There has been little empirical work on the effectiveness of safety nets designed for banks, for lack of data on safety net design across countries. The authors examine cross-country data on bank-level interest expense and deposit growth for evidence of market discipline in individual countries. In addition, using cross-country information on deposit insurance systems, they investigate the impact of explicit deposit insurance (and its key features)...
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INFORMATION
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1999/09/30
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Document de travail de recherche sur les politiques
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WPS2183
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1
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1
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2010/07/01
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Market discipline and financial safety net design
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international financial law review
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