MOMBASA COUNTY
CRIME AND VIOLENCE RAPID ASSESSMENT
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Foreword

A rapid assessment was carried out in Mombasa County, Kenya in June 2017 under the Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT) project of the Kenya Accountable Devolution Program. KADP is funded by governments of Denmark, European Union, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.

The assessment explored the dynamics of crime and violence, risk and protective factors, and potential for their prevention. The research sought to inform the CVPT, a month-long course that has been held annually in Kenya since 2011 as a collaborative project between United States International University-Africa and the Kenya School of Government, and recently joined by the National Crime Research Centre. During its first five years, the project was sponsored by Open Society Initiative East Africa as part of its Crime and Violence Prevention Initiative in the region, and it is now sponsored by the World Bank through KADP. Coffey International has also been a funding partner. The project has evolved over time to equip a wide range of relevant actors at the county level in response to Kenya’s devolved government structure since 2013. County assessments now precede training courses to contextualize the training curriculum and provide common ground for discussion and learning.
Acknowledgements

This report was written by Kennedy Mkutu, Elizabeth Otieno, Victoria Gioto, Gerard Wandera, Obondo Kajumbi, and Sabine Palmreuther. We are grateful for the support for this project from the World Bank and to all informants from the various sectors of national and county government, security, civil society, businesses, and communities who assisted in providing the information in this document. It is evident that many are committed to building their county for the future and creating a safer and healthier society for all Kenyans. Thank you to those who assisted the research in Mombasa, Mrs. Riziki Mwakusirikwa of Sauti ya Wamama; Bishop Obuya, formerly from the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics; and doctoral candidate John Githiongo.

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Acronyms

ACLED  Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
AMISOM  African Union Mission in Somalia
CICC  Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics
CPA  County Policing Authority
CVPT  Crime and Violence Prevention Training
MUHARI  Muslims for Human Rights
NGO  nongovernmental organization
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
WHO  World Health Organization
1. Introduction

Across the globe, high rates of crime and violence are undermining growth, threatening human welfare, and impeding social development, with the poor and vulnerable particularly affected. One in five people worldwide has been the victim of violence or crime (UN-Habitat 2013).

The term *crime* means different things to different people. As Haskell and Yablonsky (1983) point out, to members of the legal profession, a crime is an illegal act, but some social scientists equate the term with any behavior injurious to society (Haskell and Yablonsky 1983). Crime refers to behavior, either by act or omission, defined by statutory or common law, that is deserving of punishment.

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as:

> “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation.”

There are various classifications of crime and violence. Crimes can be classified based on the potential penalty, such as felonies and misdemeanors, or based on subject matter, such as crimes against persons or property.

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1. For more on definitions and typologies of violence, see www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en.
Violence can be classified based on its agents, such as gangs, youths, or collective groups; victims, such as women, children, or minority groups; the relationship between aggressor and victim, such as interpersonal or unrelated; perceived causality, such as psychopathological, situational, or learned; and type of harm, such as physical, psychological, or sexual.2

Root causes of crime and violence include rapid urbanization, persistent poverty and inequality, social exclusion, and postconflict cultures. Urban residents, the poor, and those living in marginalized neighborhoods must cope with particularly high levels of crime and violence. Many African countries are growing increasingly concerned with soaring levels of crime and violence, which take a variety of forms, including youth violence; gender-based violence; and generally high rates of criminal victimization by robbery, assault, and theft (World Bank 2009).

The costs associated with crime and violence are significant. Direct costs can include the immediate destruction of public infrastructure as well as ongoing physical and mental health care. Indirect costs can include productivity losses, population displacement, and overall welfare (World Bank 2009). Social multiplier effects portend far-reaching ramifications for crime and violence, measuring the impact of an erosion of social assets, an intergenerational transfer of violence, a reduction in the quality of life, and a decrease in the public’s confidence in the government and its institutions.

A preventive approach to crime and violence has been gaining increasing international recognition, as demonstrated in recent years by its enactment in violence prevention laws and its promotion as part of an efficient and effective response to the ravages of crime and violence. As the WHO, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the United Nations Development Programme assert:

“Crime prevention strategies not only prevent crime and victimization, but also promote community safety and contribute to sustainable development of countries. Effective, responsible crime prevention enhances the quality of life of all citizens. It has long-term benefits in terms of reducing the costs associated with the formal criminal justice system, as well as other social costs that result from crime.” (WHO, UNODC, and UNDP 2014)

Crime and violence prevention efforts involve taking a detailed look at both risk and protective factors. Based on a growing evidence base, the WHO and its partners have identified seven key strategies to help to prevent crime and violence:

1. Develop safe, stable, and nurturing relationships between children and their parents and/or caregivers;
2. Develop the life skills of children and adolescents;
3. Reduce the availability and harmful use of alcohol;
4. Reduce access to guns and knives;
5. Promote gender equality to prevent violence against women;
6. Change cultural and social norms that support violence;

Promote victim identification, care, and support programs (WHO, UNODC, and UNDP)

2. For more on definitions and typologies of violence, see www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/definition/en.
Holtmann (2011) describes this process as “building protective social layers,” which contributes to resilience against both victimization and offending behaviors. It is a multifaceted endeavor calling for extensive planning and strategizing. Successful prevention techniques target the underlying causes of violent behavior: spatial environments, family structures, and education. Referring to South Africa, Holtmann argues, “We can only expect safety when we take collective responsibility for rebuilding our social system to mitigate the ravages of the social engineering of the past” (Holtmann 2011). Such an argument could apply to much of the African continent. The often-cited root causes of crime and violence include rapid urbanization, persistent poverty and inequality, political violence, post-conflict cultures, the more organized nature of crime, and the emergence of illegal drug use and drug trafficking—all of which may require national strategies to combat (World Bank 2003).

Multiple agencies must be involved in crime and violence prevention efforts, which if well-coordinated, could contribute a variety of perspectives, resources, and skills to utilize as efficiently, cost-effectively, and sustainably as possible. Partners for such efforts can be from many different sectors. Efforts would involve national and local levels of government, which have different mandates and areas of expertise; as well as nonstate actors, particularly civil society groups and traditional authorities, to ensure local ownership at every stage—a key aspect of any successful approach. The media, with its powerful positive and negative potential to foster changes in attitudes and to disseminate information, plays an important role in a multiagency approach. Private sector players have an interest in the issue and can participate in prevention efforts, such as with the growing use of public-private partnerships for the provision of services and by reducing opportunities for crime through situational crime prevention programs and environmental design. Lastly, academia and research institutions can direct and support crime prevention initiatives through valid research and publication of findings.

Crime and Violence Prevention in Kenya

The Kenyan government often adopts a traditional approach to law enforcement and criminal justice in addressing the country’s crime and violence problem. Official and public discourse around crime and violence call for more aggressive policing and stiffer penalties against perpetrators (Reisman and Ruteere 2010). The government has responded to threats of crime and violence by establishing new police units and elite squads with more firepower, such as an antiterrorism police unit to address the terrorism issue, and by enacting laws to enhance the punishment of perpetrators of violent crime, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012) and the Security Amendment Act (2014). Forceful disarmament operations have been carried out in cattle rustling areas but with little impact, except to harden resistance and strengthen the illegal supply chain of arms (Muhereza, Wairagu, and Kimani 2011). Such approaches fail to consider the underlying causes of crime and violence in society. They also fail to deal with hidden crime and violence, such as household violence—which leads to societal breakdown and hence to an increase in crime. The lack of available quantitative and qualitative data due to limited police capacity, security, and access (Hills 2009) presents a key challenge.

There has been little public debate or policy discourse about the prevention of crime and violence. Community policing has received
some attention in Kenya over the past two decades, but benefits were never felt, partly due to a poor understanding of the concept, a lack of real partnership with communities, and a persistently repressive police culture (Ruteere and Pomerolle 2003). Therefore, Kenya urgently needs to develop alternative thinking and practices to replace repressive policing and must move its focus from securitization toward safety.

Crime and Violence Prevention Training

In 2011, through its Crime and Violence Prevention Initiative, and in collaboration with United States International University-Africa and Kenya School of Government, the Open Society Institute East Africa sponsored the Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT), convening representatives from government, civil society, and academia to learn about crime prevention in Kenya. The training sought to:

• Promote policy and public discourse on crime and violence prevention and safety in Kenya;

• Explore strategies, tools, and methods of crime and violence prevention in Kenya;

• Facilitate the emergence of a multisector group of public, private, and civil society actors engaged in crime and violence prevention in Kenya; and

• Equip stakeholders of crime and violence prevention with adequate skills to conceptualize, design, implement, and monitor crime and violence prevention programs and interventions at the national and county level.

Subsequent trainings built on the aims and successes of the first, widening the audience and expanding the curriculum. In response to the devolution of many functions to county governments in 2013 (according to Kenya’s 2010 constitution), CVPT has been brought to the county level, training county-level actors and entering into dialogue with participants about county-specific challenges. The ongoing training aims to continue the momentum in terms of building the capacity of people and promoting discourse around crime prevention and fostering an integrated approach to the issue.

The training has been a success in multiple ways. First, given the mounting evidence of the effectiveness of prevention strategies, an important next step would be to intensify and expand violence prevention awareness among decision makers (WHO 2010), which is exactly what CVPT does. Second, CVPT workshop sessions enhances the capacity of nonstate and state actors to design, implement, and manage effective sustainable crime and violence reduction programs. Third, while security management has traditionally remained a preserve of the state and its machineries, and a relationship of mistrust, fear, and suspicion has existed between members of civil society and Kenya’s law enforcement agencies, CVPT promotes understanding and partnerships between the actors.

County-Level Crime and Violence Prevention

Under the 2010 constitution’s new dispensation, Kenya now has 47 county governments, each with its respective county governor. (see figure 1.1). The 2010 constitution restructured
Figure 1.1. Kenya’s New System of Devolved Government

existing security institutions, for example, the former Kenya Police Service became the National Police Service, and created new institutions, including the National Intelligence Service and the Kenya Defence Forces. The Provincial Administration, which comprised provincial commissioners and various administrative tiers down to chiefs at the ground level and which had previously coordinated security at the local level was restructured and renamed the National Government Administration Office. County commissioner positions were created to oversee county-level coordination of security their role as chair of their respective county security committee (see figure 1.2).

In addition to the restructuring of security functions, devolution has the potential to influence security in other ways. Abdille and Abdi (2016) note that the devolution of funds for county development has frequently led to political and ethnic competition—and even conflict—at the county level as new majorities and minorities seek to control and benefit from the funding. At the same time, large-scale national and regional infrastructural development projects have raised the stakes for political power and brought the well-recognized dynamics of land conflict and other adverse social and environmental impacts. Development and urbanization bring benefits as well as risks, including new forms of crime and violence.
County governors are responsible for controlling drugs and pornography, firefighting and disaster management, transport, control of public nuisances, trade development and regulation, early childhood education and health, and overall county planning and development. While conventional “security” provisions, such as police and intelligence, remain under the purview of the national government, overseen by county commissioners, the role of the county government is nonetheless vital to managing issues that have a bearing on security, including employment, development, and planning. Governors thus have the opportunity to improve their county’s security over the medium to long term, and possibly even over the short term. One area of potential conflict, however, is that the national police has to enforce county laws (Burbidge 2017), which it may be unwilling to do if the county law is at odds with a national one.

Furthermore, echoing the constitutional requirement for increased participation by communities regarding decisions that affect them, the National Police Service Act of 2011, establishes a County Policing Authority (CPA) for each county, headed by the respective county governor and comprising 13 representatives of county-, national-, and local-, and community-level security interests, including 6 laypersons. CPAs are responsible for monitoring trends and patterns of crime; developing proposals on the priorities, objectives, and targets for police performance; monitoring progress and achievements; overseeing and promoting community policing initiatives; facilitating public participation; and providing financial oversight over the budget for policing. Regular briefings by the CPA are intended to inform the county security committee, which is responsible for day-to-day security management and police deployment. However, guidelines to operationalize CPAs have not yet been created, which has slowed the implementation of this vital structure for crime and violence prevention.

Some governors have pushed to assume a greater role in policing, arguing that such responsibilities should be devolved. They cite the essential part they play in mitigating intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic, and communal conflicts, as well as the need for security provision to better

Figure 1.2. County-Level Security Actors
fit with local development plans. These governors also contend that, despite the hundreds of lives being lost, the national government has left them side-lined with regard to security issues (Mosuku 2015). Opposing views include concerns that localized control of security could allow governors to use security forces to manipulate political events and interethnic tensions to their advantage.

