23231
Latin America and Caribbean Region
Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
Defining Ethnodevelopment
in Operational Terms:
Lessons from the Ecuador Indigenous and
Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project
January 2000
Martien van Nieuwkoop
Jorge E. Uquillas
The World Bank
Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development SMU






LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms:
Lessons from the Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Project
January 2000
Martien van Nieuwkoop
Jorge E. Uquillas
The World Bank
Latin America and Caribbean Region
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development SMU



Martien van Nieuwkoop (Natural Resources Economist) and Jorge E. Uquillas (Senior
Sociologist) work in the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector
Management Unit (LCSES) of the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office.
The findings interpretations and conclusions in this document are attributable to the authors, and should
not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, its affiliated organizations, members of its Board of
Executive Directors or the countries they represent.
This working paper series is produced by the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development
Sector Management Unit (John Redwood, Director) of the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office.
Additional copies may be obtained either from the authors, or from LCSES Projects Assistant Peter
Brandriss (pbrandriss@worldbank.org, or tel. 202-473-9379).
Cover photos (left to right):
Indigenous community work project-Martien van Nieuwkoop
Participants in stakeholder consultation-Cecilia Guzman



Contents
Foreword ..................................................v
Executive Summary ..................................................1
1.  Introduction ..................................................3
2.  Critical Entry Conditions ..................................................4
Minority Population with Distinct Characteristics 4
Strong Poverty-Ethnicity Relation 5
Presence of Strong Social Organizations   6
Commitment to Finding Common Ground 7
Existence of an Enabling Policy Environment 8
3.  Success Factors in Project Preparation ................................................9
Participatory Framework for Joint Decisionmaking 9
Appropriate Division of Functional ResponsibilLities 10
Relatively High Degree of Project Autonomy 11
Conducive Working Environment 12
Transparent Rules of the Game 12
Mobilizing Alliances 13
Hands-On Experience 15
Flexible Processing Schedule 15
Continuity of Task Team 21
4.  Essential Project Design Features                     .......................................... 16
Objective Beneficiary Targeting Mechanism 16
Mobilizing Social Capital 18
Concrete Cultural Dimensions 21
5.  Conclusion .................................................                                     22
Annexes ................................................. .                                           25
1. Timeline of Key Events 25
2. Project Institutional Structure during Preparation Process 32
3. Target Population    33
4. Social Capital Index Criteria 34
. .i






Foreword
Martien van Nieuwkoop and Jorge Uquillas have distilled important lessons from their work
with Ecuadoran Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples during the past several years. With
this paper they share their insights into the practical application of "ethnodevelopment"
concepts in actual projects. Ethnodevelopment offers strong potential to sharpen the focus of
development initiatives and increase their success SoD that they yield the greatest benefit for
those most at risk.
The Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project, which forms the
basis for this analysis, is the first stand-alone World Bank-financed project to exclusively address
the development needs of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. It is therefore especially
useful that the project team convey to others the lessons they learned. This type of knowledge-
sharing about innovative initiatives is essential for maximizing our development impact.
This document is part of the LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper series published by
the Latin America and Caribbean Region's Environmentally and Socially Sustainable
Development Sector Management Unit (LCSES). The series seeks to disseminate the results of
analytical and operational work, present preliminary findings, and describe "best practices"
with regard to major sustainable development issues facing the region. The findings,
interpretations, and conclusions expressed in these papers are entirely those of the authors and
should not be attributed to the World Bank, members of its Board of Executive Directors, or
the countries they represent.
John Redwood
Director
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development SM[
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
The World Bank
v






Executive Sumnmary
It is important to take successful development models from one situation and apply them to other
situations, but not without recognizing that different ethnic groups or parts of society undergo
development in different ways. They usually benefit most or respond best to approaches and
mechanisms tailored to their specific cultural heritage and social characteristics.
This paper seeks to strengthen development projects for indigenous peoples and ethnic groups by
examining the critical concepts of "ethnodevelopment" or "development with identity," and how
to incorporate them into operational planning and implementation.
Ethnodevelopment builds on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies to promote
local employment and growth. Such qualities include these peoples' strong sense of ethnic identity,
close attachments to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital, and other resources to
achieve shared goals. These dynamics are recognized as fundamental to the way in which
indigenous peoples define their own processes of development and interactions with other segments
of society.
The Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project is the World Bank's
first stand-alone investment operation that focuses exclusively on indigenous peoples and other
ethnic minorities. The process of preparing and designing the project yielded valuable lessons
and insights into the factors that make ethnodevelopment work in the real world. These lessons
are grouped in three categories:
Critical Entry Conditions   * Minority population with distinct characteristics
* Strong correlation between poverty and ethnicity
* Strong social organizations
* Commitment to finding common ground
* Enabling policy environment
Success Factors in       * Participatory framework for joint decisionmaking
Project Preparation      * Appropriate division of functional responsibilities
* Relatively high degree of project autonomy
* Conducive working environment
* Transparent rules of the game
* Mobilization of alliances
* Hands-on experience
* Flexible processing schedule
* Task team continuity
Essential Design Features  * Objective beneficiary targeting mechanism
* Focus on mobilizing social capital
* Inclusion of concrete cultural dimensions
The project team has written this paper to share their insights with other development
professionals and help bring this innovative approach into the mainstream of the Bank's work.
I






1. INTRODUCTION
In 1993 the World Bank launched its Indigenous Peoples Development Initiative, and has been
working ever since to open new and innovative avenues of support for indigenous peoples
development. Initial efforts focused on mitigation measures, training and capacity building, and
preinvestment operations. Gradually, indigenous peoples development is becoming an integral
part of the Bank's loan portfolio.
Because the Bank is still building its knowledge and experience in this field, it is essential to
share information and lessons learned from actual operations carried out in partnership with
indigenous peoples and their organizations. This paper attempts to distill lessons from the
preparation and design of the Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development
Project. The project preparation process was long, bumpy, and exhausting, but also exciting,
fulfilling, and instructive.
The project is the first stand-alone investment operation financed by the World Bank that focuses
exclusively on indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities. It the first time that Ecuador
borrowed resources specifically for investments to benefit its indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran
populations. It is also the first time that indigenous organizations and theEcuadoran government
have joined forces in an effort explicitly based on putting into practice the vision of
"development with identity," or "ethnodevelopment." This vision builds on the positive qualities
of indigenous cultures and societies-such as their sense of ethnic identity, close attachment to
ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital, and other resources for shared goals-to
promote local employment and growth.
The Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project invests in local capacity
building, small-scale demand-driven rural subprojects, land tenure regularization, cultural
heritage activities, and institutional strengthening of the Council for the Development of the
Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador. The total project budget is $50 million ($25 million from
the World Bank, $15 million from the International Ftnd for Agricultural Development, and $10
million from the Ecuadoran government and from Ecuadoran indigenous communities and
organizations. The project was prepared beginning in early 1995, approved in early 1998, and
became effective in September 1998 (see Annex I for a detailed timeline).
Chapter 2 of this paper focuses on conditions that are considered critical for project entry, and
which preferably should be met before initiating the project preparation process. These
conditions include a) a minority population with distinct characteristics, b) a strong correlation
between poverty and ethnicity, c) strong social organizations, d) commitment to finding common
ground, and e) an enabling policy environment.
Chapter 3 examines the factors that detennine success in the preparation phase. Our findings
stress the importance of a) a participatory framework for joint decisionmaking, b) an appropriate
division of functional responsibilities, c) a relatively high degree of project autonomy, d) a
conducive working environment, e) transparent rules of the game, f) mobilization of alliances, g)
hands-on experience, i) a flexible processing schedule, and j) continuity of the task team.
3



4 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
Chapter 4 presents essential design features for projects that aim to put into practice the vision of
ethnodevelopment. These include a) an objective beneficiary targeting mechanism, b) a focus on
mobilizing social capital, and c) inclusion of concrete cultural dimensions.
This paper is not a formal, quantitative, statistically rigorous survey, nor is it an informal, rapid,
qualitative assessment. It is an attempt to distill and present in a systematic way the collective
knowledge of the task team that worked on the project for over three years, from project
identification to project launch and beyond.'
2. CRITICAL ENTRY CONDITIONS
The task team identified certain conditions that they considered critical for project entry, and which
preferably should be met before initiating the project preparation process. These include a) a
minority population with distinct characteristics, b) a strong correlation between poverty and
ethnicity, c) strong social organizations, d) commitment to finding common ground, and e) an
enabling policy environment.
Minority Population with Distinct Characteristics
The existence of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran populations with distinct characteristics is a rather
obvious precondition for the launch of an investment project dedicated to their development.
Indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans are important parts of Ecuador's multicultural society.
They differ from the mainstream Hispanic (white and mestizo) population both in their degree of
economic deprivation, their high level of social capital (particularly among indigenous peoples), and
their cultural and social characteristics.
Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples together represent almost 30 percent of the population,
although estimates vary widely. There are 13 officially designated, non-Hispanic ethnic groups or
nationalities in Ecuador.3 The largest nationality group comprises the highland Quichua-speakers
(also known as the Runa) who constitute more than 90 percent of Ecuador's indigenous peoples.
However, the Runa themselves are culturally diverse, as demonstrated by the contrasts between
subgroups such as the Otavalo and Saraguro, or the Chibuleo and Cafiari peoples.
Many indigenous people have moved to urban areas and in some cases have become assimilated
into the dominant mestizo society. However, in rural areas they have tended to maintain their
1. Task team members included: Martien van Nieuwkoop, Jorge E. Uquillas, Maurizio Guadagni
(LCSES); Surajit Goswami (LCC3C); Marta Molares-Halberg (LEGLA), Pablo Glikman (IFAD) and
Dino Francescutti (FAO).
2. Indigenous organizations often give higher estimates (about 40 percent of the total population), while
some social scientists (such as Knapp) put the figure closer to 10 percent on the basis of census data.
3. Indigenous peoples in Ecuador prefer to be designated as "nationalities" or "peoples" rather than
"ethnic groups." The first two terms imply having standing as a nation, and a broad range of rights
established in United Nations instruments and the International Labor Organization's Convention 169.
Non-Hispanic nationalities in Ecuador are: Runa, Shuar, Huao, Siona, Secoya, Cofan, Huancavilcas,
Mantefios, Punaes, Chachi, Epera, Tsachilas, Awa, and Ecuador's black population.



