the NER, and the conclusions that would be drawn from those estimates, is not negligible.37 Second, in contrast, household surveys and the population census have the following strengths: (i) consistency in how school attendance was measured over time,38 (ii) a high level of technical quality that is documented and widely acknowledged, and (iii) the merit of being self-contained in that the numerator (the number of children attending primary school) is measured commensurately with the denominator (the number of children of primary school age). Finally, the hypothesis that household surveys measure “attendance� while the MoE measures “enrollment� which would tend to be higher than attendance 39 does not appear to explain the difference between household survey and MoE estimates as household surveys and population census have consistently shown considerably more school-aged children attending school compared with MoE enrolment figures. 6. Finally, the potential impact that the exogenous shock of the 2008 post-election violence may have had is given consideration as a mitigating factor as may be relevant. 36 Internal inconsistency is most evident in the disconnect between grade-by grade enrolment and: (a) reported dropout rates and (b) assumed low repetition (assumed because EMIS does not collect data on repetition). As a result, Rotich et al, for example, conclude that dropout rates are underestimated and completion rates are overestimated. Further, the reported enrolment bulge in 2003 that followed the introduction of FPE is not evident in the EMIS data. 37 With respect to private school attendance, development partners were aware of the problem and supported a school mapping exercise to improve the capture of private schools. The survey began in 2007; and results were made available and incorporated into the EMIS in 2009. The mapping exercise added at least 500,000 children to total enrolment for 2007. This adjustment accounted for over half the enrolment “increase� registered by EMIS over 2005-2008. As the MoE NER series was not adjusted retrospectively to account for the under-representation of private school attendance in prior years, a substantial part of the reported increase in the NER relative to the KESSP baseline is attributable to this artifact. With respect to the school-aged population, annual growth rates derived from the EMIS indicators (using reported total enrolment and Gross Enrolment Ratios) yield a highly unlikely 0.51 percent in 2005, 0.20 percent in 2006, 8.9 percent in 2007, 2.6 percent in 2008 and 7.3 percent in 2009. 38 All sources gathered school attendance by posing the same question namely, whether the child was currently attending school, or in the case of the 2008 DHS whether the child had attended during the 2008 school year since the survey was conducted partially during a non-school period. 39 This is because surveys may not count children who were not attending school at the time of the survey but may have been in attendance at other times during the school-year. 51 B.Basic Data Used for the ICR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Ministry of Education Data and Indicators Total enrolment (000) 7,603 7,632 8,330 8,725 8,827 Public 7,234 7,260 7,441 7,640 7,853 Private 272 368 372 889 924 Gross Enrolment Ratio 107 107 108 110 104 Net Enrolment Ratio 83 87 92 93 93 Pupil:Teacher ratio 42:1 43:1 43:1 45:1 46:1 Pupil:Textbook Ratio (public) 3:1 na 1:1 na na Primary Completion Rate 78 76 81 80 83 NER Gender Parity Index 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.98 Provincial Net Enrolment Ratios Coast 74.2 71.8 80.8 82.5 Central 87.5 83.0 82.6 83.6 Eastern 94.4 96.4 98.3 98.4 Nairobi 40.1 40.2 50.7 60.8 Rift Valley 86.6 90.8 96.2 98.1 Western 96.9 96.9 99.0 99.3 Nyanza 97.8 97.8 98.3 98.6 North Eastern 22.7 22.4 27.0 31.9 Household Survey and Census Results KIHBS DHS Census Total Primary Attendance 9,425,390 Primary Net Enrolment Ratio 79.0 0.0 0.0 78.8 77.2 Primary Gross Enrolment Ratio 117.0 0.0 0.0 111.5 110.6 Primary NER by Province Coast 70.5 71.4 Central 88.2 89.9 Eastern 84.7 82.5 Nairobi 79.0 91.1 Rift Valley 74.9 71.9 Western 80.7 80.5 Nyanza 82.1 86.3 North Eastern 49.5 53.4 Sources: Ministry of Education, Education Statistics 2010; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2010. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2008-09; Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics. 2007. Kenyan Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005/06. 52 Annex 4: Economic and Financial Analysis The relevant analysis is contained in Section 3.3. 53 Annex 5: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Michael Mills Lead Economist AFTHE Task Team Leader Nightingale Rukuba-Ngaiza Senior Counsel LEGAF Project Counsel Moses Sabuni Wasike Sr Financial Management Specialist OPCFM FM Dahir Elmi Warsame Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Hyacinth D. Brown Senior Finance Officer CTRFC Disbursement Agnes Albert-Loth Senior Finance Officer LOAG1 Disbursement Andrew Sunil Rajkumar Economist (Health) AFTHE Economist Carla Bertoncino Economist AFTH1 Economist Monica Ndungu Program Assistant AFCO5 Program Support Victoria Fofanah Program Assistant AFCO5 Program Support Debbie Peterson Program Assistant AFTH1 Program Support Geoffrey Bergen Country Program Coordinator AFCKE Harold Bedoya Senior Economist OPCCE Katy Roffe Senior Program Assistant AFCKE Catherine Gachukia Operations Officer AFCO5 Christel Vermeersch Economist HDNVP Johan Mistiaen Economist and Statistician DECDG Stella Manda School Health Specialist AFCO5 AFTH1 - Cathal A. Higgins Education Consultant Infrastructure HIS James M. Kamunge Education Consultant AFCE2 Education Policy Josephine Lutta Kiyenje Consultant AFTED Research Analysis AFTH1 - Jon Lauglo Education Consultant TIVET HIS Wycliffe Otieno Consultant AFTH1 University Ed. Christine Onyango Consultant LEGAF Counsel Ashutosh Dubey Consultant/Economist DFID-funded Consultant/ Paul Blay Economist DFID-funded Consultant/ Jonathan Caseley Governance DFID-funded Consultant/ Bill Leathes Architect DFID-funded Consultant/ Andy McCoubrey Environmental DFID-funded Consultant/ Eric Woods Education 54 DFID-funded Consultant/ Chris Yates Teacher Training Peer and QER Reviewers Eduardo Velez Sector Manager LCSHE Jacob Bregman Lead Education Specialist AFTH3 Pasi J. E. Shalberg Senior Education Specialist ECSHD Robert Prouty Lead Education Specialist HDNED Supervision/ICR Lead Health Economist/ Michael Mills AFTHE Former TTL Consultant (October 2010 onwards) Shobhana Sosale Senior Operations Officer AFTED Current TTL Nightingale Rukuba-Ngaiza Senior Legal Counsel LEGAF Project Counsel Henry Amena Amuguni Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM FM Moses Sabuni Wasike Sr Financial Management Specialist OPCFM FM Carla Bertoncino Senior Economist AFTED Economist Hyacinth D. Brown Senior Finance Officer CTRFC Disbursements Luis M. Schwarz Senior Finance Officer CTRFC Disbursements Dahir Elmi Warsame Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Joel Buku Munyori Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Margaret Olale Procurement Assistant AFCE2 Procurement Wycliffe Otieno Consultant AFCE2 University Ed. Kristine Schwebach Operations Analyst AFTCS Social Safeguards Monica Gathoni Okwirry Program Assistant AFCE2 Program Support Lucie Muchekehu Program Assistant AFCE2 Program Support Lucy Anyango Musira Team Assistant AFCE2 Program Support Donald A. P. Bundy Lead School Health Specialist AFTHE School Health Adriaan Verspoor Consultant/ Lead Specialist Education Sp. Rosemary Bellew Consultant/ Lead Specialist Ed. Economist Arvil Van Adams Consultant/ Lead Specialist Skills Development William Saint Consultant/ Lead Specialist University Ed. Prof. Maurice Mangol’i Consultant/ Lead Specialist University Ed. Dr. Gituro Wainaina Consultant/ Lead Specialist University Ed. Prof. Francis Aduol Consultant/ Lead Specialist University Ed. Prof. Pundy Pillay Consultant/ Lead Economist University Ed. Eldah Onsomu Consultant/Economist Anthony Wambugu Consultant/Economist 55 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks (including travel and consultant costs) Lending FY04 3.13 23.18 FY05 59.97 254.25 FY06 53.93 142.99 FY07 23.22 136.15 FY08 0.00 0.00 Total: 140.25 556.57 Supervision/ICR FY07 25.64 93.65 FY08 70.17 320.52 FY09 36.66 159.43 FY10 34.55 249.06 FY11 29.00 189.06 Total: 196.02 1,011.72 56 Annex 6: Beneficiary Survey Results 1. Introduction. The objective of the survey was to analyze views and perceptions of beneficiaries on the extent to which the school investment program has had an impact on educational improvement. A wide range of beneficiaries was considered, among them primary school pupils and secondary school students, parents, teachers, headteachers, as well as general community members. Specifically, the assessment sought to: (i) test the awareness of communities regarding the KESSP school investment; (ii) collate perceptions on school investment, that is, educational improvement; and (iii) gauge the impact of the program. The findings of the beneficiary survey are summarized below. 2. Methodology. The study applied a mixed methods approach, with wider utilization of quantitative research. To reach a wider sample, generation of statistical data through closed-ended questions was favoured, complemented by limited open-ended questions and in-depth interviews. 2.1 Data collection methods and instruments The study triangulated four methods, and utilized seven instruments. Table 1: Data Collection Methods and Instruments 1. School Data Sheet – 2 data sheets were used to collect enrolment, teacher and facility data, comparing status in 2005, 2007 and 2010; 2. Questionnaire for primary school head teachers – this tool served to focus on key aspects of KESSP I, views on relevance of investment programs, and rating satisfaction with the various service delivery areas; 3. Questionnaire for secondary school head teachers – collected data specific to the secondary school investment programs, on head teacher satisfaction, and view on impact created by the programme, views on next phase; 4. Questionnaire for ECDE teachers – focused on the ECDE investment programme, with specific focus on receipt of community support grants, teacher training, and health and nutrition programmes; 5. Questionnaire for pupils/students – sought views on improvement of service delivery, views on improvement, and rating importance of various investments in improving learning; 6. Questionnaire for parents and local leaders – rated satisfaction with GoK’s investment in education, comparing past and current trends, and perspectives on the next phase; 7. Short Message (SMS) feedback: SMS to head teachers of 1,000 schools, focusing positive change that has happened in their schools. 57 2.2 Sampling and Sample The assessment was conducted in 22 randomly sampled districts (out of the 158 2009 census districts), constituting 14 percent of the districts. In each district, 2 villages were randomly sampled to participate in the assessment. For each village, a public primary school was reached, as well as the public secondary school nearest to the village. In each village, interview was conducted with the chief or village elder, and also in four randomly sampled households. In each primary school, the head teacher (or their representative) was interviewed, the ECDE teacher, as well as ten children (five girls and five boys). In each secondary school, the head teacher (or their representative) was interviewed, as well as ten students. Table 2 summarizes the study sample, in 22 districts. Table 2: Beneficiary Assessment Sample Categories Per Total district Villages 2 44 Primary Schools 2 44 Secondary Schools 2 44 Households 8 176 Respondents Local leaders 2 44 Primary head teachers 2 276 ECDE teachers 2 44 Secondary head teachers 2 44 Parents 8 176 Primary School Pupils 20 440 Secondary School Students 20 440 Total Respondents 58 1,464 2.3 Data Analysis Two types of data were generated: quantitative data, generated through the data sheets and closed-ended items of the questionnaires; and qualitative data, generated through the interviews and open-ended items of the questionnaires. Quantitative data were coded using Microsoft excel data base, and transferred to stata for generation of tables. Descriptive statistics were used as basis of analysis. Qualitative data were coded manually, and codes entered into the quantitative databases, while the rich quotations were singled out and analyzed thematically. 3. Conclusions and Recommendations  Head teachers are aware of KESSP, but ECDE teachers are largely unaware of sources and amounts of funding. The assessment has established that all head teachers (but one) are aware of the KESSP investment. However, ECDE teachers are largely unaware of whether their schools have received community grants or 58 not, leave alone the amounts. Seemingly, funding information is largely a preserve of the head teacher, at least in regard to ECDE funding. Perhaps, the lowly qualified teachers, working in a non-recognized sector, are hardly consulted in making decisions pertaining to developments in ECDE.  Access to education has for sure expanded, but how much of this can be attributed to KESSP? While analysis of EMIS enrolment trends points to progressing, consistent rise in enrolment at all levels (after near stagnation in 2006), the assessment is unable to isolate the growth in enrolments from general population growth over the review period. Still, the expansion in enrolment seems to favour high potential agricultural districts, with lower gains in arid districts.  Quality is improving, but the growing enrolment continues to overburden the facilities. The beneficiaries are appreciative to improvement in quality, brought about by the various interventions. However, beneficiaries view teacher shortage and inadequacy of learning materials as the leading markers of low quality in Kenyan public schools. At the ECDE level, payment of teachers and focus on child development are noted as challenges that require attention, beyond just education. Head teachers attribute teacher training to improvement in learning. However, whether teacher training may have meant reduction of time-on-task requires investigation, for this may mean reversal of the relationship between teacher training and learning, depending on how the training sessions are timed. Further on, doubt is casted, if training of ECDE teachers is making any impact, going with their poor academic disposition. It emerges, that the growing enrolment needs to be matching with increased resources, while it may be wiser to map school resource needs, and use this as the basis of allocation.  