Framework for Analysis

In analyzing the dynamics that drive crime and violence in Mombasa and that shape local prevention capacity, this work draws on the socio-ecological framework that has been widely used in crime and violence research and literature (Dahlberg and Krug 2002; Moon, Patton, and Rao 2010; Moore et al. 2014; Cramer and Kapusta 2017) (see figure 1.3). The framework helps to identify risk and protective factors whose complex interplay influences the likelihood of involvement in crime and violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2006). In so doing, it also suggests avenues for intervention.

Social cohesion, internal ties, and community identity are critical to crime prevention at the community level, and community organizations play a crucial role in promoting them (figure 1.4). This approach draws from social disorganization theory, which identifies particular characteristics of a community that shape opportunities for crime and for prevention (Bursik 1988; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). Dense internal ties, interpersonal trust, and shared expectations allow community members to trigger shared norms through social controls. Norris et al. (2008) notes that communities have used dense internal ties to prevent crime from taking root.

Communities can directly contribute to the prevention of crime and violence in multiple ways. Past assessments conducted in other countries demonstrate that it is common to

Figure 1.3. The Socioecological Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Risk factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Age, education, and income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History of abuse or substance misuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Parenting and family relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experiences of conflict in the home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak community cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Economic and social inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Societal norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urbanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exposure to drugs and weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Dahlberg and Krug 2002.
find several community-based organizations working on different issues relevant to crime and violence prevention with no coordination of efforts and sometimes in competition with one another. While these organizations might be doing good work, they often lack the capacity and resources to sustain their efforts or to expand into new areas. Strengthening and integrating community groups is therefore a crucial strategy.

Criminological research in North America and Europe shows that crime tends to be concentrated in geographic “hot spots” (Groff, Weisburd, and Yang 2010). The “routine theory” examines how patterns of individual behavior lead to the salience of hot spots where perpetrators cluster, such as malls, movie theaters, specific streets, and public spaces (Cohen and Felson 1979). Related to this is situational crime prevention literature, which focuses on the physical environment that affects the cost and benefit of perpetrating crime by facilitating surveillance or deterring criminal acts (Clarke 2008). This theory is currently being applied in Kenya. In Mombasa and Nairobi, the police are making use of closed-circuit television cameras to combat crime and violence and are implementing an integrated command control and communication system in urban areas. The use of surveillance through what is called Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) looks for changes in the physical environment that might reduce the opportunity for crime, such as street lighting (Cozens and Love 2017).

Lastly, the work considers violence in a broad sense, that is, not only manifest physical violence but also structural violence as identified by Galtung (1969), whose work extends violence to include psychological hurt and, in turn, alienation, repression, and deprivation (Galtung 1991). According to Rylko-Bauer and Farmer (2017), who define structural violence simply as “the violence of injustice and inequity” structures include pervasive “cultural and political-economic structures such as caste, patriarchy, slavery, apartheid, colonialism, and neoliberalism, as well as poverty and discrimination by race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and migrant/refugee status.”
Structural violence not only leads to victimization but also perpetuates and reproduces violence through the marginalization of people and communities (Winter and Leighton 2001). Several studies have applied the concept of structural violence to explain the link between social problems, including crime and violence associated with poverty and social suffering (Dahlberg and Krug 2002; Mukherjee 2007; Peña 2011).

In urban contexts, deprivation as inequality is the most common form of structural violence, resulting in the reactionary violence that is prevalent in Kenya. Such deprivation includes income disparities and lack of access to basic social services; the absence of universal state security protection; the severe corruption, inefficiency, and brutality that generally hits the poor the hardest; and the lack of social cohesion. These living conditions heighten the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime, and violence (Vanderschueren 1996). Rylko-Bauer and Farmer (2017) note that a structural violence framework provides a holistic approach to identifying the root causes of crime and violence by focusing on historical forces as well as social, economic, and political processes that shape risk and local reality, which is critical to developing effective approaches to counter crime and violence.

Goals of the Rapid Assessment

Since the training moved to the county level, crime and violence assessments have been carried out in preparation for the training. Such assessments assist in the tailoring of the curriculum to the specific challenges of the county, provide common ground for discussion among participants, and help identify participants from whom the training might be a useful investment. Drawing from the theory on crime and violence prevention, questions addressed by the assessment include:

- What are the main challenges in the county regarding crime and violence?
- What risk factors—drivers and enabling factors—as well as protective factors are visible?
- Who are the players in terms of managing crime and violence, and what are their capacities?
- What kinds of prevention activities and partnerships are already in place?

The assessments also provide a useful reference for participants to use in their work as well as a starting point for further data collection, the importance of which has been noted. Mombasa County is an important focus given its high population and high rates of gang-related crime, and it is an ideal choice for training in urban crime and violence prevention.

Methodology

The rapid assessment relies on desk-based research and five days of fieldwork by the team in each county. It is a rapid assessment consisting of quantitative and qualitative information as well as primary and secondary data, triangulated to enhance reliability. Primary data were collected using questionnaires, interviews, and focus group discussions, using purposive sampling, convenience sampling, and snowball sampling with all tiers of society, including key security actors, civil society workers, and local community members. The assessment’s general approach is to prearrange focus group discussions with chiefs and ward administrators, as well as interviews with key informants, to gain an overall view of the county and to explore specific issues in greater detail. Snowball sampling is then
employed to follow important leads. Focus group discussions with community members, including women and youth, ensure that local voices are heard. Secondary data was sourced from civil society and donor reports, academic papers, official records, and reports by national and county governments, including the health and education departments (see list of references). The assessment assumes that many incidences of crime and violence are never reported to the police due to low police presence; the existence of alternative justice mechanisms; stigma; and lack of access to and mistrust of the police and the judiciary due to past experiences of harassment, corruption, and long delays. Therefore, in addition to police data, other sources of information are needed to gain a fuller picture of crime and violence in the county.

Purposive sampling of informants took place during: (1) 10 scheduled focus group discussions with women; youth; transport operators; elders; members of civil society, peace groups, and interfaith groups; chiefs; and administrators; and (2) 29 individual in-depth interviews, with some interviewees reached through a snowballing process. Areas visited included four of Mombasa’s six subcounties (see table 1.1). To triangulate and complement qualitative findings, a questionnaire exploring perceptions of crime and its management was completed by 80 respondents representing a range of sectors (see figure 1.5) and areas of the city.3

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3. Male and female respondents were equally represented in the sample. Over 50 percent of respondents had completed a secondary or higher level of education, uncharacteristic of Kenya as a whole but reflective of the particular sectors from where most respondents came.

**Figure 1.5. Sectors Represented by Questionnaire Respondents in Mombasa County**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of respondents by sector.

Source: Mombasa County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment.**
## Table 1.1. Overview of Fieldwork in Mombasa County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Fieldwork</th>
<th>Subcounty/Ward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mvita/Old Town</td>
<td>Mvita/Ziwa la Ng’ombe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-depth interviews with key informants</td>
<td>Police commandant; county commissioner; regional commissioner; officer for International Organization for Migration; officer for MUHURI; university lecturer; police officer; business community-based organization chair; boda boda association chair; county secretary; land, planning and housing officer; immigration officer; medical officer; Kenya Ports Authority; county security advisor; county director of education; officer in department of health; Tuk-Tuk Association chairman; superintendent in county inspectorate; officer in department of trade; officer in department of early childhood development (education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions or group interviews</td>
<td>Chiefs from various constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionnaires administered</td>
<td>80 respondents from a variety of constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary data obtained at source</td>
<td>Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Tour of Police Command Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Boda boda = motorcycle taxi; MUHURI = Muslims for Human Rights; NGO = nongovernmental organization.
Limitations included budgetary constraints, insufficient time to visit every constituency, and insufficient time to conduct a community victimization assessment. The problem of illiteracy was overcome by offering to help people complete the assessment verbally. In the given time, the information gained was maximized by the use of key informant interviews and focus groups discussions with respondents who were thought to have a broad or specific understanding of the dynamics and impacts of crime and violence. Further, some of the respondents came from outside of the constituency from which they were sampled. The authors were able to gain access to security and administration personnel by virtue of their governmental connections (KSG and NCRC being governmental agencies).
2. Background: Crime and Violence Trends in Kenya

Kenya has experienced an increased incidence of crime and violence in the recent past, greatly affecting its growth and development. The nature and extent of the problem varies according to setting—urban or rural—and the prevailing conditions of a particular area. The Crime and Safety Report identifies road safety and crime as the greatest threats to security in Kenya (OSAC 2017). It further identifies car-jacking, burglaries, and home invasions as the most serious crimes in Kenya. Police data for 2016 reveals that, by far, the highest number of reported crimes are in the assault category, followed by stealing, house break-ins and burglary, other offenses, and offenses against morality (mainly defilement).

The crime mapping survey conducted in 2016 by the National Crime Research Centre identifies the top 10 most commonly mentioned crimes: stealing, possession of illicit alcohol, assault, house break-ins and burglary, murder, rape, robbery, stock theft, defilement, and drunk and disorderly behavior (NCRC 2016). However, because it was not a victimization survey as such, certain crimes, such as gender-based violence and violence against children are probably underreported. Importantly, there is a great variation among counties in the incidence of crimes such as stock theft and associated violence, smuggling, and female genital mutilation (FGM).
High-profile and troubling incidences of crime and violence in Kenya include large-scale terrorist attacks as well as persistent smaller-scale attacks in the country’s northern counties; gang killings and other gang crimes; political violence, such as the postelection violence of 2007–08; and police violence against citizens. On a day-to-day basis, however, serious incidents of crime and violence are normalized or repeatedly suffered because the victims are not in a position to report them. Incidents include corruption, gender-based violence, violence against children, and crimes or violence resulting from or flourishing due to a poor police presence and ineffective criminal justice mechanisms. This chapter provides useful contextual information on some of the issues raised by this rapid assessment, which are not limited to the participating subcounties.

Boda-Boda-Related Crime and Violence

There are an estimated 500,000 motorcycle taxis (boda bodas) on Kenyan roads (Omondi 2015). They play a major part in enhancing access to rural areas and unplanned urban settlements where road networks are poor. The boda boda subsector is a key contributor to business development and to the economy (Omondi 2015), and it is a crucial contributor to youth employment in Kenya. However, in addition to such benefits, boda bodas are renowned for their risks, particularly of road traffic accidents and severe injuries (NTSA 2014). Several factors may contribute to this problem, such as careless driving, poor training, lack of protective gear and reflectors; traffic congestion; poor urban and highway planning, including lack of pavements and lights; the use of alcohol; speeding to maximize customer base, and poor condition of vehicles. In addition, the motorbikes (and parts) are not always genuine. While laws cover age (over 18) licensing, and protective gear (helmet and reflective clothing), enforcement is generally poor and bribery common. Importantly, scholars point out that Africa’s road safety record is a function of larger structural inequalities and problems in transport planning and development that fail to protect the most vulnerable (Khayesi and Peden 2005; Lamont 2010). New mega projects in the country threaten to dispossess rural people from their land and increase the number of poor and underage youths attempting to make a living driving a boda boda (Mkutu and Mkutu 2019). The boda boda sector is also an important context for crime, with operators being both victims and perpetrators or accomplices. Operators are also frequently mobilized for political campaigns and can become actors in political violence.

Alcohol and Drug Abuse

Alcohol consumption has been identified as a public health concern in Kenya (Ndetei et al. 2016). According to a survey conducted by the National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse in 2012, alcohol is the most frequently abused substance in the country and poses the greatest harm to Kenyans (NACADA 2012).

The most common traditional alcoholic brews, such as the chang’aa spirit and the milder busaa beer, is widespread among poor families due the easy availability of needed ingredients, including maize, sorghum, and sugar (NACADA 2012; Kinoti, Jason, and Harper 2011). Legal instruments include the
Alcoholic Drinks Control Act 2010, which permits the production and consumption of chang’aa as long as certain rules are adhered to: that the drink is manufactured, packed, sold, and distributed in glass bottles of a capacity of not less than 250 milliliters and is not sold to anyone under the age 18 (Muturi 2014). However, the effectiveness of the law has been questioned (Opiyo and Omanga 2010). The restrictions imposed on the manufacture and consumption of traditional brews, such as chang’aa, may indirectly provide a ready market for second-generation alcohol: alcoholic drinks made by mixing neutral spirit—food grade ethanol, water and, flavoring (Otieno 2015). These drinks, which are simple to produce, inexpensive, and easy to access, are popular among many drinkers with low income levels. However, sometimes these spirits are adulterated with toxic substances, which has led to the deaths of hundreds of people and the permanent loss of vision among many survivors (Kihuria 2014).

Alcohol abuse is well recognized as a cause of crime and violence, including murder, rape, and domestic violence. Media reports have highlighted extreme incidents of women mutilating or even killing their alcohol-abusing husbands. Children are consuming alcohol and engaging in risky sexual behavior and impulsive crimes such as arson.

