88170 FOCUS NOTE Electronic G2P Payments: Evidence from Four Lower- Income Countries I ncreasingly, governments and donors are looking to move their social cash transfer payments from cash to electronic and, in some cases, incorporate financial and having less experience administering social cash transfer programs, to name just a few. The transition from cash to e-payments will undoubtedly inclusion objectives into these payment schemes. This look different in Brazil than in Uganda. We wanted momentum toward electronic payments (e-payments) to further examine the opportunities and challenges rests on the promise of improving transparency, in implementing electronic social cash transfers in decreasing costs, and reducing leakage on the one less-developed countries1 from the perspective of hand, and facilitating value-added services through the same three core stakeholder groups: program financial access on the other. In 2012, the CGAP Focus funders (government and/or donors), PSPs, and Note “Social Cash Transfers and Financial Inclusion: recipients. Evidence from Four Countries” (Bold, Porteous, and Rotman) considered the case for financially This Focus Note presents the evidence gained inclusive social cash transfers by analyzing evidence from a comprehensive study of the experiences in from government-led cash transfer programs in developing and implementing e-payment schemes four middle-income countries (MICs), in which the linked to financial inclusion in four lower-income programs and the e-payments systems on which they countries—Haiti, Kenya, the Philippines, and Uganda relied were relatively mature and robust. (see Table 1 for country backgrounds).2 The research aimed to uncover (i) the development and evolution The Focus Note, which investigated the large of the program; (ii) the current delivery and payment social cash transfer programs in Brazil, Mexico, process(es); (iii) the costs and benefits to programs Colombia, and South Africa, looked at the value of and providers of using e-payments; and (iv) the e-payments for the different stakeholders involved: experiences of e-payment recipients and staff at the the affordability of financially inclusive services in field level. social cash transfer programs for the government; the profitability of offering such services for the payment Through a comparative analysis of the four programs’ service provider (PSP); and the likelihood of recipients design and implementation experiences, this report using the services for more than just receiving the offers six key findings and five specific lessons for cash transfer. The research found that, in the case of transfer program managers and PSPs (particularly but the cash transfers in these MICs, building inclusive not exclusively in lower-income countries) to consider financial services can be affordable to the government when planning for electronic government-to-person and profitable to the PSP if the government pays (G2P) payments. adequate fees, but recipients were not quick to adopt No. 93 the services and use them for personal needs beyond Program Overviews April 2014 receiving the transfers. Jamie M. The four cash transfer programs—Ti Manman Cheri Zimmerman, But what about the experiences in less-developed (TMC) in Haiti, Cash for Assets (CFA) in Kenya, Kristy Bohling, Sarah Rotman countries? In contrast to MICs, these countries the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) in Parker typically have more difficult operating conditions the Philippines, and Social Assistance Grants for stemming from less-developed transportation and Empowerment (SAGE) in Uganda—were selected mobile infrastructure, being at an earlier stage of from a broader range of programs in lower-income development in the banking and payment systems, countries based on the programs’ adoption of 1 We refer to “less developed” countries and “lower income” countries throughout this report to account for the varying levels of development among the four countries of the programs studied. Haiti, Kenya, and Uganda are low-income countries, while the Philippines is a lower- middle-income country. The Philippines was selected for this study, despite its lower-middle-income country status, to maximize variation across country and payment system contexts. 2 Detailed case studies on each of these programs are also available at http://www.cgap.org. 2 e-payments, the type of e-payments they employ, programs’ characteristics are shown in Table 2 and the PSPs they partner with, their geographic further described below. Timelines of the design and diversity, their target recipient group, and whether implementation of the programs can be found in they are government- or donor-led programs. The Annex A. Table 1. Country Backgrounds Haiti Kenya Philippines Uganda Population (in millions) 10.2 43.2 96.7 36.3 Population % urban 55 24 49 16 Gross domestic product per capita 771 865 2,587 547 (current US$) Human Development Index ranking T161 145 114 T161 Adult literacy rate (%) 49 (2006) 87 (2010) 95 (2008) 73 (2010) Corruption Perception Index country rank 165 139 105 130 Account at a formal financial institution 22 42 27 20 (% age 15+) Bank branches/100,000 people 2.7 5.2 8.1 2.4 ATMs/100,000 people N/A 9.5 17.7 3.9 SIM penetration (%) 61 70 106 47 Sources: World Bank (2011 and 2012), Findex (2011), and GSMA (2012). Human Development Index ranking out of 186 countries (UNDP 2012). “T” signifies a tie with another country. Corruption Perception Index country rank is out of 174 countries (Transparency International 2012). Table 2. Program Characteristics Haiti Kenya Philippines Uganda Region Latin American and Sub-Saharan Africa Southeast Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Caribbean Program name Ti Manman Cheri Cash for Assets Pantawid Pamilyang Social Assistance (TMC) (CFA) Pilipino Program Grants for (4Ps) Empowerment (SAGE) Administered/ FAES (Government World Food Department for Ministry of Gender, managed by of Haiti’s Social and Programme (donor) Social Welfare Labor and Social Economic Assistance and Development Development Fund) (government) (government) Funded by Government of World Food Government and DFID (donor) and Venezuela (donor) Programme (donor) donors (World Bank, government Asian Development Bank, AusAid) Target recipients Mothers of school Food insecure Parents—school and Senior citizens children households health requirements (primarily) and vulnerable households Year started May 2012 Pilot: January 2010 February 2008 Pilot: April 2011 to December 2011 to February 2015 Full scale: January (expected) 2012 Conditionality Yes Yes Yes No Number of 75,000 (May 2013) 62,500 (July 2013) 3,712,953 (August 95,000 (July 2013) recipients 2013) Delivery method Mobile money and Debit card and bank Debit card and cash Mobile money and cash account cash 3 TMC is the first ever government-led cash transfer vulnerable families. The Expanding Social Protection program in Haiti, reaching 75,000 mothers of school agency under the Ministry of Gender, Labor, and children after one year of operation and funded by the Social Development, with funding from various PetroCaribe Fund of the Government of Venezuela. international donors, designed the unconditional From its start in 2012, the program transferred cash SAGE payment scheme with several core objectives to recipients, conditional on their children’s continued in mind: transparency, scalability, and financial enrollment in school, using mobile money through inclusion. Currently being piloted in 14 districts mobile network operator (MNO) Digicel’s TchoTcho around Uganda from 2011 to 2015, the government- Mobile product. Digicel was a close partner in both led program pays recipients through the MNO MTN. the design and early implementation of the payment Though working with MTN’s Mobile Money Unit, the scheme, which is led by FAES (Government of Haiti’s program does not use MTN’s commercial mobile Social and Economic Assistance Fund) within the money product. Given MTN’s limited network Haitian government. coverage in SAGE target areas, it provides either electronic or manual payments, depending on CFA is a joint World Food Programme (WFP)/ network availability. The e-payment is through a Government of Kenya cash transfer scheme reaching