65880 ParticiPatory Forest ManageMent and redd+ in tanzania The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funders. Supporting research for this document was carried out from July to October 2010. ii Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania Photo by Arne Hoel ParticiPatory Forest ManageMent and redd+ in tanzania By Tom Blomley, Kahana Lukumbuzya and Gernot Brodnig THE WORLD BANK Acknowledgements This report is part of the World Bank’s analytical work on the social dimensions of REDD+, led by Gernot Brodnig, Senior Social Development Specialist, SDV. The study was written by Tom Blomley, Kahana Lukumbuzya (Independent Consultants) and Gernot Brodnig. During the review process, valuable contributions and comments were received from Diji Chandrasekharan, Neeta Hooda, Robin Mearns, Carole Megevand, Christian Peter (all World Bank). This publication was made possible by a grant from the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD). For more information, visit www.worldbank.org/sdcc. This publication should be cited as: Blomley, T, Lukumbuzya, K.and Brodnig, G. 2011. Participatory Forest Management and REDD+ in Tanzania. World Bank. contents Background...................................................................................................... 1 Forest tenure and carbon rights ................................................................ 2 Benefit sharing.............................................................................................. 4 Distributing carbon benefits between national and district levels ...........6 Distributing carbon benefits within communities ................................... 10 awareness, consultation and consent..................................................... 13 Monitoring, reporting and Verification (MrV) .....................................16 conclusions and policy implications ....................................................... 21 Forest tenure and carbon rights ................................................................ 21 Benefit sharing ........................................................................................... 21 Awareness, consultation and consent ...................................................... 22 Monitoring, reproting and verification ..................................................... 22 references ................................................................................................... 24 iii iv Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania Background and Tourism, Forestry and Beekeeping Division (MNRT-FBD), the Prime Minister’s Office, Tanzania’s land, local government and forest and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock laws mean that rural communities have well- and Environment in Zanzibar. This task force defined rights to own, manage and benefit from has prepared a National REDD+ Framework forest and woodland resources within their document, which provides a vision of future local areas through the establishment of village REDD+ outcomes and processes, as well as the forests. This approach, known by practitioners key challenges to be addressed if goals are to as Community Based Forest Management be met, followed more recently by a National (CBFM) results in the legal establishment of REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan. With support Village Land Forest Reserves, Community Forest from the Norwegian government, several REDD+ Reserves or Private Forests. By 2008, 1,460 demonstration projects have been launched, villages on mainland Tanzania1 were involved spread across different parts of the country, in establishing or managing village forests implemented by national and international covering a total of over 2.345 million hectares. NGOs A further 863 villages are currently involved Since its genesis in Tanzania in the early in Joint Forest Management (JFM) approaches 1990s, a significant body of experience has within government forest reserves, in which emerged regarding how and under which management responsibilities are shared between conditions participatory forest management government and local communities. 1.78 million (PFM) approaches appear to have worked best, hectares of forest reserve under central or local as well as some of the underlying constraints to government jurisdiction are now under JFM its scaling up (Blomley and Iddi 2009). Many arrangements. of these lessons are of great relevance to the Since 2008, the Tanzanian government has emerging REDD+ systems and structures being been making preparations for the establishment developed through the REDD+ Task Force. of systems and structures for REDD+ (Reduced This report has been prepared to provide Emissions from Deforestation and Forest inputs to the development of policy processes Degradation). Tanzania is being supported in its currently evolving in Tanzania regarding REDD+. preparations by the World Bank’s Forest Carbon This review draws on almost two decades of Partnership Facility (FCPF), UN-REDD+ and the experience within Tanzania on the development Norwegian Forests and Climate Initiative as well and establishment of PFM—an approach which as a number of local and international NGOs. (like REDD+), aims to achieve the combined As part of its preparations, the Tanzanian objectives of sustainable forest management with government has established a REDD+ task secure rights, improved local forest governance force with membership drawn from the Vice- and secure livelihoods for forest-dependent President’s Office, Division of Environment communities. (VPO-DoE), the Ministry of Natural Resources The report is presented in four main sections, namely: 1 • Forest tenure and carbon rights; Legislation regarding land, forests, local government and environment differ between mainland Tanzania and • Benefit sharing; Zanzibar. Photo by Tom Blomley Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 1 • Awareness, consultation and consent; and situations when forest (and carbon) tenure rights • Monitoring, reporting and verification. are clear and enforceable, and when these rights and responsibilities are devolved to the lowest Each section presents relevant experiences and possible level. lessons from PFM, assesses current status within Clearly, the unfolding debate over REDD+ REDD+ and then presents options regarding and carbon rights has much that can be learned how these experiences can be incorporated from the experiences of PFM. Carbon tenure into emerging REDD+ proposals in Tanzania. (and by implication the rights to any payments Proposals, recommendations and policy options that arise as the result of reduced emissions) are presented in a final concluding section. remains one of the most complex and potentially controversial issues in the emerging debate on REDD+, not only in Tanzania, but also in Forest tenure and carbon rights many other countries. A binding decision by government on the allocation or transfer of Tanzania is currently promoting two different carbon rights has yet to be taken. The following models of PFM—one where forest management section reviews land and forest tenure systems rights and responsibilities are transferred from in Tanzania and explores future options for the central or local government to community allocation of carbon rights and revenues. institutions in a legally enforceable manner Land in Tanzania is divided into three broad (CBFM) and one where responsibilities for categories—“reserved� land, “village� land management are shared between the state and and “general� land. Reserved land is land set local actors (JFM) and where rights are largely aside by the government for a specific purpose unclear. Of the two models being promoted in (such as biodiversity conservation through the Tanzania, CBFM appears to be the more effective establishment of nature reserves or national in improving forest condition and reducing parks). Village land is land that is under the overall levels of forest disturbance. Studies direct management of village governments and conducted over the past five to ten years all point includes land for settlement as well as local to the fact that when clear and enforceable rights use, contained within the “village area.