Closely connected to the problem of alcohol consumption is the issue of drug abuse. Commonly abused drugs in Kenya include tobacco (not illicit), bhang, miraa, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine (“meth”), and MDMA (“ecstasy”) (Kahuthia-Gathu et al. 2013). Bhang is the most easily available illicit drug in Kenya and its recreational use has about a 1.2 percent prevalence, while that of cocaine is 0.1 percent (NACADA 2012). Bhang is sourced from the Cannabis Sativa plant and can either be smoked or consumed as a beverage. Rates of use are high among Kenyan urban youth, who usually smoke it, although new modes of consumption are emerging, including the lacing of confectioneries such as cakes, cookies, and sweets (NACADA 2015).

Miraa refers to the leaves and young shoots of the Catha Edulis flowering shrub, which is native to East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. It is a mild stimulant with a slight euphoric effect that has been widely used as a recreational drug by the indigenous people of East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Middle East since the 13th century (NDIC 2008). Muguka is a slightly stronger variety of the same drug. The Ministry of Health in Kenya recently classified miraa as being dangerous to human health, contradicting the move by the Kenyan government to petition the United Nations to remove it from the international list of psychoactive drugs, which would allow its export (Gathura 2017). Despite the health and socioeconomic impacts, production, sale, and consumption of these substances remain unregulated in Kenya (Michuki and Kivuva 2013; Carrier 2008). A study focusing on the five counties of Kwale, Isiolo, Marsabit, and Kitui found that current usage of khat is 54 percent. Apart from the health issues associated with its use, from a socioeconomic point of view, consumption of khat results in idleness, irresponsibility, crime, wastage of household resources, and addiction (Michuki and Kivuva 2013).

Drugs can have severe community-level repercussions, particularly in low-income urban areas. They are integral to many forms of local-level violence, including gang warfare (controlling the drug market), robbery and assault (when money for drugs is scarce), the murder
of drug addicts by social cleansing groups and constant (often violent) quarrels in the home. Winton (2004) notes,

“At their most extreme, drug groups can dominate the institutional structure of entire communities, with the drug trade creating a structure so embedded in some communities as to become normal … In addition, the problem of drugs, if unchecked, results in imposing its own system of justice and social norms which are linked to the erosion of institutions and emergency of alternatives.”

Drug factions can become a recognized sociopolitical force at the local level (Dowdney 2003). However, this has less to do with the power of the drug factions and more to do with the absence of state-provided services, providing an opportunity to drug groups to fill the gap (Leeds 1996).

“...The existence of drug lords in communities is often made legitimate through a complex but mutually beneficial relationship. The drug lord is given anonymity and freedom to carry out business, and the community in return receives internal security and other services.” (Winton 2004)

Therefore, simply strengthening state institutions may weaken the power of the illicit groups that are fueling the drug problem.

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Gender-based violence, mostly against women, is common in Kenya, but it is under-reported and normalized. Importantly, some cultural traditions in Kenya legitimize physical and sexual violence within marriage, although this is becoming less prevalent due with increased education and economic status (KNBS 2014a). The 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KNBS 2014a) finds that almost half of women and men (45 and 44 percent, respectively) aged 15 to 49 have experienced some form of physical violence since age 15. Interestingly, while the main perpetrators against women are husbands; men are more likely to suffer at the hands of their parents, teachers, or others. Sexual violence has affected a smaller number of people overall, but women are more vulnerable than men (14.1 versus 5.9 percent). The most likely perpetrator for either men or women is their current or former spouse. Women are more often affected by physical or sexual spousal violence than men (39 percent versus 9 percent respectively, of those currently or previously married).

Violence against Children

In terms of violence against children, a survey commissioned by the World Health Organization finds that around 31 percent of girls and 18 percent of boys in Kenya have been victims of sexual violence (including unwanted sexual touching, forced sex, and attempted forced sex or sex under pressure). With regard to forced sex, this was claimed by 7.1 percent of girls and 1.4 percent of boys. In most cases, the perpetrator was a boyfriend or girlfriend, sometimes a neighbor, and less often a family member; in one third of cases, the perpetrator was at least 10 years older than the victim (UNICEF and GOK 2012). Although the 2006 Sexual Offences Act created tighter laws against defilement and sexual assault, implementation remains weak.

5. Defilement is the legal term for sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 18, subject to punishment of life imprisonment if the child is 11 years old or younger.
There are physical, psychological, and social implications for victims of sexual violence, including potential unintended pregnancies, pregnancy complications, unsafe abortions, gynecological disorders, complex pain syndromes, chronic pelvic pain, HIV, and other infections, (WHO, UNODC, and UNDP 2014: 14–16) anxiety, depression, stigma, and poor performance at school. Importantly, economic, educational, and social barriers impede most women from accessing timely help after experiencing sexual violence. And because it is usually not feasible to collect forensic evidence within 24 hours after an incident, as required, most cases never reach the formal justice system, instead being handled out of court by traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, if at all (FIDA Kenya 2013).

Radicalization and Recruitment into Violent Extremism

Kenya has experienced horrifying and high-profile terrorist attacks on the public in recent years, and it continues to suffer ongoing incidents against police posts and the public near its border with Somalia. Al-Shabaab has taken responsibility for most such attacks (Nzes 2014). Especially since losing territory in Somalia after the offensive by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2012, efforts to recruit and build local support within Kenya through its affiliate Al-Hijra, have been persistent and successful (Anderson and McKnight 2014; Nzes 2014). A 2011 United Nations report roughly estimates that there are 200 to 500 Kenyan fighters, mostly Muslim youth who have joined Al-Shabaab’s campaign against AMISOM forces in Somalia or who have taken part in terrorist attacks within Kenya (UN Security Council 2011: 140–44). A later estimate put the figure at around 2,000 Kenyan fighters—roughly one quarter of Al-Shabaab’s 7,000–9,000 forces (Burridge 2014). In 2014, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims estimated that around 700 “returnees” (mostly between the ages of 18 and 45) were living in Kenya, having returned from Somalia where they had trained and fought with Al-Shabaab (SUPKEM, IOM, and GOK 2015).

Radicalization can be understood as the propensity to carry out acts of violence in the name of a political cause; recruitment can be usefully considered in terms of “enlistment,” whether voluntary or forced to some extent; importantly, one can occur without the other (Borum 2011). Push and pull factors are often used to conceptualize radicalization or recruitment (Hassan 2012). Push factors relate to perceived benefits of joining an extremist organization. The United States Agency for International Development also usefully refers to enabling factors—contextual elements that allow such activities to take place (USAID 2009).

Mlula, Ruszkiewicz, and Shirley (2015) list commonly identified factors related to a rise in violent extremism in Kenya, including: the spillover of Salafi ideology, fighters, and resources from Al-Shabaab’s occupation of Somalia; external actors who have exploited this instability; a burgeoning Muslim youth population; socioeconomic disparities; and lack of political representation.

Western governments often speak of the importance of combatting poverty to undermine radicalization, but this view is controversial; literature from many countries does not appear to support such an approach (Kessels
and Nemr 2016; Piazza 2011), although Kfir (2008) notes that East Africa has not been examined sufficiently. In a study by Botha and Abdile (2014), 27 percent of 88 former Al-Shabaab combatants in Somalia identify “economic reasons” as the primary push factor for their recruitment; 39 percent cite economic reasons as the “catalyst” to their joining. Several other scholars echo the observation that people join because they are offered money or a salary (Amble and Hitchens 2014; Bradbury and Kleinman 2010). Organizations that support terrorism may also provide essential services and assistance (von Hippel 2004; Kfir 2008). Further, inequality—rather than poverty per se—may lead to alienation and frustration, which recruiters can then exploit (Piazza 2011). A large study carried out in Kenya by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2017) finds that economic factors represent a source of frustration for youths, making them vulnerable to narratives that inviting them to channel their grievances into acts of violent extremism.

The influence of low educational levels on recruitment and radicalization is also a controversial topic, partly because some terrorist organizations deliberately favor the educated as prospective recruits (Bueno de Mesquite 2005), although this does not appear to be the case with Al-Shabaab, which represents the majority of Kenyan recruits (SUPKEM, IOM, and GOK 2015).

In addition, the UNDP study identifies a lack of parenting and an unhappy childhood as common threads in the stories of youths who had been radicalized (UNDP 2017). It further examines the role that religion plays, determining that, for the most part, it is used by recruiters to frame other grievances. Recruits, it found, generally have low levels of understanding of religious texts but still feel that their religion is “under threat.” Mlula, Ruszkiewicz, and Shirley (2015) point to the growing influence of extremist forms of Islam in the country funded through external sources, however non-Muslims are also being recruited (Mkutu, Marani, and Ruteere 2014).

Importantly, 71 percent of respondents in the UNDP study say that government actions “tipped” them into recruitment. Botha (2014) and Van Metre (2016) among others, argue that stigmatization, harassment, and marginalization by the Kenyan state and security forces contribute to recruitment efforts. As a result, efforts to combat terrorism often have the opposite of the intended effect.

Returnees are youths who have returned back to Kenya after training or fighting with Al-Shabaab in Somalia; many live in Kenya’s coastal area. Some are disillusioned by promised pay that never materialized; some returned out of fear or because of the weakness of or conflict within Al-Shabaab; and some returned intending to carry out violent extremist activities in Kenya. The phenomenon of foreign fighters returning home from Syria and other parts of the world has become a major issue (Barrett 2016; De Bie, de Poot, and van der Leun 2015). These returnees, having witnessed extreme violence, have become hardened and have acquired skills in the use of weapons and explosives as well as networks with jihadists (Byman 2015). In addition, the policies of home and host states are crucial to the reintegration of foreign fighters (Malet 2015).

7. Interview with county commissioner, Isiolo, May 9, 2017.
3. Rapid Assessment of Mombasa County

Overview of County

Mombasa County is a small urban and semi-urban region on Kenya’s coast with a vital regional port. It is also the country’s second largest city, after Nairobi. Mombasa boasts magnificent coral beaches and is home to significant historical sites, making it a hub for local and international tourism. Its main economic sectors are tourism, industry, transport, water sports, and fishing. Its population density is high at an estimated 1.2 million people per 230 square kilometers.8 Geographically, the county is divided by two creeks, Port Reitz and Port Tudor, creating an island on which the Old Town, among other developments, is located. The Likoni Ferry connects the island with the southern part of the county, and bridges connect the island to its north and west. Mombasa County comprises six sub-counties (table 3.1).

Mombasa was once a vibrant trading center for glass, brass, copper, iron, and rhino horn, with established trade routes to China, Persia, and India. The area was originally inhabited largely by the Bantu Mijikenda people, but it has successively been colonized successively and to varying extents by Persians, Arabs, Portuguese, and British peoples. Under Arab rule, there was a slave trade and a plantation industry serviced by enslaved people. Portuguese invaders occupied Mombasa beginning in 1593; they built Fort

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8. Based on projections from the 2009 census and a growth rate of 3.5 percent per year.
Jesus in 1598 and held the port for the next 100 years. In 1888, the British gained control of the coastal area, leasing the coastal strip from the Sultan of Zanzibar. It was arguably then ceded to a newly independent Kenya in 1963, a matter of fierce debate that forms the basis for secessionist claims by the Mombasa Republican Council.

Cross-Cutting Drivers of Crime and Violence

Mombasa’s history, culture, and current challenges tend to reflect those of the entire former Coast Province, including the counties of Lamu, Kilifi, and Kwale.9 Repeatedly mentioned cross-cutting drivers of crime and violence in these areas include historical marginalization of coastal area; land issues, particularly the lack of secure land tenure for indigenous coastal peoples; cultural and religious tensions; low educational standards; and the breakdown of the family.

Land and Marginalization

Kenya’s coastal area includes the largest concentration of landless indigenous peoples in the country (GOK 2009). Under historic Arab rule, many indigenous people worked on plantations. Under British rule, inequalities were reinforced: 9,000 titles were issued to former plantation owners and other elites, while the indigenous Mijikenda people were expected to make up the working class (Zelezer 1989). The area has otherwise been neglected. Since independence, amid opportunistic acquisition of choice plots of coastal land by elites, some land adjudication and allocation for locals has taken place, but the process has been fraught (Ipsos 2013). Those given titles sometimes then sold them “for peanuts” (Ipsos 2013), only to later discover that the land was very profitable and beautiful.10 A great deal of land still belongs to absentee landlords living outside Kenya who have retained major political interest and influence (GOK 2009). Indigenous coastal people therefore rely on informal and customary agreements; some are squatters vulnerable to eviction and who have no security for loans. These factors lead to poverty and inequality, which then feeds into patterns of crime and violence.

