Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 7890 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT GUATEMALA AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) JUNE 23, 1989 Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division Country Department II Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. THE WORLD BANK FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY W&:.hingsoom DC 20433 U.SA Opmusta# IwlAuhumfi June 23, 1989 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECTt Project Completion Report on Guatemala Apuacapa Power Project (Loan 1426-GU) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Guatemala - Aguacapa Power Project (Loan 1426-GU)' prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. No audit of this project he.a been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document ha a rtricted distfibution and may be used by recipients only in the performnce of their official duties. It contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. GUATEMALA FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE ...................................................... (i) BASIC DATA SHEET ............................................. (ii) HIGHLIGHTS ................................................... (v) CHAPTER I: BACKCROUND 1.1 Bank Lending to the Sector ............... 1.2 Electric Power Sector Organization 1 1.3 References. 2 CHAPTER II: PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 2.1 Origin. 2 2.2 Preparation. 3 2.3 Appraisal and Negotiations. 3 2.4 Project Description. 4 2.5 Estimated Project Cost and Financing 5 CHAPTER III: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST 3.1 Generation/Transmissiotn Component ....... ... 5 3.2 Start-Up ................................. .. 5 3.3 Execution Timetable. 5 3.4 Major Execution Problems. 6 3.5 Procurement. 9 3.6 The Consultant,s Services and Organization Strengthening Component. 9 3.7 Project Cost and Finatcing .10 3.8 Disbursements .11 3.9 Performance of Consultants, Contractor and Suppliers .11 3.10 Covenants ................................... 14 CHAPTER IV: PROJECT JUSTIFICATION 4.1 Project Achievements .14 4.2 Load Growth .15 4.3 Rate of Return on Investment .15 CHAPTER V: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 5.1 Comparison of Actual and Forecast Data 16 5.2 INDE's Financial Performance .17 5.3 EEG Financial Performance .17 CHAPTER VI: INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 6.1 The Borro-3r and the Bank .18 6.2 Governent .18 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their offirial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Page 2 of 2 Page No. CHAPTER VII: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 7.1 Phased Objectives for Institutional Development ............................... 19 t.2 Compliance with Agreements .................. 19 7.3 Extensive Project Preparation ............... 19 7.4 Procurement Planning ........................ 20 7.5 Definition of Construction Supervision Responsibilities .......................... 20 A.iNEXES: Annex 1.1 - Sources of Infomation .21 Annex 3.1 - Actual and Forecast Timetable of Project Implementation .22 Annex 3.2 - Comparison of Actual and Estibzated Volumes of Works .23 Annex 3.3 - Comparison of Actual and Forecast Costs 24 Annex 3.4 - Cost of Tunnel Repairs .26 Annex 3.5 - Comparison of Actual and Forecast Financing Plan .27 Annex 3.6 - Comparison of Forecast and Actual Loan Disbursement .28 Annex 3.7 - Key Loan and Guarantee Agreement Covenants 29 Annex 4.1 - Comparison of Forecast and Actual Sales to Final Consumers .31 Annex 4.2 - Return of Investment .32 Annex 5.1 - INDE - Actual and Forecast Income Statement (1976 - 1985) .33 - INDE - Actual and Forecast Sources and Applications of Funds Statements (1976-1985) ....................... 34 - INDE - Actual and Forecast Balance Sheets Statements (1976-1985) .35 Annex 5.2 - EEG - Actual and Forecast Income Statements (1976-1985) .36 - EEG - Actual and Forecast Sources and Applications of Funds Statements (1976-1985) .37 - EEG - Actual and Forecast Balance Sheets Statements (1976-1985) .38 Annex 5.3 - Power Sector - Actual and Forecast Income Statements (1976-1985) .39 - Power Sector - Actual and Forecast Sources and Applications of Funds Statements (1976-1985) .40 - Power Sector - Actual and Forecast Balance Sheets Statements (1976-1985) 41 Annex 5.4 - Performance Indicators .42 Annex 5.5 - Comments from the Executing Agency 43 ti) GUATEMALA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) PREFACE 1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Aguacapa Power Project, which was partially financed by Loan 1426-GU (US$55.0 million equivalent). The Borrower was Instituto Nacional de Electrificacion (INDE). The PCR was issued by the Infrastructure Division of Country Department II and prepared by staff of the Infrastructure Division of Country Department IV, both of the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, based on information in the Bank files, a final report prepared by the Borrower and discussions with former and current staff of the Bank and the Borrower. 2. This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower and Cofinanciers for comments and they are annexed to the Report (Annex 5.5). (ii) GUATEMALA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BASIC DATA SHEET INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (1426-GU1) KEY PROJECT DATA APPRAISAL ACTUAL OR CURRENT ITEM EXPECTATION _ STIMATE Total Proiect Cost (excluding interest during construction, US$ million equivalent) 100.0 183.2 Cost Overrun (C) - 83.2 Loan Amount (US$ million) 55.0 5-.0 Disbursed 55.0 55.0 Cancelled - - Repaid (as of 12/31/87) 28.49 28.49 Outstanding 26.51 30.06 2/ Date Physical Components Completed 06/79 10/81 Time Overrun: Months - 29 z 107 Internal Rate of Return (Z) 14.9 10.0 Financial Performance Satisfactory 1/ Weak 3/ Institutional Performance Improving Weak 1/ Required to earn 9? on revalued assets annually after project completion. 2/ Includes US$ 3.55 million due to currency adjustment in the Bank's Central Disbursement Account. 3/ Assets were not revalued. Rates of return on historical assets for the period 1982-1985 were on the average about 9.4Z, which compares to an average of 12.82 estimated at appraisal. (iii) MISSION DATA No. of No. of Staff- Date of Type of Mission Month/Year Weeks Persons Weeks Reports Identification/ Preparation 1/ 03-08/75 1.5 2 3 08/75 Appraisal 02176 3 1 3 04/76 2 2 3 1 1 1 5/4/77 10 Supervision I 11177 1.5 1. 1.5 12/22/77 Supervision II 09/78 1 1 1 10/30178 Supervision III 05/79 1 2 2 6'8/79 Supervision IV 10/79 1.5 1 1.5 11/21/79 Supervision V 08/80 0.5 1. 0.5 8/29/80 Supervision VI 09/80 0.8 2/ 1 0.8 10/27/80 Supervision VII 02/81 0.4 2/ 3 1.2 3/16/81 Supervision VIII 10/81 1 2 2 11/6/81 10.5 1/ Four missions in March, April, July and August, 1975 for the Power Sector Review helped identify and prepare the project. Number of weeks shown is an estimate for the Aguacapa Power Project only. 2/ Joint mission with other projects. Number of weeks shown is an estimate for the Aguacapa Power Project only. (iv) OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Plan Revision Actual First Mention in Project File - - 12/31/74 Government Loan A.pplication - - 04/18175 Negotiations 1- 01'26/77 Board Approval Date 03/22/77 - 05/17/77 Loan Agreement Date - - 06/10/77 Effectiveness Date 06/15/77 09/14/77 02/07/78 Closing Date 12/31/79 12/31/80 10/31/81 Borrower INDE - INDE Executing Agency INDE - INDE Fiscal Year of Borrower Calendar Year - Calendar Year Follow-on Project Name Ch;xoy - Chixoy Loan Number - 1605-GU Amount (US$ million) - 116.6 1/ Loan Agreement Date - 07/21/78 1/ 1/ Amount includes US$44.6 million of a supplemental loan signed on 3/22/85. EXCHANGE RATE Name of Currency Quetzal (Q) Exchanae Rate At Appraisal US$1.00 = Q 1.00 Intervening years US$1.00 = Q 1.00 Completion Date USSl.00 = Q 1.00 (v) GUATEMALA PROJECT COMPLETION PROJECT INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) HIGHLIGHTS 1. Loan 1426-GU (US$55.0 million equivalent) helped to finance the construction of the 90 MW Aguacapa Hydroelectric Power Plant and associated 230 kV transmission facilities. Consultant services for personnel administration, planning, financial management, and studies were financed by INDE's own resources and not by the Bank, as originally envisaged in the Staff Appraisal Report. 2. The Project was successful in meeting the objectives of increasing the generation capacity and associated transmission facilities in order to meet the expected demand increases and of saving fuel by replacing thermal generation. The Project was not successful: (i) in strengthening the financial planning and personnel organization and management, because the functioning of the Departments of Planning, Finance and Personnel that were created was not satisfactory; and (ii) in carrying out studies relative to tariff, revaluation of assets and a new office building, because none of the studies was actually implemented. 3. No effective progress was achieved in reorganizing the sector during the course of the Project, in spite of the studies completed by a commission appointed by the Government and the interest of the Bank in a more efficient secto_ orgarization. 4. The Aguacapa Hydroelectric Plant was commissioned in October 1981, with a delay of nearly two-and-a-half years with respect to the appraisal estimates due to procurement problems and to failure of the power tunnel lining. Plant cost was US$183 million, with an overrun of 83Z witil respect to the appraisal estimate. After 11 months of operation, the power house was flooded and because of an unsettled insurance coverage, one of the damaged generators has not yet been replaced, thus reducing the plant capacity to 60 MW. 5. The financial performance of INDE was weak during the period 1977-83 due to inflation, decrease in sales as a consequence of economic recession and cost overruns and delays of the Aguacapa and Chixoy Projects. Government contributions, much higher than expected at appraisal, were necessary to bridge the financing gap created by the aforementioned factors. GUATEMALA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) Aguacapa Power Project (Loan 1426-GU) I. BACKGROUND 1.1 Bank Lending to the Sector 1.1.1 The Bank has supported the development of the Power Sector in Guatemala since 1967, through six loans to INDE totalling US$263.6 million, out of which the Aguacapa Power Project (Loan 1426-GU of June 1977, US$55.0 million) was the third operation. The two projects prior to Aguacapa were the 60 MW Jurun-Marinala Hydroelectric Project (Loan 487-GU of March 1967, US$15 million) and the Thermal Power Project (Loan 545-GU of June 1968, US$7.0 million). A review of the power sector was carried out in August 1975. The main conclusions of this review were that, although the Bank had played a large part in the expansion of Guatemala's power supply and in helping to establish INDE as the main institution in the power sector, it could have contributed more to the solution of the two most serious problems -- the sector's poor financial performance arising mainly from the unsatisfactory arrangements between Instituto Nacional de Electrificacion (INDE) and Empresa Electrica de Guatemala (EEG) (para. 1.2), and the lack of development of the country's hydroelectric resources. Accordingly, Bank assistance was designed to address both these problems through the financing of the Aguacapa Hydroelectric Project and later by the Chixoy Hydroelectric Project (Loan 1605-GU of July 1978, US$72.0 million and Supplemental 1605-1-GU -jf March 1985, US$44.6 million). A new lcan for US$70.0 million (Power Distribution Project, Loan 2724-GU), was signed on June 7, 1988; it had been approved in June 1986 for the amount of US$81.0 million. This project will support expansion of EEG's distributior system and INDE's establishment of a national dispatch center and carrying out of hydroelectric feasibility studies. 1.2 Electric Power Sector Organization 1.2.1 Public electricity service is provided by INDE, EEG and eleven small municipal utilities. INDE was created in 1959 as a Government-owned institution responsible for power generation and transmission, rural electrification, the supply of bulk electricity, and retail distribution outside the area of the capital city. EEG, a former subsidiary of Boise Cascade (USA), became a mixed public and private enterprise in 1977; it is controlled by INDE and is responsible for electricity distribution in Guatemala City and its environs. 