Some multilateral agencies implement aid projects in a broad range of sectors, with aid disbursements showing a strong overlap with those of bilateral donors. The question then arises of why do bilateral donors delegate sizable shares of their aid to non-specialized agencies for implementation? This paper develops a game theoretic model to explain this puzzle. Donors delegate aid implementation to the multilateral agency (ML) to strengthen the policy...
Voir la suite
INFORMATION
-
2015/10/22
-
Document de travail de recherche sur les politiques
-
WPS7455
-
1
-
1
-
2015/10/22
-
Disclosed
-
On the delegation of aid implementation to multilateral agencies
-
public good
TÉLÉCHARGER
RAPPORT COMPLET
Version officielle du document (peut inclure des signatures etc…)
-
Total Downloads** : 1225
*La version texte est une version à reconnaissance optique de caractères non-corrigée. Cette version est fournie uniquement pour accommoder les utilisateurs disposant de connections lentes.