Table 3.1. Mombasa’s Subcounties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcounty</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Wards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mvita</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>Mji wa Kale/Makadara, Tudor, Tononoka, Ganjoni/Shimanzi, and Majengo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisauni</td>
<td>106.1</td>
<td>Mjambere, Junda, Bamburi, Mwakirunge, Mtopanga, Magogoni, and Shanzu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyali</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>Ziwa la Ng’ombe, Frere Town, Mkomani, Kongowea, and Kadzandani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likoni</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>Mtongwe, Shika Adabu, Bofu, Likoni, and Timbwani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changamwe</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>Port Reitz, Kipevu, Airport, Changamwe, and Chaani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jomvu</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>Jomvu Kuu, Miritini, and Mikindani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>229.9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MC 2013.

km² = square kilometers.

9. The former Coast Province consisted of what is now the counties of Lamu, Kilifi, Mombasa, and Kwale. Kenya’s 2013 constitution which created 47 counties from seven provinces.

10. Interview with CEO of a beach hotel, Mombasa, June 9, 2017.
Members of groups such as the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) note that the land question on the coast is a major focus of political rhetoric, serving as a “trump card” in political campaigns but rarely being addressed after the election is over. The issue of expiring leases is especially complex. Land-related concerns have led to several uprisings, including Kaya Bombo in 1997, Mulung’unipa in 2007–08, and the rise of the Mombasa Republican Council (Mkutu and Opondo 2019). Frustrations over land also play into radicalization narratives.

The recently completed (standard gauge) railway from Nairobi to Mombasa (popularly known as the SGR) threatened to increase Mombasa’s marginalization when, in September 2019, the cabinet secretary for infrastructure directed that all port cargo be transported by rail to Nairobi and on to Naivasha where a dry port is planned. This was met with strong protests over the loss of thousands of jobs in clearing and forwarding agencies, fuels and lubricants, and transport sectors, together with innumerable others in related informal industries and an anticipated shrinkage of Mombasa’s economy by over 16 percent (Ahmed and Cece 2019; Dolan 2019). In response to the protests, the directive was suspended in early October (Njagih and Chepkwony 2019).

Family Issues

Many people consulted for this study spoke of early marriage and the twin problems of polygamy and divorce, men are allowed to marry up to 4 wives, and divorce is relatively easy under local religious laws. Many women are therefore left with the burden of rearing children alone while they also try to work or run a business on a full-time basis. In neighboring Kwale, women claim that they cannot easily remarry due to barriers obtaining divorce papers, such as the lack of an identification card. Children are often left un supervised and vulnerable to unhealthy influences during their spare time; many drop out of school early, leaving them with few prospects. These children are then more likely to become very young parents, take drugs and consume alcohol, or even join a gang or radical group. One bishop observed that fathers are largely absent from their children lives, leaving the parenting role to mothers who, it was noted, cannot possibly manage to discipline their children singlehandedly.

Poverty and Unemployment

According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, in 2009, the poverty rate in Mombasa was around 38 percent, and the unemployment rate was about 15 percent (KNBS 2009), although that probably does not account for those involved in informal, nonsalaried work. The labor migration rate is high in rural areas among the working age population (ages 15 to 64), as well as among many noncoastal peoples. The narrative of wabara (up-country people) and wapani (coastal people) was common in the discussion on employment as key state jobs are skewed against locals and as outsiders are often hired for skilled and semiskilled jobs. The most common salaried industries include family businesses, port operations, transport, and tourism (MC 2015b; KNBS 2016).

The causes of poverty and unemployment are many. Mombasa County’s integrated development plan highlights issues such as landlessness; the high cost of living; a dearth of skills, education, and training; lack of access

to credit; the prevalence of HIV/AIDS; gender discrimination; and poor resource management (MC 2013). The coastal tourist industry has been particularly hard hit by insecurity and by travel advisories that recommend avoiding Kenya. A hotel manager explains: “People have been losing jobs and people are hungry. There is a lot of joblessness and hence insecurity.”

Large unplanned settlements in the city exist and are growing in places such as Kisauni, Bangladesh, Magogo, Likoni, Longo, and Bamburi. Living conditions are poor, with residents highly vulnerable to crime and violence (MC 2013).

According to Sharkey, Beisbris, and Friedman (2016), the relationship of poverty to crime and violence is complex and not directly causal. Importantly, they note that the most useful analysis is not at the level of personal characteristics but instead the context in which a person lives. Poor-quality environments increase opportunities for crime and violence and fail to protect young people from undesirable influences. Factors include overcrowding, poor lighting, lack of secure physical barriers, and a low level of state presence, which leads to groups such as gangs providing services and security. They add, however, that crimes by wealthy people may be underrepresented and inadequately researched because they are usually committed behind closed doors rather than on the street. The relationship between unemployment and crime is more direct. It is often based on the need to provide for one’s family, and being unemployed also deprives people of the social bonds that might have prevented them from committing crimes (Sharkey, Beisbris, and Friedman 2016).

Education and Health

Historically, the coastal area has suffered from educational marginalization. This was partly caused by the fact that “Christian” education often led by missionaries was unacceptable to the largely Muslim population. Investments in and quality of education remain low today, recruitment rates are poor, and school dropout rates are high due to poverty and cultural factors. According to the county’s integrated development plan for 2013–17, literacy levels are around 86.3 percent (MC 2013). Primary and secondary school enrollment rates are 81.1 and 32.5 percent, respectively. School infrastructure is reportedly underresourced. The development plan identifies four polytechnical schools in the county for youth, one technical training institute, one teacher-training college, one public university (the Technical University of Mombasa), four satellite campuses of other public universities, and three satellite campuses of private universities. The county has three public hospitals, including a level-5 referral hospital and two level-4 hospitals (in Port Reitz and Tudor), as well as 35 level-2 and level-3 public dispensaries and health centers. There are four major private hospitals and 15 smaller ones (MC 2015a). The doctor-to-patient ratio is high at around 1: 10,000 (MC 2013). According to the 2014 Kenya Demographic Health Survey, Mombasa County’s fertility rate (live births per woman) is 3.2, which is lower than the national average, but with slightly lower uptake of family planning. Maternal health indicators are better than the whole of Kenya, and uptake of vaccinations is on par with the national average of 86 percent (KNBS 2014b).

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Dynamics of Crime and Violence

This section begins by presenting the available quantitative data, which provide an overview of crime and violence trends in Mombasa County. Following this, detailed information is provided on some of the specific forms of crime and violence that rapid assessment participants say is important, their dynamics, and specific contributory factors revealed by the qualitative research component and supplemented by secondary data.

Overview of Crime and Violence

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the quantitative assessment data on the perceived frequency of various types of crime and violence in Mombasa County, as well as the types of crimes that people worry about the most.

An overwhelming 42 percent of assessment participants cited poverty as the most significant causal factor of crime and violence (figure 3.3). The failure to effectively deal with...
criminals and stop them from reoffending was mentioned or implied by 27 percent, and only 13 percent cited drugs as the most significant factor.

Police data are available for 2015 and 2016 (see table 3.2). A particularly high number of incidents are recorded for stealing or theft, assault, defilement, robbery with violence, possession of drugs, and economic crimes.

The figures are markedly silent with regard to offenses by police officers as well as offenses against children. The well-recognized phenomenon of underreporting crimes to police is explored later.

A 2016 survey of about 100 people per county by the National Crime Research Centre includes a list of common crimes that participants claim occur in their respective localities.
Figure 3.3. Perceived Causes of Crime and Violence in Mombasa County

Source: Mombasa County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment.

Figure 3.4. Commonly Mentioned Crimes in Mombasa County, 2016

Source: NCRC 2016.
Table 3.2. Police Records of Crime Incidences in Mombasa County, 2015 and 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Category of Offense</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicides</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manslaughter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infanticide</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procuring abortion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concealing birth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suicide</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attempted suicide</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Causing death by dangerous driving</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>+13</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenses against morality</td>
<td><strong>Rape</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defilement</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incest</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unnatural offenses (sodomy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bestiality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indecent assault</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sexual harassment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abduction</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bigamy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gang rape</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>225</strong></td>
<td><strong>231</strong></td>
<td><strong>+6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other offenses against persons</td>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creating disturbance</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>+28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affray</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grievous harm</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>538</strong></td>
<td><strong>548</strong></td>
<td><strong>+10</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robberies</td>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robbery with violence</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carjacking</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robbery from motor vehicle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cattle rustling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>112</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td><strong>-3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakings</td>
<td>Housebreaking</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>+24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other breaking</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>187</strong></td>
<td><strong>166</strong></td>
<td><strong>-21</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft of stock</td>
<td>Theft of stock</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>+1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Table 3.2. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Category of Offense</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stealing</td>
<td>Handling stolen property</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stealing from person</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>+129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stealing by tenant or lodger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stealing from a building</td>
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<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>General stealing</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
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<td><strong>705</strong></td>
<td><strong>+91</strong></td>
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<td>Theft by servant</td>
<td>Stealing by directors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stealing by agents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stealing by employee or servant</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>139</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicle and other thefts</td>
<td>Theft of motor vehicle</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Theft from locked motor vehicle</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>+7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Theft of motor vehicle parts</td>
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<td>51</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Theft of motorcycle</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Handling</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trafficking</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>-76</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cultivating</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Usage</td>
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<td>-12</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>346</strong></td>
<td><strong>-164</strong></td>
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<td>Traffic offenses</td>
<td>Taking vehicle without lawful authority</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Driving under influence of alcohol or drugs</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>-2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal damage</td>
<td>Malicious damage</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negligent act</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other criminal damage</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>108</strong></td>
<td><strong>86</strong></td>
<td><strong>-22</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic crimes</td>
<td>Obtaining by false pretense</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>+42</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Currency forgery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>False accounting</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conspiracy to defraud</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issuing bad check</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other fraud or forgery offense</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>183</strong></td>
<td><strong>214</strong></td>
<td><strong>+31</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

(continued)
Table 3.2. Continued

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Category of Offense</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Diff</th>
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<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Soliciting for bribe</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accepting bribe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accepting free gifts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demanding by false pretense</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other corruption offense</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenses involving police officers</td>
<td>Soliciting bribe</td>
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<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accepting bribe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accepting free gifts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demanding by false pretense</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other criminal offense</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenses involving tourists</td>
<td>Bag snatching</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other offense against tourist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other offense</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenses against children</td>
<td>Child stealing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child trafficking</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cruelty to child</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other offense against child</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other penal code offenses</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>+237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,919</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>+178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mombasa County police records.

In Mombasa, the most commonly mentioned crime is stealing, followed by possession of illicit brew, robbery, and assault (figure 3.4). Terrorism is mentioned as a crime in Mombasa more often than in other counties.

Gangs

There are several gangs operating in Mombasa. In December 2016, the Ministry of the Interior banned 90 gangs by name, including some based in the coastal area (Muriuki 2016). Members of a peace committee in Likoni noted, “It is a major problem in Mombasa.” They cited the case of a new ward and settlement called Timbwani, which has a population of about 60,000 people and where there are 55 gangs, due to which it is considered a criminal hideout. The peace committee members also identified 25 additional gangs in Likoni through their own barazas (public meetings).\(^{15}\) In a 2016 crime mapping report, the National Crime Research Centre lists 22 different gangs named by respondents, some of which are also mentioned by this study’s

\(^{15}\) Focus group discussion with a peace committee, Likoni, Central Mombasa, June 7, 2017.

The term gang can describe a wide spectrum of activity, from simple gatherings of young people to groups engaging in low-level criminal activity such as the use of soft drugs, low-level territorial conflicts, or petty crime, to groups involved in full-blown organized and/or violent crime. Distinguishing between types of “gang” activity is crucial as the police often use indiscriminate and excessive punishment against youths deemed gang members, without due process.