SIM-embedded card that recipients present to MTN food insecure households in seven3 arid and semi- agents to insert into portable pay phones. arid counties in eastern and coastal Kenya where recipients work on community asset projects to build resilience against drought. Financial inclusion has been a core objective since the program’s inception. Box 1. Financial Inclusion as an Explicit Objective?a Working with Equity Bank from the design and The role of financial inclusion varies within each prepilot phases in 2009, the CFA program provided program’s design and implementation, though bank accounts to each recipient to receive his or there was an explicit focus of the programs in her payments. WFP Kenya has recently conducted a Haiti, Kenya, and Uganda. In the Philippines, the 4Ps did not design its payment system with an competitive bid process and selected Cooperative explicit objective to provide financial access or Bank as its new PSP. promote financial inclusion: it employs e-payments for efficiency’s sake only. This may be influenced The 4Ps in the Philippines is a government-run, in part by the age of the program, as its design began before governments and donors considered donor-supported conditional cash transfer program adding financial inclusion as a desirable component targeting poor households with a pregnant mother of cash transfer programs. While SAGE and TMC and/or children between 0 and 14 years old.4 The both initially had financial inclusion as an objective, the programs had to deprioritize this objective to primary PSP is the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), focus on reliably delivering payments to recipients. the largest of three government-owned banks in the In contrast, CFA has stayed true to its financial country, providing a cash card with which recipients inclusion objective and, while it has influenced the can withdraw from LBP and partner automatic teller expansion of bank agents in participating counties, a vast majority of recipients have not yet begun machines (ATMs). Forty percent of the 3.9 million to use their accounts or banking services beyond recipients use this cash card, while the remaining withdrawing to collect their CFA payment. payments are made over-the-counter (OTC) by a. Financial inclusion is defined as providing customers with several other contracted PSPs. access to formal financial services and ensuring they know how to use them and are comfortable using them to increase their financial services options (whether they choose to use formal SAGE is the Government of Uganda’s first major methods or not). cash transfer initiative, targeting senior citizens and 3 It is now reaching six counties, but at the time of the research, it was seven. 4 The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program, DSWD. http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/about-us 4 Comparing Payment mainstream financial account, as the card is “open- Approaches loop” and can thus be used at any payments infrastructure (rather than just Equity Bank’s The payments categorization used here remains the and now Coop Bank’s ATMs, point-of-sale [POS] same as that which was introduced in our previous devices, and branches). research on MICs: cash, limited-purpose instrument, • In the Philippines, the 4Ps offers a limited-purpose and mainstream financial account.5 The programs’ instrument, the “cash card,” that recipients can use use of these approaches is as follows, with Table 3 at Land Bank branches and Land Bank, Metro Bank, also showing the characteristics. and Bank of the Philippines ATMs to withdraw their 4Ps payments. Recipients’ names are linked to the • In Haiti, TchoTcho Mobile would be considered account where the money is stored, though the a limited-purpose instrument as of May 2013 card is not publicized or used as a typical debit because recipients can withdraw and deposit card. money only at TchoTcho Mobile agents and • In Uganda, SAGE’s MTN SIM cards are limited- specified partners. purpose in that they may be used only at • In Kenya, CFA’s debit cards (previously from Equity specialized MTN pay phones, which are deployed Bank and now from Coop Bank) are linked to a at 390 pay points throughout the country. Table 3. Current Payment Approachesa TMC—Haiti CFA—Kenya 4Ps—Philippines SAGE—Uganda Payment frequency Bi-monthly Monthly (but rarely Bi-monthly Currently monthly on time) but moving to bi-monthly Payment provider(s) Digicel, Unitransfer Cooperative Bank Land Bank, rural MTN (previously Equity banks, pawnshop Bank) M Lhuillier, PhilPost (and previously GCASH) % of payments in 69% from 0% 59% from post 20% from MTN physical cashb Unitransfer office, M Lhuillier, agents rural bank or, previously, GCASH % of payments 31% through mobile 0% 41% through Land 80% from an MTN through limited- money “mini- Bank and First agent purpose instrument wallet”c whereby at Consolidated Bank least a portion of “cash cards” (debit the funds must be cards) withdrawn within 3 months of receiving payment at a Digicel agent % of payments 0% 100% through a 0% 0% through mainstream debit card at a bank financial account agent, branch or ATMd a. As modifications to these programs are frequent, the payment approaches detailed here are as of the dates when the research took place. b. “Physical Cash” is a nonelectronic method of receiving cash transfers; recipients must withdraw the amount in full at a particular time and location. c. Customers register for the mini wallet through a USSD code on their phone and may maintain a balance of up to HTG 4,000 (US$94); no form of ID is needed. Customers can register for the full wallet by presenting a photo ID to an agent who will register them in the mobile money system. Full wallet customers may maintain a balance of up to HTG 10,000 (US$250). d. The program used magstripe cards with Equity Bank. As it starts working with Cooperative Bank, the program is now moving to smart cards. 5 Whereas limited-purpose instruments transfer the grant to the recipient through a notional account, these accounts are restricted in at least one of the following ways: (i) funds cannot be stored indefinitely; (ii) funds must be withdrawn only at dedicated infrastructure; and (iii) additional funds may not be deposited into this account from other sources. In contrast, mainstream financial accounts have none of the limitations of the limited-purpose account and are typically available to nontransfer recipients as well. For more information, see Bold, Porteous, and Rotman (2012). 5 Comparing Payment Costs for Unitransfer’s services than any other program studied. The 4Ps’ low fee to Land Bank (0.7 percent) In most cases, PSPs across the four programs charged is less than half of the fee paid to other PSPs (called the programs transaction fees between 1 percent and “conduits”) (average of 1.5 percent). However, 4 percent of the grant amount. These rates are similar conduits incur considerably more expense to ensure to those charged by most of the PSPs in the MICs their OTC cash payments are reliable. studied in the previous Focus Note where payment system infrastructure was already relatively mature. Additional subsidies to PSPs exist, however, Strikingly, however, the absolute values of these fees to varying extents: resources for staff or one-off are significantly lower per payment in these lower- set-up fees are paid to Digicel in Haiti and MTN income country programs. in Uganda, and the programs pay a fee per card issued to both Equity and Cooperative Bank in That is, while the mandate of the PSPs in these Kenya and to Land Bank in the Philippines. In all lower-income environments was much more difficult programs, the recipients’ first withdrawal from to carry out than in the MICs, their compensation their e-payment instrument is free (excluding any was about the same. For instance, even in Uganda indirect travel costs), while subsequent withdrawals where infrastructure and capacity are weak, SAGE are subject to typical withdrawal fees charged by pays MTN a fee of 3.5 percent of the amount of each the PSP. In the Philippines, if recipients withdraw social cash transfer, which includes the withdrawal from an out-of-network ATM, they incur charges fee, the transaction fee, and the operating fee. TMC, of