INSET seems to be working well, but re-structuring pre-service training would be more sustainable. The positive attitude towards INSET may be an indicator that this programme has worked well. However, in the long run, it would be more strategic to restructure pre-service training. The many limitations of the teacher noted in the schools may also be an indicator of weak pre-service training. Focusing on this sub-sector, and investing more in it than in INSET, seems both strategic and sustainable.  Access and quality may have improved, but the school mirrors the existing inequalities of the Kenyan society. Despite the gains in access and quality, it remains unclear, if the capitation has equitably improved quality, or if the funding has actually exasperated the existing inequalities in the Kenyan society. The beneficiary assessment has illustrated that inequalities still persist: gender inequalities, inequalities against the marginalized categories in arid lands, among nomadic communities and urban informal settlements. Though participation of local communities in managing schools has improved, the gains are challenged by continued eliticization, clanism and nepotism, especially in arid districts. In some districts, parents view participation in school management committees as preserve of the rich in their local communities. 59 Recommendations for the Future A. Access Act on the ‘compulsory’. For many decades, the government has been quiet on the compulsory bit of Kenyan basic education. Yet, the Kenyan constitution now comes out clearly, to entitle the child to basic education that is both free and compulsory. Some studies (ILO, 2009) have indicated that local administrators who have adopted the ‘compulsory’ have maintained nearly 100% enrolment of all eligible children in their villages, while making every effort to retain them in school. The Ministry must now come out to emphasize that basic education is compulsory, and work with local administration to enforce this. Implement the school distance norms, based on outcomes of the school mapping. In some villages in Turkana and Msambweni, among other sampled districts, beneficiaries site long distances to school as a major cause of non-attendance. Following the just-concluded school mapping exercise, it is critical to now focus on evidence-based implementation of school distance norms, starting with the disadvantaged areas. Work with partners and innovators, to focus on the hard-to-reach. The default increase in enrolment established by this study lacks impact on marginalized categories. To achieve, or even get nearer to Education for All by 2015, the Ministry of Education must seek to work with innovators in reaching the extremely marginalized. Rather than clinging only on the mobile schools, boarding schools and the few other alternative forms that have also shown limitation, a close look at civil society innovations that are delivering results in reaching children of nomadic families, children with disabilities (especially multiple), and children in urban informal settlements may help. The scientifically-proven interventions that are working must be packaged for countrywide replication, and this can only be achieved by the Ministry of Education. Sourcing for extra resources from the ministries of Northern Kenya and other arid lands, Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development, and other key ministries may help accelerate the replication of these innovations. Strengthen Capacity of Schools and District Offices for Data Management and Utilization. The ineffectiveness and inaccuracies cited in the current model of EMIS seems to emerge from its over-centralized nature. Rather than just compiling data for forwarding, the head teachers and district education officers need to discover ways of analyzing this information, especially in the study of trends that should inform decision making at their levels. If head teachers were to be forwarding both raw and analyzed data, and the DEO’s do the same to the PDEs, and so on, the inaccuracies may be reduced, while still creating more reference data points for easier corroboration of EMIS. 60 Quality Shift focus, from schooling to learning. Indeed, at least according to head teachers, KESSP has gone a long way in expanding access of children to the public school. However, assessments of learning outcomes (KNEC 2010, Uwezo 2010) point to dismal levels of learning outcomes at lower levels. Confirming this, most head teachers only make reference to improved mean scores, which may just mean systematic drilling of children at the expense of lifelong learning. And as a boy in Gucha South cries out, teachers may be focusing only on the few strong students to pull up the mean score. To manage this shift, the Ministry of Education must go back to the philosophy of our Kenyan education, and insist on learning from lower primary levels. Unless Kenyans acquire this broad-based education, it would be impossible to develop, even with the highest mean scores there can be. The MoE must now utilize the assessment of learning outcomes to shape new focus on teachers, materials, environments, contents and methods. Think beyond the allocation of the Ministry, to draw extra resources from other ministries and citizens. Seemingly, improving quality of schools can be responsibility of other ministries also. For instance, rural electrification has had focus on government institutions, and most schools have benefited from this. Similarly, it is more the responsibility of the Ministry of Water to see that children in schools have access to clean drinking water, the Ministry of Communication to see that young Kenyans have access to ICT, the Ministry of Public Health to ensure that children have access to proper nutrition and hygiene, the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development to see that the young generation has access to facilities, and the list can be countless. Packaging education as ‘everyone’s business’ can go a long way in not only drawing the strengths of other government ministries to improve schools, but spurring every citizen to take action. Equity Like the Constituency Development Fund, allocate FPE and FSE funds equitably. The current system continues to aggravate inequalities, and indeed, the school perfectly mirrors the existing inequalities in the Kenyan society today. From an argument of social justice, it would be critical to focus more on marginalized categories. Rather than allocate a uniform amount for all children, work out formulas of increasing capitation for children and schools in arid districts and urban slums, while focusing on gender, special needs, geographical location and family backgrounds. 61 Annex 7: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results 1. A Stakeholder Workshop was convened in Nairobi on May 13, 2011 to review the draft Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR), including the findings of the Beneficiary Assessment, for the Kenya Education Sector Support Project (KESSP) which closed on December 31, 2010. The Chair for the Workshop was Mr. Kiminza Onesmus (Senior Deputy Director for Policy, Partnership and the East African Community). Participants included KESSP Secretariat staff and other senior officials from the Ministry of Education (MoE)40, civil society organization representatives, development partners, and World Bank staff and consultants. Representatives from the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology (MoHEST) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) were unfortunately unable to participate in the workshop due to scheduling issues. Presentations 2. Initial Presentation. Ms. Helen Craig (Lead Education Specialist and Human Development Sector Leader for Kenya) made the initial presentation on the ICR draft findings and ratings, on behalf of the World Bank team. The presentation was augmented with details by Ms. Shobhana Sosale (current KESSP and ICR Team Leader) and Mr. Michael Mills (former KESSP Team Leader). The team stressed that the judgments were being based on the specific indicators which had been originally identified in the KESSP design. Additional indicators provide a broader picture of the progress of the KESSP activities. 3. Beneficiary Assessment. Dr. Sara Ruto provided a summary of the findings of the Beneficiary Assessment, which was based on three objectives: (i) to assess the awareness of communities of the KESSP school investment program; (ii) to collate perceptions of educational improvements; and (iii) analyze views on the impact of the KESSP programme. Overall, Dr Ruto concluded that the beneficiaries interviewed were overall quite positive about the KESSP. In particular, the Beneficiary Assessment showed that the communities interviewed felt that (i) access to schooling had improved; (ii) the status of infrastructure and learning materials had also improved; (iii) communities had become more involved in the education of their children and in school management; and (iv) the Government is keen to improve the education of children. They also felt that the improvement in school infrastructure was linked to an improvement in student learning, although there were concerns about increased pupil-teacher ratios in many of the communities. The need for more teachers was mentioned as the greatest need. 40 The MoE leadership and the secondary education team were unable to participate in the workshop due to a regional workshop being held at the same time. The Workshop Chair gave their apologies for absence. 62 Main Issues Discussed 4. Focus of the review. Clarity was sought as to whether the draft ICR findings reflected the rating of the World Bank only on its own support to the KESSP, or on the achievements and challenges of the entire government and donor supported Program. In response, it was noted that it would be impossible to separate out the impact of the support just from the World Bank, especially as the financial resources had been passed through a pooled account. More broadly, it was agreed that the KESSP was based on a total partnership, and that generally the attribution of specific achievements would be very difficult. However, it was also recognized that some judgements could be made on the respective performance on various parts of the program. 5. The Rating Scale. The MoE and development partners posed questions about the norms, definition and judgments used in the ratings scale for assessing the achievement or absence of progress of the results indicators. For example, the “tipping point� between “moderately unsatisfactory� and “moderately satisfactory� was explored. The Bank team explained that the indicators were based on a specific rating scale and explanations to guide the preparation of the ICR document. Appendix A of the ICR Guidelines was used as the basis to explain that the ratings. 6. Data sources. There was considerable discussion about data analysis and the assessment of the achievement of the KESSP performance indicators using different data sources, including (i) the Education Management Information System (EMIS), (ii) the Kenya National Examinations Center (KNEC) data, (iii) survey data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), and (iv) the 2009 Census data (published in 2010). It was noted that the EMIS data were erratic over time, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) had been underestimating population growth, and the EMIS had utilized the KNBS population figures. In order to assess the likely trajectory of the performance of the KESSP, the EMIS data was therefore considered to be questionable. It was further emphasized that only the 1999 census data had been available at the time of the KESSP design in 2005, and that therefore this had to be used as the underlying database for the population figures. It was agreed that measuring progress using differing datasets is difficult, but it was also pointed out that using a single data source (such as the EMIS) would be unrealistic and that the data needed to be triangulated. It was also noted that the EMIS data could have been artificially inflated, especially as schools had an incentive to increase enrolment figures due to the capitation system of financing. In any event, there was general agreement that the accuracy of the EMIS data has been questioned throughout the KESSP implementation period, although, the MoE team felt strongly that the EMIS data alone should be used for assessing the KESSP results. They indicated that the EMIS has always been used in international fora to outline the progress made through the KESSP, and noted that there needs to be consistency in using data to assess the KESSP indicators. Some development partners, especially the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), also cautioned against using the 2009 census data ex-post to assess the progress made in the KESSP, since it was not available when the MoE commenced. In addition, UNICEF pointed out that (i) there are always issues relating to the exact phrasing of questions in 63 surveys, (ii) the survey data might not be fully representative, and (iii) a continuous dataset is needed to assess progress rather than a point estimate. 7. Enrolments. There was a particular discussion on the Net Enrolment Rate (NER). It was first noted that the EMIS data showed the 2010 NER to be around 93 percent, and that this fell short of the 100 percent NER goal that MoE had established for itself. In response, the MoE pointed out that the NER of 100 percent is an aspirational policy and that the policy is for all children to have access to schooling. However, it was also pointed out that the survey data do not show an increase in the NER, despite the growth rate for overall enrolments. UNICEF pointed out that maintaining the NER at a relatively high level is major progress, even if the target is not met, and that the NER indicator needs to be seen from this perspective. DFID stressed that there is a need to look at the whole story about enrolments and what happened. 8. Learning achievements. There was also a major discussion about learning achievements, as measured by: (i) the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) and the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE); (ii) surveys, and especially the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ); and (iii) the National Assessment for Measuring Student Learning Achievements (NASLA). The key issue was to assess whether the educational activities through the KESSP had contributed towards increasing, keeping constant or decreasing learning achievements. The expert views of the KNEC representatives were sought about the rating of the learning achievements under the KESSP, especially as the findings of the Beneficiary Assessment and the draft ICR rating seem to be contradictory. In response, the KNEC representatives stated that: (i) overall, although learning is increasing, competencies are low; (ii) the SACMEQ data show flat learning achievements in Kenya as a whole; (iii) in terms of provincial disparities, some provinces such as the North Eastern Province did better during the KESSP period; (iv) if average learning stays more or less constant with big increases in enrolment numbers, and more hard-to-reach children are brought into the system, this is a significant achievement; and (v) there is a slight improvement in performance in KCPE, although not at a significant level. It was also noted that the findings of the Beneficiary Assessment were based on beneficiaries’ own perceptions. Ministry of Education Perspective and Conclusions 9. Conclusions  On the use of the EMIS versus survey data, the discussion was somewhat inconclusive, since it was pointed out that there is a major disconnect between EMIS and survey data. However, it was agreed that all available data should be used where relevant.  