Competing theories increasingly support the positive role of social capital in small loan default costs of group lending; at the same time, potential group collusion may increase loan delinquencies. Findings from the available literature are mixed on the role of the various attributes of group lending. But past studies suffer from estimation bias due to the unobserved sorting behavior of group members and their other attributes. This paper attempts...
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INFORMATION
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2012/09/01
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Document de travail de recherche sur les politiques
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WPS6204
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1
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1
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2012/09/01
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Disclosed
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Grameen bank lending : does group liability matter ?
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loan repayment rate
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