which the program covers up to US$0.45. In the with its cash delivery options, pays significantly more case of manual payments, recipients receive their to Unitransfer (just over 11 percent) than to Digicel money without incurring additional fees, other than (3 percent) for payments, and significantly more any travel costs. Table 4. Cost of Payment to Government/Donor Agenciesa TMC— Haiti CFA—Kenya 4Ps—Philippines SAGE—Uganda Average grant per $15.00 $34.12 $63.01 $19.34 recipient Payment frequencyb “Bi-monthly” “Monthly” Bi-monthly Bi-monthly Weighted average $1.36 $0.53 $0.75 $0.68 fee per payment (all methods) As % of average 9.1 2 1.2 3.5 grant Cost by type of instrument Cash payment $1.67 (11%) N/A $0.96 (1.5%) $0.68 (3.5%) Limited-purpose $0.50 (3%) N/A $0.45 (0.7%) $0.68 (3.5%) instrument Mainstream financial N/A $0.53 (2%) N/A N/A account Rate used in conversion (conversions used in country case studies) USD 1 = HTG 40.00 KES 85.00 PHP 44.44 UGX 2,585.00 a. Recipients are not required to maintain a minimum balance for any of the program accounts. Fees exclude one-off and flat fees paid to PSPs for expenses, such as seconded employees or full-time project managers. These costs are those fees specifically paid per payment for each program. b. Quotation marks indicate notable variability between the intended and actual payment frequency. The programs have struggled to achieve this schedule. 6 Six Findings payments in the absence of sufficient agents, leading to the introduction of a second PSP—the remittance The design and implementation processes of each provider Unitransfer—to improve payment delivery, of the four programs varied based on the specific albeit by returning to cash payments at a significant contexts in which the cash transfer programs were cost to the program. rolled out. Yet despite clear variations, several common themes emerged when evaluating the In Uganda, SAGE had very few viable e-payment experiences of each, indicating a cross-cutting set options when it began. The program originally of issues any program could expect to face when explored using a bank-linked POS solution with planning a shift to e-payment mechanisms. biometric identification, as financial inclusion was one of many program objectives. Yet the financial sector 1. Country-Level Readiness, infrastructure in the country could not support the Especially for Mobile Solutions, design without significant added cost due to the high Was Overestimated. price of the biometric solution, the limited availability of POS terminals already deployed (three for every Infrastructure is the backbone of e-payments. 100,000 adults in 2011), and poor mobile and internet To varying extents, these cash transfer schemes network coverage. The program turned to MTN rolled out before adequate infrastructure had been to devise a new payment solution through mobile established outside of urban areas. To deliver money. But MTN lacked sufficient agent or network payments to all recipients, several programs had presence to employ an actual mobile money product, to resort to cash payments in some areas or at the and instead had to deploy specialized pay phones to very least adjust their expectations around financial process payments on a mobile money platform. As a inclusion. All programs attempted to use mobile result, what MTN is able to offer does not leverage its payments platforms to some degree and with standard MTN Mobile Money platform and diverges varying degrees of success, though mostly wrought in many ways from the mobile money business it is with challenges and frustrations. While the appeal trying to grow. MTN even facilitates 20 percent of of mobile solutions, and the will to employ them, the payments in physical cash. is strong, programs should carefully consider what needs to be in place before executing a mobile-led Even in Kenya, well-regarded for its robust banking scheme. and mobile money agent networks, WFP was unable to offer a mobile-based payment solution for CFA. In Haiti, mobile money has received enormous Originally working with Equity Bank to prepilot the attention and donor support. For TMC, in bank’s M-KESHO product, linked to Safaricom’s particular, the MNO played a central role in the M-PESA, WFP Kenya found that network connectivity conceptualization, design, and implementation of was not strong enough to process payments. WFP the payment scheme. In fact, the program design Kenya thus moved to a debit card-based system that was led by a staff member seconded from Digicel provided each recipient with an Equity account and to work with the Haitian government. As such, debit card. the government assumed that the designated areas were ready for mobile money and they did 2. The Technical Capacities Required not thoroughly consider other payment options or to Shift from Cash to E-Payments contingencies. Yet, Digicel’s mobile money agent Were Often Underestimated. network was not strong enough outside of Port au Prince to support the immediate and unanticipated Delivering cash transfers electronically requires a call to scale the program across the country. Staff high-quality management information system (MIS) struggled to continue to manage cash transfer to manage the data needed to make e-payments, 7 along with sufficient technical capacity for (i) cleaning stages of the program, Digicel would consistently enrollment data, (ii) gathering information for know have to reject at least 15–25 percent of payments your customer (KYC) and other regulatory standards, in every payment cycle because of data errors and as well as (iii) reconciling payment records among inconsistencies between data in Digicel’s and FAES’s implementing partners. All of the programs struggled systems. By January 2013, only 36 percent of TMC to create functional, coordinated systems, which recipients were properly registered to TchoTcho caused errors and delays that detracted from the Mobile and TMC and consistently receiving payments. envisioned efficiency benefits of e-payments and weakened their ability to provide a reliable, consistent In the Philippines, nearly 10,000 staff are needed experience for recipients. to manage the 4Ps program. Staff capacity has had to develop even as systems are being developed, In Kenya, WFP originally used Microsoft Excel instituted, and even modified or changed altogether. spreadsheets to manage the prepilot caseload, but For instance, staff have had to adjust to multiple quickly realized that the need to manage, clean, and changes in conduits and payment mechanisms in maintain (let alone protect) such a high volume of each municipality, particularly with the increased detailed data would require a more powerful MIS. competition among payment conduits and the As a result, WFP invested in creating an MIS for its evolving payment system hierarchy managed by cash transfer programs, but faced a host of problems Land Bank. With the program holding bids for PSPs related to migrating data into the new system. The in different regions twice a year for the past two shift from food aid to e-payments required a seismic years, a recipient’s PSP could change after only operational shift for WFP’s partners. Most partners three pay periods, potentially requiring recipients had been working in a nearly entirely paper-based to adapt to different forms, processes, and locations environment when distributing food and were not for payment. required to record as much specific recipient data as needed for bank accounts. With e-payments, 3. Internal and External Pressure this had to change. Delays in registration due to on Design and Implementation inaccurate data not only delayed payments to Was Inevitable. recipients but also impacted Equity Bank. After three months without usage, Equity’s accounts go Programs often found their plans undermined by dormant, meaning that it had to reopen thousands pressure from either donors or government to modify of accounts once the data cleaning process was the scheme in some way (e.g., to expand it more finally complete. quickly or to different areas than originally planned). These pressures tested the programs’ abilities to TMC in Haiti originally planned to use a computerized manage implementation of payments processes well. system for efficient TMC registration, but