1.2.2 Lack of coordination and institutional weakness of INDE have been a major problem ir- the energy sector. EEG operated thermal generation and electricity distribution in Guatemala City and its environs, i.e., the most profitable portion of the market, with sales concentrated in a small area - 2 - comprising most industrial and high income users. As a result, a significant part of the sector's financial resources was generated by EEG. Because of resistance by EEG, INDE ras for many years unable to obtain a share of the sector's cash generation in accordance with its investment needs to meet the required expansion of generation capacity and provision of service to remote, low income rural areas. As a result, installation of new generation capacity did not always keep pace with growing -ieeds, and there have been periods of service curtailments. 1.2.3 Over the last five years, the Government has taken a number of significant steps to improve coordination and develop INDE's institutional capacity. First, a Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) was created in 1983 to formulate the country's energy policies, coordinate planning activities, and take executive responsibilities for the development of hydrocarbons. Second, the Government transferred to INDE its shares in EEG, completed a number of studies to strengthen INDE, increased its planning capacity, appointed the same President for INDE and EEG, and created a joint INDE-EEG committee to coordinate the system's operation. Lastly, the Government established in 1985 a commission presided over by the Ministry of Energy and Mines and comprising the Minister of Economy, the Secretary General of Planning, and the President of INDE to formulate policies for the power sector, including development strategy, investment plans, and tariffs. The responsibility for overall supervision of INDE was shifted from the Ministry of Communications, Transport and Public Works to MEM. Presently, INDE and EEG have the same President and the same Board of Directors; and coordination in the sector and cooperation between technical staff of INDE atnd EEG have i ,proved. The presence of the Bank through the Aguacapa, Chixoy and Power Distribution Projects has been instrumental in achieving these institutional improvements. Much, however, remains still to be done in all the areas discussed. 1.3 References 1.3.1 Sources of information on which this PCR is based are listed in Annex 1.1. II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 2.1 Origin 2.1.1 The Government that took office in 1974 adopted as a major policy objective the development of the coulntry's hydroelectric potential. The Government's new emphasis coincided with the completion of the first phase of a master plan for the development of the electric system which grew out of discussions between the Bank and the Guatemalan authorities in 1972 and was financed by a technical assistance grant from the Federal Republic of Germany. Vi.'s work enabled the Government for the first time to base its power investment program on a comprehensive long-range plan. The medium- term program which had been developed from individual project studies was confirmed by the May 1976 master plan and contained the Aguacapa Hydroelectric Project for operation in 1979. -3- 2.2 Preparation 2.2.1 Engineering studies and design of Aguacapa were done by Swiss consultants under financing from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). Pre-feasibilit1 was completed in December 1975 and feasibility in June 1976. During the initial project preparation stage the size of the plant had been tentatively set at 60 MW. Subsequent project designs, refined cost estimates, and economic analyses justified increasing plant calacity to 90 MW, principally by the higher fuel saving that could be obtained. In addition, the increase would offset possible delays in the commissioning of the Chixoy Project. 2.2.2 The increase in the capacity, along with some refined cost estimates motivated the Bank to increase the amount of the loan from US$35 million, as considered in mid 1975, to US$55 million. The Bank had considered financing the whole foreign cost of the plant, except for engineering, which had already been assured by CABEI. 2.2.3 Missions in connection with the power sector review discussed the Aguacapa Project with INDE and Government in the framework of the sector investment program in March, April, July, and August 1975. They helped prepare the project. Because of staff constraints, the appraisal was carried out by two missions, the first by the engineer alone in February/March 1976 and the second by the engineer, the financial analyst, and a lawyer, in April 1976. One of the important issues identified in the Issues Paper of June 1976 was procurement; three of the four major contracts had been awarded before Bank's loan approval. A visit of a Guatemalan delegation in June to agree on procurement matters with the Bank, was followed by a Bank appraisal follow-up mission in August and by another visit of a Guatemalan delegation in September to discuss procurement matters and follow-up on loan processing. 2.3 Appraisal and Negotiations 2.3.1 The appraisal mission was much concerned with the sector's organization and with INDE's internal structure, excess of unskilled workers and lack of specialized technicians and experienced professional at mid-management level. Unavailability of a financial analyst delayed preparation of the appraisal report. Negotiations were completed by the end of January 1977 without substantive changes in the draft loan documents. During negotiations, the project implementation schedule was reviewed and performance indicators were identified and mutually agreed upon for use in project implementation. The Board of Executive Directors approved the loan in mid-May 1977. Declaration of effectiveness of the Second Education Loan, signed in March 1976, and of two loans for Earthquake Reconstruction, signed in August 1976 were conditions of Board presentation of the Aguacapa Project, causing its delay. Also, after negotiations, the Bank learned that EEG intended to buy two gas turbines that were not included in the sector investment program which had been agreed upon during negotiations. This issue was resolved to the satisfaction of the Bank through appropriate economic justification of the new investment. However, this matter delayed Board presentation. 2.3.2 The Bank conditioned effectiveness of the loan and guarantee agreements on: (i) the execution by the Government, INDE and EEG of a - 4 - subsidiary contract to ensure that EEG, not a party to the agreement with the Bank, would take all necessary actions in respect of adequacy of EEG revenues, assessment of EEG's tariffs and asset revaluation; (ii) the increases of electricity tariffs as agreed; and (iii) the approval of a loan of at least US$17 million by the Fon(do de Inversiones de Venezuela (FIV) (or other source satisfactory to the Bank) to help meet the project's 1977 financial requirements. The loan became effective in February 1974 requiring postponement of the effectiveness terminal date, initially set in Section 7.03 of the L.A. as September 14, 1977. Delays were caused by the following: (i) Congress approved the loan in mid-December; and (ii) by end of January the Bank took the decision to waive dated covenants that had not been complied with and could be considered conditions of effectiveness, namely level of accounts receivable from public sector and actions for organization strengthening and studies. 2.4 Project Description 2.4.1 On the basis of the findings of the appraisal mission, the Project consisted of: A. Generation (1) Construction of a concrete gravity diversion dam in the Aguacapa River (90,000 m3) and a reservoir of 300,000 m3 for daily regulation; (2) Construction of a concrete lined power tunnel of 2.7 m inside diameter, and 12 km in length; (3) Construction of a steel penstock of inside diameter between 2.4 and 2.7 m and 3.7 km in length; and (4) Construction of a surface power station with three 30 MW generating units. B. Transmission (1) Construction of step-up transformation facilities at the power plant (10/230 kV, 3 x 37.5 MVA); (2) Construction of a 230 kV switching station at about 500 m downstream from the power plant; and (3) Construction of a 230 kV single-circuit transmission line to the existing Escuintla substation (25 km). C. Consultant's Services and Organization Strengthening (1) Completion of a study reviewing the value of the fixed assets of INDE and EEG and proposing adequate methods for its periodical reevaluation; (2) Preparation and implementation of a program to assist INDE in financial planning and in the improvement of all its accounting, budgeting and treasury functions, including the creation of a finance department. (3) Preparation and implementation of a program for staff upgrading. (4) Reorganization of the planning staff into a planning department. (5) Completion of a study on tariff structure and levels. (6) Planning of the construction of the new office building. 2.5 Estimated Project Cost and Financing 2.5.1 The estimated cost of the project excluding financing charges was US$100 million. The US$59.5 million foreign currency component would be financed by the Bank's loan (US$55 million) and CABEI (US$4.5 million). The US$40.5 million local currency component would be financed by CABEI (US$4.3 million), FIV (US$22.0 million) and internal cash generation and Government capital transfers (US$14.2 million). Financing charges would amount to US$11.2 million (all in foreign currency) being financed by FIV (US$8.0 million) and internal cash generation and Government capital transfers (US$3.2 million). The participation of CABEI was limited to the engineering studies and was defined prior to an assurance of Bank participation in the project. FIV's participation in the project was coordinated with the Bank. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST 3.1 Ge:teration/Transmission Component 3.1.1 Due to its overwhelming weight in the Project, the generation/transmission component will be discussed separately under the headings to follow; the management consultant services components will be discussed later in the chapter. 3.2 Start-up 3.2.1 The long time (eight months) between loan sig:ing (June 1977) and declaration of effectiveness (February 1978) did not delay project execution because procurement started during the project preparation phase and payments to contractors and suppliers were made using funds advanced by the Government. Funds were later reimbursed to the Government. 3,3 Execution Timetable 3.3.1 Annex 3.1 presents appraisal and actual timetables for the various project components. The execution of generation and transmission works was organized under four lots: 1. Plant civil works 2. Plant hydromechanical equipment supply and erection 3. Electromechanical equipment supply and erection 4. Transmission line material supply and erection. - 6 - 3.3.2 Actual plant operation was in October 1981, a delay of 29 months with respect to appraisal estimate. The bidding and rebidding of lot 1 (para. 3.5.2) caused a 17 month delay in the start of the civil works. Repairs of the tunnel lining which cracked during pressure tests (para. 3.4.6) took 14 months. Had it not been for tunnel failures, project execution would have taken 32 months (four months less than the 36 months estimated in the appraisal) and would have allowed plant completion in June 1980 as compared to the appraisal estimate of May 1979. At the latter date, the physical progress of the project was as follow-: civil works - 65Z; hydromechanical equipment - 612; electromechanical equipment - 55Z, transmission line - 80Z. 3.4 Major Execution Problems 3.4.1 Three major problems were encountered during construction which significantly delayed commercial operation and increased project costs considerably. These problems were related to the dam foundation, tunnel lining, and flooding of the powerhouse. 3.4.2 Dam Foundation. Work began on the dam around April 1977. Based on the review of the consultant's progress report of June 1977 and supervision of the dam foundation works in November 1977, the Bank concluded that suitable material had not been encountered at depths indicated from geologic investigations for the feasibility study. Consequently, the Bank requested INDE to instruct their consultants to prepare a comprehensive report on the subject. The report was prepared by March 1978, and then, also at the request of the BanL, INDE's independent board of consultants carried out a comprehensive investigation on the dam foundation designs and construction procedures under terms of reference prepared by the Bank. 3.4.3. The principal conclusion of the board, stated in their report of September 1978 was: 'The presence of unconsolidated sediments beneath Blocks 1 to 5 and a portion of Block 6 of the Aguacapa dam requires a re- examination of the stability of the structure, as now designed and partially built. Without a positive cut-off to rock the present design cannot be considered to satisfy current criteria with respect to subsurface piping. The sliding stability of the blocks on soil also appears questionable. Problems of differential settlement of the dam and potential liquefaction of saturated sand portions of the foundation during strong earthquakes must be solved for this foundation. The board believes that it is technically feasible to resolve these problems and has recommended additional foundation exploration, sampling, and testing to obtain the necessary data for design." 