While there is agreement about the EMIS data, the rating of the indicators depends on a judgment call which needs to be informed by the overall storyline. For example, overall enrolments did increase during the KESSP period. Even though 64 NER was flat with population growth, the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) shows improvement.  Development partners pointed out that the qualitative context for the KESSP is unclear in the ICR report. There was general agreement that a lot of progress had been made in setting up better systems, and that both quantitative and qualitative data should be used together to arrive at the final ratings.  It was agreed that the World Bank’s analysis is very important, that it will be taken very seriously by many people, and that the ICR document will be widely consulted. Therefore, the language in the ICR document needs to be carefully reviewed, to ensure a balance between the Program achievements and the challenges faced, and to provide a clearer articulation of the ratings.  Finally, it was agreed that an assessment of future investments in the sector need to include: (i) sustaining the gains; (ii) reaching the hard-to-reach which is relatively more expensive; (iii) improving policy-making, based on more accurate data; and (iv) addressing the issue that some development partners are now bypassing country systems, due to lack of confidence in the country systems. 10. Ministry of Education. In conclusion, the MoE team felt that the draft ICR conclusions: (i) were very negative about the KESSP activities, with a disproportionate stress on the governance and financial management issues; (ii) did not seem to highlight the KESSP achievements sufficiently, especially as it was a complex sectorwide program, and warranted a more holistic analysis; and (iii) should have been shared in its entirety with the MoE and MoHEST teams before the workshop. In addition, the MoE team challenged the standards and definitions of the ratings used (namely, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, and Unsatisfactory). 11. Next Steps. It was noted that the ICR document would shortly go through the World Bank review and clearance process. Serious consideration could also be given to using the ICR document as the end-KESSP Phase I (2005-2010) assessment for the Program as a whole. However, it was noted that there should be another process and review meeting for all stakeholders to conclude regarding the KESSP. 65 Annex 8: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR KESSP Co-ordination Four central themes of this programme are: transparency; decentralization; team work; and performance-based management and accountability. These themes determine the way the programme is implemented and monitored. A key coordinating body for KESSP is the Programme Steering Committee which is chaired by the Education Secretary, and involves all the Directors at Headquarters, Chief Executives of Semi-Autonomous Government Agencies, and departmental heads in the MOE and MOHEST. This Committee meets monthly and is accountable for KESSP implementation. The KESSP Reform Secretariat is a small team from MOE and MOHEST staff, under the Policy and Planning Directorate to support the entire secretariat comprising all investment team leaders, who report to the KESSP Steering Committee. This team is responsible for coordination, monitoring and impact evaluation, programme documentation and reporting, and advisory support to KESSP Management Units. The following are the KESSP objectives/targets:  Attainment of UPE and EFA by 2015;  Achievement of a transition rate of 70 percent, from primary to secondary school from the current rate of 47 percent, paying special attention to girls’ education by 2008;  Enhancement and sustainability of access, equity and quality in primary and secondary school education through capacity building for 45,000 education managers by the end of 2005;  Construction/renovation of physical facilities/equipment in public learning institutions in disadvantaged areas, particularly in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) and urban slums by 2008;  Development of a national training strategy for TIVET in 2005, and ensure that TIVET institutions are appropriately funded and equipped by 2008;  Achievement of 50 percent improvement of levels of adult literacy by 2010;  Expansion of public universities to have a capacity of at least 5,000 students each by 2015; and  Increased proportion of all students studying a science related courses to 50 percent, with at least one third of these being women by the year 2010. Achievements During the implementation of KESSP, in order to address access, quality, equity and relevance in education, policies, strategies and guidelines have been developed. These include: (i) Education sector policy on HIV & AIDS; (ii) National school health policy; (iii) Gender policy in education; (iv) Policy framework for nomadic education in Kenya; 66 (v) Policy for alternative provision of basic education and training; (vi) National adult and continuing education policy; (vii) ECDE policy; (viii) TIVET strategy; (ix) Secondary strategy; (x) University strategy. Finally, financial and procurement procedures manuals were developed for strengthening Governance and Accountability in the education sector. Challenges encountered in implementation of KESSP Phase I (2005-2011) The programme has been faced with challenges; the main one being a large unfinished agenda for primary and secondary education especially as regards quality improvement and providing access to the children that are currently out of school, especially the hard-to- reach. Other aspects include:  Under funding of or no funding for some investment programs despite prioritization, costing and being eligible.  Delay in implementation of programs, thereby reducing effectiveness.  Non-adherence to the JFA terms, such as delay in funds disbursements on a timely basis.  Variation in exchange rate and conversion to Kshs. This caused a problem in writing of books.  Lack of or little attention being given to efficiency gains across investment programs.  Lack of alternative financing arrangements; all financing was based on the JFA.  The link between performance indicators to the investment programs was weak, which impacted negatively on coordination/management.  Phase I of KESSP was implemented as a pilot since it had not been tried before and therefore errors were encountered.  Lack of adequate capacity building arrangements to meet management gaps.  Lack of an approved M&E framework to improve management aspects.  Human resource capacity: too few officers for too many tasks.  Slow process of attitude change amongst our people.  High cost of investment programs.  Lack of capacity to develop well thought out and realistic work plans and procurement plans.  Low procurement capacity especially at school level.  High bureaucracy.  The low capacity of Quality Assurance and Standards officers to deliver services in relation to the staffing levels and skills.  The low capacity of School Audit to audit all schools regularly.  Though there has been marked achievement towards the realizing universal primary education in the country, the attainment of the MDGs and EFA continue to experience a number of challenges such as: (a) weak local level partner participation i.e. the community and their leaders; (b) high turnover of school leadership especially in Primary Schools. SMC (elected every year) bringing in untrained leadership; (c) unsupportive public (education in a government service); and (d) unwillingness of many Kenyans to complain formally of alleged misdeeds. 67  ECDE sub-sector is marked by a high turnover of trained teachers (estimated at 40% annually) and low participation rates especially in arid and semi-arid lands and urban slums.  Overcrowding in schools especially those in urban informal settlements, arid and semi-arid lands areas, and densely populated areas.  Inadequate physical facilities due to increased enrolments and dilapidated infrastructure.  High pupil/teacher ratios in some schools as a result of inadequate teachers.  High cost of special equipment/facilities and materials to cater for children with special needs.  Low quality of education offered in Non-Formal Schools and Non-Formal Education Centres and lack of clear linkage with the formal education system.  Many of the OVCs and NFE service providers are registered under different organizations including Government Departments, such as under the Office of the Vice President, Attorney General Chambers, Social Services and NGOs. Existence of many private NFS that charge fees to the poor. Very few NFSs and NFECs are registered by Ministry of Education making it difficult to extend Government support to the NFE sub-sector.  Inadequate in-servicing of teachers to adopt alternative methods of curriculum delivery especially for the hard-to-reach children.  Low transition rates from primary to secondary and underutilized capacity in TIVET sub-sector leading to very high wastages.  Diminished support from communities mainly due to poverty.  Gender, socio-economic and regional disparities that impact negatively on access, retention, participation and quality.  Regional variations of female to male literacy ratios pose challenges to the national literacy achievements.  HIV/AIDS pandemic that has robbed the country of trained and experienced teachers and given rise to many additional orphans in schools. It is estimated that 1.8 percent of the country’s 245,000 teachers are dying annually. HIV/AIDS is draining the supply of education, eroding its quality, weakening demand and access, drying up the countries pool of skilled workers and increasing sector cost which is already high in relation to available public resources. The number of AIDS orphans and other vulnerable children now is estimated to number about 1.2 million.  The Adult and Continuing Education (ACE) sub-sector faces the challenge of relatively low enrolments in relation to the estimated 4.2 million functionally illiterate adults due to low funding of the sub sector compared to other sub-sectors and inadequate teaching personnel who are also unmotivated. And  The realization of girls and women’s empowerment through education has been impeded by a number of other factors such as cultural and religious attitudes and practices, infrastructural limitations, poverty, HIV/AIDS, lack of community awareness as well as lack of adequate female role models especially in some rural areas. In some areas the boy child suffers from child labor practices and lack of male role models especially in the poor urban slums. 68 Constraints and challenges to university education: (i) Inadequate teaching/learning material; (ii) inadequate teaching staff especially teacher with PhD qualification; (iii) inadequate physical facilities especially in new university colleges; (iv) low proportion of women to men in science and technical courses; and (v) limited dissemination of research results. Issues relating to Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) and Risk Policy Management (RPM) The Ministry is committed to strengthening Governance and Accountability in the sector. Since the introduction of Free Primary Education, the Ministry has put in place Governance and Accountability mechanisms geared towards: (a) efficient service delivery; (b) enhanced transparency; and (c) prudence and resources utilization. Good governance is a principle in which political and management processes translate the will of the people into public policies and establish the rules that efficiently and effectively deliver services to all members of the society. In the context of Kenya’s education sector good governance, as a means to enhance accountability, was critical to the attainment of the KESSP I objectives of access, equity and quality. Since 2005 Governance and Accountability annual reports and action plans for the education sector have been prepared every year; these have been shared with the Development Partners and local stakeholders. To build on the Education Sector Governance and Accountability Action Plan (2007) and to address emerging issues in the sector, MOE is implementing Governance, and Anti- Corruption (GAC) And Risk Policy Management (RMP) Action Plan (2010).The Plan includes actions that will elicit organizational and culture change in the institutions managing Programs at MOE Headquarters and decentralized level. The GAC plan was prepared with the joint effort of Development partners and the Ministry of Education. The action plan has been implemented and the status is as follows:  GAC and RPM action plan has been prepared and implemented to address systematic failures;  GAC & RPM prepared enhances, effective monitoring (participants’ evaluation of trainings, list of participants with signatures, and the organizers’ training report, participants’ ID numbers), and documentation of the capacity development events are a requirement in accounting for funds on capacity building;  Regulations on allowances in capacity development are being enforced;  Costed work plans prepared by all directorates and a template developed and in use to ensure the laid down procedures are strictly followed;  Treasury circular on district allowances with respect to accommodation, transport, expenditure and authorization of imprests has been enforced (MoE has issued circulars on imprests);  Training on corruption risk assessment and corruption prevention plan is part of all capacity building initiative;  Management Manuals and Handbooks being revised by a consultant and recommendations of IAD report to be addressed; 69  Ministerial integrity audit committee in place;  Social accountability mechanisms strengthening is ongoing (service charters developed at province and district levels, educational institutions displaying fund disbursed on notice boards);  Procurement, accounting and audit issues raised in the GAC are being addressed (a capacity building strategy in Public Financial Management is being developed by MOE, MOF and Development Partners); and  An increasingly important part of financial and procurement management has been decentralized to school level in order to allow more community participation, efficiency and adherence to school priorities. Guidelines in the form of manuals and handbooks have been developed and distributed up to the schools and education institutions. Structures - most importantly District Education Boards - have been established and capacity building efforts have been continuous. Despite the progress made with regard to service delivery there are still important challenges, including: (i) the high turnover of key personnel: head teachers, education officers, and SMC/BOG members and low levels of education of the latter; (ii) ambiguity about the responsibility for education decisions in an increasingly decentralised system is exacerbated by a system of shared responsibilities that makes it difficult to hold any single actor accountable; (iii) MOE communication strategy which is not fully operationalised and needs to become more proactive; (iv) poor compliance with established procedures for record keeping and transmission of information with regard to financial management and procurement; (v) too many instances where of SMCs and BOGs do not perform their roles and duties effectively; (vi) absence of a system that ensures high quality of work by auditors and QASOs at all levels; and (vii) absence of a capacity building program that has not reached many of the large number of education and oversight staff involved and that has not provided much follow-up school and institutional support and training. To accelerate progress towards the goal of good governance and financial and service delivery accountability MOE/MOHEST have decided on a strategy that aims to (i) increase client voice by involving them in management; (ii) link responsibility to a specific actor (iii) rationalize responsibilities under decentralization by identifying and eliminate overlaps. The elements of the strategy are:  Strengthening communications. A two way flow of information from Ministry to clients will be established. Parents and other stake holders will be sensitized to play their roles in school/institutional governance. Information will be released to the general public using the most appropriate medium to reach the relevant target group.  