the registration process was often more tedious and TMC was the first-ever government-led social challenging to manage than expected. For instance, cash transfer program in Haiti. The government’s TMC staff reported “having 10 staff to do 300 urgency to create and implement new programs registrations, but 1,000 people would show up, to decrease extreme poverty put unexpected making it hard to handle all the people demanding pressure on Digicel to expand payments to areas to be registered” and making staff feel unsafe among where its agent network was not yet fully developed. the larger-than-expected crowds. By the time the While the circumstances under which the scale-up program staff found errors in recipients’ information, occurred were unique to Haiti, the political pressure it was too late to troubleshoot: they could not return to scale up is something the Philippines experienced to each location to verify recipients. In the early as well. After launching a pilot for 6,000 recipients in 8 Figure 1: Program Growth since Launch Number of recipients—TMC, CFA, SAGE 120,000 3.7m 4,000,000 Number of recipients—4Ps 100,000 3,500,000 100,000 3,000,000 80,000 66,000 2,500,000 62,000 60,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 40,000 1,000,000 20,000 500,000 0 0 g ar s s s s ar ar ar ar in ye ye ye ye ye nn +1 gi +2 +3 +4 +5 / be Years since launch ch un La Ti Manman Cheri (May 2012) Cash for Assets (Jan 2010) SAGE (Apr 2011) 4Ps (Feb 2008) Source: CGAP research. Note: Numbers reflect the number of recipients paid over a specific time period, which may differ from number of total recipients enrolled in the program. The 4Ps’ growth is shown on the secondary vertical axis. late 2007, the Philippines’ then-president mandated called into question the extent to which recipients the program’s growth, leading to the program understood the payment method and the extent to expanding from 6,000 to 4 million recipients in which recipients should be pushed to “control” the five years. As a result, neither the program nor its payment process and transact by themselves. associated PSPs succeeded in implementing the payment scheme as originally designed. In Uganda, MTN described transporting large amounts of cash to the districts where payments Figure 1 shows the quick growth of the four programs, occurred as a “logistical nightmare.” Where agents which contributed to their diversification of payment existed, there was not always a way to supply them methods and the adoption of new PSP partners. with the necessary cash for all the payments. Thus, MTN had to create the ability for the agents to make 4. Agents Affected the Experience cash-out payments to recipients, and starting in of Recipients and While the 2013, MTN contracted “franchise dealers” (master Agents’ Control of PINs Was agents) to move physical cash to subcounties to make Expeditious, It Also Carried Risks. payouts. There were some instances in which MTN could not execute e-payments, for example, due to All four programs struggled with the logistics of network outages, and there was a period in which making payments through an agent network in distant staff could not issue SIM cards/e-wallets because of locations. As recipients learned to use a new payment a faulty batch of cards. In such cases, MTN made method, in certain areas the recipients were exposed manual payments, which involved a cumbersome and to PSPs only through their interaction with the PSP’s laborious process that was very much outside of the agents, meaning a recipient’s negative experience business model underpinning mobile money and the with an agent could reflect poorly on the PSP. As core business practices of an MNO. programs were keen to make payments quickly, in some cases agents “controlled” the payment For Equity Bank agents in Kenya, the challenge process to improve efficiency and speed. This of ensuring agent presence and liquidity has had 9 an adverse impact on the program, particularly at agents became tired and frustrated with recipients the field level. WFP and Equity both described the who did not understand the payment method. At the payout process as chaotic. Despite the program same time, at least the recipient PINs were not being often urging recipients to spread out their trips to compromised for the sake of efficiency. The long agents to retrieve their money, due to unreliability lines and pressure to remember the PIN also created and unpredictability of when the payments would anxiety for recipients, though this may subside as arrive, recipients, not surprisingly, continued to the program matures and the PSPs and recipients gather on the same day to withdraw their payments, become more familiar with the payments process. causing long lines, insufficient agent liquidity, agent Regardless, in all cases, programs and PSPs struggled frustration, and recipient confusion. In some cases, to monitor and enforce consistent agent behavior. recipients reported that insufficient liquidity led to agents insisting that the recipients buy goods from 5. Recipient Capability Was Greatly the agent’s store or come back several times instead Affected by Program and Payment of withdrawing the full payment at once. The cost Method Training as Well as the of managing and maintaining the necessary agent Availability and Timeliness of Payments. liquidity eventually led Equity to adjust its agent fee schedule such that agents received a higher amount Recipients’ feedback about their understanding of the for larger withdrawals. This came as a surprise to program—and, in some cases, lack thereof—reflected CFA, which was not originally consulted on the a need for programs to train recipients on “program modification and thus no longer sufficiently covered literacy,” not just “financial literacy” to improve the withdrawal fees incurred by many recipients as recipients’ initial understanding of the program, intended. payment process, conditional payment calculation, and recourse mechanisms. Given recipients’ experiences In all programs, there appeared to be a clear of the payment methods and processes, not all the tension between processing a single payment as programs sufficiently educated recipients about using quickly as possible and teaching recipients a new and remembering their PINs, understanding how payment method. In Uganda, the program efficiently much money they should receive each payout period, distributed money to the recipients so that, even if and knowing what to do if something went wrong. they had to travel a distance, once they arrived at Where recipients felt comfortable with the payment the agent, they were not waiting in a slow-moving, process and instrument, they seemed to benefit from long line. Likewise, agents were better managed, consistently using the instrument every time there was and few recipients voiced any concerns over trust a payment; for programs where payments were not or agent behavior. However, this efficiency came available at reliable intervals or the agent did not have at the price of handing control of the payments sufficient liquidity to serve all recipients, recipients process to agents who entered the PIN on behalf struggled to remember and adapt to the process, and of recipients. SAGE elected to put aside its original trust the system. If recipients do not understand how objective of financial inclusion and the possibility the program works and if payments are inconsistent, of agent theft or misconduct for the sake of more reaching financial inclusion objectives will be even efficient payments, leaving recipients completely more difficult. dependent on agents to conduct their transactions. In contrast, TMC and CFA recipients waited in long Recipients were often unclear about how the lines because the agents would often need to call program worked, what their eligibility was based on, the TchoTcho Mobile customer service line or the how often payments were made, and the values of bank, respectively, to resolve issues with the PIN their payments. Recipients’ lack of program literacy and account. The extra work required of agents also was clear in Kenya, where interviewed recipients resulted in poor customer service in some cases, as reportedly received 13 weeks of financial literacy 10 training from Equity, but