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 5
distinct identity. Ecuador's rural population of indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans is
concentrated in 288 of the country's 966 parroquias (parishes, the smallest division in the country).
This segment of the Ecuadoran population, more than 815,000 people, has the country's highest
indices of poverty measured both in terms of income and unsatisfied needs.
The size and distribution of the ethnic population may also be an important factor in deciding
what type of project to implement. If the population is relatively small and widely dispersed,
sophisticated beneficiary targeting mechanisms are required, making a dedicated program quite
complex. On the other hand, a relatively large and concentrated target population may seem like
obvious justification for a dedicated project. However, in that case there is also a question of
whether to implement a development project specifically targeted to the ethnic group, or if it is
more appropriate to have a rural development project (with a strong ethnic perspective) targeted
at an area rather than a specific group.
If existing, nondedicated investment projects and programs are successfully reaching out to
indigenous peoples, there is not as strong a case (from a poverty alleviation perspective) to
implement a targeted project. Without judging other situations, in Ecuador general rural
development projects do not successfully reach the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran populations,
making a dedicated program justifiable.
Strong Poverty-Ethnicity Relation
The World Bank's 1995 poverty assessment for Ecuador found a strong correlation between being
indigenous and being poor (as is the case in most countries). If there were not a strong correlation,
or if existing programs were reaching ethnic minorities, a targeted project still might be justifiable to
address the cultural or identity dimensions that are an essential element ofethnodevelopment. But
such a project would have a stronger cultural than economic focus, and the World Bank would have
to assess its comparative advantage before carrying out the program. However in Ecuador the very
strong poverty-ethnicity correlation calls for a program focusing on economic development, an area
in which the Bank has a well-established comparative advantage.
Thirty-five percent of Ecuador's population lives in poverty and another 17 percent is highly
vulnerable to poverty. Overall, the relationship between poverty, household characteristics, and
social indicators varies considerably both across and within regions and areas. Urban poverty is
associated with low educational achievement, employment in the informal sector, rented housing
rather than home ownership, and low rates of participation in the labor force by women. Rural
poverty is associated with lack of education, little access to land, a low degree of market
integration, and lack of employment in the vibrant nonfarm rural sector. However, poverty and
ethnicity are closely correlated both in rural and urban areas. Households in which an indigenous
language is spoken are more likely to be poor than are Spanish-speaking households, and
strongly indigenous cantons are worse off with respect to a wide variety of social and service
variables, such as education, nutrition, water, and sewerage. In parroquias with an indigenous
majority, the poverty rate (including those highly vulnerable to poverty) is approximately 85
percent. This is 14 percentage points higher than thie rural average, and 32 percentage points
higher than the national average.



6 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
Presence of Strong Social Organizations
Having strong social organizations is an essential entry condition because they are agents for
change and are vital tools for self-management-a crucial element of ethnodevelopment. They
form the foundation from which a project can put the notion of ethnodevelopment into actual
practice. If social organizations are weak or nonexistent, considerable local capacity-building
efforts are required. The question is whether these efforts should be built into the dedicated
investment project itself, or whether a technical assistance operation should precede the
investment project. Compared to other countries, indigenous peoples in Ecuador have relatively
strong organizations.
In general, indigenous peoples in Ecuador suffer from economic deprivation, but are well
endowed in social capital (for example, organization, solidarity patterns, and shared social and
cultural values). They are extremely well organized at the grassroots, regional, and national
levels. Their forms of organization vary. In some cases they are principally organized along the
lines of political parties and labor unions, in others by religious affiliation, and in still others
directly by ethnic affiliation. This diversity of origins and organizations has caused friction
among regional and national federations, particularly after the 1998 Constitution elevated the
legitimacy of ethnic-based organizations. However, they all are part of a vibrant social process
that is contributing to the revitalization of the indigenous identity and leading to the formulation
of a uniquely indigenous vision of development.
The indigenous population of Ecuador is highly organized. Organizations along ethnic lines were
recognized during the Inca Empire. The Conquistadors tried to dismantle and destroy these
organizations, and during colonial times community-based organizations were used by the
Spaniards to wring taxes and labor from the indigenous population. However, the organizations
persisted, and in the period following Ecuador's independence they were known asparcialidades
indigenas. With approval of the Ley de Organizacion y Regimen Comunal in 1937, the
organizations were formally recognized and became known as comunas. The 1964 Ley de
Reforma Agraria as well as subsequent reforms in 1973 also specifically recognized the comunas
as an element of Ecuadoran society. Originally comunas were managed and held land resources
jointly, but in recent years there has been a trend toward individual land ownership. However,
contributing labor for community enterprises (mingas) is still common, especially for small
infrastructure projects.
There are about 2,300 grassroots indigenous organizations (communes, centers, and
cooperatives) at the community level. These, in turn, have formed about 180 second-tier
organizations (organizaciones de segundo grado, or OSGs). The OSGs may be considered
associations, unions, or federations, and frequently are affiliated with provincial, regional, and
national organizations. The overall coordinating body for these groups at the time the project was
prepared was the Comite del Decenio.
Grassroots indigenous organizations are distinguished by features such as their members' sense
of belonging to a community, communal territoriality, their own system of government, solidarity
through collective works, and joint celebrations and communal calendars.



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 7
The black population in Ecuador has less formal organization than the indigenous population.
The main organization for most Afro-Ecuadorans is at the community or grassroots level
(commune, compound, cooperative, committee, union), and only recently have they begun to
form more complex organizations. The main features of black grassroots organizations are a
sense of belonging, a recognizable territoriality, certain forms of self-government, and calendars
of celebrations. Black grassroots organizations are formed more through real or ascribed family
networks than as community societies.
Commitment to Finding Common Ground
The views of Ecuador's indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans about development are based
on a combination of theoretical elements from the Latin American school of ethnodevelopment
and their own experiences as ethnic minorities in Ecuadoran society. Until around 1990 the
indigenous perspective revolved around four fundamental propositions of ethnodevelopment: a)
strengthening of one's own culture, b) identity as a people, c) self-determination and territoriality,
and d) self-management. In recent years, however, this perspective has evolved toward finding
common ground as a platform for concrete initiatives. The new terms of this perspective can be
summarized as follows:
a) Interculturalism. Stemming from the need to strengthen one's own culture in order to
have a clear identity as a people, it is considered necessary to "build a bridge of
communication with mestizo culture."
b) Political economy and comanagement. The principle of self-determination of peoples and
territoriality has progressed to one of political autonomy, understood as being
synonymous with decentralization in public administration and resource management,
and to indigenous representation at the national level.
c) A "viable" development model. Previously indigenous people insisted that only an
endogenous development model was suitable, but now there is greater openness to
adopting elements of exogenous models, including project management and evaluation,
new technologies and socioeconomic growth objectives, and the participation of multiple
actors in the development process.
d) Generation of coordinated state policies. Confrontation has gradually given way to
coordination, and demand for short-term measures has given way to adopting long-term
policies. One example is the case of bilingual education, which has four general features:
a) the state devolves management of education to indigenous organizations, b) the
government provides operating funds, c) long-term effectiveness is the main goal, and d)
teaching in native languages, as well as bilingualism and interculturalism, are
institutionalized to both preserve native culture and improve communication with the
broader society.
e) Proposal on a national scope. The new indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran proposals are
relevant for society as a whole as well as for the state. This stems from the realization by
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations that favorable changes require
coordination with nonindigenous peoples and that proposals for indigenous and Afro-



8 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
Ecuadoran development may benefit nonindigenous sectors as well, provided they
contribute to the construction of an alternative, civilizing proposal.
f) Redefinition of identity. Originally it was proposed that "indigenous" be defined as an
individual's membership in a specific ethnic group. But this has given way to a more
flexible approach that, while keeping the idea of membership in an ethnic group, also
defines "Indian-ness" on an indigenous-peasant continuum and acknowledges that some
indigenous persons do not belong to a specific ethnic group nor exhibit ancestral symbols
of identity.
Existence of an Enabling Policy Environment
State policy regarding indigenous peoples has not been clearly defined and has numerous
ambiguities, but certain general trends may be distinguished. Since the creation of Ecuador in
1830, attempts have been made to integrate indigenous peoples into the general society by
promoting acculturation. However, at times certain forms of social exclusion persisted, such as
limitations on collective indigenous private property, citizenship rights (for example, by not
allowing illiterate persons to vote or be elected), land ownership, and the right to maintain their
own forms of government.
Since the 1980s there has been a gradual shift toward greater openness to the interests and
demands of indigenous peoples. Although agrarian legislation has many gaps, significant
progress has been made in acknowledging indigenous land rights.4 Bilingual education has been
legitimized, with autonomous management by indigenous organizations. Opportunities have been
created for the training and legal recognition of second- and third-tier organizations, from
community associations to provincial federations to regional and national organizations. The
1998 National Constitution states that the country is multicultural and establishes that indigenous
"jurisdictions" will be created in areas of their domain. Moreover, processes have definitely
begun that will allow the inclusion of indigenous people in national society, within the context of
cultural diversity.
By the mid- 1990s a combination of favorable factors led to the preparation of the Indigenous and
Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project-the first World Bank operation focusing
exclusively on ethnic minorities.
First, indigenous peoples' level of organization and capacity for social mobilization had grown
substantially. In a demonstration of their new-found power, in 1990 indigenous peoples marched
from Puyo, in the eastern lowlands, to Quito to push their demands for recognition of collective
title to the lands they occupied. In 1992 indigenous and black organizations joined forces and
formed the Coordinadora Agraria (Agrarian Coordinating Commission) to pressure the
government to revise its recently approved Agrarian Law. After the United Nations declared
1995-2004 the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People, and called for the
formation of joint government and indigenous peoples committees, the Coordinadora Agraria
4. The Land Regularization Component of the Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development
Project includes initiatives that aim to improve existing agrarian legislation, particularly with respect to
the definition and application of ancestral property rights.