� The together with corresponding responsibilities 1999 Village Land Act defines general land as are fully devolved (as under CBFM), incentives a residual category—‘all public land which is appear to be sufficient for communities to invest not reserved land or village land’. In contrast in forest restoration and long term management and somewhat confusingly, the 1999 Land Act (Blomley et al.2008). In situations where defines general land as ‘all public land, which community managers are subject to weaker is not reserved land or village land and includes tenure, unclear rights and external governance unoccupied or unused village land’. There are influences, the link to improvements in forest no provisions in either Act that clarify to what management and conditions appear to be less exactly the definition of unoccupied and unused clear (Persha and Blomley, 2009). These findings refers. suggest therefore that verifiable emission As a result of these legal inconsistencies, reductions from reduced deforestation and forest interpretations vary widely between different degradation are more likely to be realized in parts of government about the true extent of 2 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania village land and general land. (See Box 1) The Box 1 REDD+ Framework Document (United Republic Village Land or general Land? of Tanzania 2009) states that “17.3 million The Jane Goodall Institute (JGI) has developed a REDD+ hectares (49% of all forest land) are unprotected demonstration pilot project in western Tanzania. The project forests in General Land�. The National Land site encompasses the vast Masito-Ugalla Ecosystem (MUE). Use Planning Commission (within the Ministry The MUE is a forested landscape of approximately 10,827 km2, of Lands) indicate however, that general lands composed mostly of native miombo woodlands and includes cover only 2% of the country, with village 13 villages. The MUE is made up of approximately 470 km2 of lands covering over 70% and reserved lands the woodlands actively managed by the 13 villages and on village land; an additional 1,538 km2 of woodlands within two National remaining 28% (United Republic of Tanzania, Forest Reserves; and an additional 2,683 km2 of forest and 2010). woodland described by FBD as “General Lands�. This inconsistency creates further legal grey areas with regard to the management and This “General Lands� designation has been challenged by a beneficiaries of timber harvesting on village land. number of key individuals in the surrounding 13 villages, arguing that these lands are ancestral, customary in nature and used The Forest Act (2002) assigns the responsibility by villagers before the “villagization� exercise of the 1970s. As for managing forests (and collecting “royalties�- a result, they argue that they are village lands and should be a form of harvesting tax) on general lands to the managed by the village council. Staff from the District Council Forestry and Beekeeping Division, at national (supported by NGOs such as JGI) argue that these areas are level, a task that is often delegated to District “unused and unoccupied� and due to their size and distance Forest Officers and District Councils. When trees from villages are difficult to manage. Consequently, they argue that the land is general land and administration falls under the are harvested from Village Land Forest Reserves, remit of central government. no royalties are payable, as a means to create incentives to local managers (in effect, the trees are considered “tax free�). Villagers may charge unclear carbon rights through REDD+. prevailing market rates for the sale of timber. Although the question of uncertainties However, trees that are on village land, but regarding landownership and tenure is described outside Village Land Forest Reserves are taxed in the R-PP, this is not followed by an analysis by central government (through the payment of possible options or actions. With regard to the of royalties), although management decisions allocation of carbon tenure, one option being regarding their harvesting are taken jointly discussed is that carbon rights follow tree and with village leaders. Villagers may negotiate a land tenure rights. If this decision is taken, a fee for the value of the timber but this is often number of legal issues will require clarification only sufficient to compensate local laborers for and agreement, such as: identifying and harvesting valuable trees. Where • the status and legal definition of “unused the boundaries between village land and general and unoccupied� village land, outside land are uncertain, roles and responsibilities village land forest reserves and in particular with regard to the management of trees, as well those lands with extensive forest or as the payment and beneficiaries of royalties woodland cover; and other revenues is often uncertain and open • the extent and geographical distribution of to local interpretation. This uncertainty is only village, general and reserved land; likely to be accentuated through the addition of Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 3 • the rights of village governments to carbon are already deforested and where afforestation revenues in unreserved forests on village or reforestation opportunities exist. While this land, and the possibility of creating more scenario offers many potential advantages, it is positive incentives for local management ultimately dependent upon the existence of a and conservation; benign state, acting fully in the public interest. • the rights of community level forest managers to carbon revenues in JFM forests; and Benefit sharing • the beneficiaries of carbon sales in wildlife As discussed above, PFM in Tanzania (and management areas (WMAs), where elsewhere in the world) appears to work best agreements have already been reached (for both people and forests) when clear, binding regarding the sharing of wildlife hunting and mutually enforceable agreements are made revenues between village, district and regarding how the benefits of forest management central governments. are shared between stakeholders at different levels. In CBFM, all forest management benefits A second possibility is that carbon is inherently are transferred to local actors, in return for the a public good that cannot be divided or allocated transfer of all corresponding forest management at the individual, group or institutional level, costs and duties. In JFM, no clear agreement has and consequently the rights to carbon are been reached on how much forest management retained by the state on behalf of its people. benefits are transferrable to local actors (from, Possible arguments for this model include the for example, licensed forest harvesting in jointly fact that tree and land tenure are so complex managed production forests) despite a number and heterogeneous that the transaction costs of concrete proposals having been made and of allocating payments based on forest tenure discussed over recent years. The matter is further would be prohibitively high, and any benefits complicated by the fact that JFM potential in gained at the local level would be outweighed high biodiversity catchment forests is further by the costs of establishing and maintaining limited by restrictions on the use or harvest of such a system. It might be argued that if forest products as a result of their higher levels government retains carbon rights, it can act in of protection. Consequently the viability of the public interest to ensure “fair play� and JFM at the local level is questionable due to the where necessary protect the rights of vulnerable disproportionate transfer of management costs to groups who may be negatively affected by local managers and minimal transfer of benefits. REDD+ initiatives. This could for example, In the absence of legal clarifications regarding include measures to discourage speculative land benefit sharing arrangements in JFM, many purchases or leases, with a view to capturing observers are beginning to question its long term future carbon payments from reduced emissions, future (Pfliegner and Moshi, 2007). thereby avoiding the risk of disenfranchising The differential adoption rates of the two communities of land and natural resources in models over the past decade also point to the the process. Furthermore, it could provide fact that despite strong support to JFM from a funding support to areas of the country that number of conservation-oriented NGOs, the 4 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 2,500 1,600 1,400 2,000 1,200 Area (million hectares) Number of villages 1,500 1,000 800 1,000 600 400 500 200 0 0 1999 2002 2006 2008 1999 2002 2006 2008 Year Year Forest area under CBFM (hectares) Number of villages with CBFM a Forest area under JFM (hectares) B Number of villages with JFM Figure 1: (A) SPREAD OF PFM BY AREA AND (B) SPREAD OF PFM BY NUMBER OF VILLAGES Source: Blomley and Iddi, 2009 spread of CBFM in terms of both geographical a variety of sectors such as health, education, coverage and number of communities appears to rural roads, water and agriculture (and more be outpacing that of JFM (Figure 1). recently in support of PFM). Given that this Given the increasing role of local usually involves actors from different ministries, governments in the delivery of services (such as Prime Ministers Office-Regional (including forest extension and training) and Administration and Local Government–– their autonomy from central government, a PMO-RALG), sector ministries, the Ministry key aspect of supporting PFM across Tanzania of Finance and Planning and development has been the development of financial transfer partners) it is common to see inter-ministerial mechanisms to district level facilitation teams. steering committees overseeing the allocation, Government has a long history of transferring transfer and reporting of these payment systems. funds from national to sub-national level More recently, government has also introduced through its advanced system of decentralised “performance based� criteria within the funding local government authorities and inter- allocations. Local government authorities are governmental transfers. Block grants are required to meet “minimum conditions� of routinely disbursed from the Ministry of Finance governance, financial management and planning and Planning, using the so-called “Exchequer capacity before they become eligible for larger System� to provide “ear-marked� support to sources of discretionary development funding. Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 5 This creates incentives for local governments to of clarity regarding village and general lands improve management and governance systems. discussed earlier, there is a risk that those The PFM program, being overseen by the with customary tenure rights may be omitted. Forestry and Beekeeping Division has adopted Although the creation of fungible carbon units similar systems for the transfer of performance- would increase the liquidity of international based grants to strengthen local level service carbon markets, there are concerns with respect delivery and extension services through local to the predictability of the funding that can governments (Blomley, 2006). be accessed via markets. Risks of fluctuations Learning from these experiences tells us that in the price of REDD+ credits may negatively it will be important to ensure that legally binding impact upon the willingness of local level forest agreements are made regarding the allocation managers to engage in the market (Meridian and/or sharing of carbon benefits from forest Institute, 2009). Furthermore, concerns have management, and that any system developed been raised by government that compliance to transfer benefits from one level to another requirements under such a system may be so is effective, transparent and creates positive rigorous that most communities would be unable incentives for performance. The following to qualify on their own in the absence of external section reviews this debate in two parts: the private or donor funds. distribution of benefits between national and As described above, government has many local level actors (vertical benefit-sharing) years of experience in the transfer of funds to and the distribution of carbon benefits within district and sub-district governments to support communities (horizontal benefit-sharing). service delivery across a range of sectors. Could REDD+ funds be allocated through such a system Distributing carbon benefits that bring national and local government players between national and district levels together around agreed principles and systems? Given that any future international REDD+ REDD+ payments are likely to differ from routine agreement is almost certain to involve inter-governmental transfers in a number of demonstrating and verifying emission specific ways: reductions from reduced deforestation and forest • Fund allocations are likely to be linked degradation at a national level, it is equally strongly to performance rather than a likely that some form of national fund and wider adherence to capacity and the associated structures will be established, within development of systems. Furthermore, other which REDD+ carbon credits could be deposited considerations more typical of mainstream and then disbursed to implementing agencies development funding (such as poverty and and sub-national actors. Although a purely population levels) may not feature so highly. market-based instrument has been discussed, • The beneficiaries of payments are likely to this does not currently remain the government’s be more numerous and at different levels preferred option. This is for a number of than those under routine grant systems. reasons including the fact that payments will be Local government grants are almost entirely channelled to those individuals or communities directed at local government authorities such with defined property rights. Given the lack as district and town councils, whereas under 6 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania Communities undertake forest resource assessment in Kilwa. Photo by Steve Ball Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 7 REDD+, beneficiaries are likely to include • Payments made entirely based on individuals, groups, village governments, performance in reducing emissions from local governments and even national deforestation and forest degradation. government agencies managing forest areas Payments made from national to sub- (such as wildlife division, TANAPA and national level will be linked in some FBD). way, to evidence of reduced (or avoided) • “Co-mingling� (or mixing) of different funds deforestation and forest degradation. One is unlikely. Current government policy seeks option open to government would be to to reduce transaction costs by amalgamating make these payments entirely performance and clustering government transfers under based, with the result that payments would simplified and unified systems. Development only flow to management agents who have partners—together with government—have made demonstrable emission reductions signed agreements at the national and as a result of improvements in forest international level designed to align and management. This would require projections harmonize external development funds with of emission reductions from REDD+ those of government. It is likely that any not only at national level but at a more future REDD+ fund will have to be entirely disaggregated level (such as regions, zones “stand-alone� and will not be permitted to or ecotypes), and the ability to monitor these mix funds with other government funding independently. The advantage of a system sources directed, for example to natural entirely based on performance is that it is resource management. Further questions transparent, verifiable and relatively simple remain, however, regarding the relationship to maintain, once it has been established. between the REDD+ fund and the “Forest A possible disadvantage of such a scheme Fund� which is mandated under the 2002 is that it may lead to funds flowing to those Forest Act, for the purpose of furthering institutions or agents that already possess forest conservation and management in capacity (such as national government Tanzania, and which will be established agencies involved in the protection or through retaining a small percentage of management of forest landscapes, or private all royalties, levies and taxes collected on corporations with established systems the harvesting, transport and sale of forest and capacity). Weak institutions (such produce. as village governments or community based organizations) with an interest and As a result of these fundamental differences, mandate in forest management, but with it is quite likely that transfers to and from a limited capacity, would be disadvantaged REDD+ fund will take place outside any routine by a system entirely based on performance. local government block grant transfer system This is an inherent weakness that has and that the establishment of some kind of already been recognized within routine parallel structure seems inevitable. Given this, local government transfer systems and has it will be important to consider a number of been addressed through the introduction of different options with regard to the design and “capacity building grants,� aimed at assisting establishment of this fund. local government authorities who fall short 8 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania of minimum governance and capacity equitable outcomes at the household level. benchmarks to establish and introduce These developments indicate a general improved administrative and finance trend in Tanzania away from a more rigid systems. approach to REDD+, to one that embraces • Other criteria introduced into payment a wider range of social and environmental systems designed to incentivise good outcomes such as biodiversity conservation governance and achieve equitable and sustainable forest management. outcomes. The national REDD+ framework Unreserved forests tend to