Gangs largely comprising juveniles go by several names, including the Old Town Youth Gang, Wakali Wao, (the toughest of them all) Nyuki (bees), Watalia (they will cry), Chafu (dirt), Wakali Kwanza (toughest first), Akili za Usiku (intelligence of the night), 64 Gang, Memory Gang, and Crazy Boys. Kapenguria Six, Wajukuu wa Bibi (grandchildren of the grandmother), Young Thugs, and Born to Kill are operating around Likon; Gaza and Spanish Sparta operate in Changamwe and Bumayeye; and Vietnam is in Ziwa la Ng’ombe in Mvita.16 Members are as young as 11—17 or in some cases even as young as 7.18 Some gang members carry knives, and some are said to be using Bugizi (the “date-rape drug” Rohypnol), which they think gives them “courage and confidence” to engage in all manner of crimes, including extortion, petty theft, bag snatching, and pick-pocketing; participating in such criminal activities then enables them to maintain their drug habit. Some youths have acquired a reputation for sexual assault in the form of sucking a woman’s breasts if she does not have valuables or money to give them. The county security advisor claims that they are “more feared than robbers.”19

More mature gangs, such as Forty Brothers, are said to be well organized and to carry weapons such as pistols in addition to machetes and other crude weapons. They may commit violent robbery of houses and businesses, including mpesa agents. Such acts often occur at night and with the assistance of a boda boda driver. One local hotel manager described the gangs this way:

“They are young boys who have no second thought about hacking a person they think stands in their way of getting what they want. They are vicious people acting under influence of strong hallucinatory drugs. If you refuse to cooperate, you end up with a knife. These groups often barricade the Old Malindi Road, sometimes for an hour, terrorize motorists and rob them of their valuables before strolling to their hideouts or melting into the crowds. They are however, not restricted to the streets.”21

Youths noted the presence of a cartel-like gang that specializes in stealing numberless

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16. It is beyond the scope of this work to accurately map the areas where the gangs are operating, and which are always changing. The list provided is information derived from interviewees and does not indicate exclusivity to those areas.
17. Interview with senior police officer, Mombasa, June 2017.
19. Interview with county security advisor, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
21. Interview with the CEO of a beach hotel, Mombasa, June 9, 2017.
cars leaving the port of Mombasa for up-country. They claim that this cartel has adopted a strategy of soliciting a ride up-country only to later steal the car. This might involve, for example, the passenger claiming the need to stop and use the bathroom in a ruse to hijack the car.\(^{22}\)

Hotspots for gang-related crime and petty theft by youths are Kisauni and Mvita, including the ward of Majengo; such incidents are increasing in the ward of Ziwa la Ng’ombe in Nyali and at popular beaches, including Pirates and Nyali. Some described being accosted on Pirates beach by gangs demanding valuables. In Old Town, youths armed with knives have reportedly been attacking tourists and tuk-tuk (auto rickshaw) operators, robbing them of their money and other valuables. A police commander explained: “Sometimes they pretend they are going jogging, and they snatch your bag.”\(^{23}\) Phone thefts are said to be rampant, particularly in Mwembe Tayari, which is adjacent to Old Town in Mvita; stolen phones are subsequently resold. The police commander also pointed out that some gang members have attacked police officers, and that he had even seen cases of juveniles knifing their own parents.\(^{24}\) A local hotel manager noted that his own staff members were greatly impacted by the youth gangs operating in the slums, negatively affecting productivity. He claimed that gang members were being protected by the police and politicians.\(^{25}\)

Weddings and funerals, especially those of gang members themselves, are focal point for gang crime and violence, including territorial conflict. According to one chief participating in a focus group discussion:

“They go to bury their [gang member] and youths say, ‘You cannot come to our side to bury.’ In every burial, there are gangs fighting for territory. It started when Sheikh Abdi Rogo was buried. The gangs have now penetrated even burials. It is the youths that go to burials, not women. After burial, the stealing and fighting starts.”\(^{26}\)

A representative of a local women’s group concurred:

“I lost my sister’s brother. They buried the youth and we got the information that after burial they were planning to fight. In burials where a gang member is killed, the gangs are protecting the territory and making sure other gangs do not come to the funerals.”\(^{27}\)

Gangs are also known to commit crimes against people attending weddings and funerals. \textit{Wakali Kwanza} reportedly frequents funeral meetings (matangas) and weddings to engage in petty crimes in addition to sexual assault and rape, sometimes coordinating with the disc jockey to play a particular song as a signal to attack.\(^{28}\) There is a legal curfew for such events, but enforcement is lacking, and most events continue throughout the night, increasing gang opportunities.\(^{29}\)

\(^{22}\) Focus group discussion with youths, Changamwe, June 10, 2017.
\(^{23}\) Interview with police commander, Mombasa, June 9, 2017.
\(^{24}\) Interview with police commander, Mombasa, June 9, 2017.
\(^{25}\) Interview with CEO of beach hotel, Mombasa, June 9, 2017.
\(^{26}\) Focus group discussion with chiefs, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
\(^{27}\) Interview with Sauti ya Wamama member, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
\(^{28}\) Focus group discussion with Sauti ya Wamama, Likoni, June 7, 2017.
\(^{29}\) Focus group discussion with community policing group in Ziwa la Ng’ombe, June 8, 2017.
Multiple factors were cited as impacting the gang problem. One administrator stressed the importance of peer pressure and group identity: “They influence each other as they smoke and dance together. Some ... adopt similar hairstyles and tattoos.” Other factors mentioned include divorce, poor parenting, dropping out of school, unemployment, and drugs.

One senior police officer noted, “There is pressure to get money to buy drugs. In the absence of money, they kill. When the drug issue was addressed, they went down.” A civil society officer concurred that drug addiction among gang members is a big part of the theft problem. Some noted that the groups or gangs did not usually have political goals; other claimed that they were linked to politicians and even to security officers. One chief claimed: “The gangs are linked with politicians. Each politician has their own gangs in both camps. One way forward is sitting with the politicians and talking with them as each of them owns a group.” Another chief said that in his location, “if they are taken to court, they are bailed out by politicians.”

Gangs are often strengthened and financed by politicians prior to elections, but may be later abandoned, which leads to crime and violence to get money.

Both the police and the public are often at a loss for how to deal with such youth groups and gangs—mob justice and summary execution have become common responses, especially if members are armed, but even sometimes when they are not. On May 18, 2017, four gang leaders of Wakali Kwanza and Wakali Wao were shot in a police operation, and another was killed by a mob. Ten members were arrested (Ahmed 2017a). The full circumstances of the confrontation and the degree to which the gang leaders resisted the police are not indicated in the report.

In May 2017, three local gang members in Likoni, thought to be 20 years old or younger, were executed by members of the public after they violently robbed an area shop. A senior police officer acknowledged that mob justice is common, with at least two deaths occurring every week for crimes like theft. Sometimes innocent people are accused and attacked by the mobs. According to Haki Kenya, victims of mob attacks are usually aged 13 to 19; affected areas include Kibokoni, Old Town, and other parts of Mvita, as well as Likoni, Jomvu, and Kisauni (Mkongo 2017).

Another approach being used to address the gang problem is profiling. In May 2017, police released 24 names and photos of members of juvenile criminal gangs who they blamed for increasing the incidence of crime and robbery in Mombasa, especially Old Town (Onsarigo 2017).

30. Interview with senior administrator, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
32. Suggestions made by several interviewees, Mombasa, June 2019.
33. Interview with senior police officer, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
34. Interview with local NGO leader Ziwa la Ng’ombe, June 8, 2017.
35. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
36. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
38. Interview with local peace activist, Likoni, Mombasa, June 7, 2017.
Photos of the accused reveal some very young faces, raising questions about where and how such names and images were acquired and whether or not they are even genuine. This kind of profiling can contribute to mob justice against accused persons and can lead to cases of mistaken identity. Mohammed Bobocha, one of the gang leaders identified among the 24 profiled, was killed by a mob in the month following the list being published (Ahmed 2017b). An updated list and photos were released in July—two of the profiled members were girls. The the accused were given 10 days amnesty; six accepted the offer, presenting themselves to police, accompanied by civil society representatives, representatives of human rights organizations, and family members (NTV Kenya 2017).

Mombasa Republican Council

The Mombasa Republican Council describes itself as a social movement that cites many years of coastal region marginalization and land-related injustices against indigenous coastal peoples. The movement challenges the validity of the agreements of 1895 and 1963, which led to the coast’s incorporation into Kenya—a decision made without any consultation with the local peoples. “Pwani si Kenya” (“the coast is not part of Kenya”) is the call of the council, as they argue for secession for the coastal peoples of the 19-kilometer-wide strip of coastline (Willis and Gona 2013; Kamau and Beja 2016). The council has attempted to register itself as a civil society organization, but it has been at times accused of having links to militia violence, which led to their being included on the 2013 list of banned organizations and gangs; however, it has since been removed from the above list and allowed to operate. The MRC may be linked to other secessionist movements on the East Africa coast, which could reflect the aspirations of absentee landlords (Mkutu and Opondo 2019). The movement is strong in the southern part of Kwale County—where the chair has his home and where there are many sympathizers and recruits—as well as in parts of Mombasa.

Violent Extremism

The county commissioner thinks that the foremost security threat in Mombasa is radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism. The main concern is the many youths who are being recruited into Al-Shabaab for training and combat in Somalia. Official sources note that the majority of Kenyan youths who have joined Al-Shabaab have come from the coastal counties of Kilifi, Mombasa, and Kwale.40 While some returnees may be disillusioned with Al-Shabaab and its ideals, others may be forming bases inside Kenya.

One cleric in Mombasa said: “You cannot go to 4 or 5 houses before you hear of the radicalization problem.”41 Others related a story of a 16-year-old boy whose parents had noticed him getting home late and acting strangely. Soon after, he disappeared. His parents then received a brief called from their son, who said: “Where I am, I am safe, do not worry.” There was no way for them to call him back. Such scenarios are reportedly common. “There are so many disappearances,” explained one of the interviewed clerics.42

In 2014, Mombasa’s Musa Mosque became associated with recruitment and radical preaching by Sheikh Abubakar Shariff (also known as Makaburi) who was killed after

40. Interview with human rights activist, April 12, 2016.
42. Group interview with CICC members, Nyali, Mombasa, June 6, 2017.
police linked him to a massacre of a church in March 2014 (Sanga and Mwahanga 2014). The mosque was stormed by police in February of that year, and five community members and one police officer died in the confrontation. For a time, the mosque was renamed Masjid Shuhadaa (Martyr’s Mosque). At the time, a local Sheikh recounted the speeches given in such mosques by recruiters, for example: “I cannot see a man here, if you are a man, put up your hand.” They would follow up with promises of money (Mkutu, Marani, and Ruteere 2014).

Some youths are given guns and offered monthly salaries of KShs 50,000 (about US$500) to join the group before ever being asked to fight, although several study participants shared stories of such promises of money not materializing.43

In Majengo’s mosques, disagreements between youths and sheikhs over the latter’s salaries and the distribution of food at the mosque has served as an enabling factor to radicalization. Youths ended up taking over some mosques and appointed their own leaders (Mkutu, Marani, and Ruteere 2014). Such exposure to violence at a young age, as previously noted, may indirectly reduce resistance to new forms of violence. Further, drug addiction was shown to be a push factor for radicalization as monetary incentives were offered (Mkutu, Marani, and Ruteere 2014). Sometimes, a job offer is made that turns out to be recruitment for training in violent extremism.44

While mosques and madrassas have been sites of radicalization, efforts have been shifting online through social media platforms. Recruiters are said to be targeting youth aged 15 to 23, and that this was increasingly including girls.45 Vulnerable individuals include manual workers and wealthier people, such as high school students and graduates or young professionals. A Sheikh noted that high school teachers, madrassa tutors, and even Sunday school teachers are among the recruiters.

A recent challenge facing Mombasa County is the return of unknown numbers of youth from Somalia. Some have deserted Al-Shabaab because promised remuneration did not materialize; others remain allied to the group’s objectives and may even be part of internal terror cells with a specific mission or strategy. Some have reportedly been given missions to execute under the command of cells acting anonymously.46

Many returnees are in hiding because they face threats from state security and from Al-Shabaab sympathizers, as well as rejection by their own communities who fear and mistrust them. Amnesty has been promised for these people occasionally but is far from certain. A 10-day amnesty was announced in April 2016 to allow returnees to come forward for deradicalization, rehabilitation, and monitoring programs. However, the official position on returnees has been confusing, inconsistent, and lacks policy. In May 2016, the then-senator of Mombasa urged the government to reclarify its position on amnesty because the youths had not been assured of their safety (Ahmed 2016). In neighboring Kwale, locals reported that returnee youth had been deliberately targeted and killed by police. One Muslim professional noted that targeted killings may

43. Group interview with CICC members, Nyali, Mombasa, June 6, 2017
44. Group interview with CICC members, Nyali, Mombasa, June 6, 2017.
46. Interview with Muslim professional, name withheld, Nyali, Mombasa, June 6, 2017.
be even more complicated and sinister as “some, the recruiters/agents, will finish them. It’s a big syndicate, the security are aware. The disappearances are not clear.”

Terrorism

According to data based on media reports from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), between 2012 and 2016, Mombasa experienced 17 attacks that were likely carried out by violent extremists, during which 31 people died, including police officers and sometimes the extremists perpetrating the attack. During the same timeframe, police launched 20 counterterror operations, killing 29 suspects, some of whom were unarmed at the time. Three radical clerics—Sheikhs Aboud Rogo, Ibrahim Omar, and Abubakar Shariff (also known as Makaburi)—and two moderate clerics—Sheikhs Salim Bakari Mwarangi and Mohammed Idris—were reportedly killed as well. A report by IRIN (2014) lists several more clerics and others who were killed by police and by radical youths from mid-2011 to 2014.