Defining E-thnodevelopment in Operational Terms 9
was transformed into the Committee of the Decade (Comite del Decenio) with the mandate to
propose and to respond to proposals for development activities for member organizations.
Second, in 1994 the Ecuadoran government created the National Secretariat of Indigenous and
Ethnic Minorities (SENAIME), and appointed an indigenous entrepreneur as its first secretary.
Immediately thereafter Ecuador initiated a series of contacts with donors to request support for
SENAIME and its proposed operations to benefit indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans. The
government of Ecuador conveyed its interest in this matter quite strongly to the World Bank
through direct contacts between the president of Ecuador and the vice president of the Bank's
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office, a visit by the secretary of SENAIME to the
Bank's headquarters in Washington, and other means.
Third, partly in anticipation of the United Nations International Decade of the World's
Indigenous People, in 1993 the World Bank started its own Indigenous Peoples Development
Initiative, hiring more social science staff, organizing workshops to discuss alternatives for
indigenous peoples, and designing preinvestment operations-particularly a technical training
program for indigenous peoples in Latin America. Thus, the institution was relatively well
positioned to respond to requests such as that from Ecuador.
In early 1995, in response to Ecuador's requests, the Bank decided to begin preparation of a
project that would focus exclusively on Ecuador's indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran populations,
thereby embarking on the road presented in detail in Annex 1.
3. SUCCESS FACTORS IN PROJECT PREPARATION
This chapter examines the factors that determine success in the preparation phase. Our findings
stress the importance of a) a participatory framework for joint decisionmaking, b) an appropriate
division of functional responsibilities, c) a relativelly high degree of project autonomy, d) a
conducive working environment, e) transparent rules of the game, f) mobilization of alliances, g)
hands-on experience, i) a flexible processing schedule, and j) continuity of the task team.
Participatory Framework for Joint Decisionmaking
From the very beginning of project preparation the Bank committed itself to three basic guiding
principles: a) alleviation of poverty by targeting resources at the poorest sectors of the
population, b) promotion of participatory processes to ensure that project design responds to
grassroots demands, and c) close coordination between governmental and nongovernmental
organizations to increase project efficiency.
Preparation started with a project concept paper based on a proposal from the Ecuadoran
government and the knowledge of Bank staff about the situation of indigenous peoples in
Ecuador. The concept paper, along with an invitation to a project inception workshop, was sent to
key government offices, NGOs, and national indigenous organizations. Participants at the
workshop discussed the objectives, basic components, design methodology, and preliminary
work plan for the project. The initial response to the project concept was favorable.



10 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the indigenous organizations had reservations about
working with the government and the World Bank. The largest indigenous organization,
CONAIE (claiming to represent 70 percent of all indigenous peoples in Ecuador), turned out to
be a particularly tough negotiator. In the early 1990s CONAIE organized well-attended popular
marches to put forward claims for indigenous rights, thereby gaining very high credibility with
the indigenous population as the genuine representative of their interests. With relations between
the government and indigenous organizations historically defined by confrontation rather than
cooperation, it was clear that a substantial change in the mindsets of both sides was required
before they could engage in constructive dialogue (even though they recognized that such
dialogue was desirable).
Moreover, it also became clear that although the national indigenous organizations had come
together in the Comite del Decenio, they were not particularly well linked and did not necessarily
speak with one voice. In fact, there was a fair degree of rivalry and continuous jockeying for the
best position at the negotiating table. The role of the Bank as a honest broker and intermediary to
assist the stakeholders in defining common ground for joint action turned out to be crucial at this
stage of the project preparation process.
It took several months to gain a formal commitment from the indigenous organizations to
participate in the project. At first the government suggested the creation of a Consultative Group
in which indigenous organizations would be represented, but with a minority status. This model
of participation was rejected by the indigenous organizations. Instead, they proposed a model in
which indigenous organizations had a direct relationship with the Bank, and administered project
preparation and implementation themselves without the participation of the government. Because
the World Bank's charter mandates that it work with national governments, this model could not
be accepted by the Bank or the government. Further negotiations led to a coadministration model
in which decisions would be made by a Managing Committee (Comite de Gestion) with equal
representation by government and indigenous peoples. The government would be represented by
three delegates from SENAIME, and the indigenous organizations by three representatives
selected by the Comite del Decenio. In addition, the parties agreed to create a Technical Unit
(Unidad T&nica) to support the work of the Comite de Gesti6n. The coordinator of the Unidad
T&cnica was also a member of the Comite de Gestion.5 This helped ensure a strong link between
the decisions of the Comite de Gesti6n and implementation of those decisions by the Unidad
Thcnica. Because the coordinator was selected from a list of three candidates provided by the
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran organizations, in effect they gained an extra representative on
the Comite de Gesti6n. Annex 2 provides an overview of the agreed institutional structure.
Appropriate Division of Functional Responsibilities
Within the agreed institutional setup the Comite de Gesti6n was meant to be the political or
decisionmaking body that would operate at the strategic level. The indigenous members on the
Comite were chosen by the national indigenous organizations and had the mandate to provide
strategic guidance in the project preparation process. Representatives of the government were
5. The Comite del Decenio sent a letter to the World Bank and to the Government of Ecuador stating its
formal commitment to collaborate in the project. In the final analysis, indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran
organizations became the majority bloc in the committee, since the coordinator of the Technical Unit
was the secretary and a voting member of the Comite de Gesti6n.



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 11
selected from SENAIME and the Office of the President. Members of the Comite de Gestion
were also responsible for informing their respective stakeholder groups about progress in project
preparation and for representing their views in the decisionmaking process. The Unidad Tecnica
consisted of professionals that were responsible for implementing the decisions of the Comite de
Gesti6n as reflected in the Project Preparation Plan. These professionals could either have an
indigenous or mestizo background, the idea being that only technical criteria played a role in their
selection process.
This division of responsibilities between the Comite de Gesti6n and the Unidad Thcnica worked
quite well in practice. It enabled both the indigenous organizations and the government to appoint
representatives they believed they could trust (personas de confianza). Since this criteria did not
necessarily imply that all members had a profound technical background, the creation of the
Unidad Ticnica was meant to ensure the availability of the required professional skills to move
project preparation forward at the operational level. However, given the political orientation of
the Comite de Gestion, it was clear that the selection of personnel for the Unidad Tecnica on
professional criteria alone would be quite a challenge. Consequently, while taking an
accommodating approach with respect to the selection and appointment of the members of the
Comite de Gesti6n, the Bank invested considerable time and effort in reviewing the selection of
professionals in the Unidad T&cnica to make sure the project could count on the best pool of
technical expertise available.
A source of continuing debate was where to draw t'he exact line of responsibilities between the
two entities. There was a tendency on the part of the Comite de Gesti6n to micromanage the
Unidad Thcnica. To a large extent this was caused by the fact that the Comite operated on a full-
time basis. In retrospect it would have been better to have a part-time Comite de Gesti6n that met
on a monthly basis to review progress and agree on ithe work program of the Unidad Tecnica for
the coming month.
Relatively High Degree of Project Autonomy
The decision to create a stand-alone project office turned out to be a good one. The decision
reflected the preference of the indigenous organizations to have their own space. One the one
hand this was a positive expression of the importance of self-management in the context of
ethnodevelopment. On the other hand, it was partly fueled by the indigenous organizations'
uneasiness at becoming too closely identified withi the government because their relationship
historically had been on of confrontation rather than cooperation. A separate project office
provided a neutral space, outside their usual political realms, where government representatives
and indigenous organizations could start fostering a constructive relationship and work together
toward a common goal.
An important part of building this relationship was the explicit acknowledgement that it would
provide a forum for project preparation purposes only. This prevented disagreements in other
areas, which could potentially disrupt project preparation, from being interjected into the dialogue
of the Comite de Gesti6n. The fact that both sides agreed on the need for an operation to benefit
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities, regardless of their differences about other issues,
provided a solid basis for this arrangement. This narrow focus allowed the project to keep a
relatively low profile, and despite frequent changes in government (the agency dealing with



12 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
indigenous affairs changed its leadership almost every year) and internal struggles among the
indigenous organizations of the Comite del Decenio, the composition of the Comite de Gesti6n
and the Unidad Thcnica remained virtually unchanged.
The relatively high degree of autonomy of the project was also reflected in the fact that both the
coordinator and administrator of the project had authorized signatures for withdrawal applications
of both PPF and grant funds that were used to finance the preparation process. Hence, within the
framework established by the Comite de Gesti6n, the Unidad Thcnica was in charge of all
operational aspects of the project, including the flow of funds.
Conducive Working Environment
The project's high degree of autonomy provided an opportunity to create a business culture
conducive to a productive working environment. The subject of business culture was discussed
explicitly at various stages during project preparation. Key notions about the appropriate
elements of the business culture were even included in an aide-memoire signed by the various
parties. The discussions resulted in an agreement that the project's working environment would
be based on a) a high degree of tolerance and respect, b) direct, frank, and transparent
communication focused on issues rather than persons, c) drive for high quality results, and d)
willingness to learn from mistakes and to accept constructive feedback. This provided an agreed
code of conduct for people who, until recently, had never worked together. The usefulness of this
exercise was reflected in the fact that on various occasions people made reference to the written
principles. Agreeing on these principles early in the process definitely helped shape a positive
work environment and contributed to an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual trust.
The mechanisms and processes that were employed within the Comite de Gesti6n to deal with
conflicts and differences indirectly contributed to fostering more constructive relationships
among the indigenous organizations themselves as well as between indigenous organizations and
the government. A case in point is that when the National Council for Indigenous and Afro-
Ecuadoran Development was established in March 1997, its organizational structure reflected
that of the Comite de Gesti6n as agreed in November 1995.
Transparent Rules of the Game
Because all the indigenous organizations were interested in having the project hire professionals
affiliated with their particular group, considerable efforts were made to ensure that the rules of
the game, particularly the procedures to hire project personnel, were clear to all stakeholders.
Terms of reference, qualifications, and selection criteria for each position financed under the
project were agreed up front. To acknowledge and validate the goal of having indigenous
professionals employed in the project, knowledge of indigenous languages was included as one
of the selection criteria for positions in which a pool of qualified indigenous professionals was
available. For specialized positions in which there were expected to be very few, if any, qualified
indigenous candidates, the language requirement was replaced by a stipulation that the candidate
should have relevant experience working with indigenous organizations.
The Bank went to great lengths to ensure that all parties complied fully with what they had
agreed on paper. This was necessary because of the significant pressure to appoint consultants