were often still unclear the payments to be unreliable (and might stop at about why they received the amounts they did and any time), and (iii) be more likely to opt to cash how much the agent was to take for commission. out immediately due to lack of confidence in the While some recipients understood the work norms program or the payment system. By contrast, the 4Ps and the fluctuating payment amounts that often recipients, many of whom had been in the program depended on the number of months of back pay they for four or five years, expressed no anxiety or received, others thought they were missing money. concern about using a PIN at ATMs and understood One woman explained that when her most recent the payment conditionalities and thus how much payment was less than half of previous payments, she to expect at each payment cycle. However, 4Ps assumed the agent stole her money. CFA recipients recipients explained that when they were new to the also often did not know how to use their PIN, and program and using the ATMs, security guards helped either brought a family member with them who could them use the machine, until they were subsequently enter the PIN or asked the agent to enter their PIN comfortable with the process. (even though program rules prohibited this). Although Equity’s financial literacy training covered how to use Overall, recipients’ lack of knowledge about and a POS device, it did not provide an opportunity for trust in the program and an inconsistent use of the recipients to practice entering their PINs themselves. payment system due to irregular payments may undermine the use of accounts and any related SAGE recipients did not have the same questions financial inclusion objectives. about their payment amounts as seen in Kenya. Since their payments were typically on time and not 6. Appropriate Recipient Recourse conditional, they knew exactly how much they should Mechanisms Built Confidence and Trust. receive for each payment, reducing confusion and possible fraud and helping to build trust. However, Some recipients viewed the cash transfer as a “gift” confusion over the payment method persisted: one and were reluctant to submit formal complaints if group of SAGE recipients explained that it “failed” they did not receive their full payment amounts, the training about the payment method. As a whether due to program error or misconduct or result, agents conducted the transactions for those errors at the pay point. While programs taught recipients. A local SAGE staff member, however, recipients about the recourse mechanisms to varied explained that this “training” was actually a 45-minute extents, recipients did not necessarily benefit from program sensitization and was not intended to teach the mechanisms; recipients did not always trust that recipients how to use the pay phone or keypad. they were entitled to voice such issues and feared Another group was hardly aware that they had a PIN, removal from the program or another penalty. In and was not at all aware of what their PINs were. other cases, recipients were not even aware of recourse mechanisms and were unsure of who to Whereas recipients’ lack of understanding around tell about issues. In cases where recipients told the amount they should receive is a matter of program staff about an issue, some did not see their program literacy, timely payments can contribute problems resolved, leading to confusion about the to recipients’ comfort with using a PIN and the recourse mechanisms. new payment method that comes from repeated use. Even with thorough, interactive training on the Some recipients, particularly those who recently payment method at the beginning of a program, if began receiving cash transfers for the first time, recipients do not receive their payments at reliable were reluctant to admit any problems or challenges intervals, they are more likely to (i) forget how with their payment methods because they thought to use the payment method, (ii) be less likely to they were receiving “free” money and they were not commit to learning the payment method if they find always treated the same as “regular” customers of 11 the PSPs. The recipients of TMC most exhibited the inclusive features into the scheme—for low-income need to trust the program to successfully manage people in low-infrastructure contexts. a recourse mechanism. Digicel had the foresight to implement a TMC-only call center, which became 1. Ensure Reliable Payments First. particularly useful when recipients would arrive at agents and could not remember their PINs. Getting payments reliably to recipients is a necessary precondition to meet most other program priorities From the beginning of the program, SAGE had and objectives, including ultimately any financial extensive recourse mechanisms (separate from MTN’s inclusion objectives. Using an e-payment system will recourse system) in place to protect recipients. The not be effective and could even have adverse effects recipients interviewed for this study hardly used these if it does not work well. Payment delays or working mechanisms since payments almost always arrived with agent networks in which liquidity is a problem within the expected dates and recipients were aware will undermine the entire program, as recipients fail of how much they were to receive each pay period. to trust or understand the new system. Recipients This was also due in part to MTN agents being would benefit from the iterative process of receiving responsible for having sufficient liquidity, and being payments at a consistent interval so they know it is able to guarantee sufficient liquidity because they worth investing in learning the payment method, and were aware of the number of recipients they would they are able to practice using the payment method serve each pay period. until they feel comfortable. If recipients do not see the value in the system or do not trust it, they will not Similar to SAGE, the 4Ps recipients typically knew continue to use it for reasons other than receiving how much they should receive and also knew the their social cash transfers, which could undermine complaints process if they did not receive their full agent network development, the long-term business amount. The 4Ps, as a more mature program, also case of the provider, and financial inclusion objectives. grappled with and has had more time to resolve payment delays than the other programs studied. In both Haiti and Kenya, unreliable payments With nearly 10,000 staff to serve the program and hampered the e-payment system as well as the its recipients, the staff interviewed for this study customer and PSP experience and may have lessened suggested that recipients did not refrain from the probability that recipients would eventually use the expressing grievances to the staff. Still, while the financially inclusive features offered to them. SAGE, program reports on recipient complaints ranging on the other hand, offers a prime example of setting from faulty cards or ATMs, to rude service at a financial inclusion aside to focus on delivering timely conduit, to disputes over the amount of the payment payments. It has not deserted financial inclusion, itself, DSWD reported only 26,194 formal grievances but rather has shifted (and perhaps sequenced) its in the first quarter of 2013 (with over 3.9 million priorities. It remains to be seen if and when financial households enrolled and over 3.7 million recipients inclusion will once again become a central objective as of June 2013). of the program. Overall, sequencing is important to administer e-payments well, particularly if financial Five Lessons inclusion is an objective. The six findings draw from the apparent trends across 2. Create Sufficient Communication four programs that vary significantly across contexts. Channels with Recipients. Based on these experiences, we offer five lessons for programs and PSP partners to consider when Programs and PSPs would benefit from creating exploring, designing, or implementing e-payments— proper communication channels when introducing, particularly if there is a desire to incorporate financially implementing, and scaling up the program. Programs 12 communication with recipients can be important 3. Ask “What If?” to not only improving