The negotiation of sovereign debt repayments and of new loans after default may yield inefficient outcomes that justify intervention by creditor country governments and international financial institutions. The author analyzes possible distortions arising in renegotiations between private creditors and sovereign borrowers. He argues that legal privileges accorded to existing creditors in their home jurisdictions can distort the flow of resources for...
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INFORMATION
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1990/10/31
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Document de travail de recherche sur les politiques
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WPS441
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1
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1
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2010/07/01
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Inefficient private renegotiation of sovereign debt
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debt contract
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