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 13
and divide training budgets according to quotas put forward by indigenous organizations. Though
it risked being labeled bureaucratic by insisting that the rules be observed, in doing so the Bank
actually established a solid reputation as an honest guarantor of due process for all stakeholders.
Given the lack of strong trust among the stakeholders, this role was highly appreciated, and
probably was one the most valuable aspects of the Bank's role in the preparation process.
Regarding fiduciary issues, the Bank made it clear from the beginning that the project had to
comply with the full range of requirements that are applied to other Bank-financed projects, and
that obtaining exceptions to these rules would probably be more painful and frustrating than
complying with them. This slowed down project preparation because of rather weak institutional
capacity and the fact that most project personnel lacked experience working in Bank-financed
projects. Nevertheless, it was considered the right thing to do from a long-term perspective. It
avoided potentially endless discussions about which requirements would be subject to exceptions,
what the alternatives should be, and what would be the minimum justification needed to agree to
an exception. It also avoided the trap of creating false expectations. In addition, it was made clear
on various occasions that certified compliance with Bank procedures, as implied by nonqualified
external audit reports, would in itself be a major benefit because it would demonstrate that
indigenous peoples were fully capable of managing public funds. A series of nonqualified
external audit reports would establish a clean track record that would help indigenous peoples
maintain access to public funds in the long run.
Mobilizing Alliances
Second-Tier Indigenous Organizations
While the national-level indigenous organizations were legitimate representatives of the project's
intended beneficiary population, it was recognized that their particular strength was in the
political and public policy arena. Given the project's orientation toward generating direct benefits
for indigenous communities, it adopted a strategy of also working directly with second-tier
indigenous organizations. These organizations, in effect, are the members of the national-level
organizations. They usually are based in small urban or rural towns accessible to their
community-level member organizations. Since second-tier organizations have a closer
relationship with indigenous communities, they are in a better position to know local needs and
demands, are inclined to focus on providing services to their members rather than merely
representing them politically, and in general have a more pragmatic agenda.
This strategy of making the project known at the regional level, including the second-tier
organizations in project preparation, and aligning project design to their pragmatic agenda,
created a substantial "pull" effect of second-tier organizations speaking in favor of the project at
relevant meetings and forums. Because the credibility of the national indigenous organizations
depends to a large extent on effective linkages with their bases, the opinions of second-tier
organizations tend to be taken into account by national leaders. Reaching out to the second-tier
organizations therefore created a more deeply rooted and more solid base of support for the
project, and reduced the risk of facing politically motivated decisions by a few indigenous leaders
at the top.



14 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
International Fundfor Agricultural Development
Since the project was the first of its kind, the Bank recognized that it did not necessarily have
comparative advantage in all areas covered by the project. In this context, the International Fund
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) proved to be an appropriate cofinancing partner.
First, IFAD had two ongoing rural development projects-one in the province of Cafiar and
another in Saraguro-that already worked closely with indigenous organizations at the local and
regional level. Learning from IFAD's experience in those projects, whether positive or negative,
could benefit preparation of the Bank-supported project. Second, IFAD had a strong interest in
starting a rural development project targeting Afro-Ecuadorans in the coastal province of
Esmeraldas. Third, IFAD's experience in financing rural credit programs complemented the
Bank's experience in financing matching-grant funds. This enabled the project to establish an
integrated program of rural investments that could respond to a wide range of demands from
indigenous communities, including those with a public-good or a private-good nature. Fourth,
IFAD's more flexible stand on financing land purchases made an interesting complement to the
Bank's in-house possibilities, and widened the range of options for financing land regularization
and conflict resolution programs. Fifth, combining the Bank loan with lower-interest IFAD
resources offered a more attractive financial package, and lessened the chance that the
government would lose interest in the project even if macroeconomic conditions deteriorated. In
addition, bringing IFAD on board added its dialogue with the government to the factors ensuring
continued official support for the project.
Inter-American Foundation
Another attractive partner was the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), which was experienced in
financing and implementing small-scale initiatives in cooperation with Ecuadoran indigenous
organizations. The IAF had a long and successful history in this field, and had established a wide
reputation and excellent relations with the indigenous movement in Ecuador. The Bank project
provided a good opportunity to build on those experiences and successes, especially since at the
time the IAF was downscaling its programs due to cuts in U.S. bilateral aid. To benefit from their
experience, the IAF was enlisted to serve as a peer reviewer during project preparation.
This arrangement provided mutual benefits. First, it provided a vehicle for the IAF to increase the
scope of the model it had developed. Second, with the IAF as part of the team, the project had
unrestricted access to relevant information that was required to design some key aspects of the
project, particularly with respect to participatory planning and local capacity building. Third, by
associating the project with IAF's efforts and network, IAF officials became effective spokesmen
for the project and provided an excellent alternative channel of communication with indigenous
organizations. If indigenous organizations were in doubt about the Bank's intentions at some
point during the preparation process, they could express their doubts to the IAF officials who
they had known and worked with for a long time, and get a response they trusted from people
who were knowledgeable about the Bank's opinions and intentions.



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 15
Food and Agriculture Organization
During project preparation another alliance was established with the United Nations Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) to create a window of access, almost on a standby basis, to
technical expertise on the preparation and implementation of small-scale, demand-driven rural
investment subprojects. The arrangement allowed the project to tap into international experiences
in this field and to design this project component in line with best practice.
Hands-On Experience
While planning the project preparation process, it became clear that the indigenous organizations
did not have a strong interest in spending resources on design studies. They claimed that lots of
studies had been done in the past and that any additional investment in studies would not add
substantive value. They also made the point that ipast studies had generated high expectations
among the indigenous population, but that those expectations usually were not met. Therefore
they expected communities to be strongly skeptical, and reluctant to participate in such research
efforts.
Taking into account these reservations, it was agreed that a large number of preparatory activities
would be incorporated in the context of a pilot project. The objective of the pilot project was to
generate both input for the project design, and direct benefits for the indigenous communities
involved. Fourteen second-tier indigenous organizations agreed to prepare and start
implementing a demand-driven program of small-scale investments as part of a participatory
development plan elaborated by the organizations and their member communities. In this way,
indigenous communities benefited directly from the investments made under the pilot. Outputs of
the pilot that were incorporated in the project design included the participatory planning
methodology, priorities for local capacity building, and detailed formats and procedures guiding
the subproject cycle.
The pilot project had a number of benefits that were not explicitly anticipated. First, it provided
an opportunity for the Comite de Gestion and the Unidad Tecnica to obtain detailed hands-on
experience in procurement and disbursement issues. Second, it enabled the project to establish
concrete alliances with a number of second-tier indigenous organizations that consequently
became strong supporters and spokesmen for the project. Third, the pilot project's pragmatic
approach helped create a results-oriented culture in the project. Fourth, the programs
implemented by the 14 second-tier organizations were useful in training other second-tier
organizations once the main project was approved and moving toward full implementation.
Flexible Processing Schedule
Project planners recognized from the beginning that for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples
to participate effectively they needed time to make their own systems of consultation work.
Decisions taken by indigenous leaders usually had to be discussed and confirmed by their
organizational boards or even their general assemblies.6 As a result, project preparation took
6. In most indigenous organizations important decisions are taken by the general assembly of members
and often after they have reached a consensus. Majority rule is applied but on an exceptional basis.



16 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
almost three years (see Annex 1), which is longer than most Bank projects. This possibility was
explicitly discussed and accepted by Bank management at the project identification stage. The
bottom line was that things would be done right, and that as long as the project was moving
forward the exact time required for each step in the project cycle was not important. However,
the result is that high-quality participatory projects do not come cheap; total Bank-financed costs
over the entire preparation period were about $350,000 in this case.
The pilot project helped keep participants committed to this quality-first principle because the
preparation process resulted in some tangible benefits for the target population rather than just
generating paper and reports. Most importantly, adjusting the pace to the capacity of the
indigenous organizations-both in social terms (consultation and consensus building) and
technical terms-yielded enormous gains in establishing project ownership. While it is difficult
to quantify these gains, the relatively long preparation time definitely paid off by smoothing the
transition to implementation once the project was approved.
Continuity of Task Team
Although preparation took almost three years, the Bank task team never changed substantially.
This continuity paid off in several ways. First, given the sensitivity of the relationship between
the indigenous organizations and the government, especially in the early stages, the task team
played an important intermediary role that required a fair amount of trust that could only be built
up over time. Second, the various indigenous organizations in the Comiti del Decenio did not
necessarily have a common strategy, and on occasion pursued their own separate agendas.
Continuity allowed the task team to understand and appreciate these different agendas, and to
move project preparation forward while taking these agendas into account. Third, continuity
enabled the team to build a track record as an objective mediator that consistently proposed
solutions based on two basic principles: a) inclusiveness, or ensuring that the solution to a certain
problem allowed all stakeholders to continue to participate, and b) technical orientation, or
keeping political issues from interfering at the operational level.
4. ESSENTIAL PROJECT DESIGN FEATURES
This chapter presents essential design features for projects that seek to put into practice the vision
of ethnodevelopment. They include a) an objective beneficiary targeting mechanism, b) a focus
on mobilizing social capital, and c) inclusion of concrete cultural dimensions.
Objective Beneficiary Targeting Mechanism
One of the first challenges of the project was to identify the indigenous peoples and Afro-
Ecuadorans who were the intended beneficiaries. The two principal questions were a) whether the
mestizo population living in the same areas would be part of the project's target population, and
b) how to settle the politically contentious issue of defining who is indigenous. The largest
indigenous organization in Ecuador, CONAIE, claims that 40 percent of the country's population
is indigenous, while some census estimates put the figure at only 4 percent. The actual proportion
is probably somewhere between these two figures, but the question is where.