recipients’ awareness and understanding of the program, but also to reducing Governments, donors, and PSPs should incorporate the number of complaints and questions that program contingency planning and realistic risk assessments staff must manage once the program is under way. into the earliest stages of the design process, as well With this in mind, we have identified several instances as revisit them as situations affecting the program where clear communication with recipients is critical: inevitably change. At a minimum, this should manifest itself in three areas: • Explain to recipients how much their payments should be. This includes explaining to them • Programs and PSPs should map the relevant where the money comes from and why they are infrastructure capabilities in target areas to consider receiving it. the sequencing of investment in infrastructure; • Teach recipients how to conduct payment set geographic parameters for piloting, such as transactions. This should occur more than once to adjusting for urban/rural differences; and realistically ensure recipients really understand the process, cost the payments or other required subsidies. and should involve the recipients practicing the • Programs and PSPs should know the level of transactions themselves. recipients’ payment services capabilities to design • Inform recipients when there is a delay in receiving a mechanism that takes into proper account their their payments. Before recipients even arrive at the abilities and limitations. The customer payment agent to withdraw their money, programs would experience should be considered an integral part benefit from advising recipients when payments of a sustainable payments strategy, particularly if are delayed, such as by SMS. For example, in the objective is to build financial inclusion through Kenya recipients reported going to the agent on the program. the date they expected their money, but when the • Programs and PSPs should acknowledge the various money was not yet available, they wasted precious reasons (other than giving money to vulnerable time and money taking unnecessary trips to the populations) why governments and donors are agent. implementing the program (e.g., politics, financial • Teach recipients where to go for troubleshooting. inclusion, education). They should be aware that When recipients do not receive their full payment, these other motivations may very likely result in have a question about the amount they receive, modifications to the program. While the functioning have a problem with an agent, or encounter a of the program may seem paramount to the design of technical glitch with their SIM, card, or phone, payment systems, the political economy in which each they should know who to call and how to rectify program evolves should not be discounted given the the situation. very political nature of G2P payment schemes. Who should be responsible for these roles? The 4. Ensure a Value Proposition program maintains a responsibility to, at a minimum, for All Stakeholders. oversee that this communication occurs. However, PSPs should prioritize investment in and management By the very nature of G2P payment schemes, no of their agent network. With agents representing single entity has complete control over all facets the PSP, recipients’ negative interactions with agents of its design and implementation. Therefore, it is could lead to negative perceptions of the entire PSP critical that a clear value proposition exists for all (again reducing the chances of recipients adopting stakeholders from the outset. the PSP for other services). The program thus must clearly define the roles of each partner to include • For the program: Program management should communication responsibilities. ensure that government stakeholders see the 13 value in the e-payment system. If program staff are and ability to deliver on program objectives. PSPs not sufficiently convinced of the value proposition under these conditions are likely to require more offered by the new payment system, they may investment and cross-subsidy from the program than prefer to rely on the systems they already know. PSPs that already have agent networks (e.g., PSPs • For the PSP: The PSP should consider the fixed and in Brazil and South Africa). Whereas programs seem ongoing costs of infrastructure and also consider to assume that PSPs can easily leverage these types the benefits, whether they be profit, new client of payment schemes as a strategic way to improve acquisition, opportunities for other work with the agent ubiquity, liquidity, and cross-selling, in reality government, or corporate social responsibility. these factors need to be sufficiently strong before • For the recipients: If recipients do not trust the recipients use them to receive payments. program’s reliability or the PSP staff or the agents with whom they interact, they will do little more Conclusion than use the method to withdraw their periodic payment, which may weaken their propensity to The evolution of the e-payments programs in Haiti, learn about the payment method or interact with it Kenya, the Philippines, and Uganda revealed several regularly. As a worst case, poor initial experiences intriguing commonalities across different stakeholder with the payment system (or by extension a groups involved in their design and implementation. provider or agent) may inhibit their demand for While their contexts, sizes, and objectives varied, e-payments or other such financial services in the they all faced the realities of testing and rolling out future. electronic cash transfer schemes in areas with weak infrastructure and with populations largely unfamiliar 5. Be Willing to Invest. with financial institutions or e-payment methods. The need for (i) upfront investment in program and Programs setting up electronic G2P payments payments infrastructure, (ii) adequate contingency in countries and regions with limited e-payment planning and flexibility, and (iii) understanding of infrastructure might initially need to expend and communication with recipients permeated each resources to ensure adequate infrastructure, such as a program to varying degrees at design and operational functioning agent network or well-built interoperable levels. As these experiences also demonstrate, even MIS for data management and reconciliation. For where e-payment systems, particularly mobile money, instance, while cheaper in the long run than cash- already seem robust, these inherently complex cash in-transit services, developing and maintaining transfer schemes will always be challenging to design robust agent or POS networks to enable convenient and implement. payments with sufficient liquidity can be expensive to create in environments where the infrastructure is not From the government or donor perspective, each already in place. It is not likely that a PSP will make program was originally motivated, to varying extents, such an investment without a strong business case to use e-payments to improve the efficiency and for doing so. In the four programs examined here, transparency of cash transfers; reduce their cost to PSPs charged fairly nominal fees for their services the program; and provide value-added services to and not surprisingly, several PSPs or their conduits payment recipients, such as accounts that provide (in the case of the Philippines) lacked a clear financial formal financial access. Yet the programs encountered case for partnering with the program. In several challenges with creating consistently strong instances, it was clear that the revenue-to-expense payment schemes in the face of limited resources ratio—particularly as the design or implementation and limited infrastructure. The programs frequently plans of the program expanded or changed without underestimated the challenges posed, which led commensurate changes to the fee structure—was to the disruption of well-laid plans. Notably, each so low that it weakened the PSP’s commitment program benefited from at least one “champion,” a 14 member of the implementation team who directed implementation plan in each, the PSPs often found the program through unchartered waters, making their business case for involvement strained while various course corrections along the way to an