3.4.4. Subsequently, suitable design adjustments recommended by the board were incorporated in the dam foundation to ensure its safety. But this delayed completion of the dam by about six months and increased its cost by about US$1.5 million. 3.4.5 Tunnel Lining. Tunnel construction began in November 1977 and was completed in March 1980, or two months shorter than the period originally estimated. However, the project was already some eight months behind schedule due principally to rebidding required for the civil works contract and ineffective interim construction by INDE with own forces. - 7 - 3.4.6 Filling of the tunnel for testing was done between May 26 and June 6, 1980. At the designed static internal pressure, measurements of flows into the tunnel detected a seepage of about 3.5 m3/s out of the tunnel, considered to be excessive; filling was stopped and dew.tering for inspection took place between June 6 and 10, when extensive longitudinal cracks were observed in the unreinforced concrete lining (about 70Z of tlle corresponding length, ranging from hair-line fissures to 5 mm. wide cracks). 3.4.7 The board of consultants was requested to review and analyze the construction of the tunnel, to recommend field investigations and propose measures for repairing it. It concluded that the excessive loss of water from the tunnel had been caused by cracking of the unreinforced concrete lining under the designed internal pressure and was due to: (a) the designers counting on the tensile strength of concrete to contribute in resisting internal pressures, without specifying or providing for special temperature control measure during casting of the concrete. (Thermal tensile stresses caused by concrete with high cement content reduced to a considerable extent the relatively low available strength of the lining); and (b) the elasticity (static modulus of deformation) of the tuffaceous rocks ':ncountered in more than 75Z of tunnel was substantially lower than assumed in the design. Hence, the rock did not provide sufficient support to the lining in the design. 3.4.8 During the period in which the tunnel was empty, additional field and laboratory tests of in situ rock properties and concrete were made to supplement the available data on design assumptions and construction of the tunnel lining. On the basis of this information, the design was changed, the tunnel reinforced and after the repair, the water loss during the tunnel re-filling WdS only about 1OZ of the maximum allowable. The board also noted that the need to assume very low values of deformation for tuffaceous materials had only recently (late 1970's) been generally recognized mainly as a result of similar lining failures in pressure tunnels in several countries. Paradoxically, before the design of the Aguacapa tunnel, the same consultants had designed the repairs in the lining of the Arenal power tunnel in Costa Rica, which was built under similar geologic conditions but designed by others. 3.4.9 In their report of July 1980, on the tunnel tests and inspection, the consultantsl contend that their design was technically sound and economic and had they opted for more conservative design criteria, (i.e. a practically water-tight lining), the incremental cost for the reinforcing would have been at least US$13 million and would have required at least ten more months to complete it, which would have delayed commercial operation to May 1981. They also estimated repairs of the lining to cost about US$8 million and take six months to complete (December 1981). However, by January 15, 1981, their estimate for repairs had jumped to US$25.8 million and completion had been extended to Spptember 1981. Based on data available in the Bank, it appears that the difference between the May 1981 and December 1981 cost Lstimates prepared by the consultant for the repairs of the tunnel lining were due principally to the three-fold increase in 1/ INDE does not agree with this point of the consultants. See Annex 5.5. - 8- steel lining. However, the significant cost increase (US$13.8 million)2 between the December 1981 estimate and final ce3ts in tunnel lining repairs (Annex 3.4) cannot be explained by available records in the Bank. 3.4.10 Flooding of the Powerhouse. During the final stages of construction, around October 1979, the river flooded the powerhouse, causing considerable damage to the installed electrical equipment. The consultants attributed the responsibility for this accident to the civil contractor for not having provided adequate protection to the powerhouse against high waters during construction and the poor practice of dumping into the river channel excavated material from powerhouse and penstock foundations thereby constricting the channel. However, after the contractor cleaned and widened the channel at the powerhouse and built a protective wall designed by the consultant, the powerhouse was flooded again, but this time apparently while most of the river flow was passing through the turbines as the power plant was already in operation. The reasons for the floodings have not been clearly explained by INDE.3 3.4.11 The flooding of the power house after 11 months of commercial operation damaged the generating units and INDE used components of one unit to repair the two others, while submitting a claim to the insurance company. Until now, INDE has been unable to reach a settlement with the insurers that would allow the repair of the cannibalized unit. It is expected that this unit would be back in operation by 1990, contingent upon INDE reaching an agreement with the insurers in the third quarter of 1988. 3.4.12 Changes in volumes of works. Annex 3.3 shows the differences in actual and estimaLed volumes of works by work front for excavation, filling, concrete and steel. Excavation doubled (mainly because of considerable increases for the penstock, power house and substation) use of concrete increased 36Z (mainly because the tunnel required twice as much as the estimated amount) and use of steel nearly doubled (because of a ten- fold increase in the tunnel steel lining). 2/ This difference refers only to civil works. It does not include US$3.8 million for: (i) engineering and administration; and (ii) delay in testing of electromechanical equipment (Annex 3.4) which were not included in the consultant's estimate. The US$13.8 million difference is composed of the following increments with respect to the consultant's estimate: (i) US$12.5 million in works and materials (including part of the steel plates for the tunnel lining) supplied by the main civil works contractor; and (ii) US$1.3 million in steel plates for the tunnel lining supplied by the hydromechanical equipment contractor. 3/ INDE stated in its project completion report that due to delays in the topographic survey of the powerhouse site, the !.-ierhouse was located in an unfavorably narrow area. This does not see.~m reasonable because the existing topographic information at the time of the feasibility study was sufficient to locate the powerhouse. -9- 3.5 Procurement 3.5.1 Procurement of equipment, materials and construction services financed by the Bank was done through ICB in accordance with Bank guidelines. INDE's contract award recommendations for three (electromechanical equipment, hydromechanical equipment and tr..tsmission line) of the four contracts were reviewed and found acceptable by the Bank before loan approval to expedite project execution. 3.5.2 Award of the largest contract (civil works) was complicated by INDE's proposed partial award, to each of two contractors who presented bids for the complete works. Even though the bidding documents were prepared by experienced international consultants and were reviewed by the Bank, they did not specify how the splitting of the award would be evaluated. In particular, they did not set a criterion for splitting the overhead costs presented by the bidders for the whole lot into the possible sub-lots. Letters of intent based on partial and provisional awards were submitted by INDE to the two bidders. The bidder that did not present the lowest evaluated bid for the complete lot signed the letter of intent for its part of the work before the Bank could review the borrower's evaluation report. ThE bidder which presented the lowest evaluated bid for the complete lot did not reach an agreement with INDE as to a contract for partial execution of the civil works. 3.5.3 Fearing that the award of the civil works contracts could escalate into a political controversy with international repercussions, the Government decided to rebid. CPS and LAC Projects after reviewing closely the original evaluation report concluded that the consultant's recommendation (splitting of the award with savings of US$15,000, equivalent to 0.04% of the cost of the complete lot) was not justified and the Bank pressed the Government to award the contract to the bidder with the lowest evaluated bid for the complete lot. Nevertheless, Government cancelled the tendering. The contract involved represented about 80% of the Bank's loan. In the interest of avoiding abortion of a major project at a mature stage, the Bank accepted the cancellation of the bidding process. Retendering resulted in the award of the civil works contract to a single contractor for an amount of US$39.3 million, as compared to the lowest offer of US$42.0 million in the first tender. Time consumed in arriving at a decision on the outcome of the first tender and in the retendering process caused one year delay in the start of the civil works. 3.6 The Consultant's Services and Organization Strengthening Component 3.6.1 INDE set up the financial department within the envisaged deadline and met the purpose of concentrating in one unit the accounting, budgetary and treasury functions. The studies for improving accounting practices and data processing, albeit satisfactory, were completed 3 years beyond the initially agreed date with the Bank due to late hiring of consultants and a prolonged duration of the studies. 3.6.2 The asset revaluation study of INDE was only completed in 1982, about four years after the agreed date due to late hiring of the consultants and problems with the execution of the study (para. 3.9.6). The similar study for EEG was completed much earlier and carried out - 10 - without major difficulties. The studies concluded that INDE'S and EEG's net assets in service as of December 31, 1979 were undervalued by 84Z and 781 respectively. Although found satisfactory by the Bank, the recommendations were not implemented. INDE and EEG have always been reluctant to have their assets revalued. The Bank did not press INDE and the Government to fulfill their commitment and lost credibility. Although implementation of asset revaluation for the sector was a covenant in the Chixoy Project, it was not carried out either. Under the Power Distribution Loan, it was agreed that INDE and the Government would update the assets revaluation studies and incorporate their results into the accounting system. Until now, this has not materialized. 3.6.3 An experienced financial analyst was hired by INDE within the time agreed with the Bank to lead the financial analysis unit of the planning group. This planning group was reorganized into a department within the rescheduled date, (June 30, 1979, a year later than the date set in the Loan Agreement. The study on tariff structure and levels was completed four years later than the date agreed (which was revised several times) due to late hiring of the consultants. The consultant's report was made available to the Bank, however, INDE never presented to the Bank its comments on the oroposal made by the consultant or a plan of tariff restructuring prepared by INDE staff based on the work done with the consultant. The tariff study became a component of the Chixoy Hydropower Project (Loan 1651-GU) because the Bank felt such study was still necessary and consultant's collaboration should be ensured for their proper carrying out. The preparation of this study was a good experience for the Planning Department, but it was not implemented or updated by them (para. 6.1.2). 