Increasing transparency and accountability. The Ministry has embraced Rapid Results Initiative, Results Based Management, and more recently Risk Based Audit and more recently the Value for Money Audit as approaches that make explicit expected results, establish accountabilities for achieving them, identify and manage potential risks, strengthen and make explicit targeting procedures. Benefiting institutions and schools will be required to display accounts and institutional charters on notice boards for public to perusal and scrutiny. 70  Promoting Integrity. MOE/MOHEST will ensure that the flow of funds from the Ministries’ Headquarters to the point of expenditure is clean, open, and honest with clearly defined criteria for disbursement and guidelines for expenditure and feedback. M&E will be extended to district and zonal level structures. Fiduciary controls will be strengthened. Procedures for auditing the use of public funds will be significantly tightened to fight and expose corruption and fraud and sanctions will be vigorously enforced.  Enhancing responsiveness and participation. Decentralization of decision making in education either through devolution to lower levels of government or through delegation of responsibilities to the school and other institutions of learning has the potential for stronger accountability and improved governance. MOE will strengthen the capacity of school/other institutional level organizations like Parents Associations (PA), Parents Teachers Association’s (PTA’s), BOG’s SMC’s and Schools Instructional Materials Management Committee (SIMMC) to enable parents and communities to participate effectively in school level governance. Lessons Learned  Need for continuous capacity building programs for teachers education administrators and managers are key.  Need for continuous reassurance and confidence building to avoid stakeholders giving up.  Display of leadership, accountability, political will, transparency, and commitment all levels of governance.  Need for continuous review of FPE/UPE policy.  Communication strategy should be in place.  Review of capitation grants from time to time reflecting inflation trends.  Consistency in staff managing FPE programs.  Direct disbursements to schools removed red tape.  Partnerships have been guided by partnership principle.  MOE and partners have been undertaking intensive financial monitoring but scattered leakages are still emerging. And  Operational financial and procurement manuals have helped a great deal in program implementation. Specific Lessons Learnt From TIVET  Need for continuous Capacity Building Programs for lecturers, education administrators and managers are key for effective implementation of KESSP Programmes.  Display of leadership, accountability, political will , transparency, and commitment at all levels of governance 71  Monitoring and evaluation is an important component for successful implementation.  Encouraging the use of ICT enhances curriculum delivery and efficient management of resources. And  The provision of bursaries to needy students has greatly enhanced access of TIVET to the disadvantaged. Way Forward  Working in collaboration with partners and other stakeholders for coordination and resource mobilization.  Sustain financing for all interventions.  Enhance resource mobilization to support programs.  Strengthen community participation and enhance governance and accountability.  Initiate mechanisms for operationalization of the new constitution.  Some of the areas identified in the GAC Action Plan will be addressed continuously as KESSP II is being implemented.  All ministerial trainings to include sensitization packages on anti-corruption.  Strengthening School Audit and shifting focus from book to school audit.  Training and sensitizing staff at all levels in ethics and anti-corruption and their roles and responsibilities in managing educational resources.  Sensitization of communities on their roles in KESSP implementation to improve governance and accountability.  Capacity building of staff dealing with finances at all levels on Public Financial Public Management. And,  Alignment of the education sector to the new constitution will address structural management and funds flow challenges to improve on transparency and accountability. Ways Forward For TIVET  Working in collaboration with partners and other stakeholders for coordination and resource mobilization.  Sustain financing for all interventions.  Enhance resource mobilization to support TIVET programs.  Strengthen stakeholder’s participation and enhance governance and accountability.  Initiate mechanisms for operationalization of the new constitution.  Strengthening Audit of TIVET Institutions, training and sensitizing staff at all levels in ethics and anti-corruption and their roles and responsibilities in managing training resources.  Capacity building of staff dealing with finances at all levels on Public Financial Public.  Strengthen M&E and value for money audits in TIVET programs. And,  Implement KESSP II. 72 Ways Forward on University Education  In order to continue realizing increased access, equity, improved quality and relevance of research, innovation and training the Ministry will continue implementing the Strategic Plan and Science and Technology Policy.  Promotion and integration of ICT into training and curricula.  Replace obsolete equipment in Institutions of Higher Learning.  University draft bill is ready for tabling in the cabinet. And  Enhance coordination of all research activities in the country through enhanced funding in priority areas of ST & I and dissemination of research findings to promote socio-economic development. 73 Annex 9: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders I. Department for International Development (DFID): Summary of Findings of a Project Completion Report, April 2010 1. Summary. KESSP has brought major benefits and positively changed the management of development activity, mutual expectations among partners and ways of working in MoE. It is clear that MoE is committed to its programme and is unlikely to return to a project mode. However, MoE’s reputation has been severely damaged by the findings of fraud and corruption. MoE’s leadership has not offered a convincing response which has resulted in cessation of external funding and paralysis of programme activities. Additionally, the means of assessing KESSP progress are not as robust and credible as they could be. Nevertheless, there is enough evidence to show that the programme has been on a positive trajectory but many targets will not be attained by June 2011. The strongest progress has been in increasing primary education enrolments; the weakest area is in respect of serving the poorest and most disadvantaged populations. 2. Achievements. KESSP is now the reference point for all education development and a vehicle for national/international goals. All proposed new developments are only considered in the light of this sector programme and strategy. The programme can be seen to be spurring decentralization. Similarly, KESSP is building a planning culture. MoE officers, practitioners, public servants and most development partners expect now to combine efforts to support an overall sector strategy. 3. The most notable achievement has been the massive increase in access, demonstrated by greatly improved net enrolment ratios (92.5 percent compared with 83.2 percent in 2005, with close gender parity). Other notable achievements include increased transition to secondary school and improved textbook to pupil ratios, with the target of 1:1 achieved in some schools. The physical environment has been greatly improved through infrastructure development and although there is much further work to be done most stakeholders refer to visible improvements. There has been an effective model of school- based teacher development which other countries seek to emulate. Raising quality is now firmly on the agenda and there is increased attention to learning achievement. Also, important to the sustainability of developments has been the raft of policy development. Some (e.g. TIVET, universities and the planned Open University) are still awaiting Cabinet/parliament approval but they are in the pipeline and will support major reforms in these areas. 4. Some Shortcomings. The topics listed in this paragraph reflect some points arising very frequently over the past five years, consistently recorded in aides memoire and validated by the DFID evaluation team:  the high number (possibly more than 1,000,000) of out-of-school “missing children� - the most vulnerable, poorest and marginalized  weak monitoring and evaluation, unreliable data  insufficient community involvement (for accountability and support)  a narrow conceptual approach to capacity building 74  expanding access at the expense of quality  inadequate approach to teacher management  curriculum insufficiently geared to students’ expectations, livelihood opportunities, national aspirations and labour market needs. 5. The evaluation team also notes the following factors that need to be borne in mind in the future:  The prevalence of corruption in GoK systems, and MoE in particular, is well known yet development partners’ confidence in financial management rose over the first four years of KESSP shedding doubt on the efficacy of internal audit systems, financial reporting and on development partners’ routine monitoring (though it is important to acknowledge that the uncovering of fraud was triggered by a World Bank supervision mission).  Post-election chaos and an increased volume of work in the Infrastructure Unit permitted undue involvement of senior MoE officers in infrastructure transactions, over-rode laid down procedures and provided an opportunity for corruption. Preoccupation with the extra activities and concerns about their quality engaged development partners and deflected attention from rumours of fraud.  Lack of clarity regarding who (which development partner? which MoE unit?) should take what form of action resulted in rumours not being acted upon while those alleging corruption did not provide firm evidence due to fear of retribution and the absence of a convincing “whistle-blowing� policy.  Review processes have become increasingly stale and seen more as events. External representation tends to be token. There is scope for greater externality from a wider range of stakeholders for more creative design and more challenging analysis.  The flow of funds to KESSP has been stop-start and disbursements delayed year on year creating an end of year funding bulge that could not be easily spent and which fosters expediency. Non-pooled funding is not captured in financial reporting. The budget setting process is based on vote heads rather than programme outputs.  There has been pragmatic rather than prioritized spending on investment programs. The budget process tends to be a “bidding� game (where wish-list workplans generate bids for high funding allocations which cannot feasibly be absorbed).  The application of standard formula for school-level funding ignores the fact that some schools require more support than others.  There has been insufficient inter-Ministerial collaboration and coordination (between the MOE, MOHEST, MOF and sister Ministries dealing with training and education). Similarly, there has been inadequate synergy across the KESSP investment programs and inadequate partnership with civil society organizations and with the private sector.  Relatedly, more analytical research could play a part in informing evidence-based policy and planning. 6. Lessons Learned from point to the need to strengthen several key design and implementation processes going forward as follows: 75  The need to build robust M&E systems which draw on accurate and timely EMIS data is a major priority. From the start, major weaknesses in the monitoring and evaluation of investment program work plans against key indicators and the lack of reliable baselines were identified.  Combating corruption requires a combination of “bottom-up� with “top-down� accountability approaches. The “bottom-up� approach would include strengthening the community and school level focus of KESSP through the decentralization of management and delivery of education services. The “top-down� approach is likely to involve an extra inspection system for quality assuring internal audits. It will also be necessary to engage Parliamentarians in demanding greater accountability and in scrutinizing senior management/sector performance.  Clearer roles and responsibilities, and better communication between and within each level of the education system, are also needed.  