increasingly locked into high-visibility partnerships. appropriate and functioning payment solution for the program. From the recipient experience, it was clear from focus groups that certain components of the recipient From the PSP perspective, the motivation to get “payment journey”—from learning that the payment involved in each e-payment scheme came more from is ready to traveling to the pay point to carrying out the strategic value of partnering with the program the transaction—most affected a recipient’s payment on new and growing payment schemes (links to the experience and, ultimately, the desire to be financially government, perceptions of helping the poor, etc.) included. Recipients’ access to clear communication than on the financial attractiveness of either the client and appropriate recourse mechanisms throughout on an individual level or the program at an aggregate the journey is critical. level. They in fact charged relatively little for their services compared to other benchmarks in G2P The collective experiences of these four programs payment schemes. Yet all of them underestimated the toward e-payments and financial inclusion should challenges of serving the recipient population; setting temper the exaggerated enthusiasm in the promise up appropriate management and communications of technology to solve all programmatic and systems with the program; and preparing their payment issues in a cash transfer program. Yet it own staff’s capacity to implement the proposed should also encourage stakeholders that progress payment scheme. Additionally, as internal and is indeed possible, even in the most challenging of external pressures altered the payment process or circumstances. Figure A-1. Ti Manman Cheri, Haiti TMC modified the payment scheme to improve payout efficiency, yet at a higher cost with a system providing less transparency. The program exposes lessons about planning, PSP bidding, and maintaining every stakeholder’s commitment to the program. Early 2011 June 2012 Then-Minister of Foreign GoH finalizes the accord to Affairs Laurent Lamothe secure PetroCaribe funds. returns from a study and April-May 2012 listening tour of March 2012 GoH and Digicel negotiate the November 2012 conditional cash transfer GoH obtains US$15 million details of the CCT partnership, Program expands to serve (CCT) programs in Latin through the PetroCaribe fund to and GoH approves the recipients throughout the America, inspired to start fund the CCT program. proposal. country, rather than only in a similar program in Port au Prince. Haiti. November 2011 March-April 2012 August 2012 Lamothe solicits ideas for a CCT program in GoH approves Digicel’s concept note GoH releases the funds Haiti, consulting CEPAL, the World Bank, and requests a proposal. Digicel submits for payments to Early 2013 and UNDP on the initial design. its proposal to FAES, the government recipients. Unitransfer joins agency charged with implementing the TMC as a PSP. CCT program, on April 20, 2012. November 2011 At Lamothe’s request, Digicel submits a May 27, 2012 concept note, describing how the Lamothe launches the TMC Government of Haiti (GoH) could provide program on Haiti’s Mother’s Day. CCTs through Tcho Tcho Mobile transparently and expediently. Annex A. Program Design to Implementation Process Highlights 15 16 Figure A-2. Cash for Assets, Kenya After working with Equity Bank to develop the CFA payment system, CFA shifted to partner with Cooperative Bank after its second procurement process. The procurement process is one of the UN’s worldwide standard processes that sometimes constrains the forward-thinking WFP Kenya program, showing the effects of donor influences (in a case where government influences are minimal). 2010 October 2010 WFP leveraged the lengthy piloting WFP did a two-month test run November 2011 WFP conducted a second 2003–2009 process to sensitize partners, staff, (prepilot) of the initial feasibility study to support WFP implemented Food for and other relevant stakeholders, such enrollment and payment this next phase of the pilot. Assets (FFA), providing food as related central ministries, on the processes with the proposed assistance to build resilience of plans to shift from in-kind aid to M-KESHO scheme, involving Kenyan households in regions e-payments. 3,660 households in three towns deemed “food insecure.” in Mwingi County. January 2012 2010 July 2010 WFP reached scale Starting with a market assessment and WFP went through the tender process (80,000 recipients in seven feasibility study, WFP’s Innovations Team to select Equity Bank as its financial counties), though it still designed a cash transfer program to replace services provider for CFA. WFP and March–May 2011 struggled with delivering FFA in some areas. CFA was to be an Equity extended the contract three WFP rolled out the second timely, regular payments. e-payment system and promote financial times between September 2010 and phase (pilot) from June to inclusion as part of building resilience. The May 2012, before WFP retendered. December, an adjustment team designed the program as a pilot to and expansion of the first document the process and build evidence prepilot where cards around the best way to electronically deliver replaced M-KESHO. social cash transfers to food insecure households. Figure A-3. The 4Ps, the Philippines The 4Ps shows what continual modifications and persistence, even in spite of political pressure, can achieve, with the program serving nearly four million recipient households nationally. The program has maintained a focus on health and education, and does not appear to be considering adding a financial inclusion objective at this time. 2006 2008 2010 At World Bank’s urging, a Embattled President Gloria GCASH Remit used its mobile money delegation of senior government Arroyo mandated immediate platform to make payments in highly officials attended the “Social extension of program to 300,000 remote areas in cash. Protection and Inclusion” global households. conference in Turkey. 2007 2010 2012 The Department of Social Welfare and President Benigno Aquino appointed as President Aquino announced Development (DSWD) launched a pilot to Minister of DSWD Corazon Dinky expansion of 4Ps; interest pay 6,000 households in four municipalities Soliman. At the insistence of Minister among potential payment and two cities in three regions Soliman, the 4Ps added new payment conduits increased. over-the-counter at Land Bank branches. conduits to reach areas where Land Bank did not operate. 17 18 Figure A-4. Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment, Uganda SAGE has modified its program with the longer-term view of establishing a pension policy, and thus with a need to solicit government buy-in and to create an efficient system. SAGE’s commitment to fast and timely payments comes as the program is learning how to push e-payments in a country that may not be ready for such payments and in a way that, for the time being, disregards the financial inclusion objective. 2000s 2011 The Government of Uganda The program began (GoU) created a social with a six-month development sector and began prepilot phase in 2010, September 2012 promoting social development testing MTN’s mobile SAGE made first manual through formation of an money product for payments. intergovernmental technical payments in three January-June 2013 committee and study tours to November 2010 districts. MTN management other countries implementing SAGE launched procurement restructured. social protection strategies. process. June 2010 August 2011 September 2011 October 2012 June 2013 Maxwell Stamp SAGE After a lengthy bid process SAGE made first Faulty cards caused Agent involved in SAGE program manager arrived during which five PSPs submitted MTN payments (but major backlog of payments was robbed, to oversee program set up bids, SAGE selected MTN as its not through payments. resulting in two-month and implementation. PSP. commercial mobile suspension of all money product). manual payments. April 2011-February 2015 GoU gradually rolls out to 14 districts in the pilot phase, expecting to reach 95,000 households. 