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 17
To tackle this issue an approach was adopted that combined quantitative methods and geographic
location with the notion of self-identification and community affiliation with second-tier
organizations. Census information on indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population at the parroquia
level was crossed with data on poverty (an index of u:nsatisfied basic needs), to obtain figures on
level of poverty by ethnicity. Additional information was gathered in the field, particularly self-
identification of communities as either indigenous or Aifro-Ecuadoran, and membership in a second-
tier indigenous organization. This information was then represented in an indigenous poverty map.
The quantitative analysis gave an idea of which parroquias had a majority indigenous and Afro-
Ecuadoran population and which ones had a significant minority presence of those groups. Once
the parroquias were known, second-tier indigenous organizations could be identified that were
operating in them. The project would then form an alliance with these organizations for
implementation purposes, and in so doing would accept the membership eligibility criteria of the
organization as the basis for targeting the intended beneficiary population in that particular
parroquia. Depending on these locally defined criteria, the project would include the mestizo
population to the extent that they are members of the second-tier organizations.
Through this analysis the project targeted about 815,000 people who were members of indigenous
and Afro-Ecuadoran communities in rural areas. Being identified as "indigenous" was based on
self-identification, membership in a specific indigenous community or grassroots organization, and
recognition as indigenous by other members of that sociocultural unit. Being considered "Afro-
Ecuadoran" was based on self-identification and membership in a black community.
The indigenous and black population of rural Ecuador is concentrated in 48 cantons, which
comprise 288 rural parroquias (230 indigenous and 58 black). This is 29 percent of the country's
total rural parroquias. However, in nearly all cases indigenous and black people live in areas
where there is also a mestizo population. In fact, only 150 parroquias have a majority indigenous
or black population (of which 111 are indigenous and 39 are black). In the remaining 138
parroquias the percentage of the indigenous and black population varies from 10 to 50 percent.
Thus there is ample opportunity to put the principle of interculturalism into practice.
There are about 180 second-tier organizations operating in the 288 parroquias included in the
project area. It is through these organizations (generally grouping contiguous communities) that
the project defines its annual operational plans and implements agreed activities.
The target population exhibits great cultural diversity, especially among indigenous peoples. The
most numerous of the indigenous people are the Quichua speakers (or Runa) in the Sierra. They
may be further subdivided by area of ethnic predorninance, including the Otavalo, Carangui,
Cayambi, and Quito in the northern region, and the Panzaleo, Puruha, Cafiari, Salasaca, and
Saraguro in the south-central region. The next largest group are the peoples of the Amazon
region, including the Shuar, Achuar, and Runa or Quichua speakers of the lowlands, and the
Huaorani, Cofan, and Siona-Secoya. In the coastal region are found the Awa, Embera, Tsachila,
and Chachi, and other peoples such as the Huancavilca, Manteho, and Puna who have lost their
language but retain strong indigenous cultural features. Afro-Ecuadorans live in both coastal and
highland areas, though there is not as much diversity between subgroups as there is between the
indigenous subgroups. (See Annex 3 for details and pcipulation sizes.)



18 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
Mobilizing Social Capital
Social exclusion, economic deprivation, and politicalmarginalization are sometimes perceived as
the predominant characteristics of Ecuador's indigenous peoples. But as they often remind
outsiders, indigenous peoples are also characterized by strong positive attributes, particularly
their high level of social capital. Besides language and their own sense of ethnic identity, the
distinctive features of indigenous peoples include solidarity and social unity (reflected in strong
social organizations), a well-defined geographical concentration and attachment to ancestral
lands, a rich cultural patrimony, and other customs and practices distinct from those of Ecuador's
national society, which bears a strong western influence. The project aims to mobilize this social
capital, based on these characteristics, as a platform forethnodevelopment. The main strategies to
establish this platform include a) self-management as a basic principle for project
implementation, b) local capacity building, and c) participatory planning to ensure that activities
are demand-driven.
Self-Management
Project beneficiaries and their organizations are empowered to manage the project at the strategic
level through the National Council for Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran Development
(CONPLADE-IN), an official government body that includes a representative from the
Presidency, and delegates from the main indigenous organizations. Indigenous and Afro-
Ecuadoran representatives on the council review and approve the project's Annual Operational
Plans, and discuss progress reports submitted by the Project Technical Unit.7
The Project Technical Unit is responsible for coordinating implementation of the Annual
Operational Plans approved by the National Council. The unit is headed by a three-person
management team: an executive director, a technical coordinator, and a financial-administrative
coordinator. The composition of the Project Technical Unit mirrors the project's design and areas
of operation. Hiring of Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran professionals is encouraged by having
the selection criteria include knowledge of indigenous languages and experience working with
indigenous or Afro-Ecuadoran organizations. This approach has worked well, creating a unit
staffed by qualified and culturally diverse professionals, including mestizos.
Because the project's success will largely be measured in terms of concrete results at the
community level, the vast majority of professionals in the Technical Unit work in regional
offices. This enables them to be closer to the second-tier indigenous organizations through which
most project activities are implemented. Over time, the project aims to work in close partnership
with about 180 of these indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran membership organizations. As a first
step second-tier organizations agree with their members communities a local development plan
that provides an overall perspective and tool to prioritize project activities in a particular area.
Once defined, they prepare and implement small-scale investments, not exceeding $90,000 per
subproject, that benefit their member communities. Second-tier organizations also provide input
in the elaboration of the Annual Operational Plan of the project in a particular region, thereby
further contributing to the demand-driven nature of the project. An additional benefit of operating
7. In December 1999 CONPLADE-IN was changed to the Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidadesy
Pueblos del Ecuador (CODENPE) to better reflect concepts agreed in Ecuador's new Constitution.



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 19
in a decentralized fashion in which most of the operational decisionmaking authority is shifted to
the regional level is that, once the Annual Operational Plan is approved, the project operates
relatively independently from the political arena. This relatively independent mode of operation
of the project is further enhanced by the fact that small-scale investments are financed with loan
funds and counterpart contributions from the communities only. Counterpart funds problems that
tend to be notorious in Ecuador therefore do not directly affect the project's investment program
in indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran communities.
Local Capacity Building
Despite the strong desire for self-management in order to take the process of development in their
own hands, not all second-tier organizations necessarily have the technical and financial
management capacity to assume their role as project implementing agents. In fact, there is a very
wide range in available institutional capacity in these organizations, with some of them having a
long history of providing services to their member cornmunities, while others even lack the basic
knowledge of managing their own finances. Recognizing this large variation in institutional
capacity, it became clear that the project could not use a blue-print approach to enter into
partnerships with these organizations as project implementing agents. A standard level of
supervision might be interpreted by one organization as the absolute minimum level of
operational support to effectively assume its responsibilities, while others might consider it as
excessive micro-management.
In order to tailor the relationship between second-tier organization and the project at a mutually
acceptable level, the project is investing heavily in the development of an index of social capital.8
This index combines indicators in the categories of management capacity, organizational culture,
human capital, and financial capital. Following criteria outlined in Annex 4 an index of social
capital is calculated. This index then determines the nature of partnership with the project in
terms of operational responsibilities and local capacity-building support activities. Three
categories of partnerships are distinguished. The first category includes second-tier organizations
that according to the social capital index have ample institutional capacity to be effective partners
on the full range of activities supported by the project. Most support provided by the project for
this type of organizations is demand-driven, while controls tend to be of an ex-post nature. In
case of noncompliance with the agreed rules of game the project can reassess its relationship with
a second-tier organization and base it on the rules of the game that apply to the second category.
This category includes organizations with limited institutional capacity. The project enters into
agreements with these organizations for the design ancl implementation of subprojects if there is a
willingness on their part to participate in training programs supported by the project. The project
also maintains a ceiling of $25,000 instead of the usual $90,000 for subprojects implemented by
organizations in this category. Project personnel maintain close relations with these organizations
to provide support on a regular basis. Controls exercised by the project tend to have a more ex-
ante nature. Once an organization has successfully implemented a number of subprojects, the
relationship can be redefined based on the rules of the game that apply to organizations that have
ample institutional capacity. The third category of second-tier organizations include those that
have no apparent institutional capacity whatsoever. The project enters into agreements with these
8. This work ties in with initiatives in this area launched by the Social Development Family of the
World Bank.