Better coordination of the technical assistance provided by development partners is needed with a greater focus on developing human resource capacity at all levels of the system to build management systems that are transparent and have clear lines of accountability.  It is necessary to examine the political (economy) context in which KESSP was operating. Authoritarianism, corruption and ethnically driven politics illustrate the backdrop of poor governance at the most senior levels. 7. Conclusion. With more than 500,000 children still out of school, most of whom live in arid and semi-arid lands and urban slums and who are often the poorest and most vulnerable, reaching these children is the greatest challenge going forward. The greatly delayed and still inconclusive Mid-Term Review represents a major lost opportunity, particularly for yielding lessons. DFID is designing bilateral project-style support to the education sector for the balance of the present KESSP’s duration. DFID support of this kind (linked to key KESSP outputs) has previously proved highly effective. II. Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA): Comments Context at appraisal of KESSP  At the time of KESSP appraisal, CIDA had been supporting the education sector in Kenya since 1998. CIDA worked in an incremental manner using varied funding mechanisms, including delegated cooperation DFID, all the while working towards more strategic and effective cooperation with the MoE.  CIDA’s increasing involvement with MoE was made possible by the strong engagement and significant achievements made by GoK in the education sector and positive trends in governance.  During the inauguration of KESSP in 2005, the then Ministry of Education Science and Technology adopted a sector-wide approach to program planning (SWAp). The Ministry was in full control of the process due to the political will prevailing then.  When CIDA considered joining the pooled fund for KESSP, several donors had already made substantial commitments: DFID (US$100 million), the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) Catalytic Fund (over US$100 million) and IDA (US$80 million). The decision to 76 contribute to the pooled fund was based on a review of fiduciary risks and related financial management and procurement issues. CIDA used several highly credible sources to evaluate the potential risks, including the World Bank Detailed Integrity Report, the World Bank KESSP Project Appraisal Document, the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Evaluation (SIDA, June 2006); the Country Integrated Fiduciary Assessment (World Bank, September 2006); the Kenya Governance Report (World Bank, December 2006) and the Fiduciary Risk Assessment (DFID, September 2005). In addition, CIDA tasked a procurement consultant to complete a desk review of available procurement-related documents, including those mentioned above. The due diligence undertaken by the team of advisors was consistent with requirements contained in CIDA’s Operational Guide on PBAs (2005). Factors that contributed to Implementation success  Established sector review process (JBRW and JRES) for work plans and progress  Strong Donor coordination  Comprehensive and clear sector plan  Strong GoK financial support to KESSP  Political will and strong leadership at the MOE  Policy dialogue between development partners and MoE, especially through JFA partners  Framework for partnership (e.g., partnership principles) between GoK and development partners  Stronger development partner alignment, coordination and harmonization through the Education Donors’ Coordination Group, JFA, and HAC and lower transaction costs of implementation  KESSP linked to Medium Term Expenditure Framework and PER  Flexibility in financial modalities (pooled funding and project support) Factors that gave rise to implementation challenges  Inadequate financial accountability and delays and weaknesses in production of FMRs  Inadequate infrastructural development in schools  High staff turnover at the MOE  Inadequate number of teachers  Inadequate human resource recruitment and development at the MOE  Lack of comprehensive capacity development plan  Weak implementation capacity of districts and schools  Poor quality of district and school development plans  Lack of implementation of actions and recommendations agreed at JRES and JBRWs  Inadequate KESSP sensitization, training and capacity development of SMCs  Inadequate financial and procurement training of head teachers  Lack of planning, coordination and synergy among the multi partners school infrastructure support such as KESSP, CDF, LATF, and others 77  Inadequate capacity to implement governance and accountability plan  Weak supervision of curriculum implementation at school level due to inadequate number of quality assurance and standards staff  Lack of comprehensive in-service primary teacher training program  Inadequate use of SACMEQ II for quality improvement  Inadequate inter-ministerial coordination  Lack of internal communication between different MoE directorates and investment program leaders  Lack of KESSP communications strategy M&E design, implementation, and utilization  EMIS capability to collect, synthesize, store and retrieve data and information.  M&E designed as an investment program with very little coordination with other investment programs which have M&E as integral part.  Inadequate monitoring of KESSP results framework  Inadequate EMIS training at district and school level  Inadequate utilization of EMIS for planning purposes  Delayed and inadequate Mid-Term Review MTR Results and outcomes of interventions in the context of the objectives  KESSP is credited with several achievements, as evidenced by improvements in a number of education indicators. However, quality of education remains a serious challenge and financial and program management requires considerable strengthening, as highlighted in the extended audit report.  Inadequate monitoring of KESSP logframe (logic model) and performance indicators (especially related to quality). III. UNICEF Success Factors of KESSP o KESSP opened up opportunities for engagement with civil society to improve coordination of activities and fostered partnership and coordination at district level (e.g. the Coalition of Civil society in education was invited to the Education Donors’ Coordination Group and JRES meetings improving advocacy for government support towards diverse interventions. o Created a platform to harmonize the agenda around equity and disparity addressing vulnerable groups and disadvantaged geographical areas such as arid and semi-arid lands and urban informal settlements. Most donors/NGOs presented research findings on respective supporting areas which are often in urban informal settlements, pockets of poverty etc. This information was factored into KESSP expenditure items- a very good example is FPE grants given to Non-Formal Schools, support to Mobile schools for nomads, prioritization of pro- poor policies such as children in arid and semi-arid 78 lands, nomadic populations, children in in-formal education institutions, gender policy etc. o EDCG played the key coordination role in the first five years of KESSP implementation. The Education Donors’ Coordination Group had monthly meetings on status of program implementation; shared information of donor funded activities and consolidated priorities for a quarterly meeting with PS education- a great opportunity for implementation improvement. (However, the role has shifted to fiduciary audit monitoring – missing the opportunity in monitoring education indicators and progress towards MDGs.) o JRESs and Budget Reviews benefitted from high level attention from policy makers and significantly contributed to participatory monitoring of (a) implementation levels of different investment priorities, (b) prioritization of key education investment opportunities for the next coming year, and (c) joint problem identification and solving – the PS, directors and other decision makers in the Ministry attended the sessions and trips, where the issues within the education sector were jointly identified and confirmed, and aide-memoire addressing findings and agreements on ways forward were developed. General issues with KESSP o Too many investment plans and indicators: it is difficult to track the development. The design of the M&E framework leaves many questions e.g., how the MOE and development partners are to monitor 74 indicators without having systems in place and responsibilities assigned to track progress against these. o Lack of Harmonization and Prioritization: the KESSP is not seen as a sector programme but rather as a very large project consisting of many smaller projects. This is partly due to the capacity and ownership at different levels at MOE. o Misunderstanding around the SWAp concept, including KESSP and JFA: the KESSP is a government programme and government sector strategy with donors’ inputs. Therefore, educational intervention that is made should be considered as “within� KESSP, unless one implements a project which is thoroughly not related to government priority. The JFA is a financial modality to pool development partners fund to support a part of KESSP. Results of Fraud and Financial Audit o We have lost not only millions of shillings but also valuable opportunities due to the discovery of fraud and subsequent fiduciary audit, including  Financial resources allocated to the Ministry;  Opportunities for monitoring education development in last two years;  Investment opportunities to children in school;  Coherency among the Education Donors’ Coordination Group partners;  Partnership and trust with the Ministry, 79  Speed in implementation of activities across the board, MOE and development partners.  The SWAp approach: diversion from government support to NGO-run projects, which reduces institutional capacity of the Ministry, is being observed. o These direct outcomes following the extended forensic audit need to be addressed in the development of KESSPII, especially the issue regarding the fact that the coherency among Education Donors’ Coordination Group partners is getting weak and more and more activities are geared towards project based activities bypassing the Ministry. This is a return to where we were about 15 years ago. The focus should be on how we could improve our Education Donors’ Coordination Group coordination mechanism based on what we have experienced. Challenges of KESSP o Actual monitoring activities on education progress has ceased after the audit. o Input-Focus: there is very little discussion on results and outcomes of interventions. There seems to be little link between the review process and implementing directorates. o Over-estimation of the capacity of MOE: although it was designed that the plans in KESSP are to trickle down to the district level, it did not happen due to the capacity limitation of Ministry. IV. Elimu Yetu Coalition: Comments41 Overview of KESSP I The implementation of KESSP has been both exciting and challenging to the government, development partners and communities as well with lots lessons learnt. This far, the programme can be celebrated for having made considerable contribution towards increasing access to education, increased retention rates and improved transition from primary to secondary and increased resource base for funding education. According to Ministry of Education documents, KESSP has seen enrolment at primary increase with Net Enrolment Rate (NER) at 92.5% from 83.2% within the same period. At the same time drop-out rate at primary school declined from 6.5% to 3.5% while completion rate increased to 79.5% from 77.6%. Transition from primary to secondary increased from 57.3% to 64.1% in 2008. (MoE Educational Statistical Booklet, 2009) Within the broader sense of the programme it could be said that the KESSP concentrated so much on the government’s goal on realization of Universal Primary Education demonstrated by the commitment on Free Primary Education which has seen education continue to receive a big chunk of the budgetary allocation averaged at more than 17% of 41 EYC was established in 1999 as a national coalition of civil society organizations, professional groupings, education/research institutions and other non state actors in Kenya’s education sector to lobby for the implementation of EFA goals. Registered as a network of the National Council of NGOs, and utilizing a rights-based approach, EYC brings together up to 50 CSOs involved in efforts to domesticate the EFA Goals and other related global conventions for the attainment of quality basic education for all in Kenya. 80 the national budget over the last 3 years. While these statistics look encouraging, many challenges continue to face education especially for the urban poor and those in far flung pastoralists’ communities. Studies by Uwezo Kenya and National System for Monitoring Learner Achievement (NASLA) have revealed glaring gaps that point to regional and gender disparities in education, inadequate facilities, and low quality learning achievements, among others. The Annual Learning Report, Are our Children Learning, (Uwezo, 2010) revealed that 5 out of every 100 children aged between 6 to 16 years did not attend school citing limited facilities and congested classroom as some of the reasons for lack of access (Uwezo 2010). National Assessment Report (2010) revealed more challenges contained in repetition at 59.8% (for the number of learners who had repeated one class in their cycle), high absenteeism at 70.1% and low learning achievement at 47.7% (NASLA, 2010). Despite the achievements of KESSP I, some investment programs did not achieve their targets, largely due to a number of challenges affected the functioning of the country’s education sector within the period under review. This has been largely due: Poor Project Implementation: - lack of linking programme implementation to reporting framework compounded by delays in flow of funds from development partners to the Sector has affected the implementation of projects leading to some projects being left uncompleted after the planned period and weak monitoring and evaluation of projects leading, to poor or uncontrolled progress in implementation. Management and Financial Issues (MFI):- the implementation of KESSP I has been hampered by managerial and financial challenges, including weak co-ordination of monitoring activities in the Sector leading to duplication; weak monitoring and evaluation structures leading to poor tracking of field activities ; weak and uncoordinated information systems which makes it difficult to generate output/outcome indicators necessary for planning, and weaknesses in the implementation of Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS). Corruption and accountability concerns raising serious questions of integrity have continued to dog the education sector in the last two years. This hampers effectiveness and efficiency