be those that are document recognizes some of the trade- subject to the highest levels of degradation. offs that may need to be made in terms of Interestingly much of the unreserved forest achieving both equity and effectiveness within Tanzania is found in some of the most as well as some of the potential risks that remote (and consequently under-developed) could arise if payments were entirely parts of the country, where other economic based on performance. In addition to opportunities are severely limited. This concerns over capacity raised above, this correlation is illustrated below (Figure 2) by includes the fact that some communities comparing regional poverty rankings (a) and the are involved in shared management of high area of unreserved forest per square kilometer of biodiversity forests experiencing little or land area (b). no deforestation. They would therefore not This linkage between poverty levels and benefit from any kind of REDD+ payment, coverage of unreserved forests may mean despite the clear efforts they are making that introducing additional allocation criteria with regard to active forest management. based on poverty indicators may be redundant, Concerns over eligibility of funding to but also highlights the potential benefits that community groups or village governments REDD+ payments could provide to deprived and involved in forest restoration in areas relatively poor areas of the country. that have already been deforested for a While these all represent compelling considerable time is a second example of arguments, it will be necessary to consider the how distortions, or perverse incentives could risk that by adding in additional variables or be created from a system driven solely by criteria for the allocation of funds, complexity performance in reducing deforestation or in terms of administering such a scheme may forest degradation.2 Furthermore, Tanzania increase exponentially (and with it, increased has been selected to pilot National REDD+ costs at national level and higher risks of Social and Environmental Standards failure). Of course, this depends on the degree developed by the Climate, Community and to which the application of standards are Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) and CARE voluntary and linked (or de-linked) to the flow International (CCBA 2010), which introduce of funds. Furthermore, if additional variables a range of requirements linked to ensuring are introduced, this must be done in a way that is open to public scrutiny and independently 2 These concerns appear to be diminishing with the verifiable using clearly defined and measurable inclusion of conservation and sustainable forest management criteria. in REDD+. Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 9 Poverty rank area of unreserved forest 1–5 (most deprived) 1–5 (most deprived) 6–10 6–10 11–15 11–15 a 16–20 (least deprived) 16–20 (least deprived) B Figure 2: (a) Regional poverty rankings and (b) Area of unreserved forest per square kilometre by region (Blomley et al. 2009) Moreover, an important area that will need is established within government, experience attention before any kind of national fund is from non-governmental funds performing launched relates to the administrative costs similar functions appear to incur similarly high associated with maintaining it, the relative management and administration costs (Box 2). share of these costs to the total amount of financing available and how these costs are Distributing carbon benefits recovered and reinvested. Clearly some kind within communities of compromise will need to be reached in this Most of the debate surrounding the issue of regard. On one hand, experience from PFM benefit sharing in REDD+ concerns how future has shown that unless a real and tangible REDD+ payments will be shared between flow of benefits is received from active forest stakeholders at the national level and those management at the local level, long term operating at the field, or sub-national level and sustainability of community management involved directly in the management of forests. processes is questionable. However, it is also However, experience from Tanzanian PFM has clear that there will be considerable costs shown that it is equally important to consider involved in establishing and maintaining how benefits are shared within communities to national REDD+ structures. This will include a avoid the risk of poorer or more marginalized national REDD+ fund and associated systems members of a given community losing out from of financial disbursements, monitoring and the direct benefits of PFM (Vyamana 2009). accounting, as well as a coherent carbon Particular risks within ongoing PFM processes accounting and registration system. Although were identified that either consolidate the concerns have been raised from a number of position of richer and more influential members NGOs regarding concerns over high levels of of the community, or conversely result in administrative overheads if the REDD+ Fund increased marginalization of poorer members. 10 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania Furthermore, the limited representation of Box 2 women within management forums or decision eastern arc Mountains conservation making processes has been shown to lead to endowment Fund (eaMceF)–– their interests being poorly reflected in forest operational costs management outcomes. Some examples of how EAMCEF was established to conserve the biodiversity and benefits are skewed within PFM processes are ecosystems of the Eastern Arc Mountains in Tanzania. An initial presented below: endowment of USD 6 million was provided through the Global • Licenses, fees and other upfront payments Environment Facility. The fund is registered as an independent required to harvest products from village trust and managed by a board of trustees that are drawn from government, NGOs and the private sector. A proposal submitted forests mean that it is only middle income to the Norwegian government indicates that over a five year and richer members of the community period US$ 600,000 is allocated for field costs, while US$ 630,000 who can take advantage of the economic is allocated to staffing, training, capital investments, technical opportunities presented by CBFM. inputs, office, vehicle and board costs. This represents an overhead Licensing of forest use under PFM, even for of around 51% and a field-level expenditure of around 49%. domestic purposes, places prohibitively high costs on the poor. • The poor are rarely represented within forest • Knowledge of forest management management committees, and even when plans, bylaws and concepts outside the they are, their participation and voice is membership of the forest management rather low. committee is often low. • Opportunities for forest management • Some District Councils had either committees to provide feedback and solicit deliberately or accidentally misinterpreted input from the wider community are rare. the government’s Forest Harvesting Furthermore, there are limited options Guidelines and, as a result, were placing for forest management committees to be additional burdens, barriers or costs to held accountable for their actions to their villages regarding harvesting (and securing constituents. potential incomes). • Forest management committees, being • Income generating activities (IGAs) tended essentially government institutions, are to be more suitable for richer members of the more upwardly accountable (to the village community due to the investment of time and district government), than downwardly and funds required to establish the projects. accountable to the wider community. There was little attempt to design activities • Domestic and subsistence forest management in ways that were within reach of the poor. uses favoured by women (such as firewood, • Furthermore, IGAs tend to be provided on building materials and non-wood forest a demand-driven basis, or through existing products) are often neglected or relegated groups which generally do not include the in favor of commercial harvesting uses poor and rarely, if ever, are targeted towards (such as charcoal or timber), typically the poor. favored by men. Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 11 A community meeting under a tree in the Shinyanga District. Photo by Danielle Christophe • There is often a displacement of forest-based viewed by the village as having a legitimate incomes among poor, forest-dependent claim on forest use and management. users following increased protection and The combined impact of these distortions is a conservation measures from PFM. tendency for an inequitable distribution of forest • There is sometimes a deliberate exclusion management costs and benefits between richer of the poor, fuelled by the widespread and poorer households, with richer households belief that the poor are responsible for harvesting a greater proportion of benefits, and forest destruction as well as a belief that the poorer households bearing a greater proportion poor are unable to contribute in a useful or of costs. constructive manner. As REDD+ projects look increasingly • Seasonal forest users such as pastoralists towards PFM initiatives as a foundation for may not be included in planning processes, launching community level initiatives, it will as they are not in the village at the time key be important to ensure that safeguards are decisions are taken, or because they are not introduced to minimise the risk of elite capture. 12 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania These safeguards are not particular to forest the loss of access or use rights. In some cases, management, but are typical of any measure local concerns have been raised that PFM is a designed to increase transparency, accountability conspiracy designed to transfer village land into and equity. They might include ensuring that a protected area under government ownership.3 forest management committees provide formal A second, but related problem is that due to and regular opportunities for members to time pressures and funding constraints, some review and question how decisions are taken projects seek “short cuts�, by engaging only and how any funds have been distributed. It with a small group of village leaders (such may also include measures designed to ensure as village forest management committees), that poor households, dependent on forests in the expectation that information will and woodlands for their livelihoods are not flow downwards to members and back up to negatively impacted by the introduction of PFM committee members. While this approach may or REDD+, which may introduce rules restricting ensure a more rapid and smooth planning access and use––rules which may hit poorer, process, it may represent a false saving. There forest dependent households disproportionately are many cases where planning processes, hard. dominated by a selected village leadership, misses or ignores important interest groups, and as a result, they become alienated from awareness, consultation management planning. Other cases exist and consent where management committees have actively sought to restrict information flow as a means The PFM experience in Tanzania suggests to consolidate and abuse power (Pfliegner and that a key component regarding the successful Moshi, 2007). Clearly then, effective planning introduction of PFM at the village level is must be accompanied by a correspondingly managing expectations, communicating effective information management process that effectively and raising awareness. An targets both committee members and forest users understandable enthusiasm from project alike if the risks of misinformation, unrealistic staff coupled with high levels of demand for expectations and elite capture are to be reduced. new livelihood opportunities among poor REDD+ is a complex concept and one that communities often creates unrealistically continues to evolve rapidly as international high levels of expectations at the local level. negotiations and experiences develop and When these high expectations are inevitably change. The understanding of REDD+ confronted by the realities of long and complex within Tanzanian society is restricted to planning processes, and in some cases, long a very few people, drawn from a limited periods of forest protection and recovery number of government departments, NGOs before economically profitable harvesting and development partners. Knowledge and can take place, this tends to dampen local understanding of REDD+ at local government enthusiasm and engagement. In other cases, poor information management has led to concerns 3 These concerns are not entirely without foundation. from community members that the introduction Government has extended the coverage of protected areas of PFM will lead to total forest protection and significantly over the past decade and often across areas that are permanently settled. Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 13 or community level remains very limited Expanding this awareness raising process across and highly selective. As a result of this, the different sectors of society remains an important expectations that people have with regard to priority. Working in partnership with established the flow of benefits (both net and gross) may networks (such as the National Association be unrealistically high but also their ability to of Community Forest Managers–– known as engage in informed policy debate is limited. MJUMITA by its Kiswahili acronym) is an Some of the prevailing misconceptions regarding effective means of achieving this. REDD+ include: The establishment of a functional REDD+ • Unrealistic expectations with regard to system will involve a number of key decisions at potential levels of REDD+ financing available both policy and practical implementation levels to local level forest managers and owners. that will have far reaching consequences on forest management in the coming years. Again, • A perception in some quarters that the experience from the development of laws and establishment of REDD+ necessarily implies regulations relating to PFM, suggests that an total protection and strict conservation iterative and participatory policy formulation measures and that this is incompatible with process offers many benefits, including both any form of local use. increased buy-in of key stakeholders but also • Limited recognition of the technical the contribution of new ideas and experiences. demands of measuring and accounting However, there are also important trade-offs to for emissions reductions at the local level be made between participation and inclusion (through avoided deforestation or forest on the one hand, and efficiency considerations degradation), the costs that this will incur (such as cost and time) on the other. and the proportion of total finances that may The government of Tanzania has already be deployed in covering these costs. established a REDD+ Task Force whose • Limited understanding regarding the membership has recently been expanded to direct link between carbon payments include representation from Zanzibar. This and performance in reducing emission task force has been given the responsibility reductions. of drafting key documents relating to the design and development of REDD+ structures, These and other examples illustrate the critical institutions and systems. Equally important, importance of ensuring effective communication the task force is required to consult with around REDD+ issues at national, district stakeholders inside and outside government and community level if misconceptions and to solicit views and to ensure that the models unrealistic expectations are to be managed being developed are acceptable to key players effectively. Already, as part of REDD+-readiness across the sector. Experience from other similar activities, the REDD+ Task Force has overseen consultative policy development processes a process of awareness raising at provincial and would suggest that if the contributions from district levels, but so far, this has mainly been stakeholders representing interests beyond the conducted with the participation of government task force are to be captured, it will be necessary staff and with limited participation from to ensure a very “deliberate� consultation local level civil society or the private sector. 