20 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
organizations if they associate themselves with an NGO in a formal alliance. The underlying idea
is that the NGO has a local presence and is in a position to provide support on an almost
continuous basis; something the project cannot do. Most of the capacity building efforts
supported by the project focus on the second category of organizations as described above.
Hence, by using the index as a tool to focus and tailor local capacity building activities it also
contributes to better cost effectiveness in this area.
Recognizing the critical nature of local capacity building to achieve genuine self-management,
the project supports a wide range of training activities. To increase the available pool of
indigenous professionals both in quantitative and qualitative terms in the long run, the project has
entered into agreements with universities and colleges that provide formal education at the high
school and college level to indigenous students supported by the project. Potential candidates for
project support are proposed by second-tier organizations and subsequently selected by the
project based on previous educational achievements. The project supports students in disciplines
that are particularly relevant for the modus operandi of the second-tier organizations, including
e.g. community development, anthropology, and communications. In addition to the formal
training programs, the project supports short courses for professionals who are actually working
in second-tier organizations. Courses include a wide range of topics with most of them closely
related to participatory planning, project administration and management, procurement, and
technical issues. Learning by doing is a key element of these courses and for this reason they are
organized in close relation with the program of small-scale investments financed by the project.
The project also offers a limited number of internships in its regional offices. These internships
provide an opportunity for young indigenous professionals to obtain a fair degree of exposure to
the operational aspects of the project's rural investment program that could be of use for their
work in the second-tier organizations the project is associated with.
Participatory Planning for Demand-Driven Focus
Recognizing self-management as a crucial element of ethnodevelopment implies that project
activities by definition should be demand-driven. The project relies on participatory planning as
an underlying process to obtain a genuine demand-driven focus of its activities. The process is
designed to facilitate community and grassroots organizations to be effective players in their own
development. More specifically, participatory planning as used in the context of the project:
a) contributes to the decentralization of decisionmaking, b) stimulates grassroots participation in
local planning and demand generation, c) helps rural communities formulate development
strategies and investment plans, and d) increases investment sustainability by intensifying
stakeholders' commitment in the execution and supervision of rural investments.
The participatory planning process used by the project draws heavily on the experience of the
Inter-American Foundation in Andean countries, particularly on its methodology for participatory
community planning. It also builds on the practical experiences in the Nicaraguan Rural
Municipalities Project, the Bolivian Rural Communities Development Project, and the GTZ's
Goal-Oriented Project Planning (GOPP). The methodology consists of the organization of
community and district workshops over the course of several weeks. At the workshops, project
field promoters and second-tier organizations help the communities to carry out a participatory
diagnostic and to formulate a development strategy, by applying methods of groups dynamics.
Workshop participants are community delegates, representatives from development



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 21
organizations, and interested individuals. After each workshop, time is allotted for the community
delegates to return and inform the community of the workshops proceedings, and receive
community feedback. As some communities decisions are taken by consensus, this process can
be lengthy.
In the project the participatory planning process is carried out in the area of influence of a
particular second-tier organization. The process includes six stages:
Preparatory phase. Staff of the Project Technical Unit explains the programs and procedures
detailed in the Operational Manual to the second-tier organization or NGO.
Promotion. Second-tier organizations or NGOs disseminate the project's purposes and
methodology and in particular: a) the eligibility criteria for subprojects, b) the processing steps
for eligible subprojects identified in their corresponding Local Development Plans, including
sample documentation and approximate times of processing, and c) execution and supervision
mechanisms.
Self-diagnostic. To help the communities better perceive their economic and social strengths and
weaknesses a self-diagnostic is conducted with a view to formulating achievable socioeconomic
goals. Participatory rural appraisal techniques-such as participatory mapping and seasonal
calendars-are used to assist the community in the identification of constraints, causes, and
solutions.
Preparation of a Local Development Plan (LDP). An LDP is a ranked list of subproject ideas
screened according to development strategy, requirements, technical feasibility, and funds
availability or potential suitability for funding (from this project or other sources).
Subproject formulation. Subprojects ideas are transformed into financiable proposals according
to an agreed fornat. This is the preinvestment stage of the subproject cycle that follows the
participatory planning process.
Concrete Cultural Dimensions
In an attempt to put the concept of development with identity into practice, the project also
incorporates a series of concrete activities designed to rescue and strengthen the rich cultural
patrimony of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples of Ecuador. They include the identification
and promotion of archeological and ritual sites, support for indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran
peoples festivities, the preparation of audiovisual documents with ethnographic materials,
contests to strengthen living heritage and traditions (including traditional arts, handicrafts,
cooking, games, etc.) events to discuss the topic of development with identity, intercultural fairs;
and publications of works produced by indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran authors. The project
collaborates with governmental organizations such as the National Institute of Cultural
Patrimony, the Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, key lprovincial and municipal governments as
well as NGOs and the private sector to implement its cultural agenda.
As far as the project's support to the handicraft and tourism sectors is concerned, the activities
are subject to an agreed strategy that consists of the following elements. First, diagnostic



22 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
activities financed by the project aim to come up with a clear idea through what products,
services, or activities a particular indigenous group identifies itself with most. Second,
concourses financed by the project are tools to get a concrete handle on what exactly the quality
standards are that are underlying the identified products and services. Third, intercultural fairs
and other events sponsored by the project are thought to be spaces where products and services
can be displayed and promoted in order to increase recognition and awareness of indigenous
heritage and traditions. Fourth, products and services thus identified and that meet agreed quality
standards could be registered and protected through a particular trademark, protected label, or
certificate of origin. This would provide greater transparency in those markets where indigenous
communities and their organizations are offering handicraft products and tourist services. At the
same time, the information provided about the products and services, including the underlying
quality standards and the role they play in indigenous cultures, in themselves add value that could
benefit indigenous communities and organizations in these markets.
The project also includes features that aim to sustain and strengthen indigenous and Afro-
Ecuadoran cultures in a more indirect manner. As part of the institutional strengthening efforts
that are geared toward the Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo de Nacionalidades y Pueblos
(CODENPE), the project supports a team of professionals which, among other, review and assess
the potential impact of new legislation on the indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran population and
propose changes in case of expected adverse impacts. As part of the land tenure regularization
efforts supported by the project, an attempt is made to clarify the concept of ancestral rights in
more concrete terms with the aim to improve land ownership of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran
communities in forestry and protected areas. Finally, in the rural investments program supported
by the project, the criteria for matching grant financing of community infrastructure takes into
account indigenous notions of communal and private property rather than relying on definitions
from outsiders. For instance, the project finances capital investments for indigenous community
enterprises on a matching grant basis. These enterprises are owned by indigenous communities
and they invest part of their profits in social infrastructure, e.g. schools and health clinics.
5. CONCLUSION
What makes indigenous peoples development projects different from other World Bank
operations? What are their main characteristics? This paper has described how one project team
applied the concept of ethnodevelopment or development with cultural identity in an operational
context, and the lessons we learned from this process.
The project is unique because it is the Bank's first stand-alone operation that exclusively targets
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadoran peoples, and also because of its highly participatory nature-
from inception, through preparation, and into the implementation phase. But the operation's most
unique feature is its approach of strengthening the project by building on the positive qualities of
indigenous cultures and societies, such as their sense of ethnic identity, cultural values, solidarity
and social cohesion, close attachment to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital,
and other resources to attain shared goals.
The many lessons learned in the course of preparing the operation fall into three main categories:
important conditions at entry, key factors in project preparation, and specific design features.



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 23
While all the lessons are important, we believe that the design features are the most critical for
other operations of this kind. To successfully incorporate culture in development, projects must
formulate adequate and objective targeting mechanisms, include concrete cultural dimensions,
and apply resources to poverty alleviation in a way that recognizes the tremendous capacity of
many indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities to mobilize social capital.






Annex 1. Timeline of Key Events
1992         Formation of the Coordinadora Agraria by the six national indigenous
organizations with the objective to defend their interests in the preparation of the
new Ley de Desarrollo Agrario.
1993         UN Declaration of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People.
1994         Formation of the Comite del Decenio by the six national indigenous organizations.
May 1994    Creation of the National Secretariat of Indigenous and Ethnic Minorities (Secretaria
Nacional de Asuntos Indigenas y Minori,s Etnicas, SENAIME). Presidential
Decree No. 1679, April 22, 1994. First contacts made with the World Bank.
Sep. 1994    Distribution of draft Poverty Assessment quantifying the marginal position of
indigenous peoples in Ecuador.
Nov. 1994    Meetings between SENAIME and the WAorld Bank to explore the possibility of an
Indigenous Development Project. Aide-Mremoire of November 21, 1994; email
dated November 28, 1994.
Dec. 1994    Request from the Ministry of Finance to the World Bank for the financing of a
project for the specific benefit of Ecuador's indigenous population. Letter No. 6528,
dated December 9, 1994.
Jan. 1995    Response from the World Bank to the Ministry of Finance indicating the importance
of the issue and its interest to analyze the request through an identification mission.
Letter dated January 19, 1995.
Feb. 1995    Informal discussion in the Bank about Initial Project Concept Summary on February
3, 1995. Agreement that "project concept and design must be originated by project's
potential beneficiaries" and that project preparation should start immediately. A set
of principles is adopted that guide the design of the project (email dated February 6).
Identification mission in Ecuador from February 21-25 to prepare a government-
civil society workshop that lays the groundwork for project preparation
arrangements. Efforts started to put in place a project preparation facility (PPF).
March 1995   PPF advance of $350,000 and Japanese Grant of $520,000 prepared on March 10
and March 27, respectively. Initial Project Concept Meeting held on March 28 that
gives the green light to "prepare a project with specific focus on indigenous peoples
development and would aim for close collaboration with GOE and other
stakeholders from the very beginning of project preparation" (Minutes of IPC
Meeting, March 31).
25



26  LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
April 1995    PPF approved on April 7. Secretary of SENAIME visits the Bank on April 12. Draft
project preparation plan elaborated. Initial Project Brief distributed among
stakeholders in Ecuador. It proposes a project that focuses on institutional
strengthening of indigenous organizations, support to the implementation of
subprojects that benefit indigenous communities and improving land property rights.
May 1995    Identification mission discusses Initial Project Brief with a wide range of
stakeholders from May 2-12. Indigenous organizations indicate the need to study
the proposals in more detail. Agreement with SENAIME to set up a project
coordination committee with representation of indigenous organizations and to
establish a technical unit to implement activities at the operational level. It is
decided that the project will also focus on Ecuador's Afro Ecuadoran population.
Aide Memoire, May 12, 1995. The International Fund for Agricultural
Development is invited to join project preparation as acofinancing partner given its
involvement in two rural development projects (Cafiar and Zaraguro). Letter dated
May 22, 1995.
June 1995    CONAIE, the largest indigenous organization in Ecuador, writes that it wants to
develop a project directly with the Bank, without involvement of the Government of
Ecuador through SENAIME. The organization in principle agrees with the proposed
focus on project activities, but stresses that indigenous organizations should be in
charge. Letter dated June 1, 1995. Japanese Grant in the amount of $520,000
approved; memo dated June 30, 1995.
July 1995    Further discussions with indigenous organizations about the project concept during
a mission from July 2-6, 1995. Agreements reached are confirmed in a letter from
the Bank to all indigenous organizations (July 17, 1995). The letter also proposes
detailed rules of the game for the functioning of a joint government-indigenous
project coordination committee (Comite de Gesti6n) after the Bank makes it clear
that because of its statutes has to work through the Governnent. Indigenous
organizations subsequently accept this explanation why a direct relationship with the
Bank without Government involvement is not feasible.
Aug. 1995    TORs are elaborated for a series of design studies based on the agreed initial project
design during a mission from August 28-31. These studies include: a) land and
water rights, b) inventory of ongoing projects to obtain lessons learned, c)
beneficiary assessment; and d) rural enterprises. Aide Memoire dated August 31,
1995. Mr. Duchicela, Secretario Ejecutivo of SENAIME leaves and is succeeded by
Mrs. Graciela Ortega.
Sep. 1995    National indigenous organizations organized in the Comitt Nacional del Decenio
respond to the letter of July 17 sent by the Bank. Letter dated September 20, 1995.
They officially agree to participate in the project through the proposedComite de
Gesti6n. However, instead of equal government-indigenous representation they
propose three indigenous delegates, one of the Government and one of the Bank.
The letter sent by the indigenous organizations signifies "a landmark decision



