In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more...
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INFORMATION
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2003/12/01
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Document de travail de recherche sur les politiques
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WPS3180
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1
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1
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2010/07/01
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Equitable provision of long-term public goods: the role of negotiation mandates
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development research group
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