in resource targeting and utilization. Thus, development partners have been withdrawing support. This poses a major threat to the finalization of KESSP II framework and its final roll out. Weak Monitoring & Evaluation structure: - despite the reported achievements of the sector, it is regrettable that little efforts have been focused on measuring the extent to which national goals of education are being achieved. Furthermore, the focus of our education on national examinations has left gaps in learning outcomes. Thus, owing to weak monitoring of programmes in the sector, their actual impact on the acquisition of the desired skills among learners has often been left to mere speculation. Participation and Inclusivity: - over the implementation period of KESSP I there have been no formal way designed for the participation of civil society/citizenry in the programme. This in effect makes monitoring the progress of the programme and ensuring social accountability in education hard to effect. The current arrangement where most of the stakeholders are not involved in monitoring the outcomes and financial performance of the 81 government-led programmes provides room for fraud, corruption and at times outright theft. Quality and Relevance: - as a result of the shortage of teachers especially at primary level, pupil teacher ratios have gone up particularly in urban slums and rural arid and semi-arid lands thus impacting negatively on quality of education. In addition, shortage of Quality Assurance and Standards officer’s has seriously undermined the critical role they are supposed to play in ensuring effective curriculum delivery. Reaching the un-reached children: - absence of and/or weak implementation structures of the programmes targeting the hard- to- reach children and other marginalized groups has seen the group receive inadequate funding. For example, the NFE sub sector lacks a broad partnership framework encompassing community based NGOs, Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), multi/bilateral agencies and key Ministries to enhance efforts to reach participation for out-of-school children and youth, including deliberate expansion of FPE grants to non- formal institutions. Moving Forward As the government and development partners continue to work on and finalize the strategy for KESSP II for the period 2011-2015 which seeks to allocate further resources to the key areas necessary to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All Goals (EFA), The following features stand out from the investment strategy.  The new investment plan bases its financing on a joint or pooled funding mechanism that has been in place since 2005.  The position of non state actors and NGOs has to be clearly defined. The CSOs have been able to use the limited project based funds received from external sources especially on promoting participatory governance and accountability in the sector and have important lessons to offer government in as far as reaching out to needy sections of the community is concerned.  The governance and monitoring framework still doesn’t incorporate strong input from outside the Government such as CBOs yet empowerment of communities is the best surveillance that can guarantee full accountability at local levels. It is suffice to say here, therefore, that support of civil society observations would improve governance and strengthening of the education sector management. This in turn would significantly enhance the impact of the aid component in the pooled funding mechanism. 82 Annex 10: List of Supporting Documents Abagi, Okwach. 2010. “Report on the Evaluation of the KESSP Infrastructure Investment Programmes.� Submitted to the Department for International Development (DFID), Nairobi Office by Own & Associates Ltd, Center for Research & Development. Angoye, J., C. Olang and C. Watola. 2010. “Needs Assessment of Non-Formal Schools in Kenya,� Preliminary Brief Report to Kenya Independent Schools Association. Bellew, R. 2010. “Kenya Education Sector Support Program 2005-2010: Context and Progress A background paper for the KESSP II FTI Appraisal, draft August 15. Bold, Tessa, Mwangi Kimenyi, Germano Mwabi and Justin Sandefur. 2010. “Does Abolishing Fees Reduce School Quality? Evidence from Kenya. Center for the Study of African Economies Working Paper WPS/2011-04. Brown, Kevin. 2010. “Primary Teacher Deployment A Discussion Paper.� Draft. March. Department of International Development (DFID). 2009. Most Vulnerable Children (MVC) supported schools. Interim note on findings. Nairobi. Epari, Charles, et al. 2008. “Oh! So we have been Under-reporting Nairobi Primary School Enrolment Rates? APHRC Working Paper No. 35. Nairobi. Hassanali, Zahra. 2008. Free Primary Education Programme: Community Perceptions of Stakeholder’s Roles and Responsibilities. UNICEF, May. IMF. 2010a. Kenya: Joint Staff Advisory Note of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report No. 10/133. May. _____. 2010b. Kenya: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation. January. _____. 2007. Kenya: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – 2003/04-2004/05 – Joint Staff Advisory Note. Japanese Technical Cooperation. September 2007. The Project on Strengthening of Mathematics and Science in Secondary Education (SAMASSE) Project Phase 2. Nairobi, Kenya. Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics. 2003. “Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003 Preliminary Report,� Nairobi, December. ________. 2009. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2008. Kenya National AIDS Control Council, 2008. UNGASS 2008 Country Report. Office of the President, Ministry of Special Programs. Lucas, Adrienne and Isaac Mbiti. 2009. “The Effect of Free Primary Education on Student Achievement: Evidence from Kenya. World Bank Kenya Education Sector Review, power point presentation. Lyon, Aileen and Gerrishon Ikiara. 2009. “An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Harmonization Alignment & Coordination Effort in Kenya. February. Lucas, Adrienne and Isaac Mbiti. 2009. “The Effect of Free Primary Education on Achievement: Evidence from Kenya.� World Bank power point presentation. Miers, Henrietta. 2010. Gender Analysis of the Education Sector, Kenya. UK Department for International Development. Project number 277914. Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of State for Planning, National Development. 2008. Vision 2030 Medium Term Plan 2008-2012 Onsomu, Eldah, Juliana Nzomo and Charles Obiero. 2005. “The SACMEQ II Project in Kenya: A Study of the Conditions of Schooling and the Quality of Education.� Harare: SACMEQ, Kenya Working Report #6. 83 Kenya National Audit Office. Project audit reports 2007-2009. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 2010. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2008- 09. June. Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics. 2007. Kenyan Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005/06. January, Volume I Basic Report. ________. 2004. with Ministry of Health, and ORC Macro. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003. Calverton, Maryland: CBS, MOH, and ORC Macro. Kenya National Examinations Council (KNEC). 2010. The Report on Monitoring Learner Achievement Study For Class Three in Literacy and Numeracy. Mills, Michael and Shobhana Sosale. March 2011. Governance and Risk Management in the Kenya Education Sector Support Program (KESSP). Background document for the KESSP Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) report. Nairobi, Kenya. Ministry of Education and Kenya National Audit Office and UK National Audit Office. 2009. Empowering School Communities: Experience of Providing Free Textbooks to Kenyan Primary Schools. September. Ministry of Education. 2008. Public Expenditure Review and Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 2009/10-2011/12. November. ________. 2008. “Kenya Education Sector Support Programme Monitoring and Evaluation Reports 2007-2008.� ________. 2007. Public Expenditure Review and Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2008/09-2010/11. ________. 2006-2009. Annual Joint Education Sector Review and Budget Review Aide Memoires, presentations and related documents. ________. ________. KESSP Performance Review. Draft Summary Report for Review and Comment by Ministry of Education. 2007. Nairobi. Promin Consultants Limited. 2005. “Mid-Term Report on Baseline Survey on Learning Achievement.� Submitted to The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Nairobi, 30 December. PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 2006. Free Primary Education Support Project Expenditure Tracking Study – Final Report. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, March. Read, Tony and Nicholas Read. 2008. “Free Day Secondary Education Tuition Vote Management Training and Research Report.� International Education Partners, UK. September. Republic of Kenya. A Handbook of Financial Management: Instructions for Primary Schools. Revised July 2010. Ministry of Education. Nairobi. ________. Financial Management Manual MoHEST HQ, Field Offices and SAGAs. Issued by Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 2005, and revised manual of June 2010 incorporating additional governance measures by Ministry of Education. Nairobi. SACMEQ results: http://www.sacmeq.org/. Thompson, A., Woods E. and Onsomu E. 2009. “Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative Country Case Study: Kenya.� Cambridge Education, Mokoro, Oxford Policy Management. Draft May 23. Transparency International Kenya. 2010. Kenya Education Sector. Integrity Study Report. 84 USAID and Ministry of Education. 2008. Final Report on the Kenya Education Management Capacity Assessment (KEMACA). UWEZO.net. 2010. Are Our Children Learning? Annual Learning Assessment Report Kenya 2010. Wasanga, Paul M., O.A. Mukhtar and R. M. Wambua, 2010. The Report on Monitoring Learner Achievement Study for Class 3 in Literacy and Numeracy. Kenya National Assessment Center. World Bank. 2010. “Kenya Economic Update: Running on One Engine: Kenya’s Uneven Economic Performance.� Africa Region Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. Edition No. 2. ________. 2008. Quality Assurance Group (QAG) Assessment. May 2008. Washington, D.C. ________. 2007. Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Credit in the Amount of SDR 36.7 million (US$55 million equivalent) to the Republic of Kenya for a Free Primary Education Project. Human Development 1, Eastern Africa 2, Africa Region ________. 2006. Kenya Education Sector Support Project Staff Appraisal Report. Washington, DC: World Bank Report No. 32629-KE. 85 Annex 11: Original Project Components The project was structured around four main components and 23 investment subprograms which are summarized below. (I) Ensure equity of access to basic education (US$154.0 million). The desired key outcome of this component was to reduce disparities in education opportunity due to wealth, geographical location and gender, by creating an opportunity for all children (including those of the poorest families and those living in remote areas) to attend a school of acceptable quality. This was to be achieved through 5 investment subprograms, targeting specific beneficiaries: (i) Primary school infrastructure subprogram (US$88.0 million). The subprogram objective was to improve access. This was to be achieved by: (a) rehabilitating dilapidated schools and construction of additional facilities in existing schools in poorest areas; and (b) constructing new primary schools in areas where there was overcrowding in existing schools and/or where there were no primary schools based on priority needs across the country. Identification of location was to be based on a comprehensive analysis of the 2004 school mapping data (overcrowding, greatest demand, longest distance), and other interim intervention criteria as applicable. (ii) Non-formal schools (US$26. million). The subprogram objective was to strengthen the capacity of non-formal schools. This was to be achieved by: (a) developing a curriculum on non-formal education; (b) providing grants for instructional materials to Non-formal Schools (NFSs) and Non-formal Education Centers (NFECs), and rehabilitation or construction of infrastructure; (c) introducing non-formal education management information systems; (d) building management capacity; and (e) mainstreaming and coordinating non-formal schools and centers. (iii) Special needs education (US$20.0 million). The subprogram objective was to improve special needs education. This was to be achieved by: (a) conducting a national survey on special needs education; (b) providing equipment and the relevant instructional materials; (c) training teachers; (d) providing grants for special needs education; (e) promoting advocacy and awareness creation; and (f) financing operating costs. (iv) Adult basic education (US$17.0 million). The subprogram objective was to improve the quality of basic education. This was to be achieved by: (a) establishing a program on quality assurance and accreditation; (b) establishing a program on partnership for collaborative program support; and (c) establishing a program for monitoring and evaluation of the subprogram. (v) Expanding basic education opportunities in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) (US$2.0 million). The subprogram objective was to improve educational opportunities. This was to be achieved by establishing mobile schools. 