3.6.4 INDE completed the design of its new headquarters some two years later than the agreed date due to late hiring of the architect. Due to the difficult financial position of the sector, and the need for tariff increases, Government and INDE considered politically unwise to build a new office building for INDE. The Bank accepted their position and INDE continues to pay a high administrative price for the scattering of its personnel in many buildings throughout the city. In addition, the main office building does not provide INDE's staff with m'-nimal acceptable working conditions. 3.6.5 The studies on personnel administration were satisfactorily completed by end of 1981, tbree-and-half years late with respect to the schedule initially agreed with the Bank due to late hiring of the consultants. These studies would have provided a sound foundation for the operation of the Personnel Department created in 1983. 3.7 Project Cost and Financing 3.7.1 Annex 3.3 shows a comparison of the estimated and actual costs of the generation/transmission component. Cost overrun amounted to US$83.2 million (or 83Z of the estimated project cost at appraisal) and resulted from civil works (US$51.4 million or 62Z of the cost overrun), hydromechanical and electrical equipment (US$15.3 million or 18Z), engineering and administration (US$10.2 million or 12Z) and infrastructure (US$6.4 million or 8?). Most of the cost overrun in civil works was due to the tunnel lining repairs (US$39.6 million. Annex 3.4). If costs are - 11 - compared on the basis of the cost structure presented in the SAR (base cost, physical conting*ncies and price contingencies) nearly 90Z of this cost increase can be explained by differences in the physical contingencies (US$45.6 million or 55Z of the cost overrun), price contingencies (US$18.0 million or 222) and engineering and administration (US$10.0 million without contingencies, as presented in the SAR, or 122). Again, the tunnel lining repairs explain nearly 90Z of the above difference in the physical contingencies. 3.7.2 Annex 3.5 presents a comparison between the SAR forecast and actual financing of the Project. The 80% increase in the cost of the project was absorbed by INDE's internal cash generation and Government capital transfers. As a result, Government/INDE participation in the total project financing requirements increased from a forecast level of less than 202 to an actual level of more than 50Z. 3.8 Disbursements 3.8.1 The Joan was intended to be quickly disbursed: two and a half years from the originally planned effectiveness date (June 1977) to closing date (December 1979). The loan was fully disbursed by October 1981, an almost two-year delay with respect to the initial closing date (Annex 3.6). By the latter date two thirds of the loan had been disbursed. By the end of the following semester - June 30, 1978 - 932 of the loan had been disbursed. Had it not been for rebidding of the civil works, which delayed effective start of the project by almost one and a half years (para. 3.3.2), disbursement of the loan would have been satisfactory. Closing dates were postponed initially to December 31, 1980 and then to June 30, 1981. 3.8.2 The amount assigned for financing consultant's services (Part C of the project, para. 2.4.1) in the Loan Agreement, US$250,000 was eventually disbursed against the plant civil works. The consultant's services were funded by INDE's own resources. 3.9 Performance of Consultants, Contractors and Suppliers 3.9.1 The performance of the plant general consultant4 was not satisfactory. Excessive additional construction costs and substantive delays in project work completion are directly attributable to designs based on overly optimistic criteria, as discussed in paras. 3.4.2 to 3.4.9. In June of 1984 INDE filed a claim against its consultants for damages equivalent to US$100 million. The consultants countersuited INDE in August of 1984 for defamation of character. The Supreme Court of Guatemala in July 1986 dismissed INDE's suit because the parts did not resort first to the arbitration procedure included in the contract I tween INrEz and the consultant. Subsequently, the consultants also d',,ped theit charges against INDE. 3.9.2 INDE attempted to build up its technical capability by creating a Project Supervision Unit to share construction supervision function with 4/ In charge of the design and construction inspection (see para. 3.9.2 for discussion of its role as construction supervision advisor). - 12 - the design consultant. The contract between INDE and the consultant defined the role of the consultant as being responsible for the permanent inspection of the work fronts, however, it did not define the interface between the consultant and the contractor. Formally the dealing with the contractor would be done by the INDE's Supervision Unit using the information provided by the consultant. The consultant considered thus itself as an advisor rather than a supervisor of the contractor. This arrangement would have been effective if, in addition to INDE's Supervision Unit being properly dimensioned and staffed with highly qualified professionals, INDE's top management had been strong. It was not, and project execution suffered from it.5 As early as October 1979, the Bank pointed out the difficulties stemming from this arrangement to INDE's top management and due to its recommendations the civil works contractor's project manager for Aguacapa and INDE's Financial Manager were removed from their posts. But INDE's top management continued ineffective. In the case of Aguacapa, it would have been much better for INDE to assign full responsibility of the supervision to the consultant. 3.9.3 The civil works contractor had poor management during the initial phase of the works, but improved towards the end of the project. A sizeable part of the construction equipment was old and the size of its construction plant was too small to complete the work on schedule. This deficiency was corrected during the final stages of construction. The performance of the hydromechanical and electromechanical equipment contractors was satisfactory, even though the former had problems in promptly replacing defective components and the latter had problems with equipment supplied by subcontractors. The performance of the transmission line contractor was satisfactory. 3.9.4 The general consultants for the project were given the opportunity to comment on the assessment given on their performance. The following is a transcript of their comments: "Dam Foundation: "During excavation we realized that the surface of competent rock was much lower than anticipated during the studies which were based on the field investigations. Immediately the consultant reviewed the design and proposed to solve the problem by grout curtains apart from a lowering of the foundation of some blocks. "The Board of Consultants proposed another solution. 'We are of the firm opinion that, a) our solution was sound, and b) that at all times we were in full command of the situation. 'Tunnel Lining: 'We would like to draw your attention to the fact that the consultant was not in charge of construction supervision. 5/ INDE considers that the Supervision Unit was adequately staffed with qualified persounel. See Annex 5.5. - 13 - "We had only one man on site as adviser. During construction, we continuously advised the Client about various issues like method of excavation, placing temperature of concrete, grouting, etc. But very seldom, or too late, our advice was followed. We fully agree with your st.:ement in para. 3.9.2 that it would have been much better for the Client to assign full responsibility of the supervision to the Consultant. "It is our firm opinion, that the defects resulting from the incorrect construction procedures caused the failure of the tunnel and we have documented this in various reports to the Client. We have even employed international consultants to independently look into this problem.6 "Flooding of the Powerhouse: "The first flooding of the powerhouse in 1979 was due to a restricted river section causfd by dumped excavation material. Additionally, the river correction was not carried out according to our drawings and instructions. "During construction, we repeatedly pointed out this fact to the Client, however, without success. "The cause for the second flooding in 1982 was due to two facts: 1) The river correction designed by the Consultant was not fully carried out. The wall designed to give additional safety was not built according to our design. 2) The creek which enters the river downstream of the powerhouse brought a large amount of sediments and trees. This was due to a flash flood flow as a detailed study showed, a very exceptional hydrological situation. "Subsequent studies show that the flood took place because they did not follow the directitns given by the Consultant, confirming the correct site for the powerhouse. "Performance of the Consultant: "The Consultant is fully convinced, and subsequent studies show that its performance was correct and within the modern consulting engineering norms and criterion. During the entire development of the project, the Consultant had full control of all technical problems and resulting consequences. Nevertheless, the ambiguous contractual situation of being an advisor without the right to intervene directly over the contractor resulted in that the advice and directions given by the Consultant were not always followed as promptly and quickly as was required and caused the problems previously stated in this report." 6/ INDE does not agree with this opinion of the consultant. See Annex 5.5. - 14 - 3.9.5 The performance of the consultants for financial and management studies was satisfactory. In the case of the asset reevalu:tion study, difficulties with completion of the report stemmed from the inconsistency of data provided by INDE and the lack of collaboration of INDE's management with the consultants in order to overcome the problems generated by the faulted data. The consultants completed in a very satisfactory manner the asset revaluation study for EEG. 3.10 Covenants 3.10.1 The key covenants for the Loan (LA) and Guarantee (GA) Agreements dealt with financial performance and expansion planning and are summarized in Annex 3.6 3.10.2 The most important financial covenants dealing with contribution to investment (L.A.5.04a, G.A.3.02), rates of return (L.A.5.04b, G.A.3.03), setting of rates for the sale of electricity from INDE to EEG (L.A.5.06, G.A.3.05) and accounts receivable (L.A.5.07a, G.A.3.09a) hf.e not been in general complied with (paras. 5.1 to 5.3). These covenants were reestablished in the Chixoy Project (Loan 1605-GU), however, in general, there was a state of no compliance throughout the life of this first Chixoy loan. In the negotiation of the supplemental loan for Chixoy (Loan 1605-1-GU), substantial progress was achieved in setting the rate for the bulk sales of INDE to EEG and cancelling the debts of the public agencies to INDE. 3.10.3 Regarding generation expansion covenants (L.A.5.08, G.A.3.u8), the Bank agreed to the purchase of two gas turbines (about 50MW) by EEG once they were proved to be economically justified, even though these were not in the investment plan initially agreed with the Bank. The Government's decision of starting construction of the 440 MC Chulac Hydroelectric Project (pars. 4.1.3) was unquestionably a default of G.A. 3.08. 3.10.4 There was no compliance with dated covenants dealing with the completion of management and financial studies (para. 3.6) in spite of several postponements agreed by the Bank. IV. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION 4.1 Project Achievements 4.1.1 The ihain objective of the project was to increase the generation capacity and associated transmission facilities in order to meet the demand increase and to save fuel by replacing thermal generation. In spite of the commissioning delay and the unavailability of the third generating unit due to the flooding of the power house, the project was successful in meeting this objective. 4.1.2 A secondary objective of the project was to strengthen the financial, planning and personnel organization and management and to carry out studies relative to tariff revaluation of assets and a new office building. The project was not successful in meeting this objective since even though some restructuring of the organization was implemented (creation of the planning and finance departments by the dates envisaged; - 15 - the personnel department much later in 1983) and the studies have been completed (albeit with long delays), the functioning of the new units was not satisfactory and none o.- the recommendations were implemented. 