The terrorist attacks include the March 2014 church shooting and the several grenade attacks in Likoni, as well as the failed attack on the Mombasa central police station by three women in September 2016, during which all three were shot dead (Ochami and Ombati 2016). The women are said to have been aligned with the slain radical cleric Sheikh Aboud Rogo. Several incidents were revenge attacks for police operations and killings. One senior police officer asserted that antiterrorism security measures are intense in Mombasa:

“All churches are armed, weddings are armed, malls are armed and public functions are all protected.” Sea and road links are also guarded, and many illegal immigrants have been deported. In October 2019 according to the media, a terror cell in Likoni was stormed by police. Three suspects were shot, seven were arrested and a large amount of ammunition and other military gear was recovered (Omar 2019).

Religious tensions in Mombasa are closely related to the marginalization of indigenous peoples, most of whom identify as Muslim, and their resentment of outsiders they see as having taken their land and opportunities. However, these have been exacerbated by the rise of terrorism and Kenya’s role in global antiterrorism activities allied to the United States. Counterterrorism operations by the state and the police raise local tensions because of disappearances of several suspects without a trace and the killing of others (MUHURI 2013). Conversely, “moderate” clerics involved in interfaith activities have also been targets of radical killings, illustrating the determination by some to disrupt unity and deterring others from taking part in peace-making. As noted above, ACLED lists three prominent extremist clerics and two moderates who have been killed but there seem to have been more than this; Haki Africa list four extremist clerics and at least 4 others who have been summarily killed by unknown assailants (IRIN 2014).

Several of the terrorist and counterterrorist incidences noted above were carried out in places of worship, which has taken the issue beyond a few individuals to affect entire religious communities. As noted by one Catholic

47. Interview with Muslim professional, name withheld, Nyali, Mombasa, June 6, 2017. 48. See www.acleddata.com. 49. Interview with a senior police officer, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.

50. Interview with a senior police officer, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
priest, “You only need to attack one mosque and it will appear like it's a religious conflict” (PBS Newshour 2013). Indeed, radical narratives often make use of attacks on Muslims to say that Islam is under threat. When the police stormed Musa Mosque in February 2014, worshippers were upset that this had been done during Friday prayers and that police had walked through the mosque with their shoes (Mkutu, Marani, and Ruteere 2014). Church attacks include the March 2014 shooting in Joy Jesus Church in Likoni, during which six died and 19 others were injured (BBC 2014); the June 2013 grenade attack on the Earthquake Miracle Ministries church in Likoni during, during which 12 were injured (Mwakio and Ombati 2013); and the October 2013 burning of the Salvation Army church in Majengo, an act of revenge for the killing of Sheikh Omar (Akwiri 2013).

Drug and Alcohol Abuse

Informants called the drug problem *swala nyeti* (a serious issue) and *donda ndugu* (malignancy or gangrene). It was noted that all manner of hard and soft drugs were being used openly. One community leader commented, “In my assessment, the government has been defeated in this war.” Commonly used drugs include hard drugs such as cocaine and heroin and soft drugs such as *bhang* (marijuana), *miraa*, and *mogoka* (leaves that are chewed to bring on a mild stimulant effect). The latter are popular among Muslim women, and some expressed concern that they are associated with alcohol use and prostitution at social gatherings (Ali 2014). There are also pharmaceuticals such as *Bugizi* (Rohypnol), which being imported and supplied by cartels.

Peer pressure to use drugs is high, and youths with few prospects and little education are easy targets for drug pushers, who often offer them free drugs at to get them started.

Table 3.3 illustrates Mombasa-related results of a recent survey of 1,819 people aged 15 to 65 living in the coastal region by the National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse. Mombasa generally had the highest rates of drug and alcohol use of all coastal counties (NACADA 2016).

Importantly, in the NACADA study, males were much more highly represented than females. Key drugs among the younger age cohort (15 to 24) were the prescription drugs; this is consistent with information given in interviews above. Interestingly, heroin use was highest among the 35 to 65 age cohort.

The drug trade is enabled by Mombasa’s port and coastline, which offer several potential unmanned entry points and, aided by

| Table 3.3. Drug and Alcohol Use in Mombasa (percent of study population) |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                            | Alcohol   | Tobacco | Khat | Prescription Drugs | Bhang | Heroin | Cocaine |
| Dependency                 | 15.9      | 20.1    | 14   | 2.2              | 16.2   | 15.9    | 5.7      |

Source: NACADA 2016.

52. Group interview with CICC members, Nyali, Mombasa, June 6, 2017.
53. Interview with a senior police officer, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
corruption,\textsuperscript{55} results in impunity for drug dealers and barons. Warehouses in the rail area (known as “godowns”) are reportedly used to store drugs, hidden among other cargo.\textsuperscript{56} In 2006 cocaine worth KShs 6.4 billion (about US$64 million) in Malindi and Nairobi (Pflanz 2006) while in 2014, a vessel containing heroin worth KShs 1.3 billion (US$13 million) was destroyed while still at sea (Rugene and Mwagefa 2014).

One chief noted that children are used to transport drugs and are paid well for it.

“Children are used as conduits. You find a child of 13 years with a lot of money. Why would they need to go to school? The unga\textsuperscript{57} comes from Afghanistan. If the teachers speak about the use of children in transporting drugs, they are threatened and beaten by the gangs.”\textsuperscript{58}

Children involved in the drug trade may be even more vulnerable than child soldiers because their plight is hidden and because their lives are in danger (Dowdney 2003).

In terms of repercussions, the National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse noted that risky sex was associated with drug use; 9.5 percent of people reported sleeping with someone other than their usual partner while under the influence, often without using a condom. Needle sharing, infections, and blood clots following injection of heroin or cocaine were also cited as issues of concern. Thus, HIV, other sexually transmitted infections, and unplanned pregnancies are common sequelae to drug and alcohol abuse. Drug and alcohol abuse also results in high rates of injury to self and others, absenteeism from school and work, and diversion of family resources to fund a habit (NACADA 2016).

The media have reported several “swoops” on drug cartels, as well as arrests of drug barons in the coastal region, along with allegations of involvement by some prominent Kenyan business people, politicians, and police (Malemba 2017). Such crackdowns have been criticized for their lack of consistency (Dowdney 2003). Low-income communities are usually the ones targeted, rather than the high-level actors. Mombasa communities face manipulation by the state, drug cartels and the elite political sector, finding themselves permanently caught between multiple power systems. One member of the community police noted that officers would rather police drugs because they can receive bribes: “The community police does not work on it as the drugs are the ATM for the police.”\textsuperscript{59} Youth in Changamwe concurred that the police are complicit in the drug problem.\textsuperscript{60}

Boda Bodas, Crime, and Accidents

Boda bodas (motor bike taxis) are said to be an important contributor to the economy in Mombasa; by providing useful employment, the industry may prevent some youth from engaging in criminal activity or taking drugs.\textsuperscript{61} On the other hand, they are associated with a range of crimes and violent activities.

\textsuperscript{55} Interview with a senior police officer, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
\textsuperscript{56} Interview with a senior police officer, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
\textsuperscript{57} Ungas is a Swahili word that means “flour,” but in this case it is being used to describe the powdered cocaine.
\textsuperscript{58} Focus group discussion with chiefs, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
\textsuperscript{59} Focus group discussion with Peace and Security Committee, Mombasa, June 6, 2017.
\textsuperscript{60} Focus group discussion with youth, Changamwe, June 10, 2017.
\textsuperscript{61} Interview with chairwoman of the Kongowea Business Community, July 4, 2017; interview with senior police officer in Ukunda, June 21, 2017.
Operators are the frequent target of violent assault or vehicle theft. Some are themselves involved in conflicts, mob justice on behalf of other operators, theft, transporting thieves or stolen goods, trafficking drugs or illegal home-brew (alcohol), political heckling, and sometimes even murder. Victims are often tourists or other members of the public. The problem is particularly acute on the last weekend of the month after people have been paid, as well as during festive seasons. Drugs are transported overnight or very early in the morning. Accidents, criminal activity, and arrests have enormous impacts on the families of operators. Poverty, drug abuse, peer pressure, and lack of training are said to be key risk factors in boda-boda-related crimes.

Hospital data reveal an alarming rate of road traffic accidents (see figures 3.5 and 3.6). In 2016, there were 62 deaths recorded in Mvita and 24 in Likoni, although some data are likely missing; specific figures for boda-boda-related accidents could not be obtained for this study.

**Smuggling**

According to Gastrow (2011),

“Mombasa port, which handles an average of 1,700 containers per day, is a strategic asset for Kenya and its hinterland. It has become notorious for its abuse by organized crime networks for the smuggling of drugs, counterfeits, and other illicit commodities.”

He quotes an interview with a former news boss who said “Mombasa is like a tunnel. All illicit business happens here, and it is controlled by traders supported by customs personnel and powerful people in government. Whoever controls the port controls the illicit business in Kenya” (Gastrow 2011). Importantly, the smuggling trade is well linked with Al-Shabaab for the mutual benefit of both (Gastrow 2011 quoting UN 2011: 31).

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Figure 3.5. Traffic Accidents in Mombasa’s Subcounties , 2014–16

![Traffic Accidents Chart](image-url)
Interviewees mentioned that smuggling involved the railway, the port, the industrial area, and its warehouses. Players include the Kenya Ports Authority, the Kenya Revenue Authority, individual businesses, and professional cartels. The Anti-Counterfeit Agency report that smuggled goods include ivory, illegal drugs, imported vehicles, sugar, and counterfeit goods often disguised among genuine goods. Fast-moving items such as household goods, cigarettes, fertilizer, seeds, and apparel are the most common counterfeit goods—the agency seized KShs 800 million (US$8 million) worth of goods over the past five years. This may be an inconvenience or even a risk to the consumer and disrupt the local economy and fund or catalyze other criminal activities including terrorism, drugs, political conflict, and gang crime. One respondent said that a container of food dispatched by the World Health Organization to Kakuma “disappeared.” In 2016, the government of Kenya replaced senior members of the port authority in an attempt to halt smuggling (Akwiri 2016). But it was also noted that the authority has a network that can be traced to the revenue authority in Nairobi. Fuel and cooking gas sold at filling stations may also have shady origins:

"Most of the cylinders sold in Mombasa are locally made and filled illegally. Most of the cars in Mombasa use stolen fuel filled from shady petrol stations which are owned by well-connected linked people. Siphoning of fuel is a disaster in waiting."

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65. Comment by a local chief in focus group discussion with chiefs, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
66. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
67. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
Illegal Immigration and Human Trafficking

In addition to the high numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya, the International Organization for Migration states that Kenya is a hub for human trafficking, commonly Ethiopian and Somali migrants in being trafficked to South Africa. The main routes are across the Kenya–Somalia border near Garissa, and across the Kenya–Uganda border near Busia. Kenya is a source, transit, and destination country of men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking (IOM 2015).

Mombasa in particular is listed as a transit point and a destination for human trafficking and illegal immigration, among several others (IOM 2015). In 2013, a growing number of people were reportedly arriving in Kenya by boat, some into Mombasa from Kismaiyo and Mogadishu in Somalia. The sex-tourism industry is rife in the county, with both adults and children being trafficked. Many girls, some as young as ten, are brought into Mombasa and bought for US$600 to be used for forced labor and sex work. One 2009 report found that a busload per week of girls from Somalia were being trafficked into work in beauty salons, massage parlors, and brothels (Gastrow 2011; Wambui and Karongo 2009).

One 70-year-old elder alleged that a nearby mosque was being used as a refuge for immigrants from Somalia: “A truck (for carrying cattle) comes, at times at 4:00 a.m., and from nowhere you see 20 Somalis jumping out.” He described how they are able to bribe to get identification cards and to escape arrest. He stated that the National Intelligence Service was aware of this and that officials are behind it.68 Previous research revealed that local people felt threatened by the influx of people from Somalia who can often manage to buy land in Mombasa (Mkutu, Marani, and Ruteere 2014).

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Table 3.4 presents rates of sexual and gender-based violence in the coastal area as determined by the 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey. Unfortunately, county-specific data are not available. The assessment found that physical violence is slightly lower in the coastal area for both sexes than the

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68. Interview with a 70-year-old elder, Mombasa, June 9, 2017.
national average and that sexual violence is considerably lower, though this finding must be questioned due to the taboo nature of the subject.

Estimates in a 2015 report by the National Crime Research Centre are similar, with 45 percent of women and 38 percent of men in Mombasa reporting having ever experienced violence at the hands of a partner (NCRC 2017).69 A study by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Healthcare Assistance Kenya reported that, among coastal counties, Mombasa has the highest number of cases of sexual violence with reported 433 cases in the past 10 years, reflecting the high population in the county. Victims included 199 women, 123 girls, 47 men, and 64 boys, although these are likely gross underestimates due to massive underreporting (Atieno 2017).