86 (vi) Gender and education investment program (US$1.0 million). The subprogram objective was to ensure that gender aspects received attention through the KESSP implementation. This was to be achieved by: (a) preparing a Gender and Education Policy; (b) increasing enrolment and retention of girls in schools (and boys where applicable), girls’ participation and performance in education; and (c) water and environmental sanitation in schools. (II) Enhance quality and learning achievement (US$735.0 million). The desired key outcome of this component was to ensure that a set of essential inputs was available to every child, that these inputs were effectively utilized, that learning was the central focus of what was happening in the classroom, that learning progress was regularly measured, and that the quality of schooling was effectively monitored and supported. Also included in the component were subprograms on teacher development and communication technology in education. These were to be achieved through 8 investment subprograms, targeting specific beneficiaries: (i) Early childhood and development (ECD) (US$32.0 million). The subprogram objective was to enhance the quality of ECD. This was to be achieved by: (a) developing national policy guidelines and service standards on early childhood development; (b) reviewing and updating the curriculum on ECD; (c) mobilizing and building the capacity of communities on ECD through awareness creation; and (d) providing community support grants to promote early childhood access, health, nutrition, and primary school readiness. (ii) School health, nutrition and meals (US$121.0 million). The subprogram objective was to enhance the school meals program. This was to be achieved by: (a) promoting health, education and parasite prevention; (b) building capacity on school health and meals program; and (c) monitoring the school health and meals program. (iii) Primary school instructional materials (US$475.0 million). The subprogram objective was to provide all public primary schools and non-formal schools with instructional materials in order to increase access and address quality. This was to be achieved through the logical development of a continuous and well tested set of reforms in textbook financing through a basic decentralized instructional materials system on which the IDA FPESP procurement system was based, and one which was pioneered by a pilot project supported by the Dutch Government which was launched in Laikipia and Machakos Districts in 1996. From 1999 until 2006 the pilot project initiatives were further developed by the Government/ DFID SPRED 3 project, which extended the same basic principles to every district in Kenya. These were successful, established programs for the provision of textbooks and other materials at primary level through the school level SIMBA account. There was evidence from various studies that there were positive impacts of the textbooks and teacher guides on teaching and learning. They included improvements in student retention and attendance, students’ appreciation of the new books leading to their improved performance in school, and easing the teaching challenge for teachers 87 who were able to convey skills and knowledge more quickly, and enabling them to give homework assignments. The continuation of the established program through the KESSP was to be achieved by: (a) providing instructional materials; (b) providing funds for general purposes; (c) reprinting instructional materials; and (d) providing stationery and equipment. (iv) In-service Primary Teacher Education (INSET) (US$37.0 million). The subprogram objective was to extend the INSET program. This was to be achieved by: (a) extending the successful School-based Teacher Development Program (SbTD) which was one component of the MOEST Strengthening Primary Education (SPRED 2) Project II, support by DFID, to include the training of an additional 36,000 Key Resource Teachers (18,500 Kiswahili KRTs and 18,500 Guidance and Counseling teachers—one in every school in the country).; and (b) continuing the second national program of school-based development called the School Empowerment Program (SEP). (v) Pre-service teacher education (US$18.0 million). The subprogram objective was to strengthen primary teacher training. This was to be achieved by: (a) establishing a Local Resource Center and equipping it with the relevant materials and equipment; (b) providing funds in the form of bursaries to needy students; (c) providing transport to primary teacher training colleges; and (d) monitoring of pre-service teacher program. (vi) Quality assurance and standards (US$27.0 million). The subprogram objective was to ensure a quality of education with standards. This was to be achieved by: (a) establishing a national assessment system; (b) harmonizing training in learning achievement studies; (c) setting up an examination item banking system; and (d) monitoring student achievement. These were to be undertaken by the KNEC. The KIE was to: (a) undertake curriculum review and material for non-science students, adult basic education for the Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) and Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) equivalent; (b) ensure curriculum support material production and induction of teachers; and (c) explore alternative teaching/learning approaches. (vii) In-service training for secondary teachers to upgrade mathematics and science instruction (US$20.0 million). The subprogram objective was to promote stronger mathematics and science instruction. This was to be achieved by providing INSET to upgrade mathematics and science teaching. (viii) Information and communication technology in education (US$5.0 million). The subprogram objective was to promote information and communication technology in the classroom. This was to be achieved by: (a) preparing an ICT policy and strategic plan; (b) establishing an educational administrative system; (c) e-learning delivery system; (d) developing the ICT infrastructure; and (e) capacity building for the use of technology in the classroom and in education administration. 88 (III) Provide opportunities for further education and training (secondary, TIVET, university) (US$389.0 million). The desired key outcome of this component was to expand the number of students that could continue with education or training after completing primary school. The surge in enrolment that was created by FPE had increased the demand for access to secondary education. This was to be achieved through 4 investment subprograms, targeting specific beneficiaries: (i) Guidance and counseling (US$6.0 million). The subprogram objective was to develop prepare a comprehensive guidance and counseling framework for a cross- section of beneficiaries. This was to be achieved by: (a) developing a policy for all education institutions; (b) developing, implementing, and monitoring of training programs for teachers and learners; (c) developing and disseminating information booklet and materials on careers; and (d) developing a counseling service at the workplace in the MoE. (ii) Secondary education (US$168.0 million). The subprogram objective was to increase access to and improve the quality of secondary education. This was to be achieved by: (a) providing bursaries/scholarships especially to the poor and disadvantaged students; (b) constructing classrooms in urban slums including providing the schools with basic equipment and facilities; (c) supplying science equipment in targeted schools; (d) recruiting teachers and providing them with in- service training; (e) providing ICT in secondary schools; and (f) introducing open and distance learning (ODL) strategies. (iii) Technical, Industrial and Vocational Education and Training (TIVET) (US$45.0 million). The subprogram objective was to improve access to and support the provision of quality TIVET instruction. This was to be achieved by: (a) developing a national skills training strategy; (b) enhancing transition from primary to TIVET; (c) establishing centers of excellence in TIVET; (d) enhancing skills for automation and computer integration in industry; (e) setting up and operationalizing a bursary awards program; and (f) establishing production centers in TIVET institutions for teaching and producing goods and services for sale. (iv) University education (US$170.0 million). The subprogram objective was to improve equity in access to university education. This was to be achieved by: (a) developing a university education strategy; (b) introducing governance and efficiency in the management of university education; and (c) enhancing the use of information technology in public universities through the provision of ICT equipment and training. (IV) Strengthen sector management (US$76.3 million). The desired key outcome of this component was to develop the capacity of the implementing structures of the KESSP, and provide supporting tools including education management information system (EMIS), and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). These were to be achieved through 6 investment subprograms plus one on communications strategy in 2008/09, targeting specific beneficiaries. 89 (i) HIV/AIDS (US$56.0 million). The subprogram objective was to mainstreaming HIV/AIDS mitigation in education in line with the Government’s Policy on HIV/AIDS which includes prevention, care & support, and workplace issues especially strengthening AIDS Control Units and supporting university ACUs in HIV/AIDS and drug dependency initiatives. This was to be achieved by: (a) maximizing the potential strengths of education institutions in all sub-sectors to help prevent new infections; (b) extending evidence-based initiatives to the widest scale possible, whilst maintaining effectiveness; (c) utilizing existing training capacity and teaching and learning resources strategically and cost-effectively; (d) protecting, caring and providing support to the most vulnerable, including orphans, girls, those out-of-school and those with special needs in education; (e) leading others in developing strong multi-sectoral partnerships; (f) mobilizing education services providers to implement HIV/AIDS policy in the full and in conjunction with other sectors; and (vii) strengthening and extending the response to the prevention and care needs of education service providers. (ii) Capacity building (US$11.0 million). The subprogram objective was to build the capacity of educational institutions staff at Headquarters, SAGAs, provincial and district education office staff, primary schools, secondary schools, TIVET institutions, and universities. This was to be achieved by: (a) developing capacity building courses and delivering them at national, provincial, district, or educational institution level; (b) capacity programs delivery through on-the-job training with the support of technical assistance; and (c) enabling participation at national level and international level capacity development programs in various fields of study for different target audiences/beneficiaries. The capacity development courses comprised: (a) financial management and procurement; (b) textbooks procurement: (c) infrastructure development plans; (d) overall policy development, programming, implementation and management; (e) primary and secondary school management; (f) District Education Boards (DEBs) management; and (g) governance, ethics, anti- corruption and accountability. (iii) Education management information system (US$7.0 million). The subprogram objective was to improve MoE’s data collection, analysis and dissemination capacity. This was to be achieved by: (a) harmonizing education data between EMIS, TSC, KNEC and other sources; (b) providing ICT equipment for data processing and management; (c) establishing Local Area Networks (LANS) for information sharing; and (d) training of education staff at all levels in the management of EMIS for policy and planning. (iv) Teacher management (US$0.3 million). The subprogram objective was to improve teacher deployment and management. This was to be achieved by: (a) redefining the role of the Teachers Service Commission (TSC) agency functions by revising the relevant Acts related to the performance of core functions of the TSC with a view to legalizing some of the agencies that were not legally recognized, such as DEBs and BOGs; (b) capacity building for teachers, districts and TSC headquarters 90 to perform devolved functions; (c) improve the efficiency of teacher deployment and utilization system by implementing the recommendations of the ongoing study on staffing norms; and (d) monitoring and evaluation of the actions to be undertaken. Since teacher management is a sensitive issue, TSC was to regularly and closely monitor and evaluate the implementation of the intended reforms with a view to review. (v) Monitoring and evaluation (US$2.0 million). The subprogram objective was to ensure effective monitoring and evaluation of the KESSP. This was to be achieved by: (a) preparing the KESSP baseline; (b) establishing a process monitoring system; and (c) commissioning impact evaluations. 91 Annex 12: KESSP Coordination, Advisory and Oversight Structures An Education Stakeholder Forum (ESF) would provide an institutional framework for coordination and information sharing between Government and non-state education providers, and would receive progress reports on KESSP implementation. The forum would be comprised of the Ministers and Permanent Secretaries of Education, and representatives from NGOs, CBOS, Faith Based Organizations, private sector and trade unions. It would meet at twice a year or additionally when need arises. National Education Advisory Council (NEAC) whose role is to advise the Minister, mobilize resources and advocate on key issues regarding the education sector. The Council would be comprised of the Ministers and Permanent Secretaries of Education, representatives of universities, the private sector, NGOs, school head associations, National Environment Management Authority, KIPPRA, KNUT as well as eminent industrialists and educationists. The council ought to hold meetings twice a year or additionally when need arises. GoK - Development Partners Coordination Committee whose role is to “review and discuss� KESSP implementation, and resource mobilization and utilization issues). The Committee comprises development partners and Senior MoE managers and is to meet bi-monthly with quarterly meetings chaired by PS MoE. Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee whose role is to coordinate efforts and roles of government departments with a stake in education and training. Participating on this committee are the Permanent Secretaries of concerned Ministries. KESSP Steering Committee whose role is to monitor KESSP implementation, provide guidance and decisions on implementation, advise on resource allocations and be held accountable for implementation performance. The Committee was chaired by the Education Secretary and comprised all directors and heads of SAGAs and support departments, and members of KESSP Secretariat. KESSP Secretariat whose role it is to monitor and evaluate KESSP programs, provide support to KESSP management units, and coordinate program documentation and reporting. 92 Annex 13: Progress on KESSP Governance Strengthening Plan Issue Action Status as at October 2006 Achieved Partially Achieved Not Achieved 1. Monitoring and Analysis of 2005 Data available for 40 districts With delay Evaluation for school census data (out of 76), preliminary Results-based validation and cleaning of the Management datasets done. MoE and TSC data TSC & MoE databases need to MoE and TSC be reconciled by linking TSC, databases linked in KNEC, MoST and MoE school 2008/09; KNEC and codes MoHEST data not yet linked. Analysis of 2005 Initial survey results now KIHBS survey data household survey available for preliminary was analyzed in 2009 (KIHBS survey) analysis and presented at the data KESSP ABRW, but policymakers did not use the data and analysis to monitor the KESSP. Governance survey Governance survey planned for by CBS September 2006 Not achieved Literacy Survey Country-wide survey ongoing Achieved with delay. Short messaging SMS server and technology use No incentive for services (SMS) in place. Head teachers and MoE and MoST to quality assurance officers in test and roll-out Kajiado and Nairobi trained in the use of the use of SMS for data submission SMS tool. & communication. KESSP impact KESSP first year of Achieved with significant study implementation completed. delay. Mid-term review turned out to be an end-of program evaluation of unsatisfactory quality. Monitoring of Program indicators and targets Review of progress results are indicated in the KESSP. against KESSP Indicators are reviewed in indicators only took individual IP work plans. place in 2009 at the Joint Review. KESSP implementation could not be adjusted at mid- term to factor in the new challenges identified through the risk-based indepth audit of the Program. The Joint Review has been Joint Review was institutionalized. institutionalized until October 2010. 