4.1.3 Another objective pursued by the project was a sector reorganization, with better definition of INDE's and EEG's functions and their rapport with the Government. In particular transfer of assets, planning coordination and regulation were major issues calling for a prompt settlement. This objective was not met. As a matter of fact the situation worsened with the formation of another entity (Hidrochulac) to construct a major hydro power project (Chulac, 440 MW), which was not included in the expansion program agreed with the Bank. 4.1.4 The Bank attempted to address the problems cited in paras. 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 in the loans 1605-GU and supplemeutal 1605-1-GU (Chixoy hydroproject) and in the Power Distribution Project. Construction of the Chulac Project was interrupted in 1982 and Hidrochulac was disactivated. 4.2 Load Growth 4.2.1 Forecast and actual sales by INDE and EEG were equal in 1979, expected year for the commissioning of Aguacapa (Annex 4.1). Sales de-reased from 1980 to 1983 and it was only in 1985 that sales surpassed the 1979 level. As a consequence the actual sales departed considerably from forecast sales (e.g. 1981: -10Z; 1985: -42Z). The output of Aguacapa was thus initially used to replace thermal generation. Due to problems with Chixoy and the thermal plants, Aguacapa was extremely valuable in minimizing electric energy shortages. 4.3 Rate of Return on Investment 4.3.1 The appraisal estimated the rate of return as 14.9%. including in the cost stream the investment in Aguacapa and the distribution system expansion required by the project. The benefits were estimated as the forecast revenues from the sale of electricity due to the project, and fuel savings measured by the electricity generated by the project to substitute thermal generation. Following the same methodology but with actual data for the period 1976-86 and forecast data for the remainder of the life of the plant, the rate of return has been estimated at about 10% (Annex 4.2) roughly in line with the opportunity cost of capital in Guatemalp. The lower-than-expected rate is due to the higher project costs.7 Also, the plant has been operating with only two units and it is expected that only in 1990 full capacity would be available again (para. 3.4.11). 7/ Lower revenues from sales due to low levels of consumption in Guatemala in the first years of Aguacapa's opet tion were more than offset by substitution of costly thermal generation. - 16 - 1 V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 5.1 Comparison of Actual and Forecast Data 5.1.1 Annexes 5.1 to 5.4 compare the appraisal forecast income statement, sources and applications of funds, balance sheets and performance indicators for INDE, EEG and the Sector (consolidation of INDE and EEG).8 The Sector financial performance wat weak during the period 1976-80 and deteriorated further during the period 1981-1983, however, it improved in 1984 and 1985. The weak financial performance was due to inflation, decrease in sales as a consequence of economic recession, and cost overruns and delays of the Aguacapa and Chixoy Projects. The financial indicators presented in Annex 5.4 show that the contribu;ion to investment was generally lower than covenanted in the period 1976-83, but improved substantially for 1984 and 1985 after commissioning of the projects under construction.9 The financing gap was covered by Government contributions, higher than expected at appraisal, and by short-term financing. The debt-service coverage ratio was generally lower than covenanted, and deteriorated from 1.8 in 1976 to 1.0 in 1980 and 1.3 in 1985. The debt-equity ratio of 1985 was 28/72, better than expected at appraisal as a result, basically, of the increase in Government contributions. The rate of returr on historically valued assets was lower than the appraisal target. The rates of return range from 4.42 to 13.92 and are low if taken into account that the assets were seriously undervalued (para. 3.6.2). 5.1.2 The contribution to investment ratio, which was the main financial covenant of the loan, was generally lower than agr:eed. However, the Bank did not press the Government and INDE to fulfill their commitment, based on the fact that tariff actions were practically the only option left and rate increases had been the basic tool that the Government had used to counteract the financial problems of the sector; Government argued that further rate increases were politically difficult because rates were already high, compared with other Cetitral American countries, and also because the quality of service had declined due to delays in the commissioring of the Aguacapa Project and operation problems (including lack of adequate maintenance) with some of the thermal units. The Bank accepted these arguments and waived the requirement of the contribution to investment covenant on various occasions. 5.1.3 For the calculation of the contribution to investment ratio, change in non-cash working capital was added to the internally generated funds, and since the change tended to be negative as a result of increases of current liabilities of the sector, this produced an increase in net cash generation, thus overestimating the sector's contribution to investment. In future operations witn INDE, internally generated funds should not include change in non-cash working capital. 8/ There are eleven small municipal companies which have not been included in the consolidation, but their addition would have a negligible effect on the aggregate figures of the Sector. 9/ The contributions to investment covenanted were: 162 ror 1977, 132 for 1978, 162 for 1979 and 18% for 1980 and thereafter. - 17 - 5.2 INDE's Financial Performance 5.2.1 INDE's financial performance reflects the evolution discussed above. The contribution to expansion ratio was lower than agreed, except for years 1978, 1984 and 1985. INDE's sales in the period 1983-1985 (Annex 4.1) were approximately 40Z lower than forecast at Rppraisal due to the slowdown in economic activity, this being the main cause for the financial constraints. In addition, investment was much higher-than-expected due to cost ovetrun of Aguacapa and Chixoy. 5.2.2 Average electricity rates increased by about 180Z, from 3.77 in 1976 to 10.51 cents of current Quetzales in 1985. In 1976 prices, this represents an increase of about 3% per annum as follows: frori 1976 to 1981 rates grew by 10% per annum in real terms, while from 1982 to 1985 rates declined by abotit 6Z pec annum; this decline was due to a reduction of revenues resulting from the application of the fuel adjustment clause, as fuel consumption was reduced due to the increase in Aguacapa hydro generation.°0 Even though there was an overall improvement in the level of rates during the period, this was offset by lower sales and by higher operating expenses than expected at appraisal. 5.2.3 Other factors affecting INDE's finances were (i) overstaffing and (ii) the high level of accounts receivable. The number of employees increased from 4,561 in 1976 to 6,407 in 1980, representing an annual increase of 9Z. The number of employees for 1985 was 2321 higher than the target established in the performance indicators agreed during the negotiations. The level of employees for the period 1981-83 was aoout the same as that of 1930, but increased substantially in subsequent years, reachinig 7,248 in {985 (para. 6.2.2). 5.2.4 The level of accounts receivable was generally above the 60 days agreed under Section 5.07 of the Loan Agreement. The collection period increased to a maximum of 149 days in 1982. Though the situation has improved in recent years, accounts receivable are still high, representing 89 billing days in 1985. The main reason for this is the poor payment record of the Government and municipal entities. Under the Power Distribution Project, the Government and INDE agreed to take all necessary actions to ensure that by January, 1989, the accounts payable by public agencies to INDE would not exceed 60 days and that EEG would pay to INDE its electricity bills within 45 days. 5.3 EEG Financial Performance 5.3.1 The financial performance of EEG during the period was adequate even though its sales for the period 1976-85 were about 40% lower than expected at appraisal, thus substantially decreasing the expected sector revenues. However, EEG was able to maintain its operating ratio, debt service coverage ratio and debt-equity ratio at levels somewhat comparable to the ones expected at appraisal. Its internal cash generation allowed EEG to fund its working capital and investment requirement without borrowing. However, it should be noted that investment was kept low. A 10/ A minor decline in rates was also foreseen at the time of appraisal (Annex 5.1, Attachment 1). - 18 - large component of the working capital was the accounts receivable, which have been steadily increasing and represented 118 billing days in 1985, mainly due by the capital city's water supply company, EMPAGUA. In December 1987, EMPAGUA paid the outstanding debt as of December 1986. VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 6.1 The Borrower and the Bank 6.1.1 The appraisal's diagnosis of the institutional problems of INDE and the sector focussed on INDE's deficient organization, poor working conditions and procedures and lack of first rate management as well as on the unsuitable sector organization. Seen in retrospective, the Bank proposed action can still be considered correct. In addition, the Bank's supervision, although mainly concentrated i-. resolving the problems of the Aguacapa Power Plant, always insisted on the timely hiring of consultants for the studies having a bearing on institutional development and followed up with Government on sector reorganization. In the case of INDE, failure in achieving the project institutional objectives (paras. 4.1.2 and 4.1.3) can be attributed to ineffective management, aggravated by frequent changes in top managerial positions. 6.1.2 The failures of (i) the Planning Department in making use of the tariff study prepared by the consultants; (ii) the Finance Department in implementing the results of the asset revaluation study into the accounting system; and (iii) the Personnel Department in implementing the re"alts of several personnel-related studies, attest to the statement of in, active management mentioned above. The Project was pursuing many objectives in INDE arnd in the power sector, all of which were achievable during the Project period but it failed to press firmly and consistently towards INDE achieving them. As a result, the Bank kept on including the same unattended objectives in the following operations, which contributed to eroding its credibility vis-a-vis the Guatemalans. This process also raised within the Bank some criticism to the Projects and Programs Departments as promoters of new operations in the Guatemalan Power Sector with many of the objectives which had not been achieved in the past. Moreover, these objectives were sought through the same means (e.g. studies by consultants followed by plan of action for implementation of the consultants' recommendations) that had failed in the past. 6.1.3 Bank supervision should have detected or flagged in the early stages the development of problems that later became main issues: (i) defects in procurement documents (para. 3.5.2) and (ii) the inadequate relationship between owner, contractor and consultant (para. 3.9.1). The Bank seems to have erred on the side of excessive flexibility, given INDE and the Goverment's failure to comply with irnportant undertakings and serious procurement issues (para. 3.5.3). 6.2 Government 6.2.1 Government did not support institutional changes which were necessary in INDE and in the sector. It is to be borne in mind that the project was executed during a period of acute political instability in - 1° - Guatemala. Government was unable or unwilling to face the opposition, mainly in the private sector, to the transfer of the EEG's generation assets to INDE and transformation of EEG in a sole distribution utility that the sector reorganization called for. In addition, there was no resolve on the part of the Government to regulate and coordinate the sector's main activities, notably the expansion planning and the ensuing in-eatment decisions. 6.2.2 Even thotgh INDE is a legally autonomous entity, it never escaped the rigid and short-sighted control of the Government's Civil Service Office. This precluded payment of salaries compati'le with EEG, let alone the private sector, which in turn made the implementation of a program for upgrading INDE's staff unattainable. Reduction of staff, mainly unskilled workers assigned to construction of Aguacapa and Chixoy was not carried out (para. 5.2.3) because Government and INDE's management considered politically and socially difficult to lay-off workers when the level of unemployment was very high. Under the Power Distribution Project, INDE agreed to prepare a five-year program of staff restructuring and reduction with targets acceptable to the Bank. This program has not yet been submitted by INDE. VII. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 7.1 Phased Objectives for Institutional Development 7.1.1 Institutional development of borrowers or sectors which present many deficiencies should be sought through the adequate phasing of objectives in a series of projects if a lending program can be ensured. The phasing of objectives requires the Bank to have a clear and practical strategy for the country and the sector. Sector objectives are very hard to accomplish only through projects because the leverage of the Bank to exercise remedies to enforce covenants leading to sector improvements is weakened by the need to have major physical components of the project completed on time. The currently available sector loans could help address this dilemma. 7.2 Compliance with Agreements 7.2.1 The Bank should thoroughly assess Government and Borrower's attitudes towards expected commitments with the Bank prior to loan approval. Govei:;ment and INDE repeatedly disregarded contractual agreements with the Bank and weak reactions of the Bank on their defaults encouraged them further. To reduce the risk of defaults, the Bank should seek fulfillmeLt of selective policy conditions, on which there are questions on the Government's commitment prior to, or as conditions for. processing the loan. Deferral of such obligations to later stages of loan preparation jeopardizes the implementation of related provisions. 7.3 Extensive Project Preparation 7.3.1 In dealing with hydroprojects, extra caution has to be exercised in the project preparation and in the plant design. Cost estimates should be based on basic design preceded by thorough field investigations, notably geological, as warranted by the design stage. In particular, any - 20 - hydroelectric works to be built on tuffaceous or breccia rocks should be examined with special attention by a team of experts in this particular field, including their in depth assessment of all design criteria for major works in this type of material. This task should be carried out upon completion of the feasibility study stage. Selection of consultants should take into account their particular knowledge of the region. 7.4 Procurement Planning 7.4.1 An agreement on the bidding documsnts should be preferably finalized at appraisal. In addition, it is highly desirable that the document be based on a Bank's sample bidding document with adjustments to reflect specific project conditions. Review by the Bank under time pressure of complex bidding documenits prepared by our borrowers--as happens for major civil works--may not detect potential problems for bid evaluation and contract award that eventually lead to disputes among interested parties and delay of the project. 7.5 Definition of Construction Supervision Responsibilities 7.5.1 Proposed contracts for Bank financing with contractors and consultants, particularly when major works are involved, should be thoroughly examined regarding safety of the works, workmanship, and formal relations between all contractual parties involved to ensure proper definition of accountability in all project related acts. In particular, the responsibilities for construction supervision should be clearly established between the owner and the consultant. It is acceptable that the consultant playc no role in the construction supervision--its role being limited to the final design activities and any special studies the owner may specifically request under clear terms of reference--or that the consultant is in charge of the inspection of the works and the owner does the actual supervision of the contractor. These options are only recommended to borrowers wliich have a strong top management and a construction supervision unit suitably dimensioned and staffed with highly qualified professionals. Another acceptable option is that the consultant directly supervises the contractor. This is particularly suited to borrowers which do not have strong management and qualified construction personnel. The selection of the consultant is crucial in this case and the Bank should closely scrutinize the criteria for selection of consultants and the short list of consultants invited for bidding. * 21 - ANNEX 1.1 GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) Sources of Information for the Proiect Completion Report World Bank Report No. 1361 lb-GU, the Project Appraisal Report World Bank Report No. P-2069-GU, the Project President's Report Consultants' Feasibility Report of June 1976 World Bank supervision mission reports from December 1977 to Novembez 1981 INDE's Report on the project completion, dated February 1986 (in Spanish) Board of Special Consultants' Report on the damages and repairs of the Project's pressure tunnel, August 1981 (in Spanish) INDE's Reports related with the Project's pressure tunnel failure, 1982 to 1984 (in Spanish) Consultants' Report on the design criteria and analysis of the causes of the project's pressure tunnel lining failure, February 1983 (in Spanish) 'World Bank LAC Project Department's files on the Project - 22 ANNEX 3.1 GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) Actual and Forecast Timetable of Project Implementation ----------Forecast----------- -----------Actual------------ Nuer of Months Difference No. of No. of Il-p_anntation Completion Star I/ Conwoltien Flonths Start I/ Comletion Months Period Data Power Plant Elctromechanical Equipmnt OS/77 03/79 26 07/77 10/80 89 13 17 Hydromechanical Equipment IJ3/77 OS/79 26 07/77 06/80 88 9 11 Civil Works 08/77 V 06/79 28 11/77 2 10/81 47 22 29 Trenspioion System 03/77 0O/79 26 07/77 04/80 J 3S 7 it Mansfioent Coneu I tant Services/grani zation irenotenina Personnel 08/77 02/78 9 02/80 09/81 19 10 43 Planning OS/77 06/78 41 16 09/77 06/79 21 8 t2 Aset Reealustion 07/77 02/78 7 06/80 01/82 19 12 47 Accounting and Data Precessing 10/77 06/78 E/ a 07/78 07/61 36 28 as Tariff Study 07/77 01/78 6 12/80 01/82 18 7 48 Now Offico Building Design 10/77 01/78 IV 08/79 02,80 6 3 28 Sector Roraanization 06/77 Z/ 12/79 80 06/ Not done - - - 2/ Start mans signing contrect or letter of intent with euppliers, contractors or consultants. 2/ This reform to the main civil work. contractor. Actual work by INE's force account on tunnel construction and dam foundations started in the first quarter of 1976. fl/ Completion could have been on about 04/79. if progress in power house construction could have allowed completion of the m1l stretch between the power house and the Aguacaps substation. ^/ Compli implementation of new planning departuent. / COmplete implemntation of new financial departmnt. B/ 8uilding would be completed by 1/81. Z/ Defintion of legal structure of the sector required to permit initiation of Covernment action to implemnt sector reform. A Comi-eion was created by the Government in January 1976 to study the sector reorganization; it presented its recomendations in September 1976. - 23 Annex 3.2 GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED VOLUMES OF WORKS WORK FRONT CAVATION -1OM6 FILLING 1013 CONCETE - 103Y STOEL - t W ACrUAL $DIFF. CaT. ATUAL X DIFF. E. CU SDIF.- C DI. Dom 126.0 151.2 20 291.0 348.1 20 76.6 82.1 7 804S 2D73 -16 Tunnel 85.7 110.3 29 - - - 43.S 88.2 96 460 4995 1010 Pen-tock/Surg. Tank 20.0 99.5 398 30.0 0.1 -90 13.6 18.7 38 710 869 21 Power House/ Substation 20.0 161.8 709 3.0 5.4 80 12.0 12.8 7 700 911 31 Total 251.7 522.8 108 824.0 386.6 10 146.1 198.8 36 4.905 9,S44 90 I/ Includes 4,814 t for tunnel lining repaies. ANNEX 3.3 - 24 - Page 1 of 2 GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND FORECAST COSTS (Current prices in US$ millions) ----Difference--- Forecast Actual Amount Percent 1. Infrastructure 1.466 7.897 6.431 438.7 2. Civil Works 56.268 107.638 51.370 91.3 3. Hydromechanical Equipment 12.765 20.064 7.299 57.2 4. Electromechanical Equipment 17.918 25.911 7.993 44.6 5. Transmission Line 1.386 1.329 -0.057 -4.1 6. Engineering and Admin. 9.947 20.113 10.166 102.2 Sub-Total Power Plant and Transmission 99.750 182.953 83.203 83.4 7. Consultant's Services .250 .2501/ 0.0 0.0 TOTAL 100.000 183.203 83.203 83.2 1/ Bank's estimate; actual figures not available at INDE. - 25 - ANNEX 3.3 Page 2 of 2 GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND FORECAST COSTS (SEGREGATION OF PHYSICAL AND PRICE CONTINGENCIES) In US$ millions ------------ Forecast---------- ---------Actual … ------- ----Differenc---- Local / Foreicn Total Local 1/ For.inn Total mount Percent t. INFRASTRUtUR 1.300 1.300 .0 7.897 7.897 6.597 507.5 2. CIL WORKS 2.1 Diversion* 1.200 2.000 3.200 1.437 .774 2.211 2.2 Dee 8.000 6.000 14.000 10.115 5. '47 15.562 2.3 Tunnel 9.780 9.600 19.380 14.280 7.687 21.969 2.4 Pen-tock .100 2.800 2.900 1.939 1.044 2.983 2.5 Powerhouae/Substation 1100 S. 0 4. 0 2.0 1.100 3.143 Sub-Total 20.180 23.650 43.830 29.814 16.054 45.868 2.039 4.7 3. HYDROMECHANICAL EQUIPMENT: 3.1 Penatock/Surge chamber 6.800 0.800 7.600 6.016 1.136 7.152 3.2 Cates/Hoists 0.970 0.200 1.170 1.593 0.055 1.648 3.3 Tunnel lining 0.920 0.300 1.220 0.779 0. 1.164 Sub-Total 8.690 1.300 9.990 8.388 1.576 9.964 -0.026 -0.3 4. ELECTROMECHANICAL EOUIPMBIT: 4.1 Turbines/Valvem, 3.300 0.200 3.500 3.149 .107 3.256 4.2 Oenerator. 4.000 0.200 4.200 3.244 .056 3.300 4.3 Transformers 1.000 .0 1.000 1.168 .039 1.207 4.4 Substation Apparatus 2.000 0.100 2.100 1.758 .197 1.95S 4.5 Aux. Electric Equipment 2.200 0.200 2.400 2.981 .336 3.317 4.6 Aux. Mechanical Equipment 0. Q.140 0Q40 1.69..053 1.751 Sub-Total 13.200 0.840 14.040 13.998 0.788 14.786 0.746 5.3 5. TRANSMISSION LINE: 0.870 0.210 1.080 0.931 0.327 1.258 0.178 16.5 6. PHfSlCAL CONTINOENCIES: 3.370 2.610 5.980 36.637 14.986 51.623 45.643 763.3 7. ElINEERIN0 ANO AOMINISTRATION: 4.500 4.740 9.240 5.577 13.658 19.235 9.995 108.2 8. BASE COST (W/PHYS. CONT.): J 50.810 34.650 85.460 95.345 55.286 150.631 65.171 76.3 9. PRICE COQNIN T:ICES: 8.390 5.900 14.290 21.251 11.071 32.322 18.032 126.2 TOTAL COST J 59.200 40.S'0 99.750 116.596 66.357 482.953 83.203 83.4 / US11.00 m Q. 1.00 2 Prices as of June 1976. / Consultant's srvices not included (se- note 1 on page 1). - 26 - ANNEX 3.4 GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) COST OF TUNNEL REPAIRS (In current US$ million) 1. Civil works 39.62 1/ 2. Engineering and Administration 2.82 2/ 3. Delay in testing of electromechanical equipment 1.02 TOTAL 43.46 1/ Includes US$8.60 million of steel plates supplied by the hydromechanical equipment contractor. 2/ Includes US$0.38 million for board of special consultants. - 27 - ANNEX 3.5 GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND FORECAST FINANCING PLAN (In current US$ million) -----FO RECAST ------------ ---AC TUAL/-- ----Totel--- - -Total---- Source Foreign Locol Amount X Foreign Locol Amount X lBRD 66.0 - 55.0 49.6 65.0 - 55.0 28.3 CA8EI 4.5 4.8 8.8 7.9 4.0 - 4.8 2.5 FIV 8.0 22.0 80.0 27.0 80.0 - 80.0 15.4 INDE/GOVERNUENT 0 17.4 17.4 15.6 88.1 66.4 104.6 58.8 TOTALs AMOUNT: 67.5 48.7 111.2 100.0 127.9 66.4 194.8 100.0 1: 60.7 89.8 100.0 - 65.8 84.2 100.0 - 1/ Expensee related with consultant's serviece (Part C, para. 2.4.1) originally forsen af uS10.260 million src not Included; actual amount (totally funded by INDE's own resources) was not made available by INDE. - 28 - ANNEX 3.6 GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) COMPARISON OF FORECAST AND ACTUAL LOAN DISBURSEMENT (In current US$ million) DATES FORECAST ACTUAL Loan Signing June 1977 Effectiveness June 1977 March 1978 Closing date December 1979 October 1981 Disburnsment During Semester ----- ----Cummulative Disbursemnt---------- Fiscal Year/Semoster Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Actual as X of Forecast FY77 =Lne 80, 1977 9.0 9.0 0 FY78 D-cember 81, 1977 14.4 23.4 0 June 80, 1978 10.0 9.5 33.4 9.6 28 FY79 Dce-mber 31, 1978 8.2 2.1 41.8 11.6 28 June 80, 1979 8.0 14.8 49.6 26.4 63 FY80 December 31, 1979 6.4 10.7 55.0 37.1 87 June 30, 1980 14.0 61.1 93 FY81 December 31, 1980 0.7 51.8 94 June 80, 1981 2.6 64.3 99 FY82 =ecemiber 81, 1981 0.7 55.0 100 - 29 - ANNEX 3.7 Page 1 of 2 GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) Key Loan and Guarantee ARreement Covenants (i) Sector rate of return will not be less than 9Z commencing in the year subsequent to project completion (L.A. 5.04.b, G.A. 3.03); (ii) Contribution of sector internal cash generation to capital expenditures will not be less than 162 in 1977; 132 in 1978; 162 in 1979 and 18Z in 1980 and onwards until project completion (L.A. 5.04.a, G.A. 3.02) (iii) INDE's accounts receivable from public agencies shall not exceed two months of billVng (L.A. 5.07.a., G.A, 3.09.a) (iv) INDE's debt service ratio will not be less than 1.5 (L.A. 5.09); (vI Government will make contributions to INDE's in amounts not less than (in US$ million): US$17 in 1977; $13 in 