Available county medical data reveal that many people report sexual violence at medical facilities. Such reporting rates are highest in Mvita for reasons that are unclear but which likely represent both the population and distribution of medical facilities (see figure 3.7).

Youths in Changamwe noted that rape was rampant in their area and is sometimes committed by boda boda operators who transport women at night.70

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69. The sample size was much smaller, with only 47 respondents.

70. Focus group discussion with youths, Changamwe, June 10, 2017.
In Mombasa, respondents said that early marriages are prevalent in Malindi due to cultural factors, where a dowry is paid for a girl as young as four years of age. Another important issue is the high rate of prostitution; a particular hotspot is Ziwa la Ng’ombe, which involves underage girls.

Security Interventions

Respondents painted a picture of policing, particularly county-level community policing. They noted that, at the highest level, relations between the county government and national government administration office in Mombasa are poor, which has hampered the establishment of the County Policing Authority. The governor, however, together with the County Commissioner and civil society, has created a county plan for countering violent extremism, which is likely to require considerable collaboration among sectors (MC, MCC, and Haki Africa 2017). Respondents said that cooperation between regular police and administration police is problematic, although ferry police work well with the regular police.

Command Center

The Kenyan government has created a command center in Mombasa to observe and map crime in the city using closed-circuit cameras and other technologies. The center will provide surveillance for the central business district, where car-jackings and robberies occur; the port, where smuggling occurs; and at strategic installations, such as the Nyali bridge, Mtwapa crossway, and Likoni Ferry crossing. However, having established the centre it is important to strengthen the response on the ground and to ensure that security actors are not compromised in delivery of services as will be described.

Community Policing and Nyumba Kumi

Community policing groups have existed for some time in Mombasa. There are also Sungu Sungu groups, inspired by the groups of the same name which originated in rural Tanzania in 1980s and later spread into Kuria, Kenya, through which communities managed crime using existing indigenous structures of governance. Since late 2013, the Nyumba Kumi (“10 Houses”) novel approach was launched, borrowed from Tanzania’s socialist history, for collecting counterterrorism intelligence by creating “clusters” of houses and leaders for each cluster who would report to higher policing committees. The concept has been criticized as being unsuitable for a modern capitalist Kenya. In urban gated communities, people manage their own security with private guards, fences, and closed-circuit cameras, while in less affluent urban areas although they lend themselves better to collective security, there is rapid turnover of tenants in houses and flats which would destabilize clusters.

Mombasa’s experience of Nyumba Kumi is similar to that of other counties. The initiative seems to have lacked clarity and resources. Administrators noted that it was not functioning in Kisauni, Likoni, or Mvita. One chief said, “Nyumba Kumi is a total failure… [In our sub-county] there has not been any meeting with any of the houses in the last five years.”
The 10 houses were created and people were elected, but that was the end; they are not functioning … Nyumba Kumi has no direction. They do not know their mandates and do not know what they are doing! The people are grassroots and do not know how to fight crime.”

A peace committee member in Likoni said,

“The government is in confusion in terms of the legislation; it is difficult for the groups to work together to involve the grassroots and all actors. The Nyumba Kumi has never been made easy for the wananchi (citizens) to understand. In some [places] it has picked up and in some it has never worked.”

Difficulties have arisen because the model is different from other community policing models that have yet to be disbanded, creating conflict and occasional disruption of the gains already made by the old models. A cleric explained, “They are at war and conflict with one another. Both see the job as theirs.”

The relationship between the community policing and the police is also said to be poor, although the former and current national government administration (county commissioner’s office) have a good relationship. “We share the problems with him and he comes and addresses the problems. The regional commissioner often comes down. The police commander only acts when you go to them.”

Community policing groups lack adequate resources and support to meet the risks they face. Groups in Likoni and Ziwa la Ngombe complain that they lack official identification, making it difficult for people to trust them. “Most of the people have dropped out of the community policing because of this lack of identification, you go to arrest someone and they ask you who are you? One of my people from my community police office was nearly burned.”

Community policing has reportedly assisted in making arrests but poor witness protection undermined gains by allowing criminals, once released, to seek revenge for their treatment at the hands of the police, thus deterring any further reporting. Many community policing officials have died at the hands of criminals. “Community policing provides reports on drugs and people caught with evidence and tomorrow the offenders are back in the community or streets and threatening you.”

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76. Focus group discussion with chiefs, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
77. Focus group discussion with a peace committee in Likoni, Central Mombasa, June 7, 2017.
78. Group interview with CICC members, Nyali, Mombasa, June 6, 2017.
79. Focus group discussion with Mombasa, June 2017.
80. Focus group discussion with Community Policing Group in Ziwa La Ng’ombe, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
81. Focus group discussion with a peace committee in Likoni, Central Mombasa, June 7, 2017.
Community–Police Relations

Other county surveys reveal a dysfunctional relationship between police and communities that is self-perpetuating; this rapid assessment found the same. The questionnaire revealed a low level of trust in the police (see figure 3.8) in terms of capacity and desire to assist citizens.

Police are accused of being weak; slow to respond; and easily bribed to ignore all manner of offenses, particularly those related to drugs. In their efforts to control crime, the police tend to take a militaristic and indiscriminate approach to dealing with citizens, failing to observe human rights and due process. One security officer noted, “The mkubwa (big man) syndrome is a problem in the police, it’s a major problem. The police first see citizens as suspects.”

He attributes this to problems with training, including a culture of fear. A senior administrator concurs: “The police mindset has not changed … there is a need for the curriculum at the colleges to be addressed. The curriculum is still colonial and not user friendly.” Importantly, police are often limited by insufficient training, resources, and funds for investigations, transport costs, and other essentials of efficient and effective policing, which has led to disillusionment and a lack of professionalism. Citizens, for their part, withhold information due to their lack of trust in the effectiveness of the police and for fear of being implicated or unprotected against repercussions once the perpetrator has been bailed out, resulting in a dearth of evidence for prosecuting cases. Witness protection is poor, resulting in perpetrators exacting revenge upon being released, which they often are. “The police reveal or tell them your name, there is no confidentiality.”

With regard to violent extremists, such individuals are known to the community but the barriers to bringing them to justice include poor police response and challenges around the collection of evidence. “We know the radical criminals, but following them is hard.” Witnesses are supposed to be provided transportation to court, but many are unaware of this and lack the money to cover the expense of attending. Police officers noted with frustration that the families of suspects fill the court corridors to bail them out; the suspects then threaten everyone who may have been involved in their being arresting. Due to this weakness in the social contract, citizens often resort to breaking the law, bribery, and mob justice to deal with criminal behavior.

Official police policy is to deal with youth gangs and terror suspects with “shoot to kill” tactics. By way of sharp contrast, police in Finland, reacting to events in August 2017 during which two people were killed and six others wounded in stabbings in the western city of Turku, demobilized the perpetrator by shooting him in the thigh, after which he was transferred to a hospital (AP 2017).

Figure 3.9 portrays the chain of events from reporting of a crime to successful prosecution, and the events and problems that interfere with or break the chain along the way. It would seem that while communities are the first responders in fighting crime and violence, based on past experience, they do not trust that a chain of events will reach a conclusion; it is usually better not to embark on the process

82. Interview with an immigration officer, Mombasa, June 7, 2017.
83. Interview with administrator, Mombasa, June 9, 2017.
84. Focus group discussion with a peace committee in Likoni, Central Mombasa, June 7, 2017.
85. Focus group discussion with a peace committee in Likoni, Central Mombasa, June 7, 2017.
because the prospect of success seems too low and, unless it is completed and the criminal successfully incarcerated, the risk of repercussions is just too high. The system’s weak links need to be carefully examined and addressed if it is expected to work, and trust will not be built overnight.

Crime and Violence Prevention Activities

This section describes actors, institutions, and organizations that are relevant to crime and violence prevention, peace, and cohesion in Mombasa, as well as specific issues related to crime and violence for which there are various interventions by multiple actors. The study’s questionnaire asked about a wide range of institutions responsible for addressing crime and violence (see figures 3.10 and 3.11), reactively and preventively. Most respondents recognized the importance of formal and informal institutions, with 78 percent of people rating the family as a very important institution. Most institutions received a moderately high confidence rating; respondents rated prisons as the institution in which they had the most confidence; they had less confidence in the criminal justice system.
rehabilitation of offenders through community service orders, probation, and after-care services.

**Peace and Cohesion Committees**
The committee in Likoni is made up of several community policing leaders and people from other sectors. It has met with communities to identify gangs operating in the area. It has some contact with the young people and attempts to assist those who wish to change and return to school. The committee also seeks to engage parents, particularly mothers. Members note that the police have implied that they need the help of the elders, religious leaders, and parents to manage the problem of youth gangs.86

**Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics**
The Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) is an organization that brings together leaders of all faiths in the coast, including Hindus, Muslims, Kayas, and Christians. It was launched in 2001 with the goal of promoting enduring peace in the region. Its mission is to achieve a religious and progressive society that will create a culture of peace,

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86. Focus group discussion with a peace committee in Likoni, Mombasa, June 7, 2017.
Figure 3.11. Confidence in Institutions to Address Crime and Violence

Source: Mombasa County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment.
justice, healing, sustainable development, and restoration of the environment through interfaith dialogue and cooperation in the coastal region. The mission is implemented through daily interfaith dialogue to promote peace and trust and to end hostilities and religiously motivated conflict and violence. The CICC facilitates collaboration and cooperation between the government of Kenya and other stakeholders, provides a forum for information and the sharing of experiences, and provides a platform for advocacy for the marginalized and for civic education.

87 Current religious organizations represented on the council are:

- Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
- Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
- Hindu Council of Kenya
- Catholic Church
- National Council of Churches of Kenya
- Evangelical Alliance of Kenya
- Organization of African Instituted churches
- Africa Traditional Religions

The CICC is involved in sensitizing parents and community members to the signs of radicalization, such as withdrawal and seclusion, spending excessive time on the phone or on another electronic gadget, arriving home late, and being secretive about activities. The CICC also teaches about peace and the ills of radicalization and terrorism from the perspective of the represented religions.

Other Civil Society Organizations

In 2013, there were 214 cooperative societies, 877 women’s groups, and 884 youth groups active in the Mombasa County. There are many NGOs and community-based organizations operating in the county, many of which work with women and girls on issues such as sexual health, empowerment, and combatting HIV/AIDS, as well as general development; there are other organizations working on conservation, agriculture, the care of vulnerable children, and care for people with disabilities. Several international donors and development organizations also work in the county.

Specific Issues

Regulating and Improving the Boda Boda Sector

Police conduct spot checks on boda boda operators for essentials such as licenses and protective gear; in collaboration with the National Transport Safety Authority, they are also involved in regular educational efforts regarding road safety and security. Police provide training to boda boda on how they can help by reporting criminals as they are able to access interior areas. Boda boda associations organize and informally regulate riders, along with welfare and loans through merry-go-round schemes (in which individual members take turns to benefit from all members’ investments). However, not all boda bodas are registered, and there is high turnover among operators making regulation more difficult. Security officers feel that stakeholders, including community members and businesses, could better collaborate to deal with sector-related problems.

Countering Violent Extremism

The Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism was launched in 2017 by the Mombasa County government in collaboration with the national government’s county commissioner, and the civil society organization Haki Africa, following

88 Group with interview CICC members, Nyali, Mombasa, June 6, 2017.

89 Based on multiple interviews with senior police officers, members of the business sector, and the chair of a boda boda association, among others, Mombasa, July 2017.
a two-day meeting of stakeholders. The plan’s approach is based on the National Countering Violent Extremism Strategy, whose activities are structured around the following pillars:

- **Education.** Develop a curriculum for schools to counter violent extremism; promote interfaith activities at institutions of learning.

- **Faith and ideology.** Promote cohesion, tolerance, nondiscrimination, and responsible enjoyment of freedom of worship through various forums, meetings, and outreach activities.

- **Economy.** Train and build the capacity of vulnerable individuals and communities; audit, lobby, and advocate to ensure equitable service provision.

- **Security.** Strengthen Nyumba Kumi and the community’s understanding of their role in promoting safety, advocacy, and public meetings to improve relations between the community and the police; training for security and communities in human rights.

- **Arts and culture.** Engage in intercultural activities, lobbying, advocacy, and training for the community on the appreciation of African history and diversity and against cultural violence.

- **Politics.** Convene forums and meetings where politicians can promote unity, politically engage on issues related to countering violent extremism and returnees, and lobby and advocate for amnesty for returnees.

- **Psychosocial.** Mobilize families and communities to counter violent extremist messages, lobby, and advocate for the county plan.