14 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania process. This will involve the development and policies may create at grassroots levels. dissemination of a clear timetable and process Providing opportunities to NGOs to both for soliciting views, providing interest groups contribute towards and provide comments with sufficient time to review draft policies and to the emerging REDD+ strategy will be ensuring adequate space for receiving inputs. important if these and other concerns are Participation levels will be increased if those to be adequately captured within the final providing inputs see their involvement as part of agreed policy process. a deliberate, planned and organized process. • Capturing the true economic value and • The role and involvement of NGOs and contribution of forests. The forest sector pilot projects: Pilot projects, implemented has traditionally been seen very much as largely through NGOs are already playing a “minor player�, when compared to more an important role in the development of influential, priority sectors such as health, REDD+ policy and practice through the education or agriculture. This is despite the development of site based, project-level fact that forest goods and services contribute systems, as well as helping raise awareness across the economy as well as providing among different levels of society on the very important cash and subsistence benefits potential opportunities and risks that at the household level. The real contribution REDD+ presents. To date, the number of of the forest sector is often “hidden� or NGOs with the capacity to understand goes unrecognized by policy- and decision- and actively contribute to the REDD+ makers alike. Although REDD+ is a complex discussions is relatively limited to a subject, it has the potential to provide new number of key national NGOs, but this is sources of funding for the government. expanding with the establishment of new Recognizing the potential economic value REDD+ pilot projects and other REDD+ of REDD+ payments and using this as capacity building events being organized leverage to gain widespread political support specifically to build NGO capacities in this across government will be an important area. Many questions of direct interest to way in which the REDD+ Task Force will NGOs remain, such as the potential nature be able to catch the attention of important and role of REDD+ projects operating at the ministries such as the Ministry of Finance sub-national level, the way in which they and Planning, PMO-RALG, and the Vice could operate with finances from voluntary President’s Office. markets within a “nested approach� and • Capturing the views from both central how carbon accounting at project level might and local government institutions. Given interact or support national level carbon that many of the drivers of deforestation monitoring and accounting processes. and forest degradation are site specific Furthermore, a number of NGOs by virtue and local in nature, it will be important of their involvement with development to ensure that government agencies with processes within rural communities are implementation mandate at the local level are also interested in the potential benefits, also involved in the design and development opportunities as well as threats that REDD+ of REDD+ policies. The REDD+ Task Force, Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 15 Box 3 useful perspectives about the challenges and agricultural marketing co-operatives— realities of working at the community levels a possible model for carbon sales? and below. Since independence, agricultural co-operatives have been viewed by government as a key vehicle for supporting farmers and farmer groups to access agricultural markets, ensure quality produce Monitoring, reporting and realize fair prices. “Primary societies�, formed at the village and Verification (MrV) levels form the lowest organizational level of agricultural co- operatives. One person per family becomes a member following Although MRV is a term largely associated the payment of a one-time entrance fee. Primary societies buy with REDD+ processes, there are a number of crops from members and provide input supplies. In some cases, important lessons learned from PFM with regard societies also act as commercial enterprises and own storage to monitoring changes in forest condition as well facilities, equipment (such as weigh scales) and vehicles, all of as the achievement of positive outcomes with which can be leased for a fee. Primary society members can, but regard to improvements in forest management are not obliged to, sell their crops to the society. Farmers deliver their crops throughout the harvest season. At each delivery the and biodiversity. crop is examined, weighed, recorded and the farmer paid. Delivery Experiences from a number of PFM sites in of superior quality crop is rewarded with a premium. Crops are Tanzania, particularly in Iringa district, have delivered in bulk to a Cooperative Union at District or Regional pointed to the important role played by local level for processing and eventual marketing. forest managers in monitoring forest conditions The 1991 Co-operative Societies Act and the 1997 Cooperative and disturbance. Within the context of a Danida- Development Policy introduced key reforms into the sector by de- funded PFM project, a community-managed linking co-operatives from government control and making them biodiversity and natural resource use monitoring fully member-owned. The 1991 Act encourages the formation of scheme was established. The monitoring scheme apex organizations around particular commodities such as coffee, was established in 2002 and was developed cotton, tobacco and cashew nuts. These apex organizations, specifically to meet the needs and capacities are charged with representing the interests of members at national levels through interaction with policy makers within of forest management committees engaged in government. Apex organizations are represented at the national the management of the forests. Rather than level through Crop Industry Councils, which are forums developed measuring biodiversity as an end in itself, the by government to facilitate dialogue between producers, traders monitoring was focused on resource extraction and government. Recent liberalization of the markets has meant and disturbance. The scheme is based on data that trading monopolies enjoyed by co-operatives have been lost collected by village guards during patrols and by and as a result they have lost some market share. However they village committee members interviewing people remain the major channels through which most rural poor still sell their produce. about their perception of changes in available forest resources. The village forest management committee also keeps records of their own in recognition of this, has taken the step activities and all transactions related to natural of requesting the participation of PMO- resources––such as issuing user permits, and RALG. This is an important development collecting fees and fines. The monitoring was as both PMO-RALG and local government initially implemented in 23 communities and authorities have significant experience in has since been replicated by other villages. the management of development funds Recent research conducted at this site was able targeted at specific sectors, but also can give 16 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania to show that local monitoring was continuing reporting and verification (MRV) framework. across the majority of sites, despite the fact that A number of on-going, externally-funded external project assistance had been withdrawn initiatives are assisting this process including in 2004. Furthermore, when the findings of work by the Clinton Foundation on the locally managed monitoring schemes were development of a carbon baseline, and work compared with monitoring carried out by experts by the National Forest Resources Monitoring conducted in similar areas, it was found that and Assessment (NAFORMA) process being variations in accuracy were small and overall supported by the Government of Finland and monitoring costs were significantly lower when FAO. The establishment of a Tanzanian Carbon implemented by communities (Danielsen et al., Monitoring Centre is being planned, which will 2010). be the institutional home for national level MRV A number of studies have demonstrated that processes. the introduction of PFM leads to improvements It looks likely that MRV processes will take in forest management and a reduction in place at both the national level and also at the forest disturbance. Fewer studies, however, project, or site level, where specific interventions have analyzed the impact of PFM on adjacent, are on-going. Site level MRV will be needed non-PFM areas. Recent research conducted within the context of some of the projects that across different PFM sites has suggested that are currently being developed with Norwegian “leakage� of unsustainable forest harvesting may funding to assess and account for reduced be a significant problem in certain situations emissions as well as social benefits, with a (Vyamana, 2009). In CBFM sites, the study found view to complying with the Voluntary Carbon that communities had other patches of forest that Standard (VCS) and Climate, Community and were not formally covered by the CBFM bylaws Biodiversity (CCB) standards. At the national but in which the community was nevertheless level, MRV systems will be needed to assess to informally applying the same bylaws. This what degree national rates of deforestation and suggests strong local ‘ownership’ of the bylaws forest degradation are changing over time. and recognition by the community that they As the development of MRV processes have a generally positive impact. The reverse takes place at these two levels, two potential was true in JFM sites studied. Bylaws developed risks emerge. First, there is the risk that actors by the village were only applied to the specific at the local level begin to develop monitoring forest areas under JFM management–– and and accounting tools that are not compatible were not applied to other areas of government with those being developed at the national forest reserve, leading to a displacement of use level, which would mean that it would not be from one site to another. This shift in utilisation possible to “nest� sub-national projects within pressure from JFM to non-JFM forest suggests any national accounting system. This risk is that the improvements in forest conditions, increased by the fact that different projects, recorded elsewhere, needs to be interpreted with working in different parts of the country may caution. themselves develop MRV processes that are not Much of the effort behind the establishment compatible with each other, or with national of a functional REDD+ system involves the systems, but need to be balanced with the need development of an effective monitoring, for local innovation and experimentation. Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 17 Photo by Tom Blomley 18 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania The second risk is that of increased cost in many countries through externally and growing inefficiencies. Assuming that funded pilot projects, often supported by agreements are reached on a common approach, international NGOs. The bulk of these there is an additional risk that systems that could efforts have been directed to areas with most effectively be established at a higher level, tropical high forest such as Brazil, Indonesia, are being repeatedly created and established Ecuador and some parts of Central America. at a lower one. It will become increasingly In these areas it is often deforestation that important, as national and sub-national represents the principle threat (through approaches develop, to ensure coordination conversion to oil palm, through logging or and harmonization between actors at all levels, other forms of planned use or conversion). and to agree a common framework for MRV. In Tanzania, however, the threats to forest Furthermore, it will be important to agree cover are largely driven by factors related to which MRV functions can be most effectively degradation, rather than deforestation. This institutionalized at which levels to avoid the risk includes illegal logging, charcoal production of increased cost and spiralling inefficiencies. and small scale agriculture. Large scale Some of the key areas for the emerging MRV conversion of forests to alternative non- architecture include: forest uses is relatively rare, apart from a • Role of local stakeholders and communities limited number of biofuel or agro-industrial in MRV. As discussed above, locally-driven production sites. This presents some monitoring approaches appear to be both challenges within the Tanzanian context accurate and cost effective. As high-level for both projects and national level actors discussions continue on the technical wishing to assess the impact of degradation specifications of MRV systems, including as well as deforestation. choices of digital and GIS approaches, it • Options for aggregation of carbon will be important to consider how national accounting and payments at project level. demands for standardised data collection Forests managed and owned by village can be reconciled with participatory carbon governments, community groups and and forest monitoring approaches. individuals tend to be fragmented and • The applicability of MRV models dispersed, rather than in large, continuous developed to date within the Tanzanian blocks. This presents significant challenges context. REDD+ places extremely high for MRV processes within community-level methodological demands in terms of MRV. projects and raises questions regarding the This is complicated by the fact that in the economic viability of REDD+ processes absence of any global and legally binding in these areas due to potentially high agreement on REDD+, systems are in a transaction costs. Pilot REDD+ projects state of flux and based on assumptions currently being funded by the Norwegian of what may or may not feature in any government have recognized this constraint final convention. The methodologies for and are experimenting with various models accounting for reduced deforestation and that allow for transaction costs to be reduced forest degradation are being developed through economies of scale. Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 19 The Tanzania Community Forest • Learning from pilots and sharing Conservation Network is proposing to experiences. There are currently several establish a “carbon co-operative� which NGO REDD+ pilot projects being supported would offer participating community forest by the Norwegian government and overseen managers the opportunity to market REDD+ by the REDD+ Task Force. These projects credits to the voluntary market, through the are currently in the process of developing adoption of agreed common standards and project design documents (PDDs), as criteria. This would build upon Tanzania’s well as detailed carbon accounting and long history of supporting agricultural measurement tools. Given the relatively marketing co-operatives (Box 3). A limited number of REDD+ pilot projects cooperatives model has advantages in that a) that have been developed worldwide in Cooperatives are the government’s preferred miombo or coastal woodlands, tools and vehicle for addressing rural poverty methodologies for these conditions are reduction and are supported by prevailing lacking and in some cases, non-existent. policy and legislation; b) Membership At the same time, government is moving based, voluntary cooperatives have a long swiftly with the development of national history in Tanzania and capacity building, REDD+ systems (including the design of a regulatory and audit institutions exist to national carbon accounting centre and the support their functioning; c) Cooperatives development of a carbon baseline through are flexible and should be able to market NAFORMA). Clearly, the benefits of ensuring new “products� such as emission reductions that lessons are shared both horizontally on behalf of their members; d) The voluntary between pilot projects, and nationally and autonomous nature of cooperatives is between these pilots and national agencies enshrined in law and means that members are substantial. These benefits include are in control of their own development ensuring that MRV development proceeds agenda; and e) Cooperatives, once trained, in ways that build upon emerging field can be used to monitor, report on and verify experience; identifying and capitalizing on agreed standards. opportunities for collaboration and reduced Similarly, the Tanzania Traditional Energy costs; and avoiding the development of Development Organisation (TaTEDO), multiple, (and potentially incompatible) another national NGO, is proposing to MRV systems at different levels. At present, aggregate functions related to MRV for apart from one or two ad-hoc workshops individual, private forests (called ngitiri) there has been little deliberate networking at community level as a means to reduce between REDD+ pilots and national (or transaction costs. The practical challenges international) level experiences. One option related to establishing such aggregation in this regard may be to identify a national models, and the compliance of these models institution with a mandate and track record to any future REDD+ agreement at national in networking between governmental and or international level remain unanswered non-governmental stakeholders within questions that TaTEDO and other NGO pilot the field of natural resources management projects hope to answer. who could perform this function. Their 20 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania capacity could be complimented through a • the status and legal definition of “unused partnership with an international centre of and unoccupied� village land, outside excellence with global expertise in REDD+. village land forest reserves and in particular • Reducing the risks of leakage across PFM those lands with extensive forest or sites. As discussed above, leakage from PFM woodland cover; sites (and in particular JFM areas) appears to • the actual extent and geographical be a significant risk. Given the prominence distribution of village, general and reserved of PFM as a foundation for REDD+ activities land; within government policies, it will be • the rights of village governments to carbon important to invest resources in developing a revenues in unreserved forests on village deeper understanding of leakage across PFM land, and the possibility of