1978, and $5 in 1979 (G.A. 2.02); (vi) Government will make contributions to INDE'S equity of not less than (in US$ million): $7 in 1977, $11 in 1978, and $8 in 1979 (G.A. 3.08.c) (vii) The rates for the sale of electricity from INDE to EEG will be set at such level as shall be required to transfer to INDE all funds available to EEG in excess of EEG's requirements for operations, repayment of debt, net working capital and capital expenditures (L.A. 5.06, G.A. 3.05); (viii) Any reduction in rates for the sale of electricity by the power sector will only be made with the agreement of the Bank (G.A. 3.11); (ix) Government will ensure that rates for the sale of electricity will be adjusted to cover fuel cost variations (G.A. 3.06); (x) INDE should complete a study reviewing the value of the fixed assets of INDE and EEG not later than five months from the effective date (L.A. 3.03) (xi) Government or INDE will carry out a study on tariff levels and structure by January 30, 1978 (G.A. 3.07); (xii) No major work, construction or asset acquisition not included in the agreed investment program for INDE or in excess of specified amounts for EEG would be undertaken, unless the Bank - 30 - ANNEX 3.7 Page 2 of 2 has been furnished with satisfactory evidence that: (a) such work, construction or acquisition is economically justified; and (b) INDE has available adequate financial resources for their carrying out (L.A. 5.08, G.A. 3.08) (xiii) Not later than June 30, 1978, INDE should: (a) reorganize its planning and financial staff into, respectively, a planning department and a finance department; (b) put into effect a program for achieving adequate financial planning and improvements of accounting practices; (c) prepare the plans for the construction of the headquarters building, including preliminary contractual arrangements for land acquisition and preliminary design and specifications (L.A. 4.01.b) - 31 - ANNEX 4.1. GUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-GU) COMPARISON OF FORECAST AND ACTUAL SALES TO FINAL CONSUMERS - GWh Appraisal Report Actual Difference EEG INDE Total EEG INDE Total Actual - Appraisal GVh I Appr. 1976 723 142 865 768 137 905 40 5 1977 859 149 1008 872 166 1038 30 3 1978 932 190 1122 949 200 1149 27 2 1979 1011 228 1239 1002 237 1239 0 0 1980 1097 270 1367 1001 235 1236 -131 -10 1981 1191 311 1502 984 245 1229 -273 -18 1982 1292 355 1647 934 205 1139 -308 -31 1983 1402 397 1799 942 207 1149 -650 -36 1984 1521 443 1964 973 215 1188 -776 -39 1985 1650 492 2142 1005 240 1245 -897 -42 - 32 - ANNEX 4.2 WUATEMALA INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION (INDE) ACWACAPA POWER PROJECT (LOAN 1426-CU) Return on Invoste_nt (million of US1 of old-1978) Thermal Saving Sales due Substitu- In Fuel Net Plant ----Capital Investment----- OU Total to Project Reovnues tion Expenses Benefits Yeoro Life Aguacape Other Subtotal Costs Cost OWh Million CWh Million Million a/ 1976 16.7 0.0 16.7 6.0 16.7 a 0.o -16.7 1977 2.1 e.g 2.1 0.0 2.1 0 0.6 -2.1 1978 26.9 0.6 26.9 0.0 26.9 a 0.0 -26.9 1979 8S.6 0.0 85.6 0.0 85.6 0 0.0 -85.6 1980 81.0 0.0 81.6 6.6 81.6 6 6.0 -81.0 1981 1 26.8 0.0 26.8 6.2 27.0 6 6.6 85 2.9 -24.1 1982 2 8.4 8.4 o.6 4.0 28 2.8 185 11.8 9.6 1988 8 0.0 0.6 0.6 40 8.0 189 16.5 17.9 1964 4 6.6 6.6 47 8.4 236 16.8 19.1 1985 6 6.6 6.6 58 8.8 266 19.2 21.9 1986 6 6.6 6.6 106 6.6 194 11.8 17.7 1987 7 6.6 6.6 266 15.8 15.2 1988 8 6.6 6.6 272 16.8 16.2 1989 9 6.6 6.6 886 20.7 20.1 1990 10 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 1961 11 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 1992 12 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 1993 18 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 1994 14 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 1995 15 6.6 9.6 343 21.2 20.6 1996 16e 0.6 0.6 48 21.2 20.6 1997 17 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 1998 18 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 1999 19 6.6 6.6 843 21.2 20.6 2666 20 0.6 0.6 848 21.2 20.6 2001 21 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 2002 22 6.6 0.6 848 21.2 20.6 2003 28 6.6 6.6 48 21.2 20.6 2064 24 6.6 6.6 843 21.2 20.6 2005 26 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 2666 26 9.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 2007 27 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 2008 28 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 2009 29 6.6 6.6 843 21.2 20.6 2010 86 6.6 9.6 848 21.2 20.6 2011 81 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 2012 82 6.6 6.6 843 21.2 20.6 2018 38 6.6 6.6 348 21.2 20.6 2014 84 6.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 2016 86 6.6 6.6 843 21.2 20.6 201 U 0.6 0.6 848 21.2 20.6 2017 87 0.6 6.6 848 21.2 20.6 2018 88 6.6 0.6 843 21.2 20.6 2019 89 0.6 o.6 843 21.2 20.8 2020 40 0.6 6.6 848 21.2 Rate of Roturn 6.11 U- I a LSf U2 - Wit. &i " - ilo .1a a's a- iz ftI " If sotVS Ii SIt 9UU S_t I?- 9 utl W- eV t 1101t 11 " 11 01 OIU-019 110 . ft U tis U 2I1 123o U- a 0% to1 a 2- a 2* WCt 01 O- go I it 1- St'I to 11 IL- 101 Oi 412- 1 11 U- sill tlt V6- ug I 100g hi1. i4 of `- "12.0 " " 0001 0 11 0 10 09 St- iga tn 12 - an9 a1Oa i`- 0001t tool co- 121a 1201 00- 10 Ion e 14- a1a21 lii '00- a0 ItO. i00 i0tI00h1P- Vii vs at a2 f t I ut-6'1 6 61, 1- ft a2 1g 41 1212 01 t U A- 612 S4 t 110 0 1 ft 12- ftl'I 12t 19 2- ?A0 11VT 10- ft' 9It b tlC 01a II Vo0,0 11'- ftl sbpo Cgf- ot n Oslo- i- 01 09 I- pi- a-u ST-ti% - c Q-n VI I- I P 1 1-10 1 co-l-001 IP u I0- f- lIa O-- so O- go- Iva0 St O-1 1115 h09 0 U 121 as.. . as 021 aI Ii.- 001 Ca0 ft 0011 *iC at I i T? o. a01 00ST001 04 10 et0 104 Vc2 OI I 4 e 019 ' 001 a1 10 ftP a000 ft s 310 oi t S 0& e III W co1 *1 12 011 140 101 00gm11 W 101 t I Ot 1 10 02 'S T t9 IS Ut OII ft UOStt 00 00 110P 09g t- ut 9121 0011 1l010W -4O 411 UV s Y ot 120 121 to 1,1VI St 110 IS 201 Si0 lii Lo 110 g 01o001 1 U 0l 00 401 MT U 10 o 12 a elo 1109 11 te0l Ol il.Ofu.hIVbbLa. as t so I or ft Ii Oil Im 001 ill- 0 SS-I Uto 01 III LO0 i t CS1 011 i so P 120 to v~t . 1- 001as n- a Il TS nC. no T .... S. - 12 ITI 40 o S.- C. a 000 t * aoc n t- ats 100TS 0 I 000 s I0 IO 000 U11 10 a Vt 000 t 10 10- 100 ItO 1100i I- 1012ot U 011 01- lif go 111 0 It ft 601 01- ? to 91 0 1to it a's Oto 51 I01 9 ft et1 11 IL 1 it 51 Vt- 11 it ft Ot St uk 1St I P1 SC 012ol 1l 10 00 1a01 It I S-0 00 10 1 -0 0 PAt no ab no 11"0 C, ItO 001 0b- 110 040 0GO LO0 0 0 ?9 0 gtoS o 1- so50 4 0 %- 0 us ot 0 itt? t to 1211 120 00 T s1 WIn o 11 tt201 121 ob 11t 001o to 0 io Ut tot a; t ooVIX11 VS9 Uoa 120 00 12 121 a 01- Stet0 itsSI ao li CaU0 00 g at a2 f t 129 UP 9 c~:G Vt 1 e6t10 Lo 121 is ft IC t to1 1 1 00 a 0 1 12 100 StOlt Is0- 9 Oti Ott to 01 I 00 C 12 III = to , I0 blO 012 in.= 0110 t if s4 Vt co 00, 211 C3 t on0- P1 to 001 .11 2 so 000t I S 021 OUI I 001 1C, 1 41 11 ta l 000? 01P lO -O i- 10 0001 12" V- 20L" 00111 10- L 010 9111 P1- 100 002 TV1 0010 0012? 91- 000 I 0gm9 1t- L0e.1 0112 01- 012 CM VoUt 0- C0120 ui 1120on111 `10 (U-) 0010 M,-q -On. -s-no -loin * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- - - ---a---o.. ... --- ------ -- - ---n ---- - ---- - ---- 0.110 (1000) wTw)tavWO100001 a1100 "0 0r.000 A428836 PW U42W7 (LA 1411-05 444.. W4 P...4 1o. 30 - 80 AP1221.000 P.34 64.2D . (1479-346) (.IOIh..O 04.744 ..WI Mt I 333044.0300.4. 13. .92 172 IS. 12.2 1.61 49 14.164 4.42 41 42.41 10.I4 -84 24.1? 4.0 -a 87.40 8.6 M7 W8.4 u9.* - 4.7 69.32 -44 34.66 18." .76 78.78 86.3O - Plo.- l.,.3.23 5~~~~~~~~~~~~.70 2.44 -9 4.78 8.84 -10 8.6 4.4 -4m ali2 0.42 -80 W.0. 8.08 -4 12.11 6."40 8 17.14 9.74 .40 22.2 10.29 40 22.: 10.8 4 1142.10 U.32 -41 844.0 o..-..44 44.eu.. ~~~~~ ~~~0.01 0.22 Is 0.22 0.42 Is 1.C42 0.11 41t 3.47 0.81 -71 1.87 0.41 42 1.07 I.42m so 1.07 1.46 6 3.04 8.la 1ot 0.8 4 8.8 "7 1.84 4.4 36 2-4...30400 004 g0o434 4.611 0.42 22 2.8 S.76 -71 01.72 4.42 -88 WA. 14.1 IS -1 48.84 12.07 .74 810.8 17.8 47 78.88 84.46 .6 U.3m Go.34 00.3 M.3la -3 490.1 40.9 -4 L- No4 = 1..03. 1100.01 1.87 4- J.0M 1.12 -48 A." 1.8 42 T."4 1.70 -78 10.41 1.38 44 32.14 1.82 42 14. 12 3 3 4.2 1.8 -8 33 88 - 14 .2 4 A-6.43214 3.42 242 2 84 8.108 4 8.22 8'.684 4 7.82 2.3 -42 14.44 8.74 -a2 42.4 11.91 -7 27.42 32.68 46 87.6 21.8 -3 70 6.8 12 006.3 66 S642 8.64 -7 8040 4.8 -21 7.40 .8, 46-1 10.02 7.41 4as WA. 6.2 -46 U.42 4.42 -4a 46.2la 22.68 -41 82.64 83.11 -48 so.. 87.0 .41 46.78 IN.3 14 - 12-0 0i34d. 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.42 0.W2 0.42 .0.2 8.22 0.22 0.80 0.22 2.30 8.22 0.42 0 22 0.42 0.42 0.42 Pi.4 0.DM 00I4183 "0 2 0.22 02 .2 80 .2 .00D .2 0.2 02 02 .2 0 0.0 .22 .0.42' 0.2 0.42 0.8 02 4434 l.4.,..l ..44 g...r.43.. 2~~S22 -4.78 -404 84.081 -21.42 -2114 It 12 92.04 3 14.37 14.22 30 04.4 44. 248 18.421 -.420 -1to 42.01 6.42 4 34 440 -a 01 o~ 4808 84.68 22 42.8 3.04 .14 ft-i". 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I ZZ DM s I." m s WI 5 IV-V IIVII s O." we 5 0- we a we s 1 WIT s IV-V Ws a 1.1" we s we __mT_ _!4 __wt_ ... _190T ..... -!* .." _', .----A _ VA -.-A _--A -.,,-A -.!,.A surum smamomw (01"m won) mroam awed variAwr YTAQLWID - 43 - ANNEX 5.5 Page 1 of 15 (TRANSLATION) COMMENTS FROM THE EXECUTING AGENCY Guatemala, April 25, 1989 Gentlemen: Operations Evaluation Department World Bank Dear Mr. Nowicki: In connection with the Project Completion Report corresponding to the Aguacapa Power Project, Loan 1426-GU, I wish to make the following observations with respect to the below-indicated items: 3.4.9 If the Consultant maintains that had the necessary precautions to have a more adequate lining been taken (we do not agree with the Consultant's position that it would had been a more conservative design criteria -- rather, it would really had been a more adequate design in accordance with soil conditions), it would have 'increased costs by US$13 million," shows, once more, his erroneous design concept, since it would had saved the Guatemalan Government a large amount of money, considering that total repairs amounted to US$40 million. On the other hand, the difference between initial estimates for repair costs and final costs, is clearly due to the fact that when the Consultant submitted his initial estimate, based on his amply demonstrated erroneous design criteria, &nd after carrying out the in-situ tests requested by the Board of Consultants, the costs were modified increasing the amounts and types of repairs. In addition, there were other cost overruns caused by the Consultant as, for example, when the Consultant ordered a new series of grout curtains which have been fully demonstrated to be useless in tufaceous materials; changes in the treatment of the fissures originally contracted because it was demonstrated that it was not going to have the necessary flexibility with its subsequent re-contracting overruns, etc. 3.9.2 INDE emphatically considers that the Supervision Unit was adequately dimensioned and the staff had the necessary technical capability to carry out its functions, which definitely did not include any related to design. Besides, the remark that the Consultant considered himself an Advisor rather than a Supervisor is no relevant to the tunnel failure since the failures were due to design and not to supervision factors. - 44 - ANNEX 5.5 Page 2 of 15 3.9.4 INDE and the Board of Consultants have fully established that the tunnel failure was a product of erroneous design criteria applied by the Consultant, as was the difference of rock modules used, the lack of adequate specifications with respect to concrete, etc., and, therefore, INDE finds the comments made by the Consultant unacceptable, as he attempts to blame his errors on supervision failures. Sincerely, Eng. Edgar Flores Izaguirre Planning and Projects Manager Instituto Nacional de Electrificaci6n (INDE) EFI/mtdc 05!0a; e tI. 3? 2 502 2 34S785 INDE PLAN!FJCACI P.01 - 45 - ANNEX 5.5 INSTITUTO NACKONAL DE ELECTRFICACON Page 3 of 15 FORMA 7410303 @I.N. D. E. GUATEMALA, C. A. 0__ 600__ 185_ DIRECCtON CREVC4enFlC NotI ovATEMALA. l noifnsro y M9cA TELEX-ltNDE-5324- U snmr cr Guatemala, 25 de Abril de 1,989 Sefhores Departamento de Evaluacin de Operaciones BANCO MUNDIAL seflor Nowicki: En relaci6n al Informe de Terminaci6n de Proyecto, correepondiente al Pro- yecto Hidroelfctrico Agiacapa, PrGesLawo 1426-GU, mo pormito hacer 1aR 5i- guientes aseveraciones respecto a los incisoe indicadoss 3.4.9 Si el Coasultor afirma que si hubieran tomado las previsiones pa- ra tener un revestilmento mis adecuado (no es aceptable 18 posi- ci6n del Consultor de que serfa un criterio mis conservador de di seao, porque lo que realmente serfs, es un disefto adecuado a las condiciones del terreno), so hubieran "incrementado los costos en 13 millones de d6lares", es una muestra mis de sue conceptos erro neos de disefio, ya que le hubieran ahorradu al Goblerno do Guate- mala una consiJerable suma de dinero, en virtud de que la repara- ci6n total cost6 40 millones de d6lares. Por otro lado, la duie- rencia entre lo estimados lniciales del coeto de la reparaci6n y el costo final, so deben claramento a que cuando el Consultor pre sent6 au estimado inicial, se basd en sus crtiLL.la arrfncos do - diseho, ampliamente demostrados, que despuie de efectuados los en sayos -de roca in-situ solicitados por el panel de consultores es- peciales, fueron modificados lncrementando las cantidades y tipos de reparacin. Adicionalmente hay otros sobrecostos causados por el Consultor como por ejemplo el que el Consultor ordenara una - nueva campafia de inyecciones de consolidaci6n que ha quedado ple- namente demostrado que son inoperantes en los materiales tobSceoos; el que se tuviera quo cambiar el tratamiento de grietas original- mente contratado debido a que se comprob6 que no iba a tenor flexi bilidad necesaria con sus consiguientes sobrecostos de recontrsta- ci6n, etc. ..