19 Annex B. Recipients’ Incentives to Use E-Payments Table B-1 compares the recipient experiences across -result they rarely interacted with the PSP beyond the four programs. In most cases, recipients did not withdrawing the entire transfer. Even 4Ps recipients in fully understand how to use the electronic methods, Manila, where some merely had to walk less than 10 even after some time in the program. Additionally, minutes to reach the pay point, were not interested those recipients located in rural areas typically in using their Land Bank account beyond withdrawing had longer to travel to reach pay points and as a their payments. Table B-1. Comparing the Recipient Experiencea TMC—Haiti CFA—Kenya 4Ps—Philippines SAGE—Uganda Cost and time spent Up to $2.50 2 hours is most About 1.5 hours Up to 8 kilometers, traveling to collect roundtrip, taking commonly cited and $3.60–$4.49 costing up to $4 15–30 minutes travel time. round trip to ATM, round trip (Kiboga). (most commonly GCASH, M Lhuillier cited travel time in (Pantabangan rural); urban areas where 10 minutes and respondents lived). $0.34 or less in Manila. Financial costs to use None, though some None, though Up to US$0.45 to None. service to withdraw reported paying some recipients withdraw from non- payment $0.25 to withdraw complained about Land Bank ATMs. at TchoTcho Mobile incurring costs— agents—likely e.g., agent did not an additional, give full amount. unsanctioned payment the agent charged. Additional financial “Save” in chicken “Save” in chicken Save at home. “Save” in chicken services used/ and goats for and goats. Save and borrow and goats. preferred children. Save at home. with savings groups. Save at home. Save in groups. Save and borrow Rather than save, Save and borrow Borrow from money with savings groups. borrow (primarily with savings groups. lenders. from friends, family Microloans. and money lenders) when they need money. Social cash transfer Least reliable (third Range from second Ranked first to third Most commonly reliability “ranking”b out of three income to fourth most most reliable income ranked the most sources). reliable out of top source (out of five reliable income five income sources. income sources) in source. and outside Manila (in urban and rural areas). Social cash transfer Smallest income Second to third Second through First through third size ranking source. largest income fourth largest largest income source. income source. source. Those in Manila ranked it lower than those in LICAB and Pantabangan. a. From qualitative field research by Bankable Frontier Associates from May through August 2013. b. Ranking compares social cash transfer payment to the reliability and size (amount) of other income sources, which include TMC recipients: Small businesses, support from their children’s fathers not living in the households, and remittances from family members abroad. CFA recipients: Casual labor, selling poultry and goats, farm produce, selling food, charcoal, local brew, etc., savings group. 4Ps recipients: Farm produce and vegetables, skilled work, fishing, selling poultry and pigs, small business. SAGE recipients: Farm produce, selling poultry and goats, selling food, charcoal, local brew, etc., casual labor, skilled work. 20 References World Bank. Accessed 4 October 2013. http://data. worldbank.org/indicator/FB.ATM.TOTL.P5 Bold, Chris, David Porteous, and Sarah Rotman. 2012. “Social Cash Transfers and Financial Inclusion: World Bank. 2012b. “GDP per capita (Current Evidence from Four Countries.” Focus Note 77. US$).” Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Accessed Washington, D.C.: CGAP, February. http://www. 4 October 2013. http://data.worldbank.org/ cgap.org/sites/default/files/Focus-Note-Social-Cash- indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD Transfers-and-Financial-Inclusion-Evidence-from- Four-Countries-Feb-2012.pdf World Bank. 2012c. “Literacy Rate, Adult Total.” Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Accessed 4 October DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and 2013. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT. Development). n.d. “The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino LITR.ZS Program. Quezon City, Philippines: DSWD. http:// pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/about-us World Bank. 2012d. “Urban Population (% of Total).” Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Accessed GSMA. 2013. GSMA Intelligence 2013: Data Dashboard. 4 October 2013. http://data.worldbank.org/ Data from Q4 2012. Accessed 4 October 2013. https:// indicator/SP.URB. gsmaintelligence.com/markets/2659/dashboard/ Zimmerman, Jamie M., and Kristy Bohling. 2013a. HDI (Human Development Index). 2012. 2012 “Helping Ti Manman Cheri in Haiti: Offering Mobile rankings. Accessed 4 October 2013 http://hdr.undp. Money-Based Government-to-Person Payments org/en/statistics/ in Haiti.” Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: CGAP. http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/ Transparency International. 2013. Corruption eg2p_Haiti.pdf Perceptions Index 2012. Berlin, Germany: Transparency International. Accessed 4 October ———. 2013b. “Cash for Assets: World Food 2013. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results Programme’s Exploration of the In-Kind to World Bank Findex. 2011. “Account at a Formal E-Payments Shift for Food Assistance in Kenya.” Financial Institution (% age 15+).” Washington, Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: CGAP. http:// D.C.: World Bank. Accessed 4 October 2013. www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/eG2P_Kenya.pdf http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/ ———. 2013c. “Striving for E-payments at Scale: The World Bank. 2011a. “Commercial Bank Branches Evolution of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (per 100,000 adults).” Washington, D.C.: World in the Philippines.” Working Paper. Washington, Bank. Accessed 4 October 2013. http://data. D.C.: CGAP. http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/ worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5 eG2P_Philippines.pdf World Bank. 2011b. “Population (Total).” Washington, ———. 2013d. “Electronic Payments with Limited D.C.: World Bank. Accessed 4 October 2013. http:// Infrastructure: Uganda’s Search for a Viable data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL E-payments Solution for the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment.” Working Paper. Washington, World Bank. 2012a. “Automated Teller Machines D.C.: CGAP. http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/ (ATMs) (Per 100,000 Adults).” Washington, D.C.: eG2P_Uganda.pdf No. 93 April 2014 Please share this Focus Note with your colleagues or request extra copies of this paper or others in this series. CGAP welcomes your comments on this paper. All CGAP publications are available on the CGAP Web site at www.cgap.org. CGAP 1818 H Street, NW MSN P3-300 Washington, DC 20433 USA Tel: 202-473-9594 Fax: 202-522-3744 Email: cgap@worldbank.org © CGAP, 2014 The authors of this Focus Note are Jamie M. Zimmerman, Bankable Frontier Associates; Kristy Bohling, Bankable Frontier Associates; and Sarah Rotman Parker, CGAP. The authors are grateful for the participation of the four programs studied in this report, and the willingness and openness of the individuals from each program who dedicated their time to this research. We would like to thank the reviewers of this paper, including Gerhard Coetzee, Katharine McKee, and Stephen Rasmussen from CGAP. This Focus Note was written based on materials compiled and analyzed by a Bankable Frontier Associates project team: David Porteous (project director), Kristy Bohling (project manager and demand-side researcher), Jamie M. Zimmerman (supply-side researcher), and John Ratichek, Caroline Pulver, Stephen Kidd, and Beatriz Marulanda (project advisers). The Technology and Business Model Innovation Program at CGAP is co-funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, CGAP, The MasterCard Foundation, and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The suggested citation for this Focus Note is as follows: Zimmerman, Jamie M., Kristy Bohling, and Sarah Rotman Parker. “Electronic G2P Payments: Evidence from Four Lower-Income Countries.” Focus Note 93. Washington, D.C.: CGAP, April. 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