This paper models a dynamic bargaining game between a highly indebted country and its commercial bank consortium, to analyze the determinants of the resulting re-scheduling agreements and the net transfer of resources over time. The bargaining game is based on the simple paradigm that if no agreement is reached for a current payment, the banks would apply default sanctions. The author found that under general conditions settlements would be reached...
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INFORMATION
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1991/10/31
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Document de travail de recherche sur les politiques
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WPS778
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1
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1
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2010/07/01
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A dynamic bargaining model of sovereign debt
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debtor country
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