This paper surveys recent work on long-term credit relationships from a game-theoretic perspective. The purpose is to provide an explanation for observed behavior based on rationality in a specific context of long-term strategic contracting as opposed to instantaneous, complete, perfectly competitive and enforceable markets. This helps explain the existence of credit rationing, of reschedulings, of predominantly short-term international credits and...
Voir la suite
INFORMATION
-
1984/09/30
-
Document de travail départemental
-
CPD8423
-
1
-
1
-
2017/11/15
-
Disclosed
-
International lending, long-term credit relationships, and dynamic contract theory
-
credit limit
TÉLÉCHARGER
RAPPORT COMPLET
Version officielle du document (peut inclure des signatures etc…)
-
Total Downloads** : 219
*La version texte est une version à reconnaissance optique de caractères non-corrigée. Cette version est fournie uniquement pour accommoder les utilisateurs disposant de connections lentes.