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 27
because indigenous organizations in Ecuador have usually taken a confrontational
posture against the government and have also been very critical of the World Bank
and other indigenous organizations in the past" (Bank internal memorandum,
September 28, 1995).
Oct. 1995    In a letter to the Comite del Decenio (October 23), the Bank indicates the
importance of a joint government-indigenous decisionmaking process in the Comite
de Gesti6n in order to facilitate ownership of all parties involved. With the Japanese
Grant available, the Bank also proposes to launch a pilot project that will allow the
Comite de Gesti6n to take charge of the project preparation process; it also responds
to doubts raised by the indigenous organizations to use project preparation funds for
studies only. The Bank receives a copy of the PPF Agreement Letter, countersigned
by the Minister of Finance, on October 30, 1995. It signifies that for the first time in
history, Ecuador is willing to borrow money that will exclusively benefit its
indigenous and Afro Ecuadoran population.
Nov. 1995    First joint Bank-IFAD preparation mission in Ecuador from October 30 to
November 10. Official agreement to establish a joint government-indigenous
project preparation committee, Comite de Gesti6n, consisting of three government
and three indigenous representatives. Letter of Comite Nacional del Decenio signed
on November 7, 1995. The Comrit de Gesti6n would appoint a Technical Unit that
would be responsible for project preparaLtion at the operational level. Hence, there is
a clear separation of political aspects (Comite de Gesti6n) and technical aspects of
project preparation (Unidad Te&cnica). TORs of studies further clarified; new study
about indigenous policy is added to the four already agreed previously. Japanese
Grant Agreement signed by Government of Ecuador on November 15, 1995. By
now, the key elements for project preparation have fallen into place: there is
agreement about: a) an institutional structure that allows for joint government-
indigenous decisionmaking, b) an initial project design that takes into account
feedback from a wide range of stakeholders, c) a project preparation plan consisting
of studies and a pilot project, and d) a PPF and a Japanese Grant, totaling $850,000,
to finance project preparation. The challenge now is to successfully implement what
has been agreed.
Dec. 1995-   Indigenous organizations are divided who should represent them in the Comite de
Feb. 1996    Gesti6n and who should be appointed as the Director Ejecutivo of the Unidad
Tecnica. Proposals for a new Ley de Aguas, that call for a considerable degree of
privatization, are complicating matters in the sense that indigenous organizations
invest considerable time and efforts in the ongoing debate about this issue. With the
focus of project preparation moving to the implementation of activities at the
operational level, SENAIME's weak institutional capacity is also clearly exposed at
this stage of the project preparation process. The president of FENOC-IN, the
second largest indigenous organization, assumes the rotating presidency of the
Comite Nacional del Decenio after the president of CONAIE held this position for
one year. The new president turns out to be an effective player in fostering
consensus among indigenous organizations on project-related matters. The Bank
organizes an intemal review meeting on January 17, 1996 in which the proposed



28 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper Vo. 6
project design is endorsed. Two decisions are important: a) the project will be an
investrnent rather than a technical assistance operation, allowing indigenous
organizations to take the process of development fully in their own hands, and b)
given the complexity of the issue, the project will stay away from structural changes
in the legal and institutional framework related to land and water rights, but would
respond to support mechanism for local land and water rights conflict resolution.
Bank internal memorandum dated January 26, 1996.
March-       Another joint Bank-IFAD preparation mission visits Ecuador from March 18 to
April 1996    April 3. In meetings with the indigenous organizations, the mission stresses the
importance that the members of the C'otnitei de Gesti6n and the Director Ejecutivo of
the Technical Unit are finally appointed. SENAIME invites proposals for the
implementation of studies based on the agreed TORs. The selection process to hire
other professionals in the Technical Unit is also initiated at this point. Finally, it is
agreed that the pilot project would focus on participatory planning activities,
preparation of subprojects and institutional strengthening activities of second-tier
indigenous organizations (organizaciones de segundo grado, OSGs). Aide Memoire,
April 1, 1996. As a result of the mission, the ComitN acional del Decenio informs
the Bank in a letter on April 12, 1996 that there is agreement among the indigenous
organizations about the persons who will represent them on the Comrit de Gesti6n
and who will be the Director Ejecutivo of the Technical Unit. Because of its long
involvement and experience in workinig with indigenous peoples in Ecuador, the
Inter-American Foundation (IAF) is asked to accompany project preparation as a
peer reviewer. Letter dated April 15, 1996.
May-July    The Comite de Gestion is officially formed following aResoluci6n Administrativa
1996         of SENAIME published in the Registro Oficial on July 3, 1996. The discussion
starts focusing under what rules it should operate, who will be the President, and
where its office would be. The Bank steps in with another mission from June 3-11 to
facilitate discussions among all parties involved. An agreement is negotiated and
signed on June 11. It is agreed that: a) there will be a separate project office to allow
for some independence from SENAIME, b) the presidency of the Comitei de Gestion
will be done on a rotating basis, c) decisions will be taken by consensus, d) steps
already taken in the selection process of executing agencies for the implementation
of project design studies will be respected, and e) theDirectorEjecutivo will get an
authorized signature for withdrawal applications for the PPF and Japanese Grant.
Subsequently, personnel in the Uni(lad Thcnica are appointed. Once appointed, the
question arises what the exact division of responsibilities between theComite de
Gesti6n and the Unidad Tecnica should be in order to ensure a clear separation
between political and technical issues. Executing agencies to implement studies are
identified and selected. In the light of upcoming election, Mrs. Graciela Ortega
resigns as Secretario Ejecutivo of SENAIME; Mr. Oscar Salazar takes over for a
brief period until the new Government is formed.
Aug. 1996    The Bucaram Administration takes office. Mr. Mariano Morocho becomes the new
Secretario Ejecutivo of SENAIME. A mission is in Ecuador from August 26-30 to
clarify internal working relationships between the Comite de Gesti6n and the



Defining Ethniodevelopment in Operational Terms 29
Unidad Tecnica. A code of conduct is agreed as well (Aide Memoire August 30,
1996). Arrangements are made to contract OSGs for the implementation of the pilot
project. The FAO is brought on board to provide technical assistance in the
implementation of the pilot project and subsequently provides input in the detailed
design of the rural investments component. The Comite de Gesti6n and the Unidad
Tecnica elaborate a detailed work plan covering project preparation aspects. It is
agreed that a project design workshop would be organized with all relevant
stakeholders in November in which the results of the studies would be presented.
Sep.-Dec.    The institutional framework is complicated by the fact that theBucaram
1996         Administration decides to establish a Ministry for Ethnic Development that coexists
beside SENAIME. At this stage, the indigenous representatives are clearly
committed to the Comite de Gestion; however the participation from the
Government is erratic. The indigenous organizations in a memorandum signed on
October 10, 1996, demand full participation from the Government in theComiti de
Gesti6n following the structure that was published in theRegistro Oficial of July 3.
A full-fledged preparation mission is in the field from November 19 to December 5.
Results of the studies are presented in a workshop with about 70 representatives
from indigenous organizations. Based on the results of these studies and following
the feedback from the workshop, a detailed project design is agreed that indicates
for each component objectives, activities, institutional arrangements, dimension, and
procedures. The project will have four components, including: a) land and water
regularization, b) institutional strengthening of indigenous and black organizations,
c) rural investments through matching grants and credit, and d) institutional
strengthening of SENAIME. Aide-Memoire signed on December 4, 1996.
Jan.-March   Pilot project launched after a long bidding process. Design studies are finalized
1997        following feedback received during the November 1996 workshop. The institutional
framework is consolidated with the creation of the National Council for Indigenous
and Afro Ecuadoran Development (Consejo Nacional de Planificaci6n y Desarrollo
Indigena y Negro, CONPLADE-fN) on March 17, 1997 after the Bucaram
Government is ousted from power. Mrs. Nina Pacari, formerly from CONAIE, is
appointed as the new Secretario Ejecutivo of CONPLADE-IN. The institutional
structure of CONPLADE-IN, with a joint government-indigenous Consejo
Surperior, reflects institutional arrangernents under which the Comite de Gesti6n
has been operating.
April-June    A joint Bank-IFAD mission visits Ecuador from April 14-25 to agree on a detailed
1997         project design. A second project design workshop is held to validate the detailed
design with representatives of about 80 indigenous organizations. Based on an
indigenous poverty map, the target population of the project is defined, consisting of
about 815,000 peoples in 288 parroquia.s. Aide Memoire signed April 25, 1997. A
second PPF of $1.1 million is put in place to finalize project preparation and kick off
some project activities, particularly the implementation of some subprojects
prepared under the pilot project. Letter dated June 11, 1997. Project Appraisal
Document is written.



