Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools (anglais)

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid...

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INFORMATION

Auteur

Leaver,Clare;

Ozier,Owen;

Serneels,Pieter Maria;

Zeitlin,Andrew;
Date du document
2020/09/11
Type de document
Document de travail de recherche sur les politiques
Numéro du rapport
WPS9395
Volume
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Pays
Rwanda,
Région
Eastern and Southern Africa,
Date de publication
2020/09/11
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Titre du rapport
Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
Mots clé
Teachers

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Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools (anglais)

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