2. Community Continuation of There is a well managed Achieved involvement and community program in place for social participation in decentralized procurement and accountability  management of storage of Instructional Instructional Materials. Formation on grants Materials Program and supplies is locally displayed at all schools. Field offices maintain lists of all suppliers in the district and schools they serve. Instructional Sample monitoring is Achieved materials conducted yearly. management unit School audit unit Undertakes audit every year Schools not audited every year due to prohibitive cost Quality assurance Conducts quality assurance While the quality services every year assurance teams have visited schools, areas 93 of intervention for improvements have not been explicitly identified & followed through. Complete design of Considerable work has already Although the design of decentralized been done to train communities the program is sound and school and education officers in over significant capacity infrastructure 1,000 schools in 12 districts. development has taken development These schools have been place, it is evident that targeted (using clear and lapses in oversight at poverty-focused criteria) for MoE HQ level have infrastructure development resulted in jeopardizing grants. School infrastructure the program development accounts have been opened at pilot schools (using similar procedures as in line with the successful instructional materials program). Publication of Contracting started with Improved transparency information at funding from the school in information access, school level on improvement grants in FY06/07 however, community contracting monitoring efficacy activities for school varies across the infrastructure country. program. Introduction of Commitment made to introduce Constituency Report community score them in the first year of the Cards completed; cards KESSP National Taxpayers Assn. Citizen Report Card also completed; Follow-up on results during KESSP Phase II. 3. Consultations, Implementation of Optimal use made of MoE Although Transparency and communications website and other media about communications There is no Information strategy the KESSP and implementation strategy was developed systematic Disclosure  results the consistent roll-out information and improvements in disclosure communications have not taken place during the implementation of Phase I KESSP. MoE’s press briefings have been in the areas of exams results and specifically linked to the governance, fraud & corruption issues identified in 2009. Client satisfaction First client satisfaction survey Supervision has been surveys for FPE conducted used to obtain information on client satisfaction/. Consultative Donor/MoE consultative Achieved regularly until Harmonization of Minutes of the meetings meetings held quarterly June 2010 education services meetings not made partially achieved available publicly. The MoE/KEPSA now holding quarterly meetings. 4. Transparent Pro-poor orientation MoE has maintained pro-poor Achieved through the Program and Efficient of the education orientation of budget with preparation of annual budgeting was not Resource budget emphasis on FPE, targeting Sector Reports which rolled out until Allocation  infrastructure development and provide the basis for pro- FY10/11 improvements in ASAL areas poor program budget and urban slums; school feeding allocations through the in food deficit areas and urban fiscal year budget. slums; and bursaries for the needy students. Public expenditure An independent PET has been First PETS undertaken in Institutionalization tracking completed, concluding that 2005; follow-on PETS of the PETs on an “Overall, the flow of funds has attempted in 2008/09. annual basis has 94 been efficient, with schools Ed-PETS pilot now been a challenge receiving funds allocated on ongoing in 2010/11. due to the time.� prohibitive cost of the exercise. Public Expenditure Conducted annually to feed the Education PER was Constituency Citizen Review budget carried out in FY09/10 Report Card completed; National Taxpayers Assn. Citizen Report Card completed Reform of Revised guidelines were issued Achieved secondary school for distribution and (PWC study of 2007/08; bursary scheme identification IDA Additional Financing designed in 2009 with Plans for a bursary study are reformed secondary ongoing bursary scheme. Project was not submitted to the Board due to F&C issues in the sector). Improve MoE and TSC are Teacher rebalancing Public information distribution of implementing a teacher exercise had on teachers has teachers rebalancing exercise, with commenced in 2007, not yet been made district balancing completed but the work was public interrupted in 2008 Decision taken by officials to with the post-election Multi-grade redeploy teachers based on new emergency which teaching has not norm 45:1 pupil-teacher ratio, caused severe been introduced in use of part-time or contract constraints bringing to schools with small teachers; multi-grade teaching the fore the ethnic classes in schools with small classes. dimensions of teacher rebalancing; Contract Need based recruitment of teachers’ recruitment teachers. pilot was implemented. Control Schools being established by School mapping exercise Solution to mushrooming of communities through CDF has been completed for uncoordinated schools 2007, but dynamic data estbmt of schools Too many schools coming up collection has not yet not yet identified leading to teacher demand commenced since school mapping has not yet been officially launched CDF schools posing registration problems. Secondary teachers Policy decision taken for New Staffing have increased workloads to be increased Norms proposal teaching loads has been before between 25-30 Cabinet for hours per week several years now without any decision. 5. Fiduciary Financial Pilot on a risk-based internal Pilot risk-based internal No public Management and management audit approach started and the audit was completed disclosure of Controls  strengthening preliminary risk assessment was findings completed, with greater use being made of electronic funds remittance arrangements to schools Manuals made available Financial management manuals to all education insttns. for different management levels produced Initial training course Staff at all levels received conducted for KESSP program training in governance & team leaders on governance anti-corruption issues (May 2006) Capacity for FMS 700 peer educators trained in Periodic training on and financial financial management financial management to reporting officers at HQ, provincial, district, educational 8 officers trained in financial institutions, and schools monitoring reporting levels. While overall capacity has increased, 95 capacity development and its impact need to be measured regularly due to high staff turnover. 15,600 Head teachers trained in Difficulties for financial management training to keep pace with an increasing turnover of head teachers. KESSP FMR format agreed KESSP FMRs upon. prepared but not on time and to acceptable standard. Financial Controls Payment schedules for FPE Disbursements grants are checked by various information never departments before posted on website disbursements Checking by Discipline of head teachers who various flout financial management department of all guidelines grants did not take place due to collusion/ F&C. Procurement Procurement bill has become Achieved. Capacity strengthening law assessed to be relatively weak especially for roll- Procurement regulations are out of new policy of Free under review to ensure Day Secondary Education consistency with KESSP plans. (FDSE) in 2008. MoE procurement manuals Achieved. have been developed for all levels. Procurement plans are being Public prepared to guide and monitor accountability of progress of KESSP contracts has been implementation an issue throughout the KESSP Phase I period. MoE procurement department Additional staff strengthened from 0 in 2003 to recruited prior to IDA 14 officers in 2006 effectiveness, but not maintained throughout the KESSP Phase I implementation period. Disciplinary actions Following the 2009 MoE follow fiduciary indepth audit through in the first disciplinary cases years of relating to improper implementation procurement of was inconsistent capacity building and incomplete activities were publicized. 6. Organization, School management The following already exist: Continual capacity management structures school instructional materials development activities structures, management committees; undertaken throughout accountability and school infrastructure the KESSP Phase I legal framework  management committees (in period, but unable to pilot schools); Boards of keep up with the pace Governors (secondary schools); of staff turnover school management committees. Ministry of KESSP Inter-ministerial Committee not Education committee established. established. structures Ministerial Senior Management Monthly meetings Committee functioning well undertaken regularly during the initial years of implemtn. KESSP Steering Committee Meetings regularly held during the initial years of 96 implementation, but not since 2009 KESSP Secretariat in place Estbd & functioning in Years 1, 2, & 3, however, roles & responsibilities were liberally interpreted leading to ineffective coordination over time. Budget committee in place Achieved at Government level through the Sector Report preparation process. Audit committee in place Indepth risk-based Audit findings audits have not been have not been systematic. publicized regularly Teachers Service Field agents appointed with The TSC Commission delegated functions. governance Teachers Service Appeals aspects have been Problems identified Tribunal estbd. at national level difficult and in Transparency Professional committees set up intractable with International Report to deal with cases involving resistance from especially employees. Code of ethics teachers to MoE’s concerning developed for employees. pilot Citizen perceptions of Decentralized management to Report Card. teacher recruitment districts and school levels. Recruitment guidelines have been reviewed. Teachers employed only where vacancies exist and through advertisement. Problems identified Working with TI Kenya for Teachers in Transparency monitoring and evaluation of governance issues International Report organizational systems have been concerning the difficult to Integrity Division Integrity Division estbd. In implement due to 2003 the significant political power Staff have been sensitized on wielded by the corruption issues. Information TSC. The materials developed for teachers’ unions awareness of corruption have focused solely on seeking 23 corruption prevention civil service pay committees estbd. In all major scales and service areas for process, resisting true procedures and system checks. social accountability measures. Exams Council Security mechanism in place Achieved. The Exams Council has reviewed Posting of examination results administration and in the website management of the entire Learning Assessment process and program, and has institutionalized a National Assessment Framework Policy Exams results are publicly announced and posted on the MoE website. Higher Education Strategy on higher education Achieved with a two-year now underway. delay. Report drafted of Public Report drafted in Universities Inspection Board. 2007/08. Competitive process of Capacity development recruitment of senior study completed with management in use IDA support Depoliticization of university Difficult issue to 97 management and environment get traction for in general results Capacity building initiatives Implementation undertaken underway. Improvement of terms of and Difficult issue to conditions of service of staff get traction for results Rationalization of academic Part I study on University Difficult issue to programs underway. Education Financing get traction for completed with IDA results. support; Rationalization of institutions study scheduled for FY12. Capacity building for students Difficult issue to union representatives. get traction for results. 98 IBRD 33426R2 K E N YA CITIES AND TOWNS MAIN ROADS DISTRICT CAPITALS* RAILROADS NATIONAL CAPITAL DISTRICT BOUNDARIES RIVERS INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES *not all District Capitals are shown. 34°E 36°E 38°E 40°E 42°E SOUTH SUDAN To Murle ETHIOPIA To Karungu Juba Lotikipi Plain Lokichokio Chalbi To 4°N 4°N Desert To Ramu Mandera Imi Kakuma Dila lls Lake Hi Sololo Tu r k a n a North Horr Moyale Mandera sa Turkana is Lodwar an D Marsabit el Turkw Buna El Wak UGANDA Lokichar South Horr Marsabit Tarbaj . tns 2°N Kangatet M Wajir 2°N to West Pokot do Lo g N aB Wajir Che Samburu og al ran Lak Bor ga Isiolo SO M A L I A Milgis Hil ny ls ’iro To Trans Nzoia Elgeyo/ Maralal Ng Bilesha Plain Mbale Kitale Kapedo Marakwet Ewaso Mando Baringo Archer’s Gashi Bungoma Uasin Post Garba To Gishu Tula Kampala Busia Marigat Eldoret Kakamega Isiolo Mbalambala Kakamega Laikipia D e ra To Nandi Nyahururu Meru Lak Kismaayo Butere Nanyuki Vihiga Falls 0° Siaya Mt. Kenya 0° Kisumu Kisumu Nyandarua (5,199 m) Tana Kericho Tharaka-Nithi Nakuru Nyeri Kirinyaga Homa Bay Kericho Nakuru Garissa Garissa Nyeri Embu Nyamira Gilgil Karungu Embu Nguni Bomet Murang'a Lake Migori Kisii ra Thika Ma Kiambu Bura Victoria To Narok Narok Kolbio To Bur Gavo Musoma Lolgorien Ma NAIROBI Ngang u E Nairobi Machakos Kitui Kitui erab sc arp Tana River eli Machakos Thua Plain me nt Konza Magadi Makueni Bodhei 2°S Kajiado Ya t t Ikutha Lamu 2°S To a A th i Seronera Pla tea Garsen Kibwezi u Lamu Namanga To Arusha Tsavo Kilifi Galana Tsavo To Moshi Voi Malindi INDIA N KENYA TANZANIA Taita/Taveta Mackinnon Park OCEA N This map was produced by Mombasa the Map Design Unit of The 4°S Kwale Mombasa World Bank. The boundaries, Kwale colors, denominations and 0 40 80 120 160 200 Kilometers any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Shimoni Group, any judgment on the 0 40 80 120 Miles To Dar Es Salaam legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such 34°E 36°E 38°E 40°E boundaries. JULY 2011