*/2. .. es,e3 89 11339 2; se2 2 ;34l?`8 INCDE PLAN1FICACI P.02 ANNEX 5.5 , - 46 - Page 4 of 15 'I # INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ELECTRIFICACION IORMA 74103.03 (WUAILMALA, C. A. : C~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Uh4 nM}() 0100 1 85-159 DIRCCCION CASLEUR^FICA RE!tRENCIA MNOE GUATTMALA. A'o Olstr, Man*s rmnolono TEi.EX.1NDE.5S24-QU We erc k ** ncI ... ./2.*.. 3.9.2 INDE considera enf6tficamente que la Unidad de Supurviti6n estaba adecuadamente dirnensionada y cotitsba conoa capacidad necesaria de acuerdo a 6us fuuclones que definitivameate uo lncluian niinguna relacionada con el diaenio. Adem6s, la observactin de que el Con- sultor se considerara como Ase6or mg que como Supervisor, no tie ne ningna re1cvjutlju al In failla dpi tCnpI, en virtud de quo lac fallas fueron de diseho y no de supervisifn. 3.9.4 INDE y el Panel de CunMultores Especiales han establecido plenamen te que la falla de la galerfa fue producto de criterio6 err6neus de diocaio aplicados por 61 Consultor .vvau lu et l.a diferencia de 108 m6dulon da roca utilizados, no establecitiento de cupecifica- c tnen ideranAdno ePn ln qto el Co01o1oIo wanpo0o e-SO., ^w 3.i" eo tnaeapetaLle INPfl b.D lus 4 udl..c el CvLwulcor cuando preten- die tiecvargar si raerone3bilida, on 'aillao da aupeavvioat6. Atentamentc, Ins. d8~LE.I~lzaguirre GERENTS P.LAIFIflCACION Y PROYECIOS EFI/mtdc - 47 - ANNEX 5.5 Page 5 of 15 (TRANSLATION) COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER April 18, 1989 Mr. Alexander Nowicki Chief Projects Evaluation Department World Bank Ref: Aguacapa Power Project (Loan 1426-GU) Project Completion Report Dear Mr. Nowicki: I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated March 20, 1989 which we received on March 27, regarding the above-mentioned report. I have personally read the "Aguacapa Power Project Completion Report (Loan 1426-GU)." I was directly involved in the Electrical Subsector as INDE's General Manager from July 1966 to June 1970 (during the first IBRD loans to the Electrical Subsector: Loan 48,-GU, Jurun Marinala 60MW and Loan 545-GU Steam Thermal Plant). Moreover, during a short period (1982-1983) as INDE's President (Implementation of CHIXOY, before the tunnel failure, cancellation of the Hidrochulac Executing Unit, Coordination INDE-Empresa Electrica de Guatemala, transferring Governmental shares from Empresa Electrica to INDE), and from 1986 to the present, as Minister of Mining and Energy involved, in a rather indirect fashion, with the Electrical Subsector. My personal knowledge of the problems confronting the Guatemalan Electrical Subsector allows me, in a very personal and unofficial manner, to congratulRte you for a well done report. As you pointed out in your letter, all those involved in the project should be interested in learning from the experience and to acquire a clear vision of the actions that should be taken, in the future, to institutionally and administratively reorganize INDE, and for the further development of the electric aector in the country. With regard to the report you kindly sent me, I wish to advise you that I have no comments to make. I remain, respectfully yours, Eng. Roland Castillo Contoux MINISTER cc: Assistant Minister of Mining and Energy Eng. RaOl Castafieda Illescas General Director of Energy Planning and Development Eng. Carlos Enrique Mansilla Mejia -48- ANNEX 5.5 Page 6 of 15 IS de abril dle I9F9 S-jK. *r !.. is. Nran,d tkw . Jefe *el Pen;xarta:.ento dt Evalitrtc.C'n &ie R'mwecto'Q Ref: Piyecto Hidroelctrico de Aguacapa (PrSs-t 1426-GU) TnXforn de TeTminaci6n del Provecto EstiLnado Sailor i'Nowki: .Ienvgt el Tist"i le diriiTnmw- a iiqt-, Pt relaciftn a sti itenta nota de fecha 20 de marzo 1989 kr recibida el ?7 del misno mes y afho, relativa al H1t-41 le npe 1m<;flr+ntP Pt' "TtnfrinOn Thsn'inRej6n dvR1 Proyecto ilidlro el&trico de Agi.acapa (PrstaviKi 1426-itJ)". Estuve directamente involucrado en el Suibsector Fi.ctrico ccm* Gerente General del INDE de julio de 1966 a jtmio de 1970 (primueros pr6stamos del BTRF para el Subsector El1ctrico: -- 487-(nU, Pm,yecto Ridroel6ctrico Ju NMarinalfi 6(MI y 545-GU Planta TUrmica de Vapor). Asi.mismo, tn corto perlodo, 1982-1983, camo Presidente del INDE (piteYst en operaci&n (IXnY, antes de la falla del tinel, cancelacin uni-- dai fipoltrra Fidmnhll3e, qconrdinani6n TNT)E-Finresa Flkctrica de Guatemala, traSlId.nqn acCicrne.? ltktt1 * l 1 Fnqresa Filirica al TNDE) y desde el nAo 1q86 a Ia foha como Ministro de rnergTa y Minas imroltucrado en forna - dfemaqi 3dto iywlirecta con el Rbsuecrtor Flktrico. Mi conocimiento personal de la problemAtica del Subsector El4ctri co de Guatemala me permite, cono opini6n absolutamente personal y no ofi--- cial, felicitarlo por el acertado informe que, cmo indica en su nota, to-- dos los ac.tores-involucrados deberfamos estar interesados en aprender de las experiencias pasadas y de tener muy claras las acciones que en el futuro de ban conduciTse para la reorgganizaci6n irstitucional y administrativa del -- IDME v para el desarrollo de la electrificaci6n del pals. ANNEX 5.5 Page 7 of 15 SfAur A It. Alt .I Nowicki l.Vd ' I;-i. LV'l: JV VVzUY¢V .A.V....... b .i.v P:inrtL- .bndiial 18 .s abril &e 1989 ... Al re:>spts-tO, pe pemito rnani.festarle qtte el suscTito no tiene nin';n- o l..s i6n 't rr.fone del cvt1l se sirvi6 elvia'rme tua copia. -r ..^sJ la ;1portimidul3 pe3ra us;cribirme, Atenta nente, Ix'Mx I -s I - *' ' at'ti ti tif t-+ wrri-fa -v minas . Tr17 Dqil1 t±$i(dq T11.cr'c nirprt1r r*-nttrql tip Planificaci6n v Desarrollo hnere6ticO, fnv,. Carlos Fnritiua Mansilla Meiia - 50 - ANNEX 5.5 Page 8 of 15 (TRANSLATION) COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER Mr. Alexander Nowicki Chief Projects Evaluation Department World Bank I have no comments on the 'Project Completion Report on Aguacapa Power Project (Loan 1426-GU)". I have sent a personal note in thie regard. Sincerely, Eng. Roland Castillo Centoux MINISTER ENERGY AND MINING MINISTRY GUATEMALA - 51 - ANNEX 5.5 Page 9 of 15 sepinr x1f*Nl !er Nowicki Jefe del Liepartamrerto de bivaltaci6n de Proyecets RThm-n M,bmdij.a N'ir..-(n rompntstnin "Thforvfp Teri-i:4riAn diel Provectr Hidroelktricrm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~s tf ~ rnitt.¶ tfal ve, ree i:. J. ng. gm.IC%~Potoug 4 MINISTRO nEbLk Y; lTIUATMA , 4 *f~~~~~~C - 52 - ANNEX 5.5 Page 10 of 15 (TRANSLATION) COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER Guatemala, April 27, 1989 Mr. Alexander Nowicki, Chief Policy-Based Lending, Energy, Industry, Uuban Sector & Public Utilities Division Operations Evaluation Department The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. We thank you for sending us the Aguacapa Power Project Completion Report (Loan 1425-GU). We consider that this evaluation report will be the basis for learning from past experience and to avoid, in the future, the mistakes made; it will also serve to combine the internal and external elements, political, technical, social, economic, financial and other factors encompassed in project analysis. We will try to apply, technically, the follow-up of the project execution process to identify possible problems and make the corresponding corrections and/or amendments. Sincerely, Ing. Marciano Castil'o G. General Secretary National Economic Planning Council MEB/ezp - 53 - C'^r'r:e Ia!'-! nn! d d Page 11 of 15 Planiffaci1n Econ 6mica *, ;, q , f ' .it t q 9 i.,-4,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ '-iu A W '@ Guatemala. 27 de abril de 1989 Al ' :L,,;lCftJ Jefe Divisi6n de Prfstomos para Ajustes de Polfticas Econdmicas y Sectoriales3 Industria, Servicios PNblicos y Sector Urbano Departamento de Evaluacifn de Proyectos HE WORLD BANK 1818 H. STREET N.YK. Washington D.C. 20433. USA (202) 477-1234. CARIE APDDRESS! INMBAFPAD Esta Secretarta General, agradece el envlo del Informe de Terminacldn del Proyecto Hidroelictrlco de Aguacapa (PrOstano 1425-GU). ademSs, considera que esta evaluacion serviri de base para tomar conclencia de lo sucedido y para que en el futuro so corrijan los errores incurridos; ast cow tam- bin, para que se combinen los elementos Internos como externos. de origen ticnico. polftico, social, econ&mico, financiero y otros quo conhlova el anAlisis de los proyectos. Asimismo, aplicar en forma tienica el -.gtu"miento del "moceso de ecu - cidn de los mtsmos para detectar posibles problemas y efectuar las correc ciones Y;o eni,iiendds oe-tlnentes. Atentamente. / o MEB/ezp. GENE S*d.MRaN C - 54 - ANNEX 5.5 Page 12 of 15 (TRANSLATION) COMMENTS FROM THE CO-FINANCIER REFERENCE NR 347 FROM: FONDO DE INVERSIONES DE VENEZUELA CARACAS, APRIL 21, 1989 TO: MR. ALEXANDER NOWICKI CHIEF, LENDING DIVISION OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT WORLD BANK WASHINGTON, D.C. I AM PLEASED TO REFER TO YOUR COMMUNICATION OF MARCH 20, 1989, REQUESTING FIV'S COMMENTS ON THE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ON THE AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WISH TO ADVISE YOU THAT, IN GENERAL TERMS. THIS INSTITUTION DOES NOT HAVE ANY COMMENTS TO MAKE. FIV'S LOAN TO THE PROJECT AMOUNTED TO BOL$128.8 MILLION, EQUIVALENT TO US$30.0 MILLION APPROXIMATELY, FOR CIVIL WORKS, PRICE ltdCREASES, AND PROJECT CONTINGENCIES. SINCERELY, AQUILES VILORIA VILORIA C.F.I. MANAGER - 55- ANNEX 5.5 Page 13 of 15 WORLDIBANK TMSS ZCZC OERPOISI JUS0126 OEttEI2 .TCP FCA * OEDt'2 * JWS0126 JGZ649 IN 21/09:57 OUT 21/10:00 29670 FIVEN VC REF NR 347 FROM: FONDO DE INVERSIONES DE VENEZUELA CARACAS, 21 DE ABRIL DE 1989 SE OR ALEXANDER NOUICKI JEFE DIVISION DE PRESTANOS DEPARTAMENTO DE EVALUACION DE PROYECTOS BANCO MUNDIAL UASHINGTON DC TENGO EL AGRADO DE DIRIGIRME A USTED, EN LA OPORTUNIDAD DE HACER REFERENCIA A SU COMUNICACION DEL 20-03-89, MEDIANTE LA CUASE V PRESENTO A ESTE INSTITUTO EL INFOP;'E DE TERMINACION DEL PROYECTO HIDROELECTRICO DE AGUACAPA, Y SE SOLICITAN LAS OBSERVACIONES DEL FIV SODRE EL MISMO. AL RESPECTO0 LE INFORMO WUE EN GENERAL ESTE INSTITUTO NO TENDRIA DBSERVACIONES DUE PLANTEAR, EN TODO CASO LE COMUNICO QUE EL PRESTAMO FJV, ALCANZO A DS. 128,8 MILLONES,, EGUIVALENTES A LA FE0HA DE USDRLS 30.0 MILLONES APROXIMADANENTE, DESTINADOS A LAS OBRAS CIVILER, ESCALAMEINTOS DE PRECIOS E INPREVISTOS DEL PROYECTO. ATENTAMENTEI AGUILES VILORIA VILORIA GERENTE C.F.I. QQ EFB 29670 FIVEN VC.... - 56 - ANNXEX 5.5 Page 14 of 15 (TRANSLATION) COMMENTS FROM THE CO-FINANCIER TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS, C. A., MAY 04, 1989 MR. ALEXANDER NOWICKI, CHIEF POLICY-BASED LENDING, ENERGY, INDUSTRY URBAN SECTORS & PUBLIC UTILITIES DIVISION OPERATIONS EVALUATIONS DEPARTMENT WORLD BANK WASHINGTON, D.C. REFERENCE: AGUACAPA POWER PROJECT LOAN 1426-GU, PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DEAR MR. NOWICKI: WITH REFERENCE TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PROJECT, THIS IS TO ADVISE YOU THAT BASED ON THE ANALYSIS MADE BY OUR TECHNICAL STAFF TO THE REPORT YOU SUBMITTED, WE DO NOT HAVE ANY COMMENTS TO MAKE. SINCERELY RIGOBERTO MERINO MONCADA ADMINISTRATION SUPERVISOR BANCADIE - 57- ANNEX 5.5 UORLDBANK ThSS Page 15 of 15 ZCZC OERP0165 JUS0608 OEDI'2 .TCP EI.S. * ** **** ** * OEDD2 * 3JS0608 ZJX598 IN 04/12:05 OUT 04/12:08 1103 BANCADIE HO TEGUCIGALPA HONDrURAS CA MAYO 04/1989 SENOR ALEXANDER NOUICKI JEFE DIVISION DE PRESTAKOS PARA AJUSTES DE POLITICAS ECONOtICAS Y SECTORIALES. INDUSTRIA. SERVICIOS PUDLICOS Y SECTOR URBANO DEPARTAMENTO DE EVALUACION DE PROYECTOS BANCO NUNDIAL UASHINGTON REF: PROYECTO HIDROELECTRICO BE AGUACAPA PRESTAMO 1426-GU. INFORNE DE EUKCITN EX-POST DEL PROYECTO ESTIMADO SENOR NOUICKI: EN RELACION CON EL PROYECTO DE LA REFERENCIA, NOS PERPITINOS MANIFESTARLE QUE EN BASE AL ANALISIS EFECTUADO POR NUESTROS TECNICOS AL INFORME PRESENTADO POR USTEDES. NO TENENOS NINGUNA OBSERVACION AL RESPECTO. ATENTAMEN1t1 RIGOBERTO MERINO MONCADA ENCARGADO ADMINISTRACION SUPERIOR BANCADIE 1103 BANCADIE HO 1103 BANCADIE HO =05041248 NNNN