Short-term debt exposes firms to credit supply shocks and liquidity risk. Short-term debt can also reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent monitoring by the market. This paper examines whether internal monitoring through independent boards and stronger shareholder protections can substitute for external monitoring through the use of short-term debt. The analysis finds that the relationship...
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INFORMATION
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2019/09/25
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Document de travail de recherche sur les politiques
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WPS9022
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1
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1
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2019/09/25
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Disclosed
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Is Short-Term Debt a Substitute or a Complement to Good Governance ?
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short-term debt
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