30 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 6
July-Aug.    Project Appraisal Document distributed on July 8 and discussed on July 21. The
1997         PAD Discussion/Decision Meeting endorses the project design, but stresses the need
to more explicitly incorporate a cultural dimension. A joint Bank-IFAD mission
appraises the project from August 4-28. Indigenous organizations are invited to
present written feedback on a detailed project description that is distributed among
them prior to the arrival of the appraisal mission in Ecuador. During the mission, a
cultural heritage subcomponent that includes financing of concourses, cultural
events, videos, book publishing etc. is added to the project. Detailed cost tables are
finalized as well, indicating a total budget of $50 million of which $25 million is
financed by the World Bank, $15 million by IFAD, and $10 million by the
Government and beneficiaries. The mission also agrees detailed TORs and selection
procedures for project personnel to be hired after Loan approval. Finally, conditions
for negotiations are agreed, including: the preparation of draft operational manuals,
draft interinstitutional arrangements for land regularization activities, draft
interinstitutional arrangements concerning formal training activities, and
presentation of final project monitoring indicators. AideMemoire signed August 28.
Sep.-Nov.    Ongoing work in Ecuador to meet conditions for negotiations. At the Bank,
1997         preparation of legal documents and obtaining green lights to clear the way for
negotiations. Negotiations are held from November 10-14, 1997. Negotiations
include the IFAD cofinancing portion. Minutes issued on November 19. Mr. Arturo
Le6n represents CONPLADE-IN as acting Secretario Ejecutivo. The Quality
Assessment Group of the Bank reviews the project design and issues a satisfactory
rating.
Dec. 1997-   Finalization of project documentation for Board presentation. Board approves Loan
Jan. 1998    on January 29, 1998 after full discussion.
Feb.-June    With the preparation of the project finalized, the Comite de Gesti6n is discontinued,
1998         its role being taking over by the Consejo Superior of CONPLADE-IN. The project
management team is hired after the TORs and selection procedures are once again
discussed and agreed with all parties involved during a mission from February 2-10.
Aide Memoire is signed on February 10. The project management team
subsequently hires project personnel for the Quito office and two regional offices
(Ibarra and Riobamba) that are set up immediately and financed with PPF resources.
An initial Operational Plan for 1998 is agreed as well. During this period
considerable efforts are made to meet all the formal requirements for loan signing.
Loan is finally signed on June 12, 1998.
July-Sep.    Elections in Ecuador divert attention from project implementation. After having
1998         gone through several drafts, operational manuals are finalized in order to comply
with the loan effectiveness conditions. Operational Manual is published in the
Registro Oficial dated September 4, 1998. Project becomes effective on September
11, 1998. Implementation agreement between World Bank and IFAD finalized.



Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms 31
Oct.-Dec.    After loan effectiveness, project personnel are hired in three additional regional
1998         offices. The project is launched on November 10-1l with the participation of all
160 OSGs involved in the project. During the launch mission, an Annual
Operational Plan for 1999 is agreed. Aide: Memoire signed November 13. Following
constitutional changes that put more emphasis on the concept ofnacionalidades and
pueblos, the Government, after pressure from CONAIE, changes the orientation of
CONPLADE-IN by creating the Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y
Pueblos del Ecuador (CODENPE) on December 11, 1998 following Presidential
Decree No. 386. Mr. Luis Maldonado replaced Mr. Arturo Leon and becomes the
first Secretario Ejecutivo of CODENPE.



Annex 2. Project Institutional Structure
during Preparation Process
1             Indigenous and
Secretariat for                                                    Afro-Ecuadoran
Indigenous Affairs and                  World Bank                      Organizations
Ethnic Minorities                                                    organized in the
Comnit del Decenio
/ ~~Committee\
/(Comnit de Gesti6n)\
3 representatives of indigenous
and Afro-Ecuadoran
orgaDizations;
3 representatives of the
G overnrnent of Ecuador       /
Executive Coordinator
Project Tec=hnical UIJt: 
Executive Coordinator
Professional Staff
Private Sector Executing                        P\ublic Sector Agencies
Agencies
32



Annex 3. Target l'opulation
Ethnicity or
Nationality      Region               Subgroup or location    Population
Afro-Ecuadoran    Costa and Sierra    Eloy Alfaro               23,256
San Lorenzo               9,067
Esmeraldas               86,653
Chota-Mira               22,793
Runa             Amazonia             Sucumbios                  8,463
Napo                     25,470
Pastaza                  15,866
Sierra (North)      Otavalo-Carangue          63,726
Cayambe-Quito            51,289
Sierra (Center-South)   Cotopaxi              72,476
Tungurahua               62,984
Chimborazo              148,715
Bolivar                  35,086
Caniar-Azuay             62,447
Saraguro                 11,936
Shuar            Amazonia             Upano                     19,412
Transcutucu              11,011
Zamora                    3,740
Huao, Siona,     Amazonia                                        3,221
Secoya, Cofan
Huancavilcas,    Costa Seca                                     65,997
Mantefios, Punaes
Chachi, Epera,   Costa (North)                                   9,892
Tsichilas, Awa
TOTAL       813,500
33



Annex 4. Social Capital Index Criteria
I POINTS
Accomplished                                   5
More than 5 years        I
Juridical Personality       In process             Between 1-5 years        2
Judicial                                                                Less than I year        3
Framework                                        Not yet initiated                              0
Status       Directives    Accomplished on time (complied w/Statute)        5
Executed    Reformed    Overdue, accomplished but missed deadline           3
Remain unchanged (as of 1993)                  0
Accounting System           Computerized                 Yes                5
Daily Bookkeeping        3
3 accounts (savings,      5
Financial                                        checking & insurance)
Management (Banking)                                  checking)             3
1 account            2
Organizational         5
Structure in Second Tier
Organization (including
board of directors, local
representatives)
Methodology                                      Basic Organizational       3
Implementation                                        Structure
Organizational         3
Structure Dependent on
NGO or other
organization
Lacking Organizational     0
Management                                                                 Structure
Capacity            Project Experience           Number of                 3 or more            5
Projects                 Less than 3           3
Excellent (9 figures or   5
greater)
Cash Flow Management                             Very good (8 figures)      4
Good (7 figures)        3
Average             2
Unsatisfactory         1
Contributions               Contributions        Contributions in kind,     5
by Partners                  in kind,           collective labor and cash
collectiv  labo Contributions in kind   4
collective labor     and collective labor
and cash               Collective labor        3
In kind             2
Cash               1
34



A Conceptual Frameworkfor Violence Reduction 35
POINTS
Technical Specialists                                    In-house             5
In- house and External    3
External Only         1
None              0
Professional Accounts                                   One account           3
None              0
Accounting                                             More than one          3
Human Capital   Assistants                                                          1               2
None              0
Administrative                                          More than 1           3
Support Staff                                                1                2
None              0
Community                                               More than 1           5
Contact                                                      1                3
None              0
Goods (inventory,   Vehicles,                           High (whole           5
status cost)          Machinery,                       package, 100%)
Office space,                   Medium high (at         4
land                               least 75%)      ____
Average (at least      3
50 %)
Low (25% and          2
below)
None (0 %)           0
Office Equipment   Typewriters,                         High (100%)           5
(inventory, status,   Computers,                       Average (75%)          4
cost)                 Desks, fax
machines and                  Low (50% and below)       3
other                                 0%                0
Telephone,                        High (100%)           5
Communication         Radio station, frequency,       Average (-75%)          4
Financial             Tools                 sound equipment,              Low (50% and below)       3
Capital                                     amplifiers/ speakers                   0%               0
Potable water,                  Excellent (100%)        5
Basic Services        Sewerage systemn,              Very good (-75%)         4
electricity                      Good (-50%)            3
None              0
Own Enterprise         5
Sources of Funds                                       Other Partner          5
Organizations
None              0



36 LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 2
POINTS|
Public Relations             NGO's Third Tier    High (3 or more)         5
With other                   Organizations,           Average (2)         3
Organizations                Other                      Low (1)           1
_                     ~~~~      ~      ~~~~None  0
Types of partner             Legal, technical,         High (all)         5
Initiatives with NGO's       capacity-building,       Average (2-3)       1
credit or other           Low (1)            2
field of expertise          None             0
Organizational  Number of                                                  65 or more          5
Culture             Affiliated First Tier                                     46-64            4
Organizations                                            31-45            3
21-30            2
1-20            1
Services offered by          Legal, credit,          Excellent (all)      5
the organizations to         education, health       Very good (1)        4
members                      and management             Good (3)          3
expertise                 Low (1-2)          2
None             0
Participation by the                                  Participation       5
partners in decision-                                 and feedback
making process                                        Participation       3
makmg________________________________________   _ prcesonly
Education level of                                 Specialized training,  5
management personnel                                 college or more
(President, Vice-President,                           High- School        3
Secretary)                                         Elementary School      I









LCR Sustainable Development Working Papers
For back issues contact:
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector Management Unit (LCSES)
Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office
The World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
U.S.A.
Tel. (202) 473-9379
Fax. (202) 676-9373
E-mail: pbrandriss@worldbank.org
No.                       Title                      Date                Author
1   Environmental Guidelines for Social Funds   December 1998   Douglas J. Graham
Kenneth M. Green
Karla McEvoy
2   A Conceptual Framework for Violence Reduction   August 1999  Caroline Moser
(available in Spanish)                                      Elizabeth Shrader
3   Youth Violence in Latin America and the     August 1999      Caroline Moser
Caribbean: Costs, Causes, and Interventions                 Bernice van Bronkhorst
4   Youth Gangs and Violence in Latin America   August 1999      Dennis Rodgers
and the Caribbean: A Literature Survey
5   Violence and Social Capital: Proceedings of the    August 1999  Caroline Moser
LCSES Seminar Series, 1997-98                               Sarah Lister
6   Defining Ethnodevelopment in Operational Terms: January 2000  Martien van Nieuwkoop
Lessons from the Ecuador Indigenous and                     Jorge E. Uquillas
Afro-Ecuadoran Peoples Development Project