Political economy explanations for fiscal profligacy are dominated by models of bargaining among organized interest groups over group-specific targeted benefits financed by generalized taxation. These models predict that governments consisting of a coalition of political parties spend more than single-party regimes. This paper presents an alternative model-that of populist pressure on political parties to spend more on the general public good, financed...
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INFORMATION
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2008/10/01
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Document de travail de recherche sur les politiques
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WPS4762
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1
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1
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2010/07/01
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Disclosed
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Populist fiscal policy
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public good
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