creating more sites, and to develop clear leakage mitigation positive incentives for local management strategies (such as broader, landscape level and conservation; planning processes) when supporting local • the rights of community level forest level forest management. managers to carbon revenues in JFM forests; and conclusions and policy implications • the beneficiaries of carbon sales in areas under wildlife management areas (WMAs), Experiences gained over the past 15 years in the where agreements have already been reached development, implementation and scaling up of regarding the sharing of wildlife hunting participatory forest management offers a range revenues between village, district and of useful insights for REDD+ policy and practice central governments. in Tanzania. In this final section, the policy implications of these insights are presented and Benefit sharing summarized. Distributing carbon benefits between national and district level managers Forest tenure and carbon rights Government is increasingly emphasizing the Given the prevailing uncertainties regarding need for a fund-based approach for carbon the legal definitions of village land and general payments at the local level. A number of options land, rights and responsibilities relating to the present themselves regarding the identity of such management of trees, as well as the payment and a fund––although some form of autonomous, beneficiaries of royalties and other revenues, are non-governmental status seems likely, perhaps often uncertain and open to local interpretation. building on the experiences of the Eastern This uncertainty is only likely to be accentuated Arc Mountains Conservation Endowment through the addition of carbon rights through Fund, which now disburses funds directly to REDD+. It will therefore be important for community based organizations and NGOs government to help clarify the following legal as a means to support effective biodiversity questions: conservation. While establishing an independent Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 21 organization offers a number of benefits in terms Awareness, consultation of transparency and effectiveness, it will be and consent important to ensure that transaction costs do not As a new, and rapidly evolving approach, with become prohibitive, thereby limiting potential the potential to inject significant amounts of revenues to community and household levels. additional financing into Tanzania, REDD+ has Furthermore, it will be important to clarify the potential to create unrealistic expectations, the basis and rationale by which REDD+ as well as misconceptions relating to forest payments will be made. Will they be based exclusion and foregone use. As government simply on verified emission reductions due together with NGOs and other projects move to reduced deforestation, or will other factors towards the implementation of REDD+, ensuring such as social safeguards, good governance, effective communication, at all levels of society, biodiversity and pro-poor approaches also be will be of utmost importance. Perhaps most used to direct payments? importantly, community members must clearly understand the costs, benefits and potential risks Distributing carbon benefits of REDD+ projects and have the opportunity to within communities discuss it internally before taking any kind of As REDD+ projects look increasingly towards decision. PFM experiences have highlighted the PFM as a foundation for launching community risks of focusing exclusively on communicating level initiatives, it will be important to ensure and negotiating with village leaders, in the that safeguards are introduced to minimise absence of a more widespread agreement. the risk of elite capture. These safeguards are It will be important to strengthen the dialogue not particular to local level forest management between government and REDD+ pilot projects approaches, but are typical of any measure across the country (as well as between projects designed to increase transparency, accountability working on similar problems in different and equity. They might include ensuring that areas) as a means to strengthen the transfer of forest management committees provide formal experiences, but also as a means to inform and and regular opportunities for members to influence policy development processes in an review and question how decisions are taken iterative and practical manner. and how any funds have been distributed. It may also include measures designed to ensure Monitoring, reporting that poor households, dependent on forests and verification and woodlands for their livelihoods are not Local forest managers have a demonstrated track negatively impacted by the introduction of record in the monitoring of forest conditions, PFM or REDD+, which may introduce rules biomass and disturbance to a level of accuracy restricting access and use––rules which may comparable to that achieved by experts and hit poorer, forest dependent households at considerably lower cost. Furthermore, as disproportionately hard. managers of the resource itself, they are perhaps best placed to oversee monitoring, so that it can 22 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania feed back into management decision-making. As the highly technical debate on MRV evolves in Tanzania, it will be important not to lose sight of the very real and effective contribution community-level forest managers can make to this process. Due to the fragmented and geographically dispersed nature of many PFM forest sites across the country, alternative models of MRV will be needed to avoid prohibitive costs on a forest- by-forest basis. Working with and through the emerging community forest network (MJUMITA) presents a number of attractive options in terms of reducing transaction costs, developing standards and synergies and the possibility of aggregated carbon sales. Leakage, particularly within sites managed under JFM, remains a concern and more work will need to be done in understanding when, how and where leakage occurs and how mitigating actions may be taken to avoid it. This may involve working at a broader, landscape level, and applying similar management approaches (and bylaws) across forest management areas under various forms of control. Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania 23 references Blomley, T., 2006. Mainstreaming participatory Danielsen, F., Skutsch, M., Burgess, N.D., Jensen, P.M. forestry within the local government reform process et al., 2010. At the heart of REDD+: a role for local in Tanzania. Gatekeeper Series No 128. International people in monitoring forests? Conservation Letters Institute for Environment and Development, London, 4(2) 158-167. UK. Meridian Institute, 2009. Reducing Emissions from Blomley, T. and Iddi, S., 2009. Participatory Forest Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): Management in Tanzania: 1993 – 2009. Lessons An Options Assessment Report Prepared for The learned and experiences to date. Ministry of Natural Government of Norway. Resources and Tourism, Forestry and Beekeeping Division, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Persha, L. and T. Blomley, 2009. Management decentralization and montane forest condition in Blomley, T., Pfliegner, K., Isango, J., Zahabu E., Tanzania. Conservation Biology, 23(6) 1485–1496. Ahrends, A., N. Burgess, 2008. Seeing the Wood for the Trees: Towards an objective assessment of the Pfliegner, K. and Moshi, E., 2007. Is Joint Forest impact of Participatory Forest Management on forest Management viable in protection forest reserves? condition in Tanzania. Oryx, 42(3) 380–391. Experiences from Morogoro Region. The Arc Journal, 21:17-20. Tanzania Forest Conservation Group, Dar es Blomley, T., Ramadhani, H., Mkwizu, Y. & Böhringer, Salaam, Tanzania. A., 2009. Hidden Harvest: Unlocking the economic potential of community based forest management in United Republic of Tanzania, 2009. National Tanzania in: German, L., A. Karsenty and A-M. Tiani, Framework for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation (Eds.) Governing Africa’s Forests in a Globalized and Forest Degradation. Vice Presidents Office, World. London. Earthscan. Division of Environment. CCBA, 2010. REDD+ Social and Environmental Vyamana, V.G., 2009. Participatory forest management Standards.Washington D.C: Climate, Community and in the Eastern Arc Mountains of Tanzania: Who Biodiversity Alliance. Available at: http://www.redd- benefits? International Forestry Review, 11(2) 239-253. standards.org/. 24 Participatory Forest Management and redd+ in tanzania THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20433 USA Telephone: (202) 473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org/sdcc Email: socialdevelopment@worldbank.org.