- **Women.** Ensure full involvement of women in CVE initiatives, engage women in peace-building and conflict management, and encourage efforts among stakeholders to promote women’s rights.

- **Media and online.** Conduct trainings for media personnel on the development of tools to create alternative narratives and advance human rights.

- **Training and capacity building.** Create a curriculum and training programs to counter violent extremism, including outreach and dialogue forums.

- **Law and policy.** Lobby and advocate for laws and policies to counter violent extremism; research and policy toward enhanced legal aid and alternative dispute resolution, and raise awareness on the rights of victims of both terrorism and counterterrorism.

The implementation framework is intended to involve forums at various levels, the lowest tying in with the existing Nyumba Kumi structures. However, as previously noted, in many places, these structures are failing or fraught with conflict. The plan acknowledges the inadequacies of police training and the need for softer approaches to counterterrorism, and a witness protection program but is not able to create a strategy to address policing matters because this is the remit of the national government matter.
Efforts are being made to rehabilitate those returnees who accepted government amnesty, particularly in Kwale, although they are not high profile. Some feel that efforts would be better used on other vulnerable youths: “By helping the returnees you are disadvantaging those that are vulnerable, should I be bad to get help?” At times, youths pretend to be returnees to get the available assistance, as a senior police official explained: “They need to be given something to do … some decided to join a garbage collection and shoe shining and managing the beach. After profiling, it was learnt they were not genuine [returnees].” Therefore, efforts should be directed at all at-need youth, not just returnees.

Several NGOs and community-based organizations are involved in countering violent extremism through education and empowerment, among other interventions. International Organization for Migration programs provide psychosocial and other support to vulnerable individuals. The Likoni Community Development Programme has a long history working with youths including a project on reforming the youth gangs. Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) is involved in peace and security initiatives, particularly ensuring that human rights are upheld in the fight against terrorism. It works to educate the public about terrorism and how to help fight it, to improve community-government relationships, and for the fair treatment of arrested terrorist suspects. MUHURI also has health, land, justice, and social accountability arms.

The Kenya Community Support Centre is a Mombasa-based community-based organization working to combat violent extremism, foster community resilience, and promote enterprises for poverty reduction and good governance in Kenya. Lastly, the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance is an independent not-for-profit youth network aimed at empowering and engaging Muslim youths, helping them interact with the government and stand up for their rights in constructive ways. Its peace and security programs are targeted at civic education to counter violent extremism in the coastal area, in collaboration with the NGO Search for Common Ground (The Coast 2017).

Drug Rehabilitation

In 2013, recognizing the significance of the drug problem, the Mombasa County government made plans for youth sensitization on the drug issue and rehabilitation of users. The National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse (2016) lists six hospitals and rehabilitation centers in the Mombasa area that help addicts at various stages of the rehabilitation process, including some government facilities. Following the first stage of drug withdrawal in the hospital, an addict remains very vulnerable to relapse and should be admitted to a rehabilitation center for a period of months. The vast majority of addicts cannot afford the fees of private or NGO institutions, but a large government rehabilitation center is currently under construction in Miritini (Baraka 2017) and new medically assisted therapy clinics were created in 2015. The success of rehabilitation is limited by lack of alternative activities and employment.

90. Interview with staff member International Organization for Migration, Mombasa, June 8, 2017.
91. Interview with senior police officer, Mombasa, June 9, 2017.
92. See Likoni Community Development Programme: https://licodep.org/
Mitigating Gender-based Violence and Violence Against Children
Several NGOs offer programs promoting women’s empowerment and health, including Deutsch Stiftung Weltbevölkerung, Women Fighting AIDS in Kenya, Coast Women in Development, Solidarity with Women in Distress, International Centre for Reproductive Health, Family Health International, Kenya AIDS NGOs Consortium, AIDS Healthcare Foundation Kenya, Manedeleo wa Wanawake, Kenya Red Cross, and Action Aid Kenya. Several respondents also mentioned Healthcare Assistance Kenya, a national NGO that advocates for and assists victims of gender-based violence with a toll-free helpline that offers 24-hour psychosocial support to women, men, and children.

Several of the NGOs noted above also offer programs to support vulnerable children. There are many children’s homes (orphanages) in Mombasa, but only about half are registered (Benyawa 2016). The county’s integrated development plan includes the construction of a child protection center in Likoni to provide advice and information, as well as a children’s home and child protection units at police stations to assist vulnerable children, including those living on the street and those involved in the sex industry. However, the county’s website does not indicate that any of these efforts have happened yet.

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
Mombasa County’s integrated development plan for 2013–17 mentions lighting as an important security priority, along with the provision of basic infrastructure and formalization of land tenure in slum areas, construction of social amenities such as halls and sports grounds, and facilities for better management of garbage. Other urban improvements intended to keep traffic and people flowing smoothly around strategic and busy locations have also been instituted by the national government. Mombasa is among the urban centers targeted by the World Bank’s Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Project, whose aim since 2011 is “to improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected municipalities in Kenya.” Settlements include Ziwa la Ng’ombe, Mkomani, Jomvu Kuu, and Jomvu Mikanjuni. Infrastructure and service delivery interventions include roads, footpaths, high-mast lighting, water, and sanitation. Planning and survey work is ongoing in Mombasa to enhance tenure security.95

Mombasa County is a vibrant and strategic location, with enormous natural and human resource and huge economic potential. However, the Mombasa County Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment reveals important challenges that threaten the security, stability, and sustainable development of the county and indeed the entire country. This picture revealed is a county with a troubled history of conquest and subjugation, and where the marginalization of the indigenous population is ongoing in terms of land, education, and citizenship rights. These factors have greatly contributed to the current severe challenges around youth unemployment and the burgeoning boda boda industry—with its associated dangers, petty crimes, and gang activity—which draws many children at a very tender age of even as young as seven years. Marginalization and land grievances feed into the radicalization narratives of and recruitment for the secessionist organization Mombasa Republican Council as well as Al-Shabaab. Mombasa’s strategic geographic position on the coast, home to East Africa’s primary port, makes the county especially vulnerable to crimes of smuggling, particularly of drugs and people—sometimes for the shady sex industry.

Risk Factors

It is important to identify the many risk factors—or drivers—of crime and violence to inform prevention strategies. Some factors are cross-cutting, driving multiple types of crime and violence; some are more specific. Some issues are longstanding and challenging to address, but it may be possible to identify potential areas for intervention that are within reach and that could bring tangible benefits over the short to medium term. Major cross-cutting drivers include marginalization...
and land injustices, poverty and unemployment, and low levels of education and broken families.

Regarding education, devolution now offers the chance to give youths a reason to stay in school through the building of institutions of further education which give them future career options. The issue of identification cards was mentioned as a major obstacle to women’s empowerment in Mombasa—a basic provision that could contribute to the reduction of crime and violence.

The use of drugs and alcohol increase the risk of various forms of crime and violence. The abuse of hard drugs and medicinal drugs among youths and gang members leads them to steal to sustain their habits. The drug trade is enabled by the port and driven by a lucrative international trade and Kenyan elites, making the problem very difficult to address. Further, the sale of drugs and alcohol are also a livelihood strategy for many, and officials and police sometimes benefit from the trade. The county is awaiting the completion of a vital rehabilitation center, however, in terms of primary prevention, one important way forward is to strengthen the presence of existing state institutions in carrying out their functions for the benefit of communities and in providing essential services so that people do not rely on drug cartels for basic services.

Enabling Factors
The results of this rapid assessment reveal multiple enabling factors for crime and violence. Although a full review of formal security interventions is beyond the scope of this study, it is evident that an effective police response to crime and violence is lacking. The assessment discovered that Mombasa city has created a high-tech closed-circuit camera crime monitoring center, which is likely to aid in the policing of strategic installations. However, basic policing is poorly resourced, and police efforts at investigating and responding to crime are therefore curtailed. There is a severe rift in the relationship between the police and the public, characterized by the former’s heavy-handed approach to youth crime and profiling of Muslim youth, resulting in many disregarding or avoiding the state apparatus when dealing with crime and violence. This breakdown of the relationship is self-reinforcing, resulting in lost intelligence-gathering opportunities as well as radicalization.

Community policing is often seen as an important arm of crime and violence prevention, but the practice is currently troubled by a lack of coordination among the various old and new initiatives, as well as insufficient resourcing to the extent that there is no provision of identification for community police members. Interestingly, while community policing is overseen by the county not the national government, it is also an important interface between the community and the national police and, as noted, much is wanting in the relationship between the two. The progression of arrests by community police to prosecution is rare for several reasons, including a dearth of capacity, resources, and professionalism of the force. This renders anyone who reports a crime vulnerable to a revenge attack and deters people from engaging with the process at all. Thus, strengthening existing structures would greatly contribute to improving reporting by the community members and community policing groups. County-level security and peace actors should explore ways of bridging the community-policing gap, assist collaboration, and protect anyone taking the
lead in of such endeavors. Youth respondents suggested that a forum between police and youth might improve their relationship.

Protective Factors

The study reveals that multiple community and peace groups, religious and interfaith organizations, and traditional institutions are engaged in valuable work and are trusted by the public. Boda bodas associations appear to serve as a protective factor for the industry and provide an avenue for partnering with other actors, such as the police and civil society. Many nongovernmental organizations and charities are active in the county, which means there is the potential for mapping and greater coordination of these actors by the county government. Religious and community organizations in Mombasa could benefit from additional support by the county and national government actors to foster the well-being of families and to mitigate violence in the home.

Final Remarks

The adoption of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals was a watershed moment for the global community, especially because it recognizes that achieving social and economic progress for humanity requires varied multisectoral approaches and that security and justice are central aspects of social development. Progress in these areas is essential to achieving the goals. Evidence suggests that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to breaking cycles of violence (World Bank 2011). However, prevention requires incentives and coalitions of many actors to become an effective development tool (World Bank 2017).

Crime and violence prevention efforts also require leadership to foster a culture of prevention and hence the attention of county governments. Leadership in the 21st century should embed the characteristics of good governance, equity, and inclusion to truly embrace development for the people. Kenya’s county governments play a crucial role in fostering a collaborative framework that allows of all levels of government to participate in the peace management and security, provides a forum for dialogue among government levels and with civil society, and strengthens and operationalizes key institutions and structures. The County Policing Authority, county security committees, and peace committees can serve as vehicles for prevention. Because the County Policing Authority is part of the county government, it can provide direction to the committees. It is laudable that Mombasa County has developed a strategy for countering violent extremism that is multipronged and that recognizes the problems associated with community-police relations. Going forward, the county will need to coordinate the efforts of a multitude of partners to achieve its aims. The Crime and Violence Prevention Training collaboration therefore aims at continuing to provide technical advice and training for capacity building to county-level multisectoral actors.
References


MUHURI. 2013. “We’re Tired of Taking You to Court:” Human Rights Abuses by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit. New York: Open Society Foundation and Nairobi: Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI)


Appendixes
## Appendix A. Crime and Violence Baseline Rapid Assessment Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police</th>
<th>National Government Administrator</th>
<th>County Government</th>
<th>Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Other (e.g., Business, Hospital, or School)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime, violence, and their drivers in the studied county</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Crime Report statistics</td>
<td>Types of crime and violence Drivers of crime and violence</td>
<td>Types of crime and violence Drivers of crime and violence (e.g., youth unemployment, inequality, borders, resources, and under-development)</td>
<td>Specific crime and violence seen Drivers of crime and violence observed (e.g., conflict and youth employment) Community safety Protective and risk factors</td>
<td>Types of crime and violence (violence against women and children, petty crime, conflicts, boda boda) Community safety Protective and risk factors</td>
<td>Violence against women and children (gender-based violence statistics if available from hospitals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention activities and partnerships</td>
<td>Addressing development and drivers of crime and violence Partnerships? Thoughts about the CPA Thoughts about community policing/nyumba kumi Vigilante bill?</td>
<td>Addressing development and drivers of crime and violence Partnerships? Thoughts about the CPA Thoughts about community policing/nyumba kumi</td>
<td>Specific activities (e.g., peacemaking, advocacy, support, and practical help) Partnering with police and government? Effectiveness of partnerships? Duplication?</td>
<td>Specific activities? Partnering, with police and government?</td>
<td>Specific activities? Partnering with other organizations, police, and government?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CPA = County Policing Authority; NGO = nongovernmental organization.
Appendix B. General Framework for In-Depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

Crime and Violence Rapid Assessment

Interview/meeting report

Date:
Reporter:
Other Participant(s):
Meeting with:
Name:
Organization:
Contact Information:

(1) What are the main activities of this organization related to crime and violence?
(2) What are the main challenges related to crime and violence in this locality?
(3) What are the drivers of these challenges?
(4) What is being done or could be done to help reduce crime and violence?
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